National Transmission Corporation vs COA and COA Chairperson Michael Aguinaldo

G.R. No. 227796, February 20, 2018

Subject: Administrative Law
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo

Facts: National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) is a government instrumentality created under RA 9136
known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law). In December 2007, its concession
was awarded to the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) and accordingly, its employees
were either retired or separated from service. Mr. Agulto, who was a regular employee of petitioner
Transco with the position Principal Engineer B from March 17, 2003 to June 29, 2009, received the amount
of P656,597.50 as separation benefits pursuant to petitioner’s resolution implementing the Early Separation
Program.

During post-audit, the Supervising Auditor (SA) issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. TC-10-005 (09)
disallowing the amount of P22,965.81 from Agulto's separation benefits as said amount pertained to the
period March 1 to 15, 2004 during which Agulto's employment status was still contractual. The SA noted
that the Service Agreement of Agulto during the said period specially provided that "the service to be
rendered is not considered and will not be credited as government service." Thus, the SA found the
following persons liable (1) Bernadine L. Protomartir — Division Manager, General Accounting & Financial
Reporting (GAFR), (2) Jose Mari M. Ilagan — Manager, Administrative Department and (3) Alfredo V.
Agulto, Jr. — Payee Petitioner appealed the ND before the Director, Cluster B, Corporate Government
Sector (CGS) of the COA. It argued that the payment of separation benefits to contractual employees was
lawful as it was in accordance with the EPIRA Law, the Corporation Code, and the Board Resolutions of
NTC.

The COA Director partially granted the appeal by exempting Agulto from liability since he received his
separation benefits in good faith. However, Respondent COA-Commission Proper (CP) rendered Decision
No. 2016-278, disapproving the Decision of the COA Director. Respondent COA-CP maintained, that under
Section 63 of RA 9136, in relation to Rule 33, separation benefits only applies if their appointments were
approved or attested to by the Civil Service Commission(CSC). In this case, since there was no proof that
Agulto's appointment was duly approved or attested to by the CSC, the payment of the amount of
P22,965.81 was correctly disallowed. Accordingly, the members of petitioner Board of Directors who
approved the Resolutions as well as Agulto, were liable to return the said amount.

Issue: WON respondent COA-CP committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing a portion of Agulto's
separation benefits and WON members of petitioner Board of Directors and Agulto are solidarily liable for
the amount disallowed

Ruling: The Petition is partly meritorious. The issues raised by petitioner have been resolved in the similar case of
National Transmission Corporation v. Commission on Audit, where the Court sustained the disallowance
of a portion of the separation benefits of an employee corresponding to the period when he was still a
contractual employee. It was ruled that under the EPIRA Law, contractual employees are entitled to
separation benefits only if their appointments have been approved or attested to by the CSC. In this case,
since there was no proof that Agulto's appointment was duly approved or attested to by the CSC, the
disallowance of the amount of P22,965.81 was valid and proper. Thus, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent COA-CP is sustaining the disallowance. The disallowed amount,
however, need not be refunded by the members of petitioner’s Board of Directors as well as by Agulto.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED . The Decision No. 2016-278 dated September
28, 2016 of respondent Commission on Audit, Commission Proper, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the disallowed amount of P22,965.81 need not be refunded.
Case: PETRON CORPORATION v ARMZ CABERTE, G.R. No. 182255, June 15, 2015
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Topic: Article 106 of the Labor Code- Contractor or Subcontractor

Facts: This case pertains to the 3 consolidated complaints against Petron Corporation for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages and non-payment of allowances, 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

For the periods from March 1, 1996 to February 28, 1999 and November 1, 1996 to June 30, 1999, Petron and
ABC, a labor contracting business owned and operated by Caberte Sr., entered into a Contract for Services
and a Contract for LPG Assistance Services. Under both service contracts, ABC undertook to provide utility
and maintenance services to Petron in its Bacolod Bulk Plant.

Respondents who were hired as LPG/Gasul fillers, maintenance crew, warehousemen, utility workers and
tanker receiving crew averred that even before Petron engaged ABC as contractor in 1996, most of them
had already been working for Petron for years. However, every time Petron engages a new contractor, it
would designate such new contractor as their employer. Despite such arrangement, Petron exercised
control and supervision over their work, the performance of which is necessary and desirable in its usual
trade and business. Respondents added that ABC is a mere labor-only contractor which had no substantial
capital and investment, and had no control over the manner and method on how they accomplished their
work. Thus, Petron is their true employer. On July 1, 1999, however, Petron no longer allowed them to
enter and work in the premises of its Bacolod Bulk Plant. Hence, the complaints for illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, Petron asserted that ABC is an independent contractor which supplied the needed
manpower for the maintenance of its bulk handling premises and offices, as well as for tanker assistance in
the receiving and re-filling of its LPG products; that among the workers supplied by ABC were
respondents, except Caberte Jr., who does not appear to be one of those assigned by ABC to work for it;
that it has no direct control and supervision over respondents who were tasked to perform work required
by the service contracts it entered into with ABC; and, that it cannot allow the continuous employment of
respondents beyond the expiration of the contracts with ABC. To prove the legitimacy and capacity of ABC
as an independent contractor, Petron submitted several following documents. In addition, it averred that
ABC, as a contractor, had duly posted a performance bond and took out insurance policies against
liabilities. Petron likewise presented affidavits of two Petron employees stating that respondents do not
perform activities related to Petron’s business operation but only tasks which are intermittent and which
can be contracted out. Also submitted were affidavits of three former employees of ABC attesting to the
fact that during their stint in Petron, they used materials such as floor polisher, floor wax, broom, dustpan,
cleaning rags and other equipment owned by ABC to accomplish their tasks and that they worked under
the supervision of Caberte Sr., through the latter’s designated overall supervisor, respondent Caberte.
Petron further revealed that ABC/Caberte Sr. has the power to hire and fire respondents and was the one
paying their wages.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding that ABC Contracting Services is a mere labor-only contractor and in
holding that respondents are regular employees of Petron.

Ruling: The petition has no merit. ABC contracting services is a labor-only contractor and a mere agent of Petron.
Petron thus is the true employer of respondents who are considered regular employees.

Petron contends that the CA erred in ruling that ABC is a labor-only contractor since respondents failed to
prove that ABC is not an independent contractor. The contention, however, is incorrect. The law presumes
a contractor to be a labor-only contractor and the employees are not expected to prove the negative fact
that the contractor is a labor-only contractor. Thus, it is not respondents but Petron which bears the burden
of establishing that ABC is not a labor-only contractor but a legitimate independent contractor.
Foremost, Petron banks on the contracts of services it entered into with ABC. It contends that the said
contracts were legitimate business transactions and were not only for the purpose of ABC providing
manpower or labor-only to Petron, but rather for specific services pertaining to janitorial, utility and LPG
assistance.

Suffice it to state, however, that Petron cannot place reliance on the contracts it entered into with ABC since
these are not determinative of the true nature of the parties’ relationship. As held in Babas v. Lorenzo
Shipping Corporation, the character of the business, whether as labor-only contractor or as a job contractor,
should be determined by the criteria set by statute and the parties cannot dictate by the mere expedience
of a unilateral declaration in a contract the character of their business.

Next, Petron endeavours to prove that ABC is a legitimate independent contractor.

To restate, a contractor is deemed to be a labor-only contractor if the following elements are present:
(i) the contractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or
service under its own account and responsibility; and
(ii) (ii) the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor are performing activities which
are directly related to the main business of the principal.

To show that ABC has substantial capital or investment, Petron submitted, among others, ABC’s BIR
Certificate of Registration, VAT Return, BIR Confirmation Receipt, TIN, Individual Income Tax Return,
Mayor’s Permit and DTI Certificate of Registration. However, the Court observes that these documents are
not conclusive evidence of ABC’s financial capability. At most, they merely show that ABC is engaged in
business and licensed by the appropriate government agencies.

As for the financial statements presented, it appears that only the audited financial statements of ABC for
the years 1992, 1993 and 1994 were submitted. As aptly observed by the CA, these documents cannot be
given much credence considering that the service contracts between Petron and ABC commenced in 1996
and ended in 1999. However, no audited financial statements for the years material to this case (1996, 1997,
1998 and 1999) were submitted. Also, as per record, ABC was obligated to submit to Petron at least once
every two years its latest audited financial statements, among others, as a requirement for the retention of
its status as an accredited contractor of Petron. If it is true that ABC continued to possess its financial
qualification after 1994, Petron should have presented ABC’s financial statements for the said years which
are presumed to be in Petron’s possession considering that they are part of the requirements that it itself
set for its accredited contractors.

The performance bond posted by ABC Contracting Services likewise fails to convince us that the former
has substantial capital or investment inasmuch as it was not shown that the performance bond in the
amount of ₱596,799.51 was enough to cover not only payrolls, rentals and equipment but also possible
damages to the equipment and to third parties and other contingent liabilities. Moreover, this Court takes
judicial notice that bonds of this nature are issued upon payment of a small percentage as premium without
necessarily requiring any guarantee.

If at all, the bond was a convenient smoke screen to disguise the real nature of ABC’s employment as an
agent of Petron.

Anent substantial investment in the form of equipment, tools, implements, machineries and work premises,
Petron likewise failed to show that ABC possessed the same. Instead, what is evident in the records was
that ABC had been renting a forklift from Petron in order to carry out the job of respondents. This only
shows that ABC does not own basic equipment needed in the performance of respondents’ job. Similarly
and again as correctly held by the CA, the fact that ABC leased a property for the establishment of its
Bacolod office is immaterial since it was not shown that it was used in the performance or completion of
the job contracted out. "Substantial capital or investment," under Section 5, Rule VIII-A, Book III of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Implementing Rules), as amended by Department Order
No. 18-02,49 does not include those which are not actually and directly used in the performance of the job
contracted out.
Going now to the activities performed by respondents, Petron avers that the same were not necessary or
desirable to its principal business. In fact, the service contracts it entered into with ABC clearly referred to
respondents’ functions as maintenance and utility works only which are remote to its principal business of
manufacturing and distributing petroleum products.

The Court finds otherwise. Gestupa, Ponteras, Develos, Blanco and Mariano were LPG fillers and
maintenance crew; Caberte was an LPG operator supervisor; Te was a warehouseman and utility worker;
and Servicio and Galorosa were tanker receiving crew and utility workers. Undoubtedly, the work they
rendered were directly related to Petron’s main business, vital as they are in the manufacture and
distribution of petroleum products. Besides, some of the respondents were already working for Petron
even before it engaged ABC as a contractor in 1996. Albeit it was made to appear that they were under the
different contractors that Petron engaged over the years, respondents have been regularly performing the
same tasks within the premises of Petron. This "the repeated and continuing need for the performance of
the job is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of the activity to the business." What
further militates against Petron’s claim that ABC, as an alleged independent contractor, is the true employer
of respondents, is the fact that Petron has the power of control over respondents in the performance of their
work. It bears stressing that the power of control merely calls for the existence of the right to control and
not necessarily the exercise thereof. Here, Petron admitted in its Position Paper that the supervision of a
Petron employee is required over LPG and tanker assistance jobs for inventory control and safety checking
purposes. It explained that due to the hazardous nature of its products, constant checking of the procedures
in their handling is essential considering the high possibility of fatal accidents. It also admitted that it was
the one supplying the needed materials and equipment in discharging these functions to better insure the
integrity, quality and safety of its products.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Petron failed to discharge its burden of proving that ABC is not a labor-
only contractor. Consequently, and as warranted by the facts, the Court declares ABC as a mere labor-only
contractor. "A finding that a contractor is a ‘labor-only’ contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an
employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and
the ‘labor-only’ contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer." Accordingly
in this case, Petron is declared to be the true employer of respondents who are considered regular
employees in view of the fact that they have been regularly performing activities which are necessary and
desirable to the usual business of Petron for a number of years.

With respect to respondents’ dismissal, Petron claimed that the same sprang from the termination or
conclusion of the service contracts it entered into with ABC. As earlier held, respondents are considered
regular employees. In cases of regular employment, an employer may only terminate the services of an
employee for just or authorized causes under the law. As the reason given by Petron for dismissing
respondents does not constitute a just or authorized cause for termination, the latter are declared to have
been illegally dismissed. Respondents are thus entitled to all the remedies of an illegally dismissed
employee. The CA is thus correct in ruling that respondents are entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges. However, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondents are
entitled to receive separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service. In addition,
respondents are entitled to full backwages from the time they were not allowed to work on July 1, 1999 up
to actual reinstatement or finality of this Decision as the case may be.

An exception must be taken, however, with respect to Caberte Jr. From the beginning, Petron disputes the
fact he ever worked for Petron. Therefore, before his case against Petron can prosper, Caberte Jr. must first
establish that an employer-employee relationship existed between them since it is basic that the issue of
illegal dismissal is premised on the existence of such relationship between the parties. Unfortunately,
nowhere in the records does it show that he indeed worked for Petron. Consequently, his complaint should
be dismissed.
Citation : G.R. No. 203514
Title : COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
Subject : Taxation
Ponente : Justice DEL CASTILLO

FACTS: Respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) received from the Large Taxpayers Service-Documents
Processing and Quality Assurance Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Audit
Results/Assessment Notice, assessing respondent SLMC deficiency income tax under Section 27(B) of the
1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended, for taxable year 2005 in the amount of
₱78,617,434.54 and for taxable year 2006 in the amount of ₱57,119,867.33.

SLMC filed with petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) an administrative protest, assailing
the assessments. SLMC claimed that as a non-stock, non-profit charitable and social welfare organization
under Section 30(E) and (G) of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, it is exempt from paying income tax. Later,
SLMC received petitioner CIR's Final Decision on the Disputed Assessment, increasing the deficiency
income for the taxable year 2005 tax to ₱82,419,522.21 and for the taxable year 2006 to ₱60,259,885.94.

Aggrieved, SLMC elevated the matter to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) via a Petition for Review. The
CTA Division rendered a Decision, finding SLMC not liable for deficiency income tax under Section 27(B)
of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, since it is exempt from paying income tax under Section 30(E) and (G) of
the same Code. CIR moved for reconsideration but the CTA Division denied the same.

This prompted CIR to file a Petition for Review before the CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc affirmed the
cancellation and setting aside of the Audit Results/Assessment Notices issued against SLMC. It sustained
the findings of the CTA Division that SLMC complies with all the requisites under Section 30(E) and (G) of
the 1997 NIRC and thus, entitled to the tax exemption provided therein. CIR filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not CTA erred in exempting SLMC from the payment of income tax.

RULING: YES. CTA erred in exempting SLMC from the payment of income tax. SLMC is liable for income tax
under Section 27(B) of the 1997 NIRC insofar as its revenues from paying patients are concerned.

The Court finds that SLMC is a corporation that is not operated exclusively' for charitable or social welfare
purposes insofar as its revenues from paying patients are concerned. Section 30(E) of the NIRC requires
that an institution to be operated exclusively for charitable or social welfare purposes to be completely
exempt from income tax must be:(1) a non-stock corporation or association; (2) organized exclusively for
charitable purposes; (3) operated exclusively for charitable purposes; and (4) no part of its net income or
asset shall belong to or inure to the benefit of any member, organizer, officer or any specific person. The
operations of the charitable institution generally refer to its regular activities. Section 30(E) of the NIRC
requires that these operations be exclusive to charity. There is also a specific requirement that no part of
the net income or asset shall belong to or inure to the benefit of any member, organizer, officer or any
specific person.' The use of lands, buildings and improvements of the institution is but a part of its
operations.

There is no dispute that SLMC is organized as a non-stock and non-profit charitable institution. However,
this does not automatically exempt St. Luke's from paying taxes. This only refers to the organization of
SLMC. Even if SLMC meets the test of charity, a charitable institution is not ipso facto tax exempt. To be
exempt from real property taxes, Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires that a charitable
institution use the property actually, directly and exclusively for charitable purposes. To be exempt from
income taxes, Section 30(E) of the NIRC requires that a charitable institution must be organized and
operated exclusively for charitable purposes. Likewise, to be exempt from income taxes, Section 30(G) of
the NIRC requires that the institution be operated exclusively for social welfare.
However, the last paragraph of Section 30 of the NIRC qualifies the words 'organized and operated
exclusively' by providing that: “Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income
of whatever kind and character of the foregoing organizations from any of their properties, real or personal,
or from any of their activities conducted for profit regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall
be subject to tax imposed under this Code.”

In short, the last paragraph of Section 30 provides that if a tax exempt charitable institution conducts any
activity for profit, such activity is not tax exempt even as its not-for-profit activities remain tax exempt. This
paragraph qualifies the requirements in Section 30(E) that the non-stock corporation or association must be
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. It likewise qualifies the requirement in Section
30(G) that the civic organization must be operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. Thus,
even if the charitable institution must be organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, it is
nevertheless allowed to engage in activities conducted for profit without losing its tax exempt status for its
not-for-profit activities. The only consequence is that the income of whatever kind and character of a
charitable institution from any of its activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of
such income, shall be subject to tax.

An institution under Section 30(E) or (G) does not lose its tax exemption if it earns income from its for-
profit activities. St. Luke's fails to meet the requirements under the said Section 30 that although SLMC, as
claimed by it, is a charitable institution organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, but it
engaged in activities conducted for profit.

Therefore, SLMC is liable for deficiency income tax under Section 27(B) of the NIRC.
Case: JACINTO vs. GUMARU, JR.
G.R. No. 191906 June 2, 2014
Subject: Civil Procedure
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"When a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review", and "there are no more proceedings to
speak of inasmuch as these were terminated by the satisfaction of the judgment."

Facts: F. Jacinto Group, Inc. filed an appeal with the NLRC on the labor case judgment involving separation pay
and other monetary claims of Gumaru. However, the appeal was not perfected for failure to post the proper
cash or surety bond, thus the decision became final and executory. NLRC denied subsequent motions to
Lift and Annul Levy on Execution. Petitioner went up to the CA, however the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping was executed and signed not by petitioner, but by his counsel.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can execute a special power of attorney designating his counsel to sign the petition
on his behalf.

Ruling: The Court takes the petitioner's side with regard to the procedural issue dealing with verification and the
certification against forum shopping; but events overtook the petition. Respondent informed the Court that
the judgment award has been satisfied in full. Petition has become moot and academic.

The Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements respecting noncompliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against
forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading
fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends
of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in

verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. H, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Case: Philtranco Service Ent. Inc vs Philtranco Worker's Union
G.R. No. 180962, February 26, 2014
Subject: Civil Procedure
Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts: Petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (a public transportation company), on the ground of suffering
business losses, retrenched 21 of its employees. Consequently, Philtranco Workers Union-Association of
Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU-AGLU), filed a Notice of Strike with DOLE, claiming that petitioner
engaged in unfair labor practices. Sec. of Labor ordered Philtranco to maintain the status quo. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and respondent, a partial appeal.

Secretary of Labor declined to rule on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and private respondent’s
"Partial Appeal", citing a DOLE Regulation which provided that voluntary arbitrators’ decisions, orders,
resolutions or awards shall not be the subject of motions for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed before the CA an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, and sought injunctive
relief. CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that petitioner erred in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 thereof, which properly
covers decisions of voluntary labor arbitrators. It added that since the assailed Decision was not timely
appealed within the reglementary 15-day period under Rule 43, the same became final and executory.

Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioner erred in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules in
assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary arbitrator
2. Whether or not Petition for Certiorari was timely filed

Ruling: 1. The Court grants the Petition.

It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of
Labor is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,
and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure. There is no distinction: when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor case in an
industry indispensable to national interest, "he exercises great breadth of discretion" in finding a solution
to the parties’ dispute. "[T]he authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and
extends to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in
nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute." This wide latitude of
discretion given to the Secretary of Labor may not be the subject of appeal.

2. Petition for Certiorari was timely filed, the Court agrees with petitioner’s submission. Rule 65 states that
where a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. This can
only mean that even though a motion for reconsideration is not required or even prohibited by the
concerned government office, and the petitioner files the motion just the same, the 60-day period shall
nonetheless be counted from notice of the denial of the motion. The very nature of certiorari – which is an
extraordinary remedy resorted to only in the absence of plain, available, speedy and adequate remedies in
the course of law – requires that the office issuing the decision or order be given the opportunity to correct
itself. Quite evidently, this opportunity for rectification does not arise if no motion for reconsideration has
been filed. This is precisely what the Court said in the ABS-CBN Union Members case, whose essence
continues to this day.
Case: Macedonio vs Ramo, et.al.
GR No. 193516 March 24, 2014
Subject: Civil Procedure
Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts: Petitioner Macedonio filed for the rescission of contract of sale of a portion of unregistered lot under Article
1191 with damages, against respondent Ramo for breach. Parties mutually agreed to settle; unable to
submit a compromise agreement, RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute and subsequent motion
was denied until the parties submit a compromise agreement. Meanwhile, Ramo was able to secure in her
name a Sales Patent and caused the subject property to be subdivided into three lots and sold to the other
respondents in this case. No part of the subject property was transferred to petitioner. Petitioner then filed
a Motion praying that the trial court issue an order directing Ramo to return petitioner's money. Ramo
proposed to pay the money in 4 years without interest. Petitioner refused and prayed for pre-trial. The trial
court did not act on petitioner's manifestation and motion. Petitioner also filed a Protest with the DENR
Cordillera claiming that Ramo's sales patent was issued despite her having committed multiple violations
of the law. Later, the court issued an order terminating the above case.Petitioner filed another civil case
against respondents for specific performance, annulment of documents and titles, with damages. Ramo
filed her answer with motion to dismiss, claiming petitioner violated the rule against forum-shopping since
there had already been a prior terminated case and a pending Protest with the DENR. RTC dismissed the
case with prejudice due to 1.)failure to inform the court of the existence of previous case and the DENR
Protest; b) forum- shopping; and c) litis pendentia.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the rules covering certifications against forum-shopping

Ruling: Petition is granted.

The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in terminating or dismissing the case for failure of the
parties to submit a compromise agreement. In Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that dismissing the action without allowing the parties to present evidence and after ordering them to
compromise is tantamount to deprivation of due process, and the "dismissal of an action for failure to
submit a compromise agreement, which is not even required by any rule, is definitely a harsh action.” The
Court likewise held therein that ''the fact that negotiations for a compromise agreement persisted even up
to the time of the dismissal of the case strongly demonstrates their earnest efforts to abide by the trial court's
order to settle their dispute amicably"; thus, "dismissing an action on account of the failure of the parties to
compromise, would be to render nugatory the pronounced policy of the law to encourage compromises,
and thus open the floodgates to parties refusing to agree upon an amicable settlement by simply railroading
their opposing parties' position, or even defeating the latter's claim by the expedient of an outright
dismissal."

For the same reasons, the Court finds the dismissal was unwarranted. It is true that while it was incumbent
for petitioner to have informed the trial court of Civil Case No. 5703-R and the pending DENR Protest, this
Court is inclined to forego petitioner's failure to abide by the requirements of the 1997 Rules regarding
certifications against forum-shopping, favor of deciding the case on the basis of merit, seeing, as the Court
does, that a rigid interpretation of the 1997 Rules would result in substantial injustice to petitioner. The
circumstances require that substance must prevail over form, keeping in mind, as the Court has held
countless times, that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; their
application should be relaxed when they hinder instead of promote substantial justice. Public policy
dictates that court cases should as much as possible be resolved on the merits and not on technicalities.
Besides, "the Rules of Civil Procedure on forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility."
CIR v. LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS
[ GR No. 175188, Jul 15, 2015 ]
Subject: Corporation Law
Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts: La Tondena Distillers, Inc. entered into a Plan of Merger with Sugarland Beverage Corporation (SBC), SMC
Juice, Inc. (SMCJI), and Metro Bottled Water Corporation (MBWC). As a result of the merger, the assets
and liabilities of the absorbed corporations were transferred to respondent, the surviving
corporation. Respondent later changed its corporate name to Ginebra San Miguel, Inc. (GSMI).

Respondent requested for a confirmation of the tax-free nature of the said merger from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). The BIR issued a ruling stating that pursuant to Section 40(C)(2) and (6)(b) of the
1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), no gain or loss shall be recognized by the absorbed
corporations as transferors of all assets and liabilities. However, the transfer of assets, such as real
properties, shall be subject to DST imposed under Section 196 of the NIRC.

Claiming that it is exempt from paying DST, respondent filed with petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) an administrative claim for tax refund or tax credit in the amount of P14,140,980.00,
representing the DST it allegedly erroneously paid on the occasion of the merger.

CTA rendered a Decision finding respondent entitled to its claim for tax refund or tax credit in the amount
of P14,140,980.00, representing its erroneously paid DST for the taxable year 2001.

Issue: Whether the CTA erred in ruling that respondent is exempt from payment of DST.

Held: No, a merger of two corporations produces the following effects, among others:

Sec. 80. Effects of merger or consolidation. - x x x

xxxx

4. The surviving or the consolidated corporation shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the rights,
privileges, immunities and franchises of each of the constituent corporations; and all property, real or
personal, and all receivables due on whatever account, including subscriptions to shares and other choses
in action, and all and every other interest of, or belonging to, or due to each constituent corporations, shall
be taken and deemed to be transferred to and vested in such surviving or consolidated corporation without
further act or deed;

In a merger, the real properties are not deemed "sold" to the surviving corporation and the latter could not
be considered as "purchaser" of realty since the real properties subject of the merger were merely absorbed
by the surviving corporation by operation of law and these properties are deemed automatically
transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without further act or deed. Therefore, the transfer
of real properties to the surviving corporation in pursuance of a merger is not subject to documentary
stamp tax. As stated at the outset, documentary stamp tax is imposed only on all conveyances, deeds,
instruments or writing where realty sold shall be conveyed to a purchaser or purchasers. The transfer of
SPPC's real property to respondent was neither a sale nor was it a conveyance of real property for a
consideration contracted to be paid as contemplated under Section 196 of the Tax Code. Hence, Section 196
of the Tax Code is inapplicable and respondent is not liable for documentary stamp tax.
Topic: Public International Law/Jurisdiction
Lhullier v British Airways
Gr No 171092

Facts: Edna Diago Lhuillier took British Airway flight 548 from London to Rome. Once on board, she requested
Julian Halliday, one of its flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead
bin. Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to
help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!".

Edna further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, another flight attendant, Nickolas
Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture
on plane safety. Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to British Airways’ ground manager and
demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were "only doing their job."
Edna then filed a complaint against British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on British Airways through Violeta
Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.
British Airways filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over theper
son of the respondent. It alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have
jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1).

The RTC of Makati City granted the Motion to Dismiss. Edna filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
I. WHETHER PHILIPPINE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER A TORTIOUS
CONDUCT COMMITTED AGAINST A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND RESIDENT BY AIRLINE
PERSONNEL OF A FOREIGN CARRIER TRAVELLING BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF
ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY; AND THUS IS OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION.

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT AIR CARRIER OF PASSENGERS, IN FILING ITS

MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE CASE AND OVER ITS PERSON MAY BE DEEMED AS HAVING IN FACT AND IN LAW
SUBMITTED ITSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT, ESPECIALLY SO, WHEN
THE VERY LAWYER ARGUING FOR IT IS HIMSELF THE RESIDENT AGENT OF THE CARRIER.

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from the tortious conduct
committed by airline personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on Human
Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract of carriage, petitioner asserts that she has the
option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.

Respondents Arguments

In contrast, respondent maintains that petitioners claim for damages fell within the ambit of Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention. As such, the same can only be filed before the courts of London, United
Kingdom or Rome, Italy.

HELD: The petition is without merit.

(I) The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of

law in this country.
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. The Convention is thus a treaty
commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this
country.
Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then
the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is
governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.

Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before

1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;

3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or

4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United
Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the
petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and
baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued
in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before
the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination
is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage
check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of
Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.

(II) This issue has been squarely passed upon in the recent case of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,[47] where we reiterated
our ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals[48] and elucidated thus:

Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not

Voluntary Appearance

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.

Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance the first sentence of the above-quoted rule
means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which
case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper
service of summons.

In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings
before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence
disagree with the contention of the petitioner and rule that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court
that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondents objection to jurisdiction over its person.
Case: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs HUANG TE FU, .

Facts: This case reiterates the rule in naturalization cases that when full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the Revised Naturalization Law, or Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473), is not
shown, a petition for naturalization must be perfunctorily denied.

On March 19, 2004, respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy — a citizen of the Republic of China
(Taiwan) — led a sworn Declaration of Intent to Become [a] Citizen of the Philippines 6 with the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

On April 27, 2005, respondent led with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) a
Petition for Naturalization, 7 which was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251 and assigned to
Branch 96.

On his petition, he testied that he was born on August 15, 1976 in Taiwan; that his father, Huang
Ping-Hsung, and mother, Huang Wen, Chiu-Yueh are both Chinese nationals; that he is the holder
of Alien Certificate of Registration No. E062035 and Immigrant Certicate of Residence No. 259804;
that he resided at Lin 4, Chienkuo Li, Panchiao City, Taipei County, Taiwan Province since his birth
until he came to Manila, Philippines on August 13, 1982; that he rst stayed at Santiago Street,
Valenzuela City; that they transferred to Biak-na-Bato Street, San Francisco Del Monte and they later
transferred to 23-C, 3rd Street, 10th Avenue, Caloocan City; that petitioner presently resides at No.
64-A Parklane Street, Barangay Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City; that he attended Philippine
Cultural High School for his elementary and secondary education; that he attended Ateneo de
Manila University where he took up Bachelor of Science in Computer Science. AIc

When petitioner graduated from College in the year 2000, he worked as General Manager of MIT
Zipper, a company owned by the family of the petitioner; that as a businessman he conscientiously
les Income Tax Returns; that he is presently married to Irene Chan, a Filipino citizen on October
01, 2000; that he has two children namely, Rochelle Ivy C. Huang, 3 years old, and Reynard Ivan
C. Huang, 1 year old and that he and his family are presently residing at 64-A Parklane Street,
Barangay Sangandaan, Project 8, Quezon City.

Petitioner further alleged that he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution.
He had conducted himself in a proper, irreproachable manner during his entire period of residence
in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community
in which he is living. These allegations are evinced by the clearances petitioner was able to secure
from the Philippine National Police, National Bureau of Investigation, Oce of the Clerk of Court —
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, and the Oce of the cityProsecutor. He has mingled socially with
the Filipinos, and have [sic] evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions,
and ideals of the Filipinos.

Petitioner further alleged that he is not a polygamist nor a believer in the practice of polygamy.
He has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any
mental alienation or any incurable or contagious disease. The nation of which he is presently a
citizen or subject of, is not at war with the Philippines. He is not opposed to organized government
or aliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments. He has all the qualications required and none of the disqualications under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
 Moreover, petitioner's intention to become a citizen of the Philippines is being done in good faith,
and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and delity to any foreign state, prince, potentate
or sovereignty and particularly to the Chinese Government of which at this time he is a citizen
and subject, and that petitioner shall reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of ling of
this petition up to the time of [his] admission to the Philippine Citizenship.

On September 24 , 2007 , trial court granted his petition for naturalization.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner led an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 91213. Petitioner
contended in its Appellant's Brief 13 that respondent may not become a naturalized Filipino citizen
because: 1) he does not own real estate in the Philippines; 2) he does not have some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation; 3) he is not gainfully employed, as he merely
worked in the business owned by his family and was merely given allowances by his parents for
the daily expenses of his family; 4) in an August 2001 Deed of Sale 14 covering a parcel of land
in Antipolo City he and his wife supposedly purchased, respondent falsely misrepresented himself
as a Filipino citizen, thus exemplifying his lack of good moral character; 5) his income tax returns
for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly income differs from his monthly
income as declared in his petition for naturalization, leading to the conclusion that either he is
evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his income; and 6) on cross-examination by petitioner,
he could not cite any of the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution

Absent a clear and unmistakable showing that the petitioner-appellee knowingly and deliberately
filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or that he has concealed the truth in his income
tax returns, the presumption that the latter has regularly led his return prevails. The petitioner-
appellee has, in fact, explained before the trial court that his salary is not exactly xed; sometimes
he earns more or sometimes less than his estimated or average monthly earnings,

CA dismissed petition.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its March 7, 2012 Resolution, the appellate court stood
its ground.

Petition escalated to SC.

Issue: WHETHER . . . RESPONDENT . . . HAS DULY COMPLIED WITH THE RIGID REQUISITES
PRESCRIBED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED
NATURALIZATION LAW, AS TO ENTITLE HIM TO BE ADMITTED AS A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES

Held:The Court finds for petitioner.

I n Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must show full
and complete compliance full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization
law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held that
"[t]he courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest
public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full
and complete compliance with the requirements of law."
Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant
for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation. In regard to the requirement that the applicant must have a known
lucrative trade, this ponente declared:

Based on jurisprudence, the qualication of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation" means "not only that the person having the "not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be employment gets enough
for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income
such that there is an shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to appreciable margin of his
income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability
to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid
one's becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the
of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to
live with reasonable comfort, in accordance members of his family to live with reasonable comfort,
in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization."

From the above, it may be concluded that there is no basis for the CA nding that respondent is
engaged in a lucrative trade. Indeed, his supposed income of P15,000.00 to P18,000.00 per month as
found by the CA is not enough for the support of his family. By his own admission, most of his
family's daily expenses are still shouldered by his parents who own the zipper manufacturing
business which employs him. This simply means that respondent continues to be a burden to, and
a charge upon, his parents; he lives on the charity of his parents. He cannot support his own
family on his own.

Moreover, respondent's admitted false declaration under oath contained in the August 2001 deed of
sale that he is a Filipino citizen — which he did to secure the seamless registration of the property
in the name of his wife — is further proof of respondent's lack of good moral character. It is also
a violation of the constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals. 27 His
defense that he unknowingly signed the deed is unacceptable. First of all, as a foreigner living in
a foreign land, he should conduct himself accordingly in this country — with care, circumspect,
and respect for the laws of the host. Finally, as an educated and experienced businessman, it must
be presumed that he acted with due care and signed the deed of sale with full knowledge of its
import.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED .

Case: CELIZ v. CORD CHEMICALS, INC., LEONOR G. SANZ, AND MARIAN ONTANGCO,
G.R. No. 200352, July 20, 2016
Subject: Labor law
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo

FACTS: Private respondent Cord Chemicals, Inc. (Cord, Inc.) is a domestic company owned and managed by
private respondent Leonor Sanz (Leonor), its Chief Executive Officer. It was formerly operated by Francisco
Sanz (Francisco), husband of Leonor, who met his demise in 2008. Celiz and employee to such company
got promoted as Chief of Sales, the second highest ranking position, concurrent with her position as Senior
Operations Manager.

Leonor took over the reins of Cord, Inc. upon Francisco's untimely demise. Since she knew that Celiz was
her husband's mistress. Celiz informed Leonor that she will be resigning at the end of October 2008 .Leonor
agreed to give Celiz her separation pay and reminded her that the confidentiality clause in her employment
contract was still in force. Celiz received her salary for the half month of October. In the meantime, Cord,
Inc.. informed its Accounting personnel of the impending resignation of Celiz so that standard clearance
procedure on Celiz's ledgers may be undertaken because it was the standing policy of the company not to
release the last salary and benefits of a resigning employee pending the clearance of her accounts.

It was during the audit that Cord, Inc. discovered the unliquidated cash advances of Celiz in the staggering
amount of P713,471. The Accounting personnel reported that Celiz gave everyone the impression that her
"closeness" to Francisco rendered her exempt from compliance with the requirement to liquidate. Cord,
Inc. send her first Notice giving her 48 -hours within which to explain her side. She was likewise placed on
preventive suspension considering the gravity of the charges against her. When Celiz requested for more
time to scrutinize her files, Cord, Inc. acquiesced in giving her ample time to do so. Meanwhile, Leonor
conducted her own investigation and unraveled that Celiz load been padding and adjusting her sales
output, and reporting fictitious sale:: to magnify the sales figure for the whole year. Celiz finally liquidated
her advances but her accounting fell short of P445,272.93. For misappropriating company funds, Cord, Inc.
dismissed Celiz as she was found unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed upon her.

The Complaint of Celiz was accordingly dismissed for lack of merit. Undeterred, Celiz sought recourse
before the NLRC which paid no heed to her Appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's judgment. In a Petition
for Certiorari filed with the CA,Celiz sought to reverse the Labor Arbiter and NLRC’s ruling and be
awarded money claims with reinstatement on account of her illegal dismissal. She contended that there is
no basis to dismiss her on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, since the alleged loss of trust was
simulated. However Celiz petition fails to impress the CA. The appellate Court cites the case of
PHILIPPINE MILITARY VETERANS SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY V. CA ,decisively
holding that—

"Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal does not entail proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the employee's misconduct. However, the evidence must be substantial and must establish clearly and
convincingly the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee rests. To be a valid reason for
dismissal, loss of confidence, must be genuine, x x x"

As Chief of Sales and Senior Operations Manager, petitioner occupied the second highest ranking position
in the company. The routine audit conducted as clearance procedure prior to the release of her separation
pay unearthed how she wasted the coffers of the company. In this light, We cannot compel private
respondents to retain her services. She was shown to be a gross liability to the company. Neither could We
blame private respondents for losing confidence in petitioner. Her misconduct unmasked her
untruthfulness, and constituted infidelity of her employer's trust.

Appositely, Celiz held a position of trust and confidence is very evident from the nature of her position as
the Chief of Sales & Senior Operations Manager of the respondent company. The fact that she was found
wanting in the discharge of her duties and functions as such have been proven from the documentary and
testimonial evidence proving that (petitioner) failed to account for sums that were either credited to her or
 were subject to her custody. Hence, it cannot be said that the basis for finding (petitioner) guilty "of breach
of trust was simulated or fabricated, considering that the charge was anchored on the itemized advances
documents which respondents even provided the (petitioner) at the time tine show cause notice was served.

Basic is the principle that the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) a notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (b) the subsequent notice which informs
the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.

The records divulge that petitioner was furnished with the first Notice to Explain informing her of her
failure to liquidate numerous advances, which was tantamount to dishonest handling of funds, She was
duly asked to tender her written explanation and to attend the formal investigation to sift through the
grievances against her, When petitioner asked for more time to submit her explanation, she was given
another 48 hours within which to comply. Petitioner was likewise accorded access to company files and
records to allow her to thoroughly prepare her defense. Miserably, petitioner was only able to account for
a portion of the unliquidated advances attributed against her prompting private respondents to send the
subsequent notice informing her of the decision to dismiss her from service. To Our mind, private
respondents observed due process before terminating petitioner's employment. Petitioner filed her motion
for reconsideration which denied by the CA,thus, the instant petition was instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Celiz was illegally dismissed and deprived of her right to due process.

RULING: The Court denies the petition of Celiz. According to the Supreme Court ,”since the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC, and the CA are unanimous in their finding that Celiz was not illegally dismissed, this Court must
abide by such conclusion. "Factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, if supported by
substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court, more so when they coincide with
those of the Labor Arbiter. Such factual findings are given more weight when the same are affirmed by the
Court of Appeals."18 Since there is no divergence between the findings of these three tribunals, there is no
need to go over the evidence once more in order to resolve the issues relative to petitioner's failure to
liquidate her cash advances and the manner by which she was terminated.” Suffice it to state that -

We reiterate the rule that in cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof beyond reasonable
doubt of an employee's misconduct is not required. It is sufficient that the employer had reasonable ground
to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded by his position. In the case at bench, it cannot be doubted that petitioner
succeeded in discharging its burden of proof.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, there was substantial evidence showing that the subject cash advances
were properly attributed to petitioner and that she failed to liquidate the same. In short, there was just
cause to dismiss her from the service.

It is also beyond cavil that respondents observed the requirements of procedural due process. In the first
notice to explain, petitioner was properly informed of the charge against her, i.e., failure to liquidate the
cash advances. In addition, respondents allowed petitioner access to company records in order for the latter
to thoroughly prepare her explanation and defense. Considering the circumstances, respondents even
generously granted petitioner more time to sift through the company records. However, petitioner was
only able to liquidate a small portion of the cash advances; she failed to explain how and where she spent
the rest. Consequently, respondents have no other recourse but to dismiss petitioner for loss of trust and
confidence. It is on record that respondents notified petitioner of her termination from service.

Finally, no ill motive or bad faith may be attributed to respondents. It is on record that respondents even
acceded to petitioner's request for a graceful exit. However, the discovery of anomalies connected with her
office simply took away her privilege of receiving monetary benefits at such exit, which, despite the
unfortunate circumstances, Leonor was graciously willing to grant.
People vs Condino
G.R. No. 219591, February 19, 2018
Subject: Criminal Law
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo

Facts: Assailed in this appeal is the decision of the Court of Appeals(CA) which affirmed with modification decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Dakit, Bogo, Cebu, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

The prosecution's version of the incident is as follows: On September 23, 2002, at around 2:30 p.m.,
appellant appeared before the Lupon Tagapamayapa at the Barangay Hall of Barangay Lanao,
Daanbantayan, Cebu, in a hearing for the alleged destruction of a plastic chair owned by the barangay.
Present during the hearing was the victim, Isabelo D. Arrabis (Arrabis), who was then the first councilor of
the barangay. After the hearing, the victim, together with other barangay officials went out of the hall and
sat down on a nearby bamboo bench for a chat. While they were talking, appellant, who was just outside
the gate of the Barangay Hall, calmly walked toward the group, and with his left hand, grabbed the victim's
neck from behind and stabbed the latter three to four times using a yellowish pointed metal, hitting a
portion just below the victim's left breast. The victim was taken to the Daanbantayan District Hospital but
he was pronounced dead on arrival. The cause of death, as listed in the victim's Certificate of Death, is
cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to multiple stab wounds.

The defense presented appellant as its lone witness who testified that: After the hearing on September 23,
2002, as appellant was exiting the Barangay Hall, Arrabis, who was then armed with a knife, suddenly
blocked his path. Appellant struggled to get the knife from Arrabis which resulted in the two of them
falling hard on the ground. The next thing appellant saw was Arrabis' chest already bleeding. Shocked by
the events of the day, appellant went home and then travelled to Masbate. Five days later, his father fetched
him from Masbate and asked him to surrender. He was persuaded to surrender, but before proceeding to
the police station, he stopped by the house of retired Colonel Virgilio Ynot and the latter accompanied him
to the station.

RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses
who testified clearly, spontaneously and in a straightforward manner. It also noted that the victim's killing
was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery, since the victim was given no opportunity to
defend himself with the attack having been sudden and unsuspected, and evident premeditation, which
was manifested by appellant's act of bringing a pointed metal in attending the hearing. The RTC sentenced
appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It likewise ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000 as moral damages, P175,000.00 as actual damages, and
P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. Appellant thereafter appealed the RTC Decision before the CA.

The CA affirmed with modification the assailed RTC Decision as follows: a) P30,000.00 was awarded to the
heirs of the victim as exemplary damages; and b) the amounts of moral and actual damages were reduced
to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.

Issues: WON the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt considering that the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions in material points directly
going to their perception and recollection of the stabbing incident and WON the victim's stabbing was
attended by treachery.

Ruling: The appeal is unmeritorious. In resolving issues involving the credibility of witnesses, the Court adheres
to the well-settled rule that "appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment made by the trial
court because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. In this case, the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses pertained to minor details and collateral matters which did not
affect the substance of their declarations and the veracity of their statements. In fact, the records show that
the prosecution's witnesses never wavered in their testimonies as to the actual stabbing incident.

As to the issue on the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we agree with the CA's
conclusion that "[t]he attack was executed in a manner that [the victim] was rendered defenseless and
unable to retaliate." "There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."

In this case, appellant, coming from behind the victim, suddenly held the latter's neck using his left hand,
and with his right hand, stabbed the victim three to four times using a yellowish pointed metal. Clearly,
the attack was attended by treachery, considering that: a) the means of execution of the attack gave the
victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b) said means of execution was deliberately
adopted by appellant. Given these circumstances, we find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings
of the lower courts, as said findings are duly supported by the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed October 21, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01565 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the awards of civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are increased to P75,000.00 each; the award of actual
damages is deleted and in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded; and all
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully
paid.
Tangcay vs Atty. Cabarroguis
A.C. No. 11821, April 2, 2018
Subject: Legal Ethics
Ponente: Justice Del Castillo

Facts: Dario Tangcay (Tangcay) filed and Affidavit-Complaint for impropriety against respondent Atty. Honesto
A. Cabarroguis (Atty.Cabarroguis) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Petitioner Tangcay averred in his complaint that: (1) he inherited a parcel of land from his father and the
same was registered in his name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-288807; (2) one Emilia S.
Solicar filed a Petition for Probate of a purported Last and Will Testament of his late father docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 4833-98; (3) he engaged the legal services of Atty. Cabarroguis to defend and
represent him in the probate case; (4) while handling the case, Atty. Cabarroguis learned that the subject
property was mortgaged with the First Davao Lending Corporation for P100,000.00; (5) Atty. Cabarroguis
then offered him a loan of P200,000.00 with an interest lower than what the lending corporation imposed;
(6) he accepted the same and signed the real estate mortgage unaware of the illegality and impropriety of
a lawyer lending money to a client; and (7) when he defaulted in payment, Atty. Cabarroguis instituted a
Judicial Foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.

In compliance with the Order of IBP-CBD, Atty. Cabarroguis filed his answer which essentially claimed
that, despite his generosity and liberality in the collection of his professional legal fees, he was still not fully
paid for the cases he won for Tangcay.

In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano (Commissioner Adriano) found
Atty. Cabarroguis administratively liable under Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.04, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that Atty. Cabarroguis be suspended from the practice of
law for three months.

Issue: WON Atty. Cabarroguis violated the CPR and should be suspended from the practice of law

Ruling: Yes. The Court adopts the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. Quite clearly, Atty. Cabarroguis
violated the prohibition against lawyers lending money to their clients. Pertinent to the case at bar is Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which states that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his possession and Rule 16.04 thereof which mandates that
a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice.Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. There
is hardly any doubt or dispute that Atty. Cabarroguis did lend money to his client, Tangcay, this fact being
evidenced by a real estate mortgage which the latter signed and executed in favor of the former. In fact,
Commissioner Adriano noted that "[r]espondent did not deny the existence of the mortgage in his favor.
His answer did not directly touch on the propriety of his act of extending the loan to Tangcay, a client."

The law profession is distinguished from any other calling by the fiduciary duty of a lawyer to his or her
client. It is almost trite to say that lawyers are strictly required to maintain the highest degree of public
confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession. "Lawyers who obtain tut interest in the
subject-matter of litigation create a conflict-of-interest situation with their clients and thereby directly
violate the fiduciary duties they owe their clients."

WHEREFORE, Atty. Cabarroguis is found guilty of violating Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) months effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with a stern warning that a commission of the
same or similar acts or offenses will be dealt with more severely.
Case: THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs
ANA GRACE ROSALES AND YO YUK TO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183204 January 13, 2014
PONENTE: Del Castillo

FACTS: Petitioner Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. Respondent Rosales is the owner of a travel agency while Yo Yuk To is her mother. In 2000,
respondents opened a Joint Peso Account10 with petitioner’s Pritil-Tondo Branch.

In May 2002, respondent Rosales accompanied her client Liu Chiu Fang, a Taiwanese National applying
for a retiree’s visa from the Philippine Leisure and Retirement Authority (PLRA), to petitioner’s branch in
Escolta to open a savings account. Since Liu Chiu Fang could speak only in Mandarin, respondent Rosales
acted as an interpreter for her.

On March 3, 2003, respondents opened with petitioner’s Pritil-Tondo Branch a Joint Dollar Account with
an initial deposit of US$14,000.00.

On July 31, 2003, petitioner issued a “Hold Out” order against respondents’ accounts.

On September 3, 2003, petitioner, through its Special Audit Department Head Antonio Ivan Aguirre, filed
before the Office of the Prosecutor of Manila a criminal case for Estafa through False Pretences,
Misrepresentation, Deceit, and Use of Falsified Documents.

Respondent Rosales, however, denied taking part in the fraudulent and unauthorized withdrawal from
the dollar account of Liu Chiu Fang.

On December 15, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila issued a Resolution dismissing the
criminal case for lack of probable cause. On September 10, 2004, respondents filed before the RTC of Manila
a complaint for Breach of Obligation and Contract with Damages.

ISSUE: Whether Metrobank breached its contract with respondents.

HELD: YES. The Court held that Metrobank’s reliance on the “Hold Out” clause in the Application and Agreement
for Deposit Account is misplaced.
Bank deposits, which are in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum, must be paid upon demand by the
depositor.

The “Hold Out” clause applies only if there is a valid and existing obligation arising from any of the
sources of obligation enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
delict, and quasi-delict. In this case, petitioner failed to show that respondents have an obligation to it under
any law, contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. And although a criminal case was filed by
petitioner against respondent Rosales, this is not enough reason for petitioner to issue a “Hold Out” order
as the case is still pending and no final judgment of conviction has been rendered against respondent
Rosales.

In fact, it is significant to note that at the time petitioner issued the “Hold Out” order, the criminal
complaint had not yet been filed. Thus, considering that respondent Rosales is not liable under any of the
five sources of obligation, there was no legal basis for petitioner to issue the “Hold Out” order.
Accordingly, we agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the “Hold Out” clause does not apply
in the instant case. In view of the foregoing, the Court found that petitioner is guilty of breachof contract
when it unjustifiably refused to release respondents’ deposit despite demand. Having breached its contract
with respondents, petitioner is liable for damages.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed April 2, 2008 Decision and the May 30, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89086 are hereby AFFIRMED.
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., V. LIN
G.R. No. 207227January 16, 2007
Ponente: Del Castillo

FACTS: Respondent owned six (6) clustered warehouses that she mortgaged with RCBC as security for the various
loans she obtained from the latter. Five of those warehouses -which were insured with Malayan against
fire for Php56 Million – were gutted with fire on February 24, 2008.

On April 8, 2008, the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) issued a Fire Clearance Certification to respondent,
having determined that the cause of fire was accidental. Despite the foregoing, her demand for payment of
her insurance claim was denied since the forensic investigators hired by petitioner Malayan claimed that
the cause of the fire was arson and not accidental.

Respondent sought the assistance from the Insurance Commission (IC) which, after a meeting among the
parties, recommended that petitioner Malayan pay the insurance claim and/or accord great weight to the
BFP’s findings. However, petitioner Malayan still denied or refused to pay the insurance claim.
Furthermore, respondent averred that notwithstanding the loss of the mortgaged properties, the RCBC
refused to go after petitioner Malayan and insisted instead that she herself must pay the loans to them.

Thus respondent Lin filed a civil case praying, among others, that judgement be rendered ordering
petitioners to pay her insurance claim as well as damages.

Some five months later, or on June 17, 2010, respondent Lin filed before IC an administrative case against
petitioner claiming that since it had been conclusively found that the cause of fire was “accidental”, the
only issue left to be resolved is whether petitioner should be held liable for unfair claim settlement practice
under Section 241 in relation to Section 247 of the Insurance Code due to its unjustified refusal to settle the
claim. Respondent prays that petitioner’s license to operate as a non-life insurance company should be
revoked or suspended, until such time that it fully complies with the IC Resolution ordering it to accord
more weight to the BFP's findings.

On August 17, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the civil case based on forum shopping. It argued,
among others, that the elements of forum shopping are present in these two cases because there exists
identity of parties since Malayan’s individual officers who were impleaded in the civil case are also
involved in the administrative case; that there is identity of causes of action and reliefs sought in the two
cases; that respondent sought to obtain the same reliefs in the administrative case as in the civil case; and
that respondent did not comply with her sworn undertaking in the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping
which she attached to the civil case, because she deliberately failed to notify the RTC about the pending
administrative case within five days from the filing thereof.

The Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC in its order dated September 29, 2010 for lack of merit. The
RTC likewise denied, also for lack of merit, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its order dated
January 25, 2011. The court held that in the administrative case, petitioner was seeking a relief clearly
distinct from that sought in the civil case; that while in the administrative case petitioner prayed for the
suspension or revocation of Malayan's license to operate as a non-life insurance company, in the civil case
petitioner prayed for the collection of a sum of money with damages; that it is abundantly clear that any
judgment that would be obtained in either case would not be res judicata to the other, hence, there is no
forum shopping to speak of.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of Appeals but in its decision
dated December 21, 2012, the CA dismissed the petition due to the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC Judge. The CA, as did the RTC, found that petitioner did not commit forum shopping
chiefly for the reason that the issues raised and the reliefs prayed for in the civil case were essentially
different from those in the administrative case, hence petitioner had no duty at all to inform the RTC about
the institution or pendency of the administrative case.
 The CA held that of the three elements of forum shopping viz., (l) identity of parties, or at least such parties
as would represent the same interest in both actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts, and (3) identity of the two proceedings such that any judgment
rendered in one action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other
action under consideration, only the first element may be deemed present in the instant case.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its resolution dated May 22, 2013. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the Civil Case on the ground of wilful and deliberate
forum shopping despite the fact that the civil case and the administrative case both seek the payment of
the same fire insurance claim

2. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the civil case for failure on the part of respondent to
comply with her undertaking in her verification and certification of non-forum shopping appended to the
civil complaint.

HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the resolution of the CA. The Court hold that the case
law rulings in the Go and Almendras cases control and govern the case at bench.

First off, is elementary that "an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and, therefore,
not appealable, x x x to x x x avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders
as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal."

Secondly, petitioners herein utterly failed to prove that the RTC, in issuing the assailed Orders, acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. "It is well-settled that an act of a court
or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." “For grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law."

In the present case, petitioners basically insist that respondent committed wilful and deliberate forum
shopping which warrants the dismissal of her civil case because it is not much different from the
administrative case in terms of the parties involved, the causes of action pleaded, and the reliefs prayed
for. Petitioners also posit that another ground warranting the dismissal of the civil case was Lin's failure to
notify the RTC about the pendency of the administrative case within five days from the filing thereof.
These arguments will not avail. The proscription against forum shopping is found in Section 5, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. --The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith; (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same
or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-
compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute wilful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

The above-stated rule covers the very essence of forum shopping itself, and the constitutive elements
thereof viz., the cognate concepts of litis pendentia and res judicata –
x x x The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action,
the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that
any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case.

Res judicata, in turn, has the following requisites: "(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties,
(b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action."

In the case of Almendras Mining Corporation v. Office of the Insurance Commission, "The settled rule is
that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition
in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa." In the context of the case at bar, matters
handled by the IC are delineated as either regulatory or adjudicatory, both of which have distinct
characteristics.

The case of Go v. Office of the Ombudsman reiterated the distinctions vis-a-vis the principles enunciating
that a civil case before the trial court involving recovery of payment of the insured's insurance claim plus
damages, can proceed simultaneously with an administrative case before the IC. Expounding on the
foregoing points, this Court said that “The findings of the trial court will not necessarily foreclose the
administrative case before the IC, or vice versa. True, the parties are the same, and both actions are
predicated on the same set of facts, and will require identical evidence. But the issues to be resolved, the
quantum of evidence, the procedure to be followed, and the reliefs to be adjudged by these two bodies are
different.”

Respondent Lin’s cause of action in the Civil Case are predicated on the insurers' refusal to pay her fire
insurance claims despite notice, proofs of losses and other supporting documents and prays in her
complaint that the insurers be ordered to pay the full-insured value of the losses, as embodied in their
respective policies. On the other hand, the core, if not the sole bone of contention in Administrative Case,
is the issue of whether or not there was unreasonable delay or denial of the claims of petitioner, and if in
the affirmative, whether or not that would justify the suspension or revocation of the insurers' licenses.

In addition, the procedure to be followed by the trial court is governed by the Rules of Court, while the IC
has its own set of rules and it is not bound by the rigidities of technical rules of procedure. These two bodies
conduct independent means of ascertaining the ultimate facts of their respective cases that will serve as
basis for their respective decisions.

While the possibility that these two bodies will come up with conflicting resolutions on the same issue is
not far-fetched, the finding or conclusion of one would not necessarily be binding on the other given the
difference in the issues involved, the quantum of evidence required and the procedure to be followed.
Case: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JORIE WAHIMAN
[G.R. No. 200942. June 16, 2015]
Ponente: Del Castillo

FACTS: Appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Jose
Buensuceso (Buensuceso). During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued. The prosecution established that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, Buensuceso,
the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City, was on his way back to the company staff house
on board his Isuzu pick-up after attending a despedida for one of his employees. While he was about to
enter the gate of the staff house, he was gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle.
The guard on duty, David Azucena (Azucena), who was then opening the gate, identified one of the
assailants as herein appellant. During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the case, admitting to the killing of
Buensuceso. However, when it was appellant's turn to testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing, he
was at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

On February 16, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty as charged, viz.:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is issued 􀀾nding the accused Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and directing him
to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 [as] civil indemnity and
actual damages as follows:

P59,280,000.00 lost earning capacity of the deceased;

[P]25,000.00 actual damages; no receipt was presented for P220,000[;]
P1,500.00 Appearance fee; and
P50,000.00 Attorney's fee.
He shall serve his penalty in the National Penitentiary of Davao Penal [C]olony.
SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)

In his appeal, appellant argued that when his supposed extrajudicial confession was being taken, Atty.
Michael Florentino Dumlao (Atty. Dumlao), the lawyer who supposedly assisted him, was not around. He
arrived only when appellant was about to sign the extrajudicial confession. Appellant also insisted that
Azucena, the prosecution's alleged eyewitness, did not actually see him shooting the victim.
Appellant's contentions were, however, disregarded by the CA. In its Decision dated October 13, 2011, the
CA found no reason to depart from the trial court's findings. Moreover, the ballistic examination proved
that the slugs used in killing Buensuceso were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from appellant

The CA opined that although Azucena did not see appellant actually shoot the
victim, he nonetheless saw appellant within seconds from hearing the gunshots fleeing from the immediate
vicinity of the crime scene aboard a motorcycle with a gun in hand.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused—appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and the
victim’s family is entitled for award for loss of earning capacity.

RULING: We totally agree with the RTC and the CA in finding that the guilt of appellant for the crime of murder
was proved beyond reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in the
evening, appellant shot Buensuceso while the latter was about to enter the gate of the staff house of
Stanfilco-Dole in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.

Notably, this case does not fall under any of the exceptions. The deceased victim could not be considered
as a self-employed earning less than the minimum wage; neither could he be considered employed as a
daily wage worker. However, we are inclined to award lost earnings considering that the deceased, as
testified by his widow, was the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City and was receiving a
monthly salary of P95,000.00. He was 54 years of age when gunned down by appellant. This testimony was
not objected to by appellant or questioned during crossexamination or on appeal. Clearly, the existence of
factual basis of the award has been satisfactorily established. However, the amount of the award for lost
earnings must be modified following the formula [2/3 x 80 - age] x [gross annual income – necessary
expenses equivalent to 50% of the gross annual income]. Thus: [2/3 x (80-54)] [(P95,000 x 12) - 50% (P95,000
x 12)] = P9,878,100.00. Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this resolution until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
00830-MIN finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant is not eligible for parole; the award for lost
earnings is reduced to P9,878,100.00; the award of actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof, appellant is
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as temperate damages; he is likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this resolution until full payment.
People v. Abaigar
G.R. No. 199442 ,April 7, 2014
Subject: Criminal Procedure

FACTS: An Information was filed charging appellant Francisco Abaigar with the crime of murder. That on or about
the 11th day of July 2001, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Rosalim, Municipality of San
Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable cause, with
intent to kill, and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of JOSEPH GABUYA by shooting him with the use of a homemade shotgun
locally known as "Bardog", which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, hitting
the victim's left side of the face and behind the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.

The trial court lent credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Relecita del Monte (Relecita) that at
about 9 o'clock in the evening of July 11, 2001, at a distance of about 3 1/2 meters, she saw appellant shoot
Joseph Gabuya (Gabuya) from behind hitting the victim at the back of his head.

The trial court also found that treachery attended the killing as the victim was merely in the act
of opening the front door of his house without any inkling of the impending attack coming from behind.
Appellant basically argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in lending credence
to the testimony of eyewitness Relecita. Appellant claims that Relecita could have forewarned the victim
of his presence if indeed Relecita saw him in the vicinity; and that it was improbable that Relecita could
see him considering the poor lighting condition of the place.

Issue: Whether or not treachery attended the commission of the crime of murder

Ruling: Yes, We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that treachery attended the commission of the
crime. Records show that the victim was about to enter his house when suddenly he was shot from behind
by the appellant hitting him at the back of his head. The victim suffered five gunshot wounds, four of which
proved fatal.

Considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery, appellant was correctly found guilty of murder;
there being no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, both the trial
court and the appellate court correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, he is not eligible for parole.
Case: People v. Bejim y Romero,
G.R. No. 208835, January 19, 201
Subject: Criminal Procedure

FACTS: On February 19, 2007, appellant was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, with seven counts
of statutory rape under seven separate Informations. Appellant was arraigned in all the seven Informations
and pleaded not guilty. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

"AAA" first met appellant who was the helper of her cousin "CCC's" father at "CCC's" house when she
went there to play. In the first week of October 2001 while at "CCC's" house, appellant made "AAA" lie
on a sofa. He undressed her, applied cooking oil on her vagina and on his penis, and then rubbed his
penis against her vagina for some time. He then pulled "CCC" to the sofa and again placed cooking oil
on his penis and on "CCC's" vagina. "AAA" saw this because she was just a meter away from them.
Appellant warned "AAA" and "CCC" not to tell anyone of what transpired otherwise he would kill them
and their families.
Sometime in the second or third week of October 2001, while "AAA" and "CCC" were playing at the
latter's house, appellant again pulled them to a sofa. When appellant went to the kitchen, "AAA" and
"CCC" tried to run away but appellant caught them at the living room. He forced "AAA" to lie on the
sofa, pulled down her pants and panties to her ankle, and applied cooking oil on his penis and her vagina.
Appellant rubbed his penis on "AAA's" vagina. She felt pain. Thereafter, appellant likewise pulled "CCC"
to the sofa, brought down the latter's pants, and rubbed his penis against her vagina. After threatening
them, appellant wore his pants and went out of the house.
"BBB" is also a cousin of "CCC" and "AAA." In the first week of September 2001 while she and "CCC"
were inside the latter's house, appellant suddenly pulled them to the sofa in the living room. Appellant
laid "CCC" on the sofa, applied cooking oil on her vagina and his penis, and tried to insert his penis into
"CCC's" vagina. Thereafter, appellant turned to "BBB." He made her lie on the sofa, lifted her skirt, pulled
down her panties, his pants and brief, and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Unsuccessful, he just
brushed or rubbed his penis against her vagina. "BBB'' felt pain in her vagina. Appellant immediately
stood up, fixed his clothes and ran away upon seeing the arrival of "BBB's" cousins, "DDD" and "EEE."
"BBB" told her cousins that they were sexually molested by appellant but warned them not to tell
anybody because if they do appellant would kill them.
CCC" knew appellant because he was the helper of her father and lived with them in their house. In
the first week of September 2001, while she and her cousin "BBB" were playing inside their house,
appellant closed all the windows and doors, made her lie on the sofa, lowered her pants and underwear
down to her ankle, and put cooking oil on his penis and on her vagina. "BBB" saw appellant's penis
penetrating "CCC's" vagina. When appellant saw "CCC's" two sisters "DDD" and "EEE" arrive, he went
out of the house.
In the second week of October 2001, appellant laid "CCC" on the kitchen table, removed her pants, put
cooking oil on his penis and her vagina and tried to penetrate it but was unsuccessful.
In the last week of October 2001, while "CCC" was sleeping in her sister's bedroom, appellant came and
removed her clothes, mounted her and tried to insert his penis but he failed, albeit she felt his big penis.
"CCC" did not tell her father of what happened because of appellant's threat.
Sometime in the first week of October 2001 and while inside "CCC's" house, appellant laid "CCC" on
the sofa, put cooking oil on her vagina and his penis. He tried to insert his penis into her vagina but
failed. Thereafter, appellant went outside. "CCC" did not tell anyone about the incident because of
appellant's threat to kill her and her family.
"AAA," "BBB" and "CCC" were physically examined by Dra. Bernadette Valdez (Dra. Valdez). The
result of her examination which was reduced into writing shows no evident injury at the time of her
examination though her medical evaluation does not exclude possible sexual abuse.
 Appellant denied the accusations against him claiming that he was not in the house of "CCC" when the
alleged incidents happened in 2001.
After trial, the RTC rendered on December 9, 2010 its Consolidated Judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of seven counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count. He was also ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages for each crime.
Appellant interposed before this Court the present recourse adopting the same argument he raised in
his brief before the CA, viz.:
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
rape despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In support of his argument, appellant impugns the victims' credibilities by capitalizing on the alleged
inconsistencies in their open court testimonies; their failure to shout for help during the alleged incidents;
the belated filing of their complaints; and, the medical finding of no evident injury during their
examination.
ISSUE: Whether there is consummated rape committed
RULING: NO, THERE IS NO CONSUMMATED RAPE COMMITTED

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat or intimidation or
when she is under 12 years of age or is demented. Where the victim is below 12 years old, the only subject
of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge" took place. Carnal knowledge is "the act of a man having sexual
intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman." 23 There must be proof that his penis touched the
labias of the victims or slid into their female organs and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to
produce a conviction of rape by sexual intercourse

The foregoing revelations of "AAA" and "BBB" show that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution did not conclusively establish the element of carnal knowledge. In the aforementioned cases,
there is no categorical proof of entrance or introduction of appellant's male organ into the labia of the
pudendum of "AAA." Neither is there evidence to show that appellant made an attempt to penetrate
"AAA's" vagina. The prosecution's evidence lacks definite details regarding penile penetration. On the
contrary, "AAA" and "BBB" stated that appellant merely "brushed or rubbed" his penis on their respective
private organs. While "BBB" testified that appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina, she
nevertheless failed to state for the record that there was the slightest penetration into it. What is clear on
record is that appellant merely brushed it.
The Court held in People v. Butiong 28 that "the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated,
and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of
the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated
rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either the labia
of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape,
if not acts of lasciviousness." While "the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge." 29 "the act of touching should
be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not
mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum." n 30 Indeed, the grazing of the victims' private
organ caused pain, but it cannot be presumed that carnal knowledge indeed took place by reason thereof.
As the Court held in People v. Brioso, 31 "the Court is loath to convict an accused for rape solely on the
basis of the pain experienced by the victim as a result of efforts to insert the penis into the vagina."
Significantly, from their own declaration following the public prosecutor's questioning, they suffered
pains not because of appellant's attempt to insert his penis but because of the grazing of their vagina.
Given the foregoing and since there is neither clear showing or direct proof of penile penetration or that
appellant's penis made contact with the labias of the victims, which is an essential element of the crime of
rape, we cannot sustain appellant's conviction for the crime of rape.
Case: People v. Havana,
G.R. No. 198450,
January 11, 2016
Subject: Criminal Procedure

FACTS: In an Information dated November 18, 2005, the appellant was charged with illegal sale of dangerous
drugs committed as follows:That on or about the 4th day of November, 2005, at about 6:30 p.m., in the City
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent and without authority of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur[-]buyer the
following:One (1) beat-sealed transparent plastic packet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance
containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as "SHABU", a dangerous drug.

On the afternoon of November 4, 2005, a civilian informant, one "Droga", went to Police Station 10,
Punta Princesa, Cebu City and reported to the duty officer SPO1 Vicente R. Espenido, Jr. (SPO1 Espenido)
that the appellant was actively engaged in the illegal drug trade at Sitio Mangga, Punta Princesa, Cebu
City. SPO1 Espenido immediately assembled a buy-bust team, with him as the team leader, the civilian
asset and with PO2 Enriquez, SPO1 Cañete, and SPO1 Jasper C. Nuñez (PO2 Nuñez) as back-up. The
police team designated the unnamed "civilian informant" as poseur-buyer and provided him with a
P100.00 marked money bill, with its serial number (SN003332) noted in the police blotter, 7 to be used for
the purpose of buying shabu from appellant. The buy-bust operation was allegedly coordinated with the
Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). 8 When the police team reached the target
area, the "civilian informant" went to the house of appellant and called the latter. Hidden from view,
some 15 meters away from the house, the back-up operatives, PO2 Enriquez and SPO1 Cañete, saw the
civilian informant talking with the appellant. Not long after, they saw the "civilian informant" handling
over the marked P100.00 bill to the appellant, who in exchange gave to the former a plastic pack
containing 0.03 gram white crystalline substance which these two suspected as shabu. The "civilian
informant" then placed a face towel on his left shoulder to signal that the sale had been consummated.
SPO1 Espenido and his two companions rushed towards the "civilian informant" and the appellant and
arrested the latter after apprising him of his constitutional rights. SPO1 Espenido recovered the P100.00
marked money from the appellant while the plastic pack was given by the "civilian informant" to SPO1
Espenido.
The appellant was taken to the police station for investigation. The P100.00 marked money and the plastic
pack containing the suspected shabu were turned over to SPO2 Nuñez who marked the plastic pack with
"FA" the initials of herein appellant. He then prepared a letter requesting for examination 9 of the item
seized from the appellant addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory. PCI Salinas, a forensic chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory of Brgy. Apas, Cebu City, testified that he conducted a laboratory examination of
the recovered specimen 10 that yielded "positive result for the presence of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug."
The RTC found appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The appellant seeking the reversal of his conviction faulting the courts below for convicting him of the
crime charged. He questions in his Supplemental Brief. (1) the lack of pre-coordination with the PDEA
regarding the buy-bust operation, (2) the non-presentation in court of the unnamed "civilian informant"
as poseur-buyer, (3) the non-compliance by the police officers with the prescribed procedure under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and lastly, the dubious chain of custody of the subject shabu.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the lack of pre-coordination with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust operation will
dismissed the case
2. Whether or not the adherence to the chain of custody rule did not established
RULING:
1. No, the lack of pre-coordination with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust operation will not dismissed
the case.
We held in People v. Abedin 16 that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation; that in fact, even the absence
of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation. 17 Neither is the presentation of
the informant indispensable to the success in prosecuting drug-related cases. 18 Informers are almost
always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.
Unless their testimony is absolutely essential to the conviction of the accused, their testimony may be
dispensed with since their narrations would be merely corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust
team.
2. Yes, the adherence to the chain of custody rule did not established.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item
of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of
testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard
obtains in case the evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution
and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering
— without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not — dictates the level of strictness in
the application of the chain or custody rule.
The prosecution utterly failed to establish convincingly the chain of custody of the alleged seized
plastic pack subject matter hereof. , the prosecution was not able to account for the linkages in the chain
while the plastic pack was not or no longer in their respective possession.
The Court finds it exceedingly difficult to believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug
have been properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The inexplicable failure of the police officers
to testify as to what they did with the alleged drug while in their respective possession resulted in a
breach or break in the chain of custody of the drug.
In some cases, the Court declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key
witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of the shabu plus the irregular manner
which plagued the handling of the evidence before the same was offered in court, whittles down the
chances of the government to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case.
Case: ROSA PAMARAN, v. BANK OF COMMERCE,
GR NO. 205753,
JULY 04, 2016
Topic: Constitutional Law

FACTS:- 1987. Rosa Pamaran alleged that her children, Rhodora and spouses Rosemary and Leonardo Bernabe
owned adjacent lots covered by TCT Nos. 213130 and 124149 respectively in Muntinlupa City. Rosa built
her residential house on these lots with their permission.

- 1997. Southmarine Ltd. Co. obtained loans from the Bank of Commerce. To secure these loans, Rhodora
and spouses Bernabe constituted real estate mortgages (REM) on their lots. Rosa claimed that Bankcom
neither included her house.

-2011. Lots were foreclosed in favor of Bankcom.

-2012. Rosa was dispossessed of her property thus prayed for damages (3 million for the worth of house,
300k for violation of due process and 100k for legal fees).

-Bankcom replied that 1) Rosa has no cause of action, 2) Complaint is a collateral attack on its title and as
interference with the jurisdiction of RTC Muntinlupa, 3) Rosa was not deprived of due process, and, 4) the
venue was improperly laid.

- They argued that it is a collateral attack on its title because the REM and Certificate of Sale indicated that
they covered not only the subject lots, but including the improvement thereon.

- Bankcom insisted that the Complaint interfered with the jurisdiction of RTC Muntinlupa, which already
granted in its favor writs of possession over the properties.

-Rosa on her defense argued that the REM was a contract of adhesion that pertained to improvements
belonging to mortgagors and not to third persons

ISSUES:
a. Whether the court a quo erred in resolving the issue of lack of cause of action on the basis of evidence
aliunde put forth before it by the movant and not solely on the basis of the complaint.

b. Whether the court a quo erred in disregarding the jurisprudential rule that a movant to dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action is deemed to have hypothetically admitted plaintiff's factual
representation in the compliant.

c. Whether the court committed error in procedure when it resolved a question of fact in favor of Bankcom
without first giving [petitioners the opportunity to present evidence on a controversial fact and used such
conclusion of fact to justify the dismissal of a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.

d. Whether the court a quo erred in justifying its dismissal of [petitioner's complaint on a thesis that ts
initiation interfered with the exercise of jurisdiction of a co-equal court in exparte proceedings for the
issuance of writ of possession under Act 3135].

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS
 - They insist that the Complaint states a cause of action, which relates to Bankcom's purported unlawful
taking of the house of the late Rosa. They contend that the RTC Olongapo's conclusion that the REM
included the lots and the improvement thereon, without giving Rosa the opportunity to prove the
allegations in the Complaint is a procedural error tantamount to denial of due process.

-They stress that one petition for issuance of writ of possession filed with the RTC Muntinlupa and the
instant Complaint for damages are different actions and reliefs sought for in them differ from the other.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS

- Bankcom reiterates that Rosa was never privy to any contract between Bankcom and its mortgagors thus
there is lack of cause of action.

- It is a collateral attack on its title because if the value of the house restituted to petitioners, such grant
would diminish its title over the properties subject of the writs of possession issued by the RTC
Muntinlupa.

- RTC Olongapo correctly dismissed Complaint on the ground of improper venue and maintained that it
was denominated as one for damages and restitution of value of a house unlawfully taken, the action is, in
fact, a real action because it is based on Rosa's claim of ownership over the house built on the subject lots.

RULING:

The Court grants the Petition.

A cause of action is an act or omission by which a person violates the right of another. Its essential elements
are; (1) plaintiff's right, which arises from or is created by whatever means, and is covered by whatever
law; (2) defendant's obligation not to violate such right; and, (3) defendant's act or omission in violation of
the such right and for which plaintiff's may seek relief from defendant.

Thus, a distinction must be made between a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under
Section 1(g) of Rule 16, and the one under Rule 3312 of the Rules of Court.

Stated differently, a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g) of Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections
made before the trial while the motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is a demurrer to evidence on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence, and is made only after the plaintiff rested his case.

Here, Bankcom submitted its motion to dismiss by way of affirmative defenses. Clearly, there had been
no presentation of evidence made and Rosa had not yet rested her case. As Bankcom's motion was made
before trial then, it falls within the first instance above-discussed.

The RTC Olongapo does not need to inquire on the truthfulness of these allegations and declare them to be
false. If it does, such court would be denying the plaintiff (Rosa) of her right to due process of law. In other
words, in determining whether a complaint states or does not state a cause of action, the court must
hypothetically admit the truth of the allegations and determine if it may grant the relief prayed for based
on them. The court cannot consider external factors m determining the presence or the absence of a
cause, of action other than the allegations in the complaint.
Hypothetically admitting these allegations to be true, Rosa's cause of action against Bancom involves a)
her right over her house; b) Bankcom's obligation to respect Rosa's right to enjoy her house; and c)
Bankcom's violation of such right, which gave rise to this action for damages.

She clarified that she does not question the writs issued by the RTC Muntinlupa, but she assails Bankcom's
use thereof in depriving her of the right to enjoy said house. She also stressed that since this is a personal
action, then it was properly filed in RTC Olongapo, as she is a resident of Olongapo.

Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court

A real action must be filed in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the subject real property,
while a personal action may be filed where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or if the defendant is a
non-resident, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. Personal actions include those filed
for recovery of personal property, or for enforcement of contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or
for the recovery of damages for injury committed to a person or property.

Indeed, the primary objective of the Complaint is to recover damages, and not to regain ownership or
possession of the subject property. Hence, this case is a personal action properly filed in the RTC
Olongapo, where Rosa resided.

Third, this case involves a claim arising from Bankcom's alleged violation of Rosa's right to due process,
and to the enjoyment of her house. On the other hand, the one for issuance of writs of possession involves
Bankcom's application to be placed in possession of the subject properties. Last, as already discussed, the
former is a personal action while the latter is a real action affecting title to and possession of a real property.

Given these, the RTC erred in dismissing the Complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action, and
of improper venue.
Case: JAY CANDELARIA, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO;
(Pampanga) represented by its Presiding Judge HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES, OFFICE OF THE
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA and ALLIED DOMECQ
PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No.173861
July 14, 2014

FACTS: - During an alleged buy-bust operation conducted in the evening of June 22, 2001, petitioners were arrested
with the intention to sell, five cases of counterfeit Fundador Brandy. They were charged in violation of
Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines. After they were arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge on May 31,
2005,8 petitioners filed on June 17, 2005 a Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence9 based on inadmissibility
of evidence. They contended that the evidence the prosecution intended to present were obtained in
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. This is considering that
at the time the alleged counterfeit productswere seized, they were neither committing nor attempting to
commit a crime in the presence of the arresting officers as to justify the conduct of search and seizure
following their unlawful arrest.

RTC RULING: RTC issued the first assailed Order denying the Motion and held that any objection to an
arrest must be made before an accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the
quashal of the information before the arraignment, an accused is estopped from questioning the legality of
his arrest.

According to the said court, since it appears from the said affidavit that the search and seizure was
incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of the accused who were caught in flagrante delicto, any evidence
obtained during such search and seizure is admissible in evidence. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,which the RTC denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the motion of the petitioners to set the case for supression hearing.

RULING: The Petition is bereft of merit.

PETITIONERS FAILED TO ALLEGE THAT THERE IS NO APPEAL NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND
ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.

It is to be stressed that in every special civil action under Rule 65, a party seeking the writ whether for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, must be able to show that his or her resort to such extraordinary
remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. "[H]e must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy
is not speedy or adequate x x x." As held in Visca v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources:

x x x [I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to allege with certainty in his verified
petition facts showing that "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law," because this is an indispensable ingredient of a valid petition for certiorari.A petition for
certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed.The instant Petition
for Certiorari is dismissible for failure to allege that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law as to justify resort to certiorari.

ASSUMING THE ASSAILED OCTOBER 12, 2005 ORDER TO BE ERRONEOUS, THE MISTAKE IS
AN ERROR IN JUDGEMENT WHICH IS BEYOND THE AMBIT OF CERTIORARI.
In Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank,18 the Court held that:

The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-
judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in
judgment. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while
so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. Otherwise,
every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a
void judgment.

When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any mistake in the application
of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed by a court may be corrected only by appeal. The
determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its
jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in
judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions
and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the
subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the
appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case.

As such, any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its assessment of evidence is correctible by
appeal, not certiorari, as the same would only be considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Assuming that the RTC’s determination is erroneous, the mistake is clearly not an error of jurisdiction but
of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.

NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Even assuming that petitioners’ resort of certiorari is proper, the Petition must still be dismissed for their
failure to show that the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction.In this
case, petitioners miserably failed to show how the RTC supposedly abused its discretion. In fact, we note
that the main issue raised by petitioners in their Petition is when is the proper time to file a motion to
suppress/exclude evidence. They even conceded that this is a pure question of law. Only after a careful
analysis of the submissions of the parties did the RTC render its judgment.

PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE OF HEIRARCHY OF COURTS.

It also did not escape our attention that from the RTC, petitioners made a direct recourse to this Court. This
is against the well-settled principle dictating that a petition for certiorari assailing the interlocutory orders
of the RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not directly with the Supreme Court. It was held
in Rayos v. City of Manila that:

Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction. However,
such concurrence in jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.

This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court's docket.

Petition for Certiorari is dismissed.

Case: Vinuya et. Al vs Executive Secretary

Facts: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Petitioners are all members of the
MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military
forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and
systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that
the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japan's compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their
claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel
the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty
of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system established by Japan, and
the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery,
and torture. They allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms
from which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina comfort women
and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its
legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that
the Philippine government's acceptance of the "apologies" made by Japan as well as funds from the
Asian Women's Fund (AWF) were contrary to international law.

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were
dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of
1956.

Article 14. Claims and Property. —

a. It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and
suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of
Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete
reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the present time meet its other obligations.
 b. Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations
claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out
of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and
claims of the Allied

In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan have been satisfactory, and that
Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women through the atonement money paid by
the Asian Women's Fund.

Issue: Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive Department committed
grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners' claims for official apology and other forms
of reparations against Japan.

Held:The petition lacks merit.

From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners' claims against Japan.

In Tañada v. Cuenco, we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category
involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that " [t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative —
'the political' — departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.

To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.

In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein
assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners' cause would be inimical to
our country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating
serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Department's
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle — and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between
the treaty's conclusion and our consideration — the Executive must be given ample discretion to
assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of
both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies
are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioner’s claims.

As stated by ICJ in Barcelona Traction:

The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights
are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national
law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The municipal
legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the
national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding
sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the
position internationally.

The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what
extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the
exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to
the particular case.

Petition is Dismissed.
Case: LUZ S. ALMEDA, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
(MINDANAO) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (MINDANAO) and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DepEd), Surigao del Norte, and several other public officers and
employees were charged administratively and criminally before the Ombudsman, in connection with
the alleged improper use and disbursement of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allotted
to petitioner's co-respondent Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. (Navarro), Surigao del Norte Congressman,
and implemented through the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the
DepEd.The criminal charges were consolidated and docketed as OMB-MIN-010183. On March 19,
2003, a Resolution was issued in said case by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Ocer (GIPO) II
Hilde C. dela Cruz-Likit (dela Cruz-Likit), to the effect that probable cause existed to indict petitioner
and her co-accused for violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. This Resolution was
disapproved in part by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Marcelo), who made minor
modications and instructions thereto.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then took over the case, and it prepared the corresponding
Information against petitioner, which was approved by then Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-
Ignacio and Marcelo. On May 19, 2003, the Information was forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman
for Mindanao, who in turn indorsed and forwarded the same, together with the Ombudsman's
Resolution, to the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte on June 3, 2003, for appropriate filing
in court.

Petitioner received a copy of the Ombudsman's March 19, 2003 Resolution on May 29, 2003. On
July 3, 2003, she led via a commercial courier service her Motion for Reconsideration, with a prayer
for reversal of the Ombudsman's ruling and to hold in abeyance the filing of an information against
her until the motion is resolved.On July 7, 2003, petitioner led a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the
Filing of information before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte, which in
turn referred the said motion to the Ombudsman. On July 18, 2003, dela Cruz-Likit issued an Order
giving due course to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and a similar motion led by one of
her correspondents. The Order states, among others:

In their Motions for Reconsiderations [sic], both respondents-movants are united in pointing to co-
respondent ex-Congressman Constantino H. Navarro, Jr., as the one who entered into the transaction
of purchasing the nine computers delivered to DepEd Siargao, which transaction is made the basis
of their indictment for Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Before taking further action on the
motions thus led, let copies thereof be served to respondent Constantino H. Navarro Jr. and to
complainant, or them to file their respective Comment or Opposition thereto.Navarro filed his
Comment to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. On August 25, 2003, petitioner led before the
Ombudsman her Supplemental motion for reconsideration.

Through a June 16, 2004 Indorsement of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and all other pleadings, orders, and communications relative thereto were forwarded
to Marcelo for appropriate action, pursuant to Office Order No. 31 entitled ("Review and
Consideration of Motions for Reconsideration Filed in Relation to Orders and Resolutions Issued by
the Tanodbayan," which pertains to cases where the Ombudsman disapproves orders, resolutions,
or decisions emanating from sectoral oces, and considering that the OSP has taken over the case.
In another Indorsement dated October 11, 2004, then Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Antonio E.
Valenzuela forwarded a copy of an October 11, 2004 Order which ultimately closed and terminated
OMB-MIN-01-0183 as far as the Ombudsman for Mindanao is concerned, pursuant to an August 4,
2004 Order issued by Marcelo ordering the OSP to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
case.

On May 25, 2010, petitioner sent a letter of even date to the Ombudsman, seeking the early
resolution of her motions. However, the letter was not acted upon, as the handling Graft Investigation
and Prosecution Ocer (GIPO), dela Cruz-Likit, was then on official study leave and no GIPO was
as yet assigned to the case. On September 1, 2011, petitioner led before the Ombudsman a
Manifestation, seeking resolution of her Motion for Reconsideration. On November 18, 2011, she led
a second Manifestation with the Ombudsman with a prayer for dismissal of OMB-MIN-01- her.

Meanwhile, petitioner received copies of Indorsements signed by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
Humphrey T. Monteroso, referring and forwarding to the OSP petitioner's September 1, 2011
Manifestation and other pleadings and documents led in OMB-MIN-01-0183, and noting and
informing that the entire record of the case has been forwarded previously to the OSP.

On August 8, 2012, petitioner led a third Manifestation before the Ombudsman, instead of the OSP,
entitled "Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the Accused to Speedy Trial with Prayer for Dismissal
of the Case." This time petitioner bewailed the inaction and procedure taken by the Ombudsman
and OSP in not taking cognizance of OMB-MIN-01-0183 and instead indorsing and repeatedly tossing
the case back and forth to each other. She cited a June 18, 2012 Memorandum within the OSP
recommending that her Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestations be resolved by the
Ombudsman for Mindanao instead and not the OSP, which had no jurisdiction over petitioner since
she is not a high-ranking public offocial charged before the Sandiganbayan; she also noted a June
21, 2012 Indorsement by the OSP to the Ombudsman for Mindanao, referring back petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestations for action by the latter. She claimed that as a result,
her Motion for Reconsideration remained unresolved to date; that said flip-flopping attitude of these
two offices resulted in unwarranted delay and unending torment, which has unduly affected her
work; and consequently, her constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. Petitioner thus prayed
for dismissal of her case. On September 6, 2012, the Ombudsman through dela Cruz-Likit issued
the assailed Order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, stating as follows:

We also took note of respondents Almeda's [sic] and Ligutom's manifestation for the dismissal of
the case for alleged violation of their right to speedy trial, on the ground that until now, no
information was led in court, and that their Motions for Reconsideration were not resolved despite
the lapse of a considerable period of time.

OMB-MIN could not be faulted for the non-ling of the Information in court because as the records
would show, both respondents Almeda and Ligutom were the ones who moved to hold in abeyance
the ling of the Information. The motions to hold in abeyance the ling of the Information were not
only led with this Oce, but also with the Oce of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte,
and as shown by the records, the Information was already indorsed to the OPP but was indorsed
back to OMB-MIN, in view of the motions to hold in abeyance the ling of such Information in
court. Signicantly, OMB-MIN has nothing to do with the delay in the resolution of the motions for
reconsideration because as the records would show, all motions and pleadings filed by respondents
were appropriately and timely acted upon.
Issues: DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CASES WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVE THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE FILING OF
INFORMATION FOR A PERIOD OF NINE (9) YEARS FROM THE DATE OF ITS FILING?

GIVEN THE FACTS OF THE CASE, DID THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN ACT WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT
VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROMPT
DISPOSITION OF CASES?

HELD: The Court grants the Petition.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This
right applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasijudicial or administrative bodies; it is
"not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil
or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord,
any party to a case may demand expeditious action to [sic] all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice." It "includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after
trial," such as preliminary investigations and fact-nding investigations conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman.

Not only should the adjudication of cases be "done in an orderly manner that is in accord with
the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of
justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by
the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.

First of all, the preliminary investigation proceedings in said case took more than 11 long years to
resolve, or from March 23, 2001 when the proceedings were initiated and docketed, to September
6, 2012, when petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Secondly, the delay in the proceedings was caused solely by the repeated indorsement of the
Ombudsman and the OSP, which may be attributed to the Ombudsman's failure to realize that
petitioner was not under the jurisdiction of the OSP or the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, when dela
Cruz-Likit, the handling GIPO, went on official study leave, no GIPO was assigned to OMB-MIN-
01-0183; as a result, the case was neglected. Even if, as respondents argue, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was tardy and that she led a motion to defer the filing of the information, these
have no bearing as in fact they are irrelevant to the issue; the fact remains that the Ombudsman's
resolution of the case took too long; the fact that the ground for denying the Motion for
Reconsideration involved a simple procedural issue highlights the Ombudsman's failure to timely
resolve the same.

Third, petitioner had no hand in the delay. As a matter of fact, she sent a letter and led written
manifestations seeking the immediate resolution of her case. While they were led only in 2010 and
2011, petitioner's letter and manifestations cannot be considered late, and no waiver or acquiescence
may be attached to the same, as she was not required as a rule to follow up on her case; instead,
it is the State's duty to expedite the same.
Fourth, the pendency of OMB-MIN-01-0183 undoubtedly prejudiced petitioner. The case hung like a
hangman's cord above her all these years, causing distress, anxiety, and embarrassment. As was
held in the Corpuz case, the passage of time affects the parties' and their witnesses' ability to
prepare a cogent case or defense; secure witnesses; and preserve honor and reputation, financial
resources, memory, and evidence.

Finally, the Ombudsman's explanation for the delay is not at all acceptable. Instead, it can be seen
that it failed to apply a basic rule that in the investigation and prosecution of public officers and
employees accused of graft, specific rules on jurisdiction based on rank apply. What ensued was an
administrative "ping-pong," as petitioner puts it.

HEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED . The September 6, 2012 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao in OMB-MIN-01-0183 is REVERSED and all proceedings or actions arising therefrom
are ordered DISMISSED .
Case: PETRON CORPORATION v ARMZ CABERTE, ANTONIO CABERTE, JR., MICHAEL SERVICIO,*
ARIEL DEVELOS, ADOLFO GESTUPA, ARCHIE PONTERAS, ARNOLD BLANCO, DANTE MARIANO,*
VIRGILIO GALOROSA, and CAMILO TE,* Respondents.
G.R. No. 182255
June 15, 2015
Topic: Labor Law

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: This case pertains to the 3 consolidated complaints against Petron Corporation for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages and non-payment of allowances, 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

For the periods from March 1, 1996 to February 28, 1999 and November 1, 1996 to June 30, 1999, Petron and
ABC, a labor contracting business owned and operated by Caberte Sr., entered into a Contract for Services
and a Contract for LPG Assistance Services. Under both service contracts, ABC undertook to provide utility
and maintenance services to Petron in its Bacolod Bulk Plant.

Respondents who were hired as LPG/Gasul fillers, maintenance crew, warehousemen, utility workers and
tanker receiving crew averred that even before Petron engaged ABC as contractor in 1996, most of them
had already been working for Petron for years. However, every time Petron engages a new contractor, it
would designate such new contractor as their employer. Despite such arrangement, Petron exercised
control and supervision over their work, the performance of which is necessary and desirable in its usual
trade and business. Respondents added that ABC is a mere labor-only contractor which had no substantial
capital and investment, and had no control over the manner and method on how they accomplished their
work. Thus, Petron is their true employer. On July 1, 1999, however, Petron no longer allowed them to
enter and work in the premises of its Bacolod Bulk Plant. Hence, the complaints for illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, Petron asserted that ABC is an independent contractor which supplied the needed
manpower for the maintenance of its bulk handling premises and offices, as well as for tanker assistance in
the receiving and re-filling of its LPG products; that among the workers supplied by ABC were
respondents, except Caberte Jr., who does not appear to be one of those assigned by ABC to work for it;
that it has no direct control and supervision over respondents who were tasked to perform work required
by the service contracts it entered into with ABC; and, that it cannot allow the continuous employment of
respondents beyond the expiration of the contracts with ABC. To prove the legitimacy and capacity of ABC
as an independent contractor, Petron submitted several documents. Petron likewise presented affidavits of
two Petron employees stating that respondents do not perform activities related to Petron’s business
operation but only tasks which are intermittent and which can be contracted out. Also submitted were
affidavits of three former employees of ABC attesting to the fact that during their stint in Petron, they used
materials such as floor polisher, floor wax, broom, dustpan, cleaning rags and other equipment owned by
ABC to accomplish their tasks and that they worked under the supervision of Caberte Sr., through the
latter’s designated overall supervisor, respondent Caberte. Petron further revealed that ABC/Caberte Sr.
has the power to hire and fire respondents and was the one paying their wages.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding that ABC Contracting Services is a mere labor-only contractor and in
holding that respondents are regular employees of Petron.

Ruling: The petition has no merit. ABC contracting services is a labor-only contractor and a mere agent of Petron.
Petron thus is the true employer of respondents who are considered regular employees.
Petron contends that the CA erred in ruling that ABC is a labor-only contractor since respondents failed to
prove that ABC is not an independent contractor. The contention, however, is incorrect. The law presumes
a contractor to be a labor-only contractor and the employees are not expected to prove the negative fact
that the contractor is a labor-only contractor. Thus, it is not respondents but Petron which bears the burden
of establishing that ABC is not a labor-only contractor but a legitimate independent contractor.

Petron cannot place reliance on the contracts it entered into with ABC since these are not determinative of
the true nature of the parties’ relationship. As held in Babas v. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, the character
of the business, whether as labor-only contractor or as a job contractor, should be determined by the criteria
set by statute and the parties cannot dictate by the mere expedience of a unilateral declaration in a contract
the character of their business.

Next, Petron endeavours to prove that ABC is a legitimate independent contractor.

To restate, a contractor is deemed to be a labor-only contractor if the following elements are present:

(i) the contractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or
service under its own account and responsibility; and

(ii) the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor are performing activities which are
directly related to the main business of the principal.

To show that ABC has substantial capital or investment, Petron submitted, among others, ABC’s BIR
Certificate of Registration, VAT Return, BIR Confirmation Receipt, TIN, Individual Income Tax Return,
Mayor’s Permit and DTI Certificate of Registration. However, the Court observes that these documents are
not conclusive evidence of ABC’s financial capability. At most, they merely show that ABC is engaged in
business and licensed by the appropriate government agencies.

As for the financial statements presented, it appears that only the audited financial statements of ABC for
the years 1992, 1993 and 1994 were submitted. As aptly observed by the CA, these documents cannot be
given much credence considering that the service contracts between Petron and ABC commenced in 1996
and ended in 1999. However, no audited financial statements for the years material to this case (1996, 1997,
1998 and 1999) were submitted. Also, as per record, ABC was obligated to submit to Petron at least once
every two years its latest audited financial statements, among others, as a requirement for the retention of
its status as an accredited contractor of Petron. If it is true that ABC continued to possess its financial
qualification after 1994, Petron should have presented ABC’s financial statements for the said years which
are presumed to be in Petron’s possession considering that they are part of the requirements that it itself
set for its accredited contractors.

Anent substantial investment in the form of equipment, tools, implements, machineries and work premises,
Petron likewise failed to show that ABC possessed the same. Instead, what is evident in the records was
that ABC had been renting a forklift from Petron in order to carry out the job of respondents. This only
shows that ABC does not own basic equipment needed in the performance of respondents’ job.

Going now to the activities performed by respondents, Petron avers that the same were not necessary or
desirable to its principal business. The Court finds otherwise. Gestupa, Ponteras, Develos, Blanco and
Mariano were LPG fillers and maintenance crew; Caberte was an LPG operator supervisor; Te was a
warehouseman and utility worker; and Servicio and Galorosa were tanker receiving crew and utility
workers. Undoubtedly, the work they rendered were directly related to Petron’s main business, vital as
they are in the manufacture and distribution of petroleum products. Besides, some of the respondents were
already working for Petron even before it engaged ABC as a contractor in 1996. Albeit it was made to
appear that they were under the different contractors that Petron engaged over the years, respondents have
been regularly performing the same tasks within the premises of Petron. This "the repeated and continuing
need for the performance of the job is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of the
activity to the business." What further militates against Petron’s claim that ABC, as an alleged independent
contractor, is the true employer of respondents, is the fact that Petron has the power of control over
respondents in the performance of their work. It bears stressing that the power of control merely calls for
the existence of the right to control and not necessarily the exercise thereof. Here, Petron admitted in its
Position Paper that the supervision of a Petron employee is required over LPG and tanker assistance jobs
for inventory control and safety checking purposes. It explained that due to the hazardous nature of its
products, constant checking of the procedures in their handling is essential considering the high possibility
of fatal accidents. It also admitted that it was the one supplying the needed materials and equipment in
discharging these functions to better insure the integrity, quality and safety of its products.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Petron failed to discharge its burden of proving that ABC is not a labor-
only contractor. Consequently, and as warranted by the facts, the Court declares ABC as a mere labor-only
contractor. "A finding that a contractor is a ‘labor-only’ contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an
employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and
the ‘labor-only’ contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer." Accordingly
in this case, Petron is declared to be the true employer of respondents who are considered regular
employees in view of the fact that they have been regularly performing activities which are necessary and
desirable to the usual business of Petron for a number of years.
Colegio Medico Farmeceutico vs Lim
G.R. No. 212034
Subject: Corporation Law

Facts: Petitioner Colegio Medico Farmaceutico de Filipinas, Inc. (petitioner) is the registered owner of a building
located in Sampaloc, Manila.

On June 19, 2008, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 24, a
Complaint for Ejectment with Damages,6 docketed as Civil Case No. 185161-CV, against respondent Lily
Lim (respondent), the President/Officer-in-charge of St. John Berchman School of Manila Foundation (St.
John). Petitioner alleged, that in June 2005, it entered into a Contract ofLease7 for the period June 2005 to
May 2006 with respondent; that after expiration of the lease period, petitioner, represented by its then
President Dr. Virgilio C. Del Castillo (Del Castillo), sent respondent another Contract of Lease for the period
June 2006 to May 2007 for her approval; that despite several follow-ups, respondent failed to return the
Contract of Lease; that during a board meeting in December 2007, petitioner informed respondent of the
decision of the Board of Directors (Board) not to renew the Contract of Lease; that on March 5, 2008, Del
Castillo wrote a letter8 to respondent demanding the payment of her back rentals and utility bills in the
total amount of P604,936.35, with a request to vacate the subject property on or before March 16, 2008; and
that respondent refused to comply with the demand.

For her part, respondent alleged that in May 2003, St. John, represented by Jean Li Yao, entered into a 10-
year Contract of Lease with petitioner; that on May 3, 2005, due to financial difficulties, the Board of
Trustees of St. John assigned the rights and interest of the school in her favor; that the assignment of rights
was with the knowledge and approval of petitioner; that to ensure advance payment of the rentals,
petitioner persuaded her to execute a one-year Contract of Lease for the period of June 2005 to May 2006,
with advance payment of rentals for the said period; that the said contract was executed with no intention
of amending, repealing, or shortening the original 10-year lease; that she occupied the subject property
even after May 2006 without any objection from petitioner because, as agreed by the parties, the term of
the lease would continue until the year 2013; that she sent several letters to petitioner for the immediate
repairs of the library, the toilets of the school building, and the basketball court; and that she suspended
the payment of the rentals due to the refusal of petitioner to act on all her letters.

MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of a valid demand letter. RTC rendered a
Decision reversing the MeTC Decision. CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing the RTC Decision, and
consequently, dismissing the Complaint.

Issues:
1. Whether the president of a corporation send demand letter without board resolution.
2. Whether the president of a corporation may sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping.
3. Whether all the essential requisites of an unlawful detainer are present.

Held:
1. , in the absence of a charter or by-law provision to the contrary, the president is presumed to have the
authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within the scope of his
or her usual duties.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

“In this case, the issuance of the demand letter dated March 5, 2008 to collect the payment of unpaid rentals
from respondent and to demand the latter to vacate the subject property was done in the ordinary course
of business, and thus, within the scope of the powers of Del Castillo. In fact, it was his duty as President to
manage the affairs of petitioner, which included the collection of receivables. Article IV, Section 2 of the
By-laws of petitioner expressly states that the President has the power to:
xx xx

Exercise general [supervision], control and direction of the business and affairs of the Colegio;

xx xx

Execute in behalf of the Colegio, bonds, mortgages, and all other contracts and agreements which the
Colegio may enter into.

xx xx

Exercise or perform such other duties as are incident to his office or such powers and duties as the Board
may from time to time [prescribe].

Accordingly, even without a board resolution, Del Castillo had the power and authority to issue the
demand letter dated March 5, 2008.

In any case, even if, for the sake of argument, Del Castillo acted beyond the scope of his authority in issuing
the demand letter dated March 5, 2008, the subsequent issuance of the Board Resolution dated May 13,
2008 cured any defect possibly arising therefrom as it was a clear indication that the Board agreed to,
consented to, acquiesced in, or ratified the issuance of the said demand letter.”

2. Yes, a corporation exercises its powers and transacts its business through its board of directors or
trustees. Accordingly, unless authorized by the board of directors or trustees, corporate officers and
agents cannot exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation. A board resolution expressly
authorizing the officers and agents is therefore required. However, in filing a suit, jurisprudence has
allowed the president of a corporation to sign the verification and the certification of non-forum
shopping even without a board resolution as said officer is presumed to have sufficient knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations stated in the complaint or petition.

3. Yes, to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the following essential requisites must concur:

(1) the fact of lease by virtue of an implied or expressed contract;

(2) the expiration or termination of the possessor's right to hold possession;
(3) withholding of the possession of the land or building after the expiration or the termination of the right
to possession by the lessee;
(4) written demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the
premises;
(5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand received by the lessee.

In this case, requisites 1, 2, 3, and 5 have been duly established. It is undisputed that a Contract of Lease
was entered into by petitioner with St. John, which contract was later assigned to respondent; that
respondent failed to pay the monthly rentals; that non-payment of the monthly rentals is a ground for the
termination of the Contract of Lease;29 that respondent continued to possess the subject property despite
the termination of the Contract of Lease; and that the Complaint was filed within one ( 1) year from March
5, 2008 or the date of the last demand received by respondent.