Values

Journal of Management
1998, Vol. 24, No. 3,351-389

Individual Values in Organizations:
Concepts, Controversies, and Research
Bruce M. Meglino
Elizabeth C. Ravlin
University of South Carolina
The values of managers and employees in organizations are
phenomena that have captured the interest of researchers, practitioners,
social critics, and the public at large. Despite this attention, there
continues to be a conspicuous lack of agreement on what values are and
how they influence individuals. In this article we discuss how values
have been defined and conceptualized. Focusing on values as desirable
modes of behavior, we describe how they affect individuals in organizations
and discuss some of the salient controversies that characterize
contemporary research on values. Finally, we report on a comprehensive
review of the most recent literature in this area.
Values occupy a prominent place in the scientific and public discourse at a
number of levels. They are "among the very few social psychological concepts
that have been successfully employed across all social science disciplines"
(Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989, p. 775). Values are believed to have a substantial
influence on the affective and behavioral responses of individuals (Locke,
1976; Rokeach, 1973), and changing values are frequently evoked as explanations
for a variety of social ills (Etzioni, 1993), employee problems in the workplace
(Nord, Brief, Atieh, & Doherty, 1988), and a purported increase in unethical business
practices (Mitchell & Scott, 1990). At the organizational level, values are
viewed as a major component of organizational culture (O'Reilly & Chatman,
1996; Schein, 1985), and are often described as principles responsible for the
successful management of a number of companies (e.g., Mitchell & Oneal, 1994).
Values have also been characterized as "the most distinctive property or defining
characteristic of a social institution" (Rokeach, 1979, p. 51).
Despite their popularity, there is a lack of consensus on the nature of values
themselves. Among other things, values have been considered as needs, personality
types, motivations, goals, utilities, attitudes, interests, and nonexistent mental
entities. This lack of agreement (see e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach & Ball-
Direct all correspondence to: Bruce M. Meglino, The Darla Moore School of Business,
University of South Carolina
Columbia, South Carolina 29208; e-mail <meglino@dada.badm.sc.edu>.
Copyright © 1998 by JAI Press Inc. 0149-2063
351
352 B.M. MEGLINO AND E.C. RAVLIN
Rokeach, 1989; Williams, 1979) has created problems in interpreting the results
of various studies, and has prompted calls for greater unanimity on how values are
conceptualized, defined, and measured in organizational research (Connor &
Becker, 1975, 1994).
In this article we will attempt to provide some coherence on the issue of
values by (a) describing how theorists have conceptualized values, (b) discussing
some of the major controversies that surround values research, and (c)
reviewing the recent literature on values in organizations. Because the space
allotted to this article is extremely small when weighed against the diversity of
the values literature, we were required to make a number of decisions about
what to emphasize. In doing so, we focused on (a) the preponderance of theoretical
views and (b) the utility of concepts for management and organizational
behavior. Although we attempted to make these decisions objectively, we
should state that we have previously taken positions on a number of controversial
issues dealt with here (e.g., Meglino, 1996; Ravlin, 1995). Thus, it is likely
that our prior work has had some influence on our present treatment of the
issues discussed below.
Scope and limitations of this review
As noted later, our primary focus will be on processes related to values
as desirable modes of behavior. Not wanting to introduce an "ecological"
error (Robinson, 1950), we will not consider studies in which both the independent
and dependent variables are operationalized at an aggregate (e.g.,
group, organizational) level of analysis. We will also exclude studies of
values that underlie a particular orientation or philosophy (e.g., organizational
development).
Although we will introduce examples and draw on theoretical work with
deeper historical roots, we will concentrate on empirical studies that have been
published between 1987 and 1997. While this decision was primarily motivated
by space limitations, it may have additional significance. Nord et al. (1988) maintain
that prevailing work conditions influence the values that managers and social
scientists choose to emphasize. Thus, because the work environment has substantially
changed in recent years, examining studies over a longer period of time
could provide a misleading view of contemporary research issues. For example,
as discussed later in this review, research on the Protestant Work Ethic has
sharply declined recently. Because this value emphasizes the importance of hard
work at jobs that may be devoid of any intrinsic meaning (see Nord et al., 1988),
this change in research emphasis may have been precipitated by a change in the
structure of work toward more knowledge-based jobs that emphasize greater
worker control (see Howard, 1995).
In the following sections, we will discuss the nature of values, how individual
differences in values arise, the stability of values, the effects of values and
value similarity, and controversies surrounding values and values research.
Lastly, we will review the contemporary values literature, and provide a summation
of current knowledge.
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 24, NO. 3, 1998
INDIVIDUAL VALUES IN ORGANIZATIONS 353
Value Concepts
What are values ?
As noted earlier, values have been conceptualized in different ways. At the
most basic level, theoreticians (e.g., Fallding, 1965; Rokeach, 1973; Williams,
1968) have focused on two types of values. One type is the value that an individual
places on an object or outcome (e.g., the value one places on pay). As with the
valence term used in expectancy models of motivation (e.g., Vroom, 1964), these
objects or outcomes acquire value through their instrumental relationship with
other objects or outcomes which, in turn, are instrumental to still other objects or
outcomes. Because valuing an object in this way requires calculations that are
beyond an individual's capabilities, this process is probably more subconscious or
automatic than active (see Locke, 1975).
A second type of value is more likely to be used to describe a person as
opposed to an object (Feather, 1995). These values have been further subdivided
into instrumental and terminal values (Rokeach, 1973). Terminal values are selfsufficient
end-states of existence that a person strives to achieve (e.g., a comfortable
life, wisdom). As the name implies, a distinguishing feature of terminal
values is that they are pursued for their own sake. Instrumental values are modes
of behavior (e.g., honesty, helpfulness) rather than states of existence. Rokeach
has proposed a functional relationship between instrumental and terminal values
wherein instrumental values describe behaviors that facilitate the attainment of
terminal values.
The two types of values described above are often identified using terms
such as the value "inherent in an object" and the values "possessed by a person"
(see Rokeach, 1973). It is important to recognize, however, that objects or
outcomes do not possess innate value apart from the value attached to them by
persons. Thus, the locus of both types of values is within the individual.
Because of space limitations, we will focus on values applied to individuals,
as opposed to the value placed on objects or outcomes. In this respect, we reflect
the views of Rokeach (1973) and Williams (1968), who maintain that this
approach is more appropriate for social analysis because it provides information
that is more central to the individual. It is also more parsimonious because there
are far fewer values that describe individuals than there are objects or outcomes to
be valued. Thus, this view facilitates the development of common measuring
instruments. Moreover, research indicates a correspondence between these two
types of values such that the values held by a person will influence the value he or
she places on certain objects or outcomes (Feather, 1995; Prentice, 1987). Therefore,
a deeper understanding of the values held by individuals may provide a
better understanding of the value placed on objects or outcomes.
Our reading of the current literature in organizational behavior indicates a
greater focus on values as modes of behavior (instrumental values) as opposed to
end-states of existence (terminal values). We, therefore, concentrate on values
that indicate modes of behavior. Also, in contrast to end-states of existence,
modes of behavior have more in common with values as they are used by
researchers and practitioners to describe an organization's culture (Schein, 1985).
We should note that in selecting studies to include in this review it was
sometimes difficult to separate values as modes of behavior (e.g., achievement)
from values as outcomes (e.g., the feeling of achievement associated with a particular
job). In such cases, we relied on the context to make this distinction. That is,
we included studies where the context indicated a mode of behavior characteristic
of an individual, but excluded them when the value was descriptive of an object
(e.g., a job).
Having limited our attention to modes of behavior, we next consider a
distinctive characteristic of values, namely "oughtness." This term indicates that
values specify an individual's personal beliefs about how he or she "should" or
"ought" to behave. That is, a person's values do not necessarily reflect how he or
she wants or desires to behave, but rather, they describe his or her internalized
interpretations about socially desirable ways to fulfill his or her needs (Kluckhohn,
1951; Rokeach, 1973; Williams, 1968, 1979). This distinction derives from
values being partially influenced by culture. That is, values "define the limits of
permissible cost of an expressional gratification...by evoking the consequences of
such action for other parts of the system" (Kluckhohn, p. 394). Hence, an individual's
values may induce him or her to help another person, even when an alternative
behavior would provide greater pleasure, because the benefits to the broader
society outweigh the inconvenience to the individual (see Simon, 1990 for a
discussion of this process as it relates to altruistic forms of behavior). The social
aspect of values is evident in that individuals experience guilt when they act
inconsistently with social expectations that they endorse (Kluckhohn, 1951). In
light of the above, we define a value as "a person's internalized belief about how
he or she should or ought to behave" (Ravlin, 1995). If one is particularly
concerned about behavior at work, then we would add the qualifier "at work" to
the previous definition (Meglino, 1996). These beliefs are inculcated in cognition
as elements of the ideal self-schema (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) as opposed to
the actual self.
What is responsible for observed similarities and differences in values?
Numerous possibilities have been offered to explain similarities and differences
in the values held by individuals. One suggestion derives from the belief
that values are "founded, in part, upon the fundamental biological similarities of
all human beings" (Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 418). Support for this proposition was
found in a recent study of twins reared apart, which concluded that 40% of the
variance in work values could be accounted for by genetic factors (Keller,
Bouchard, Arvey, Segal & Dawis, 1992). Another proposition is that individuals,
in part, rely on values as a means to justify their behavior (Nord et al., 1988).
Thus, some variance in values could be the direct result of differences in individuals'
behavior.
By far, the most frequently evoked reason for similarities and differences ila
values is that they are influenced by personal experiences and exposure to more
formal socialization forces (Bern, 1970; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Rokeach, 1973).
This is not surprising given that most theorists see values as products of a culture
or social system. Thus, individuals learn, through both formal and informal
means, to behave in ways that are appropriate in their social environment. In the
case of general social values, this process takes place early in life. In the case of
values that are relevant to specific social institutions or work organizations, it
primarily occurs during the organizational entry and socialization processes. We
should note that Locke and Woiceshyn (1995) have expressed a different view.
They see "moral values" or "virtues" (what we have identified as "values") as
products of an individual' s reason directed toward his or her individual survival as
opposed to societal survival.
Although a detailed description of socialization is beyond the scope of this
article, two characteristics of this process have important implications for understanding
similarities and differences in values. The first is that values "are initially
taught and learned in isolation from other values in an absolute, all-or-none
manner" (Rokeach, 1973, p. 6). That is, rather than placing qualifications on
value-related behavior (e.g., being honest some of the time), the social environment
teaches individuals that they "should" or "ought" to exhibit such behaviors
all of the time. In addition, there appear to be differences in individuals' receptivity
to these socialization influences. Such individual differences include selfesteem,
cognitive style, and specific attitude structures (see Wanous & Colella,
1989). Recently, Simon (1990; 1993) has proposed a sociobiological model that
addresses this issue. His model suggests that the tendency to respond to social
influence can have beneficial effects for the individual as well as the society.
Therefore, because the tendency to accept social influence can enhance an individual'
s fitness, Simon maintains that it can evolve through the process of natural
selection. In sum, value differences can be partially explained by differences in
individuals' susceptibility to socialization and value-change efforts.
Are Values stable?
Unlike constructs that are more peripheral to an individual (e.g., attitudes,
opinions), values are relatively permanent, although capable of being changed
under certain conditions. In this respect, they are not unlike the societies or social
systems that support them. If societies were unstable, social order would be
impossible; if they were completely stable, evolution would be impossible
(Rokeach, 1985). Rokeach and his colleagues have found evidence for the relative
stability of values in American society. They have also discovered that values can
be changed using interventions that produce self-dissatisfaction (see Rokeach &
Ball-Rokeach, 1989).
A number of mechanisms have been proposed to explain value stability.
Rokeach (1973) maintains that values are stable because, as previously noted,
they are learned in isolation from each other in an all-or-nothing manner. It is this
"absolute learning of values that more or less guarantees their endurance and
stability" (p. 6). Jones and Gerard (1967) explain value stability by noting that
people experience some discomfort or deprivation in acquiring values. Thus,
values acquire stability because individuals develop attachments to the things they
have undergone discomfort to acquire (the effort justification hypothesis). These
authors also maintain that stability is further instilled because values are reinforced
on a schedule of partial reinforcement.
What are the effects of values on perception and behavior?
Once developed, a system of values functions in a number of ways. It affects
an individual's perceptual processes in that external stimuli are perceived in ways
that are consistent with the value structure itself (Postman, Bruner & McGinnies,
1948; Williams, 1979). As mentioned earlier, values also serve a legitimizing
function in that they can provide reasons to justify an individual's past behavior
(Nord et al., 1988; Williams, 1979). More importantly, values directly affect
behavior in that they encourage individuals to act in accordance with their values
(see e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Williams, 1979). In this regard, values are one of a
number of forces that affect behavior (Rokeach, 1973). Values should, therefore,
have their greatest impact in the absence of task and situational variables (e.g.,
incentives, limitations) that affect behavior in other ways. Also, as with other
constructs that are central to an individual, values affect general modes of behavior
across situations and over time (Epstein, 1979).
The psychological mechanisms responsible for the effect of values on behavior
depend, in part, upon whether the behavior itself is public or private. Because
"values specify modes of conduct that are socially desirable, the threat of social
sanctions (e.g., shame, punishment) will induce individuals to conform to dominant
social values in their public actions (Kluckhohn, 1951). This inducement will
be present whether or not an individual's internalized values conform to dominant
social values. The mechanism that operates in the case of private behavior is a
form of self sanction. An individual's internalized values (i.e., ideal self) function
as personal standards of conduct. Therefore, any actions that are inconsistent with
these values will result in feelings of guilt, shame, or self-depreciation (Kluckhohn,
1951). Thus, individuals exhibit value-related behavior in private in order to
avoid negative internal feelings. Because value-inconsistent behavior produces
such negative feelings, individuals who fail to act, or are prevented from acting, in
accordance with their values should exhibit lower levels of satisfaction.
In assessing the relationship between values and behavior, one must be careful
to distinguish values that are "espoused" from those that are "in use" (Argyris
& Schtn, 1978). Because values are socially desirable, there are strong pressures
to publicly express and validate values whether or not they are held internally ("in
use"). Therefore, when an individual's values are different from those that are
prevalent in his or her social environment (e.g., unit, organization), the values of
the social environment may influence what the individual says, but they may not
predict how he or she will actually behave.
What are the effects of value similarity?
Because values affect perceptions and behavior, they also have implications
for interpersonal interactions. That is, when persons share similar value systems
(i.e., interpersonal value congruence), they tend to perceive external stimuli in
similar ways. Among other things, this similarity in interpreting and classifying
environmental events serves to clarify their interpersonal communications. Individuals
with similar value systems also behave in similar ways. This enables them
to better predict the behavior of others and, thus, more efficiently coordinate their
actions. In effect, value similarity produces a social system or culture that facili-
tates the interactions necessary for individuals to achieve their common goals
(Kluckhohn, 1951). Because predictability in interpersonal interactions reduces
role ambiguity and conflict, individuals with similar values should also experience
greater satisfaction in their interpersonal relationships (Fisher & Gitelson,
1983; see also Byrne's 1971 research on the similarity-attraction paradigm).
Can value similarity occur between individuals and organizations?
A number of studies have measured value congruence between individuals
and units (e.g., work groups, organizations, etc.). Such studies require that one
assess the aggregate values of the unit. This can be done directly or by." (a) using
content analysis to extract values from the unit's publications, (b) measuring the
personal values of the unit' s gatekeepers, (c) measuring the personal values of the
unit's special clients, (d) assessing the values of the unit as perceived by the unit's
gatekeepers, and (e) assessing the values of the unit as perceived by the unit's
"targets" or "general clients" (see Rokeach, 1979).
It is important to note that while these and other methods can be used to
assess unit-level values, organizations do not really possess values apart from the
values of their members. Thus, there must be a reason to believe that unit-level
values, however assessed, are shared among the individual members of the unit.
Selecting a set of values that are not shared (e.g., by aggregating otherwise diverse
sets of values) can lead to erroneous conclusions (James, 1982). Also, as cited
above, a key issue for researchers using these methods is to avoid measuring
"espoused values" (Argyris & Scht~n, 1978) that are not really part of the unit's
behavioral repertoire.
As noted earlier, shared values are a major component of an organization's
culture (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996). Because of this, their role within an organization
or other unit is similar to their function in society at large. Schein (1985)
has described these functions as external adaptation and internal integration. In
the same way that values specify the behaviors appropriate for satisfying an individual's
needs, so does an organization's culture specify the behaviors necessary
for the organization to survive in its environment (i.e., external adaptation). Similarly,
as shared values encourage efficient interactions between individuals, so
does an organization's culture facilitate interactions that occur between employees
in the workplace (i.e., internal integration). It is important to recognize,
however, that the values responsible for internal integration may be different from
those required for external adaptation. Stated another way, it is possible for an
organization's culture to emphasize values that are not appropriate for its survival.
In such a case, employees may interact in a highly efficient manner while the
organization fails to survive.
This issue can be somewhat more complicated in cases where value congruence
does not enhance performance at certain tasks. For group tasks requiring
decision making, judgment, and creativity, the type of homogeneity created by
value similarity among members (e.g., similarity in interpreting and classifying
environmental events) may actually inhibit performance (see Goodman, Ravlin &
Argote, 1986). Thus, there is no necessary reason that shared values should result
in enhanced organizational survival or higher task productivity unless the values
also encourage behaviors that are appropriate for the performance of the task and/
or the survival of the organization.
Value Controversies
Although there is reasonable agreement on the issues discussed above, there
is a conspicuous lack of consensus on other issues. We consider some of these
issues below.
How are values structured?
Thus far, we have described values as being learned in isolation from each
other. However, situations inevitably present themselves where a person's values
come into conflict. For example, someone who has been taught to be honest and
to be helpful may be asked to help another by lying. In fact, because values relate
to nearly all forms of behavior, one would be hard pressed to think of a situation
that did not involve value conflict at some level. Over a lifetime, people naturally
resolve such conflicts by engaging in a cognitively-driven process of paired
comparisons between their values (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). Thus, many
theorists and researchers believe that a person's values are hierarchically organized
according to their relative importance to the individual (Locke, 1991;
Ravlin & Meglino, 1989; Rokeach, 1973). "Since a person can only take, in
effect, one action at a time, a person who did not have any hierarchy of values
would be paralyzed by conflict and would be unable to act at all or to sustain an
action once taken" (Locke, 1991, p. 291).
This view, however, is not shared by all theorists. Some acknowledge that an
individual's values may be held independently of each other (e.g., Kluckhohn,
1951). This view allows the possibility that a person's values may be uniformly
high or uniformly low. It also recognizes that values may be equal in their intensity.
As we will discuss later, one's view about how values are held can have
substantial implications for how he or she chooses to measure values.
What values are important in organizations ?
The diversity of instruments used to measure values in organizations indicates
a lack of consensus on the values researchers feel are important. Further
complicating this issue is that these instruments measure values at different levels
of specificity. For example, organizational researchers have employed Rokeach's
(1973) measure of general social values as well as Wollack, Goodale, Wijting,
and Smith's (1971) survey of specific work values. This not only raises concerns
for comparing the findings of different studies, it also creates problems for our
understanding of value-related processes (see Connor & Becker, 1975, 1994). If
inappropriate values are measured, the absence of significant findings can be
incorrectly attributed to the lack of any real relationships.
Theorists and researchers maintain that organizations transmit a relatively
narrow set of values (Schein, 1985; Kluckhohn, 1951) or a subset of general
values (Rokeach, 1979). This suggests that very specific values are most relevant
in organizations. However, individuals' behavior in organizations is influenced by
social as well as organizational forces. This would argue that broader social
values are also relevant. Furthermore, measuring values that are specific to a
particular organization constrains values research to studies in single organizations
that are of limited generalizability. It also complicates the study of values by
virtually eliminating the use of common instruments.
This controversy does not have a clear resolution. However, it does seem
obvious that there should be a reasonable amount of correspondence between the
values that are measured and the phenomena being investigated. Thus, to the
extent that one is examining processes that have their origins in a particular organization
(e.g., the socialization of new employees) or behaviors that have specific
meanings within an organization (e.g., service to the customer), it is important to
document the relevance of the values included in the study. As noted earlier, using
nonrelevant values to measure organizational processes (e.g., measuring interpersonal
congruence using values that are not relevant to interpersonal interactions)
may lead to erroneous conclusions about the process. One should also recognize
that more inclusive general instruments tend to predict general modes of behavior
and may include some values that are less relevant to behavior in a particular
organization. When such instruments are used, one might expect smaller, albeit
theoretically important, effect sizes for value-related phenomena.
How should values be measured?
Value researchers are divided on the appropriate way to measure values.
Some (e.g., England, 1975; Wollack et al., 1971) have used methods that measure
values independently of each other. Others (e.g., Allport, Vernon & Lindzey,
1970; Cable & Judge, 1996, 1997; Chatman, 1991; Meglino, Ravlin & Adkins,
1989) have employed methods that assess preferences between different values.
Cattell (1944) used the terms normative to describe the former method and ipsative
to describe the latter. The normative technique typically requires respondents
to rate the extent they endorse a set of items or statements describing a value or
set of values (e.g., "A person should strive to be successful at his or her job.").
The ipsative technique typically asks respondents to either rank order a set of
values (e.g., achievement, helpfulness, etc.), or to choose one value or value statement
at the expense of another in a forced choice format.
Researchers who employ normative methods claim a number of advantages.
Because normative techniques yield value scores that are independent of each
other, they permit a respondent's value profile to be high or low on any or all
values (what Cronbach & Gleser, 1953, have called "elevation"). This is impossible
using ipsative procedures because each value must be assigned a different
rank. Also, when values are rated independently, it is possible to capture absolute
differences between values. This information is unavailable when values are
ranked (Osgood & Suci, 1952). Similarly, normative procedures also allow for
values to be rated as equal in strength, which is not possible with ipsative
measures.
Rating values independently also permits the use of more sophisticated
statistical analyses (Hicks, 1970). Because ipsative methodologies yield value
scores that are necessarily correlated with each other, they typically limit the
statistical techniques one is able to employ. Also, because normative scores are
independent, they more readily permit researchers to compare the strength of various
values across individuals (Ng, 1982). Furthermore, some researchers maintain
that normative scores can be transformed into a rank ordering. Thus, these individuals
note that one can extract a rank ordering from normative ratings for the
purposes of analysis and for comparing ratings with rankings. Normative proponents
also note that ratings are less cumbersome than rankings, making a normative
format more convenient to administer (Munson & Mclntyre, 1979).
Researchers who utilize ipsative methods also point to advantages of their
procedures. Probably the most important of these derives from how these
researchers conceptualize the nature of values themselves. Values are believed to
be less than totally conscious, somewhat below an individual's level of complete
awareness (see e.g., Locke, 1976; Rokeach, 1985). As a result, accurate value
measurement is thought to require assessments made in choice situations (Fallding,
1965; Kluckhohn, 1951; Locke, 1991; Williams, 1968; 1979). Ipsative
measuring techniques (i.e., rank order, forced choice) require respondents to make
such choices. Therefore, ipsative scores are believed to more closely represent an
individual's true values, rather than his or her public endorsements of socially
desirable statements. Furthermore, as previously noted, some researchers maintain
that values are hierarchically structured based on their relative importance to
an individual. Because ipsative methodologies ultimately yield a rank ordering of
values based on importance, they are believed to duplicate the way values are
cognitively held by individuals. Also, some researchers have suggested that ipsative
scores can, in fact, be transformed into normalized scores by assigning each
rank an equal area under the normal curve (e.g., Chapman, Blackburn, Austin &
Hutcheson, 1983; Feather, 1975). This transformation, however, does not recover
normative information such as elevation.
As noted earlier, values are socially desirable phenomena. Ipsative scores are
less prone to social desirability bias because values are assessed in comparison to
each other. Thus, ipsatively rated value scores are likely to remain relatively
stable despite changes in the desire for social approval. Normatively rated value
scores tend to increase as the desire for social approval increases (Ravlin &
Meglino, 1987a). As a result, normally occurring differences in the desire for
social approval within a subject population can produce artifactually inflated
relationships
between normatively measured values and other self-reported constructs
that are also socially desirable (e.g., job satisfaction, self-reported performance).
Furthermore, since the desire for social approval can also motivate self-presentational
behaviors (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), it can produce artifactually inflated
relationships between normatively measured values and criterion behaviors that
are rated by others. Similar problems can occur when respondents are treated in
ways that produce differences in compliance or the desire for social approval.
Finally, the tendency to endorse socially desirable constructs can inflate the reliabilities
of normatively measured value scales (Judge & Bretz, 1992; Ravlin &
Meglino, 1987a).
Some of the problems inherent in normative and ipsative scales can be
corrected or otherwise adjusted. This is true for the previously noted tendency for
normative value scores to produce artifactually inflated relationships. Typically,
such inflation can be estimated and corrected using a separate measure of the
desire for social approval. Also, the problem of making value comparisons across
individuals using ipsative scales can be avoided if one is interested in assessing
the strength of a single value. If the set of measured values is reasonably comprehensive
of the values that are operative in a particular domain or culture (see e.g.,
Ravlin & Meglino, 1987b; Rokeach, 1973), then an ipsative value score indicates
the same value strength for all individuals (see Ng, 1982). In such cases, an ipsative
instrument essentially becomes a normative instrument with the potential
advantage of not requiring control for social desirability response bias (see Hicks,
1970). Across-person comparisons may also be possible using the normative
transformation noted earlier (Chapman et al., 1983; Feather, 1975).
There have been numerous studies comparing various characteristics of ipsative
and normative measurement techniques. Generally speaking, the conclusions
of this research have been equivocal in that some studies have found little or no
difference between the two techniques (e.g., Rankin & Grube, 1980), some have
found ipsative techniques to be superior (e.g., Miethe, 1985) and others have
found normative techniques to be superior (e.g., Hicks, 1970). In addition to direct
comparisons, one can assess a measure's susceptibility to methodological artifacts
by examining its role as a moderator. We were unable to locate any comparative
studies that specifically examined the effects of different value scales in moderated
relationships. However, a study by Zuckerman, Bemieri, Koestner, and
Rosenthal (1989) used moderated relationships to compare rankings and ratings
of desirable trait dimensions. These authors found substantially greater moderated
effects using rank order measures.
Despite decades of research on values, and numerous studies comparing
normative and ipsative measurement techniques, there appears to be no clear resolution
to the value measurement controversy. We believe that this conflict, and
perhaps its resolution, is linked to differences in the way individuals process
information under various circumstances. Specifically, there appear to be times
when an individual's cognitive processes are naturally focused on creating a rank
ordering. This seems to occur when an individual ponders mutually exclusive
alternative courses of action. In such situations (e.g., deciding what to do on
Saturday night or what television program to watch), people naturally focus on
comparing the alternatives to each other, thus constructing a hierarchy of alternative
activities (see Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). Furthermore, particularly
when the choice is a very difficult one (e.g., an ethical decision), this process
seems to require substantial contemplation or soul-searching in Order for an individual
to uncover his or her true value preferences.
Just as the process of resolving difficult choices can prompt an individual to
reflect on his or her true underlying values, so ipsative methodologies, which
require respondents to make such choices, may allow investigators to arrive at a
more accurate assessment of a respondent's value priorities in choice situations.
The work of Tetlock may be particularly relevant to this issue. In a number of
studies involving value conflict, Tetlock and his associates have found that
persons will engage in integratively complex thinking in situations where
conflicting values are activated (e.g., Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Armor & Peterson,
1994). Thus, ipsative scales may capture information about a respondent's values
in choice situations that is impossible to assess using normative procedures.
Moreover, when one is concerned with determining value priorities and subsequent
behavior in choice situations, the unique information provided by normative
techniques (e.g., elevation, absolute differences in values, whether values have
equal strength) may be of little relevance.
On the other hand, there appear to be occasions when an individual's cognitive
processes are primarily focused on making absolute discriminations on independent
dimensions. This tends to occur when an individual is concerned with,
among other things, classifying various entities, determining the extent such entities
are similar, or assessing whether an entity meets a particular standard. For
example, people naturally use terms indicating absolute intensity, degree, extent,
etc. in describing entities such as organizations (e.g., "very" socially responsible,
"extremely" profitable) or people (e.g., "highly" ambitious, "not very" honest). In
such cases, the unique information provided by normative scales is very meaningful.
Here it is important to know whether an entity is high or low on any or all
dimensions, the extent of absolute differences between dimensions, and whether
two or more dimensions are equal in strength.
In light of the above, we would propose a contingency approach to values
measurement that considers the phenomenon one is trying to understand. If one is
attempting to comprehend a respondent's choices from among alternative courses
of action, then ipsative measurement would appear to be more appropriate. This
assumes that the values being measured are reasonably representative of the alternative
behavioral choices faced by the respondent. On the other hand, if one
wishes to understand a respondent's assessment, classification, or comparison
with regard to one or a number of entities (organizations, jobs, persons, etc.), then
normative measurement would seem to be more appropriate. Of course, this
assumes that the values being measured represent the dimensions upon which
individuals actually base their assessment. In each of these cases, we believe that
the particular methodology is more phenomenologically correct in that it closely
mirrors the actual cognitive process engaged in by individuals.
The previous discussion emphasizes that ipsative and normative scales each
contain unique information that is appropriate to different phenomena. That is,
ipsative scales contain information related to values in choice situations that is not
captured by normative scales. Normative scales, on the other hand, contain information
about the similarities and absolute differences of values in comparative
situations that is not contained in ipsative scales. Therefore, each measurement
methodology captures relevant information that is unavailable using the other.
This underscores the difficulty of conducting comparative research on the relative
effectiveness of ipsative versus normative measurement. Such research typically
involves one of two methodologies, (a) a transformational methodology that
compares a single set of scale responses both before and after they have been
mathematically transformed into a second format (e.g., normative value responses
that have been transformed into a rank ordering; e.g., Beutell & Brenner, 1986, or
rank orderings that have been transformed into normative responses; e.g., Chapman
et al., 1983), and (b) a parallel methodology that asks respondents to
complete the same scale twice, each in a different format (e.g., Rankin & Grube,
1980). In light of the above discussion, the transformational methodology would
seem to be problematic because a mathematical transformation is not capable of
capturing information that was not contained in the responses before they were
transformed. Thus, a simple transformation must necessarily bias the resulting
format by excluding certain information. A different type of bias can occur when
researchers employ a parallel methodology. Because each scale tends to model a
different type of cognitive phenomenon, one of the two formats will require
respondents to employ cognitive processes that are less meaningful, or even
inappropriate,
within the context of the study. That is, because individuals do not
normally rank order values that describe various entities, nor do they rate values
that relate to alternative behaviors, asking study participants to respond in these
ways will bias one of the scales. Therefore, comparing ipsative and normative
responses to the same scale items may produce a flawed comparison because one
of the response formats will require cognitive processing that is less appropriate
within the domain of the study.
How should value congruence be measured?
Value congruence between individuals or between individuals and a collective
(e.g., group, organization) is a complex issue that has been addressed in a
number of ways. Unfortunately, all such methods have at least some problematic
elements. One of the least complicated methods is to simply ask "respondents
themselves to estimate the extent their values are similar to those of the other
(e.g., Posner, Kouzes & Schmidt, 1985). In addition to its simplicity, this method
allows the researcher to assess value congruence at a perceptual level, if that is the
desired construct. On the other hand, this method makes a number of implicit
assumptions that may not be justified. Specifically, it presumes that the respondent
(a) knows what values are, (b) knows what the relevant values are, (c) knows
his or her own values, (d) knows the values of the other, and (e) is able to compare
these sets of values to produce an overall assessment of their similarity. Variants
of this technique (e.g., priming subjects on the meaning of values and/or the value
dimensions upon which to judge differences; Enz, 1988) may avoid some problematic
assumptions, but these methods still assume that values can be accurately
measured without the aid of a values instrument, and that respondents can accurately
assess the extent their values are similar to those of the other.
These concerns are not an issue in two additional methodologies: (a) having
respondents complete two identical values instruments, one on themselves and the
second "according to the values of the other" (e.g., Feather, 1979), and (b) having
respondents complete a values instrument on themselves and using independent
assessments to determine the values of the other on the same dimensions (e.g.,
Chatman, 1991). Although the former technique raises questions of whether a
person can accurately estimate the values of the other, both techniques provide
greater control in that they restrict respondents to a particular set of values and
impose a common measurement methodology on all respondents. These techniques
also transfer the responsibility for determining value congruence to the
researcher. That is, the researcher must employ some method of assessing the
similarity between the two value profiles.
How one should assess value profile similarity is another area of disagreement
among researchers. A variety of techniques have been used which include
variants of difference scores and correlations between different value rank orderings
(see Edwards, 1993; 1994). Recently, Edwards (1993; 1994) has criticized
these techniques for a number of reasons, including their inability to assess value
similarity on each dimension independently. He has recommended polynomial
regression as an alternative that avoids this shortcoming. However, because polynomial
regression requires the type of interval level data obtained from normative
scales, it cannot be used with ipsative measurement methodologies. This is unfortunate
because, as noted above, some researchers maintain that ipsative methodologies
are the most appropriate way to measure certain types of values. These
researchers prefer to use corrected correlations between different sets of value
rankings as an index of value similarity (e.g., Cable & Judge, 1997; Rokeach,
1973). This approach allows the use of a larger number of value dimensions without
the requirement of extremely large data sets, as does polynomial regression.
We see this issue as related to the previous discussion of values measurement.
That is, we believe that the appropriate measure of value congruence
depends on how values are measured, which ultimately depends on the phenomenon
one is investigating. Specifically, if one is interested in assessing similarity
in behavioral choices, then a respondent's rank ordering would seem to be the
appropriate measure of values, and the similarity of rank orderings would, therefore,
be an appropriate measure of value congruence. Here, one is primarily interested
in the shape of the relevant profiles, rather than the distance between the
profiles. Since the correlation of one profile with another, generally called Q
(Cronbach & Gleser, 1953), represents the similarity of profile shape (Edwards,
1994), Q would appear to be one relevant measure of congruence on values that
represent alternative courses of action. For example, if persons A and B share the
same preference ordering among values that are associated with alternative
behaviors in a particular domain, we would expect them to make similar behavioral
choices. Both persons should, therefore, be extremely comfortable accepting
the choices made by the other even though person A finds his or her choices
substantially more pleasurable than person B finds his or her choices. In such
cases, differences in elevation, absolute differences between alternative choices,
and even ties would be expected to contribute very little to the assessment of
value congruence.
On the other hand, if one were trying to determine whether persons A and B
concur in their assessment of a particular entity (e.g., their job), then value ratings
would appear to be the appropriate measure of values, and the distance between
their respective value profiles would, thus, be an appropriate measure of value
congruence. Here, it is important to know how much each person agrees with the
absolute assessment of the other on all dimensions. Therefore, differences in
elevation, absolute differences between each evaluation on all value dimensions,
and ties have substantial consequences for the amount of agreement between A
and B. Thus, even when A and B have value profiles with the same shape, a
substantial difference in the elevations of the two profiles would make each
person extremely uncomfortable accepting the assessment of the other. In such
cases, profile similarity measures that respect the distance between profiles, or
polynomial regression, which avoids the problems of combining different value
dimensions into a single index, would be more appropriate measures of value
congruence.
Although questions of how to assess values and their similarity will no doubt
be debated for some time to come, we believe that the primary concern in any
current and future methodology should be to adequately reflect the phenomenon
under investigation. As noted by Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989), some
researchers have attempted to employ normative measurement techniques simply
because these techniques are more convenient from a statistical point of view.
Clearly, we believe that theoretical relevance should take precedence over statistical
convenience in such studies. In this respect, we agree with researchers who
maintain that allowing statistical issues to dictate methods of value measurement
amounts to "putting the methodological 'cart' before the theoretical 'horse'"
(Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989, p. 775).
A Framework for Values Effects
In Figure 1 we provide a framework for identifying the types of valuesrelated
effects that theorists and empirical researchers have investigated. This is
intended as a basis for organizing the values literature rather than a comprehensive
model of values processes. As this framework indicates, values are thought to
arise from socialization processes and genetics. Values then have two main
conduits by which they affect outcomes. As noted earlier, values can have a direct
effect on an individual's outcomes or they may affect outcomes to the extent that
they are similar or congruent with the values of an "other." These "other" values
can be those of a specific person or the aggregate values of a group or organizational
unit. As previously described, value congruence can affect outcomes by
clarifying communications, removing ambiguity and conflict, and otherwise
enhancing interactions.
Some of these influences are likely to be moderated by task and situational
variables. For example, values will have little impact on behavior if situational
variables restrict the behavior from taking place. Likewise, as noted earlier, the
effect of value congruence on performance is likely to be different depending on
the task. Values and value congruence are also likely to influence the effect of
task and situational variables on outcomes. Thus, situational interventions, such as
those designed to increase performance, are likely to have different effects on
persons with different value structures (e.g., those with high versus low achievement)
and on units with different levels of value congruence. Finally, we might
speculate that outcomes and behavior should be expected to reinforce an individual's
value structure. Should this reinforcement uniformly fail to occur, we would
expect an individual's values to change (Jones & Gerard, 1967). This process is
illustrated by the feedback loop from outcomes to values.
I
~.~
~~~.
T
DURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 24, NO. 3, 1998
Prior Research on Values
To provide a context for a more comprehensive review of values research
beginning in 1987, we wish to make a few observations about the general tenor of
the earlier literature. These observations are based on studies located through a
search of the psychological abstracts from 1974 through 1986, and a subsequent
screening of these studies according to our definition of values and the previously
described limitations of this review. This search yielded a total of 69 studies.
Consistent with our earlier comments, the majority of these studies (n = 36) dealt
with the Protestant Ethic or the work ethic. The studies were evenly divided in
their focus on values as an independent variable (n = 28) versus values as a dependent
variable (n = 28). Four studies examined value change over time and nine
examined values in moderated relationships.
Although there was substantial heterogeneity in the relationships examined,
there were some cases in which different studies focused on the same relationship.
For example, when values were employed as an independent variable, multiple
studies found significant relationships between values and job satisfaction (e.g.,
Ronen, 1978), ethical decision making (e, g., Hegarty & Sims, 1978), and career
success (e.g., Watson & Williams, 1977). There was, however, a conspicuous lack
of studies focusing on actual or simulated work behavior. The sole exception was
a study by Merrens and Garrett (1975), which found that the Protestant Ethic was
significantly related to output and the amount of time spent on a repetitive laboratory
task.
When values were studied as dependent variables, studies typically included
multiple independent variables. These were almost exclusively demographic.
Thus, a substantial number of studies examined value differences as a function of
occupation or organization level, sex, age, race or nationality, and education (see
e.g., Buchholz, 1978; Cherrington, Condie & England, 1979). Although there is
no shortage of significant findings in these studies, drawing firm conclusions
about specific relationships is difficult. As previously noted, differences in values
and measures make it difficult to detect consistent relationships across studies.
This was particularly true of studies in this category. Furthermore, significant
effects observed in one study were often not replicated in subsequent studies that
controlled for different variables. For example, Cherrington et al. (1979) discovered
that females were less likely to strive for advancement than males, while
Powell, Posner and Schmidt (1984) found that females were more career versus
family oriented than males, and Buchholz (1978) detected no significant differences
between males and females on the work ethic and their devotion to their
work group or their organization.
Of the four studies that examined value change over time, three consisted of
shorter-duration, longitudinal investigations (8 weeks - 1 year) of socialization in
specific occupations or work roles (e.g., Hazer & Alvares, 1981). The remaining
study was a cross-sectional design that examined broader societal value changes
over a six year period (Lusk & Oliver, 1974). Although there were significant
value changes in three of the four studies, we could not draw any clear common
conclusions from this research.
All of the studies involving values as a moderator employed versions of the
Protestant Ethic or work ethic. The most frequently studied relationship was that
between job scope and job satisfaction. These studies were primarily concerned
with testing the hypothesis, suggested by Hulin and Blood (1968), that this relationship
should be positive for workers who have internalized the Protestant
Ethic, and negative for workers who are alienated from this value. In general,
these studies failed to support the suggested relationship (see Stone, 1975, 1976).
Values Research 1987-1997
We next turn our attention to the current literature on values. In the context
of the above discussion, and in accord with Figure 1, these studies are examined
in the following categories: values as dependent variables (including a study of
value change), values as independent variables, values as moderators, and value
congruence as dependent and independent variables. No studies were located that
dealt with value congruence as a moderator. Where studies fit more than one
classification,
they are reported in each appropriate section.
A total of 30 studies fit within the limitations laid out for this review. Of
these, four dealt with values as dependent variables, one examined value change,
seven characterized values as independent variables, and seven investigated
values as moderators. In contrast to the prior literature, a large number of studies
dealt with value congruence. Five examined congruence as a dependent construct,
and 13 examined value congruence in the independent variable role. These
categorizations
add up to more than 30 because of the multiple classification of some
studies. We also examined the studies by their primary measurement method used
in assessing values. Although studies often utilized more than one procedure, in
general, ipsative and normative measures were used with very similar frequency.
Values as dependent variables
Two of the studies examining values as dependent variables investigated the
influence of national culture, while two looked at the effects of race. This body of
literature represents a shift in two respects. First, the amount of research being
done examining the effects of various demographic variables on values has diminished
remarkably, and second, in the work that is ongoing, the focus is clearly on
cultural values. Two studies examined value differences between executives or
managers from North America, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Hong
Kong (Ralston, Gustafson, Elsass, Cheung & Terpstra, 1992; Vertinsky, Tse,
Wehrung & Lee, 1990). Differences were observed between respondents of these
three nationalities, in that managers from the PRC tended to emphasize innovation
and traditional Chinese management values more than the other two groups.
North American respondents placed more value on task orientation and integration,
and the Hong Kong sample, while less task oriented than the North Americans,
was more task oriented than the PRC sample. Aside from comparable
findings regarding traditional Chinese values, it is somewhat difficult to compare
the results of these basically very similar studies because they utilized different
values measures and control variables.
>
tkl
>
-,,~
.'~ ~.~ ~ ~
O O ¢~'-- I:x0
-r-, ~ t'~ ~
~N
.~'r.
~ ~ ~ o .-~ ~~ = o ~~ . -
~o
t~ r~
>~ ~
E'~ 2
0
..2
'g
.1
0
t'l
¢o
• ~-~,~ ~
~.~ ~
E-r. "~
,~ .'~. t~
> ~,
Of the two studies examining race or ethnicity as a determining factor in
value differences, one investigation found that of 15 cultural value dimensions
measured, race explained additional variance in 6 dimensions, when age, sex,
parental education, childhood income, and socio-economic status were controlled
(Whitney & Schmitt, 1997). Some of these effects were consistent with a priori
theorizing, others were not. One concern cited in the study was that blacks apparently
tended to engage in more socially desirable responding than whites, thus
making interpretation of values differences somewhat unclear. The second study
of ethnic differences in values (Cox, Lobel & McLeod, 1991) noted that ethnic
minorities (Asians, Hispanics, and Black Americans) were more cooperative in
orientation than Anglos, as is consistent with common understandings of differences
in collectivism/individualism in the cultures of these ethnic groups.
In addition to the studies described above, one study in the review set examined
value change. Lubinski, Schmidt, and Benbow (1996) observed that in a
sample of gifted adolescents, values were remarkably stable over a 20 year time
frame. Dominant value orientation either remained unchanged, or moved to an
adjacent value. This finding reaffirms the conceptualization of values as very
stable elements tending to form early in life. While acknowledging that major
longitudinal studies of values have in general showed their remarkable stability, in
a well-known longitudinal study (published outside of the review set), Rokeach
and Ball-Rokeach (1989) designed an intervention to determine whether values
could, in fact, be changed in adults over a significant time frame. Utilizing a
broadcast television program, an effort was made to change the rankings of the
equality, freedom, and aesthetics values. Rankings of the targeted values changed
for those who watched, thus suggesting that adult socialization, such as that which
occurs through the media, or through organizational processes, can in fact change
values in a meaningful way.
Values as independent variables
Table 2 presents studies examining values as independent variables. Three
studies examined multiple values and their impact on perceptions and decisions.
Four studies examined the role of a single value in predicting decisions and
behavior. Judge and Bretz (1992) and Ravlin and Meglino (1987a) both used a
policy capturing approach to determine the effects of values on decisions. Judge
and Bretz concluded that 3 of the 4 values measured by the Comparative Emphasis
Scale (CES) interacted with a job' s value orientation to predict the likelihood
of accepting a job offer, and that the fit between an individual's dominant value
and the value orientation of a job was more influential than pay and promotional
opportunities. Ravlin and Meglino observed that respondents utilized their value
profile, as measured by multiple rank-type procedures, in making evaluation decisions
regarding fictitious employees. In addition, a simple ranking procedure also
predicted individuals' interpretation of ambiguous stimuli in this study, thus
providing support for the idea that values influence how individuals perceive their
environment.
Whitney and Schmidt (1997) also examined the effects of multiple values, in
this case on responses to extant biodata items. Results indicated that 16% of the
INDIVIDUAL VALUES IN ORGANIZATIONS 37 1
>
e4
~.~ ~
~ 09
I
09 ~
.~,.=
~1 09 09
~'N
"~?~
~'~ 0 9 ~
.e.,
09
O
09
O 09
"~ ~'~ ~ .~
~.-~ ~.
= 09.. = ~, g.~
m~m
O
~8
~ ~ ~ =~
'~.- . 0 . . ~ ~,, ~, o
d~
,.~ • ~ ~ ~..~
O
("1
09
~ 09
L;
.'~ 09
09~
~ 09
~8 .~.
i
~g
g~
22
"~ ~,~ .~'~
~ ~e ~
~-~ ~~ ~2-~ ~
=g=
~~" i--~ ' ~09 ~ ~
O e~'--
e-
e09~
N
09 O
09
09 Q 09
09 O
~.~
?.
09
E
t9
6
.=.
09
>....
09
09 z~
,-r,
=t
"~. "5 =
.=,"
09 09 09
• "= r~ = = =
items were related to the respondent's cultural values, with dimensions tapping
basic human nature and time orientation being the most influential. It is somewhat
unclear as to what extent the validity generalization of the population of biodata
instruments may be affected by cultural values, given that the specific items were
selected based on the a priori belief thatthey related to values. It is also worth
noting that only 7.5 % of the biodata items were found to be related to both
culture and race, and that these were mixed as to whether they followed theory
regarding racial differences.
Studies examining the relationship between one value and a variety of
outcomes have found a number of diverse effects. Concern for others and empathy
were found to relate positively to secretaries' prosocial behavior directed at
individuals (McNeely & Meglino, 1994). Classification as a cooperator (as
opposed to a competitor or individualist) related positively to assigning more
importance to fairness, and voting to install a leader-based system for allocation
of resources under conditions of severe over-use in a harvest decision experiment
(Samuelson, 1993). Non-cooperators in this study emphasized self interest, and
did not vote for a leader-based system under any condition. Relatedly, Wagner's
(1995) experimental study found that the cultural value of collectivism was
related to cooperation as well. Lastly, the work ethic was found to relate positively
to job involvement under conditions of mild layoff, although not under
more severe conditions (Brockner, Grover & Blonder, 1988).
These diverse studies strongly support effects of values on decisions, including
evaluation and voting types of situations, and suggest effects for affect and for
perception in ambiguous environments. However, with some exceptions, they do
not provide a great deal of insight into the relationship between values and actual
behavior. A lack of emphasis on research directly measuring behavior, particularly
in field environments, is a continued shortcoming in the examination of the
effects of values on outcomes.
Values as moderator variables
As research into the intercultural implications of organizational behavior
increases, values are often suggested to play a moderating role in how organizations
should be managed and structured (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). This theme was
largely absent from earlier research. Five studies in the review set addressed this
issue directly (Earley, 1989, 1993, 1994; Erez & Earley, 1987; Wagner, 1995),
and two additional studies looked at other types of moderating effects of values.
Erez and Earley varied procedures by which goals were set such that they were
assigned, set by a representative of the group, or set by the group. For those
subjects low in power distance, group and representative goal setting had stronger
effects on performance, and this same pattern was exhibited by goal acceptance at
a marginal level. Earley's subsequent work found moderating effects for collectivism:
collectivists performed best in in-group contexts, as opposed to out-group
or individual contexts, and also did not loaf in group settings low in accountability
as individualists did. Collectivists also responded more positively to groupfocused
training, whereas individualists were more effective under individualfocused
training conditions. A more recent study of collectivism (Wagner, 1995)
INDWIDUAL VALUES IN ORGANIZATIONS
" = ~ ~- ~ Z~'~.~ ~ ~ ~
.. ~ ~.~ ~.~.~ ~ 8. " ~ ~
z , ~ ~ ~=~ ..~
~ ~ ~ "7. "7. "~ E
_ .. ~
~0
> "~,.
5
0~
r,1
-5~ =~
• m.,
~== ,.
-•. .='7 , ~~ =. "~~ ~ ' ~
• ~ ,._=.~
05
2~
r,o ,.~
;o
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, VOL. 24,
373
¢.,
t~
5
5
Ud
NO. 3, 1998
o q~
~ ~'~
~--~ ~g.~
~;:~ ~ ~.~~
o "~.~ ~ 9 m ~ ~ o
,~'~
O
• ~- ~
io
?ui~
8~
,2
.~g~.~ ..~~. ~ ~ . - ~ ,
~-~o
~.~"~~,~~
0
~g
o
¢¢
0
r..)
r,.)
.2
"O
¢:h
O'x
Ox
~2
¢/)
found that this value interacted with both group size and identifiability in predicting
cooperation, but not with shared responsibility. Taken together, these findings
provide initial support for the widespread contention that cultural values in
general, and collectivism/individualism in particular, play an important moderating
role in the effect of organizational systems and structures.
A second thrust of research on the moderating role of values deals with the
value of concern for others, and its moderating influence in decisional and behavioral
processes. Korsgaard, Meglino and Lester (1996, 1997) observed several
important effects over the course of multiple experiments. In particular, concern
for others moderated the relationships between situational or task variables (i.e.,
the favorableness and specificity of feedback, and decision risk and payoff) and
satisfaction with and acceptance of feedback, behavior in response to feedback,
and attraction to potential gambles. Overall, persons high in concern for others
tended to exhibit less self-interested behavior, and increased willingness to
respond to social cues. A central point in this line of research is that the value of
concern for others has been demonstrated to influence affect, decisions, and
behavior that reach far beyond a simple relationship to helping behaviors.
Value congruence as a dependent variable
As Schneider's (1987) Attraction-Selection-Attrition framework would
suggest, value congruence among people in an aggregate should be of interest to
organizational scholars. Until recently, relatively little attention was paid to value
congruence within aggregates as a dependent variable. However, based on
Schneider's theory, we would anticipate that both selection effects and socialization
effects would be important in determining its extent. Five studies from the
review period addressed these issues. Chatman (1991) directly examined the
contributions of selection and socialization to value congruence in her study
utilizing the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP). In this study, the OCP was
used to compare employee values to those of the organization, as based on
responses of senior employees. Events from the selection process, such as time
spent with firm members and ratings of similarity to successful organizational
members prior to hire, predicted value congruence at organizational entry. One
year later, value congruence was predicted by attendance at social events and time
spent with a mentor over the first year of employment. Findings suggested a more
prominent role for organizational experiences than for initial selection in determining
employee fit as tenure increased.
A second study in this set considered perceptions of congruence between
employees and their organization on goals and values of the organization as one
of six dimensions of socialization (Chao, O'Leary-Kelly, Wolf, Klein & Gardner,
1994). Their findings suggested that such judgments of fit were driven by the
organizational context in which individuals functioned. Contrary to the other
socialization dimensions studied, individuals who subsequently changed jobs and/
or organizations rated their perceptions of congruence with the initial organization
lower than did those who remained in their jobs in the same organization. After
the change, changers actually were higher on this dimension than non-changers,
thus indicating that they had made an adaptive choice. Relatedly, Lee and
>
=
=
O
;>
.4
,D
.Z
=t
~ ~ . ~ ,.., ~ =
0 ~ ~ ~'~ ~ ~
.0
0
.u.o~
~ ~ ~'~
'.~ 0 ~ ~
~8~.8~ °=o~,
0
~ ~ ~ ~'~ ~.~
0
N
N
,.-,
=.~ e,
8,a8
.o 8
"O
8.
.£
N
O
O~
O~
-d
r,.)
=~=~
INDIVIDUAL VALUES IN f,RGANIZATIONS 377
~0
~'-~- ~ ~ ~ ~ ...~ ~ ~.~ ~ ~,
~ . ~ o~ ~-.
~o : ~~ o. ~ °".- ~ ~ ~
±.~
~~
• .~ ~ ~ ~
o
"~ ~ ,~ ~ "7,
. . . . - ~ . ~ ~.-
~, 8"~.='~ ~
._..~
,.d
"a
.N
¢¢
~0
o',
E
L)
if,
O
o oo
"0
o
~ ~-~.~
• ~ ,.~ '~ ~:~
_ ~ o "~ -~
m0~.~ - ~
;)..,
,.o
"~= ,..~_
0
~ , , . . . - , ~ = ~ ~ .~
0
.0. '~ e~. ~ o ¢ '~
• .-, ., - .~ ~
• ~~.~ ~0.~ 0
o~ -~.o~ ~ "~.~1 "~~1
=~'{
~.-~
~ Ot~
c~ 0
e s~
,.~ 0
.~ ~ ~ ~,,,
_O O "..
b"
~ ~.~
_~ ~ .
¢-
O
0
N
e ~e
~~
O
zO
Mowday (1987) examined the impact of the information that was available about
the job prior to entry, alternative job prospects of applicants, and individual
characteristics
(e.g., age). Only alternative job prospects did not have an influence on
individuals' ratings of their agreement with organizational values and judgments.
Lastly, in two recent studies, Cable and Judge (1996, 1997) found a number
of linkages between different types of value congruence. The match between
applicant perceptions of the organization's values and their own, as measured by
the OCP, predicted global ratings of value congruence. In addition, the match
between recruiters' perceptions of organization values and applicant self-reported
values predicted the match between recruiters' perceptions of applicant and hiring
organization values. This second match predicted recruiters' more general ratings
of values-based fit. Taken together, these five studies indicate that selection,
socialization, and the organizational context are clearly important in determining
the match between an individual's values and those of the employing organization,
and that within-person profile matches predict more general perceptions of
value congruence.
Value congruence as an independent variable
By far, the most research has been done in the area of understanding the
effects of value congruence. This literature has taken many forms, but can be
divided into two central types: those studies dealing with the global and unspecified
perception of value congruence between the respondent and some other entity
(see Table 5), and studies in which specific values are identified for the respondent
and matched directly to another response by an individual or aggregate
(Table 6). As noted earlier, there are several different iterations of these techniques;
here, we organize the research from the review period into these two basic
categories.
Results from the 8 studies utilizing general perceptions of value congruence
with the organization clearly indicate that perceived congruence relates positively
to affective outcomes, including satisfaction, commitment, and involvement
(Cable & Judge, 1996; Chao et al., 1994; Harris & Mossholder, 1996; Lee &
Mowday, 1987). In addition, findings also indicate positive relationships with
interviewer hiring recommendations and organizational hiring decisions (Cable &
Judge, 1997), job choice intentions (Cable & Judge, 1996), met expectations (Lee
& Mowday, 1987), self-reported health (James, Lovato & Khoo, 1994), optimism
about the organization's future (Harris & Mossholder, 1996), and adaptability
(Chao et al., 1994). Negative relationships were noted with performance (Becker,
Billings, Eveleth & Gilbert, 1996; Lee & Mowday, 1987), blood pressure (reverse
of prediction; James et al., 1994), retaliation for whistle-blowing (Miceli & Near,
1994), job search behavior, and intent to leave the organization (Cable & Judge,
1996; Lee & Mowday, 1987). With the exception of the above noted relationships
with performance and blood pressure, and other minor exceptions (see Harris &
Mossholder, 1996), these findings tend to be very consistent with theory that
proposes that operating in an environment consistent with one's values is a more
positive experience on many levels.
>
C~
n~
t~
=
~0~
• -- b~ ~ ~ ~,.~
~ ~ .~=~
~ ~.~o =-= = .~ ..
• ~.~ ~ .~
• t.l O ~ ..
I~ =-
~'~g~
!•;~ ~ r~ ~~ ~~ .~--.~
a~
~o
<--
_=d-
--~
~.~-~ ~ -
=~
..= E
o
O
.=
al)
r-
O~
=-
c~
r-
i
%
,,, ~ ~ ~ ~ .~ "~ = ~ "~ ".~ ,9.
~;. .,..,o3 I~r~ ,-, .0 o
0E
tO
__. ~ ~_ o_,~
- ~ ~e=:~~i .
a• 0
• .N
-d
0 ..=
-d
p.-..
With regard to matching of value profiles of respondents to the profiles of
other individuals or aggregates, five articles looked at affective and behavioral
outcomes. Research based on the OCP found strong evidence for relationships
over time between value congruence with the employing organization and job
satisfaction and commitment (positive), intentions to leave, and turnover (negative;
Chatman, 1991; O'Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991). Research performed
using the CES also provided support for positive affect as a correlate of value
congruence with one's supervisor (Meglino, Ravlin & Adkins, 1989, 1992).
Adkins, Russell and Werbel (1994) noted that congruence between applicants and
recruiters was related to positive perceptions of applicants (employability and
person-organization fit), although not to the likelihood of receiving an invitation
for a second interview. In these studies based on the CES, value congruence with
an immediate and specific other, supervisors or recruiters, provided more consistent
findings than value congruence with either aggregates or profiles derived
from perceptions not obtained directly from the target (e.g., supervisors' perceptions
of management values).
Interestingly, in this stream of research, there was once again some evidence
of a negative relationship between value congruence and performance (Meglino et
al., 1989). This is consistent with several findings cited above for perceived value
congruence. This issue is discussed further below.
Conclusions
Our review of the values literature suggests a number of conclusions, despite
a wide diversity of results. We would argue that a basic reason why more progress
in understanding value processes in the workplace has not been made is that a
reasonably large proportion of the research reported here was not performed with
the specific intent of understanding value processes, but with the idea that values
or value congruence would explain another phenomenon of interest (for example,
see Lee and Mowday's 1987 study of turnover). These studies provide some valuable
insights, but tend not to address the function of values per se. This state of the
literature is also part of the reason why there continues to be a plethora of definitions,
measurement instruments, and specific values used. While in some ways,
such diversity is gratifying as values research strives to find a dominant paradigm,
it creates some difficulties from the standpoint of making generalizations about
the current findings. Below, we provide some key conclusions that can be drawn
from this literature.
1. The extent to which an individual values a mode of behavior appears to be
related to his or her evaluation of decisions, and behavior regarding relevant situations.
While the widely diverse literature is consistent on this point, a trend that
continues from earlier research is that organizational behavior beyond decision
making has not received much attention. Furthermore, only two studies examining
values as independent variables were done in organizations, as compared to all
of the studies examining value congruence. The next logical steps would seem to
be attempts to incorporate more behavioral outcomes, and the use of more organizational
field samples.
2. A second finding that is replicated across studies and measurement methods
is that value congruence is positively related to affective outcomes and evaluations.
Both perceived and actual value congruence exhibited this relationship.
For actual organizational value congruence, a negative link to turnover, an
outcome often associated with job satisfaction and organizational commitment,
has been established. Relationships with other types of behavior, especially
performance, remain unclear.
In this regard, Argyris and SchSn's (1978) distinction between espoused
values and values in-use may be a key to understanding the empirical results
obtained to date regarding performance. Enz (1988) has suggested that congruence
with espoused values, as opposed to in-use values, is likely to have a negative
relationship with performance. This is thought to be caused by substandard
performers feeling more pressure to conform publicly to the expressed values of
the organization. This conceptualization would explain the negative correlations
noted above between perceived value congruence and performance, which may be
more easily influenced by social desirability concerns. The causal relationship
between espoused values and performance may also be post hoc in nature, i.e., the
result of behavior, rather than the cause. However, continual espousing of a set of
values might also eventually influence actual value beliefs, thus providing a feedback
loop in the values process.
The espoused versus in-use distinction is less easy to utilize as an explanation
for negative relationships between actual value congruence and performance,
as the partially unconscious nature of values, and the measurement procedure
itself, make actual match measures difficult to fake. As previously discussed,
actual value congruence may hinder performance on non-routine tasks that benefit
from constructive conflict in ideas and approaches (e.g., Amason, 1996). Some
authors might even go so far as to suggest that in today's competitive environment,
no task environment should be considered strictly routine, and therefore,
value congruence may not facilitate performance in any case. This view seems
somewhat extreme, but without empirical research into the specific processes
whereby different types of congruence affect performance on different types of
tasks, all conceptualizations of the relationship remain speculative.
3. Relatedly, although a significant number of studies has addressed both
perceptions of and actual value congruence, only initial attempts have begun to
logically distinguish between these two different constructs in the literature (see
Cable & Judge, 1996, 1997). In addition to reflecting actual value congruence,
perceptions of value congruence may in part reflect efforts to appear more consistent
with the values of the organization or of significant others, but may also be
driven by inaccurate ideas regarding what values are, what values are important,
or the actual extent of congruence that exists. This suggests that we need a clearer
theoretical understanding of the causes of perceived value congruence, given that
these determinants go beyond the amount of actual value congruence that exists.
We should logically anticipate some differences in the effects of these types
of congruence because it is quite likely that they represent different, albeit related,
constructs. Although similarities exist in the results reported here, these studies
largely ignore these potentially different processes. Another potentially interest-
ing issue is whether perceived congruence with an organization is in some cases
driven by local organizational conditions. If so, we might anticipate that outcomes
would revolve around local conditions as well, such as satisfaction with coworkers
and working conditions, and agreement with and behavior toward the accomplishment
of subgoals. Of course, these ideas remain highly speculative, and are
not represented in the empirical literature reviewed above.
4. One issue remaining to be resolved in value congruence research relates to
the appropriate method of measuring this construct. As discussed above, researchers
differ on whether normative or ipsative instruments are theoretically and
statistically appropriate. Ultimately, the choice of measurement approach should
depend on the theoretical nature of the decision process being investigated. One
might argue that, as with most research areas, multiple approaches are in fact a
strength of good research, and that investigations of both normative effects of
similarity and profile similarity should continue.
5. A central trend for the future should be the examination of national culture
and the moderating influences of cultural values. After assuming a connection for
many years, studies are now being done that show relationships between an individual's
country culture and his or her values. In addition, moderating effects of
cultural values have also been observed. Given the extent this idea has been cited
in everything from our theories to our management texts (e.g., George & Jones,
1996), relatively little in the way of empirical results has appeared in the field's
major journals until very recently. In prior research, our understanding of this
issue was hampered by research that used country of origin as a surrogate for
values, and ignored the fact that these dimensions vary not only by culture, but by
individual as well. As well designed research has begun to appear that incorporates
a theory of values as well as their measurement, we should expect to experience
greater progress in this area.
6. As some effects of values and value congruence have now been established
in the literature, it seems appropriate to focus more attention on testing
elements of process approaches to values, instead of focusing solely on what
outcomes are affected. In this respect, it may be useful to utilize a two-pronged
approach. One approach would be to investigate a general theory of values, i.e.,
processes whereby all values should function. A second approach would be to
examine individual values for value-specific processes. Either of these approaches
requires clear ideas of what values are, which values are important, and what
measurement instruments are most appropriate. However researchers proceed,
such choices should be made explicitly and as they relate to theory, rather than by
happenstance. In addition, research and theory that addresses the intra-individual
aspects of values-based decision making, including cognition regarding the self,
and emotional responses to such decisions, is clearly called for at this point.
Progress has clearly been made in values research over the last ten years, but
perhaps it has not been as great as it should be. Values are commonly cited as
influencing everything from selection (Cappelli, 1995) and control processes
(Barker, 1993), to organizational ethics (Keeney, 1994) and leadership (Selznick,
1957). For a construct of this apparent importance, more resources should be
turned toward a fuller comprehension of its relevant processes and functions.
Acknowledgment: The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for
their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. We also
thank Arzu Ilsev for her help with the review portion of this article.
References
Adkins, C. L., Russell, C. J., & Werbel, J. D. (1994). Judgments of fit in the selection
process: The role of work
value congruence. Personnel Psychology, 47: 605-623.
Allport, G. W., Vernon, P. E., & Lindzey, G. (1970). Manual: Study of values. (3rd ed.)
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Amason, A. C. (1996). Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict
on strategic decision
making: Resolving a paradox for top management teams. Academy of Management
Journal, 39:123-148.
Argyris, C., & Schttn, D. A. (1978). Organizational learning. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley.
Barker, J. (1993). Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in self-managing teams.
Administrative Science
Quarterly, 38: 408-437.
Becker, T. E., Billings, R. S., Eveleth, D. M., & Gilbert, N. L. (1996). Foci and bases of
employee commitment:
Implications for job performance. Academy of Management Journal, 39: 464--482.
Bem, D. J. (1970). Beliefs, attitudes, and human affairs. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Beutell, N. J., & Brenner, O. C. (1986). Sex differences in work values. Journal of
Vocational Behavior, 28: 29-
41.
Brockner, J., Grover, S. L., & Blonder, M. D. (1988). Predictors of survivors' job
involvement following layoffs:
A field study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 73: 436--442.
Buchholz, R. A. (1978). An empirical study of contemporary beliefs about work in
American society. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 63: 219-227.
Byrne, D. (1971). The attraction paradigm. New York: Academic Press.
Cable, D. M., & Judge, T. A. (1997). Interviewers' perceptions of person-organization fit
and organizational
selection decisions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82: 546-561.
Cable, D. M., & Judge, T. A. (1996). Person-organization fit, job choice decisions, and
organizational entry.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67:294-311.
Cappelli, P. (1995). Is the "skills gap" really about attitudes? California Management
Review, 37: 108-124.
Cattell, R. B. (1944). Psychological measurement: Normative, ipsative, and interactive.
Psychological Review,
51: 292-303.
Chapman, D. W., Blackburn, R. W., Austin, A. E., & Hutcheson, S. M. (1983).
Expanding analytic possibilities
of Rokeach values data. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 43: 419-421.
Chao, G. T., O'Leary-Kelly, A. M., Wolf, S., Klein, H. J., & Gardner, P. D. (1994).
Organizational socialization:
Its contents and consequences. Journal of Applied Psychology, 79: 730-743.
Chatman, J. A. (1991). Matching people and organizations: Selection and socialization in
public accounting firms.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 459-484.
Cherrington, D. J., Condie, S. J., & England, D. L. (1979). Age and work values.
Academy of Management Journal,
22: 617-623.
Connor, P. E., & Becker, B. W. (1975). Values and the organization: Suggestions for
research. Academy of
Management Journal, 18: 550-561.
Connor, P. E., & Becker, B. W. (1994). Personal values and management: What do we
know and why don't we
know more? Journal of Management Inquiry, 3: 67-73.
Cox, T. H., Lobel, S. A., & McLeod, P. L. (1991). Effects of ethnic group cultural
differences on cooperative and
competitive behavior on a group task. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 827-847.
Cronbach, L. J., & Gleser, G. C. (1953). Assessing similarity between profiles.
Psychological Bulletin, 50: 456-
473.
Crowne, J. E., & Marlowe, D. (1964). The approval motive: Studies in evaluative
dependence. New York: Wiley.
Earley, P. C. (1989). Social loafing and collectivism: A comparison of the United States
and the People's Republic
of China. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34:565-581.
Earley, P. C. (1993). East meets west meets mideast: Further explorations of collectivistic
and individualistic work
groups. Academy of Management Journal, 36:319-348.
Earley, P. C. (1994). Self or group? Cultural Effects of training on self-efficacy and
performance. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 39:89-117.
Edwards, J. R. (1993). Problems with the use of profile similarity indices in the study of
congruence in organizational
research. Personnel Psychology, 46:64 1-665.
Edwards, J. R. (1994). The study of congruence in organizational behavior research:
Critique and a proposed alternative.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58:51-100.
England, G. W. (1975). The manager and his values: An international perspective from
the United States, Japan,
Korea, India, and Australia. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Enz, C. A. (1988). The role of value congruity in intraorganizational power.
Administrative Science Quarterly,
33: 284-304.
Epstein, S. (1979). The stability of behavior: 1. On predicting most of the people much of
the time. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 37:1097-1126.
Erez, M., & Earley, P. C. (1987). Comparative analysis of goal-setting strategies across
cultures. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 72: 658--665.
Etzioni, A. (1993). The spirit of community: Rights, responsibilities, and the
communitarian agenda. New York:
Crown Publishers.
Fallding, H. (1965). A proposal for the empirical study of values. American Sociological
Review, 30: 223-233.
Feather, N. T. (1975). Values in education and society. New York: Free Press.
Feather, N. T. (1979). Human values in the work situation: Two studies. Australian
Psychologist, 14:131-141
Feather, N. T. (1995). Values, valences, and choices: The influence of values on the
perceived attractiveness and
choice of alternatives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68:1135-1151.
Fisher, C. D., & Gitelson, R. (1983). A recta-analysis of the correlates of role conflict and
ambiguity. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 68: 320-333.
George, J. M., & Jones, G. R. (1996). Understanding and managing organizational
behavior. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
Goodman, P. S., Ravlin, E. C., & Argote, L. (1986). Current thinking about groups:
Setting the stage for new
ideas. In P. S. Goodman & Associates (Eds.), Designing effective work groups. San
Francisco: Jossey-
Bass.
Harris, S. G., & Mossholder, K. W. (1996). The affective implications of perceived
congruence with culture
dimensions during organizational transformation. Journal of Management, 22: 527-547.
Hazer, J. T., & Alvares, K. M. (1981). Police work values during organizational entry and
assimilation. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 66: 12-18.
Hegarty, W. H., & Sims, H. P. Jr. (1978). Some determinants of unethical decision
behavior: An experiment. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 63:451-457.
Hicks, L. E. (1970). Some properties of ipsative, normative, and forced-choice normative
measures. Psychological
Bulletin, 74: 167-184.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences: International differences in work related
values. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Howard, A. (1995). A framework for work change. In A. Howard (Ed.), The changing
nature of work (pp. 3-44).
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Hulin, C. L., & Blood, M. R. (1968). Job enlargement, individual differences, and worker
responses. Psychological
Bulletin, 69: 41-55.
James, L. R. (1982). Aggregation bias in estimates of perceptual agreement. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 67:
219-229.
James, K., Lovato, C., & Khoo, G. (1994). Social identity correlates of minority workers'
health. Academy of
Jones, E. E., & Gerard, H. B. (1967). Foundations of social psychology. New York:
Wiley.
Judge, T. A., & Bretz, R. D., Jr. (1992). Effects of work values on job choice decisions.
Journal of Applied
Psychology, 77: 261-271.
Keeney, R. L. (1994). Creativity in decision making with value-focused thinking. Sloan
Management Review, 35:
33-41.
Keller, L. M., Bouchard, T. J. Jr., Arvey, R. D., Segal, N. L., & Dawis, R. V. (1992).
Work values: Genetic and
environmental influences. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77: 79-88.
Kluckhohn, C. (1951). Values and value-orientations in the theory of action. In T.
Parsons & E. Shils (Eds.),
Toward a general theory of action (pp. 388-433). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Korsgaard, M. A., Meglino, B. M., & Lester, S. W. (1996). The effect of other-oriented
values on decision
making: A test of propositions of a theory of concern for others in organizations.
Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 68: 234-245.
Korsgaard, M. A., Meglino, B. M., & Lester, S. W. (1997). Beyond helping: Do other-
oriented values have
broader implications in organizations? Journal of Applied Psychology, 82: 160-177.
Lee, T. W., & Mowday, R. T. (1987). Voluntarily leaving an organization: An empirical
investigation of Steers
and Mowday's model of turnover. Academy of Management Journal, 30:721-743.
Locke, E. A. (1975). Personnel attitudes and motivation Annual Review of Psychology,
61: 457-480.
Locke, E. A. (1976). The nature and consequences of job satisfaction. In M. D. Dunnette
(Ed.), Handbook of
industrial and organizational psychology (pp. 1297-1349). Chicago: Rand McNally.
Locke, E. A. (1991). The motivation sequence, the motivation hub, and the motivation
core. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50: 288-299.
Locke, E. A., & Woiceshyn, J. (1995). Why businessmen should be honest: the argument
from rational egoism.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 16: 405-414.
=it I
Lubinski, D., Schmidt, D. B., & Benbow, C. P. (1996). A 20-year stability analysis of the
study of values for intellectually
gifted individuals from adolescence to adulthood. Journal of Applied Psychology,
81:443-451.
Lusk, E. J., & Oliver, B. L. (1974). American managers' personal value systems-revisited.
Academy of Management
Journal, 17: 549-554.
McNeely, B. L., & Meglino, B. M. (1994). The role of dispositional and situational
antecedents in prosocial organizational
behavior: An examination of the intended beneficiaries of prosocial behavior. Journal of
Applied
Meglino, B. M. (1996). Work values. In L. H. Peters, S. A. Youngblood & C. R. Greer.
The Blackwell encyclopedic
dictionary of human resource management. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers.
Meglino, B. M., Ravlin, E. C., & Adkins, C. L. (1989). A work values approach to
corporate culture: A field test
of the value congruence process and its relationship to individual outcomes. Journal of
Applied Psychology,
74: 424--432.
Meglino, B. M., Ravlin, E. C., & Adkins, C. L. (1992). The measurement of work value
congruence: A field study
comparison. Journal of Management, 18: 33-43.
Merrens, M. R., & Garrett, J. B. (1975). The Protestant Ethic scale as a predictor of
repetitive work performance.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 60: 125- 27.
Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1994).Relationships among value congruence, perceived
victimization, and retaliation
against whistle-blowers. Journal of Management, 20: 773-794.
Miethe, T. D. (1985). The (,alidity and reliability of value measurements. Journal of
Mitchell, T. R., & Scott, W. G. (1990). America's problems and needed reforms:
Confronting the ethic of personal
advantage. Academy of Management Executive, 4: 23-35.
Mitchell, R., & O'Neal, M. (1994). Managing by values: Is Levi Strauss' approach
visionary - or flaky? Business
Week, August 1: 46-52.
Munson, J. M., & Mclntyre,S. H. (1979). Developing practical procedures for the
measurement of personal values
in cross-cultural marketing. Journal of Marketing Research, 14: 48-52.
Nord, W. R., Brief, A. P., Atieh, J. M., & Doherty, E. M. (1988). Work values and the
conduct of organizational
behavior. In B. Staw and L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol.
9, pp. 1-42).
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Ng, S. H. (1982). Choosing between the ranking and rating procedures for the
comparison of values across
cultures. European Journal of Social Psychology, 12: 169-172.
Osgood, C. E., & Suci, G. J. (1952). A measure of relation determined by both mean
difference and profile information.
Psychological Bulletin, 49:251-262.
O'Reilly, III, C. A., & Chatman, J. A. (1996). Culture as social control: Corporations,
cults and commitment. In
B. Staw & L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 18, pp. 157-
200). Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press.
O'Reilly, III, C. A., Chatman, J. A., & Caldwell, D. F. (1991). People and organizational
culture: A profile
comparison approach to assessing person-organization fit. Academy of Management
Journal, 34:487-516.
Posner, B. Z., Kouzes, J. M., & Schmidt, W. H. (1985). Shared values make a difference:
An empirical test of
corporate culture. Human Resource Management, 24: 293-309.
Powell, G. N., Posner, B. Z., & Schmidt, W. H. (1984). Sex effects on managerial value
systems. Human Relations,
37: 909-921.
Postman, L., Bruner, J. S., & McGinnies, E. (1948). Personal values as selective factors
in perception. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 43: 142-154.
Prentice, D. A. (1987). Psychological correspondence of possessions, attitudes, and
values. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 53: 993-1003.
Ralston, D. A., Gustafson, D. J., Elsass, P. M., Cheung, F., & Terpstra, R. H. (1992).
Eastern values: A comparison
of managers in the United States, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China.
Journal of Applied
Psychology, 77:664--671.
Rankin, W. L., & Grube, J. W. (1980). A comparison of ranking and rating procedures
for value system measurement.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 10: 233-246.
Ravlin, E. C. (1995). Values. In N. Nicholson (Ed.), The Blackwell encyclopedic
dictionary of organizational
behavior (pp. 598-599). Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishers.
Ravlin, E. C., & Meglino, B. M. (1987a). Effect of values on perception and decision
making: A study of alternative
work values measures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72: 666-673.
Ravlin, E. C., & Meglino, B. M. (1987b). Issues in work values measurement. In W. C.
Frederick (Ed.), Research
in corporate socialperformance andpolicy, (Vol. 9, pp. 153-183). Greenwich, CT: JAI
Press.
Ravlin, E. C., & Meglino, B. M. (1989). The transitivity of work values: Hierarchical
preference ordering of
socially desirable stimuli. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 44:
494-508.
Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological correlations and the behavior of individuals.
American Sociological Review,
15: 351-357.
Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free Press.
Rokeach, M. (1979). From individual to institutional values: With special reference to the
values of science. In
M. Rokeach (Ed.), Understanding human values (pp. 47-70). New York: Free Press.
Rokeach, M. (1985). Inducing change and stability in belief systems and personality
structures. Journal of Social
Issues, 41: 153-171.
Rokeach, M., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1989). Stability and change in American values,
1969-1981. American
Psychologist, 44: 775-784.
Rouen, S. (1978). Personal values: A basis for work motivational set and work attitude.
Organizational Behavior
and Human Performance, 21: 80-107.
Samuelson, C. D. (1993). A multiattribute approach to structural change in resource
dilemmas. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55: 298-324.
Schein, E. H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schlenker, B. R., & Weigold, M. F. (1989). Goals and the self-identification process:
Constructing desired identities.
In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Goal concepts in personality and socialpsychology (pp. 243-290).
Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Schneider, B. (1987). The people make the place. Personnel Psychology, 40: 437-453.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation.
Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Simon, H. A. (1990). A mechanism for social selection and successful altruism. Science,
250: 1665-1668.
Simon, H. A. (1993). Altruism and economics. American Economic Review, 83: 156-
161.
Stone, E. F. (1975). Job scope, job satisfaction, and the Protestant Ethic: A study of
enlisted men in the U. S. Navy.
Journal of Vocational Behavior, 7: 215-234.
Stone, E. F. (1976). The moderating effect of work-related values on the job scope-job
satisfaction relationship.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 15:147-167.
Tetlock, P. E. (1986). A value pluralism model of ideological reasoning. Journal of
Personality and Social
Psychology, 50:819-827.
Tetlock, P. E., Armor, D., & Peterson, R. S. (1994). The slavery debate in Antebellum
America: Cognitive style,
value conflict, and the limits of compromise. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 66:115-126.
Vertinsky, l., Tse, D. K., Wehrung, D. A., & Lee, K. (1990). Organizational design and
management norms: A
comparative study of managers' perceptions in the People's Republic of China, Hong
Kong, and Canada.
Journal of Management, 16: 853-867.
Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. New York: Wiley.
Wagner, Ill, J. A. (1995). Studies of individualism-collectivism: Effects on cooperation in
groups. Academy of
Wanous, J. P., & Colella, A. (1989). Organizational entry research: Current status and
future directions. In K.
Rowland & G. Ferris (Eds.), Research in personnel and human resources management
(Vol. 7, pp. 253-
314). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Watson, J. G., & Williams, J. (1977). Relationship between managerial values and
managerial success of black
and white managers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62:203-207
Whitney, D. J., & Schmitt, N. (1997). Relationship between culture and responses to
biodata employment items.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 82:113-129.
Williams, R. M., Jr. (1968). The concept of values. In D. Sills (Ed.), International
encyclopedia of the social
sciences (pp. 283-287). New York: Macmillan.
Williams, R. M., Jr. (1979). Change and stability in values and value systems: A
sociological perspective. In M.
Rokeach (Ed.), Understanding human values (pp. 15-46). New York: Free Press.
Wollack, S., Goodale, J. G., Wijting, J. P., & Smith, P. C. (1971). Development of the
survey of work values. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 55:331-338.
Zuckerman, M., Bernieri, F., Koestner, R., & Rosenthal, R. (1989). To predict some of
the people some of the
time: In search of moderators. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57: 279-
293.

Values

Încărcat de

Informații document

Descriere originală:

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Values

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Journal of Management

1998, Vol. 24, No. 3,351-389

S-ar putea să vă placă și