1. OPOSA V. FACTORAN - G.R. NO.

101083 JULY 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO
and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO,
AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES,
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION,
all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO,
JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his
parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA
MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE
MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN,
MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA,
ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX
and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their
parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it
touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors
duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio
S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition
by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
 The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of
flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are
also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the
basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the
endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g)
recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which
result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the
reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of
the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of
the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per
cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire
land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of
fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit
from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
 This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice
of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially
plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and
indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional
policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory
and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only
was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question —
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
 Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed
a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O.
No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same
does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected
by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to
file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class
suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that
the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
 The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions
of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although
we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific
legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule
2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of
public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of
Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by
the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the
latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
 MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing
the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13
then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the
benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for
future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section
1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining
a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present
as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations
of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16
As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 —
to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right
of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself.
No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth
thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be
true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21
this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a
blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations,
as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of
this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights
as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
 In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by
the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first
place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If
he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits
and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by
the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No.
L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause
cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature
and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
 Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject
to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or
exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it
in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in
cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint
to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

SEPARATE OPINIONS

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the
most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to
influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces
the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself,
what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the
very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require
public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a
beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of
the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
 The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with
very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage
and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora;
and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1,
Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of
policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced
and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular
provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are
seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the
part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-
executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in
future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language
of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or
part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of
the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal
right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or
proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section
1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are
combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,"
the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical
competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners
demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners'
entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the
specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies
litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should
allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts
or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory,
is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be
subjected to closer examination.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, 164; 186.

2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.

3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.

4 Rollo, 67.

5 Id., 74.

6 Rollo, 70-73.

7 Annex "B" of Petitions; Id., 43-44.

8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.

9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.

 10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.

11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.

12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.

13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and Patrimony.

14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

15 E.O. No. 292.

16 Section 1.

17 Section 2.

18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215
[1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202
SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].

19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.

20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayn, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.

21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].

22 1991 ed., 226-227.

23 180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452
[1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].

24 Rollo, 44.

25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].

26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].

27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.

28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.

29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.

30 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].

31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. supra.; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172[1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling
vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].

2. CONCERNED CITIZENS V. MMDA G.R. NOS. 171947-48 DECEMBER 18, 2008

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL
SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R.
OPOSA, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the
international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other
critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and
clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory
command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by
human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high
national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the
environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many
decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of
the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the
complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated,
stemmed from:

x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the
clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which
reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.3

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of
the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

 (12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay.
Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches
around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number
(MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact
recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified
about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on
ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for
swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the
lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a
consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under
its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the
proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the
bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid
wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid
waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock
its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of
Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay.
These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering
arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other
non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
 Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and
protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal
fishing.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of
Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.

On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive
departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of
December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152)
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns
about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing
that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.7

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and
supporting arguments:

THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS

[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT
COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL

II

THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And
second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
 The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that "requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the
person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law."10
Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion one way or the other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems
necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the
MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking
feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and
act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners,
the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which
discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on
whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to
attend to such services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are
to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may
entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court
directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil
players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the
effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is
ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and
projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and
related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste.
(Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes
the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements
that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA
9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001,
from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled
dumps.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152)
and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and choose
to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste
disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion:
these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to
perform these duties. Consider:
 (1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of
2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s
Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes
and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to
prevent and abate such pollution."

The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the
Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities:

a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided,
That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;

b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of the
status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the
framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management
area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation of
the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water
Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it
under RA 9275.

Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in
partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the
final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila
Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod the
concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and
sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal
and Cavite, and charged with the duty:

(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses
of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum
standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA
can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of
sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with
providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage
disposal system in the different parts of the country.19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide
sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.

(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the agency
tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and
fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local
government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to
ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.21
Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality
standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA
9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and
conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 29223 to provide
integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development systems
in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to "flood
control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and
projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system."

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made
the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the
implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services
shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages)
in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the
Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine
pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the
national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective
implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-
made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the
Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of
any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any
kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable
water; and

c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any
navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by
storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of
such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on
December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters
and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the
capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform
the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the
enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was
made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were
authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.25

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a
rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the
PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain
its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law
enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:

xxxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the
port of watercraft.27
 Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the
provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid
wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have
jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in
public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open
dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open
dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed "when
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the
DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers,
waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into
the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH
and concerned agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and
regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or
municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies,
shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and
operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix
sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.

In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its
implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private
sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge
collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate
subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration
with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide
educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of
environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.33

(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987
to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s
development objectives.34

One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law
stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and
revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control
mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that
recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological
protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water
pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the
country’s development objectives.

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the
obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the
cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in
general, not just specific pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade
the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of
the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution
in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean
up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization
and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately
undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment,
removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused
such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water
Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the amendment,
insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the matter of
cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be
read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as
follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to
pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions
and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to
undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water
concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations
that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and
cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup operations" to
restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional
or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to
the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert
that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may
have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other
sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a
delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water
pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective
mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that
petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
"cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases
"cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought
to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands concerned
government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific
situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the
concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they
have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec.
17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no
pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA
9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what
the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court
wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better
served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to
have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to
draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable
certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be caused by
polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty
into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water
bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways,
such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and
involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be
almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the
apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and
undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a
general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The
preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative
then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the
Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water
quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus
behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and
preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus,"36
the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not
be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce
directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.37

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic
tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which
discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If
there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures
would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve,
then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,39 which
prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three
(3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are
subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be
allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of the
Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions,
some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable
period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their
sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-
complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks,
we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are
embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking.
Some highlights of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an
alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the
earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.

2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding
areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs
rehabilitation is an understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into
ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.40

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and
possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:

Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor
any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste,
be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the
effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
 RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006
has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet
been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads,
canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge
companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends
up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies,
groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of
sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances
to the aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual
products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid
substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure."

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned
executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed,
time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them
as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is
not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once
thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the
help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that
the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary,
and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different
government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that
there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a
discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec.
16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.41 Even assuming the
absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean
and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944
and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of
subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification
Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.

In particular:

(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR
as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at
the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and
agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion
schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of
1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing
waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes
along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine
whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules
and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up
said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from
flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other
sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary
adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to
provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and
disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible
time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the
Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in
developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to
prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the
PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other
ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services
in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and
esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest
of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs,
PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a
period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the
discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension
and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275
(the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision,
determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within
which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
 (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on
pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to
inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years
to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with
the country’s development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and
revival of our marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also
of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit
to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Now the Department of Education (DepEd).

2 Gore, An Inconvenient Truth 161.

3 Rollo, p. 74.

4 Id. at 53.

5 Id. at 109-123. Penned by Executive Judge Lucenito N. Tagle (now retired Court of Appeals Justice).

6 Id. at 47-58. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria
and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.

7 Id. at 52.

8 Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301, 306.

9 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed., 2004).

10 Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 490 (1912).

11 G.R. No. 156052, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 657, as subsequently reiterated on February 13, 2008.

12 RA 9003 was approved on January 26, 2001.

13 2 Feria Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated.

14 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed., 2004).

15 "Providing for the Reorganization of the [DENR], Renaming it as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and for Other Purposes."

16 Per DENR Secretary Jose Atienza, the DENR is preparing an EO for the purpose. TSN of oral arguments, p. 118.

17 Per information from the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, DENR, as validated by
the DENR Secretary during the oral arguments. TSN, pp. 119-120.
 18 "An Act Creating the [MWSS] and Dissolving the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority [NAWASA]; and for Other
Purposes."

19 Sec. 22. Linkage Mechanism.––The [DENR] and its concerned attached agencies x x x shall coordinate and enter into
agreement with other government agencies, industrial sector and other concerned sectors in the furtherance of the objectives of
this Act. The following agencies shall perform tile functions specified hereunder:

xxxx

b) DPWH through its attached agencies, such as the MWSS, LWUA, and including other urban water utilities for the provision
or sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment and disposal of sewage within their area of
jurisdiction.

20 Book IV, Title IV, Sec. 2.

21 Sec. 14. Monitoring Control and Surveillance of the Philippine Waters.––A monitoring, control and surveillance system shall
be established by the [DA] in coordination with LGUs and other agencies concerned to ensure that the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Philippine waters are judiciously and wisely utilized and managed on a sustainable basis x x x.

22 Sec. 22. Linkage Mechanism.––x x x x

a) Philippine Coast Guard in coordination with DA and DENR shall enforce for the enforcement of water quality standards in
marine waters x x x specifically from offshore sources;

xxxx

c) DA, shall coordinate with the DENR, in the formulation of guidelines x x x for the prevention, control and abatement of
pollution from agricultural and aquaculture activities x x x Provided, further, That the x x x BFAR of the DA shall be primarily
responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management and conservation of the
fisheries and aquatic resources.

23 Book IV, Title V, Sec. 2. Mandate.––The [DPWH] shall be the State’s engineering arm and is tasked to carry out the policy
enumerated above [i.e., the planning, design, construction, and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, especially x x x flood
control and water resources development systems].

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions.––The Department, in order to carry out its mandate, shall:

xxxx

(2) Develop and implement effective codes, standards, and reasonable guidelines to ensure the safety of all public and private
structures in the country and assure efficiency and proper quality in the construction of public works;

(3) Ascertain that all public works plans and project implementation designs are consistent with current standards and
guidelines;

xxxx

(8) Provide an integrated planning for x x x flood control and water resource and water resource development systems x x x.

24 Sec. 6. Enforcement and Implementation.–The [PCG] shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing the laws, rules and
regulations governing marine pollution. However, it shall be the joint responsibility of the [PCG] and the National Pollution
Control Commission to coordinate and cooperate with each other in the enforcement of the provisions of this decree and its
implementing rules and regulations, and may call upon any other government office, instrumentality or agency to extend every
assistance in this respect.

25 Sec. 124. Persons and Deputies Authorized to Enforce this Code x x x.–The law enforcements of the [DA], the Philippine
Navy, [PCG, PNP], PNP-Maritime Command x x x are hereby authorized to enforce this Code and other fishery laws x x x.
 26 <http://www.ppa.com.ph> (visited November 20, 2008).

27 EO 513, "Reorganizing the Philippine Ports Authority," Sec. 2 provides further:

Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as follows:

Sec. 6-c. Police Authority.–x x x Such police authority shall include the following:

xxxx

c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in coordination with local police authorities;

xxxx

e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority pursuant to law.

28 "International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978
Relating Thereto."

29 Sec. 10. Role of LGUs in Solid Waste Management.––Pursuant to the relevant provisions of RA No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the
provisions of this Act within their respective jurisdictions.

30 Sec. 72. Scope of Supervision of the Department.––The approval of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is
required in the following matters:

xxxx

(g) Method of disposal of sludge from septic tanks or other treatment plants.

31 Sec. 5.1.1.a. It shall be unlawful for any person, entity or firm to discharge untreated effluent of septic tanks and/or sewage
treatment plants to bodies of water without obtaining approval from the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized
representatives.

32 Sec. 53. Environmental Education.––The [DepEd] shall integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula
at all levels. It shall also endeavor to conduct special community education emphasizing the relationship of man and nature as
well as environmental sanitation and practices.

33 Sec. 56. Environmental Education in the Formal and Nonformal Sectors.––The national government, through the [DepEd]
and in coordination with concerned government agencies, NGOs and private institutions, shall strengthen the integration of
environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with particular emphasis on the theory and practice of waste
management principles like waste minimization, specifically resource conservation and recovery, segregation at source,
reduction, recycling, re-use, and composing, in order to promote environmental awareness and action among the citizenry.

34 Title XVII, Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy.––The national budget shall be formulated and implemented as an instrument of
national development, reflective of national objectives and plans; supportive of and consistent with the socio-economic
development plans and oriented towards the achievement of explicit objectives and expected results, to ensure that the
utilization of funds and operations of government entities are conducted effectively; formulated within the context of a
regionalized governmental structure and within the totality of revenues and other receipts, expenditures and borrowings of all
levels of government and of government-owned or controlled corporations; and prepared within the context of the national
long-term plans and budget programs of the Government.

35 Rollo, p. 76.

36 Vineet Narain v. Union of India, 1 SCC 226 (1998).

37 M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 4 SC 463 (1987).

38 TSN, p. 121.
 39 Repealed Art. 638 of the Civil Code. See E.L. Pineda, Property 399 (1999).

40 Asian Development Bank, The Garbage Book 44-45 (November 2006).

41 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 805.

42 Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.––(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the
President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.

43 Sec. 8. Domestic Sewage Collection, Treatment and Disposal.––Within five (5) years following the effectivity of this Act, the
Agency vested to provide water supply and sewerage facilities and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly
urbanized cities (HUCs) as defined in [RA] 7160, in coordination with LGUs, shall be required to connect the existing sewage line
found in all subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports and recreational facilities, hospitals, market places,
public buildings, industrial complex and other similar establishments including households to available sewerage system.
Provided, That the said connection shall be subject to sewerage services charge/fees in accordance with existing laws, rules or
regulations unless the sources had already utilized their own sewerage system: Provided, further, That all sources of sewage and
septage shall comply with the requirements herein.

44 Supra note 19.

45 Sec. 65. Functions of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.––As a line bureau, the BFAR shall have the following
functions:

xxxx

q. assist the LGUs in developing their technical capability in the development, management, regulation, conservation, and
protection of fishery resources;

xxxx

s. perform such other related function which shall promote the development, conservation, management, protection and
utilization of fisheries and aquatic resources.

46 Supra notes 26 & 27.

47 Among the prohibited and penalized acts under Sec. 48 of RA 9003 are: (1) littering and dumping of waste matters in public
places; (2) open burning of solid wastes; (3) squatting in open dumps and landfills; (4) transporting and dumping in bulk of
collected domestic, industrial, commercial and institutional wastes in areas other than centers and facilities prescribed under the
Act; (5) construction or operation of waste management facilities without an Environmental Compliance Certificate; and (6)
construction or operation of landfills or any waste disposal facility on any aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area.

48 Supra note 32.

49 Supra note 33.

3. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT V. ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 180771 &
181527, 21 APRIL 2015;G.R. NO. 180771 APRIL 21, 2015

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES,
AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-
Osorio, In Their Capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR
Regional Director-Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board,
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII
ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC. Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 181527

CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in
their personal capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND
PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE
SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR
Regional Director-Region VII and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ,
in his capacity as Director - Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director for Region VIII1 ANTONIO
LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

"Until one has loved an animal,

a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."

Anatole France

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.

In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity, alleging that
they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in a
representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations."1 They use
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental laws
enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.3 As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the
human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as
to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine
of public trust.4

Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have the opportunity to
lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."5

The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the environment and to continue to define environmental
rights in the context of actual cases is commendable. However, the space for legal creativity usually required for advocacy of
issues of the public interest is not so unlimited that it should be allowed to undermine the other values protected by current
substantive and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently formulated set the balance between competing interests.
We cannot abandon these rules when the necessity is not clearly and convincingly presented.

The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for animals through their
allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the premises that (a) they were chosen by the
Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the species of the Resident
Marine Mammals; (c) they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their animal
principals that they would wish to use human legal institutions to pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to
acknowledge through judicial notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what the Resident
Marine Mammals would assert had they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are the strategies that they
agree with.
 In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of guardianship between them and
all the resident mammals in the affected ecology.

Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and procedural law cannot be founded on feigned
representation.

Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves and already have legal standing to sue with
respect to the issue raised in their pleading. The rules on standing have already been liberalized to take into consideration the
difficulties in the assertion of environmental rights. When standing becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for abuse.

II

Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:

SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may
be parties in a civil action.

The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be authorized by statute to be
parties in a civil action.

Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:

ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is
lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:

ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable
to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified 'in the following article.

Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:

ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon
as they have been constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe, the provisions of the Rules of
Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party in interest:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a)6

A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party in interest.7 When a case is
brought to the courts, the real party in interest must show that another party's act or omission has caused a direct injury, making
his or her interest both material and based on an enforceable legal right.8

Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in representation of the real party in interest, as defined in
Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
 SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by
law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a)9

The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not bound to directly or actually benefit or suffer
from the judgment, but instead brings a case in favor of an identified real party in interest.10 The representative is an outsider to
the cause of action. Second, the rule provides a list of who may be considered as "representatives." It is not an exhaustive list,
but the rule limits the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11

These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment, which means that for the Petition of the human
petitioners to prosper, they must show that (a) the Resident Marine Mammals are real parties in interest; and (b) that the human
petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in a representative capacity.

The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting
Tañon Strait."12 While relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have legal standing before courts
has been the subject of academic discourse in light of the emergence of animal and environmental rights.

In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a system which Hogan explains as the "guardianship
model for nonhuman animals":13

Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review to
enforce their statutory rights and protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal advocacy organizations may bring suit
on behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged humans
who possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.

In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Christopher D. Stone
asserts that the environment should possess the right to seek judicial redress even though it is incapable of representing itself.
While asserting the rights of

speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly poses legitimate challenges - such as identifying
the proper spokesman -the American legal system is already well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by which nonhumans may
obtain standing via a judicially established guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless - and nonhuman - entities such as
corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have standing to bring suit on their own behalf. There is little reason to fear
abuses under this regime as procedures for removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest, and termination of a
guardianship are well established.

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that AL VA
might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment
of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization
might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a derivative of its
history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and
commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified
organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a
court-sanctioned guardianship.

This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to empower non-profit organizations with an established
history of dedication to the cause and relevant expertise to serve as official guardians ad !item on behalf of nonhuman animals
interests. The American legal system has numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and interests of nonhumans; any
challenges inherent in extending these pre-existing mechanisms to nonhuman animals are minimal compared to an interest in
the proper administration of justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of nonhuman animals, the legal system must
recognize those statutory rights independent of humans and provide a viable means of enforcement. Moreover, the idea of a
guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has been urged on behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even
more compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient beings with the ability to feel pain and exercise
rational thought. Thus, animals are qualitatively different from other legally protected nonhumans and therefore have interests
deserving direct legal protection.
 Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman animals threatens the integrity of the federal
statutes designed to protect them, essentially rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting nonhuman animals
would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen suit provisions: the most well-known example is found in the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to encourage civic participation on behalf of
nonhuman animals. Our law of standing should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable representatives of
the natural environment, which includes nonhuman animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as individuals who
have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are
also similar to entities that by their very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).

In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and,
therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals.

Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may feel the need to
nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them
before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know
what remedy they need in the face of an injury.

Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger,15 the court held that an emotional response to what humans perceive
to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within the "zone-of-interest" protected by law.16 Such sympathy cannot stand
independent of or as a substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to represent animals was further
limited in that case by the need to prove "genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting animal rights:

What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's assertion that standing doctrine further required ALVA
to differentiate its genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the general disdain for animal cruelty shared by
the public at large. In doing so, the court found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated ALVA to
the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "

....

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA might
have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of
animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization
might have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's standing is more than a derivative of its
history, but history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action.
ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and
commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court's analysis suggests that a qualified
organization with a demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a
court-sanctioned guardianship.18 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the principle of human stewardship over the
environment in a citizen suit under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to act as a
representative of a party who has enforceable rights under environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is defined in Section
5: .

SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order
which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest
their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.

There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on behalf of
animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can
claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that
humans seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves, which of course includes
compassion for all living things.
 Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.

In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad interpretation we have given to the rule on standing.
While representatives are not required to establish direct injury on their part, they should only be allowed to represent after
complying with the following: [I]t is imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring
the suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal rights. It is not sufficient to draw
out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a potential "injury."20

I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño21 regarding this rule alongside the appreciation of legal standing in
Oposa v. Factoran22 for environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that procedural liberality, especially in cases brought by
representatives, should be used with great caution:

Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.

That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental concerns in light of emerging
international legal principles. While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain
judgments that would preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual concerns. The
present generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a different time, under a
different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future
generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our
children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their ability to make their own arguments.

It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there is a
clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no
possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d)
there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate
protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.23
(Emphasis in the original)

Similarly, in Paje:

A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the
court's jurisdiction must be the "owner of the right sought to be enforced." In other words, he or she must have a cause of
action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not the real party in
interest.24 The term "interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity about or
an "interest in the question involved." The interest must be present and substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent interest.

A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as representative of a .real party in
interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a representative, that representative is not and does not become the real
party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest. The representative remains to be a third party to
the action instituted on behalf of another.

....

To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has
been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and (b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent
the victim."

The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit. A citizen's suit under this rule allows any Filipino
citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially
a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in
interest.

The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and generations yet unborn is a recognition of this
court's ruling in Oposa v. Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their parents) to file a class suit
on behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's
access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
 To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is dangerous for three reasons:

First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into. question its
representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the
resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and
generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the
impossibility of determining future generation's true interests on the matter.

In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits for others. Uninterested persons will argue for the
persons they represent, and the court will decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the court will be
binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The court's decision will be res
judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.25

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of
legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or
animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather
than an actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can
only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court
cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent,
rational, scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.

Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However, they should be considered carefully so that no
unintended or unwarranted consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of Madame Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully narrows down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine Mammals and
the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.

However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center,. Engarcial,
Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in interest and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the
Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families, and the present and future generations of Filipinos
whose rights are similarly affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected their source of
livelihood, primarily felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest.27 The actual, direct, and material damage they
suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a proper subject of a legal suit.

III

In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of implied petitioners, most especially when the
implied petitioner was a sitting President of the Republic of the Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto
themselves the status of "legal guardians" of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, human petitioners also
impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-petitioner" for "her express declaration and undertaking
in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon Strait."28

No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent. In our jurisdiction, only
when there is a party that should have been a necessary party but was unwilling to join would there be an allegation as to why
that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary
party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the
reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person
may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against
such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered
therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.29

A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded as a
defendant in the nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
 SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be
made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.30

The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action but who do not consent should
be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons or other court processes. Petitioners. should not take it upon
themselves to simply imp lead any party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk
of being denied due process.

Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this suit. As a co-equal constitutional department, we
cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The procedural situation
caused by petitioners may have gained public attention, but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former
President's name should be stricken out of the title of this case.

IV

I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and unconstitutional.

SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, and
Presidential Decree No. 1234,31 which declared Tañon Strait as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46 violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the .
1987 Constitution because Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.32 It further asserts that SC-
46 cannot be validly classified as a technical and financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 4
of the 1987 Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1, but is a
validly executed contract under paragraph 4.34· Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither granted exclusive fishing
rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center's right to preferential use of communal marine and
fishing resources.35

VI

Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception. of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from
its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
 I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural resources,
but only through either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the clear import of the words "either financial or technical
assistance agreements." This is also

the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution:

1973 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION

SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the
Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or association at least sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or
associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign
person or entity for the exploitation, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and
binding service contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such.
(Emphasis supplied)

1935 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any attempt to infer interpretation from the Constitutional
Commission deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product of a full sovereign act: deliberations in a constituent assembly
and ratification. Reliance on recorded discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, may result in dependence on
incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to further subjectivity from those who spoke during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations who may not have predicted how their words will be used. It is safer that we use the words already in
the Constitution. The Constitution was their product. Its words were read by those who ratified it. The Constitution is what
society relies upon even at present.

SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.

Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid in light of the standards set forth in La Bugal-
B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:36

Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof
is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions
and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the
President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
 (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government
an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.37 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be tested against three important points: (a) whether
SC-46 was crafted in accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms, and conditions; (b) whether SC-46 was signed
by the President for and on behalf of the government; and (c) whether it was reported by the President to Congress within 30
days of execution.

VII

The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and
Development Act of 1972.1âwphi1 It is my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. (Emphasis
supplied)

The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President may enter into with foreign-
owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means that service contracts are no longer allowed by the
Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency renders the law invalid and
ineffective.

SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an important point, which is
that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be
discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected seascape under Presidential
Decree No. 123439 requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are explicitly covered by a
law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992:

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict
nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy
resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in
accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the public and
submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within
NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)

No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and conditions of an oil exploration, extraction,
and/or utilization for Tañon Strait and, therefore, no such activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-46. The
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a
protected seascape such as Tañon Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.

VIII

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of
Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then Department of
Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases where the
Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated to another public
official.41 La Bugal highlights the importance of the President's involvement, being one of the constitutional safeguards against
abuse and corruption, as not mere formality:

At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:

• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in referring to
agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance. • They spoke of service contracts as the concept was
understood in the 1973 Constitution.
 • It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.

• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that would eliminate or m minimize the abuses
prevalent during the marital law regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)

Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was involved in the signing or execution of
SC-46. The failure to comply with this constitutional requirement renders SC-46 null and void.

IX

Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently informed of the execution and existence of SC-46. The
reporting requirement is an equally important requisite to the validity of any service contract involving the exploration,
development, and utilization of Philippine petroleum. Public respondents' failure to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively
took away any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions.

In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2.
It is, therefore, null and void.

I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being violative
of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the requirements of
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Tañon Strait is covered by the National Integrated Protected
Areas System Act of 1992. This law declares as a matter of policy:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of the natural
environment particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement and recognizing
the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the environment notably
on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as plant and animal life, it is hereby
declared the policy of the State to secure for the Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all
native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas within the
classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.

It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological values that may be
incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of these areas is possible
only through cooperation among national government, local and concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of
these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable development.

To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass
outstanding remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants
and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be
designated as "protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañon Strait must undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment:

SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of the management plan for
protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the
results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.45 (Emphasis supplied)

The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance Certificate be secured under the Philippine
Environmental Impact Assessment System before arty project is implemented:

No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
under the Philippine Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed to be
undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and take
preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or
indiscretion.46 (Emphasis supplied)
 In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be
publicly accessible. The program shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program to Congress.
Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources found within a protected area
such as Tañon Strait:

SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict
nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy
resources and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in
accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the public and
submitted to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within
NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a taw passed by Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)

Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural requirements of obtaining an Environmental Compliance
Certificate.48 At any rate, they assert that the activities covered by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they interpret to be an exception to Section 12. They argue that the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since (a) the Tañon Strait is not a nature' reserve or
natural park; (b) the exploration was merely for gathering information; and ( c) measures were in place to ensure that the
exploration caused the least possible damage to the area.49

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional requirements for cases involving Philippine energy
resources. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 was enacted to recognize the importance of protecting
the environment in light of resource exploitation, among others.50 Systems are put in place to secure for Filipinos local resources
under the most favorable conditions. With the status of Tañon Strait as a protected seascape, the institution of additional legal
safeguards is even more significant.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance Certificate for SC-46. Based on the records, JAPEX
commissioned an environmental impact evaluation only in the second subphase of its project, with the Environmental
Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6, 2007.51

Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any environmental assessment contrary
to Section 12 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

XI

Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient species, we do not lack in the
wisdom or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of
mitigating the greed that is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign representation of any
other species or some imagined unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim any of our fundamental rights
to a healthful ecology. In this way and with candor and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace and
power endowed on our species.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote:

(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name of Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
from the title of this case;

(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and

(c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and
Presidential Decree No. 1234.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes
 1 Rollo (G.R. No. 180771), p. 7-8.

2 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

3 Rollo (G.R. No. 180771), p. 16.

4 Rollo (G.R. No. 180771), p. 123-124.

5 Id. at 196.

6 1997 RULES OF CIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 2.

7 See Consumido v. Ros, 555 Phil. 652, 658 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

8 Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 252 Phil. 831, 839 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division], citing Lee et al. v. Romillo, Jr., 244
Phil. 606, 612 ( 1988) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].

9 1997 RULES OF CIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 3.

10 Ang, represented by Aceron v. Spouses Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA 699, 709 [Per J. Reyes, Second
Division]. ·

11 1997 RULESOFCIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 3.

12 Rollo (G.R No. 180771), p. 8.

13 Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 95 CAL. L. REV. 513 (2007)

<http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/califomialawreview/vol95/iss2/4> (visited March 15, 2015).

14 Id. at 517-519.

15 Id. at 513-514. Footnote 1 of Marguerite Hogan's article cites this case as Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 765
F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir., 1985).

16 In that case, the claim was based on a law called "National Environmental Policy Act."

17 Marguerite Hogan, Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra. Club v.
Morton, 95 CAL. L. REV. 513, 514 (2007) <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/califomialawreview/vol95/iss2/4> (visited March
15, 2015).

18 Id. at 515, 518.

19 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, G.R No. 206510, September 14, 2014

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/september2014/206510 _ leonen.pdf> [Per J.

Villarama, Jr., En Banc].

20 Id. at 11.

21 J. Leanen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 205257, February 3, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov
.ph/pdf/web/viewer.htm l?fi!e=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/207257_leonen.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].

22 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 803 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
 23 J. Leanen, Concurring Opinion in Arigo v. Swift, G.R No. 206510, September 14, 2014, 13
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/september:iO 14/206510 _leonen.pdf> [Per J.
Villarama, Jr., En Banc].

24 J. Leanen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 205257, February 3, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/february2015/207257 _ leonen.pdf> [Per J. Del
Castillo, En Banc]. See also De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 254, 265 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division], citing
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 875, 900-902 (1996) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].

25 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 205257, February 3, 2015, 3-5
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/february2015/207257_leonen.pdt> [Per J. Del Castillo,
En Banc].

26 Id. at 7.

27 Rollo (G.RNo.180771), p.12.

28 Id. at 8.

29 1997 RULES OF CIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 9.

30 1997 RULES OP CIV. PROC., Rule 3, sec. 10. e 31

31 Declaring the Tañon Strait Situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area
Pursuant to R.A. 7586 (NIPAS Act of 1992) and Shall be Known as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape, May 27, 1998.

32 Rollo (G.R No. 181527), p. 26.

33 Id. at 26-28.

34 Rollo (G.R No. 180771), p. 81-83.

35 Id.

36 486 Phil. 754 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

37 Id. at 815.

38 Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

39 Declaring the Tañon Strait Situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area
Pursuant to R.A. 7586 (NIPAS Act of 1992) and Shall be Known as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape, May 27, 1998.

40 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 14.

41 See Jason v. Executive Secretary Ruber Torres, 352 Phil. 888 (1998) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

42 a Bugal-B'laan Tribal.Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 486 Phil. 754, 813-814 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

43 Declaring the Tañon Strait Situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area
Pursuant to R.A. 7586 (NIPAS Act of 1992) and Shall be Known as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape, May 27, 1998.

44 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 2.

45 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 12.

46 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 12.

47 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 14.

48 Rollo (G.R No. 180771), p. 91-92.

49 Id. at 85.

50 Rep. Act No. 7856 (1992), sec. 2.

51 Rollo (G.R No. 181527), p. 58-59.