- Generality

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. PHILIP K. SWEET,

defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901

Nature of the Action: Petition for Review

Facts: A complaint was filed against Sweet, an employee of the US Military, for
having committed an offense against a prisoner of war. In his defense, he
contended that being a soldier or a military employee, that he was “acting in the
line of duty” at the time the offense was committed, it exempts him from the
jurisdiction of the civil courts.

Issue: Does the civil court have jurisdiction to try the case of the accused?

Ruling: The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Yes. In this case, the general principle applies—that the
jurisdiction of civil courts is unaffected by the military or other special character
of the person brought before it. The contention also that the act was performed
under the order of his military superior cannot affect the right of the court to
take jurisdiction of the case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions; the military tribunal not
asserting any claim.

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28,

2000
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released
him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied,
the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement
and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal
process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot
blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to
protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not
absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official
capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime,
such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable
by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule
on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

- Territoriality

Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978

Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which
arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon,
brought them on board and had them in his possession during the said trip. The
8 cans of opium were found in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's
engine by authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the port of Cebu.
The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying
the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands,
when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which
has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdiction limits of
the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless
contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.

JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner, vs. COMMANDING GENERAL,

PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY,
respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States
Army in the Philippines, who has been charged with disposing in the Port of
Manila Area of things belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the
94th Article of War of the United States. He has been arrested for that reason
and a General Court-Martial appointed by respondent tried and found him guilty
and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. On March 11, 1947, the Republic
of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, entered
into an agreement concerning military bases,

ISSUE:
whether or not the general court martial has jurisdiction to try offenses
committed outside the military base

Held:
No. Paragraph 3, of Article XXI of Temporary Installation provides "that
offenses committed within the temporary quarters and installations located
within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as
offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions of Article
XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as
committed within, but without, a base, since it has been committed in the Port of
Manila Area, which is not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to
the Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located within the present
limits of the City of Manila. And so hold, that the General Court-Martial
appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense
allegedly committed by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said
court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.

- Prospectivity

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to

reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was
rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner
Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the
petitioners have been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their
convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated
such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their
convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for
rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under
Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after
their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served more than the
maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued
detention is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a
retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favourable
to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)

RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied

retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not
a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection,
given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they
have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of
benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.
NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE

CARMELO C. BERNARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al.

520 SCRA 332 (2007), SECOND DIVISION

Carmelo Bernardo (Bernardo) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila with six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P.
22), for issuing six postdated checks in equal amounts of P22,500 to F.T.
YLANG-YLANG MARKETING, CORP.(Ylang Ylang Mktg). The MeTc
rendered judgment finding Bernardo guilty of the offense charged. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC judgment.Bernardo elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). He filed a motion for extension of time
to file petition for review within 30 days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from
his counsel‘s receipt of the RTC Order denying his Motion Partial
Reconsideration.
The CA granted the motion for extension of time but only for 15 days.
Apparently unaware of the CA order, he used up the 30-day extension sought
and filed his petition. Hence, the appellate court denied his petition having been
filed 15 days later and for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and other
pertinent and material documents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in granting only 15 days extension

HELD:
Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may grant an “additional
period of 15 days only” within which to file the petition for review. Albeit under
the same section, a “further extension” not to exceed 15 days may be granted
“for the most compelling reason,” petitioner had no basis to assume that his
request for a 30-day extension is meritorious and would be granted.

Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for
extension or postponement would be granted or that they would be granted the
length of time they pray for.
The wording of the rule with respect to further extension is couched in
restrictive terms. Section 1 of Rule 42 provides that “[n]o further extension shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days.”
People v. Pimentel

Facts:
As early as 1983, Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 ( Anti-
Subversion Law) as amended before the RTC Manila. A warrant for his arrest
was issued on July 1983 but was unserved as he could not be found.
Seven years after, Tujan was arrested on the basis of warrant of arrest in the
subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed revolver and six rounds of live
ammunition was found in his possession. On June 1990, Tujan was charged
with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition in furtherance of
Subversion under PD No. 1866 before RTC Makati. Tujan filed a motion to
quash the information invoking protection versus double jeopardy since he
claims that alleged possession of firearms was absorbed in subversion. It was
granted by RTC and CA.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7363 (An Act Repealing RA 1700) should be applied
retroactively to Tujan.
Held:
Yes, RA 7363 should be applied retroactively. The repeal by said law of RA
1700, as amended was absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal.
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which
was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the
previous offense is obliterated. It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a
total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence
persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the
accused-private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET

AL. G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424
May 3, 2006

Presidential Proclamation No. 1017

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and
lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the
cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies
issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along
EDSA.

The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at

the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was
his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest
was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN
MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion.

On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that
it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas
and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were
valid?

3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as

respondent in the petitions?

4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?

5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the

alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?

Ruling:

1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives.")

(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence
of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the
part of the police or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.

2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their
rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing
acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880;
the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of
its articles for publication and other materials, are declared unconstitutional
because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state
has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the

doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for
it in the Constitution or law.

4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v.
Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners
have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal
arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP
1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of
national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may
temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must
enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under
which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best
assurance that due process of law would be observed.

PENAL LAWS ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners Case Digest

Facts:
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case
against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel
announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected,
relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against
himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual
to testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court ordered
that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case and
to await the judicial disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a decision was
rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against
himself." Hence, the Board appealed.

Issue:
Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case
can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.

Held:
Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice
medicine while administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect.
An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the license of the
respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness
stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony,
to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called by as a witness
by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self incrimination, along
with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
desirable objective should not be accomplished according to means and
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the human
personality. (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May
26, 1969)
FELONIES
DOLO

PEOPLE VS VICENTE TEMBLOR

The accused-appellant, Vicente R. Miñano, was charged with the crime of rape
in Criminal Case No. 1673 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Fourth
Judicial Region, Romblon, Romblon.
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant entered the plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On January 21, 1991, the trial court
render its decided that the accused VICENTE R. MIÑANO GUILTY is beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.

In this appeal, the accused-appellant assails his conviction by the trial court. It
allegedly failed to take into account the following: 1) several inconsistencies in
the testimony of the victim; 2) delay in filing the complaint; 3) admission of the
victim that she was menstruating when the rape incident happened; and 4)
affidavit of waiver and desistance which was executed by the victim.

ISSUE: WON THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT

HELD:
Although this Court ordinarily relies on the factual findings of the trial court,
recognizing its superior competence to assess the credibility of the witnesses
through direct observation of their deportment on the stand, We decline to apply
this policy in the case before Us. 14 It is not enough that the victim expressed
her emotions to the fullest while testifying, the totality of the evidence should be
considered before reaching the conclusion that, indeed, her testimony is credible
and positive. A meticulous examination of the records and analysis of the
arguments of the parties enabled Us to unearth the truth behind the victim's
serious charge of rape against the accused-appellant. The prosecution has not
sufficiently established his guilt to the point of overcoming the constitutional
presumption of innocence that he enjoys.
The accused-appellant sets up the main defenses that at the time of the rape
incident, their entire family was at home and the victim left their house on
March 11, 1988. Although these were adequately corroborated by his wife, not
much credence should be given to her testimony. It is undeniably tainted with
bias since it springs from the natural desire of a wife to bail out her husband
from criminal liability even to the extent of lying . 42 We thus find his defenses
weak. However, it is an enduring rule that the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its evidence rather than on the weakness of that of the defense. 43
This Court has no option but to declare that the prosecution has failed to meet
the exacting test of moral certainty and proof of guilt of the accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. It is imperative that We reverse the trial court's guilty
verdict.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. The
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of rape.
SO ORDERED.

CULPA