TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable
only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
FELISA P. DE ROY v. CA, GR No. 80718, 1988-01-29
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied
by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa
Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated
on August 17, 1987, copy of... which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987,
the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987, but
this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
Issues:
Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision
Ruling:
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for... the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if
it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners' prior
negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine... of "last clear chance", which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY

94 SCRA 641, March 29, 1954 (Constitutional Law – Publication of Bank Circulars and Regulations)
FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S.
money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt
of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the
said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or
omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930
do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in
order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect.
HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

G.R. No. 176006 March 26, 2010

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PINATUBO COMMERCIAL, represented by ALFREDO A. DY, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The National Power Corporation (NPC)1 questions the decision dated June 30, 2006 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75
unconstitutional. The dispositive portion of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE then, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring item[s] 3 and 3.1 of
NAPOCOR Circular No. 99-75, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that
directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of
aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for being violative of
substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive
free trade and commerce.
The claim for attorney’s fees is denied for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.2
NPC also assails the RTC resolution dated November 20, 2006 denying its motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.3
In this petition, NPC poses the sole issue for our review:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED ITEMS 3 AND 3.1 OF
NAPOCOR CIRCULAR NO. 99-75 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
SUBSTANTIAL DUE PROCESS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
AS WELL AS FOR RESTRAINING COMPETITIVE FREE TRADE AND COMMERCE.4
NPC Circular No. 99-755 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in the "disposal of scrap aluminum conductor
steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC installations and to
generate additional income for NPC." Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provide:
3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS
3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as
the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum, or their duly appointed
representatives. These bidders may be based locally or overseas.6
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap
ACSR7cables. Respondent Pinatubo Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as copper, aluminum, steel
and other ferrous and non-ferrous materials, submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC. Pinatubo, however, was
informed in a letter dated April 29, 2003 that its application for pre-qualification had been denied.8 Petitioner
asked for reconsideration but NPC denied it.9
Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75, with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.10 Pinatubo argued that the
circular was unconstitutional as it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, and
ran counter to the government policy of competitive public bidding.11
The RTC upheld Pinatubo’s position and declared items 3 and 3.1 of the circular unconstitutional. The RTC
ruled that it was violative of substantive due process because, while it created rights in favor of third parties, the
circular had not been published. It also pronounced that the circular violated the equal protection clause since it
favored manufacturers and processors of aluminum scrap vis-à-vis dealers/traders in the purchase of aluminum
ACSR cables from NPC. Lastly, the RTC found that the circular denied traders the right to exercise their
business and restrained free competition inasmuch as it allowed only a certain sector to participate in the
bidding.12
In this petition, NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of general application.
It was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal committees, heads of
offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs. NPC also contends that there was
a substantial distinction between manufacturers and traders of aluminum scrap materials specially viewed in the
light of RA 7832.13 According to NPC, by limiting the prospective bidders to manufacturers, it could easily
monitor the market of its scrap ACSRs. There was rampant fencing of stolen NPC wires. NPC likewise
maintains that traders were not prohibited from participating in the pre-qualification as long as they had a tie-up
with a manufacturer.14
The questions that need to be resolved in this case are:
(1) whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published; and
(2) whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 -
(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and
(b) restrained free trade and competition.
Tañada v. Tuvera15 stressed the need for publication in order for statutes and administrative rules and
regulations to have binding force and effect, viz.:
x x x all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative power or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative Rules and Regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.16
Tañada, however, qualified that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.17 (emphasis ours)
In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or
regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by the
NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified
bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the
disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS.18 It also provided for the deposit of a proposal
bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap
ACSRs.19 All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap
ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not involved in
the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally.
Pinatubo’s argument that items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 deprived it of its "right to bid" or that
these conferred such right in favor of a third person is erroneous. Bidding, in its comprehensive sense, means
making an offer or an invitation to prospective contractors whereby the government manifests its intention to
invite proposals for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment for official business or public use, or for
public works or repair.20 Bidding rules may specify other conditions or require that the bidding process be
subjected to certain reservations or qualifications.21 Since a bid partakes of the nature of an offer to contract
with the government,22 the government agency involved may or may not accept it. Moreover, being the owner
of the property subject of the bid, the government has the power to determine who shall be its recipient, as well
as under what terms it may be awarded. In this sense, participation in the bidding process is a privilege
inasmuch as it can only be exercised under existing criteria imposed by the government itself. As such,
prospective bidders, including Pinatubo, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to meet
these criteria. Thus, it has been stated that under the traditional form of property ownership, recipients of
privileges or largesse from the government cannot be said to have property rights because they possess no
traditionally recognized proprietary interest therein.23
Also, as the discretion to accept or reject bids and award contracts is of such wide latitude, courts will not
interfere, unless it is apparent that such discretion is exercised arbitrarily, or used as a shield to a fraudulent
award. The exercise of that discretion is a policy decision that necessitates prior inquiry, investigation,
comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task can best be discharged by the concerned government
agencies, not by the courts. Courts will not interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within
those boundaries. Otherwise, they stray into the realm of policy decision-making.24
Limiting qualified bidders in this case to partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw
material in producing finished products made purely or partly of aluminum was an exercise of discretion by the
NPC. Unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or used as a subterfuge for fraud, the Court will not
interfere with the exercise of such discretion.
This brings to the fore the next question: whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 violated the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."25 The
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification.26The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may
be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary.271avvphi1
Items 3 and 3.1 met the standards of a valid classification. Indeed, as juxtaposed by the RTC, the purpose of
NPC Circular No. 99-75 was to dispose of the ACSR wires.28 As stated by Pinatubo, it was also meant to earn
income for the government.29 Nevertheless, the disposal and revenue-generating objective of the circular was
not an end in itself and could not bar NPC from imposing conditions for the proper disposition and ultimately,
the legitimate use of the scrap ACSR wires. In giving preference to direct manufacturers and producers, it was
the intent of NPC to support RA 7832, which penalizes the theft of ACSR in excess of 100 MCM.30 The
difference in treatment between direct manufacturers and producers, on one hand, and traders, on the other, was
rationalized by NPC as follows:
x x x NAPOCOR can now easily monitor the market of its scrap ACSR wires and verify whether or not a
person’s possession of such materials is legal or not; and consequently, prosecute under R.A. 7832, those whose
possession, control or custody of such material is unexplained. This is based upon the reasonable presumption
that if the buyer were a manufacturer or processor, the scrap ACSRs end with him as the latter uses it to make
finished products; but if the buyer were a trader, there is greater probability that the purchased materials may
pass from one trader to another. Should traders without tie-up to manufacturers or processors of aluminum be
allowed to participate in the bidding, the ACSRs bidded out to them will likely co-mingle with those already
proliferating in the illegal market. Thus, great difficulty shall be encountered by NAPOCOR and/or those
authorities tasked to implement R.A. 7832 in determining whether or not the ACSRs found in the possession,
control and custody of a person suspected of theft [of] electric power transmission lines and materials are the
fruit of the offense defined in Section 3 of R.A. 7832.31
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable
classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property,
as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct
manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.
Finally, items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not restrain free trade or competition.
Pinatubo contends that the condition imposed by NPC under items 3 and 3.1 violated the principle of
competitiveness advanced by RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) which states:
SEC. 3. Governing Principles on Government Procurement. – All procurement of the national government, its
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, government financial institutions and local government units, shall, in all cases, be
governed by these principles:
xxx
(b) Competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting parties who
are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding. (emphasis ours)
The foregoing provision imposed the precondition that the contracting parties should be eligible and qualified. It
should be emphasized that the bidding process was not a "free-for-all" where any and all interested parties,
qualified or not, could take part. Section 5(e) of RA 9184 defines competitive bidding as a "method of
procurement which is open to participation by any interested party and which consists of the following
processes: advertisement, pre-bid conference, eligibility screening of prospective bidders, receipt and opening
of bids, evaluation of bids, post-qualification, and award of contract x x x." The law categorically mandates that
prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening, and as earlier stated, bidding rules may specify other
conditions or order that the bidding process be subjected to certain reservations or qualifications.32 Thus, in its
pre-qualification guidelines issued for the sale of scrap ACSRs, the NPC reserved the right to pre-disqualify any
applicant who did not meet the requirements for pre-qualification.33 Clearly, the competitiveness policy of a
bidding process presupposes the eligibility and qualification of a contestant; otherwise, it defeats the principle
that only "responsible" and "qualified" bidders can bid and be awarded government contracts.34 Our free
enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a
strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil-devour-the-hindmost rule.35
Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of
others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition.36 While the Constitution
enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare.37 In the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of scrap
ACSR wires will hamper the government’s effort of curtailing the pernicious practice of trafficking stolen
government property. This is an evil sought to be prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within the
authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order to prevent it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 213 dated June 30, 2006 and resolution dated November 20, 2006 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. MC-03-2179 for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Topic: Executive Privilege – Constitutional Law 1)
Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri
Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate Committee on
Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA),
was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on the alleged anomalies in
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This project was contracted by the Philippine Government
with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which involved the amount of
US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed that then Commission on
Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or not the President followed up the NBN Project,
2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear
and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated 15
November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China,” and given the confidential
nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri “cannot provide the Committee any
further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.”
Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he should
not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29 November,
Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and
requested that if there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in
advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President, and
that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating
to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of
foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on
issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed that
his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive privilege in accordance
with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006). For its part, the
Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in issuing the assailed orders because there is
no valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In addition, they claimed that the refusal of
petitioner to answer the three questions violates the people’s right to public information, and that the executive
is using the concept of executive privilege as a means to conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest levels
of government.
Issue:
Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive privilege,
making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.
Discussion:
Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three elements needed to be
complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the protected
communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; 2.) it must be authored,
solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and, 3.) it may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that the
communications elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,” and that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the
President’s Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere
showing of public need by the branch seeking access to such conversations. In the present case, respondent
Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment
of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative
oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the oversight function
of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides that
this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
Held:
The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three questions are covered by presidential
communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department, enough
to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for not answering such
questions.
The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in contempt of the Senate
Committee and directing his arrest and detention was nullified.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate
Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the
C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee
was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the
investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with
the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was
approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the
Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and
proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUES: [1] Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, an indispensable party
in this petition?
[2] Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?
[3] Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection?
[4] Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under
Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution?
[5] Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their effectivity?
HELD: [1] An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In this case, Senator
Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an
interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of
jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without
affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.
[2] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not require the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here
are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
[3] While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within
the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation
when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the investigation to the
Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a
majority of the members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to equal protection.
[4] The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not
violate Senator Villar's right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules
of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution, which states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the
House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be
published,unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. Hence, in
this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be
published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution,
publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate
their publication. PARTIALLY GRANTED.

ART. 4
Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815
Retroactive Effect of Laws on Penal Character
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court Ruling
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner
vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Respondent
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was
released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live
ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not
been issued to the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in
the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the room
as the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of the
room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry
Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a
revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a
letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid

HELD/DECISION:
1. Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested
lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the accused may be used to
resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen.
This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest
allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within the area of his immediate
control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and
placed outside the room where the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could
not be “in his immediate control.” Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are permitted
to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view doctrine.”
However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore not incidental.
Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used against him.

HIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 104528. January 18, 1996.]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND

LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB), ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P.
REYES, JORGE C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA, FLORENCIA
CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO, SANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA
TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON, NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD
GARCIA, ANA ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL, represented by their duly
authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE LEON AND SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN
SEBASTIAN, Respondents.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- APPEAL THEREFROM MAY BE TAKEN
TO THE COURT OF A~PEALS; SUPREME COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE THEREOF IN THE
INTEREST OF SPEEDY JUSTICE. — Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from
judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . ."
However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision three years
ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.

2. CIVIL LAW; GENERALLY, LAWS HAVE NO RRETROACTIVE EFFECT — Pursuant to Article 4 of the
Civil Code," (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 (THE SUBDIVISION AND

CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ PROTECTIVE DECREE) WITH RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. — It is
obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at
issue here, executed prior to its enactments, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the preamble) must be
given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved. While P.D. 957 did not
expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable
intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small
lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law as an
instrument of social justice - must favor the weak. Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957,
which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole. These are
Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon even
those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957’s enactment

4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENT OF THE STATUTE IS THE LAW. — The instent of a statute
is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent
is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained; although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter
of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In
construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that
sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and
objects of the legislature. (Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on Statutory Construction [quoted with
approval by this Court in an old case of consequence, Ongsiako v. Gamboa]).

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION, NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE: CAN NOT PREVAIL

OVER POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. — Despite the Impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its
execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper
exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. Into each contract are read the provisions of
existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter
affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its
susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 (THE SUBDIVIION AND

CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ DECREE); REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE MADE BY THE SUBDIVISION
OWNER IN FAVOR OF THE BANK DECLARED NULL AND VOID WHERE RIGHTS OF SUBDIVISION
LOT BUYERS CLASH WITH THE MORTGAGEES BANK’S RIGHT TO FORECLOSE. — The decision of
the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor v. Lao, et al, penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose
A R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the factual circumstances therein being of
great similarity to the antecedent facts of the case at bench. By the foregoing citation, this Court thus adopts by
reference the foregoing as part of this Decision. The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although
constituted in 1975 and outside the beneficial aegis of P.D. 957,was struck down by the Court of Appeals which
found in favor of subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the mortgagee bank’s right to
foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court declaring the real
estate mortgage as null and void.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. MORTGAGEE BANK OBLIGED TO ACCEPT PAYMENT OF REAMINING UNPAID
AMORTIZATIONS OF SUBDIVISION LOT BUYERS. — A to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner
avers that, in view of the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a "total stranger to the land
purchase agreement," cannot be made to take the developer’s place. We disagree. P.D. 957 being applicable,
Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the rernaining unpaid amortizations
tendered by private respondents. Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law
explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the
mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the
mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without
prejudice to petitioner Bank’s seeking relief against the subdivision developer.

PHIL. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

July 2, 2014
GR. NO. 1677330 September 18, 2009, SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION (CORONA, J.)
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation whose primary purpose is to establish, maintain, conduct and operate a
prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance organization to take care of the sick
and disabled persons enrolled in the health care plan and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial
responsibilities of the organization. On January 27, 2000, respondent CIR sent petitioner a formal deman letter
and the corresponding assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency taxes, including surcharges and
interest, for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 in the total amount of P224,702,641.18. The deficiency assessment
was imposed on petitioner’s health care agreement with the members of its health care program pursuant to
Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code. Petitioner protested the assessment in a letter dated February 23, 2000. As
respondent did not act on the protest, petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
seeking the cancellation of the deficiency VAT and DST assessments. On April 5, 2002, the CTA rendered a
decision, ordering the petitioner to PAY the deficiency VAT amounting to P22,054,831.75 inclusive of 25%
surcharge plus 20% interest from January 20, 1997 until fully paid for the 1996 VAT deficiency and
P31,094,163.87 inclusive of 25% surcharge plus 20% interest from January 20, 1998 until fully paid for the
1997 VAT deficiency. Accordingly, VAT Ruling No. [231]-88 is declared void and without force and effect.
The 1996 and 1997 deficiency DST assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent is ORDERED to DESIST from collecting the said DST deficiency tax. Respondent appealed the
CTA decision to the (CA) insofar as it cancelled the DST assessment. He claimed that petitioner’s health care
agreement was a contract of insurance subject to DST under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code.
On August 16, 2004, the CA rendered its decision which held that petitioner’s health care agreement was in the
nature of a non-life insurance contract subject to DST. Respondent is ordered to pay the deficiency
Documentary Stamp Tax. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. engaged in insurance business.
(2) Whether or not the agreements between petitioner and its members possess all elements necessary in the
insurance contract.
HELD:
NO. Health Maintenance Organizations are not engaged in the insurance business. The SC said in June 12, 2008
decision that it is irrelevant that petitioner is an HMO and not an insurer because its agreements are treated as
insurance contracts and the DST is not a tax on the business but an excise on the privilege, opportunity or
facility used in the transaction of the business. Petitioner, however, submits that it is of critical importance to
characterize the business it is engaged in, that is, to determine whether it is an HMO or an insurance company,
as this distinction is indispensable in turn to the issue of whether or not it is liable for DST on its health care
agreements. Petitioner is admittedly an HMO. Under RA 7878 an HMO is “an entity that provides, offers or
arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a fixed prepaid premium. The
payments do not vary with the extent, frequency or type of services provided. Section 2 (2) of PD 1460
enumerates what constitutes “doing an insurance business” or “transacting an insurance business”which are
making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract; making or proposing to make, as surety, any
contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental to any other legitimate business or activity of
the surety; doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting
the doing of an insurance business within the meaning of this Code; doing or proposing to do any business in
substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this Code.

Overall, petitioner appears to provide insurance-type benefits to its members (with respect to its curative
medical services), but these are incidental to the principal activity of providing them medical care. The
“insurance-like” aspect of petitioner’s business is miniscule compared to its noninsurance activities. Therefore,
since it substantially provides health care services rather than insurance services, it cannot be considered as
being in the insurance business.

ART. 6
Consunji v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell.
And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to
the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.1

Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against
the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria
Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. D. M.
Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits
she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD: Yes. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.

As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees or for higher
damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. But There is an exception is where a
claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under
the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
The choice of the first remedy based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice.

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages using the police investigation report to support her
complaint may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office
dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence. This court is more inclined to believe
appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received the
benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception
Payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all
other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

EMETERIO CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, GR No. L-15127, 1961-05-30

Facts:
plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up... preparatory law course in the defendant University. After
finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school
year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first...
semester of the fourth year.
Plaintiff, during all the time he was... studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semesters and when his
scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff... to defendant and
refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the
college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he
applied to take the bar... examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his
records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts.
The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033.87 which defendant... refunded to him as above
stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said
sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.
on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject
of "Scholarships", addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities"
"2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and
earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently
charged to the recipient students when they decide to... quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.
Issues:
whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in
cash, is valid or not.
Ruling:
Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although the
contractual provision "may be... unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the
defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle".
If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to... issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on
September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of
the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to... sound morality and civic honesty.
The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy.
Thus conceived it is not... only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals.
The practice of awarding... scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has
it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano
University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article
XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with
the leading colleges and universities of the United
States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are
granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value but to reward merit or
help gifted students in whom society has an... established interest or a first lien."... the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as
well as... the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim.

ART. 7
Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992)
16APR
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his
7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not
restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73,
S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or
abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that
the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence,
before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in
enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise,
at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first
act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws
on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari
materia.
ART. 8
G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor
Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
On December 3, 1965, Rafael Licera was charged with illegal possession of a
Winchester rifle by the Chief of Police on the municipal court of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro.
In August 14, 1968, the court acquitted Licera on the charge of assault upon an agent ofa person in authority,
but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm under the Mapa rule (1967). In 1974, Licera appeal to the
Court of Appeals invoking his legal justification to possess the Winchester rifle because he was appointed as
secret agent by Governor Feliciano Leviste on December 11, 1961 pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in
People vs Macarandang . People vs Macarandang (1959) – the appointment of civilian as “secret agent” whom
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm
licenses.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in the application of Mapa rule retrospectively?

Held: Yes, at the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his
apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit thereof
in 1965, the Macarandang rule formed part of the jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal
system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.
Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not law, constitute evidence of
what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of the law as of the
date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates and old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and
should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the
faith thereof.
ART. 9
CHU JAN VS LUCIO BERNAS (GR NO L-10010 AUG 1, 1916)

FACTS:
Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match, defendant Lucio Bernas
was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160 before the cockfight. Justice of peace court decided
that bout was a draw. Defendant appealed toCourt of First Instance praying judgment and ordering defendant to
abide and comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights ,to pay P160 and return the other amount
which s in safekeeping of Cockpit owner Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss
cost against plaintiff. Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. On
plaintiff's motion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal Treasurer of Tabacco
to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu Jan. Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by
means of the proper bill of exceptions
ISSUE:
Did Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds for dismissal pronounced
by lower court appealed from ere that court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar
with the rules governing cockfights and duties of referees; that he does not know where to find the law and that
he knows of no law that governs the right to plaintiff and defendants concerning cockfights.
Held:
Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision are
not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without
deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing that a case may arise to which no law
would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2ndparagraph of Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shal
l be observed and in absence thereof, the general principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and order appealed
from are reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to court from when they came for due trial
and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to cost.

ART. 10
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)

FACTS:
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly
weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege
facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime,
viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited
acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for
reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.

HELD:
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine
the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree
and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

ART. 11-12
Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest
Facts:
1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila
when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses
are attached), came from the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to let
the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into
the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the
plaintiff’s head.
3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident,
was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was
tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving
lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered.
However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The
employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.
4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically
cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a
trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the
evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive
and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent.
 The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One
could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair
therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances.

The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through
horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which
they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of
accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.
Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen, petitioners, versus Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel
Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy, and Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents.
No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving
behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging among
others that:
a) They are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;
b) To their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate;
c) They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and
d) They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratriz of the intestate estate of the deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that:
a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat who he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
b) The other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased Yao Kee; and
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix
of the estate of Sy Kiat.
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not have
a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the bethrotal of their
children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into an agreement with the
parents of her husband; that she and her husband have been living in Fookien, China before he went to the
Philippines; that in China, the custom is that there is a go-between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to
both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son-in-law,
then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on the wedding day, the document would be signed by the
parents of both parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that the parties do not
sign the document themselves; and that she and Sy Kiat were married for 46 years already and the document
was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now.
The testimony of Gan Ching, the younger brother of Yao Kee, that he attended the marriage of his sister with Sy
Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents and
elders of the parties being sufficient. Statements were made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified that a) Sy
Kiat was married to Yao Kee according to a Chinese custom.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China is valid.
Held:
The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a
source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact.
Article 71 of the Civil Code states that: “All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or custom on
marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they
are competent to testify on the subject matter. The marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction. Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved
as any other fact.
As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China, they
cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only of acknowledged natural children.
CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax
which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that
year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their
quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were
claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit
additional documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which
prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed
beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.
According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown
filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed 731
days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary period. Primetown
appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar
months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number
of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as
the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year
reglementary period.

ART. 15-17
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton
is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to render
an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. He was bound by
the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and
had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony eventuated in Erich
initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage
and that they had been living apart since April 1982.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila on January 23,
1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner
moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a
resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
Held:
The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that private respondent is the
offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the
same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was
Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with
whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to
his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12,
1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous,
thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the
case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue
of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their
joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismissand its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.

ART. 19-21
RAMAS vs QUIAMCO Case Digest
RAMAS, plaintiff-appellant VS. QUIAMCO, defendant-appellee
December 6, 2006

FACTS: Quiamco has amicably settled with Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso for the crime of robbery and that
in return, the three had surrendered to Quiamco a motorcycle with its registration. However, Atty. Ramas has
sold to Gabutero the motorcycle in installment but when the latter did not able to pay the installment, Davalon
continued the payment but when he became insolvent, he said that the motorcycle was taken by Quiamco’s
men. However, after several years, the petitioner Ramas together with policemen took the motorcycle without
the respondent’s permit and shouted that the respondent Quiamco is a thief of motorcycle. Respondent then
filed an action for damages against petitioner alleging that petitioner is liable for unlawful taking of the
motorcycle and utterance of a defamatory remark and filing a baseless complaint. Also, petitioners claim that
they should not be held liable for petitioner’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged
motorcycle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the petitioner is correct.

RULING: No. The petitioner being a lawyer must know the legal procedure for the recovery of possession of
the alleged mortgaged property in which said procedure must be conducted through judicial action.
Furthermore, the petitioner acted in malice and intent to cause damage to the respondent when even without
probable cause, he still instituted an act against the law on mortgage.
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went away and Beatriz did not
hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral damages. Velez contended
that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the court
did not find this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to
marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public humiliation.
ISSUE:
Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages?
RULING:
The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The
mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels,
gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and
ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for
the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff
believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY
BISAYA”
2005 Feb 28
G.R. No. 154259

FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent was
invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s manager. During
the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive
Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was
invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted
him out of her party.
Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstances
painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep
the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with
no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the party after he finished eating. After she
had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene.
Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower court
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently
imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for review.
ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the
employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.
RULING: The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There was no proof of motive on
the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version of the
story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to
ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employees.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.
Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive conduct.

The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one who
has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.
GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALSand MARILOU
T. GONZALES, respondents
G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an
Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old. Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was
22 years old. Petitioner was allegedlythe lover of the respondent, and was said to promise marriage to the latter,
which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house
of the respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage
did not materialize, with several beatings and maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.
The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However,
the petitioner claimed that the judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not true,
and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts were in accordance of his custom. The
decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner.
RULING:
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a good
moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a
promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the
petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal
desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already
looked for pigs and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and
then damages were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the
respondent against the petitioner.
Pe et. al. vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962.
Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant,
a married man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the
rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited
defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared
from her brother’s house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside
Lolita’s aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court
dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.

Issue: W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”

Held: “The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of
making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of
Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita’s
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
New Civil Code.”

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs CA

August 25, 1989

Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager,
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the
Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that
he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said
leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private
investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports
from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of
Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private
respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective
December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry
wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias,
then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment
in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs; hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that
all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would
file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos
(“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter
to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six
criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by
malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of
guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with
the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively,
then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the
right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

TITLE: University of the East vs. Jader

CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7, 2000
FACTS:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1stsemester, he failed to take
the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an
application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28 and
on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.
The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name
appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30,
1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes
and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UE’s negligence.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages
HELD:
SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latter’s actual damages.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter
to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have been awarded moral damages though JADER
suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to
take the bar examinations as what CA held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether he
has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he
should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic
achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the
subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which
prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00),
with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral
damages is DELETED.

G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)

Tenchavez vs. Escaño
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a
Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However, the two were unable
to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United
Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of
Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and
absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California,
had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May
1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine
Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño
was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable
cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married
again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on
the basis of adultery.
2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of
Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration,
and were belied by Tenchavez’ own letters written before the suit had begun. An action for alienation of
affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives
on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and
anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
St. Louis Realty Corp. vs CA
TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA
CITATION: 133 SCRA 179
FACTS:
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center,
seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp.
misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.
St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished
on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with
whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the
mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or
apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the
advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On
March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or
explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the
notice of rectification was published.
ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.
HELD:
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never
made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's
fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that
“St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the
questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil
who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 179799
FACTS: The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for violation of B.P. 22 by Emma J. Datuin
(Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of Sansio
Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of
Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous
appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect,
Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she was indicted for three (3) counts
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the armed operatives of the Public
Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
on October 17, 1997, Friday, at around 9:30 a.m. in Quezon City while she was visiting her husband and their
two (2) daughters at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she was
subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was detained. She was released in the afternoon of the same day
when her husband posted a bond for her temporary liberty.
On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and
Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even have a
checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn, as certified by the branch manager of the
Philippine National Bank, Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her signature was patently and radically
different from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted. In the course of the reinvestigation, Datuin
submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating, among others, that Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the
bounced checks subject of prosecution.
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the
ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.
HELD: A perusal of the allegations of Gregorio’s complaint for damages readily shows that she filed a civil suit
against Sansio and Datuin for filing against her criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that respondents
did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently
funded checks as payment for the various appliances purchased; and that respondents never gave her the
opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because they stated an incorrect address in the criminal
complaint. Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she was
suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting her family. She was, at the time of her
arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26, 2176, and
2180 of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin,
Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought. Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint
based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious
prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to
whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the
damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other
relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right
to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5)
right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements
of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity,
personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise
the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering
insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of
petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper
notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the
office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by
armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while
visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she
had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held
several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and
Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its
vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.
These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted a cause of action against Sansio and
Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct when it denied respondents’ motion to dismiss.

Capili vs. People G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013 Bigamy
JANUARY 27, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is
declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil
case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal
case.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy.
RULING:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information
was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December
8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the
second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the
second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even
if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before
Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the
marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab initio and without
legal force and effect
Ruling:
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites
for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and
they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the Court of
Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.

CASE DIGEST: MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA

CIPRIANO. G.R. No. 181089; October 22, 2012.

FACTS: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Cipriano (Lourdes) married Socrates Flores (Socrates). On
January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio V. Cipriano
(Silverio). In 2001, Lourdes filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her
marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC rendered its
decision declaring the marriage of Lourdes with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final
and executory on October 13, 2003.

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed a
complaint for bigamy against Lourdes alleging that Lourdes failed to reveal to Silverio that she was
still married to Socrates.

Lourdes moved to quash the information alleging that her first marriage to Socrates had already been
declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to
Silverio on January 24, 1983. She also averred that she had contracted her second marriage before the
effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the existing law at that time did not require a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. Hence,
the RTC granted the motion to quash.

ISSUE: Was the RTC correct in quashing the information for bigamy?

HELD: The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her
first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003.

In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated.

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family
Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus: “The fact that procedural
statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.” GRANTED.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES v. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, GR No. 166836, 2013-09-04

Facts:

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the
real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then
represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized... rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),[2] 130 residential lots situated in its
subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate
price of P106,248,000.00. The... transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale.

Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged in the
real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then
represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized... rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),[2] 130 residential lots situated in its
subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate
price of P106,248,000.00. The... transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale.[

The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel
Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565... square
meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel
Properties paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land
purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation
receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by

FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC.
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel
Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las
Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of... titles in
violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957

At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB
(HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),[6] praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its
favor.

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Piñas rendered its resolution,[10] dismissing San Miguel
Properties' criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no
action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the

SEC that had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial
question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on... the liability of
the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no
prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable
cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories... in the three deeds of sale.

San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Piñas to the Department of Justice
(DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal... the CA dismissed San Miguel Properties' petition,
holding and ruling as follows:

From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question
generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.

However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents. In
this case, an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the resolution of
a civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of... the latter until after termination of the
administrative proceedings.

Issues:

whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason
to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial... question.

Ruling:

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a
prejudicial question

BF Homes' posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB posed a
prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Section 25
of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the... jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal.
The rationale... behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.[23] The
essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action... involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San
Miguel Properties' submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil
action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for... specific performance in the
HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge
for the criminal violation of Section 25[24] of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because
the action for specific... performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted
elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.[25]

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial

question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance
case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation... of Presidential
Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be determinative of the
question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus
necessary.

the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel
Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal
action would decide whether or not BF Homes' directors... and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede that of the latter, for
should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs
because Atty. Orendain did not have the... authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with
the criminal... case.

Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further... prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the
Prosecution has not yet presented a single... piece of evidence on the indictment or may not have
rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question
is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB, instead of
in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for specific
performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This... situation conforms
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of administrative
agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to... defeat the resort to the judicial adjudication of
controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their
resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of
contracts and the... determination of private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial
function exercisable only by the regular courts.
QUIMIGUING VS ICAO
34 SCRA 132 | July 31, 1970 | J. J.B.L. Reyes

Facts:

Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from
the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request
for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations
with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and
attorney’s fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact
that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently
denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:

W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege
fact of birth in complaint

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an
independent cause of action for damages.

This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child,
which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article
742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons
that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish
Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused”
per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages
for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs
against Icao.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her husband before their marriage. Geluz
performed an abortion on Nita Villanueva. After the latter’s marriage, she again became pregnant and since she
was employed in the Commission on Elections, the pregnancy was inconvenient and she had herself aborted
again by Geluz. In less than two years, she again became pregnant and had her two-month old fetus aborted by
Geluz for a sum of fifty pesos. Nita’s husband was then campaigning for his election and was aware and did not
give consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the award of damages. The trial court and Court of
Appeals predicated the award of damages in the sum of three thousand pesos for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Lazo could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed
with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover
are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations. In this case,
however, the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions of his wife, clearly indicative that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and expectations.
The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.
MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In
the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines,
she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines
on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others,
that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On
25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action
for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau
Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name
any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-
law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4
of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does
not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo
the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife
of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure
(a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of
her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she
has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but
such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau
Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim
Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
Republic v Batuigas (Digest)
Republic of the Philippines vs. Azucena Saavedra Batu(i)gas (DIGEST)
GR No. 183110
7 October 2013
TOPIC:
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife, Naturalization, Citizenship
FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that granted
the Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. She
stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to
China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to
the time of her naturalization.

After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in
some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage
directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property
because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to
be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never departed
the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education, she then
practiced her teaching profession in several different schools in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen. They
have five children, all of whom studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail business of and
later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint
annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During their marital union, the
Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law to become a
naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA
473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto
Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for
naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration
and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to
a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the
CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate
indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and
business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien
wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be
a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and
this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance
with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the Revised
Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration
should be cancelled.
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)
July 08, 2013
GR No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then
petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a
Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to
run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes,
as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree
No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to
reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are:
(1) filing the application;
(2) action by the committee; and
(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved.
It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then
it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied
and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she
taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the
late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late
President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a
voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as
a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the
1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an
honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In
the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does
not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only
after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of
the First District of Leyte.