HERMINIO MARIANO, JR.

,
Petitioner,
- versus -
ILDEFONSO C. CALLEJAS and EDGAR DE BORJA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 166640

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

On appeal are the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66891, dated
May 21, 2004 and January 7, 2005 respectively, which reversed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, dated September 13, 1999, which found respondents jointly and severally
liable to pay petitioner damages for the death of his wife.

First, the facts:

Petitioner Herminio Mariano, Jr. is the surviving spouse of Dr. Frelinda Mariano who was a passenger of a
Celyrosa Express bus bound for Tagaytay when she met her death. Respondent Ildefonso C. Callejas is
the registered owner of Celyrosa Express, while respondent Edgar de Borja was the driver of the bus on
which the deceased was a passenger.

At around 6:30 p.m. on November 12, 1991, along Aguinaldo Highway, San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite,
the Celyrosa Express bus, carrying Dr. Mariano as its passenger, collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer
bearing plate numbers PJH 906 and TRH 531. The passenger bus was bound for Tagaytay while the trailer
truck came from the opposite direction, bound for Manila. The trailer truck bumped the passenger bus
on its left middle portion. Due to the impact, the passenger bus fell on its right side on the right shoulder
of the highway and caused the death of Dr. Mariano and physical injuries to four other passengers. Dr.
Mariano was 36 years old at the time of her death. She left behind three minor children, aged four, three
and two years.

Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against respondents for their
failure to transport his wife and mother of his three minor children safely to her destination.
Respondents denied liability for the death of Dr. Mariano. They claimed that the proximate cause of the
accident was the recklessness of the driver of the trailer truck which bumped their bus while allegedly at
a halt on the shoulder of the road in its rightful lane. Thus, respondent Callejas filed a third-party
complaint against Liong Chio Chang, doing business under the name and style of La Perla Sugar Supply,
the owner of the trailer truck, for indemnity in the event that he would be held liable for damages to
petitioner.
Other cases were filed. Callejas filed a complaint,[4] docketed as Civil Case No. NC-397 before the RTC of
Naic, Cavite, against La Perla Sugar Supply and Arcadio Arcilla, the truck driver, for damages he incurred
due to the vehicular accident. On September 24, 1992, the said court dismissed the complaint against La
Perla Sugar Supply for lack of evidence. It, however, found Arcilla liable to pay Callejas the cost of the
repairs of his passenger bus, his lost earnings, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.[5]

A criminal case, Criminal Case No. 2223-92, was also filed against truck driver Arcilla in the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. On May 3, 1994, the said court convicted truck driver Arcadio Arcilla of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide, multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property.[6]

In the case at bar, the trial court, in its Decision dated September 13, 1999, found respondents Ildefonso
Callejas and Edgar de Borja, together with Liong Chio Chang, jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner
damages and costs of suit. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the defendants are ordered to pay as follows:

1. The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the loss of life;

2. The sum of P40,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

3. The sum of P1,829,200.00 as foregone income;

4. The sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages;

5. The sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;

6. The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Respondents Callejas and De Borja appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court
erred in holding them guilty of breach of contract of carriage.

On May 21, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It reasoned:

. . . the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable presumption. It gives in
where contrary facts are established proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence
required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in the
instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of
transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of private respondent's
employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as
well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which
the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted
and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier
the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers.[8]

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, insofar as it found defendants-appellants Ildefonso Callejas
and Edgar de Borja liable for damages to plaintiff-appellee Herminio E. Mariano, Jr., is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered absolving them from any liability for the death of Dr. Frelinda Cargo
Mariano.[9]
The appellate court also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Hence, this appeal, relying on the following ground:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL FOURTEENTH DIVISION IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE CASE.[10]

The following are the provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to the case at bar:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

In accord with the above provisions, Celyrosa Express, a common carrier, through its driver, respondent
De Borja, and its registered owner, respondent Callejas, has the express obligation to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances,[11] and to observe extraordinary diligence
in the discharge of its duty. The death of the wife of the petitioner in the course of transporting her to
her destination gave rise to the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To overcome the presumption,
respondents have to show that they observed extraordinary diligence in the discharge of their duty, or
that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.

This Court interpreted the above quoted provisions in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals.[12] We elucidated:

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of
their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the
carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and precaution in the
carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What
constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances.

Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from
introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the
common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its
contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.

In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and Congress to curb the
recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company makes it
an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries sustained by its passenger
rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot succeed in his contention that respondents failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence against them. The totality of evidence shows that the death of petitioners
spouse was caused by the reckless negligence of the driver of the Isuzu trailer truck which lost its brakes
and bumped the Celyrosa Express bus, owned and operated by respondents.

First, we advert to the sketch prepared by PO3 Magno S. de Villa, who investigated the accident. The
sketch[13] shows the passenger bus facing the direction of Tagaytay City and lying on its right side on the
shoulder of the road, about five meters away from the point of impact. On the other hand, the trailer
truck was on the opposite direction, about 500 meters away from the point of impact. PO3 De Villa
stated that he interviewed De Borja, respondent driver of the passenger bus, who said that he was about
to unload some passengers when his bus was bumped by the driver of the trailer truck that lost its
brakes. PO3 De Villa checked out the trailer truck and found that its brakes really failed. He testified
before the trial court, as follows:

ATTY. ESTELYDIZ:

q You pointed to the Isuzu truck beyond the point of impact. Did you investigate why did (sic) the Isuzu
truck is beyond the point of impact?

a Because the truck has no brakes.

COURT:

q What is the distance between that circle which is marked as Exh. 1-c to the place where you found the
same?

a More or less 500 meters.

q Why did you say that the truck has no brakes?

a I tested it.

q And you found no brakes?

a Yes, sir.

xxx

q When you went to the scene of accident, what was the position of Celyrosa bus?

a It was lying on its side.

COURT:

q Right side or left side?

a Right side.

ATTY. ESTELYDIZ:
q On what part of the road was it lying?

a On the shoulder of the road.

COURT:

q How many meters from the point of impact?

a Near, about 5 meters.[14]

His police report bolsters his testimony and states:

Said vehicle 1 [passenger bus] was running from Manila toward south direction when, in the course of its
travel, it was hit and bumped by vehicle 2 [truck with trailer] then running fast from opposite direction,
causing said vehicle 1 to fall on its side on the road shoulder, causing the death of one and injuries of
some passengers thereof, and its damage, after collission (sic), vehicle 2 continiously (sic) ran and
stopped at approximately 500 meters away from the piont (sic) of impact.[15]

In fine, the evidence shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising on its rightful lane
along the Aguinaldo Highway when the trailer truck coming from the opposite direction, on full speed,
suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane, and bumped the passenger bus on its left middle portion.
Respondent driver De Borja had every right to expect that the trailer truck coming from the opposite
direction would stay on its proper lane. He was not expected to know that the trailer truck had lost its
brakes. The swerving of the trailer truck was abrupt and it was running on a fast speed as it was found
500 meters away from the point of collision. Secondly, any doubt as to the culpability of the driver of the
trailer truck ought to vanish when he pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple slight physical injuries and damage to property in Criminal Case No. 2223-92, involving the same
incident.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 21, 2004 and the Resolution dated
January 7, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66891 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978

CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY
VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners,

vs.

VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.

Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners

Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Civil
Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there
is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. 1

The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla
and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that for the death of
Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on September 25, 1975
against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as C Case No. 3162-P
of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco,
the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the driver
on his criminal liability; that on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said c case to
withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor actively
participated in the trial and presented evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of
Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs
of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite
at Bacoor, Branch V, for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the
registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action, Criminal Case No.
3162-P, pending between the same parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the Court of
First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo
Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the
Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2

The principal issue is weather or not the of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the damages
based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on the
passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.

It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the
Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent
act.

The Supreme Court has held that:

According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first sight startling,
is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or quasi-delito has been sustained
by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by
Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that upholds 'the spirit that given life' rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles
29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Penal Code, and, in a
sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it
is 'more congruent' with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress', to borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to 359, to
hod as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault covers not only acts 'not punishable by law'
but also criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty and
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the, two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words the extinction of civil liability
refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of
Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 3

The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No.
3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for
damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of
the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the
prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The source of the obligation
sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law.
Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by
law are two different sources of obligation.

Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have only to
establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is
reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990

YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of
Manila, and ROY CAMASO, respondents.

Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.

David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation to
file a separate civil action? This is the issue in this petition.

On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la
Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines
and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.

Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries in an
information that was filed on January 6, 1983 with the then City Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 027184. On October 19, 1984 a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by
his father, David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27317.

In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26, 1989 ordering defendants to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical services and
hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. Although said defendants appealed the
judgment, they nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals challenging the
jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case.
Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence
of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of
the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made.

In a decision dated November 3, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.1 A motion for
reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied on January 30, 1990. Hence this petition.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information,
the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
(1a)

Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the
promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply
retrospectively to the present case. 2

Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.

It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it
separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action.
However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed,
so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.

The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a quasi delict as
defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case,
nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action,
and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is
even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made
by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.

The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages
twice for the same act or omission.

Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the separate civil action
brought before it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
3, 1989 and its resolution dated January 30, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Transportation Case Digest: Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Teves (1978)

G.R. No. L-37750 May 19, 1978

FACTS:

Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro bought tickets for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu

Since many passengers were bound for Surigao, M/S "Sweet Hope would not be proceeding to Bohol

They went to the proper brancg office and was relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" where they were forced
to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard."
and they were exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of
corn grits and their tickets were not honored so they had to purchase a new one

They sued Sweet Lines for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental who dismissed the compalitn for improper venue

A motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets -dismissed

instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction

ISSUE: W/N a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition printed at the
back of passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the contract of carriage should
be filed only in a particular province or city

HELD: NO.petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Restraining order LIFTED and SET ASIDE

contract of adhesion

not that kind of a contract where the parties sit down to deliberate, discuss and agree specifically on all
its terms, but rather, one which respondents took no part at all in preparing

just imposed upon them when they paid for the fare for the freight they wanted to ship

We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void
and unenforceable for the following reasons

circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship

will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who, under
Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu
subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions

philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs
as well as his witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice