DE CASTRO V. JBC, G.R. NO.
191002, APRIL 20,2010 RES JUDICATA
Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The
said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the
nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and
submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional
provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight
appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the
principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or
abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE (Section 4):
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?
RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the
dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec.
13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld
its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to
vacancies in the Supreme Court.
Civil Code. Article 8
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n)
Stare decisis-
a legal doctrine that obligates courts to follow historical cases when making a ruling
on a similar case. Stare decisis ensures that cases with similar scenarios and facts
are approached in the same way. Simply put, it binds courts to follow legal
precedents set by previous decisions.
PHIL CONST. ART VII
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, G.R. No. 173148, April 6, 2015
Facts:
Degayo and Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. were contesting the Facts ownership of a disputed
area adjoining the
Jalaud River: Degayo was claiming ownership on the theory that the disputed area was an
accretion to her own
property; on the other hand, Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. were claiming ownership on the
theory that the disputed
area was an abandoned riverbed which accrued to them, as the owners of the land where
the new riverbed ran
through. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. filed a complaint for ownership against Degayo’s
tenants (CIVIL CASE NO. 1). After
denying Degayo’s motion to intervene, the RTC eventually decided in favor of Magbanua-
Dinglasan, et al. – which
decision attained finality. Meanwhile, Degayo filed a separate case for ownership with
damages against MagbanuaDinglasan, et al. (CIVIL CASE NO. 2). Although the RTC
decided in favor of Degayo, the CA – on appeal – reversed, on
the ground that Civil Case No. 1 constituted res judicata, and after taking judicial notice of
Civil Case No. 1. The
Supreme Court DENIED the petition for review on certiorari filed by Degayo.
CONTINUATION FACTS:
Antecedents
1. Controversy between riparian owners (Jalaud River):
1.1. Degayo’s lot: used to be bounded on the southwest by the Jalaud River
1.2. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.’s lot: opposite side of the Jalaud River
2. In the 1970s, the Jalaud River steadily changed its course and moved southwards.
2.1. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.’s lot decresed in size while the banks adjacent to
Degayo’s lot gradually increased in land area.
2.1.1. Half of the disputed area, 52,528 sq.m. big, was made up of the original
abandoned river bed, while the other half was made up of the resurfaced area of
Magbanua-Dinglasan et al.’s lot.
2.2. Degayo and her tenants: believed that the disputed area was an ACCRETION to
Degayo’s lot – the tenants began cultivating and tilling the area with corn and tobacco.
2.3. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.: believed that the disputed area was an
ABANDONED RIVERBED – thus,rightfully belongs to them, to compensate for the
portion of their lot over which the Jalaud River presently ran.
The Case
3. (CIVIL CASE NO. 1)
3.1. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. filed a complaint for ownership and damages against
Degayo’s tenants (RTC of Iloilo).
3.1.1. Degayo sought to intervene – her motion was denied.
3.1.1.1. NOTE: Degayo never filed anything to question the
interlocutory order denying her motion to intervene.
3.2. Notwithstanding the denial of her motion to intervene (and as Civil Case No. 2 was
pending), Degayo participated in the proceedings as a witness for the defense (her
tenants).
3.2.1. During her direct examination, she testified on the same matters and
raised the same arguments she alleged in her complaint in Civil Case No. 2.
3.3. RTC: rendered a decision in favor of Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.
3.3.1. Although Degayo’s tenants filed an appeal, they failed to file an appeal
brief – causing the dismissal of their appeal.
3.3.2. The decision became final and executory on 6 August 1999.
4. (CIVIL CASE NO. 2)
4.1. Degayo filed a complaint for declaration of ownership with damages (RTC of Iloilo).
4.1.1. Degayo stressed that the disputed area was an accretion to her lot.
4.2. RTC: found in favor of Degayo – declared the disputed area as an accretion of
Degay’s lot.
4.2.1. After the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration, Magbanua-
Dinglasan, et al. filed an appeal w/ the CA
4.3. CA: granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the RTC.
4.3.1. The CA noted that the disputed area was an abandoned riverbed that
rightfully belonged to MagbanuaDinglasan, et al.
4.3.2. ***The CA also noted that the decision in Civil Case No. 1 was
CONCLUSIVE to the title of the thing (Conclusiveness of Judgment).
4.4. After the CA denied her motion for reconsideration, Degayo filed a petition for
Review on Certiorari (R45) with the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Does the Decision in Civil Case No. 1 constitute res judicata? (YES.)
2. ***Was the CA correct in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 1? (YES.)***
RULING:
1. The Decision in Civil Case No. 1 constituted res judicata.
Final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits on points on matters determined in the former suit.”
Parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. (There should
be an end to litigation.)
o Practical concern: overflowing dockets, scarce judicial resources, efficiency. (Salud v.
CA)
o Rights and liabilities once established should remain fixed.
Most important purpose of res judicata: provide repose for both the party litigatnts
and the public.
Res judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars vexatious litigation, and
frees
the courts to resolve other disputes.
What of Judicial error?
Should be corrected through appeals – NOT repeated suits.
Relitigation: risk of inconsistent results – which should be preferred?
o Since there is no reason to suppose that the subsequent determinations are necessarily
more
accurate, the first should be left undisturbed.
Basis in remedial law: R39, Sec. 47.
Bar by former judgment (Claim preclusion)
Conclusiveness of judgment (Issue preclusion; collateral estoppel)
o Identities of parties and issues
o Facts or questions settled by final judgment/order binds the parties (and persons in privity
with them,
and successors-in-interest) – cannot be relitigated
Parties estopped from raising the same issues raised, controverted, determinative of
ruling.
Case at bar:
Civil Case No. 1: adjudicated on the merits, attained finality, decided by competent court.
Identity of parties in both actions – absolute identity of parties is NOT required, shared
identity of
interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of res judicata.
On contention that Degayo could not be bound because she had not been made a party in
Civil Case No. 1:
Real litigant may be held bound as a party even if NOT formally impleaded because he
had his day in court
and because her substantial rights were not prejudiced. (Torres v. Caluag)
o Degayo had the fullest opportunity to ventilate her accretion claim in Civil Case No 1:
Asserted that she inherited her lot from her parents, and had been in possession since
1954.
Asserted that the disputed area – occupied by her tenants – was the result of accretion.
o These are the same allegations asserted by Degayo in Civil Case No. 2.
These allegations had already been considered and evaluated in Civil Case No. 1.
Community of interest between Degayo and her tenants (respondents in Civil Case No.
1).
o TEST: whether the success or failure of one party materially affects the other.
Degayo’s rights over the disputed area is predicated on the same defenses that her
tenants
interposed in Civil Case No. 1.
Both claims emanate from a singular fundamental allegation of accretion.
The disputed area in Civil Case No. 1 and Civil Case No. 2 are one and the same.
o Degayo admitted as much in her petition.
Question of ownership of the disputed area had been unequivocally settled in Civil Case
No. 1.
o Abandonment of river bed – NOT accretion.
SC: agreed with the uniform view of the CA, on the application of conclusiveness of
judgment to the present case.
2. ***The CA may take judicial notice of Civil Case No. 1.***
The SC stated that “[t]he taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience
for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is
equivalent to proof.” (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal)
General Rule (contents of records of other cases): courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice – even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before
the same judge.
Exceptions:
o Close connection with the matter in controversy.
o To determine whether or not the pending case is moot.
Moreover, Degayo’s objection to the action of the CA is merely technical:
Degayo herself repeatedly referred to Civil Case No. 1 in her pleadings, her appellee’s
brief before the CA, and her petition for review before the SC.
o Complaint: “motion to intervene in [Civil Case No. 1], which was denied by the Court…”
o Appellee’s brief: “[Civil Case No. 1] was for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages…”
Existence of Civil Case No. 1 was jointly stipulated by the parties and mentioned by the
court a quo in its decision.
SC: “Under the circumstances, the CA could certainly take judicial notice of the finality of a
judgment in Civil Case No.16047. There was no sense in relitigating issues that have
already been passed upon in a previous civil case. That was all that was done by the CA in
decreeing the dismissal.” Justice Paras on Judicial Notice (Republic v. CA): A court will
take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in
prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case
between the same parties,of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public
records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record,
pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or
involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between
different parties in the same court.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of
merit. Costs against the petitioner
Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation (Emerald) v. The
H.D. Lee Company, Inc. G.R. No. 210693, June 7, 2017
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by Emerald Garment Manufacturing
Corporation (Emerald) against The H.D. Lee Company, Inc. (H.D. Lee) to assail the
Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated April 8, 2013 and January
6, 2014, respectively. The CA reversed the Decision of the Intellectual Property Office's
(IPO) then Director General Ricardo R. Blancaflor (DG Blancaflor) in Inter Partes Case,
approving H.D. Lee's application for registration of the trademark "LEE & OGIVE CURVE
DESIGN."
H.D. Lee filed before the IPO an application for the registration of the trademark, "LEE &
OGIVE CURVE DESIGN" and claimed that the said mark was first used in the Philippines.
Relative thereto, on outer clothing categorized under Class 25, which includes jeans, casual
pants, trousers, slacks, shorts, jackets, vests, shirts, blouses, sweaters, tops, skirts,
jumpers, caps, hats, socks, shoes, suspenders, belts and bandannas, was filed. Within
three years from the filing of the application, H.D. Lee submitted to the IPO a Declaration
of Actual Use of the mark. 5 H.D. Lee's application was published in the Intellectual Property
Philippines' Electronic Gazette for Trademarks, which was belatedly released on January
5, 2007. 6 Emerald opposed argued that the approval of the application will violate the
exclusive use of its marks, "DOUBLE REVERSIBLE WA VE LINE," and "DOUBLE CURVE
LINES," which it has been using on a line of clothing apparel since October 1, 1973 7 and
1980, respectively.
DG Blancaflor rendered a Decision reversing the findings of Atty. Abelardo based on the
grounds cited as follows:
 That H.D. Lee has established by substantial evidence that it is the owner of
LEE & OGIVECURVE DESIGN.
 That Emerald has trademark applications and/or registrations in the Philippines
on marks similar to [H.D. Lee] and which were filed and/or registered earlier than H.D.
Lee's trademark application is not sufficient to overcome the pieces of evidence proving
H.D. Lee's ownership of LEE & OGIVE CURVE DESIGN. c. H.D. Lee has shown that LEE
& OGIVE CURVE DESIGN is a well-known mark.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the records which explained how [Emerald] came to use a
highly distinctive sign such as a "Back Pocket Design" or the "Double Curve Lines" which
are identical or confusingly similar to the well-known mark LEE & OGIVE CURVE DESIGN.
The absence of any explanation on how Emerald conceived these marks gives credence
to the position that H.D. Lee is the owner and creator of LEE & OGIVE CURVE DESIGN
and is, therefore, entitled to the registration of this mark.
Emerald filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which the CA denied
in the herein assailed decision which ruled that H.D. Lee substantially complied with the
procedural requirements in filing before the IPO a petition for registration of the mark "LEE
& OGIVE CURVE DESIGN." Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION has the
rights over the registration of the marks "DOUBLE CURVE LINES' and "DOUBLE
REVERSIBLE WAVE LINE' as against H.D. Lee's "OGIVE CURVE DESIGN."
Ruling:
The instant petition is impressed with merit. The reason for this is that litigation must end
and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies. The
Court also emphatically instructs anent the concept and application of res judicata, viz.:"a
final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of
the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined
in the former suit." The elements for res judicata to apply are as follows: (a) the former
judgment was final; (b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (c) the judgment was based on the merits; and (d) between the first and
the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject matters, and causes of action.
H.D. Lee argues that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since no
identity of issue exists between the instant petition, on one hand, and G.R. No. 195415, on
the other. The Court finds the foregoing untenable as the issues all point to the registrability
of the confusingly similar marks "DOUBLE CURVE LINES," "DOUBLE REVERSIBLE
WAVE LINE," and "OGIVE CURVE DESIGN." Further, H.D. Lee's claim that the instant
petition involves the mark "LEE & OGIVE CURVE DESIGN' and not "OGIVE CURVE
DESIGN' is specious and a clear attempt to engage into hair-splitting distinctions. A
thorough examination of the pleadings submitted by H.D. Lee itself shows that indeed, the
focus is the "OGIVE CURVE DESIGN," which remains to be the dominant feature of the
mark sought to be registered.
The Court needs to stress that in G.R. No. 195415 and Inter Partes Case No. 3498 before
the IPO, Emerald had already established with finality its rights over the registration of the
marks "DOUBLE CURVE LINES' and "DOUBLE REVERSIBLE WAVE LINE' as against
H.D. Lee's "OGIVE CURVE DESIGN."
People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958
‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
MINUTE RESOLUTIONS
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. 167330 (September 18, 2009)
Facts:
On January 27, 2000, the respondent CIR sent petitioner assessment of deficiency taxes,
both Value-Added Tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) in the total amount of
P224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996 and 1997.
Petitioner protested such assessment in a letter, but the respondent did not act on the
protest which led the petitioner to file a petition in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking
the cancellation of said assessments. CTA partially granted the petition wherein the
petitioner is ordered to pay the deficiency VAT and set aside the DST deficiency tax.
Respondent appealed in Court of Appeals (CA) with regard to the cancellation of DST
assessment. CA granted the petition. The Court affirmed CA’s decision. Hence, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay the DST on its health care agreement pursuant
to Sec.185 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997
Held:
Petition granted. Petitioner is not contemplated to be included in “or other branch
insurance” covered by Section 185 of NIRC because it is a Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) and not an insurance company. HMOs primary purpose is rendering
service to its member by lowering prices and reducing the cost rather than the risk of
medical health. On the other hand, insurance businesses undertakes for a consideration to
indemnify its clients against loss, damage or liability arising from unknown or contingent
event. The term “indemnify” therein presuppose that a liability or claim has already been
incurred. In HMOs, there is no indemnity precisely because the member merely avails of
medical services to be paid or already paid in advance at a pre-agreed price under the
agreements.
Moreover, HMOs play an important role in society as partners of the State in achieving its
constitutional mandate of providing citizens with affordable health services.
Also, the DST assessment of the petitioner for the years 1996 and 1997 became moot and
academic since it availed tax amnesty under RA 9480 on December 10, 2007. Thus,
petitioner is entitled to immunity from payment of taxes for taxable year 2005 and prior
years.
OBITER DICTUM:
something said by a judge in a decision that is not essential to the decision a
nd does not form partof the RATIO DECIDENDI.
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO, G.R. NO. 155108, APRIL 27, 2005
Facts:
 The funding for the Agno Rover Flood Control Project, a public works project, was to be
derived primarily through a loan from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)
 DPWH constituted a Bid and Awards Committee (BAC) for the purpose of conducting
international competitive bidding for the procurement of the contract
 Among the 6 pre-qualified bidders are present intervenors Daewoo and China
International
 Nolasco, invoking his right as a taxpayer, prayed that the DPWH and BAC be restrained
from awarding the contract to Daewoo and have Daewoo disqualified as a bidder
 He alleged having obtained copies of "Confidential Reports from an Unnamed DPWH
Consultant"
 He said that based on the reports, Daewoo's bid was unacceptable and the putative
award to Daewoo illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and the Filipino
taxpayers
 March 27, 2002: the RTC of Manila dismissed Nolasco's petition
 According to the RTC, it was a suit against the State, which had been sued without its
consent
 Meanwhile, BAC resolved to recommend the award of the contract to Daewoo as it has
the lowers bid; DPWH Secretary Datumanong approved (i.e signed) the recommendation
Issue:
 Whether or not the petition was a suit against the State without its consent
Holding:
Yes.
Ratio:
 An unincorporated government agency such as the DPWH is without any separate
juridical personality of its own and hence enjoys immunity from suit.
 It cannot be said that the DPWH was deemed to have given its consent to be sued by
entering into a contract, for at the time the petition was filed by Nolasco, the DPWH had not
yet entered into a contract with respect to the project.
 The presumption is that the State and its elements act correctly unless otherwise proven.
PRO HAC VICE:
the phrase refers to the application of an out-of-
state lawyer to appear incourt for a particular trial, even though he/she is not licensed
to practice in the state where the trial is being held. Theapplication is usually granted
, but sometimes the court requires association with a local attorney.
REPUBLIC V. VEGA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 177790, 17 JANUARY
2011.
FACTS:
Respondents Vega sought to register a parcel of land, claiming that they inherited the
same from their deceased mother. Respondent-intervenors Buhay claimed a portion of
the lot in question. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
claim. The Republic maintains that the parcel of land is public domain, and that
respondents failed to substantiate that such was alienable. Respondents presented as
witness an officer from CENRO who testified that the land in question is indeed alienable.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered titles to be issued in favor of Vega
and Buhay. The Republic appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
findings of the lower court. The Republic files a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The
Republic claims that respondents were unable to prove that the parcel of land in question
is not part of the public domain. Respondent-intervenor Buhay challenged the petition as
it raises a question of fact, which is outside the scope of Rule 45, a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
ISSUES:
Is the parcel of land in dispute part of public domain?
Is the issue at hand a question of fact?
HELD:
Remedial Law: A question of fact requires the reexamination of the evidence on record.
What the current question involves is a determination of the correctness of the
appreciation of the facts. Is the court correct, in light of law and recent jurisprudence, in
assessing the land to be alienable? It does not seek for the presence of facts. The issue
is the application of law, to the facts.
Civil Law: The rule for registration of government land is that there must be open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable government
land. The fact of occupation and that the land is alienable government land must be
proven. Here, the Republic does not question the fact of occupation, but that of the
alienability of the land. They also contended that the testimony of the CENRO officer is
insufficient. It has been held in Jurisprudence that a CENRO certificate is inadequate
proof that the land is alienable. There must also be certification from the Secretary of
Natural Resources. However, in light of a recent ruling, the CENRO certification is held to
be substantial compliance to the needed proof. Since respondents sought certification
from the CENRO before, they are in good faith in claiming the land. The proof that they
presented may be considered as competent and sufficient proof. It is to be noted,
however, that this ruling applies pro hac vice.
DENIED
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The ratio decidendi is "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the
principle that the case establishes".
FALLO:
When there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a decision and
the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former
prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on
the body, of the decision.
FLORENTINO V. RIVERA, G.R. NO. 167968, JAN. 23, 2006
FACTS:
RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs Riveras and
third parties defendants Mendozas and adversely to the defendant and third-party plaintiff
Florentino
(aa) declaring the lease contract (Exh. 'G' also marked Exh. '2') terminated;
(bb) ordering the defendant Florentino to turn over the possession of the leased premises
to the Riveras, with Florentino being permitted to take all removable improvements at his
expense in accordance with the lease contract;
(cc) ordering Florentino to pay the Riveras annual lease rental of P500.00 for the year 1982
up to the time possession had been delivered to the Riveras and to compensate in cash or
in kind the Riveras' claim for damage for unrealized annual harvest of 100 cavans from
1978 up to the present;
(dd) ordering further Florentino to pay the Riveras and the Mendozas attorney's fees in the
amount of P20,000.00;
(ee) dismissing for lack of merit the counterclaims in the original complaint and the third-
party complaint of Florentino.
Aggrieved appealed the decision but which affirmed the same in a decision
Private respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC)
but which is denied
Petitioners filed before the RTC a Motion for Execution of its decision which was granted
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration on the ground that the decision sought to
be enforced is vague and contrary to the pronouncement made by the CA in the body of its
decision that the petitioners were deprived of only an area of 1,650 square meters or an
annual harvest of 16.5 cavans.
the RTC granted the said motion, the decretal portion but denied the Order.
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in modifying
the dispositive portion of a final and executory judgment, since the modification
substantially reduced the amount of damages awarded to herein respondents, i.e., from
100 cavans to only 16.5 cavans of palay, annually
ISSUE:
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals overstepped the bounds of
judicial discretion in reversing the orders of the trial court which substantially amended the
dispositive portion of its final and executory judgment by reducing the damages awarded
to respondents.
RULING:
It bears stressing that a decision that has acquired finality, as in this case, becomes
immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. In short,
once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter
how erroneous it may be and nothing further can be done therewith except to execute it
It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the
fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo
controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in
the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing." We expounded on the underlying
reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco where, reiterating the earlier
pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix
Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision
and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the
body of the decision."
While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the
manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that
finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and
imposes the corresponding duties or obligations
It bears noting that in the foregoing cases cited, the perceived inconsistencies referred to
alleged ambiguities found in the body of the same judgments. It is worse in this case
because what the trial court did was to amend paragraph (cc) of the dispositive portion of
its final and executory October 20, 1986 verdict in order that the same would conform to
the disquisitions contained in the body of the appellate court'sjudgment which had
affirmed in full in the decretal portion of the decision dated March 29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 15784, the lower court's ruling. Suffice it to state that this is anathema to the above-
mentioned rules. Hence, the Court of Appeals could not be faulted for setting aside the
trial court's assailed orders of September 13, 2000 and October 31, 2000 and ordering
said court "to enforce its Decision dated October 20, 1986 in accordance with its terms
and conditions
QUESTION OF LAW VS. QUESTION OF FACT:
In law, a question of fact (also known as a point of fact) is aquestion which must
be answered by reference to facts andevidence, and inferences arising from those
facts. Such a questionis distinct from a question of law, which must be answered
by applying relevant legal principles.
PAGSIBIGAN V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 163868, JUNE 4, 2009.
FACTS:
Elizabeth Hinal (Hinal) and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) entered
into a deed of conditional sale over a piece of property located at Malolos, Bulacan.
Under the deed, GSIS sold the property to Hinal payable in 25 years.
Eleazar M. Cabasal (Cabasal) was a depositor, while Romualdo A. Pagsibigan
(Pagsibigan) was the manager, of the Rural Bank of Guiguinto, Bulacan (Rural Bank).
Aside from being the manager of the Rural Bank, Pagsibigan acted as a real estate
agent, usually to bank depositors. A certain Liza Geronimo informed Cabasal that there
was a property for sale which he might like. Cabasal approached Pagsibigan and, in
1991, Pagsibigan offered for sale Hinal's property to Cabasal for P215,000 plus
assumption of the outstanding obligation with GSIS. Cabasal agreed to buy the property.
In a receipt[6] dated 30 January 1992, Pagsibigan acknowledged receipt of P215,000
from Cabasal. Cabasal occupied the property and spent P400,000 on renovation.
In 1992, Cabasal received from GSIS a notice directing Hinal to settle her outstanding
obligation of P535,000. Alarmed, Cabasal referred the matter to Pagsibigan. Pagsibigan
accompanied Cabasal to the house of Hinal and asked Hinal to sign a deed of sale and
transfer of rights over the property in favor of Cabasal. Hinal refused to sign the deed
because she did not (1) sell the property, (2) authorize Pagsibigan to sell the property,
and (3) receive P215,000. Pagsibigan assured Cabasal that he would settle the problem.
In 1999, Cabasal received another notice[7] from GSIS directing Hinal to settle her
outstanding obligation of P752,157.10, otherwise the deed of conditional sale would be
cancelled. Cabasal referred the matter to a certain Atty. Reyes. Upon the advice of Atty.
Reyes, Cabasal made an initial payment of P50,000 to GSIS to forestall the cancellation
of the deed of conditional sale.
Atty. Reyes sent a demand letter to Pagsibigan asking him to return Cabasal's P215,000.
Because Pagsibigan failed to return the money, Atty. Reyes initiated a criminal case
against him. In an Information[8] dated 3 April 2000, Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Alfredo L. Geronimo charged Pagsibigan with estafa. Pagsibigan pleaded not
guilty.
ISSUE:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of
law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers
on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to
determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of
the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
RULING:
A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of
facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to
determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of
the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value
or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or
the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are
without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party,
weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may
be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented
by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their
spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs
of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight - all these are
issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this Court which, as a rule,
confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law
raised in the petition and therein
distinctly set forth.
Whether Pagsibigan received P215,000 from Cabasal is a question of fact. It can only be
resolved after reviewing the probative value of the evidence. Thus, it is not reviewable.
The award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must have factual and legal
justification, which must be stated in the body of the decision. Otherwise, the award is
disallowed.
The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the
circumstances of each case. However, the discretion of the court to award attorney's fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the Philippines demands factual, legal and
equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise and
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. It becomes a violation of the proscription
against the imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate
The reason for the award must be stated in the text of the court's decision. If it is stated
only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same shall be disallowed. As to the
award of attorney's fees being an exception rather than the rule, it is necessary for the
court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the exception and
justify the grant of the award
In the instant case, the lower courts totally failed to justify the award of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. There was no factual or legal justification stated in the texts of the
lower courts' decisions. The RTC merely stated in the dispositive portion of its 26
February 2002 Decision that, "Accused is also ordered to pay attorney's fees in the
amount of P20,000.00 to complainant and costs of suit." Thus, the award is disallowed.