LEGAL RESEARCH - 1.
INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
A . Definition of Legal Research and B. Need for Legal Research
a. Marcos v Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG,
SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense
and Chief of Staff, respectively, ​respondents.
CORTES, ​J.:
Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this
case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed
from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and
forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her
ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged.
The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr.
Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops
led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the
unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from
Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese
arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation
to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the
fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The
ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people
power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs.
Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to
the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of
the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left
scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were
several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they
conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the military
establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and
brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at
the mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in
misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There
are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in
Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the
extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their
own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are
virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up
on this groups' determination to wrest power from the govermnent.
Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and
destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated
foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and
his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic
recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to
show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained
elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years
of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within
the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for ​mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order
the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of
the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend
on the resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former
President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former
President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in
the interest of "national security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding
(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in
making such finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has
the President's decision, including the grounds upon which it was
based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the
same?
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a
political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return
of former President Marcos and his family is a clear and present
danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have
respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the
President's decision to bar the return of former President Marcos and
his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act
which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and
his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7;
Rollo, pp. 234-236.1
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair
the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
"within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They
advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by
any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to
that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of
Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within
that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to
protect national security, public order (order public), public health or
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the
other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue
in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable.
According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel
and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights ​in
vacuo​ without reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether
or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to
return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the
determination by the President that such return and residence will
endanger national security and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is
not a political question as it involves merely a determination of what
the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the
two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental
right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question
becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return
to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a
justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to
return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if
their return and residence here will endanger national security and
public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable
Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and
establish their residence here? This is now a political question which
this Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive
authority and competence of the President of the Philippines.
[Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II
of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal,
military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and
family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo
of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge
Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt,
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez
Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return
to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See
Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in
Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the
scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this
issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties'
formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in
arriving at a solution to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case
within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of ​Kent v.
Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and ​Haig v. Agee
[453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the
right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof,
respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is ​not the right
to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a
totally distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration
of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right
to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration
speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art.
13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the
right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)]
which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to
protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter
qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art.
12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations
to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of
abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the
right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against
being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases ​Kent and Haig which refer to the
issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right
to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially
material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action
and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American
jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of
whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the
absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An
appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to
explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue
will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or
not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine,
pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in
Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of
the three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice
Laurel in ​Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the
Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he
executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines"
[Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law"
[Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of
powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, ​supra]​
but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers
subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the
Supreme Court in ​Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed
out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative
power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the
judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At
631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which is
exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than
two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a
hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power
which is vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1].
However, it does not define what is meant by executive power"
although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain
powers by the President, ​i.e.​ , the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause,
the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract
or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress,
and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of
the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the
President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these
se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"?
Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they
assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not
enumerated is impliedly denied to her. ​Inclusion unius est exclusio
alterius[​ Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This
argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after
which ours is legally patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United
States grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To
those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything
beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who
think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for
the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words:
"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." . . .. [​The President: Office and Powers,
17871957, pp. 3-4.​]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the
different persons who held the office from Washington to the early
1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's
dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any
particular moment depends in important measure on who is President."
[At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in ​The Imperial
Presidency:​
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it
remained of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying
demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than
most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos
according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive
temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits,
expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the
WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive
branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the
character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its
impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to
President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his
personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and
hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the
nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened
the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or
what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the
development of presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations
to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935
Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers
than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify
the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the
President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments,
the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also
the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought
back the presidential system of government and restored the separation
of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution
among three distinct branches of government with provision for
checks and balances.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is
the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well
as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law, ​e.g.,​ his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of ​specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the
landmark decision of ​Springer v. Government of the Philippine
Islands​, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the
Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the
shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the
National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do
so, said:
...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the
"board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the
performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything
which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature.
Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved
upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the
Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character,
and still more clear that they are not judicial. ​The fact that they do not
fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical
ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining
one among which the powers of government are divided ....[At
202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his
enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it
would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the
Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may
disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the
distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were
it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or
that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he
prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and
that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life,
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving
at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation ​under the Constitution to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national
interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from
being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the
people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the
common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising
the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the
people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that
"[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons
who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his
family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from
whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to
be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither
absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms
of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms,
admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally
important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare
and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of
the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to
do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the
needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, ​supra​, at 153]. It is a power
borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution.
It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to
take care that the laws are faithfully executed [​see Hyman, ​The
American President​, where the author advances the view that an
allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government
and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's
powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter ​The American
Presidency​].The power of the President to keep the peace is not
limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times
of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal
threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order
and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by
the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the
calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and
maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of the
Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the
House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the
President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a
genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as
irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising
respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House
Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question
the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to
allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter
that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this
wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the
Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the
President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a
plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the
President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how
premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside
a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is
totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution
under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the
power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend
courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not
established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is
for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution,
defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government,
incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in ​Lansang v. Garcia
[G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified
conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers
underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within
his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with
the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and
when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and
the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in
the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the
function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not
there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the
national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If
such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts,
arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to
bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were
represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the
country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist
insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies
to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military
men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The
documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers
to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ​ponencia bolsters
the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and
instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be
contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it
could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the
catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the
proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these
before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and
in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that
would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the
commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to
suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt
to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of
the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of
the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The
President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the
faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is
within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the
President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder
of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates
and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a
position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the
enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign
jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing
burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing
during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development
and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its
attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the

return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
b. Republic v Manalo, G.R. No. 221029
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,​ Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO​, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, ​J.:
This petition for review on ​certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (​Rules​) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision​1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution​2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is ​GRANTED. ​The
Decision d​ ated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43,
in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is ​REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.​3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (​Manalo)​
filed a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by
virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch
43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for
initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial
hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel
for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and
issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or
caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the
court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also
a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines
to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein
[petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the
Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree,
petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer
living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are
living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of
marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese
husband's marriage was previously registered, in order
that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of
causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between
the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage
was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with
the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she
be allowed to return and use her maiden surname,
MANALO.​4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to
leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were
offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the
petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27,
2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former
Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.​5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the
allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of
merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for
a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing
marriages."​6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with
Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7​ ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and
in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of
injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national,
who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the
fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.​8 where
the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed
abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence,
this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a ​vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or
a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.​9
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it.​10
2. Consistent with Articles 15​11 and 17​12 of the New Civil
Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.​13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.​14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.​15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed
into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988.​16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No.
227 was issued on July 17, 1987.​17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.​18 This provision was
originally deleted by the ​Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee),​ but it was presented and approved at a
Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.​19
As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
in accordance with the laws in force in the where country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her
to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.​20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.​21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it
is tantamount to trying a divorce case.​22​Under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, ​e.g.​, on custody, care
and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must
still be determined by our courts.​23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the ​Committee​,
the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino
as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.​24 The aim was
that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under
the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them
under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already
married again.​25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to
a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and
obtained a favorable decree. We held in ​Republic of the Phils. v.
​
Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of
Quita v. Court of Appeals. In ​Quita, t​ he parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The
wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein
hinted, by the way of ​obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship ​at the time valid divorced ​obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision,
a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law
after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the
divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in
order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the
said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer
married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried,
she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and
to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both ​Dacasin v. Dacasin28 ​ and ​Van Dorn29​ already recognized a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation​,​respectively.
In ​Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement
for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband
who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement,
alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband
moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his
former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement,
which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged
invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois
law, but ​because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound
by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. ​Van Dron v.
Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse
of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's
Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce (​obtained by the Filipino spouse​) is not
valid in this jurisdiction x x x.​30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There,
a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against
his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged
to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the
same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On
his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the
Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary
to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, ​as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from standards of
American law, under which ​divorce dissolves the
marriage. ​As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in ​Atherton vs. Atherton,​ 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change
the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from
the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed
as stone party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides in the nature of penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely feed
from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, ​et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.​31
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by
the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in ​Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32
and ​Medina v. Koike.​ 33
In ​Fujiki, t​ he Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a
Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family
court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to
file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
​ the moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by
the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of
the Family Code. x x x​34
On the other hand, in ​Medina​, the Filipino wife and her Japanese
husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently,
she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with ​Corpuz
​ and ​Garcia v. Recio,​36 the divorce decree and the
v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35
national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing
the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual
issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned
rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change
as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle,
Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national ​not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a
contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the
Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition
until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof ​"a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
lawmakers.​37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by
the use of such words as are found in the statute. ​Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be
departure."​38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word ​"obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.​39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.​40 As held in ​League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v.
COMELEC et. al.:41 ​
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately
reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a ​verba legis or strictly literal
interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and
lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To
obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law
control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under
the laws of his or her countr.​42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated
the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore,
the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it
is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by
operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to
certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written
by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.​43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial
review.​44 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection
by the Constitution.​45 When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties,
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.​46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class ​strict judicial scrutiny is required since
it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government
to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.​47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.​48 It includes the right to free
speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to
travel, and the right to vote.​49 On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.​50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties
must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety
or the general welfare.​51 It essentially involves a public right or interest
that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the
former to take precedence over the latter.​52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same
principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which have
the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In
this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites​53 of the equal protection clause.​54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by
the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated
with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. ​Ergo,​ they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed.
Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void,
a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.​55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse .
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2
of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are
no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There
is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien
spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.​56 In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she
should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's
comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she
may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in
accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code"
is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar,
it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these
"mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as
well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality
is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the
same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted.
All to the prejudice of our ​kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of
Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the
floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First,​ the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever
was sworn to support what he intends to prove. ​Second​, We adhere to
the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on
evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted
and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong,​57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,​59 that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was
conformable to the law and fact, 60 ​ that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage,​61 and that the law has been obeyed.​62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a
Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a
fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into
out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
profit. ​Third,​ We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are
relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are
more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And ​Fourth,
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to
marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid.
Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support
a marriage.​63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.​64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on
divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical
about this point.​65​ Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that
Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it
has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the
proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood
as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention
is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not
primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to
encourage the social institution of marriage, but not
necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to
discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does
this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.​66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country.
Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute
divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of
the Philippine Legislature.​67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the
authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of
the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such
as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year
prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one
spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living
together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.​68 When the
Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.​69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.​70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various
sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a
matte of fcat, in the currnet 17​th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
116​71 1062​72 2380​73 and 6027​74 were filed in the House of
representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled
"An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in
the Philippines" ​or the ​Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by
the House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March
19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2
absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of
absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic
gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with
another person other than one's spouse during the
marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the
spouses, a child is born to them by ​in vitro or a similar
procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a
victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the
petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more
thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court
for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of
the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the
marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over
but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or
personl having substitute parental authority over the party,
in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one
(21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other
husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating
the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues
or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible
infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided​, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the
time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute
divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly
improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided
for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender
reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute
divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent,
or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which
have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage
beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their
nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts
what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as
policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus
establish a state religion.​76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that
they are good for country.​77​While marriage is considered a sacrament,
it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
Code.​78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that
the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized
with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development.​79 It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
to their development.​80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively
enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or
Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the
helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact,
among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not
eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("​Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ​("The Magna
Carta of Women")​, R.A. No 10354 (​"The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208
("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), a​ s amended by R.A. No.
10364 ​("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
​ oreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family
2012").M
as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight
of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.​81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained
a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in
the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine
law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer
the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a
few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the
child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage
under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in
favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but
without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.​82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
time. With the advancement of communication and information
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized
that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect unions.​83 Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it.​84 In reiterating that
the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served, ​San Luis v. San
Luis​85​ quoted:
x x x In ​Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the
Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the
law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume
the good motives of the legislature, is to ​render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of
but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of
our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must
not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice
"as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one of
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when
it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it
for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of
its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the
law be dispensed with justice.​86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.​87 A
statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.​88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write ​finis to this
controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the
divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry
of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice.​89 The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.​90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.​91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to
be written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand,
a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his
office.​92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court
a quo the 1) ​Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the
divorce; 2) the ​Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Decree of Divorce; and 3) ​Acceptance of Certificate of
Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact.
Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese
Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.​93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the
divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign
court.​94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not
denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground
of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.​95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
defendants have the burden of proving the material
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial
notice must be exercise d with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.​96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE​, the petition for review on ​certiorari is ​DENIED​.
The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. ​100076, are AFFIRMED
IN PART. ​The case is ​REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law
on divorce.
SO ORDERED
c. De Roy v Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 757
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, ​petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA
BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL,
namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL,
SR., ​respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, ​J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void
two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of
Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy,
et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the
decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution
dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not
being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court.
However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect,
this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve
to deny it.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out
building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial
Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of
gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On
appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of
which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September
9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in
the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion
for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the
Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment
and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the
rule laid down in ​Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon​, [G.R. No.
70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court ​en banc
restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in
cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate
Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15,
1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said rule,
and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the
rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February
27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30,
1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in ​Mission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court​ [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time
was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the
coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of
the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their
failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the ​Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the
non-publication of the ​Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication
of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding
petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to
the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to
DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
d. Re Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated 11 January 2010 of
Acting Director - Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the
Ombudsman, 614 SCRA 1
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC March 20, 2012
Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting
Director ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 10-9-9-SC
Re: Order of the Office of the Ombudsman Referring the
complaint of Attys. OLIVER O. LOZANO and EVANGELINE J.
LOZANO-ENDRIANO Against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
[ret.].
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve the separate successive letter-petitions​1 ​of Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano, addressed to the Supreme Court en banc, for the lifting of the
indefinite suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court in
its Resolution of June 15, 2010.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
In our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we found Atty. Lozano and Atty.
Evangeline Lozano-Endriano guilty of grave professional misconduct
when they misquoted or misused constitutional provisions in their
pleadings​2 ​in order to impute unjust acts to members of this Court.
Subsequently, we have reinstated Atty. Lozano-Endriano in our
August 23, 2011 Resolution, because of circumstances indicating
lesser culpability on her part.
Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional
provisions for the purpose of insulting Members of this Court is a
serious breach of the rigid standards that a member of good standing of
the legal profession must faithfully comply with. Thus, the penalty of
indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the past two years
during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly
expressed his willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and
standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he
should be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not been
informed of any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in
any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a member of the bar.
While this Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will
not prolong a penalty after it has been shown that the purpose for
imposing it had already been served. From Atty. Lozano’s
letters-petitions, we discern that his suspension had already impressed
upon him the need for care and caution in his representations as an
officer of this Court.
Under these circumstances, this Court decides to grant Atty. Lozano’s
letters-petitions with the expectation that he shall now avoid going to
the extreme of employing contortions of and misusing legal provisions
and principles to justify his positions, and instead focus his energies
and talents towards a lawyer’s primary aim of promoting the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby LIFT the indefinite
suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Oliver Lozano and
REINSTATE him to the status of a member in good standing in so far
as the suspension imposed him by this Court is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
C. Legal Authority, d. Hierarchy of Laws and E. Sources of Legal
Research
a. Ting v Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562
BENJAMIN G. TING,​ ​Petitioner,​ ​v.​ ​CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent​.
DECISION
NACHURA, ​J.​:
Before us is a Petition for Review on ​Certiorari seeking to set aside
the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision​1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution​2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution,
affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision​3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.​4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen
Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
medical school.​5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975
in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first
child.
At first, they resided at Benjamin's family home in Maguikay,
Mandaue City.​6 When their second child was born, the couple decided
to move to Carmen's family home in Cebu City.​7​In September 1975,
Benjamin passed the medical board examinations​8 and thereafter
proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted
to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the
preceptorship program for the said field​9​and, in 1980, he began
working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen's family, as member of
its active staff,​10​ while Carmen worked as the hospital's Treasurer.​11
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December
9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on
April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles
Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16,
1991.​12
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.​13
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was
already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally
with his friends.​14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to
drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in
the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront
and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex
with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and
shot the gate of their house.​15 Because of his drinking habit,
Benjamin's job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he
often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass
the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling
him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable.
Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter's drinking
problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.​16
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give
financial support to their family and would even get angry at her
whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing
support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling
and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.​17 He rarely
stayed home​18​ and even neglected his obligation to his children.​19
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.​20 He
would gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his
friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money.
Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife's own jewelry to finance
his gambling.​21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to
sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited
from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.​22
Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was
banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he
purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling
establishments.​23
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
In sum, Carmen's allegations of Benjamin's psychological incapacity
consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamin's alcoholism, which adversely affected his
family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamin's violent nature brought about by his
excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which
Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice
and the property he inherited from his father in order to
pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay
the same; andcralawlibrary
4. Benjamin's irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by
his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to
his family.​24
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated.
He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would
confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic
clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for
leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked
by circumstances.​25 As for his alleged failure to support his family
financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would
collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still
serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.​26 In his testimony,
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within
his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent
for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.​27
He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care
of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice
a week.​28
During the trial, Carmen's testimony regarding Benjamin's drinking
and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana
Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses' children from 1987 to
1992.​29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when
Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.​30
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a
psychiatrist.​31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr.
Oñate's evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin's deposition because the
latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in
South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr.
Oñate concluded that Benjamin's compulsive drinking, compulsive
gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that
petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.​32
To refute Dr. Oñate's opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D.
Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry
in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert
witness.​33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin's psychological behavior
based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric
evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the
University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra's) interview
with Benjamin's brothers.​34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate's findings, Dr. Obra
observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner's personality,
considering the latter's good relationship with his fellow doctors and
his good track record as anesthesiologist.​35
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision​36 declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The
RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate's findings and the admissions made
by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive
drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his
extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent
tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect
existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxx
SO ORDERED.​37
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the
CA rendered a Decision​38 reversing the trial court's ruling. It faulted
the trial court's finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support
the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the
time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate's conclusion was based only
on theories and not on established fact,​39 contrary to the guidelines set
forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals​40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals and Molina.​41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the
Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more
than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.​42 She
claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply
retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis.
Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been
filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a
manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but
the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent
filed a petition for ​certiorari 43
​ with this Court. In a Resolution​44 dated
March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to
resolve Carmen's motion for reconsideration.​45 On review, the CA
decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17,
2003, it issued an Amended Decision​46 reversing its first ruling and
sustaining the trial court's decision.​47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the
same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.​48
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis
when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of
proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized; andcralawlibrary
III. Whether the CA's decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.​49​Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues,​50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In
our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil
Code.​51
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied
by the English courts and was later adopted by the United States.
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno's discussion on
the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting
opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections​52​ is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by
the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the
English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th
century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where
the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early
limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed
if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority
developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the
decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the
decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the
framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules
and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the
courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison
"disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would
allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas
"reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by
the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is
this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with
for over two centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life
in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by
legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the
duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases
involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.
Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been
viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been
viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare
decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis - constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility
in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated:
"Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule
of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what
we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on
judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens
explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by
a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had
been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect
for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings;
(3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the
hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for
future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow
the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most
famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which
junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy
upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be
segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme
Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal."
Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of
inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to
be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public
welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we
reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law
are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that
a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will
show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered
before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition,
courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the
voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare
decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine
whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind
of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the
old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4)
find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently,
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification.​53
To be forthright, respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines
prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for
being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The
same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v.
Pesca,​54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.​55 In these cases, we explained
that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a
part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit,
non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina
doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,​56 we
declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving
as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing
all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by
it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic
as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can
be considered as on "all fours" with another.​57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is
logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament
of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non
in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.​58 At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.​59​The trial
court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base
its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties
but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo
Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of
the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on
the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root
cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified
written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have
proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect
access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are
provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in
the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by
a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the
pre-trial conference.​60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to
present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the
root cause, gravity and incurability of a party's alleged psychological
incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a
petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence
adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18)
years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's and the appellate
court's rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.​61 The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.​62
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner's "defects" were
present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely
cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner
would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such
statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the
parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the
opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent's
allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate
testified that petitioner's behavior is a positive indication of a
personality disorder,​63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing
wrong with petitioner's personality. Moreover, there appears to be
greater weight in Dr. Obra's opinion because, aside from analyzing the
transcript of Benjamin's deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr.
Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report
furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally
examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra's) personal interview
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
with Benjamin's brothers.​64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in
favor of Dr. Obra's findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner's drinking
and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There
is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember
that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the
latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondent's testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by
the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically
unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. ​Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.​ 65
​ In this
case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce,
prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision
and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
b. Philippine Farming Corporation, LTD. v Llanos, et al.,
G.R. No. L-21014
G.R. No. L-21014 August 14, 1965
PHILIPPINE FARMING CORPORATION, LTD., represented in
this action by FLOR R. RAMIRO, president,​plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALEJANDRO LLANOS, ET AL.,​ defendants-appellees.
R. P. Sarandi and Eustaquio Bumanglag for plaintiff-appellant.
Angel Sison for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., ​J.:
Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Hawaii) executed on July 11,
1950, an indenture of sale purporting to transfer ownership of a 4,706
square meter parcel of land situated in Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1584, to Manuel Ramos,
Dominador Llanos and Juliana Andrada, for P30,000.00. As a result
thereof the aforesaid buyers were subsequently issued by the Register
of Deeds of Rizal Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19248 covering said
parcel of land.
Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines), a distinct
corporation from its aforementioned namesake, filed in August 1950 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal a suit docketed as Civil Case No.
1209 to annul and declare null and void the indenture of sale
aforestated as well as to cancel TCT No. 19248 in the buyers' name
and reinstate TCT 1584, allegedly in plaintiff's name. The
parties-defendants were: Alejandro Llanos, Aquilino Galiza, Antonio
Bacilio, Dionisio Quinto, Andres Baxa (who all signed the sale as
Directors of Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. [Hawaii]); Manuel
Ramos, Dominador Llanos, Juliana P. Andrada (the buyers); and the
Register of Deeds of Rizal.
On September 29, 1950, however, Philippine Farming Corporation,
Ltd. (Philippines) moved to dismiss its complaint in said Civil Case
No. 1209 stating as reason therefor the settlement of the case.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Defendants concurred to said motion and the court dismissed the
complaint.
Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines) later sought to
withdraw its motion to dismiss and to annul the order of dismissal,
alleging deceit on the part of the defendants. Still later, however, it
moved that its motion for withdrawal be itself considered withdrawn,
and the court granted said last motion on November 20, 1950.
On May 8, 1951, Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines)
filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1439, against the same defendants as in Civil Case No. 1209,
likewise to declare the same indenture of sale null and void and to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19248. The court dismissed
this second suit on November 27, 1951 for being ​res judicata​. A
motion for reconsideration was denied on February 19, 1952.
Sometime in 1960 Philippine Farming Corporation, Ltd. (Philippines)
filed the present suit in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 6322, to declare the same indenture of sale
null and void, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19248 in the
buyers' name, and to declare null and void a certain mortgage executed
by the buyers on November 1, 1950, as well as the subsequent
foreclosure sale on said mortgage. Alejandro Llanos, Manuel Ramos,
Dominador Llanos, Juliana Andrada assisted by her husband Honofre
Andrada, the Register of Deeds of Rizal — all of whom were
defendants in the previous suits — were again impleaded as
defendants. Furthermore, the following were also included as
defendants: Estate of Florentino P. Buan, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. (as purchasers of the right to redeem in the foreclosure sale) and
Philippine Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (as mortgagee).
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss raising the ground of ​res
judicata.​ On January 30, 1962, the court dismissed the complaint on
the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff appealed to this Court on the sole
issue of whether its present complaint is barred by ​res judicata​.
The requisites for ​res judicata are: (1) court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) final judgment or order on the merits; and (3) identities of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action (San Diego v. Calderon, 70 Phil.
281, 283).
The Court of First Instance of Rizal clearly had competent jurisdiction
in Civil Case No. 1209. The subject matter thereof was annulment or
declaration of nullity of sale. And the parties came within the court's
jurisdiction by the filing of the complaint and service of summons.
The dismissal in said Civil Case No. 1209 was by a final order since
thereafter nothing was left to be disposed of. The dismissal was with
prejudice, hence, on the merits. It was with prejudice because the
dismissal was by order of the court upon the instance of both plaintiff
and defendants, on the allegation of a settlement (Exh. 14-B, Offer of
Additional Documentary Evidence, Rec. on App., 89-92). Not being,
therefore, a dismissal by plaintiff's mere filing of a notice (Sec. 1, Rule
30, Old Rules of Court), nor a dismissal by order of the court upon
plaintiff's instance alone (Sec. 2, Rule 30, Old Rules of Court), it falls
under "dismissal on other grounds" covered by Section 4 of Rule 30 of
the Old Rules of Court, in which case the dismissal, unless otherwise
specified (and here it was not), is with prejudice.
As to the identities required, the parties here were defendants in Civil
Case No. 1209. The newly added defendants — mortgagee and
purchasers of right of redemption — are only successors-in-interest
and purchasers by title subsequent to the filing of the first action. Such
parties are considered the same as their predecessors-in-interest for
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
purposes of ​res judicata​. Since their predecessors-in-interest were
parties to the first case, the principle of ​res judicata applies even with
their inclusion, since they are after all bound by the first judgment as
the parties thereto.​*
As regards the subject matter, the identity is undisputed, namely, the
parcel of land now covered by TCT No. 19248 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal and the annulment or declaration of nullity of the sale
thereof, with cancellation of its Transfer Certificate of Title.
Similarly, the cause of action is identical. As stated in ​Peñalosa v.
Tuazon​, 22 Phil. 303, the test is: "Would the same evidence support
and establish both the present and former causes of action?" In the
instant case, the same evidence, namely, plaintiff's ownership of the
parcel of land and that the sale thereof was fictitious, would support
and establish the present and former causes of action. It is therefore
identical.
All requisites for ​res judicata being attendant, we find no error in the
order of dismissal appealed from.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
c. Elsa De Gayo v Cecilia Dinglasan, G.R. No. 173148
G.R. Nos. 173148 April 6, 2015
ELSA DEGAYO,​ Petitioner,
vs.
CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, JOHNNY DINGLASAN,
ASUNCION MAGBANUA-PORRAS, MARIANO P
ASCUALITO and AMADO JR., all surnamed MAGBANUA,
Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, ​J.:
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the
petitioner Elsa Degayo (Degayo) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision​1 dated November 7, 2005 and the Resolution​2
dated May 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
62070.
The Factual Antecedents
The present case involves a property dispute, which gave rise to two
civil cases for ownership and damages between conflicting claimants
over a parcel of land located on the northeastern bank of Jalaud River.
The respondents Cecilia Magbanua-Dinglasan, Johnny Dinglasan,
Pascualito Magbanua, Mariano Magbanua, Asuncion
Magbanua-Porras, Amado Magbanua Jr. (respondents) initiated the
first civil case against Nicolas Jarencio, Cesar Jarencio, Myrna Olmo,
Fredercio Sumvilla, Herminio Sumvilla, Perpetuo Larano and Angelo
Larano, the tenants (tenants) of Lot No. 861. Degayo, on the other
hand, initiated the second civil case, which eventually reached this
Court via the present petition.
Records show that Lot No. 861 isa 36,864 sqm. parcel in the Cadastral
Survey of Dingle, Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-2804, registered in the name of Degayo’s deceased
parents, spouses Marcelo Olmo and Rosalia Labana. Lot No. 861 used
to be bounded on the southwest by the Jalaud River that serves to
separate Dingle from Pototan Iloilo.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
On the other side of Jalaud River, opposite Lot No. 861, lies a 153,028
square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 7328 of the
Cadastre of Pototan, Iloilo, collectively owned by the respondents,
covered under TCT No. T-84829. The Jalaud River, which separates
these parcels of land, thus flows along the northeast side of Lot 861
and the southwest side of Lot No. 7328. Sometime in the 1970’s the
Jalauad River steadily changed its course and moved southwards
towards the banks of Pototan, where Lot No. 7328 lies, leaving its old
riverbed dry. Eventually, the course of the Jalaud River encroached on
Lot No. 7328. As a result, Lot No. 7328 progressively decreased in
size while the banks adjacent to Lot No. 861 gradually increased in
land area.
Degayo and the tenants believed that the area was an accretion to Lot
No. 861. As a result, her tenants, commenced cultivating and tilling
that disputed area with corn and tobacco. The area allegedly added to
Lot No. 861 contains 52,528 sqm, broken down as follows:
1. 26,106 sqm. Original abandoned river bed;
2. 26,419 sqm. resurfaced area of Lot No. 7328
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the disputed property
was an abandoned riverbed, which should rightfully belong to them to
compensate for the erstwhile portion of Lot No. 7328, over which the
Jalaud River presently runs.
On October 2, 1984, the respondents filed a complaint for ownership
and damages against the tenants, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Iloilo, Branch 27, entitled Cecilia Magbanua Dinglasan, et al. v.
Nicolas Jarencio, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. 16047. Degayo
sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 16047 but her motion was
denied. Notably, Degayo never bothered to question the interlocutory
order denying her motion for intervention by filing a petition for
certiorari. Instead, Degayo initiated the present suit against the
respondents for declaration of ownership with damages, also with the
RTC of Iloilo, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case No. 18328,
involving the disputed parcel of land.
In her complaint, Degayo alleged to have acquired Lot No. 861 by
inheritance by virtue of a Quitclaim Deed and that she had been in
possession of that land since 1954. She likewise stressed that the area
in dispute was an accretion to Lot No. 861.
Meanwhile, notwithstanding the previous denial of her motion to
intervene in Civil Case No. 16047, Degayo was able to participate in
the proceedings therein as a witness for the defense. In particular,
during her direct examination, Degayo testified on the same matters
and raised the same arguments she alleged in her complaint in Civil
Case No. 18328, those are: that she acquired Lot No. 861 by
inheritance by virtue of a Quitclaim Deed; that she had been in
possession of that land since 1954; and that the area in dispute was an
accretion to Lot No. 861 On May 7, 1996, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch
27, rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 16047, in favor of the
respondents. The tenants promptly filed an appeal but they failed to
file an appeal brief, resulting to a dismissal of their appeal per
resolution dated June 20, 1999.​3 The decision in Civil Case No. 16047
became final and executory on August 6, 1999.​4
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 18328, the court, a quo, found in favor
of Degayo and declared the property in question as an accretion to Lot
No. 861. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their
motion was denied. Hence, the respondents filed an appeal with the
CA.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
The CA Ruling
On November 7, 2005, the CA granted the respondents’ appeal and
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC Branch 22 in Civil Case
No. 18328. In granting the appeal the CA noted that the disputed
properties are abandoned riverbeds. Being abandoned riverbeds, the
property in question rightfully belongs to the respondents as the
owners of the land now occupied by the Jalaud River.​5 The CA
likewise noted that the previous RTC Branch decision in Civil Case
No. 16047 is conclusive to the title of the thing, being an aspect of the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment.​6
Degayo sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision but the CA
denied her motion in its May 19, 2006 Resolution.​7​Aggrieved, Degayo
filed the preset petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this
Court.
The Petition and Comment
Degayo’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:​8
1. That the CA erred in declaring the disputed property as an
abandoned riverbed and not an accretion to Lot 861;
2. The CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Civil
Case No. 16047, which was not even presented during the hearing of
the present case;
3. The CA erred in declaring the RTC Branch 27 decision in Civil
Case No. 16047 conclusive upon Degayo when she was not even a
party in the said Civil Case.
In his Comment,​9 the respondents assert that the petition raised
questions of fact which are not proper issues to be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari.​10 They also claim that the essential requisites
of accretion are not present.​11 Finally, the respondents claim that the
decision in Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes res judicata.​12
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes res judicata.
Res judicataliterally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers
to the "rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former
suit.​13 It rests on the principle that parties should not to be permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate.​14
This judicially created doctrine exists as an obvious rule of reason,
justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public
tranquillity.​15 Moreover, public policy, judicial orderliness, economy
of judicial time, and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace and
order of society, all require that stability should be accorded
judgments, that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain
in repose, that inconsistent judicial decision shall not be made on the
same set of facts, and that there be an end to litigation which, without
the doctrine of res judicata, would be endless.​16
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
This principle cannot be overemphasized in light of our clogged
dockets. As this Court has aptly observed in Salud v. Court of
Appeals:​17
"The interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the
same dispute recognizes that judicialresources are finite and the
number of cases that can be heard by the court is limited. Every
dispute that is reheard means that another will be delayed. In modern
times when court dockets are filled to overflowing, this concern is of
critical importance. Res judicata thus conserves scarce judicial
resources and promotes efficiency in the interest of the public at large.
Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has
an interest in the stability of that judgment. Parties come to the courts
in order to resolve controversies; a judgment would be of little use in
resolving disputes if the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate the
same claims again and again. Although judicial determinations are not
infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals
procedures, not through repeated suits on the same claim. Further, to
allow relitigation creates the risk of inconsistent results and presents
the embarrassing problem of determining which of two conflicting
decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no reason to suppose that the
second or third determination of a claim necessarily is more accurate
than the first, the first should be left undisturbed.
In some cases the public at large also has an interest in seeing that
rights and liabilities once established remain fixed. If a court quiets
title to land, for example, everyone should be able to rely on the
finality of that determination. Otherwise, many business transactions
would be clouded by uncertainty. Thus, the most important purpose of
res judicata is to provide repose for both the party litigants and the
public. As the Supreme Court has observed, "res judicata thus
encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars vexatious litigation, and
frees the courts to resolve other disputes."
The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which in its relevant part reads:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1)
bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
The first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution
of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.​18
In traditional terminology, this aspect is known as merger or bar; in
modern terminology, it is called claim preclusion.​19
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
The second aspect precludes the relitigation of a particular fact of issue
in another action between the same parties on a different claim or
cause of action. This is traditionally known as collateral estoppel; in
modern terminology, it is called issue preclusion.​20
Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question
has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in
a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question
settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and
persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and
continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing
and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the
conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be
litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their
privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of
action.​21 Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for
the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.​22
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring
effect as that of a bar by former judgment that proscribes subsequent
actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later
case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and were
determinative of the ruling in the earlier case.​23 In other words, the
dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment or order becomes
conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, their
privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that
judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or
incident before the court in a later case; the binding effect and
enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a
later case since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to
rest in the earlier case.​24
In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case
No. 16047 has attained finality in view of the tenant’s abandonment of
their appeal to the CA. Moreover, records show that that decision was
adjudicated on the merits, i.e., it was rendered after a consideration of
the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case​25 by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.
We likewise find that there is an identity of parties in Civil Case No.
16047 and the present case. There is identity of parties where the
parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between them,
or they are "successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity.​26 Absolute identity of parties is
not required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the
coverage of this principle.​27 Thus, it is enough that there is a
community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in
the second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.​28
It is not disputed that respondents were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
16047. Degayo, however insists that she is not bound by the decision
in Civil Case No. 16047 as she was not made a party in that case. We,
however, refuse to subscribe to this technical interpretation of the
Rules. In Torres v. Caluag,​29 we held that a real litigant may be held
bound as a party even if not formally impleaded because he had his
day in court and because her substantial rights were not prejudiced. In
that case, J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. (Tuason) commenced Civil Case
No Q-3674 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City against Isidro
Conisido to recover from him the possession of a parcel of land.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Conisido answered the complaint alleging, that he was occupying the
land in question as a mere tenant of Dominga Torres (Torres), who
owned both the land and the house thereon. Torres was not impleaded
in the said case but she nonetheless appeared as witness for Conisido
and asserted her ownership over the disputed property because she had
purchased it from Eustaquio Alquiroz on October 20, 1951 and
constructed a house thereon worth ₱500.00, which she had leased to
Conisido for a rental of ₱20.00 a month. The CFI eventually decided in
favor of Tuason and that decision became final and executory.
Subsequently, Torres filed a petition for certiorari with the Court to set
aside the decision of the CFI. Indismissing the petition, we ruled:
"x x x, it appears that DomingaTorres who, according to the defendant
Conisido was the true owner ofthe land in question, testified as his
witness and asserted on the witness stand that she was really the owner
thereof because she had purchased it from Eustaquio Alquiroz on
October 20, 1951 and constructed a house thereon worth ₱500.00
which she had leased to Conisido for a rental of ₱20.00 a month. In
other words, petitioner herein had really had her day in court and had
laid squarely before the latter the issue of ownership as between her,
on one hand, and respondent Tuason, on the other.
xxx
In the present case, assisted heretofore, petitioner had the fullest
opportunity to lay before the court her claim but the same was
overruled. The fact that she was not formally made a party defendant
in the case would appear therefore to be a mere technicality that would
not serve the interest of the administration of justice. As we have
repeatedly held, technicalities should be ignored when they do not
serve the purpose of the law.
x x x"
In the present case, Degayo had the fullest opportunity to ventilate her
accretion claim Civil Case No. 16047. In her testimony, she asserted
that she inherited Lot No. 861 from her parents and that she has been
in possession of that parcel of land since 1954.​30 She further stressed
that the disputed parcel of land has been occupied and tilled by her
tenants and that it was the result of the gradual and continuous deposit
of the river.​31 Notably, these are the same allegations that Degayo
asserted in the present case, which have been previously considered
and evaluated by the RTC Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 16047.
Likewise, there exists a community of interest between Degayo and
her tenants, who were respondents in Civil Case No. 16047. One test
to determine substantial identity of interest would be to see whether
the success or failure of one party materially affects the other.​32 In the
present case, Degayo is suing for the ownership of the disputed land.
Degayo’s rights over the disputed land is predicated on the same
defenses that his alleged tenants interposed in Civil Case No. 16047,
that is, their perceived rights which emanated from the disputed
accretion to Lot No. 861. The interests of Degayo and the tenants in
relation to the two cases are inextricably intertwined in that both their
claims emanate from a singular fundamental allegation of accretion.
Moreover, Degayo and the respondents are litigating the same
properties subject of the antecedent cases inasmuch as they claim
better right of ownership. Degayo even admitted this in her petition
wherein she stated that "the land subject of Civil Case No. 16047 is the
same property subject of the case at bench.​33​ "
Notably, the ownership of the disputed parcel of land has been
unequivocally settled in Civil Case No. 16047.In ruling that the subject
parcels of land belong to the respondents, the RTC Branch 27 in Civil
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Case No. 16047 opined that the claim of accretion has no valid basis.​34
What really happened was that the Jalaud River naturally changed its
course and moved southward. As a result, it abandoned its previous
bed and encroached upon a portion of Lot No. 7328. It further held
that the claim of accretion could not be sustained because the 26,419
sqm. portion is ostensibly within the metes and bounds of Lot No.
7328, owned and registered in the name of the respondents.​35 On the
other hand, the 26,106 sqm. portion refers to an abandoned river bed,
and is thus governed by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which states
that River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.
The fact that the present cause of action is based on an accretion claim
does not prevent the application of res judicata. For, res judicata, under
the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, operates even if no
absolute identity of causes of action exists. Res judicata, in its
conclusiveness of judgment concept, merely requires identity of issues.
We thus agree with the uniform view of the CA – on the application of
conclusiveness of judgment to the present case. The CA may take
judicial notice of
Civil Case No. 16047.
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and
convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to
achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof.​36 Generally, courts
are not authorized to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the same judge.​37 " While the principle
invoked is considered to be the general rule, this rule is not absolute.
There are exceptions to this rule. In the case of Tiburcio v PHHC,​38
this Court, citing Justice Moran, stated:
"In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in
other causes, because of their close connection with the matter in the
controversy. Thus, in a separate civil action against the administrator
of an estate arising from an appeal against the report of the committee
on claims appointed in the administration proceedings of the said
estate, to determine whether or not the appeal was taken on time, the
court took judicial notice of the record of the administration
proceedings. Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases
to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether
or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."
Moreover, Degayo’s objection to the action of CA on this matter is
merely technical because Degayo herself repeatedly referred to the
Civil Case No. 16047 in her pleadings in Civil Case No. 18328and
even in her appellee’s brief before the CA and her petition for review
before this Court. In particular, in her complaint, she stated that her
motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 16047, which was denied by the
Court.​39 The existence of that case was likewise jointly stipulated by
that parties in Civil Case No. 18328​40 and mentioned by the court a
quoin its decision.​41​In her appellee’s brief as well, Degayo expressly
referred to Civil Case No. 16047. In particular, she stated:
"The said Civil Case No. 16047 was for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages over the property subject of the instant case
filed by the herein defendants-appellants against [the tenants]"
She also referred to the decision in Civil Case No. 16047 in her
appellee’s brief. She mentioned: "In Civil Case No. 16047, the Court
had ordered the deposit of 50% of the net produce of the disputed
portion that pertains to the owner, thus depriving the plaintiff of her
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
share of not less than Php 4,000.00 a year starting 1986, to the damage With the conclusion that Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes resjudicata
of plaintiff." on the present case, we see no reason to engage in a discussion on the
factual issues raised by the petitioner for they have been passed upon
There was thus no denial of the existence and the decision in Civil and considered in Civil Case No. 16047.
Case No. 16047. In fact, Degayo stated on record her full knowledge
of Civil Case No. 16047 and clearly and frequently referred to it in her WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack
pleadings, and sufficiently designated it by name, parties, cause of of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
action and docket number from the court a quo, to the CA and even
before this Court. Under the circumstances, the CA could certainly
take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in Civil Case No.
16047. There was no sense in relitigating issues that have already been
passed upon in a previous civil case. That was all that was done by the
CA in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary
to law. As we aptly stated in Republic v. CA,​42 citing Justice Edgardo
L. Paras:

"A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the
same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case,
of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same
parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public
records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be
taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court
between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well
as of the record of another case between different parties in the same
court. " Lastly, there is another equally compelling consideration.
Degayo undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law
then in force could be availed of, which is to file a petition for
certiorari with the CA. It would have served the cause of justice better,
not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on her part and the
vexation to which the respondents were subjected if she did reflect a
little more on the matter.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
d. Borra v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167484
G.R. No. 167484 September 9, 2013
HERNANDO BORRA, JOHN PACHEO, DANILO PEREZ,
FELIZARDO SIMON, RAMON BUENACOSA, JR., FELIX
BELADOR, WILFREDO LUPO, RONALD VILLARIAS,
ARSENIO MINDANAO, MAX NONALA, SIMPLICIO DE
ERIT, NOEL DONGUINES, JULIO BORRA, MELCHOR
JAVIER, JOHNNY ENRICO VARGAS, PAQUITO SONDIA,
JOSE SALAJOG, ELMER LUPO, RAZUL ARANEZ, NELSON
PEREZ, BALBINO ABLAY, FERNANDO SIMON, JIMMY
VILLARTA, ROMEO CAINDOC, SALVADOR SANTILLAN,
ROMONEL JANEO, ERNESTO GONZALUDO, JOSE PAJES,
ROY TAN, FERNANDO SANTILLAN, JR., DEMETRIO
SEMILLA, RENE CORDERO, EDUARDO MOLENO, ROMY
DINAGA, HERNANDO GUMBAN, FEDERICO ALVARICO,
ELMER CATO, ROGELIO CORDERO, RODNEY PAJES,
ERNIE BAYER, ARMANDO TABARES, NOLI AMADOR,
MARIO SANTILLAN, ALANIL TRASMONTE, VICTOR
ORTEGA, JOEVING ROQUERO, CYRUS PINAS, DANILO
PERALES, and ALFONSO COSAS, JR.,​ Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS SECOND AND
DIVISIONS and HAWAIIAN
COMPANY,​Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, ​J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65of
the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the November 14,
2003Resolution,​1 as well as the subsequent Decision​2 and Resolution,​3
dated June22, 2004 and January 14, 2005, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78729. The November 14, 2003
Resolution granted private respondent's motion for the issuance of a
preliminary mandatory injunction. The assailed CA Decision, on the
other hand, set aside the Order of the Labor Arbiter, dated August 12,
2003, and dismissed RAB Case No. 09-10698-97, while the January
14, 2005 CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 1997, herein petitioners filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch
No. VIin Bacolod City two separate complaints which were docketed
as RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 and RAB Case No.
06-09-10699-97. RAB Case No.06-09-10698-97 was filed against
herein private respondent alone, while RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97
impleaded herein private respondent and a certain Fela Contractor as
respondents. In RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97,herein petitioners
asked that they be recognized and confirmed as regular employees of
herein private respondent and further prayed that they be awarded
various benefits received by regular employees for three (3) years prior
NINETEENTH to the filing of the complaint, while in RAB Case No.
PHILIPPINE 06-09-10699-97,herein petitioners sought for payment of unpaid
wages, holiday pay, allowances, 13th month pay, service incentive
leave pay, moral and exemplary damages also during the three (3)
years preceding the filing of the complaint.
On October 16, 1997, private respondent filed a Motion to
Consolidate​4 the above mentioned cases, but the Labor Arbiter in
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
charge of the case denied the said Motion in its Order​5 dated October
20, 1997.
On January 9, 1998, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss​6
RAB Case No. 06-09-0698-97 on the ground of res judicata. Private
respondent cited an earlier decided case entitled " Humphrey Perez, et
al. v. Hawaiian Philippine Co. et al. "(Perez case) and docketed as
RAB Case No.06-04-10169-95, which was an action for recovery of
13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, and it includes herein
petitioners among the complainants and herein private respondent and
one Jose Castillon (Castillon) as respondents. Private respondent
contended that the Perez case, which has already become final and
executory, as no appeal was taken there from, serves as a bar to the
litigation of RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97, because it was ruled
therein that petitioners are not employees of private respondent but of
Castillon.
In an Order​7 dated July 9, 1998, the Labor Arbiter granted private
respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC which set aside the Order of the
Labor Arbiter, reinstated the complaint in RAB Case No.
06-09-10698-97and remanded the same for further proceedings.​8
Private respondent appealed to the CA. On January 12, 2001, the CA
rendered judgment, affirming the Decision of the NLRC and denied
the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court. The case was entitled as "Hawaiian Philippine
Company v. Borra" and docketed as G.R. No. 151801. On November
12, 2002, this Court rendered its Decision denying the petition and
affirming the Decision of the CA. Quoting with approval, the assailed
Decision of the CA, this Court held, thus:
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. The two cases in
question indeed involved different causes of action. The previous case
of "Humphrey Perez vs. Hawaiian Philippine Company" concerned a
money claim and pertained to the years 1987 up until 1995. During
that period, private respondents were engaged by contractor Jose
Castillon to work for petitioner at its warehouse. It would appear that
the finding of the Labor Arbiter, to the effect that no
employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and private
respondents, was largely predicated on the absence of privity between
them. The complaint for confirmation of employment, however, was
filed by private respondents on 12 September 1997, by which time,
Jose Castillon was no longer the contractor. The Court of Appeals
came out with these findings; viz.:
At first glance, it would appear that the case at bench is indeed barred
by Labor Arbiter Drilon’s findings since both petitioner and private
respondents are parties in Perez and the issue of employer-employee
relationship was finally resolved therein.
However, the factual milieu of the Perez case covered the period
November 1987 to April 6, 1995 (date of filing of the complaint),
during which time private respondents, by their own admission, were
engaged by Castillon to work at petitioner’s warehouse.
In contrast, the instant case was filed on September 12, 1997, by which
time, the contractor involved was Fela Contractor; and private
respondents’ prayer is for confirmation of their status as regular
employees of petitioner.
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
Stated differently, Perez pertains to private respondents’ employment
from 1987 to 1995, while the instant case covers a different
(subsequent) period. Moreover, in Perez, the finding that no
employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and private
respondents was premised on absence of privity between Castillon and
petitioner. Consequently, Perez and the instant case involve different
subject matters and causes of action.
On the other hand, resolution of the case at bench would hinge on the
nature of the relationship between petitioner and Fela Contractor. In
other words, private respondents’ action for declaration as regular
employees of petitioner will not succeed unless it is established that
Fela Contractor is merely a "labor-only" contractor and that petitioner
is their real employer.
Indeed, it is pure conjecture to conclude that the circumstances
obtaining in Perez subsisted until the filing of the case at bench as
there is no evidence supporting such conclusion. There is, as yet, no
showing that Fela Contractor merely stepped into the shoes of
Castillon. Neither has Fela Contractor’s real principal been shown:
petitioner or the sugar traders/planters?
Consequently, factual issues must first be ventilated inappropriate
proceedings before the issue of employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondents [herein private respondent
and petitioners] can be determined.
It is premature to conclude that the evidence in Perez would determine
the outcome of the case at bench because as earlier pointed out, there
is still no showing that the contractor (Fela contractor) in this case can
be considered as on the same footing as the previous contractor
(Castillon). Such factual issue is crucial in determining whether
petitioner is the real employer of private respondents.​9
In the meantime, on December 21, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision​10 in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 holding that there is no
employer-employee relations between private respondent and
petitioners. The Labor Arbiter held as follows:
x x x Fela Contractor as may be noted happened to replace Jose
Castillon, as Contractor of the traders or sugar planters, who absorbed
the workers of the erstwhile contractor Castillon.
The complainants herein, who were the workers of Castillon, formally
applied for employment with respondent Jose Castillon, the owner of
Fela Contractor, the new handler and hauler of the sugar planters and
traders. Thus, on February 15, 1996, respondent Jardinico,
representative of respondent Fela Contractor, wrote a letter to the
Administrative Manager of respondent Hawaiian informing the latter
that as of March 1, 1996,the former workers of Castillon the previous
contractor, who under took the handling and withdrawal of the sugar
of the traders and planters, have been absorbed and employed by Fela,
with a request to allow them to enter the premises of the company.
In this suit, the same complainants now seek monetary benefits arising
from the employment and they again impleaded respondent Hawaiian.
We, thus resolve to dismiss the complaint against respondent
Hawaiian, who as we have found in an earlier pronouncement has no
employer-employee relations with the complainant, let alone, any
privity of relationship, except for the fact that it is the depository of
sugar where the sugar of the planters and traders are hauled by the
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
workers of the contractor, like respondent herein Fela
Contractor/Jardinico.​11
No appeal was taken from the above quoted Decision. Thus, the same
became final and executory.​12
As a consequence of the finality of the Decision in RAB Case No.
06-09-10699-97, herein private respondent again filed a Motion to
Dismiss​13 RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 on the ground, among
others, of res judicata. Private respondent contended that the final and
executory Decision of the Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No.
06-09-10699-97, which found no employer-employee relations
between private respondent and petitioners, serves as a bar to the
further litigation of RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97.
On August 12, 2003, the Labor Arbiter handling RAB Case No.
06-09-10698-97 issued an Order
14​
denying private respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the CA assailing the August 12, 2003 Order of the Labor Arbiter.
On June 22, 2004, the CA rendered its questioned Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated August 12, 2003 of public
respondent is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. RAB Case No.
09-10698-97 is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.​15
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in
its Resolution​16​ dated January 14, 2005.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari based on the following
grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED ABSOLUTELY WITHOUT
ANY JURISDICTION WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE
2nd PETITION OF HPCO DESPITE THE ABSOLUTE LACK OF
ANY INTERVENING OR SUPERVENING EVENT THAT WOULD
RENDER THE ORDERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
COURT OF APPEALS INAPPLICABLE AND THE CLEAR AND
ESTABLISHED DECISION LAID DOWN BY THE FIRST
DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT UNDER CHIEF JUSTICE
HILARIO G. DAVIDE,JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICES JOSE C.
VITUG, CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T.
CARPIO, AND ADOLFO S. AZCUNA ANDBY THE COURT OF
APPEALS UNDER JUSTICES EDGARDO P.CRUZ, RAMON
MABUTAS, JR., ROBERTO A. BARRIOS, MA.ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ AND HILARION L. AQUINO,RULING
THAT FURTHER HEARINGS AND TRIAL MUST
BECONDUCTED BY THE LABOR ARBITER WHICH
SIGNIFICANTLYFOUND THE EXISTENCE OF
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEERELATIONSHIP IN HIS DECISION
DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 2003.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD SERIOUSLY ERRED, IF
NOTGRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CHOSE
TO DELIBERATELY IGNORE AND/OR ENTIRELY DISREGARD
THE CLEAR AND ESTABLISHED FACTS ON RECORD AS TO
THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDENTITY OF SUBJECT MATTER
AND CAUSE OF ACTION BETWEEN HPCO VS. BORRA & 48
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
OTHERS/NLRC, ET. AL., C.A. G.R. NO. 59132 AND HPCO VS.
NLRC,BORRA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 151801 ON ONE HAND AND
HPCO VS.HON. PHEBUN PURA/BORRA & 48 OTHERS C.A. G.R.
NO. 78729ON THE OTHER HAND.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE SECOND PETITION OF HPCO DESPITE
THE CLEAR AND ESTABLISHED FACT ON RECORD THAT
HPCO HADSIMULTANEOUSLY AND SUCCESSIVELY FILED
AN (sic)IDENTICAL THREE (3) MOTIONS TO DISMISS IN THE
SALA OFLABOR ARBITERS AND TWO (2) PETITIONS FOR
CERTIORARI INTHE COURT OF APPEALS WHICH IS A
FLAGRANT VIOLATION ONTHE LAW OF FORUM
SHOPPING.​17
The petition lacks merit.
This Court is not persuaded by petitioners' argument that the CA has
no jurisdiction over private respondent's petition for certiorari because
this Court, in G.R. No. 151801, lodged jurisdiction in the Labor
Arbiter by directing the remand of RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97
thereto for further proceedings.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
and it is not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
determine or conveniently set aside.​18
In this regard, it should be reiterated that what has been filed by
private respondent with the CA is a special civil action for certiorari
assailing the Labor Arbiter's Order which denied its motion to dismiss.
Section 3, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, which was then
prevailing at the time of the filing of private respondent's petition for
certiorari with the CA, clearly provides:
SECTION 3.
MOTION TO DISMISS. - On or before the date set for the conference,
the respondent may file a motion to dismiss. Any motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or that the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment, prescription or forum shopping,
shall be immediately resolved by the Labor Arbiter by a written order.
An order denying the motion to dismiss or suspending its resolution
until the final determination of the case is not appealable.​19
In the case of Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug
Corporation Employees Association-Federation of Free
Workers,​20​ this Court held that:
x x x The NLRC rule proscribing appeal from a denial of a motion to
dismiss is similar to the general rule observed in civil procedure that
an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and, hence, not
appealable until final judgment or order is rendered. The remedy of the
aggrieved party in case of denial of the motion to dismiss is to file an
answer and interpose, as a defense or defenses, the ground or grounds
relied upon in the motion to dismiss, proceed to trial and, in case of
adverse judgment, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. In
order to avail of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, it is incumbent
upon petitioner to establish that the denial of the motion to dismiss was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.​21
In this regard, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which is applied in a
suppletory character to cases covered by the NLRC Rules, provides
that in all the instances enumerated under the said Rule, where the
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.​22 Thus, this Court
has held that when the denial of a motion to dismiss is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari may be justified.​23 On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear
that the CA has jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari
filed by private respondent as the latter was able to allege and establish
that the denial of its motion to dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners are wrong to argue that this Court's directive in
G.R. No. 151801 to remand RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 to the
Labor Arbiter for further proceedings deprives the CA of its
jurisdiction over private respondent's petition for certiorari. The
essence of this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 151801 is simply to require
resolution of the factual issue of whether or not Fela Contractor has
stepped into the shoes of Castillon and, thus, has taken petitioners in
its employ. In other words, this Court called for a prior determination
as to who is the real employer of petitioners. This issue, however, was
already settled as will be discussed below.
At the outset, the underlying question which has to be resolved in both
RAB Case Nos. 06-09-10698-97 and 06-09-10699-97, before any
other issue in these cases could be determined, is the matter of
determining petitioners' real employer. Is it Fela Contractor, or is it
private respondent? Indeed, the tribunals and courts cannot proceed to
decide whether or not petitioners should be considered regular
employees, and are thus entitled to the benefits they claim, if there is a
prior finding that they are, in the first place, not employees of private
respondent. Stated differently, and as correctly held by the CA,
petitioners' prayer for regularization in RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97
is essentially dependent on the existence of employer-employee
relations between them and private respondent, because one cannot be
made a regular employee of one who is not his employer. In the same
vein, petitioners' prayer in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 for the
recovery of backwages,13th month pay, holiday pay and service
incentive leave pay from private respondent likewise rests on the
determination of whether or not the former are, indeed, employees of
the latter.
As earlier mentioned, this issue has already been settled. In the already
final and executory decision of the Labor Arbiter in RAB Case
No.06-09-10699-97, it was ruled therein that no employer-employee
relationship exists between private respondent and petitioners because
the latter's real employer is Fela Contractor. Thus, insofar as the
question of employer and employee relations between private
respondent and petitioners is concerned, the final judgment in RAB
Case No. 06-09-10699-97 has the effect and authority of res judicata
by conclusiveness of judgment.
Discussing the concept of res judicata, this Court held in Antonio
v.Sayman Vda. de Monje​24
that:
x x x Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment." According to the doctrine of res
judicata, an existing final judgment or decree rendered on
the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the
points and matters in issue in the first suit. To state
simply, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and
matters determined in the former suit.
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1)
"bar by prior judgment" and (2) "conclusiveness of
judgment." This Court had occasion to explain the
difference between these two aspects of res judicata as
follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as
between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second
action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree
of the court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the
same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and
not as to matters merely involved therein.
This is the concept of res judicata known as
"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated
differently, any right, fact or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds
application when a fact or question has been squarely put
in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former
suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or
question settled by final judgment or order binds the
parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or
their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them
while the judgment or order remains standing and
unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or
petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot
again be litigated in any future or other action between the
same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in
the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction,
either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus,
only the identities of parties and issues are required for the
operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.​25
Hence, there is no point in determining the main issue raised in RAB
Case No. 06-09-10698-97,
i.e., whether petitioners may be considered regular employees of
private respondent, because, in the first place, they are not even
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
employees of the latter. As such, the CA correctly held that the Labor
Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in denying private
respondent's motion to dismiss RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97.
The question that follows is whether private respondent is guilty of
forum shopping, considering that it already filed a motion to dismiss
RAB Case No. 06-09-10698-97 in 1998? The Court answers in the
negative.
In Pentacapital Investment Corporation v. Mahinay,​26 this Court's
discussion on forum shopping is instructive, to wit:
Forum-shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one court, then in another.
What is important in determining whether forum-shopping exists is the
vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks
different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or
related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs,
in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.
Forum-shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the
ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for
dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or
res judicata).
More particularly, the elements of forum-shopping are: (a) identity of
parties or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.​27
In the instant case, there can be no forum shopping, because the
grounds cited by private respondent in its motions to dismiss filed in
1998and in the present case are different. In 1998, the motion to
dismiss is based on the argument that the final and executory decision
in the
Perez case serves as res judicata and, thus, bars the re-litigation of the
issue of employer-employee relations between private respondent and
petitioners. In the instant case, private respondent again cites res
judicata as a ground for its motion to dismiss. This time, however, the
basis for such ground is not Perez but the final and executory decision
in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97. Thus, the relief prayed for in
private respondent's motion to dismiss subject of the instant case is
founded on totally different facts and issues.
As a final note, this Court cannot help but call the attention of the
Labor Arbiter regarding Our observation that the resolution of RAB
Case No. 06-09-10698-97 has been unnecessarily pending for almost
sixteen (16)years now. The resulting delay in the resolution of the
instant case could have been avoided had the Labor Arbiter granted
LEGAL RESEARCH - 1. INTRODUCTION: CASE COMPILATION
private respondent's Motion to Consolidate RAB Case Nos.
06-09-10698-97 and 06-09-10699-97. This Court quotes with approval
the contention of private respondent in its Motion, to wit:
3. That in light of the fact that the question as to whether or not there
exists employer-employee relations as between complainants [herein
petitioners] and herein respondent HPCO will indispensably have to be
resolved in light of the presence of an independent contractor (FELA
Contractors) in RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 − which should
otherwise be determinative of the issue involved in the present suit – it
should only be logical and proper that for purposes of abating separate
and inconsistent verdicts by two distinct arbitration salas of this
Commission that the present suit be accordingly consolidated for joint
hearing and resolution with said RAB Case No. 06-09-10699-97 x x
x.​28
Under Section 3, Rule IV of the then prevailing, as well as in the
presently existing, NLRC Rules of Procedure, it is clearly provided
that:
may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning
Proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Considering that the above mentioned cases involved essentially the
same parties and the basic issue of employer-employee relations
between private respondent and petitioners, the Labor Arbiter should
have been more circumspect and should have allowed the cases to be
consolidated. This would be in consonance with the parties'
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases as well as in
keeping with the orderly and efficient disposition of cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision
and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78729 are
AFFIRMED.

Section 3. Consolidation of Cases. – Where there are two or more

cases pending before different Labor Arbiters in the same Regional
Arbitration Branch involving the same employer and issues, or the
same parties and different issues, whenever practicable, the subsequent
easels shall be consolidated with the first to avoid unnecessary costs or
delay. x x x

In the same manner, Section 1, Rule 31 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, allows consolidation, thus:

SECTION 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common

question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it