JDCRIM1| III.
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38),
in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida,"
found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at
large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of
P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim
was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal
from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon
could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except
Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective
applications for parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of
P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the
basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay
captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto
and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd
Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding
the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja
immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at the
Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses,
who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police
sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman
Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay
Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was
made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence
at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless
body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the
bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected
the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The
next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno,
accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further
investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by
Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his
companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in
Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the incident, were already there conducting their
own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the scene were
likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February
22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of
the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with
an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect
of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1
cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and
7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic cavity right,
located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located
at the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed toward the left
thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle,
located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal
3rd arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large intestine
and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed
downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of the medial
border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of the right
elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd,
forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED, STABBED (sic),
INCISED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which
are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the
deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-
station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for
detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
He requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta,
was already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the
321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the
Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information
read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES
of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with four other
companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed
and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, with treachery and
evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage
of their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which
said accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada
multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to the record
of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of said Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty.
Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981,
and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended
Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the
herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed.
Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police
Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company
based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd
Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall
of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated
wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might
have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless
opined that due to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that
at least two instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for
their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to
the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the
death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding
the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses
of the accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the
incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy,
Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took
a short-cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00
o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place
where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself
behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns
in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform.
He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and
hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales
spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then
proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother
and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27 Huntoria explained that he did not immediately
report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however,
eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience
plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him
likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peñacerrada.
Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla
Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he
saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased
attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-
appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located
some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He
asserted that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that
the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone
alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony,
the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-appellant, as the
assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have
difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering
that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking
and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant were moving around
the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation
is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon,
99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal
case is of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in
this country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved
in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to
affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria for about
10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding
whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any reason why
Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court,
however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous.
Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and
1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal
should have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the
award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128
SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731,
Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the
penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient
to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired.
Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of
the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene
is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations
relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is
rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions
proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have
provided a more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the
defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would
have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under
it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape
asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was
committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have
been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police
Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on
February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear
that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins.
Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other
persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators
of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in
their criminal complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and
Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds
described in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless,
he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as
Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that
she alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the
positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the
sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds
later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to
be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed
eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take
turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on
February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a
clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed.
According to him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was
then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an
hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the
six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of
them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that
distance by the herein accused as identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable Court who was
hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant movement, I could not
determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid
movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who was
stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons used because
according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or
contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing
in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the
same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was
the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed
by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a
felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are
committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act
or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or
the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant
has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as
to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce
some effect in the external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act"
committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that
produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who
"stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could
not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what
specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall
short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed.
Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen
inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to
reason that one of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one
could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and
stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already
sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this
argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or
two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three,
or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal
wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage
against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota
of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the
appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came
out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February
21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the
crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,41 here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence
of coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the
more it should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in
reveiling what he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse
that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that
he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible
retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of
the accused were then still free and around; they were not yet named in the original
information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when
he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He
admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal
reasons why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking
of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.46
Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the
instant case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered
as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken
in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

xxx xxx xxx

Footnotes
(Emphasis ours.) 1 Rendered by Judge Constancio E. Jaugan.
2 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 9.
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant 3 Rollo, 54 and 67.
4 Mendoza, Vicente V., J., ponente; Herrera, Manuel C. and Imperial, Jorge S., JJ., concurring.
owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him 5 No. L-49818, February 20, 1979, 88 SCRA 486; see also People vs. Galang, G.R. No. 70713, June 29, 1989; People vs. Centeno, L-
48744, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 710; and People vs. Daniel, No. L-40330, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 511.
with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords 6 Rollo, id., 114.
and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering 7 T.S.N., session of June 6, 1983. 5-9.
8 Id., Session of May 10, 1983, 34-35.
his services as a purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead 9 Original Records, 149.
to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed 10 T.S.N., Id., session of July 27, 1982, 11.
11 Autopsy Report, Original Records, id., 2-3.
to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria 12 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, id., 3.
sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially 13 T.S.N., id., session of July 27, 1982, 17-19.
14 Original Records, id., 32.
so because the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater 15 Interchangeably mentioned in the Records of the case as Jose Juntoria, Jose Hontoria, and Jose Huntoria.
urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his 16 Original Records, Id., 81-82.
17 T.S.N., session of June 16, 1982, 3.
services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious 18 Id., 24.
in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's 19 Id., session of July 27, 1982, 37; see also T.S.N., of the Reinvestigation, session of January 8, 1982, at 2, Original Records, at 187,
where Huntoria gave his age as 29 years old.
widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave 20 Id., session of July 27, 1982, 41.
30 Id., session of July 18, 1984, 12.
him employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing circumstances, 33 Rollo, id., 112.
we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least. 34 Id., 113.
35 Id., 113-114.
36 Original Records, id., 7, 14-16.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the 39 T.S.N., session on July 27, 1982, 57-59.
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the 40 REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1977), vol. 1, 68-69.
41 People vs. Punzalan, No. 54562, August 6, 1987, 153 SCRA 1; People vs. Coronado, No. 68932, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 250.
Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult 42 People vs. Delavin, Nos. 73762-63 February 27,1987, 148 SCRA 257, citing People vs. Madarang, No. L-22295, January 30, 1970,
children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other 31 SCRA 148.
43 People vs. Tulagan, No. 68620, July 22, 1986, 143 SCRA 107.
accused who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow 44 T.S.N., session of July 27, 1982, 50-51.
the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, 45 Original Records, id., 32-33.
46 T.S.N., session of July 27, 1982, id., 51-52.
granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence 49 The appellant was already 68 years old on July 18, 1984; T.S.N., session of July 18, 1984, 3.
was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant 51 People vs. Arnel Mitra, et al., No. 80405, November 24, 1989; People vs. Berbal and Juanito, No. 71527, August 10, 1989; P eople
vs. Nolasco, No. 55483, July 28, 1988, 163 SCRA 623; People vs. Pecato, No. L-41008, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 14.
went there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and 52 People vs. Santos, No. 62072, November 11, 1985, 139 SCRA 583.

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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35748 December 14, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
Teofilo Mendoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The
former as principal by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one
day of cadena temporal, in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the
latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day of presidio mayor; and both are further
sentenced to the accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose houses were
destroyed by the fire, jointly and severally, the amount set forth in the information, with costs.
Counsel appointed by the court to defend the accused- appellants de oficio, after delivering his
argument, prayed for the affirmance of the judgment with reference to the appellant Martin
Atienza, and makes the following assignments of error with reference to Romana Silvestre, to
wit:
1. The lower court erred in convincing Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime charged in
the information.
2. Finally, the court erred in not acquitting said defendant from the information upon the ground
of insufficient evidence, or at the least, of reasonable doubt.
The following facts were proved at the hearing beyond a reasonable doubt:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with her
codefendant Martin Atienza from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of Masocol,
municipality of Paombong, Province of Bulacan. On May 16, 1930, the complaining husband,
Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for that municipality, a sworn complaint for
adultery, supported by affidavits of Gerardo Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz (Exhibit B). On the
same date, May 16, 1930, the said accused were arrested on a warrant issued by said justice
of the peace. On the 20th of the month, they were released on bail, each giving a personal bond
of P6,000. Pending the preliminary investigation of the case, the two defendants begged the
municipal president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe, to speak to the complaint, Domingo
Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the complaint, the two accused binding themselves to
discontinue cohabitation, and promising not to live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza
voluntarily signed the promise (Exhibit A). The municipal president transmitted the defendants'
petition to the complaining husband, lending it his support. Domingo Joaquin acceded to it, and
on May 20, 1930, filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint. In consideration of this
petition, the justice of the peace of Paombong dismissed the adultery case commenced against
the accused, and cancelled the bonds given by them, with the costs against the complainant.
The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Niño, in the same
municipality of Paombong.
About November 20, 1930, the accused Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage,
Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio of Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa
leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol, and remained there. The accused, Martin
Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the
home of Nicolas de la Cruz. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and
his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein after supper,
Martin Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to
set fire to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to the house,
he answered that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who,
he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and his codefendant, Romana
Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to
him, not even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant. Alarmed
at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to communicate with the
barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say; but
they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back
they saw their home in flames, and ran back to it; but seeing that the fire had assumed
considerable proportions, Antonia took refuge in the schoolhouse with her 1 year old babe in
her arms, while Nicolas went to the home of his parents-in-law, took up the furniture he had
deposited there, and carried it to the schoolhouse. The fire destroyed about forty-eight houses.
Tomas Santiago coming from the barrio artesian well, and Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the
barrio school of Masocol, and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years of age, coming from their
homes, to the house on fire, saw Martin Atienza going away from the house where the fire
started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it.lawphil.net
As stated in the beginning, counsel appointed by this court to defend the accused-appellant de
oficio, prays for the affirmance of the judgment appealed from with reference to defendant
Martin Atienza. The facts related heretofore, proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the hearing,
justify this petition of the de oficio counsel, and establish beyond a reasonable doubt said
defendant's guilt of arson as charged, as principal by direct participation.
With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record against
her are: That, being married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant Martin Atienza, a
married man; that both were denounced for adultery by Domingo Joaquin, Romana Silvestre's
second husband; that in view of the petition of the accused, who promised to discontinue their
7
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
life together, and to leave the barrio of Masocol, and through the good offices of the municipal
president of Paombong, the complaining husband asked for the dismissal of the complaint; that
in pursuance of their promise, both of the accused went to lived in the barrio of Santo Niño, in
the same municipality; that under pretext for some nipa leaves from her son by her former
marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, who had gone to the barrio of Santo Niño, Romana Silvestre
followed him to his house in the barrio of Masocol on November 23, 1930, and remained there;
that her codefendant, Martin Atienza followed her, and stayed with his coaccused in the same
house; that on the night of November 25, 1930, at about 8 o'clock, while all were gathered
together at home after supper, Martin Atienza expressed his intention of burning the house as
the only means of taking his revenge on the Masocol resident, who had instigated Domingo
Joaquin to file the complaint for adultery against them, which compelled them to leave the barrio
of Masocol; that Romana Silvestre listened to her codefendant's threat without raising a protest,
and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Upon the strength of these facts,
the court below found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to
be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or
induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by
previous or simultaneous actions.
Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of
arson committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her silence when he told the spouses,
Nicolas de la Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because he was going
to set fire to their house as the only means of revenging himself on the barrio residents, her
passive presence when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where there is no evidence of
conspiracy or cooperation, and her failure to give the alarm when the house was already on
fire?
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral,
through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case
of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material
cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence
and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not
appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for
her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an
accomplice.
The trial court found the accused-appellant Martin Atienza guilty of arson, defined and penalized
in article 550, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in which people are
accustomed to meet together, without knowing whether or not such building or house was
occupied at the time, or any freight train in motion, if the damage caused in such cases shall
exceed six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
While the defendant indeed knew that besides himself and his codefendant, Romana Silvestre,
there was nobody in De la Cruz's house at the moment of setting fire to it, he cannot be
convicted merely arson less serious than what the trial court sentenced him for, inasmuch as
that house was the means of destroying the others, and he did not know whether these were
occupied at the time or not. If the greater seriousness of setting fire to an inhabited house, when
the incendiary does not know whether there are people in it at the time, depends upon the
danger to which the inmates are exposed, not less serious is the arson committed by setting
fire to inhabited houses by means of another inhabited house which the firebrand knew to be
empty at the moment of committing the act, if he did not know whether there were people or not
in the others, inasmuch as the same danger exists.
With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin Atienza might have been
convicted of the crime of arson in the most serious degree provided for in article 549 of the
Penal Code, if the information had alleged that at the time of setting fire to the house, the
defendant knew that the other houses were occupied, taking into account that barrio residents
are accustomed to retire at the tolling of the bell for the souls in purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at
night.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: (1) Mere passive
presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without
evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article 14
of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with
regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio,
without knowing whether there are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at
the time, which results in destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized
in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with
reference to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accused-
appellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
FIRST DIVISION replied that they knew nothing, the former set fire to the house and they jumped out of it; that
[G.R. No. 5126. September 2, 1909. ] the witness and two companions lived in the house; that it was situated in an uninhabited place,
surrounded by fields; that the nearest houses were far away, and cries could not be heard from
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CATALINO APOSTOL, Defendant- one house to another; and that the burnt house was not worth more than P1, because it was a
Appellant. small one, the witness himself having constructed it.

Francisco Ortigas for Appellant. Celestino Vergara says that several individuals arrived at 8 o’clock at night, asked them for
Solicitor-General Harvey for Appellee. carabaos that they claimed to have lost, wounded Tranquilino Manipul, who was asleep, and
Pedro Tabilisima, forced them to leave the house, and as they did not want to do so for fear of
SYLLABUS being assaulted the accused set fire to the same; they tried to put out the fire as long as they
could, but when no longer able jumped out of the house. The house was in an uninhabited
1. ARSON; EDIFICE USED AS DWELLING. — The words "Edifice used as a dwelling" in locality, in the fields, the nearest house being a small store to which the cry of a person might
paragraph 1 of article 553 of the Penal Code, signify and edifice intended for human carry, and the neighboring houses could be seen.
habitation, in an uninhabited place, at a time when it is unoccupied.
Tranquilino Manipul testified in almost the same terms as this last witness. The argument which
DECISION the defense advances, based on article 554, which in connection with 553 punishes the setting
fire to a building intended for habitation, in an uninhabited place, does not apply, because the
ARELLANO, C.J. : article in question refers to an edifice intended for human habitation in an uninhabited place at
a time when the same is unoccupied. It is article 549, which punishes with the very severe
The judgment entered in this case by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finds that on
penalties of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua "those who shall set fire to any edifice,
the 16th of December, 1907, five individuals, among them being the accused herein, went to
farmhouse, hut, shed, or vessel in port, with knowledge that one or more persons were within
the house where Pedro Tabilisima, Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul were living, and
the same," that must be applied.
there inquired after some carabaos that had disappeared, and because these above-mentioned
inmates answered that they knew nothing about the matter, ordered them to leave the house,
The law must be applied as laid down in the abovequoted excerpt.
but as the three men named above refused to do so, the accused, Catalino Apostol, set fire to
the hut and the same was burnt down.
But the court, in view of the nature of the crime and considering the circumstances attending
the same, recognizes the extreme severity of the penalty; therefore we apply the remedy
In the opinion of the trial court the responsibility of the accused has been fully established by
afforded it by article 2, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, when a strict application of the provisions
the testimony of the injured parties. And inasmuch as,, according to the same, the act comes
of the code would result in an excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice
within the provisions of article 549 of the Penal Code, Catalino Apostol was sentenced to sixteen
and the injury caused by the crime.
years and one day of cadena temporal, to the accessories of the law, to indemnity the value of
the burnt hut in the sum of P1, and to pay the costs.
For the reasons above set forth the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs
against the Appellant. Ten days from date let a confirming judgment be entered, and ten days
An appeal having been taken to this court, the defense claimed, on behalf of the offender: (1)
thereafter let the case be remanded to the lower court for action.
The absence of proof of criminal intent; (2) that in view of the fact that the burnt hut was situated
in an uninhabited place, it is not proper to apply article 549, but article 554 of the Penal Code.
Without prejudice to the immediate execution of the judgment, let the clerk of this court, as
provided in the said article 2 of the Penal Code, respectfully address a communication to the
Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of
Honorable, the Governor-General of these Islands, giving the result of this decision and the
the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (Art.
sentence, requesting him, should he so desire, to make use of the prerogative with which he is
1, Penal Code.)
invested in order to reduce or mitigate the penalty imposed. So ordered.
As to the circumstances connected with the burning of the hut, Pedro Tabilisima testified that Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
he and his friends were in the same; that the accused and his companions arrived at 8 p.m. and
questioned them about carabaos that they said had been stolen from them; that after they
9
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6486 March 2, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, defendant-appellant.
B. Pobre for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cagayan,
Hon. Charles A. Low presiding, convicting the defendant of the crime of malversation of public
funds and sentencing him to two months' imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification to hold
public office or public employment of any kind, and to the payment of the costs.
It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as justice of the peace of Baggao,
Province of Cagayan, on the 2d day of October, 1909, had before him sixteen separate civil
cases commenced by Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct individuals, each one for damages
resulting from a breach of contract; that said cases were all decided by the appellant in favor of
the plaintiff; that each one of the defendant in said cases appealed from the decision of the
justice of the peace and deposited P16 as required by law, at the same time giving a bond of
P50, each one of which was approved by the court; that on the 12th day of said month the
plaintiff in said cases presented a writing to the appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging
that the sureties on the said bonds were insolvent and later demonstrated this to the satisfaction
of the appellant; that thereupon the latter ordered the cancellation of the said bonds and, in the
same order, required each of the appellants to file another bond within fifteen days, that,
inasmuch as none of the appellants in said causes presented new bonds within the time fixed,
the plaintiff in said causes applied to the appellant, as said court, for an order declaring final the
judgment entered in each of the said sixteen cases and commanding the execution of the same,
at the same time asking that the sums deposited by the defendants in said actions be attached
(so called in the record) and delivered to him in satisfaction of said judgments; that the accused
acceded to the petition of the plaintiff, ordered said sums attached and delivered same to the
plaintiff, at the same time requiring of the plaintiff a bond of P50 for each attachment, conditioned
that he would respond for the damages which should result from such attachment.
After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the defendants in the said sixteen cases
presented a complaint against the appellant to the Court of First Instance, by virtue of which
said court ordered that the plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance the sums deposited by the defendants in said actions. Canillas obeyed the order of
the court and made the delivery as required.
Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the acquittal of the accused. We
are in entire accord with that recommendation. The case made against the appellant lacks many
of the essential elements required by law to be present in the crime of malversation of public
funds. The accused did not convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other person;
neither did he feloniously permit anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was done in good
faith under the belief that he was acting judicially and correctly. The fact that he ordered the
sums, deposited in his hands by the defendants — appellants in the sixteen actions referred to,
attached for the benefit of the plaintiff in those actions, after the appeals had been dismissed
and the judgments in his court had become final, and that he delivered the said sums to the
plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment which he held in those cases, can not be considered an
appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No. 1740. He believed that, as
presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had a perfect right under the law to
cancel the bonds when it was clearly shown to him that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to
require the filing of new undertakings, giving the parties ample time within which to do so, to
dismiss the appeals in case said undertakings were not filed, and to declare the judgment final.
He believed that after said appeals had been dismissed and said judgment had become final,
the sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the judgments in the actions in
which said sums had been deposited and that he was acting judicially and legally in making
such applications.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum,
nisi mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of be innocent.
In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of justice of
the peace. He had jurisdictions of the actions before him. He had a right and it was his duty to
require the payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving of a proper undertaking with
solvent sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the
said cases, he may have exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond the limits of
his jurisdiction and power, a question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so far as appears
from the record, at most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of the mind operating upon a state
of facts. Giving the act complained of the signification most detrimental to the appellant, it,
nevertheless, was simply the result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function, and not
an intention to deprive any person of his property feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose
to do justice to litigants and not to embezzle property. He acted that honest debts might be paid
to those to whom they were legally and justly due, and not to enrich himself or another
by criminalmisappropriation. It was an error committed by a court, not an act done by a criminal-
minded man. It was a mistake, not a crime.
10
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of a The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from custody
criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal forthwith.
act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal intention, and that it is for
the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur.
presumption springs must be a criminal act. In the case before us the act was not criminal. It
may have been an error; it may have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have
been declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other proceeding in the superior court. It Separate Opinions
may well be that his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as properly
CARSON, J., concurring:
to subject him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from office. But, from the facts of
record, it was not criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of criminal intention arises I am strongly inclined to doubt the bona fides of the defendant in the transactions herein set out,
from the act. but in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon this point I concur in the judgment
of acquittal of the crime charged in the information.
Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of, even
though it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public funds as defined
and penalized in Act No. 1740. It is true that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for
violations of the preceding section, the absence of any of the public funds or property of which
any person described in said section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to
produce all the funds and property properly in his charge on the demand of any officer
authorized to examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or depositary shall be deemed
to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or property have been put to personal uses
or used for personal ends by such person within the meaning of the preceding section."
Nevertheless, that presumption is a rebuttable one and constitutes only a prima facie case
against the person accused. If he present evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said
funds or property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end and the prima facie case
destroyed. In the case at bar it was necessary for the accused to offer any such evidence, for
the reason that the people's own pleading alleged, and its own proofs presented, along with the
criminal charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said money had not been put to
personal uses or used for personal ends. In other words, the prosecution demonstrated, both
by the allegations in its information filed against the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that
the absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal use thereof by the accused,
thus affirmatively and completely negativing the presumption which, under the act quoted,
arises from the absence of the funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The
facts which were presented for the purpose of creating such presumption were accompanied
by other facts which absolutely prevented its creation.

On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of estafa, as defined in
paragraph 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, then the presumption just referred to does not
arise. Mere absence of the funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure
of the accused to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even a prima
facie case. (U. S. vs. Morales, 15 Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.)
Conversion must be affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of facts
from which conversion necessarily follows. (U. S. vs. Morales, supra.)

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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony
of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or
the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping
for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y
MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a
judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in
the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and
ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway
and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim
Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as
temperate damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting
them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime
therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under
said presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense
proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-
statement of facts in the People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a
quo, documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and
which we note are without any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two
accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called
Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the
personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on
account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver
Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will
temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes
Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner
of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside
the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where
Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to
get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they
will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them
that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is?
The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and
prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed
neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called,
asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3
12
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered
her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the
car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then,
crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was
finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma.
Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her
dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's
P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant,
except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely
allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away,
until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she
stubbed her toe while running across the highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando,
Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant
and divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant
Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the
medication of his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have
been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the
submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the
crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of
the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying
circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to
determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in
the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused
had his own personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the
rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate
offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the
actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance
because if the attack was by reason of the previous performance of official duties by the person
in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured
prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the
extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is
admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification.
Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for
funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me
"Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you
doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have
been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the
victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist,
there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not
where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of
another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States
vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention
and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time
but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their
lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of
the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant
of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of
appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to your
nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic) being handed
to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow her to stay at
Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will take her to
her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is (sic) already
given you the checks?
13
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak
or some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So when we
reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the
car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of
ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally.
Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can
hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from
her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or
was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily
surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily
divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as
defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same
constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the
information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused
admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway.
They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money
that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out
three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable
under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where
robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in
Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently
necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential
Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are
not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a
modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the
relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the
alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This
is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway
robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion
thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the
matter reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands
were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was
inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in
a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The
heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for
the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306.
It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the
band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent
means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be
such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or
kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery
was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was
committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band
"sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose
is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least
four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential
Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that
distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary.
This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one
drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed
originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts
of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined
or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are
among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such
acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view
of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the
people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen
by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of
depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as
to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute
the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be
an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the
Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses
stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such
acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed
persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are
brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we
broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein
the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but
against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may
potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential
Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code
and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of
robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just
because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding
the absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged
outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a
literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be
covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the
law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to
stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but
skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of
the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant
for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect
mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we
eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated
theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws,
that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on
a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto,
would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense
within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject
matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and
traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply
Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the
present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually
operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its
definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway
robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived
and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in
Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary
of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective
liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants
and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no
mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been
made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed
by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime
of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the
former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which
they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking,
with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof
shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed
to be alleged in an information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking
(apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants
which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted
ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by
necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks
(inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It
cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but
could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
15
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one
is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao
y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the EN BANC
Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) [G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003]
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM,
Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, MANUEL DELIM alias BONG (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD
with costs. DELIM alias BONG, accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED. DECISION

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,[1] dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City, finding accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Leon Delim
# Footnotes
* Complainant testified under the name of "Corina Mutuc Sarmiento" but made the clarification that her baptismal name is "Maria del and Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them
Socorro Mutuc Sarmiento" (TSN, January 8, 1990, 4). to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The court also ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly
1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 72. and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00
3 Ibid., 137; per Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. as exemplary damages.
4 Appellant's Brief, 5; Rollo, 47.
5 Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; Rollo, 68-84.
6 Ibid., 73-75. Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias Bong and Robert, all
7 TSN, August 13, 1990, 14-15.
8 Ibid., id., 16; September 5, 1990, 18, 25-26.
surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder under an Information dated May 4, 1999 which reads:
9 Ibid., id., 11.
10 People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956). That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and within
11 People vs. Cadag, et al., 2 SCRA 388 (1961).
12 TSN, August, 30, 1990, 11.
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with short firearms
13 For this reason, kidnapping and serious illegal detention are jointly provided for in Article 267 under Chapter One, Title Nine, Book barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with intent to
Two of the Revised Penal Code on Crimes Against Liberty.
14 1 Phil. 165 (1902); see also U.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 163 (1902). kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did then and there,
15 People vs. Remalante, 92 Phil. 48 (1952); People vs. Guerrero, 103 Phil. 1136 (1958); People vs. Ong, et al., 62 SCRA 174 (1975); wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of cloth, brought out and
People vs. Ty Sui Wong, et al., 83 SCRA 125 (1978); People vs. Jimenez, et al., 105 SCRA 721 (1981).
16 TSN, August 13, 1990, 21-22. abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house guarded
17 Keith vs. State, 120 Fla. 847, 163 So. 136; People vs. Akiran, et al., 18 SCRA 239, 246 (1966). and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter, thereafter with abuse
18 Original Record, 136.
19 Rollo, 79. of superior strength stabbed and killed said Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his
20 U.S. vs. Ibañez, 19 Phil. 463 (1911). Art. 306 of the Code also specifically refers to them as "highway robbers or brigands." heirs.
21 U.S. vs. Carlos, 15 Phil. 47 (1910).
22 Aquino, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, Volume Three, 1989 ed., p. 174, citing U.S. vs. Decusin, 2 Phil. 536 (1903) and U.S. vs.
Maaño, 2 Phil. 718 (1903). CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.[2]
23 U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422 (1904).
24 Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege (2 Inst. 11; Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 390). Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim, were
25 Act 518, as amended by Act 2036.
26 Qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice (Co. Litt. 289; Broom, Max. 685; Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1413). apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel remain at-large.
27 Republic Act No. 6539.
28 Presidential Decree No. 533.
29 People vs. San Pedro, 95 SCRA 306 (1980); People vs. Masilang, 142 SCRA 673 (1986).
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel, pleaded
30 Section 4, Rule 120, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. not guilty to the charge.
31 U.S. vs. San Pedro, 4 Phil. 405 (1905); U.S. vs. alabot, 38 Phil. 698 (1918).
32 See Section 5, Rule 120, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts[3]

Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald
Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter.He took the surname
Delim after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modestos
wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as
16
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy report,
as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald which reads:
used to visit Modesto and his family. Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in
Barangay Bila, Sison, Pangasinan. SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing - Body - both upper extremities are flexed
to have their supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto and Ritas two young - both lower extremities are flexed
grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert
and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and closed the door.Each of the three intruders - (+) body decomposition
was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of
Modesto.[4] Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards - 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to
leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by - 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January 24,
1999. - 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Nio, at - 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto occipital area (POEx)
Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the
retrieval of Modesto. Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, - 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
Randy opted to first look for his father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters away
from Modestos house, to locate Modesto but failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
Randy and his relatives returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate
Modesto but again failed to find him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
to the police authorities. - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in
Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy - #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm
area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in the state of decomposition. It
exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the cadaver. Randy and - 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and to seek - 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
assistance.
- penis inflamed
When informed of the discovery of Modestos cadaver, the local chief of police and SPO2
Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen rushed to the scene and saw the cadaver under the thick SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.[5] Rita and Randy divulged to the police
investigators the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom - no significant internal findings
they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and Randy were at a loss why the CAUSE OF DEATH:
five malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy gave their respective sworn
statements to the police investigators.[6] Police authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD.[7]
Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their respective houses. The police officers
scoured the mountainous parts of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.
17
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive
wounds. The police investigators were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and
Manuel had no licenses for their firearms.[8]
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon
had pending cases for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No.
16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and 9802 pending with the
Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[9]
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and alibi.[10]
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his brothers
and sisters were in their house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away
from Modestos house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting and
killing him. He theorized that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon the coaching of
Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister, Hermelita
Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had been living since 1997 after
leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since then, he had been working for Sally Asuncion at
a hollow-block factory in that city where he was a stay-in worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leons alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home to his
hometown in Pangasinan during his employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo, likewise
averred that on January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give her his laundry. She
claimed that the distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan can be traversed in
six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove that he was a resident of
Laoag City from January 1998 up to February 1999.[11]
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to
January 29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his
return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his
cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in Dumaguete
City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The dispositive
portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby rendered
against Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of Aggravated
Murder, an offense defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim
to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner as provided for by law; the
Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim
the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to the
Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus fifteen (15) days from date of
promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta
City is hereby ordered to transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all surnamed Delim
to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking advantage of
superior strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in their appeal brief,
assail the decision alleging that:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI.[13]
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the crime
charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping. During the deliberation, some distinguished
members of the Court opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are charged
with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and not with murder in its
aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that the accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with a piece of cloth, brought out and
abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim and Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and)
guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from helping the latter. They submit
that the foregoing allegation constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty of the victim, the
gravamen in the crime of kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the Information went
further to charge accused with the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature
of the criminal charge being determined not from the caption or the preamble of the Information
nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated these being conclusions of
law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. They further submit that
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill
Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death of the victim but only for kidnapping the
victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material
inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated
are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the
prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al.,[14] that for
kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the
malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his
freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended
by the malefactor. This Court further held:
x x x. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated thereafter, it
has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even
for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds
the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation
thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping or
serious illegal detention.[15]
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation
of the victims liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act
to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim. [16] The crime
committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the
information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is
charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as
an essential element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind
which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal
consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act.[17] Specific
intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the
prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a
prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent.[18] Kidnapping and murder are specific intent
crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be
inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence
on record.[19]
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason
which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential
element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof
of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof
of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as
murder.[20] The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives
comparatively trivial.[21] Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim.
In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive
for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping.[22] In kidnapping for ransom, the
motive is ransom.Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive
is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors
in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him
with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto
was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific
allegation in the information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive
Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to
kidnapping.[23] Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
cavil of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.[24]
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of
two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the commission of the
act.[25] Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the
subjective element of crimes.[26] In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is
burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced
by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural
cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way
criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. [27] To prove the felony of homicide
or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was
deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the
malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.[28]
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus 1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto, each
delicti. Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained seven (7) stab armed with a handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald hog-tied Modesto. They
wounds,[29] defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more then seized Modesto and herded him out of his house:
specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as the nature, number and
location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent by the malefactors to FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?
kill the victim with all the consequences flowing therefrom.[30] As the State Supreme Court of A We were eating, sir.
Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:[31]
Q You said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences
of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and A My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.
by the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that happened
presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one
at that time?
man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves
show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased A When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.
was designed by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of Modesto. It
relied on circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of accused- A Yes, sir.
appellants of murder. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason
and common experience.[32] What was once a rule of account respectability is now entombed A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial
evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:
A Two of them, sir.
x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
Q Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[33] A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and
all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of accused for A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his
the offense charged.[34] For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all name was asked answered Marlon Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a person seated
the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked he answered Ronald Delim).
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and
Q You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm were they
with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[35] If the prosecution adduced the carrying at that time?
requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution. A Short handgun, sir.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial evidence Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short firearms,
to prove that accused-appellants, in confabulation with their co-accused, conspired to kill and what did they do then when they entered your house?
did kill Modesto:
A They took my father, sir.

Q Who took your father?

20
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir. PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong entered
your house, are these three (3) persons who entered your house in Court now?
Q When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
A None, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?
COURT: How did they get your father?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is Ronald
A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir. Delim.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun? Q After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?
A Marlon Delim, sir. A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun? Q What is the name of your husband?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused). A Modesto Delim, sir.[37]
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next? 2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with a
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, Stay in your house, and guarded us. handgun, acted as a lookout when he stood guard by the door of the house of Modesto and
remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:
COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?
FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three persons,
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir. what did you and your mother do while these three persons were taking out of your house?
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father? A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
A I do not know where they brought my father, sir. COURT: Where, in your house?
COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside? A Yes, sir.
A Inside our house, sir. FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three persons
Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic), where were Leon and Manuel then?
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?
A They were at the door, sir.
A Yes, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
A Because they were at the door, sir.
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir.[36]
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were
Randys account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:
guarding you, these Leon and Manuel?
PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999 at around
A They were armed, sir.
6:30 in the evening while preparing for your supper three (3) armed men entered inside your
house, who were these three (3) men who entered your house? Q What do you mean by armed?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir. A They have gun, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to answer, Your Q What kind of firearm?
Honor.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who when his name
was asked, answered, Leon Delim).[38]
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon left the
house with Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their house up to 7:00 a.m. of
January 24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking help from their relatives and police authorities.
4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of Modesto
was found under the thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing project located about 200
meters away from the house of Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad odor and was already in the
state of decomposition:
Q So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father?
A The same place and at 3:00 oclock P.M., we were able to find my father.
COURT: Where?
A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look for your
father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00 oclock P.M.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My Aunt, sir.
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Who else?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.
COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition?
A He was dead, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then when
you saw him dead?
A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic).[39]
The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the cadaver of
Modesto was in a state of decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling from his wounds, and
that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The victim sustained five gunshot wounds and
defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:
PROS. TOMBOC:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?
WITNESS:
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper extremities
are flexed and both lower extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the victim, Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there were so
many worms coming out from the injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the victim was
an igorot (sic) and they have tradition that they will bury immediately. Whether they like it or not
I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was also
20 ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular area, right; I cannot also determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.
22
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, 5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had flown the
below middle nose, directed upward (POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto- coop and were nowhere to be found:
occipital area (POEx).
COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto Delim?
Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Yes, sir.
A Five (5) sir.
Q In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects?
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary
area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his
lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. brothers, sir.
stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed Q What are the names of the brothers?
wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm.
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
Q By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for investigation?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
A No, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora?
Q Why?
A Yes sir.[40]
A Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be found,
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting on it they all left the place, sir.
and the distention of his scrotum and penis are evidence that the cadaver was in the stage of
putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for a period ranging from three to six Q In what place did you look for the brothers Delim?
days.[41] Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the exact death of the victim. An
A Within the vicinity, sir.
equally persuasive authority states:
Q In what place?
Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place where
Time Since Death Condition of the Body
the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir.
48 hours Ova of flies seen.
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers?
Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters present.
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
Moving maggots seen.
Q Wherelse (sic)?
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and
A Labayog, Sison, sir.
disfigured. Hair and nails loose.
Q Wherelse?
Tissues soft and discolored.[42]
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir.
The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of January
Q What was the result?
23, 1999 to the discovery of his cadaver which was already in the state of putrefaction in the
afternoon of January 27, 1999, about 200 meters away from his house, is consistent with and A Negative result, sir.[43]
confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution that the victim was killed precisely by the very
malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999.

23
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to the house
of Modesto and Rita:
COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day, January 23,
1999?
A Yes, sir, I know them.
Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999?
A They are my neighbors, sir.
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23, 1999?
A I know them, sir.
Q Why do you know them?
A They used to go to our house, sir.
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your husbands
name is Modesto Delim are they related with each other?
A Yes, sir.[44]
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay Bila,
Sison is strong circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of Modesto.Although flight
after the commission of an offense does not create a legal presumption of guilt, nevertheless,
the same is admissible in evidence against them and if not satisfactorily explained in a manner
consistent with their innocence, will tend to show that they, in fact, killed Modesto.[45]
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to abduct and
kill Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified that they were not aware of any misunderstanding
or grudge between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon, Ronald and Leon and their co-
accused on the other before the incident, or any motivation on the part of the three malefactors
to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless, it cannot thereby be concluded that a person or
persons other than Marlon, Ronald and Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the
victim. It is a matter of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious
crimes for no reason at all.[46] In this case, the inscrutable facts are that Marlon and Ronald,
each of whom was armed with a handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house at the gunpoint,
hogtied, put a piece of cloth in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with
Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was found
concealed under the bushes and already in a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of January
27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot wounds and died because of a gunshot wound
on the head. The criminal acts and the connection of Marlon, Ronald and Leon with said acts
having been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the act itself furnishes the
evidence, that to its perpetration there was some causes or influences moving the mind.[47] The
remarkable tapestry intricately woven by the prosecution should not be trashed simply because
the malefactors had no motive to kill Modesto.
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on Marlon,
Ronald and Leon to rebut the same and explain what happened to the victim after taking him
from his house in the evening of January 23, 1999. They may have freed the victim shortly after
taking him, or the victim may have been able to escape and that thereafter a person or some
other persons may have killed him. However, Marlon, Ronald and Leon failed to give any
explanation. Instead, they merely denied having seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi
as their defense.
Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows that he
conspired with accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald and accused Robert and Manuel in
killing the victim.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it.[48] Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not presumed. It may be proved
by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the
malefactors before, during and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.[49] To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime.[50] It
is sufficient if, at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the act
of all. It matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the victim.[51] This is based
on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the prosecution of the common plan:
x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are considered
and treated as the acts and declarations of his principal. What is so done by an agent, is done
by the principal through him, as his mere instrument. Franklin Bank of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania
D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). If the conspiracy be proved to have
existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its existence, the acts of one in furtherance
of the common design are the acts of all; and whatever one does in furtherance of the common
design, he does as the agent of the co-conspirators. R. v. OConnell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710.[52]
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one
voice, they wield one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of each, while
in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of all.[53]
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each
armed with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by
the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow, Leon stood by the door
and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood guard by the door of the house
until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors
were so synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of
24
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
all the malefactors to achieve a common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably,
the tasks assigned to Leon in the commission of the crime were (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to
ensure that Rita and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking assistance from
police authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait
accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.[54] Patently, Leon, a lookout for the group,
is guilty of the killing of Modesto.[55] Leon may not have been at the situs criminis when Modesto
was killed by Marlon and Ronald nevertheless he is a principal by direct participation. [56] If part
of a crime has been committed in one place and part in another, each person concerned in the
commission of either part is liable as principal. No matter how wide may be the separation of
the conspirators, if they are all engaged in a common plan for the execution of a felony and all
take their part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence
is not necessary if there is a direct connection between the actor and the crime. [57]
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging that the
same were marred by inconsistencies:
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father. Later
however, Randy claimed that the malefactors proceeded to the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan;
2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into their
house. She later changed her testimony and declared that it was Robert, together with Marlon
and Ronald who barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she
testified that after the three men brought out the victim, the two other accused entered the house
and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January 25, 1999,
and she was accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy testified that he was alone when
he looked for his father from January 24 to 26, 1999.[58]
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of facts of the
trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings are accorded by the
appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of its unique advantage of
observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they give
their testimonies before the court. In the present case, the trial court gave credence and full
probative weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution. Moreover, there is no
evidence on record that Randy and Rita were moved by any improper or ill motive in testifying
against the malefactors and the other accused; hence, their testimonies must be given full credit
and probative weight.[59]The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render
them incredible or their testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne in mind that
human memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a persons sense of observation is
impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness is not
always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery
of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the
slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of his
testimony.[60] Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to minor,
collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent
facts.[61] Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[62]
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in truncated
terms and the true meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a witness is to be
ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the witness and his
answers thereto.[63]
Randys testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not inconsistent
with his testimony that Ronald and Marlon brought his father towards the direction of Paldit,
Sison, Pangasinan. Randy may not have known the destination of accused-appellants but he
saw the direction to which they went. While it may be true that when asked to identify the three
who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon as one of them, however, Rita had been
consistent throughout her testimony that those who barged into their house were Ronald and
Marlon. Leons counsel never cross-examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her
identification of Leon as one of those who barged into their house to give her an opportunity to
explain her perceived inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence which reads:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether
he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing
they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.[64]
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for the
desired impeachment of her.[65] As to whether Rita and Randy were together in looking for
Modesto or Leon merely stood guard by the door of the house or entered the house are
inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood guard throughout the night to prevent Rita and
Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy and
Rita bear the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-examination,
they responded with consistency upon material details that could only come from a firsthand
knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before their eyes. The Court thus finds no
cogent reason to disregard the findings of the trial court regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not giving
credence and probative weight to their evidence to prove their defense of alibi. They aver that
their collective evidence to prove their defense is strong.
25
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of defenses in
criminal prosecution because the same is easy to concoct between relatives, friends and even
those not related to the offender.[66] It is hard for the prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit
approbation by the trial court and this Court, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove
with clear and convincing evidence that they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the
time of the commission of the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed
the said crime.[67] They failed to discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively
and spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits. The house of Ronald,
where he claimed he was when the crime was committed, was only two kilometers away from
the house of Modesto and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to adduce any
documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The barefaced fact that he
was a resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that he was in Laoag City on the day of
the commission of the crime. With respect to Marlon, he failed to adduce evidence aside from
his self-serving testimony that he resided in, left Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on
January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying circumstance
of treachery in the killing of Modesto. The trial court likewise appreciated nighttime and abuse
of superior strength and the use of unlicensed firearms as separate aggravating
circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that indeed treachery was
attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder defined
in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in
and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged
and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or
presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime.[68] As
this Court held: No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they
must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating the condition of defendant.[69] Article 14,
paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following
elements: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or
consciously adopted.[70] Although the victim may have been defenseless at the time he was
seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and killed,
treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.[71] In this case, the victim was
defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to present
any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately before and
when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although he was defenseless
when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was attacked, shot and
stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[72] What
is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio Francisco[73] is that the assailants
deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the
crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength.[74] In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce
evidence that Marlon and Ronald deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority
when Modesto was killed. The barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and
were armed while Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of
their numerical superioty and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.[75]
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide defined in
and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was proven
during the trial, there is no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and Leon had no
license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an essential element of
the crime of violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, or as a special
aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or murder.[76] Neither can dwelling, although
proven, aggravate the crime because said circumstance was not alleged in the Information as
required by Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.[77] Although this rule took effect
on December 1, 2000, after the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had been
given retroactive effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused.[78]
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald and
Leon should be meted an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which shall be taken from the
entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years and one day to 12 years and the maximum period
of which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8
months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be modified. The
sum of P75,000.00 awarded as moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[79] The amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is in order.[80] In addition, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded without
need of proof, likewise in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.[81]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide defined in and penalized by
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty
of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period
as maximum. Accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs
26
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by [43] TSN, Fajarito, pp. 5-6, August 17, 1999.
[44] TSN, Delim, p. 5, September 21, 1999.
way of moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages. [45] People v. Erardo, 277 SCRA 643 (1997).
[46] People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611 (1999).
[47] Cupps v. State, supra.
SO ORDERED. [48] Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
[49] People v. Abordo, et al., 321 SCRA 23 (1999).

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria- [50] People v. Naredo, et al., 276 SCRA 489 (1997).
[51] People v. Sequio, et al., 264 SCRA 79 (1996).
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. [52] State v. Carbonne, et al., 91 Atlantic Reporter, A.2d 571.
[53] Territory v. Goto, 27 Hawaii 65 (1923).

Vitug, J., see separate opinion. [54] The detention of Rita and Randy in their house was only incidental to the consummation of the killing of Modesto. Hence Marlon,

Ronald and Leon are not liable for serious illegal detention (United States v. Sol,et al., 9 Phil. 265 (1907).
[55] People v. Diaz, et al., 167 SCRA 239 (1988).
Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Vitug. [56] People v. Santos, 84 Phil. 97 (1949); People v. Escober, 157 SCRA 541 (1988); People v. Nacional, 248 SCRA 122 (1995).
[57] Wharton, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, p. 341.
[58] Supra, p. 15; Rollo, p. 65.
[1] Penned by Judge Modesto C. Juanson. [59] People v. Estepano, et al., 307 SCRA 701 (1999).
[2] Records, p. 1. [60] People v. Bias, 320 SCRA 22 (1999).
[3] Prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Rita Bantas, Randy Bantas, Dra. Maria Fe de Guzman and SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito. [61] People v. Lucena, 356 SCRA 90, 102 (2001).
[4] Records, Exhibit C. [62] People v. Dando, 325 SCRA 406, 424 (2000).
[5] Records, Exhibits C and C-1. [63] Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Part II, Vol. VII, 1991 ed.
[6] Records, Exhibits D and B. [64] Supra.
[7] Records, Exhibit A. [65] People v. De Guzman, 288 SCRA 346 (1998).
[8] Records, Exhibit E. [66] Naval v. Panday, et al., 275 SCRA 654 (1997).
[9] Records, p. 34. [67] People v. Caete, et al., 287 SCRA 490 (1998).
[10] Accused-appellants testified and presented, as witnesses, Sally Asuncion, Hermelita Estabillo, Estelita Delim and Flor Delim. [68] People v. Garcia, 258 SCRA 422 (1996).
[11] Records, Exhibit 2. [69] United States v. Perdon, 4 Phil. 143 (1905) cited in People v. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 (1972).
[12] RTC Decision, pp. 9-10; Records, pp. 166-167. [70] People v. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 (1999).
[13] Rollo, p. 51. [71] People v. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 (1929); People v. Amanse, 80 Phil. 424 (1948); People v. Villaruel, 87 Phil. 826 (1950); People v.
[14] 219 SCRA 85 (1993).
Silvestre, supra.
[15] People v. Puno, et al., supra. [72] Alberts Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1981 ed., Vol. 1, p. 396.
[16] In People v. Ancheta, et al., 1 Phil. 165 (1902), it was held that where the victim was kidnapped by the malefactors and brought to a [73] 234 SCRA 333 (1994).
place where he was killed by another malefactor, the crime was murder because the primary intention of the malefactors was to kill [74] People v. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 365 (1950).
him. In People v. Cajayon, et al., 2 Phil. 570, the victim was taken from his house and brought to another province where he was killed, [75] People v. Ibaez, Jr., 56 SCRA 210 (1974).
the Court ruled that the malefactors were guilty of murder. In People v. Quinto, 82 Phil. 467, the victim was taken by the malefactors [76] People v. Ave, G.R. No. 137274-75, October 18, 2002.
from his house in Floridablanca, Pampanga and brought to Gumain River where he was killed, this Court held that the crime was [77] SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver
murder. In People v. Juan Bulatao, 82 Phil. 743, the victim was taken from his house and was found dead the following morning, this the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
Court held that the malefactors were guilty of murder. In People v. Francisco Moreno, 85 Phil. 731, the victim was taken from his house offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
in Aguilar, Pangasinan and brought to Mangatarem, Pangasinan where he was killed, we ruled that the offenders were guilty of murder, [78] People v. Salvador, G.R. No. 132481, August 14, 2002, p. 15.
not kidnapping. [79] People v. Agunias, et al., 279 SCRA 52 (1997).
[17] People v. Garland, 627 NE 2d 377. [80] People v. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001).
[18] State v. Mundy, 650 NE 2d 502. [81] People v. Mejares, supra, p. 13.
[19] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, pp. 214-215.
[20] Cupps v. State, 97 Northwestern Reports, 210.
[21] Wharton, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, p. 215.
[22] People v. Manliguez, et al., 206 SCRA 812 (1992).
[23] Records, p. 1.
[24] People v. Dramayo, et al., 42 SCRA 59 (1971).
[25] Gay v. State, 60 Southwestern Reporter, 771 (1901).
[26] Ibid., note 22.
[27] Wharton, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, pp. 473-474, citing Lovelady v. State, 14 Tex. App. 545).
[28] People v. William Fulinara, et al., 247 SCRA 28 (1995).
[29] Records, Exhibit A.
[30] Warren v. State, 41 Southern Reporter 2d 201 (1949); State v. Roger, 182 Southwestern Reporter 2d 525 (1949).
[31] 97 Northwestern Reporter, 210 (1903).
[32] Francisco, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, Part II, Vol. VII, 1991 ed.
[33] Supra.
[34] People v. Elizaga, et al., 23 SCRA 449 (1968).
[35] People v. Casingal, et al., 243 SCRA 37 (1995).
[36] TSN, Bantas, pp. 4-6, August 18, 1999.
[37] TSN, Delim, pp. 2-3, September 21, 1999.
[38] Ibid., pp. 7-8, August 18, 1999.
[39] TSN, Bantas, pp. 12-13, August 18, 1999.
[40] TSN, De Guzman, pp. 5-6, August 16, 1999.
[41] Wharton & Stille, Medical Jurisprudence, Vol. III, p. 39.
[42] Casper, Forensic Medicine, cited by Modi, Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 12 ed., 157, p. 134.

27
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony
of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the
accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the
incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material
facts disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc
Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as
a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40
meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers'
mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small
room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
along the side of the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of
the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of
security, had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In
the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside
from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the
night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in
bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise
at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.
Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the
edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the
defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open,
whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the
chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it
rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out
wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out
upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the
defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was
wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook;
and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his
pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at
night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had
left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao
and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the
mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano
stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after
the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to
No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one
of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to
the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did
it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their
sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself,
unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and
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sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who
he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial
court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual
Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in
the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the
intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron,"
as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right
of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the
night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his
warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover
his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither
the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at
the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the
part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there
was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the
property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the
facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient
to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances
demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases
where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be
different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases
cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38
Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy
of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the
crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been
said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense
therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or
offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor
to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one
or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while
it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the
definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined,
in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching
liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more
apparent than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a
wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal,
and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great
harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the
measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm,
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which the criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in
proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does
greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing
done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption
was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary
shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used
in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly
asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime;
and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were
expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the
code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being
implied and included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to
exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was
in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without
intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the
exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention
there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can
be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no
moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in
its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the object
of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever
may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil
registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law;
nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following
language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in
the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question
of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element
of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an
examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal
intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts
contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence,
does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in
meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of
criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and
approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without
justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful."
And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with
a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes
"malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more
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purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the
word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition
of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought,"
or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter
mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports
his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent.
In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the
sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation
nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a man should be
deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably
it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus
non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like
sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the
ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of
mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes
the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason
comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems
another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of
evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the community deems not
his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr.
Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be
accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable
truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature
from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent
is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this
doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be
administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts
have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
Without discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts
have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain
acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute
will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the law's
fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose
need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore,
requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of
abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg.
Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact
as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily
relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his
part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the
circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44
Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb.,
625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap.,
387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to
him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal
or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence
of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on
which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them — he is legally
guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and
the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in
adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
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undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without
fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to
what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is
the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds
up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but
is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled
at his head is loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the
aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he
would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would
undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances,
proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent,
and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in
cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established
in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear
that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or
excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such
belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of
the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched
arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having
approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the
head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the
pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any
reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet
in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before
he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would
entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury
who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few
of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case
at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company
only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to
the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or
know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of
which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly
been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards
striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house.
It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as
soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral
congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always
sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness,
demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal
responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph
4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he
was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational
necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of
the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and
costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following
sentence: "Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the
accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her
child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might
have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room,
and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated that they
might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because
his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same
stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use
means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he
killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and
in the darkness of the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong
aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more
assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational
necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part
of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a
distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which, and
almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the
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voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated,
"Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the
place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in
favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of
the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years
and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from Separate Opinions
this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of
TORRES, J., dissenting:
fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the
darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according
(Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.) to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes
in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large
(voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was,
stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires
however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not
what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his house would
warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused
be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals,
that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred
one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the
responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter said room,
next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from
without any justifiable motive.
criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused
that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer
responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of
the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the
malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of
Republic of the Philippines
May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
SUPREME COURT
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the Manila
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the
EN BANC
intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was
in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant
at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he vs.
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
the property under his charge.
MORAN, J.:
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Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and
Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary,
respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six
months to two years and two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately
from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following
tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant
and asked that he be given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates
Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at
the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted
telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The
same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial
Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers
in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go
with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis
and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where
Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one
Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was.
Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that
occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of
Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened
by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the
shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene
fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The
Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who
killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The
corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de
Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on
Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly
by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the
tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house,
the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further
inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the
same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the
door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke
up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned
towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at
Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and
after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his
bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the
supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor,
he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not
only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also
because they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter
was apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on
the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in
bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson,
the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when
Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions
that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once
belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate
substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea,
Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain
extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to
Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was
awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still
lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to
observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in
accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants.
Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her version of
the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination,
even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to
the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves
justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back
towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively,
believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held
responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing
that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower
court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence.
We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed
by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on
the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case,
defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door.
He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a
robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But
at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and
believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent
mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road
held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He
was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled
at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of
the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any
fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further
inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take
the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant
case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever
which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had
been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only
legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they
were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil,
738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence,
or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par.
13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be
subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2).
And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force
or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true
that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a
menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing
him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered,
as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in
U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to
his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard
of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his
captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case,
the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers
of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it
never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate
action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever
to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation —
not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the
shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional
and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional,
it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil.,
939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no
haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera
calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del
agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo
Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence
(People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act
is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in
the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order
that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present —
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the
crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and
they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no
chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they
believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous
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inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower
by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of
murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased
Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee form Manila
to the provinces. Receiving information to the effect that he was staying with one Irene in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial
Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead
or alive". Among those assigned to the task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio Z.
Oanis, chief of police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom
the telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of Balagtas were
shown. Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector
to gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered, to follow the
instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the place where the house of Irene was
located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering
banana stalks in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the
room, she was asked by Oanis to tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari
answered that he was sleeping with Irene. Upon reaching the room indicated, Oanis and
Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting the man
who was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed, but Balagtas
was still alive, for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one Serapio
Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them only of homicide through reckless
imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 1 year and 6
months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional, to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta have
appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they undoubtedly followed
the order issued by the Constabulary authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in
Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson was
Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and
a record that made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities
were justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger
faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have acted feloniously in
shooting the person honestly believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the fact that
Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to take chances and
should not be penalized for such prudence. On the contrary, they should be commended for
their bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or ascertaining
whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without
hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use their
revolvers only after being overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by
the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in violation of the express order given by the
Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the appellants. In the second place,
it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to
have waited until they have been overpowered before trying to put our such a character as
Balagtas. In the third place, it is immaterial whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial
Inspector was legitimate and proper, because the facts exist that the appellants acted in
conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary authorities, the legality or propriety
of which is not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite psychological or
sentimental, in view only of the fact that it was not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an
"innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep." Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by
the trade, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not
vainly sacrificed, for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to
follow in the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly constituted authorities will,
upon proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed by them was
in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art.
11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally liable even if the person killed by them
was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake
of fact not due to negligence or bad faith. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any
person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable since the killing of the person who was believed
to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or felonious.
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in point,
inasmuch as the defendant therein, who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a
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quarrel, but killed another by mistake, would not be exempted from criminal liability if he actually
injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious design on his part. The other case
involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it
appears that the defendants therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered
and allowed himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have lawful instructions
from superior authorities to capture Almasan dead or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and
Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with costs de oficio.
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal
"must be taken by storm without regard to his life which he has, by his conduct, already
forfeited," whenever said criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors
in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which confronted the accused-appellants
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very similar
to this. It must be remembered that both officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or
alive" and according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also of Capt. Monsod,
constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave
more emphasis to the first part; namely, to take him dead. It appears in the record that after the
shooting, and having been informed of the case, Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta
might be decorated for what they had done. That was when all parties concerned honestly
believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had escaped
from his guards and was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person
whom the appellants met upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of
Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man
closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the
supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by
the fact that he should have felt offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was
peacefully lying down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the
part of the appellants to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the
imminent attack by a person who, according to their belief, was Balagtas It was unfortunate,
however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into consideration the facts of the
case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down in the
case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused,
who having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case which
favored the accused-appellants, arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete justifying
circumstance may be invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law. This incomplete justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office." I believe that the application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of
the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. — A penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not
wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or
to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided
that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period
which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption
present or lacking.
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal Code of the
Philippines, and which was also taken from Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by Administrative
Order No. 94 of the Department of Justice for the drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in
commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying circumstances and circumstances exempting
from liability which are the subject matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense
of relatives, defense of strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere accident.
Accordingly, justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or
the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87 of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870 which is the source of Article 69 of our Code says:
Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra violentado
por una fuerza inrresistible o impulsado por miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en
cumplimiento de un deber, o en el ejercito legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de
obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa legitima
o insuperable, puede tener aplicacion al articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En
ninguna de estas execiones hay pluralidad de requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una
sola condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve
años; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que respectivamente
hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto,
imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se
imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que establece; esto es, que
falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran
el mayor numero de ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples
condiciones.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one or two wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other wounds found by the surgeon
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by who performed the autopsy appeared to have been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In
reason of the lack of some of the conditions required by the law to justify the same or exempt consequence, it can be stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson
from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not be confused with the word "requisites". and therefore there is no reason why he should be declared criminally responsible for said
In dealing with justifying circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There are two requisites death.
in order that this circumstance may be taken into account: (a) That the offender acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise
of a right or office." It is evident that these two requisites concur in the present case if we
consider the intimate connection between the order given to the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the
showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was with a bailarina named
Irene, the conduct of said appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the
supposed criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt. Monsod Republic of the Philippines
after the shooting. SUPREME COURT
Manila
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there are more
reasons in favor of the acquittal of appellant Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from FIRST DIVISION
the gun fired by this accused ever hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon of
December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and was corroborated G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
by the unchallenged testimony of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica. According to this
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
witness, since Galanta was made a corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his
vs.
equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly used by
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-
Galanta, and, according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he
appellants.
took it from his trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24, 1938, upon order of Captain
Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to the witness with five .45 caliber bullets The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
and one empty shell. Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant
Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
of December 24, 1938, when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in
the possession of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post at
Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed. This testimony is MEDIALDEA, J.:
corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets exhibits F and O, — the first
being extracted from the head of the deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
C and the second found at the place of the shooting, — had not been fired from revolver Exhibit SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-
L nor from any other revolver of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for 175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information
the accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L was taken from which reads as follows:
him nobody in the barracks doubted that the deceased was none other than Balagtas. That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of
Moreover, Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no reason why Galanta should
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
carry along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On the other hand, aside accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with
from wound No. 3 as above stated, no other wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the
caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda
been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole
wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of
body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice
the wound's entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because according of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
to the medico-legal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will produce a
38
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means employed was to
weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the
trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting
in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave
a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime of
murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating
circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the law for
both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS
ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982,
a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of
ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and
reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As
the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the
deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a
can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body
of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of
pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out
of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased.
Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with
rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring
as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to
Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police
officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal
building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion
and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants
for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their
written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that
he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and
then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand,
alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person
who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any
participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements
alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on
Gabion for the commission of the offense.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole
basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that
"even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing
testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable
testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the
case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption
that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime.
In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo
Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of
pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by
Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed.
Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does
not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs.
Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for
the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only
was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange
for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book
during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to
testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that
she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case
was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and
the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion.
Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants
quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on
the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body
was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics when you
saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could you
possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned later
you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter
of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come to
know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you to ask
him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was
going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline that is
why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a
can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour gasoline
when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process of
pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
40
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that
Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that
Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was
while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when
Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused
Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that
the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the
respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed
against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act
committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having
taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents
on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging
smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same.
Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time
were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment.
He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would
have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and
injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his
brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the
deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by
treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such
an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill
the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his
act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to
exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the
body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have
committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt,
it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's
clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the
clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person,
a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what
took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid
code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there
is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified
that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning
(Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00.
Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00
as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137268. March 26, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUTIQUIA CARMEN @ Mother
Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel Fabie, DELIA SIBONGA @ Deding Sibonga,
ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO NUEZ @ Rey Nuez, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, finding
accused-appellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel Fabie,
Delia Sibonga @ Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario Nuez
@ Rey Nuez guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as
the costs.
The information[2] against accused-appellants alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 oclock p.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on
one Randy Luntayao which injuries caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao.
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following: At around 2 oclock in the afternoon
of January 27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7, were
playing takyan in front of the house of one Bebing Lastimoso in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, when
suddenly they heard a child shout, Tabang ma! (Help mother!). The cry came from the direction
of the house of accused-appellant Carmen, who is also known in their neighborhood as Mother
Perpetuala. The two children ran towards Mother Perpetualas house.[3] What Honey Fe saw on
which she testified in court, is summarized in the decision of the trial court, to wit:
While there[,] she saw a boy, whose name . . . she [later] came to know as one Randy Luntayao,
. . . being immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused Alexander Sibonga was holding the
waist of the body while accused Reynario Nuez held the hands of the boy at the back. Accused
Eutiquia Carmen, Delia Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were pushing down the boys head into
the water. She heard the boy shouting Ma, help for two times. Later, she saw accused Reynario
or Rey Nuez tie the boy on the bench with a green rope as big as her little finger. . . . After that
Eutiquia Carmen poured [water from] a plastic container (galon) . . . into the mouth of the
boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise his head, accused Alexander Sibonga banged the
boys head against the bench [to] which the boy was tied down. She even heard the banging
sound everytime the boys head hit the bench. For about five times she heard it. According to
this witness after forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedonia Fabie
alias Isabel Fabie took turns in pounding the boys chest with their clenched fists. All the time
Rey Nuez held down the boys feet to the bench. She also witnessed . . . Celedonia Fabie
dropped her weight, buttocks first, on the body of the boy. Later on, Eutiquia Carmen ordered
Delia or Deding Sibonga to get a knife from the kitchen. Eutiquia Carmen then slowly plunged
the stainless knife on the left side of the boys body and with the use of a plastic gallon container,
the top portion of which was cut out, Eutiquia Carmen [caught] the blood dripping from the left
side of the boys body. Honey Fe heard the moaning coming from the tortured boy. Much later
she saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuez, Delia Sibonga, Celedonia Fabie, and
Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy into the house.[4]
Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the eldest of whom,
Randy, was 13 years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a
nervous breakdown which Eddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he
took the boy with him to the farm. According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and
laughing. On January 26, 1997, upon the suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuez,
Eddie and his wife Perlita and their three children (Randy, Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with
accused-appellant Nuez to Cebu. They arrived in Cebu at around 1 oclock in the afternoon of
the same day and spent the night in Nuezs house in Tangke, Talisay.
The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot,
Pardo,[5] where all of the accused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant
Carmen regarding his sons condition. He was told that the boy was possessed by a bad spirit,
which accused-appellant Carmen said she could exorcise. She warned, however, that as the
spirit might transfer to Eddie, it was best to conduct the healing prayer without him. Accused-
appellants then led Randy out of the house, while Eddie and his wife and two daughters were
locked inside a room in the house.[6]
After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout Ma, tabang! (Mother, help!). Eddie tried to go out
of the room to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After about an
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
hour, the Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the main door
of the house.[7]
A few hours later, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into
the prayer room and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randys face
was bluish and contused, while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie
that his son was already dead. He wanted to see his sons body, but he was stopped from doing
so by accused-appellant Eutiquia Carmen who told him not to go near his son because the latter
would be resurrected at 7 oclock that evening.[8]
After 7 oclock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her group to call the
funeral parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the body
would be transferred to the house of accused-appellant Nuez. Thus, that night, the Luntayao
family, accompanied by accused-appellant Nuez, took Randys body to Nunezs house in
Tangke, Talisay. The following day, January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Nuez told Eddie to
go with him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report Randys death and told him to keep
quiet or they might not be able to get the necessary papers for his sons burial. Nuez took care
of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed.[9]
At around 3 oclock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to
Tangke, Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they
preferred to bring their sons body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they
were told by accused-appellant Carmen that this was not possible as she and the other
accused-appellants might be arrested. That same afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried in
Tangke, Talisay.[10]
After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought assistance
from the Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City which referred him to the regional office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in the city. On February 3, 1997, Eddie filed a complaint
for murder against accused-appellant Nuez and the other members of his group.[11] He also
asked for the exhumation and autopsy of the remains of his son. [12] As the incident took place
in Cebu, his complaint was referred to the NBI office in Cebu City.
Modesto Cajita, head of NBI, Region VII (Cebu), took over the investigation of the case. He
testified that he met with Eddie Luntayao and supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the
body of Randy Luntayao.[13] Cajita testified that he also met with accused-appellant Carmen and
after admitting that she and the other accused-appellants conducted a pray-over healing
session on the victim on January 27, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen refused to give any
further statement. Cajita noticed a wooden bench in the kitchen of Carmens house, which, with
Carmens permission, he took with him to the NBI office for examination. Cajita admitted he did
not know the results of the examination.[14]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on Randy
Luntayao, testified that he, the victims father, and some NBI agents, exhumed the victims body
on February 20, 1997 at Tangke Catholic Cemetery in the Tangke, Talisay, Cebu. He conducted
the autopsy on the same day and later submitted the following report (Exhs. E and F):[15]
FINDINGS
Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts wrapped in printed
blanket (white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and buried underground about 4 feet
deep.
Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side.
Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line.
Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle cranial fossae right
to left down to the occipital bone, left side.
Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral.
Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition.
Cranial vault almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a traumatic head
injury and/or traumatic chest injury.
Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victims chest was caused by contact with a hard
blunt instrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that found on the
base of the skull followed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could have
been caused by the forcible contact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a wooden
bench.[16]
On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound on the victims
body but explained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was exhumed and
examined, it was already in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such wound, if
present, unrecognizable.[17]
Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel Blase, an alleged
eyewitness to the incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina Abing,
alleged former patients of accused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the municipal
health officer of Talisay, Cebu and; (d) Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City Prosecutors
Office.
Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accused-appellant
Carmen, whom she calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 oclock in the
afternoon of January 27, 1997, while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she
saw Eddie Luntayao talking with the latter regarding the treatment of his son. The boy was later
led to the kitchen and given a bath prior to treatment. After water was poured on the boy, he
became unruly prompting accused-appellant Carmen to decide not to continue with the
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
treatment, but the boys parents allegedly prevailed upon her to continue. As the boy continued
to resist, accused-appellant Carmen told accused-appellants Delia Sibonga and Celedonia
Fabie to help her (Carmen) lay the boy on a bench. As the child resisted all the more, Eddie
Luntayao allegedly told the group to tie the boy to the bench. Accused-appellant Delia Sibonga
got hold of a nylon rope which was used to tie the child to the bench. Then Carmen, Delia
Sibonga, and Fabie prayed over the child, but as the latter started hitting his head against the
bench, Carmen asked Nuez to place his hands under the boys head to cushion the impact of
the blow everytime the child brought down his head. To stop the boy from struggling, accused-
appellant Fabie held the boys legs, while accused-appellant Nuez held his shoulders. After
praying over the boy, the latter was released and carried inside the house. Accused-appellant
Alexander Sibonga, who had arrived, helped carry the boy inside. After this, Blase said she no
longer knew what happened inside the house as she stayed outside to finish the laundry.[18]
Blase testified that the parents of Randy Luntayao witnessed the pray-over of their son from
beginning to end. She denied that accused-appellants Fabie and Delia Sibonga struck the victim
on his chest with their fists. According to her, neither did accused-appellant Carmen stab the
boy. She claimed that Randy was still alive when he was taken inside the house.[19]
The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josefina Abing, 39,
who testified that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by merely praying
over them and without applying any form of physical violence on them.[20]
Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presented by the defense
to testify on the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao died of
pneumonia. According to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997 to ask
for the issuance of a death certificate for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly suffered
from cough and fever.[21]
On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the victim as she
merely relied on what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a midwife, Mrs.
Revina Laviosa, who examined the victims body.[22]
The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, was presented to
identify the resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8)[23] on the re-investigation of the case in which
he recommended the dismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was
dispensed with, however, as the prosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to
testify with the qualification that Solimas recommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor
Primo Miro.[24]
The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies of Ritsel Blase
and Dr. Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did to his
son.He reiterated his earlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and his
wife and two daughters were locked inside a room. He disputed Blases statement that his son
was still alive when he was brought into the prayer room. He said he saw that his sons head
slumped while being carried by accused-appellants.[25]
As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her when he and accused-
appellant Nuez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having told her that
his son was suffering from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous
breakdown. He took exception to Dr. Carlotos statement that he was alone when he went to her
office because it was Nuez who insisted that he (Eddie) accompany him in order to secure the
death certificate.[26]
On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are all found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced] to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify jointly
and severally the heirs of the deceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay
the costs. The accused, are, however, credited in full during the whole period of their detention
provided they will signify in writing that they will abide by all the rules and regulations of the
penitentiary.[27]
In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated:
Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it
is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since the defendant
did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the
case at bar had contributed different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim. For having
immersed the head of the victim into the barrel of water, all the herein accused should be held
responsible for all the consequences even if the result be different from that which was intended
(Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It is pointed out that in P. v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no
intent to kill[,] in inflicting physical injuries with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted
of murder. In murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is treachery in the
attack, and this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person assaulted. Under the
guise of a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have intentionally immersed upside down
the head of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of water; banged his head against the bench; pounded
his chest with fists, or plunged a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would come out for these
acts would surely cause death to the victim. . . .
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a
person commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. In view
of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person committing a felony is criminally liable although the
consequences of his felonious acts are not intended by him. . . .
....
Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent
may arise from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. In
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
the case at bar, there is enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in
inflicting physical harm to the victim (an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong
done resulted in the death of their victim. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended. [28]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in convicting them of
murder.[29]
First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual
performed over the victim was consented to by the victims parents. With the permission of the
victims parents, accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants,
proceeded to subject the boy to a treatment calculated to drive the bad spirit from the boys
body.Unfortunately, the strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-
appellants had no criminal intent to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless
imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They
are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such
act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the
element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take
precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants
which, because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted
in the latters death. As already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical
practitioner, belong to a religious group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which
is engaged in faith healing.
In United States v. Divino,[30] the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt to
cure the victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in
petroleum around the victims feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the
victim. The Court held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. It
was noted that the accused had no intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy the victims
ailment.
In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez,[31] the Court ruled that the proper charge to file
against a non-medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not
possess the necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latters death, was
homicide through reckless imprudence.
The trial courts reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to the
contrary.[32] The facts of the case indubitably show the absence of intent to kill on the part of the
accused-appellants. Indeed, the trial courts findings can be sustained only if the circumstances
of the case are ignored and the Court limits itself to the time when accused-appellants undertook
their unauthorized treatment of the victim. Obviously, such an evaluation of the case cannot be
allowed.
Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is no
treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure
the safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the
victim.[33] Viewed in this light, the acts which the trial court saw as manifestations of treachery
in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants to restrain Randy Luntayao so that they can effect
the cure on him.
On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants contention that the testimony of
prosecution eyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced of
Honey Fes credibility. Her testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been
coached or contrived. She was only a few meters away from the kitchen where accused-
appellants conducted their pray-over healing session not to mention that she had a good
vantage point as the kitchen had no roof nor walls but only a pantry. Her testimony was
corroborated by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistent with Honey Fes testimony,
noted fractures on the third left rib and on the base of the victims skull. With regard to Dr.
Mendezs failure to find any stab wound in the victims body, he himself had explained that such
could be due to the fact that at the time the autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was already
in an advanced state of decomposition.Randy Luntayaos cadaver was exhumed 24 days after
it had been buried. Considering the length of time which had elapsed and the fact that the
cadaver had not been embalmed, it was very likely that the soft tissues had so decomposed
that, as Dr. Mendez said, it was no longer possible to determine whether there was a stab
wound. As for the other points raised by accused-appellants to detract the credibility of Honey
Fes testimony, the same appear to be only minor and trivial at best.
Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of
Frances Claire Rivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the
prosecutions evidence. We do not think so. The presentation of the knife in evidence is not
indispensable.[34]
Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tried under Judge
Renato C. Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took over
the case after the prosecution and the defense had rested their cases.[35] However, the fact that
the judge who wrote the decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not make
him less competent to render a decision, since his ruling is based on the records of the case
and the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses.[36]
Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with
murder. We hold that they can.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Samson v. Court of Appeals,[37] the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa
through falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and held
one of the accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was
contended that the appeals court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through
negligence because the information charged him with having wilfully committed estafa. In
overruling this contention, the Court held:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for
the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful
offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that
obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence
submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made
possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but
merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real
claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts
which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a
case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having
alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time
that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the
concept of negligence.
In People v. Fernando,[38] the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the trial
court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.
Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused-appellants should suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao an
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount
of P50,000.00.[39] In addition, they should pay exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
in view of accused-appellants gross negligence in attempting to cure the victim without a license
to practice medicine and to give an example or correction for the public good.[40]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Facts: The trial court rendered a decision and the accused-appellants were all found
guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder after having performed a cultic healing
pray-over which resulted to the death of Randy Luntayao. They were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Issue: WON accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder.
Held: Yes. Conviction modified to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Killing a person
w/ treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it’s presumed to be
the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. In murder qualified by treachery, it’s
required only that there is treachery in the attack, & this is true even if the offender has no intent
to kill the person assaulted
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
46
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner,
may arise from the proof of the criminal act. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural vs.
consequences of their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended. HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PAÑ;O Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
The strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no
criminal intent to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they G.R. No. 75122-49 December 18, 1986
ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder. ELINOR ABAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 139, Makati and
FEDERICO L. MELOCOTTON JR., in his capacity as Trial Fiscal Regional Trial Court,
Branch 139, Makati, respondents.

G.R No. 75812-13 December 18, 1986

Republic of the Philippines AMABLE R. AGUILUZ VII and SYLVIA V. AGUILUZ, spouses, petitioners,
SUPREME COURT vs.
Manila HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 154, now vacant but temporarily
EN BANC presided by HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI Branch 153, Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986
G.R No. 75765-67 December 18, 1986
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner,
vs. LUIS M. HOJAS, petitioner,
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, vs.
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HON. JUDGE SENEN PENARANDA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of de Oro City, Branch XX, HONORABLE JUDGE ALFREDO LAGAMON, Presiding Judge,
Manila, respondents. Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL
NOLI T. CATHI, City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City, respondents.
G.R. No. L-66839-42 December 18, 1986
G.R. No. 75789 December 18, 1986
LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON petitioner,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
HONORABLE GLICERIO L. CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Executive Judge, Branch vs.
V, Region IV, Regional Trial Court, sitting at Lemery, Batangas, THE PROVINCIAL HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
FISCAL OF BATANGAS, and MARIA LUISA TORDECILLA, respondents. Judicial Region, Branch 52, Manila and THELMA SARMIENTO, respondents.

G.R No. 71654 December 18, 1986 R.R. Nogales Law Office for petitioner in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos.
75812-13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for respondent in G.R. No. 75789.
ANTONIO DATUIN and SUSAN DATUIN, petitioners,
vs. Pio S. Canta for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 66839-42.
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PANO, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 71654.
LXXXVIII, HONORABLE ClTY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Abinoja, Tabalingcos, Villalon & Associates for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 75122-49.
G.R. No. 74524-25 December 18, 1986

47
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
The Solicitor General for respondent in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 66839-42, G.R. No. 71654,
G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75122-49, G.R. Nos. 75812-13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and
counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 75789.
YAP, J.:
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by
these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction.
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The
defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the
acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were
denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No.
75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The
parties adversely affected have come to us for relief.
As a threshold issue the former Solicitor General in his comment on the petitions, maintained
the posture that it was premature for the accused to elevate to this Court the orders denying
their motions to quash, these orders being interlocutory. While this is correct as a general rule,
we have in justifiable cases intervened to review the lower court's denial of a motion to
quash. 1 In view of the importance of the issue involved here, there is no doubt in our mind that
the instant petitions should be entertained and the constitutional challenge to BP 22 resolved
promptly, one way or the other, in order to put to rest the doubts and uncertainty that exist in
legal and judicial circles and the general public which have unnecessarily caused a delay in the
disposition of cases involving the enforcement of the statute.
For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue presented here, we do not find it necessary
to delve into the specifics of the informations involved in the cases which are the subject of the
petitions before us. 2 The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks,
whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations
or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value.
I the issuance of bouncing or rubber checks. Criminal law has dealth with the problem within the
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30
days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than
double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court. 3
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within
a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored
by the drawee bank. 4
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the
check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its
presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates
a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application,
the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the
check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the
introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to
pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall
constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment
to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." 6
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof
to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
II
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless,
i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed
later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to t public interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our statute books which penalize
context of crimes against property punished as "estafa" or crimes involving fraud and deceit.
The focus of these penal provisions is on the damage caused to the property rights of the victim.
The Penal Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 1887 until it was replaced
by the Revised Penal Code in 1932, contained provisions penalizing, among others, the act of
defrauding another through false pretenses. Art. 335 punished a person who defrauded another
"by falsely pretending to possess any power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency or
business, or by means of similar deceit." Although no explicit mention was made therein
regarding checks, this provision was deemed to cover within its ambit the issuance of worthless
or bogus checks in exchange for money. 7
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
In 1926, an amendment was introduced by the Philippine Legislature, which added a new clause
(paragraph 10) to Article 335 of the old Penal Code, this time referring in explicit terms to the
issuance of worthless checks. The amendment penalized any person who 1) issues a check in
payment of a debt or for other valuable consideration, knowing at the time of its issuance that
he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover its amount, or 2) maliciously signs the
check differently from his authentic signature as registered at the bank in order that the latter
would refuse to honor it; or 3) issues a postdated check and, at the date set for its payment,
does not have sufficient deposit to cover the same.8
In 1932, as already adverted to, the old Penal Code was superseded by the Revised Penal
Code. 9 The above provisions, in amended form, were incorporated in Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code defining the crime of estafa. The revised text of the provision read as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commis sion of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation the offender knowing
that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him were not sufficient
to cover the amount of the cheek without informing the payee of such circumstances.
The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks issued in payment of
pre-existing obligations. 10 The rationale of this interpretation is that in estafa, the deceit causing
the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. In issuing
a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer does not derive any material benefit in
return or as consideration for its issuance. On the part of the payee, he had already parted with
his money or property before the check is issued to him hence, he is not defrauded by means
of any "prior" or "simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him by the drawer of the check.
With the intention of remedying the situation and solving the problem of how to bring checks
issued in payment of pre-existing debts within the ambit of Art. 315, an amendment was
introduced by the Congress of the Philippines in 1967, 11 which was enacted into law as
Republic Act No. 4885, revising the aforesaid proviso to read as follows:
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be puma facie evidence
of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
However, the adoption of the amendment did not alter the situation materially. A divided Court
held in People vs. Sabio, Jr. 12 that Article 315, as amended by Republic Act 4885, does not
cover checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, again relying on the concept
underlying the crime of estafa through false pretenses or deceit—which is, that the deceit or
false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud.
Since statistically it had been shown that the greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted of
those issued in payment of pre-existing debts, 13 the amended provision evidently failed to cope
with the real problem and to deal effectively with the evil that it was intended to eliminate or
minimize.
With the foregoing factual and legal antecedents as a backdrop, the then Interim Batasan
confronted the problem squarely. It opted to take a bold step and decided to enact a law dealing
with the problem of bouncing or worthless checks, without attaching the law's umbilical cord to
the existing penal provisions on estafa. BP 22 addresses the problem directly and frontally and
makes the act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. 14
The question now arises: Is B P 22 a valid law?
Previous efforts to deal with the problem of bouncing checks within the ambit of the law on
estafa did not evoke any constitutional challenge. In contrast, BP 22 was challenged promptly.
Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes
the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its
enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional
provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.
The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching and thorough
scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of
what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial
department of the government." 15
As we enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the government, we need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply
ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must
be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that we approach our task with
diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its
authority under the constitution we should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as
fall it must, on the offending statute.
III
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged
conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It
is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No
person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." 16 Petitioners insist that, since
the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check
when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad
check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The
statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under
the threat of penal sanction.
First of all it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional inhibition invoked
by petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the
nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of the people's
revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted
creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At common law,
money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of
a contract could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ of capias
ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the
instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the
popular ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for
debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the Union. 17
This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of t0he
century and embodied in our organic laws. 18 Later, our fundamental law outlawed not only
imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people
in jail for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax. 19
The reach and scope of this constitutional safeguard have been the subject of judicial definition,
both by our Supreme Court 20 and by American State courts.21 Mr. Justice Malcolm speaking
for the Supreme Court in Ganaway vs. Queen, 22 stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by
the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from
imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities
arising from actions ex contractu The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in
actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any
contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he
has done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts
in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime."
The law involved in Ganaway was not a criminal statute but the Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions (1909) which authorized the arrest of the defendant in a civil case on grounds akin to
those which justify the issuance of a writ of attachment under our present Rules of Court, such
as imminent departure of the defendant from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors,
or concealment, removal or disposition of properties in fraud of creditors, etc. The Court, in that
case, declared the detention of the defendant unlawful, being violative of the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt, and ordered his release. The Court, however, refrained
from declaring the statutory provision in question unconstitutional.
Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes,23 wherein a statutory provision which made
illegal and punishable the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his
employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday every week,
was challenged for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
The constitutionality of the law in question was upheld by the Court, it being within the authority
of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police power. It was held that "one
of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the part of the employers who hire
laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus
causing them financial difficulties. "The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of
an obligation, although obviously such could be its effect, but to banish a practice considered
harmful to public welfare.
IV
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer
the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense.
Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a
worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies
at the heart of the issue before us.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor
to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to appear elusive and difficult to
conceptualize. But precisely in the failure to perceive the vital distinction lies the error of those
who challenge the validity of BP 22.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment
of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only
acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be
outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of
its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable
of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. 24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man
in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety,
good order and welfare." 25
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable
nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led
to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted
its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was
close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it
averaged between 50 minion to 80 million pesos a day. 26
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. 27 It is a
written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all
events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and
payable on demand. 28 Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an
amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment
upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that
the instrument wig be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely
accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks
have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is
shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may
become nit Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking
community.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money supply of the
country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining
two. 29 These de deposit thirds consists of currency in circulation. ma deposits in the banks
constitute the funds against which among others, commercial papers like checks, are drawn.
The magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the legitimate concern of the state in
preserving the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is
like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's economy.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand
fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated — 30
The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of
business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category
with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition
against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a
sword.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence obtaining in the various states of the
United States on the constitutionality of the "worthless check" acts. 31 It is needless to warn that
foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant caution. A caveat to be observed is that
substantial differences exist between our statute and the worthless check acts of those states
where the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily
from any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to consider that judicial decisions must be read
in the context of the facts and the law involved and, in a broader sense, of the social economic
and political environment—in short, the milieu—under which they were made. We recognize
the wisdom of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander.
As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even
override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that
the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the
state. 32 Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached,
so there is no occasion to cross it.
We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.
V
We need not detain ourselves lengthily in the examination of the other constitutional objections
raised by petitioners, some of which are rather flimsy.
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The
freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. 33 Besides, we must bear in mind that
checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this
modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking
system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of
the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is
contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since
without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would
be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should
punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted
meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification
of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. 34
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers,
on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is
made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank
for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches
to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the
power to legislate, or the power to make laws. 35 which means, as applied to the present case,
the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no
stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe
the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any
provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of
executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the
offended party is farfetched.
Lastly, the objection has been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution
was violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law. This constitutional provision
prohibits the introduction of amendments to a bill during the Third Reading. It is claimed that
during its Third Reading, the bill which eventually became BP 22 was amended in that the text
of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the bill as adopted on Second Reading was altered or
changed in the printed text of the bill submitted for approval on Third Reading.
A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows
that, indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text
of the paragraph in question which the body approved on Second Reading. 36 Part of the
confusion was due apparently to the fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the
amendment period), amendments were proposed orally and approved by the body or accepted
by the sponsor, hence, some members might not have gotten the complete text of the provisions
of the bill as amended and approved on Second Reading. However, it is clear from the records
that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually
approved by the body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved
Minutes for that day. In any event, before the bin was submitted for final approval on Third
Reading, the Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the
Committee in its report, which was approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that
"the clause in question was ... an authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof
reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on Second Reading. 37 We therefore,
find no merit in the petitioners' claim that in the enactment of BP 22 the provisions of Section 9
(2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the petition in G.R. No. 75789 and setting aside
the order of the respondent Judge dated August 19, 1986. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 63419,
66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13 and 75765-67 are hereby dismissed and the
temporary restraining order issued in G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted. With costs against private
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 4963. September 15, 1909. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GO CHICO, Defendant-Appellant.
Gibbs & Gale for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Harvey for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. THE FLAG LAW; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1 OF ACT NO. 1696. — "Any person
who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or who
shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere,
any flag, banner, emblem, or device use during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag, banner,
emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies of the United States in
the Philippine Islands for the purposes of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against
the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or
device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a
fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment
for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment,
in the discretion of the court:" Held first, that a specific criminal intent, apart from the act of
displaying, is not necessary to a violation of said statute; held, second, that said statute includes
not only the identical flags, etc., actually used in the insurrection referred to but also every flag,
etc., of that type.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
DECISION
MORELAND, J. :
The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine
Commission, which reads as follows:
"Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own
premises, or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own
premises or elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection
in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United
States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public
enemies of the United States in the Philippine Islands for the purpose of public disorder or of
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or
any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known as
such, shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years,
or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of
September, 1908. After hearing the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty
of the crime charged and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine
currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the
time and in the form and in the place prescribed by law until said fine should be paid. From that
judgment and sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following
facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico
displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario,
a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted
in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the
late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection
against the United States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had
purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public
sale made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of
August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stocks of goods for the purpose of displaying
them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store
the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of a law against the
display of the medallions in questions and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts
above stated are admitted.
The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of
the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners,
devices, or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion
against the United States.
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal
intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the persons who
commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a
deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In
many case the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the
statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same
force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The case
at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a flag or emblem used, particularly within a
recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental
functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best
of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention
of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by
the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the
corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the
interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B’s death, but upon the intention with
which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of
accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security violated; but if the
gun was discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern
in the matter, even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become
a danger to society and its institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere
discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts
must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and to the
Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but
upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is
affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.
It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that —
"The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime
without regard to the intent of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it
effect although the intention may have been innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute
is to be construed is to be determined by the court by considering the subject-matter of the
prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the intention of the
legislature."cralaw virtua1aw library
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In the case of The People v. Kibler (106 N.Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of
adulterated milk under a statute reading as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any unclean,
impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of unwholesome milk."cralaw virtua1aw library
It was proved in that case that one Vandenburg purchased at the defendant’s store 1 pint of
milk which was shown to contain a very small percentage of water more than that permitted by
the statute. There was no dispute about the facts, but the objection made by the defendant was
that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or go to the jury
upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge from the court which
made his intent totally immaterial and his guilt consist in having gold the adulterated article
whether he knew it or not and however carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell
the genuine article.
The opinion of the court in that case says:
"As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no element of the offense. The act alone,
irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime.
x x x
"It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as
to menace the health and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the
careless and heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To redress such evils is a
plain duty but a difficult tack. Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures which
depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer’s knowledge or of his intent to deceive and
defraud are of little use and rarely accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify
legislation which throws upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of
what he sells and compels him to know and to be certain."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Gardner v. The People (62 N.Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which
provided that an inspector of elections of the city of New York should not be removed from office
except "after notice in writing to the officers sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth
clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided that any person who
removed such an officer without such notice should be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer
named Sheridan was removed by Gardner, the defendant, without notice. Gardner was arrested
and convicted of a misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction
and the opinion from which the following quotation is made was written upon the decision of
that appeal. Chief Justice Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal
intent:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice. The court
ruled out the evidence offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted
the offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the indeed,
from any intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do
not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. The rule on the subject appears to be, that in
acts mala in se, the intent governs but in those mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law
been violated?’
x x x
"The authorities seem to establish that to sustain an indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is
sufficient to prove that the act was knowingly and intentionally done.
x x x
"In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been
given to the inspector, although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the offense,
because the intention to do the act would have been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended
to remove the inspector without notice, but we thought the law permitted it. This was mistake of
law, and is not strictly a defense.
x x x
"If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while
a rule requiring proof of a criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do
the act which the statute declares shall constitute the offense, would, in many cases, prevent
the restraining influence which the statute was designed to secure."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Fiedler v. Darrin (50 N. Y., 473) the court says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of The Commonwealth v. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In general, it may be said that there must by malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a
large class of cases in which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable
without proof that the defendant understands the facts that give character to his act.
"In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act
comes within the legislative prohibition.
x x x
"Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods
available for the enforcement of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
of the language, the question in interpreting a criminal statute is whether the intention of he
legislature was to make knowledge of the facts an essential element of the offense, or to put
upon everyone the burden of finding out whether his contemplated act is prohibited, and of
refraining from it if it is."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Halsted v. The State (41 N.J.L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal
intent arose under a statute, under which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that
if any township committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public
moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons constituting such board
shall be guilty of a crime. The defendants was one who violated this law by voting to incur
obligations in excess of the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from
which the quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal. The court
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the
passage and effectuation of the resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under
the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and honest motives, and that he therein
exercised due care and caution.
x x x forbidden act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and, if it did, the designed purpose of the act
"As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective
of the knowledge or motive of the doer of such act, there can be, of necessity, no judicial
authority having the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive
to be shown. In such instances the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of the
legislature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking over
the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry
has been the judicial guide."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Rex v. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E.C.L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for
unlawfully transposing from one piece of wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to
the statutes. It was conceded that the act was done without any fraudulent intention. The court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of
it are, ’Shall transpose or remove, or cause or procure to be transposed or removed, from one
piece of wrought plate to another.’"
In the case of The State v. McBrayer (98 N.C., 623) the court stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential
ingredient in every criminal offense, and that where there is an absence of such intent there is
no offenses; this is especially true as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an
act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent,
although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates. When
the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made to depend upon the positive,
willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of the Commonwealth v. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal
by the defendant from a judgment requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of
the statute of the State which provided that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who
shall manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell,"
oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that if they
believed, from the evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be
furnished, or knew of there being furnished, to any of his customers any oleo margarine, but,
as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict must be for the defendant. The
court refused to make the charge as requested and that is the only point upon which the
defendant appealed.
The court says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and
comprehensive. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the
would be practically defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that persons engaged in
the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of the nature
and qualities of the commodities they sell, as a defense."cralaw virtua1aw library
The following authorities are to the same effect: State v. Gould (40 Ia., 374); Commonwealth v.
Farren (9 Allen, 489); Commonwealth v. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth v. Boynton (2
Allen, 160); Wharton’s Criminal Law, section 2442; Commonwealth v. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3
Greenleaf on Evidence, section 21; Farrell v. The State (32 Ohio State, 456); Beekman v.
Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People v. Roby (52 Mich., 577).
It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not
intend that a criminal intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition
of the offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or
willfully. The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to interpretation.
Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime
and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime;
but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself
— intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The
act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required
to commit the crime.
We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable
55
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
only to the identical banners, etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of
those banners, can be sustained.
It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or
flags actually used in the insurrection, and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof
(saving, perhaps, size) to be displayed of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its
exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the interpretation of statutes are
rules of construction, not destruction. To give the interpretation contended for by the appellant
would, as to this particular provision, nullify the statute altogether.
The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify
those in armed rebellion against the United States" mean not only the identical flags actually
used in the insurrection, but any flag which as of that type. This description refers not to a
particular flag, but to a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other
ways of describing that type of flag. While different words might be employed, according to the
taste of the draftsman, the method of description would have to be the same. There is no
concrete word known by which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There was no
opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to describe the physical details. It had
no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the insurrection, by which it could, in such
enactment, be identified. The great and only characteristics which it had upon which the
Commission could seize as a means of description was the fact that it was used in the
insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely no was in which the Commission could, in the
Act, describe the flag except by reciting where and how it was used. It must not be forgotten
that the Commission, by the words and phrases used, was not attempting to describe a
particular flag, but a type of flag. They were not describing a flag used upon a particular field or
in a certain battle, but a type of flag used by an army — a flag under which many persons rallied
and which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever seen
or in whatsoever form it appeared. It is a mere incident of description that the flag was used
upon a particular field or in a particular battle. They were describing the flag not a flag. It has a
quality and significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used.
"Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be in capable of being used in more than one
sense, and the literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give
the real intent of the legislature . When this is the case, resort is had to the principle that the
spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the intention of a statute is as
much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing the statute unless it be within
the intention of the makers, and the statute should be so construed as to advance the remedy
and suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U.S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall., 486; State v.
Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118; U.S. v. Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green v. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515;
Lake Shore R.R. Co. v. Roach, 80 N.Y., 339; Delafield v. Brady, 108 N.Y., 524; Doyle v. Doyle,
50 Ohio State, 330.)
"The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial
construction, are to control the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and
language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize
with such intention and object, and effect the purpose of the enactment." (26 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law, 602.)
Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.
"The preamble is no part of the statute, but, as setting out the object and intention of the
legislature, it is considered in the construction of an act. Therefore, whenever, there is
ambiguity, or wherever the words of the act have more than one meaning, and there is doubt
as to the subject-matter to which they are to be applied, the preamble may be used." (U.S. v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 91 U.S., 72; Platt v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 99 U.S., 48; Myer v. Western
Car Co., 102 U.S., 1; Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. v. South
Carolina, 114 U.S. 550; Cohn v. Barrett, 5 Cal., 195; Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field v.
Gooding, v. The People, 47 N.Y., 330; The People v. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 574; The People v.
O’Brien, 111 N.Y., 1.)
"The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard
the rights of the defendants and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the
legislature. If the language be plain, it will be construed as it reads, and the words of the statute
given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant
than it would if the statute were remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect substantial
justice." (Bolles v. Outing Co., 175 U.S., 262, 265; U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U.S. v.
Reese, 92 U.S., 214.)
"It is said that notwithstanding this rule (that penal statutes must be construed strictly) the
intention of the lawmakers must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes.
This is true, but this is not a new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification
of the known maxim and amounts to this — that though penal statutes are to be construed
strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the
legislature." (U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76; Taylor v. Goodwin, L.R. 4, Q.B. Div., 228.)
In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving
any sort of carriage" a person could be convicted for immoderately driving a bicycle.
"It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will
render them operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them.
Accordingly, in case of any doubt or obscurity, the construction will be such as to carry out these
objects." (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p.106.)
In The People v. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The occasion of the enactment of a law may always be referred to in interpreting and giving
56
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
effect to it. The court should place itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain the
necessity and probable object of the statute, and then give such construction to the language
used as to carry the intention of the legislature into effect, so far as it can be ascertained from
the terms of the statute itself." (U.S. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 91 U.S., 72,79.)
We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that
clauses should be taken from the position given them and placed in other portions of the statute
in order to give the whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they
now are in the statute, a reasonable interpretation based upon the plain and ordinary meaning
of the words used, requires that the Act should be held applicable to the case at bar.
The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005]
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, [1] dated May 17, 1999, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068
alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated
July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE
CENTAVOS (P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter
that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the
check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver
the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks;
however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters
Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[2]
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly
worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that
is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount
of P12,730.00;[3]
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount
of P8,496.55.[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two
accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.[5]
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in
1989, spouses Adronico[6] and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his
pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol;[7] sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;[8] sometime in the last
week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an
additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated
July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico;[9]between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post
dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;[10] the three checks bounced upon presentment for
the reason CLOSED ACCOUNT;[11] when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check,
despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.[12]
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient
deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued
only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks
when they mature;[13] and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no
participation in the issuance thereof.[14]
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga,
alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3)
criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them
to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and a
fine in the amount of P9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and a
fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them and a
fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the
complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of P15,000.00 representing actual expenses
incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and the amount
of P30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.[16] On the other hand, petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for
conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which
is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof.[17]
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.[18] It held that the
provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of
this Court in People vs. Parel, [19] U.S. vs. Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It noted that Article
10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to
special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P.
Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving
violations of B.P. Blg.22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or
sign the checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-
conspirator takes a direct part in every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The
Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be
the act of the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution dated November 16, 1999.[22]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF
THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE
LATTERS ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future
may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING
THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS
LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.[23]
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks
subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends that
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the
RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy
would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by
the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the
drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the
Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition
of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P.
Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are
made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the
second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are
contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling
with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental
rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. [24] Lex
specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could
have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main
idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be
supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,[25] U.S. vs. Ponte,[26] and U.S.
vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles
under the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application
of Article 22[28] of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the
retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application
of Article 17[29] of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the
commission of the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act
No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the same Code, with reference to the
confiscation of the instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the
RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the
RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in
the recent case of Yu vs. People,[31] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39[32] of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy
or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[33]
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty as
a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt
act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[34] The overt act or acts of the accused may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness,
complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico,
signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.[36] With respect to Criminal Case Nos.
7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioners participation. He did not
specify the nature of petitioners involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct
act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission
of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently,
the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when
the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence
with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence.[37] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.[38] Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.[39]
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:[40]
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn.
It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be
established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and
convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused may
be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of
conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecutions evidence. The Court
ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant
Franco, merely relied and pegged the latters criminal liability on its sweeping theory of
conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength
of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid
the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility
-- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense
is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the
requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)[41]
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its 4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the
period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivation as those of which the principal penalty consists.
evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the 5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial
circumstances should improve.
constitutional presumption of the petitioners innocence must be upheld and she must be [33] People vs. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, 176; People vs. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No. 128886, November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA

448, 469; People vs. Quinicio, G.R. No. 142430, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 252, 266.
acquitted. [34] People vs. Pickrell, G.R. No. 120409, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 19, 33; People vs. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 454, 473; People

vs. Pagalasan, G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991, June 18, 2003, 404 SCRA 275, 291.
[35] People vs. Caballero, G.R. Nos. 149028-30, April 2, 2003, 400 SCRA 424, 437; People vs. Ponce, G.R. No. 126254, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 352,
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, 359-360.
[36] TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 20.
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, [37] People vs. Tamayo, G.R. No. 138608, September 24, 2002, SCRA 540, 553; People vs. Melencion, G.R. No. 121902, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 113,

1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 123.
[38] People vs. Leao, G.R. No. 138886, October 9, 2001, 366 SCRA 774; People vs. Compo, G.R. No. 112990, May 28, 2001, 358 SCRA 266, 272.

convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. [39] People vs. Natividad, G.R. No. 151072, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 587, 595.
[40] People vs. Mandao, G.R. No. 135048, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 292.

Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for [41] Id., pp. 304-305.

failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (now retired) and concurred in by Justices Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and Eloy R. Bello (now retired).
[2] Original Records, pp. 1-2.
[3] Id., p. 3.
[4] Id., p. 5.
[5] Id., pp. 29-31.
[6] Also known as Ronie.
[7] TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 4-7.
[8] Id., pp. 16-21.
[9] TSN of December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 2-3.
[10] TSN of January 28, 1992, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 1-2.
[11] TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 19; TSN of December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 1 and 3; TSN of January 28,

1992, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 1; Original Records, p. 128.

[12] TSN of December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 2 and 4; TSN of January 28, 1992, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 2; Original Records, p.
FIRST DIVISION
125.
[13] TSN of August 23, 1993, Testimony of Evangeline Ladonga, pp. 7-8, 11-12 and 15; TSN of December 20, 1993, Testimony of Adronico Ladonga, p. 18.
[14] TSN of August 23, 1993, Testimony of Evangeline Ladonga, p. 10; TSN of December 20, 1993, Testimony of Adronico Ladonga, pp. 24-26.
[15] Original Records, p. 124.
[G.R. No. 4935. October 25, 1909. ]
[16] Id., p. 126.
[17] Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo, p. 28.
[18] Rollo, p. 133.
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES L. BROBST, Defendant-Appellant.
[19] No. 18260, January 27, 1923, 44 Phil. 437.
[20] No. 5952, October 24, 1911, 20 Phil. 379. Kincaid & Hurd for Appellant.
[21] No. 9268, November 4, 1914, 28 Phil. 305.
[22] Rollo, p. 39.
[23] Rollo, pp. 69-70. Attorney-General Villamor for Appellee.
[24] Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 483.
[25] Note No. 19, supra.
[26] Note No. 20, supra.
[27] Note No. 21, supra.
[28] ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual

criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced SYLLABUS
and the convict is serving the same.
[29] ART. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 1. HOMICIDE; RIGHT TO EJECT TRESPASSERS; CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — The right
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. to use force or violence in the expulsion of an intruder upon one’s premises, when it exists, is
strictly limited to the use of such a degree of force as may be necessary under all the
[30] ART. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it

the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable
for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
circumstances, to obtain the end in view; and the use of excessive force if unlawful.
[31] G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004.
[32] ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be
2. ID.; DEATH RESULTING FROM A BLOW; REASONABLE DOUBT. — Held, That proof that
subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding a heavy blow with the closed fist, over the lower left ribs, inflicted upon a person in apparent
paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than
one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner. good health, was followed by the death of that person in less than two hours, sustains a finding
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted
for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony. that death resulted from the infliction of the blow, in the absence of proof of any intervening
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.

60
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
cause, and the circumstances being such as to afford no ground for reasonable doubt that no
extraneous cause did in fact intervene.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE. — The doubt to the benefit of which accused persons are entitled
on a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, and not a mere whimsical or fanciful doubt, based on
imagined but wholly improbable possibilities, and unsupported by evidence.
4. ID.; ID. — Held, That death may result from a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal
region, notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence.
5. ID.; ID. — Where death results as the direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the
mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death,
does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility .
6. ID.; ID.; INTENTION; CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — One is not relieved, under the law in
these Islands, from criminal liability for the natural consequences for one’s illegal acts, merely
because one does not intend to produce such consequences.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — But in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from
criminal liability, taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance.
DECISION
CARSON, J. :
The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were engaged in work
on a mine located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of
native laborers. Mann discharged one of these laborers named Simeon Saldivar, warned him
not to come back on the premises, and told the defendant not to employ him again, because he
was a thief and a disturbing element with the other laborers. A few days afterwards, some time
after 6 o’clock on the morning of the 10th of July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with three or four
others, went to the mine to look for work. The defendant, who at the time was dressing himself
inside his tent, which was erected on the mining property, when he caught sight of Saldivar,
ordered him off the place, ex-claiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue, Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar
made no move to leave, and although the order was repeated, merely smiled or grinned at the
defendant, where-upon the latter became enraged, took three steps toward Saldivar, and struck
him a powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point
where the handle of Saldivar’s bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended. On being
struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered (dio vueltas — spun around helplessly) and
without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister’s house, which stood about 200
yards (100 brazas) away, and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He died as he reached the
door of the house and was buried some two or three days later.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide (homicidio), marked with the
extenuating circumstances, denied in subsections 3 and 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, in that
the defendant "had no intention of committing so grave an injury as that which he inflicted," and
that he struck the blow "under such powerful excitement as would naturally produce entire loss
of reason and self-control." Sentence of sic years and one day of prision mayor was imposed,
and from this sentence defendant appealed to this court.
Counsel for the appellant, relying mainly on appellant’s claim that he did not strike Saldivar, and
that he merely pushed him lightly with the back of his open hand, and relying also on the lack
of satisfactory proof of the existence of lesions or external marks of violence on the body of the
deceased, contend: first, that the evidence fails to sustain a finding that the deceased came to
his death as a result of injuries inflicted by the defendant; and, second, that even if it be a fact
that the defendant, in laying his hand upon the deceased, contributed to his death, nevertheless,
since the defendant had a perfect right to eject the deceased from the mining property, he can
not be held criminally liable for unintentional injuries inflicted in the lawful exercise of this right.
Two witnesses, Dagapdap and Yotiga, who were standing close by at the time, swore positively
that the blow was delivered with the closed fist, from the shoulder (de dentro para fuera), and
that it was a hard blow; Dagapdap testifying that, "Al pegar el puñetazo, Simeon dio vueltas, y
despues se marcho" (when the blow was struck, Simeon staggered and afterwards went away);
and Yotiga that "despues de dar el golpe se retrocedio’y levanto los brazos" (after the blow was
struck, he backed away and threw up his arms). The testimony of these witnesses is clear,
positive, and definite and is wholly uncontradicted, except for the improbable story told by the
accused in his own behalf, when he testified that he testified that seeing Saldivar standing
outside his tent, he told him twice to go away and then stepped up to him and pushed him lightly
with the back of his hand, which came in contact with the handle of Saldivar’s bolo, but not with
sufficient force to push him back or do him any injury. If it had been necessary to use force to
compel Saldivar to leave the place, it is at least highly improbable that the accused approaching
him from the front would have lightly placed the back of his open right hand on Saldivar’s left
side, without attempting to seize him, or to compel him to give ground.
Pedro Leocampo, the only other witness called at the trial who appears to have been present
when the incident occurred, corroborated the testimony of the witnesses Dagapdap and Yotiga
as to all that occurred prior to the actual infliction of the blow, which he did not see. He testified
that at the time when the accused, standing in his tent, ordered the deceased to leave, standing
in his tent, ordered the deceased to leave, he, the witness, was eating his breakfast, with his
back to the accused and the deceased; that hearing the order, he turned his head and saw the
accused start toward the deceased with his arm outstretched, but that at that moment he turned
away and did not see the accused actually come up to, strike or touch the deceased; that when
he saw the accused approaching the deceased, the accused did not have his fist clenched, but
that he could not say whether the blow was struck with the open hand or the closed fist, because
at the moment when it is said the accused came up to and touched or struck the deceased, the
witness’s head was so turned that he could not and did not see what took place.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
No evidence was introduced at the trial which in any wise tends to put in doubt the truth of the
testimony of these witnesses as to the fact that they were present at the time when and the
place where the incident occurred; and of this fact we are satisfied that there can be no
reasonable doubt, although, as frequently happens when ignorant witnesses are testifying in
the courts in these Islands, their evidence is conflicting as to the precise hour by the clock when
it took place.
Some attempt is made to discredit the testimony of Yotiga, because it appears from the record
that in answer to certain questions on his examination-in-chief, he stated that when the blow
was struck he was some hundred brazas (200 yards) away. It developed, however, on
examination by the trial judge, that this answer was given under the impression that the question
asked was the distance from the mine to the house of the sister of the deceased, as to which
considerable testimony was taken; and it is very clear from all the testimony that both these
witnesses were standing within a few yards of the defendant when he struck the blow.
The testimony of Dagapdap is also criticized because, in answer to the opening questions on
the examination-in-chief, he spoke of the blow inflicted as a bofetada (a slap with the open hand
on the cheek), which, later on in his testimony, he changed to the word puñetazo (a blow with
the first), as a result, it is intimated, of suggestive questions by counsel for the prosecution. We
do not think this criticism well founded, or that the language of the witness on which it rests
sustains the inference sought to be drawn therefrom. In the first place, it must not be forgotten
that the witness was manifestly an ignorant man, unskilled in the use of words, and testifying in
a remote province in a native dialect; and that his testimony was interpreted into the Spanish of
the record by an interpreter who might well have been mistaken in selecting the precise Spanish
equivalent of the word or words actually used by the witness, and whose use of Spanish
throughout the record does not demonstrate such precision and nicety in the use of words as
to justify the laying of too much stress on the phrasing adopted by him in the haste of
interpretation in the course of a trial in open court: so that, in our opinion, the detailed description
of the manner in which the blow was inflicted, as given by the witness without suggestion or
assistance of any kind, is much more decisive as to its nature than the word by which reference
to it was made. And in the second place, as appears from the Diccionario Enciclopedico de la
Lengua Castellana and the Diccionario de la Lengua por la Academia Española, the word
"bofetada," when used strictly, connotes not merely a blow with the open hand, but such a blow
struck on the cheek or side of the face, a meaning which the whole testimony or the witness
clearly discloses it was not his intention to give to whatever word he did actually make use of in
referring to the act. The definition of the word "bofetada," as given in the former dictionary, is "a
blow which is given on the cheek (mejilla) with the open hand," and in the latter is "a blow given
the open hand, on the side of the face (carrillo) or cheek (mejilla) of another."cralawvirtua1aw
library
It has also been suggested that the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is inherently
improbable, because, as it is said, if the blow had been struck as describe by them, the injured
person would necessarily have "doubled up or over," and not, as appears from their testimony,
thrown up his hands and staggered away. No expert testimony was introduced at the trial upon
this point, and while it may, perhaps, be admitted that if the blow took effect in the abdominal
region, common experience would justify us in expecting as a result of the blow, that the injured
person would "double up or over," it must not be forgotten that the blow having been delivered
over the ribs on the left side, it may as well have taken effect in the region of the heart; in the
absence of expert testimony, we do not think in that event, evidence that the injured person
threw up his hands and staggered away is necessarily in conflict the evidence of the witnesses
for the prosecution as to the weight of the blow and the place where it was inflicted.
We are satisfied that the evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable doubt with his closed
first; and that whatever authority the defendant may have had to eject the deceased from the
mining property and to use physical force to that end in case of need, the blow thus struck was
far in excess of such authority, and was, therefore, unlawful, and can not be excused or justified
as an exercise of necessary force in the exercise of a right. The defendant’s own testimony
does not indicate that there was any danger to be apprehended from Saldivar, and there is
nothing in the record which would indicate that he would offer a violent or even a substantial to
an attempt to expel him from the mining property.
We are satisfied also that the deceased came to his death as result of the blow inflicted by the
defendant. Two or three days prior to his death he was employed as a laborer in defendant’s
mine; his sister testified that on the morning of the day he died, he left her house in apparent
good health and went to the mines to look for work; a short time afterwards he received a violent
blow on his lower left side, a region of the body where many of the vital organs are located; and
immediately thereafter, he started up the short trail leading to his sister’s house, and died as he
reached the door. In the absence of evidence of any intervening cause, we think there can be
no reasonable doubt that his death resulted from the blow.
Counsel for appellant suggest that death may have been the result of some cause unknown,
such as a fall, an assault by robbers, or perchance a suicidal frenzy, intervening between the
time when the accused was last seen starting up the 200-yard trail to his sister’s house, and the
time when, as she testified, he died just as he reached her door, on his way back from the mine;
and that the accused in entitled to the benefit of the doubt. But the doubt which must be decided
in favor of an accused person in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, and not a mere whimsical
and fanciful doubt, based upon imagined but wholly improbable possibilities, unsupported by
evidence; and while we do not hold that it is absolutely and morally impossible that some other
cause could have intervened to bring about the death of Saldivar, we do hold that there can be
no reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable man that death was in fact brought about by
the blow inflicted by the accused, and was not the result of some independent cause intervening
during the very short period of time prior to his death, during which he was not under observation
by witnesses called at the trial.
Counsel for the appellant enlarge on the fact that accepting defendant’s statement that he sent
the deceased away from the mines about a quarter past six, it would appear from the testimony
of the sister of the deceased that about two hours may have elapsed between that time and the
time when he arrived at her house. The sister fixed the time of the arrival of her brother at from
7 to 8 o’clock or possibly a little later; but she appears to have been an ignorant woman who
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
did not know how to read the face of a clock, and it is quite clear that hers was no more than a
rough estimate, based on the height of the sun, and the most that can fairly be inferred from the
testimony is that the deceased was struck early on the morning in question, and that not long
afterwards on the same morning, he died at the door of his sister’s house 200 yards away. But
even if it be granted that two hours actually did elapse from the time the deceased left that
mines, until he reached his sister’s house, this interval is not long enough to materially weaken
the inference that the death resulted from the blow.
It is true that no autopsy was had on the body of the deceased, and that a medical officer called
in by the accused who saw the body, but who does not appear to have examined it very closely
, certified that he found no outward lesions or mark or violence; but this evidence is not sufficient
to negative the existence of internal lesions, for he medical authorities inform us that death may
and often does result from a blow over or near the heart of in the abdominal region,
notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark of violence; and there is evidence
in the record of the discovery on the cadaver of two suspicious black spots, one about the place
where the blow was struck, and another at or near the umbilicus, though the evidence fails to
disclose the precise nature of these discolorations. (Medical Jurisprudence, Taylor, 12th Am.
Ed., pp. 310 and 388; Moulin’s Treatise on Surgery, Hamilton, part 2, chap. 1, p. 151; Tratado
de Medicina Legal por Legran de Sulle, Vol. II, pp. 206,207.)
It has been suggested that the deceased may have had a weak heart or some other diseased
organ, and that but for such physical defect death might not have ensued from the mere force
of the blow inflicted by the defendant. There is no evidence to this effect, and on the contrary
there is testimony in the record that on the morning before he died he was in apparent good
health; and the fact that a few days before, he was able to work in the mines, and that he came
to the mines that day in search of work, renders it highly improbable that he was suffering at
that time from any grave organic weakness. But however this may have been, it has been
frequently and justly decided that where death result as a direct consequence of the use of
illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person
contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility. (U. S.
v. Luciano, 2 Phil. Rep., 96; U. S. v. Montes, 6 Phil. Rep., 443; see also decisions of supreme
court of Spain, March 10, 1871, and June 26, 1880.)
Counsel for appellant also contend that even if it be granted that in unlawfully exercising force
upon the person of the deceased, the appellant caused or contributed to his death, nevertheless
he should at most be convicted of homicidio por imprudencia temeraria (homicide as a result of
reckless negligence), because, manifestly, the unlawful act was not committed with intent to kill,
and because, as counsel contend, the striking of the blow by the appellant was not an act
adapted, or likely (idoneo) to inflict a death wound under ordinary circumstances, or reasonably
calculated so to do. In support of this contention counsel cite decisions of the supreme court of
Spain of November 9, 1885, February 10, 1876, July 5, 1888, and July 12, 1890, and appears
to rely especially on the former decision wherein sentence of homicidio por imprudencia
temeraria was imposed, the court holding "que es condicion esencial del delito de homicidio,
que el hecho material de que resulte sea umpulsado por voluntad libre encaminada por acto
idoneo a causar la muerte o algun mal fisico que pro consecuencia natural la produzca."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In that case, however, it was proven, and the court found that not only did the defendant no
intend to kill the deceased but also that he did not intend to do him any physical injury whatever;
but in the case at bar the evidence conclusively establishes the voluntary, intentional, and
unlawful infliction by the accused of a severe blow on the person of the deceased; and while it
is true that the accused does not appear to have intended to take the life of his victim, there can
be no doubt that in thus striking the deceased, he intended to do him some injury, at least to
the extent of inflicting some degree of physical pain upon him, and he is, therefore, criminally
responsible for the natural, even if unexpected results of his act, under the provisions of article
1 of the Penal Code, which prescribes that —
"Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit."cralaw virtua1aw library
In such cases the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the natural
consequences of his illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such
consequence, but it does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as
did the trial judge in this case.
What has been said sufficiently disposes of all errors assigned by counsel for appellant, except
certain alleged errors of procedure in the court below which we do not think it necessary to
discuss, because even if it be admitted that such errors were committed, they do not appear to
have in any wise prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are
hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., with whom concurs Johnson, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The facts in this case, as claimed by the Government, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American, named Mann, were engaged in
working a mine belonging to them, located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave
employment to a number of native laborers. Mann discharged one of these laborers, named
63
 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Simeon Saldivar, ejected him forcibly from the premises and warned him no to come back, and
told the defendant no to employ him again or permit him to be upon the premises because he
was a thief and a disturbing element with the other laborers. A few days afterwards, at about 6
o’clock in the morning or a bout the 10th of July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with three or four
others, went to the mine ostensibly to look for work. The defendant, who at that time was
dressing himself inside his tent, which was erected on the mining property, catching sought of
Saldivar, ordered him off the place. Saldivar made no move to leave, and, although the orders
was repeated, still did not leave, although he said and did nothing whatever; whereupon, as
claimed by the Government, the defendant became enraged, took three steps towards Saldivar
and struck him a powerful blow with his fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs. Saldivar
turned around, without saying a word, and went in the direction of his sister’s house, which
stood about 200 yards away and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He was not seen by
anybody after starting toward the house. About two hours later, slightly more of less, he came
to the front door of the house in a dying condition. He died just after being carried into the house
and was buried two or three days later.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of the crime of homicide, marked with the extenuating
circumstances defined in subsections 3 and 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code in that the defendant
had no intention of committing so grave an injury as that which he inflicted and that he struck
the blow under such powerful excitement as would naturally produce entire loss of reason and
self-control. Sentence of six years and one day of prision mayor was imposed, and from this
sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
The claim of the defendant is that he was not enraged, that he did not strike Saldivar, the
decedent, a blow with his fist or a blow in any other manner, but that he simply stepped up to
the decedent, put his open hand against him and pushed him gently backwards.
To secure a conviction it was necessary for the Government to prove, first, that the defendant
unlawfully injured the decedent, and, second, that the decedent died because of that injury.
In this case the death is admitted. The cause of death is in dispute. The Government seeks to
prove the cause of death by circumstantial evidence. The prosecution asserts that it has proved
by direct evidence a blow or push delivered by the defendant to the person of the decedent,
and, the subsequent death being admitted, asks the court to make the deduction that the one
resulted from the other. No autopsy was had. No examination of the body, either before or after
death, which merits the slightest consideration, was made by the prosecution. No expert
testimony worthy of the name was produce by the Government as to the cause of death. Such
as was given is not only wholly valueless, but positively ridiculous.
The prosecution claims to have proved by reliable evidence, and rests its case wholly upon that
proposition, that the defendant administered a powerful blow with the closed fist in the lower left
side; that the death of decedent occurred very soon thereafter, and that therefore, the irresistible
inference is that he injury caused the death. The claim of a proper conviction rests upon the
proposition laid down generally by the authorities that where there has been inflicted an injury
sufficient to produce death, followed by the demise of the injured person, the presumption arises
that the injury was the cause of death, and, if no other cause is suggested by the evidence, the
conclusion becomes practically irresistible and need not be corroborated by expert testimony.
It should be noted here, however, in order to avoid confusion, that if there is no injury sufficient
to produce death, then that presumption does not arise and no conclusion as to the cause of
death can be indulged without additional proof.
The first question to be decided in this case is, Was the blow one which, in the ordinary
acceptation of the term, was sufficient to produce death? If it was, and that fact is established
by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, then the conviction of the defendant might possibly
be sustained — a proposition not necessary to decide under my view of the case. If it was not,
then, there being an absolute failure of proof as to the cause of death, the judgment of conviction
must be reversed.
The resolution of this question depends, in this particular case, wholly upon the nature and
character of the blow delivered.
After a very careful and thorough examination of the proof adduced at the trial, I can not bring
myself to believe that the prosecution has established satisfactorily that the blow complained of
was sufficient to produce death.
I am not convinced that the claim of the Government that the alleged blow was delivered with
the clenched hand, or fist, has been sustained. Three witnesses were sworn on behalf of the
Government to the question of the blow alleged to have been delivered by the defendant to the
decedent. One of them, Pedro Leocampo, testified flatly and directly that the push or blow (he
does not designate by express words which it was) was administered with the open hand. At
page 19 and following pages of the evidence he declares that, at the beginning of the incident
in question between the defendant and the decedent, he had his back toward the participants,
eating his breakfast; that he heard the defendant say to the decedent, "Fuera, go ahead,
vamus," and immediately turning his head he saw the defendant with his open hand extending
toward and touching the body of the decedent; that he saw decedent then turn and walk away.
Later, in replying to questions put by the trial judge, he said he was not quite sure whether the
open hand of defendant actually touched decedent’s body or not. It is unquestionable, however,
that the movement of the defendant’s hand which he saw was the blow or push which it is
claimed caused the fatal injury; because it is admitted by all, and the evidence also on that point
is undisputed, that what the witness saw was at least the critical part of the incident — the
delivery of the alleged blow. Moreover, it is conceded that the alleged blow was not delivered
until after the defendant had uttered the words referred to and had stepped forward at least one
peace; and it is nowhere asserted or claimed by anybody that the defendant extended his hand
toward the decedent more than once or that more than one blow was given. It is evident,
therefore, that what the witness saw was the delivery of the very blow or push which the
prosecution claims was the cause of death. If can not well be imagined, in view of the testimony
given by this witness, how the Government could fairly claim otherwise. These conclusion as it
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is found in the record. In answer to a question put by the fiscal on direct examination he
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"T. Que estuve de espalda con ellos y el americano no ha dicho nada y momentos despues
dejo: ’fuera,’ ’go ahead,’ le vi que tenia la mano abierta y esta mano toco el cuerpo de Simeon,
pero no he visto como estabe."cralaw virtua1aw library
After cross-examination the court questioned the witness as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"J. Oyo Vd. ruido de algun golpe cuando el acusado Brobst dijo ’fuera de aqui?’ — T. No he
oido el golpe.
"J. En el momento de decir ’fuera de aqui,’ a que distancia estabe Simeon del acusado? T. A
distancia de mas de una vara.
"J. Y vio Vd. al acusado empujar al occiso Simeon? — T. No puedo decir si el acusado empujo
a Simeon.
"J. Vio Vd. a Simeon Saldivar retroceder en el momento de decir el acusado ’fuera de aqui? —
T. He visto retroceder y dar las espaldas.
"J. Cuando hizo el ademan de empujarle, como tenia el puno — cerrado o abierto? — T. Tenia
la mano abierta.
"J. En que forma? — T. Tenia abierta la mano."cralaw virtua1aw library
The testimony of this witness clearly discloses the fact that he saw the critical part of the event,
that is, the part wherein the hand of the defendant touched the body of the decedent in the
alleged blow. At that moment the hand of the defendant was open.
The witness Miguel Yotiga, another witness called by the Government, testified on pages 2,3,
and 4 of the record that during the month of July, 1907, he was at the place questions and
answer, among others:jgc:chanrobles.com.p
"F. Sabe Vd. se durante el mes de Julio de 1907 que estuvo Vd. trabajando alli ha occurrido
alguna cosa extraoridinaria? — T. Se, senor.
"F. Que es? — T. El haber abofeteado el americano a untao.
"F. Estaba Vd. presente? — T. Se, señor.
"F. Relate Ve. fielmente en este juzgado todo lo que Vd. ha presenciado desde el principio
hasta el fin. — T. Yo he sido asalariado por el para acarrear arroz. Cuando llegue en las minmas
era ya de noche, y al requerir nuestro salario nos dijo Cristobal que nos dormiriamos alli porque
el americano estabe ya durmiendo y que Vds. pueden salir muy temprano por la manana. Se
nos dio el salario per el acarreo del arroz, y despues de darnos el salario se nos dijo que
quedaramos para desayunar. Despues de desayunar llegaron tambien 4 hombres; el cocinero
me dijo: ’Miguel, presente Vd. a estos 4 hombres por si el Sr. Brobst los quiere empliar en el
trabajo.’ Brobst so aim pueden trabajar esos 4 hombres. El Sr. Brobst se levanto para ver a
aquellos 4 hombres, al ultimo de los cuales le pego una bofetada, y yo habia visto la bofetada
que le dio en la cintura en el bolo colocado en la cintura, e inmediatamente el hombre se dirigio
a la casa de su hermana.
"F. A que distancia estaba Vd. de Mr. Brobst cuando dio el puñetazo a aquel individuo? — T.
Uns distancia de 10 metros.
"F. Sabe Vd. por que el acusado habia dado puñetazo a aquel? — T. Que yo le he visto pegar
con el bofeton, pero que no se el motivo.
"F. Cruzaron entre ellos alguna disputa o rina antes que el acusado haya dado el golpe? — T.
No se nada, unicamente he visto que cuando llegaba Mr. Brobst dio el puñetazo."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Later on the witness says, in reply to leading questions, that the blow was struck with the closes
hand and was a heavy one.
It will be observed from this testimony that the witness, in making his statement in narrative form
and without the influence which particular words in questions frequently exerts on simple-
minded witnesses, used the words abofeteado and bofetada in speaking of the kind of blow
which the defendant administered to the decedent. The word bofetada, as well as abofeteado,
means a blow with the open hand. It does not mean a severe blow, and particularly not a blow
with the fist or closed hand. It is much nearer in character to a push than it is to a puñetazo,
which is always a blow with the fist. It is a light slap rather than a blow. It is the diminutive of the
word bofeton; that is to say, if it can be called a blow at all, it is a gentler blow than would be
signified if the word bofeton were use. All of the dictionaries say that puñetazo is a blow with
the clenched hand, or fist, and that bofetada is a blow with the open hand. The dictionaries also
say, in giving the definition of bofeton, that it is the aumentativo de bofetada. In his testimony
on pages 2, 3, and 4, the witness continually and persistently used the word bofetada in
describing the blow given by the defendant to the decedent until the word puñetazo was
suggested to him or put into his mouth, as it were, by the questions of the fiscal. Then the
witness himself picked up the word and thereafter used it. No amount or species of word torture
can make the word "slap" mean a blow with the fist. No more can bofetada be made to mean
puñetazo. A witness who, in describing the same blow, first uses the word bofetada and then,
after suggestion, changes it to puñetazo, provokes a contradiction in his testimony, which, if not
explained, militates strongly against his credibility. This is especially so when the change in the
word goes to the very essence of the cause of action, as it does in this case. This whole case
depends upon whether the word puñetazo or the word bofetada correctly describes the event
out of which this action grows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It is but repeating the general experience of those familiar with the trial of causes to say that
suggestions to a witness by the form and specific wording of a question are of very frequent
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occurrence. The suggestion produces the same result whether wilfully made and received or
innocently indulged, as was undoubtedly the case here on the part of the fiscal. In the case of
an ignorant or simpleminded witness, his vocabulary being limited, he catches very readily, as
a rule, the words used by the interrogator and, in his answers, uses the exact words in which
the question is propounded, without, perhaps, being in the least conscious that the words he
assumes do not exactly, sometimes not all closely, represent what he really wants to express.
These suggestions display one of the vices found by the courts in what are termed "leading
questions," and furnish a reason for the rule uniformly enforced in trial courts that they will not
be permitted.
The questions and answers already quoted illustrate this vice forcibly as to the use by the
witness Yotiga of the words bofetada and puñetazo. On page 5 of the evidence occurs another
illustration. There the fact sought to be elicited was whether the blow was gentle or severe. "F.
Hizo despacio o fuerte? — T. Fuerte." On page 12, 19, and 24 the following
occurs:jgc:chanrobles.com.p
"F. Donde toco — directamente en el cuerpo o en el bolo? — T. Dio en el bolo.
"F. En que parte del bolo — en la vaina o en el puno? — T. En el puno del bolo.
"F. Era fuerte el puñetazo of flojo? — T. Fuerte.
"F. Cuando el acusado pego a Simeon Saldivar, estaba riendose o estaba furioso? — T.
Furioso.
"F. Tenia cerrado el puno o abierto la mano? — T. Cerrado la mano."cralaw virtua1aw library
In these illustrations, it will be observed, the witness is presented by the questions with only two
words to make use of in answering — one word the very extreme in one direction and the other
word the very extreme in the other. The ignorant or simple-minded witness whose vocabulary
is extremely limited, who is unused to court proceedings, is strongly tempted, and in many
instances is virtually forced, to accept one word or the other and thereby assume one extreme
or the other in making his answers, although the word made use of may not within many degrees
express his real meaning. All of these questions were leading and suggestive, and, judging from
the testimony given anterior to those questions, especially by the witness Yotiga, led to very
marked contradictions of, or, at least, changes in, the evidence as previously presented.
The third and last witness for the Government who testified as to the blow was Fermin
Dagapdap. In describing the blow this witness from the first used the word puñetazo. This
witness, however, stated that he was at the time of the occurrence about 100 brazas (600 feet)
from the participants. Later in his testimony he attempts to claim that he gaves 100 brazas as
the distance which the decedents was from his brother’s house at the time of the occurrence.
This, however, is very difficult to believe in view of the evidence which he gave, as shown on
page 25, which follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"F. A que distancia estaba Vd. de los dos cuando dio el puñetazo? — T. Unas 100 brazas.
"F. Vd. estaba a 100 brazas de distancia? — T. Se, senor.
"F. Indique Vd. aqui la distancia aproxemadamente de las 100 brazas que Vd. dice. — T.
Aquella casa de techo de hierro.
"F. Esa es la distancia donde Vd. estaba cuando dio el punetazo a Simeon Saldivar? — T. Si,
señor."cralaw virtua1aw library
If, after all that questioning as to the distance he was away from the scene of the occurrence,
and if, after all the effort which the fiscal evidently made to induce in him a proper
comprehension of the nature of the question, the witness did not then understand, he displayed
qualities, or the lack of them, which justly lead to the conclusion that his testimony ought not to
be given any weight whatever, especially where it is in conflict with the testimony of any witness
more reliable. Moreover, his manifest evasions on cross-examination materially weaken any
claim which may be made in favor of his credibility.
These witnesses for the Government are in conflict in other particulars. Yotiga declared that the
incident occurred at eight o’clock in the morning. Dagapdap swore that it occurred at four o’clock
in the morning. Yotiga declared that if happened while the workmen were eating breakfast;
Dagapdap averred that it took place after breakfast and while the men were working.
It seems to me, therefore, that the direct testimony adduced by the Government to prove that
the defendant delivered against the body of decedent a blow with his fist, is conspicuously weak,
particularly when we take into consideration that one of the Government witnesses flatly
contradicts the other two in every important point; and that testimony, taken in connection with
all the circumstances surrounding and accompanying the incident, seems rather to support the
testimony and claim of the defendant that he did not strike the decedent with his fist but gave
him a push with his open hand.
The following are the said circumstances, present at the very time the act complained of was
committed, which go to prove that the blow, alleged to have been delivered against the body of
the decedent was not blow at all in the real sense of the word and was wholly insufficient
ordinarily speaking, to cause any injury whatever:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The decedent at the time showed absolutely no signs of having been injured in the slightest
degree.
(a) The three witnesses for the prosecution above referred to, Yotiga, Dagapdap and
Leocampo, if their testimony is to be believed, unite in declaring that they were looking the
decedent full in the face when the alleged blow was struck and that they saw thereon nothing
but a perfectly natural expression. There is not the slightest evidence to show that the
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countenance of the decedent betrayed even the faintest appearance of Spain, distress or
discomfort at the time the blow was delivered or at any time thereafter so long as he was
observed.
(b) Nobody heard any blow struck. It is concealed by every witness for the Government that
there was no sound of a blow. There were at the place where the incident occurred about twenty
men, all of them as close to the participants as were the three witnesses for the Government
and yet, so far as can be gathered, not a person heard the sound of a blow. In fact, only three
of the twenty (the witnesses for the Government) knew that anything unusual had happened at
all.
(c) The decedent gave no cry of pain, made no exclamation, uttered no sound. This is the
uncontradicted proof.
(d) The decedent did not reel or stagger backward, forward or sideways, nor did he lose his
equilibrium in any way.
This is established by uncontradicted proof. Every witness for the Government declares that
after the delivery of the alleged blow the decedent remained in a perfectly upright attitude and
in a natural position; and that immediately after receiving the blow he turned and walked away.
One of the witnesses, after being sharply questioned by the fiscal, stated that on the delivery of
the blow the decedent stepped back, threw up his arms and walked away. The following is his
testimony:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"El Sr. Brobst . . . le pego una bofetada y yo habia visto la bofetada que le dio en la cintura en
el bolo colocado en la cintura e immediatamente el hombre se dirigio a la casa de su hermana.
"F. En que posicion se quedo aquel individuo en el mismo momento de recibir el golpe? — T.
Que inmediatamente de haber recibido el puñetazo se marcho.
"F. Yo le pregunto a Vd. en el mismo momento de haber dado el puñetazo. — T. Que despues
de dar el golpe se retrocedioy levanto los brazos yen seguida se marcho."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It will be observed, from the evidence quoted, that the witness testified at first the decedent did
nothing on receiving the blow except to turn and walk away. This testimony the witness repeats
in response to a second question of the fiscal. The third question as to the same point was
evidently very sharply put by the fiscal, and that effort drew from the witness the additional
statement, quite inconsistent with his two previous ones, that the decedent stepped back and
threw up his arms. Neither of the other two witnesses for the Government saw this latter
manifestation on the part of the decedent. One of them, Leocampo, testifies directly that no
such thing happened, and the other, Dagapdap, although one of those who claimed to have
been a eyewitness of the whole affair and who assumed to describe the whole incident in detail,
fails to mention the very important fact, if it is a fact, that the decedent threw up his arms. He
testified that the decedent simply whirled around and walked away.
The claim of the prosecution that the decedent staggered at the time of the alleged blow is
based upon the translation of "dio vueltas." One of the Government’s witnesses says that on
the delivery of the blow the decedent "dio vueltas y se marcho." So far as my researches go,
no such interpretation can be given those words. They do not mean that he "staggered." They
mean simply that he turned or whirled around. This might follow a blow or a push. No other
witness uses these same words; but the other two witnesses for the Government, in describing
the same act of the decedent, used words which, it may fairly be assumed, in order to maintain
as much harmony as possible in the testimony of the Government’s witnesses, were intended
to mean the same thing. Such words are "se dirigio a la casa," and "volvi la cara y se marcho
el difunto." These words were used by the other two Government witnesses in describing the
very same act to which the other Government witness applied the description "dio vueltas."
Those words can not possibly be construed to mean that the decedent staggered.
(e) The decedent, according to the testimony of the prosecution, did not attempt to ward off,
dodge or escape the blow in any way.
He had abundant opportunity to do so. It is nowhere denied, but always admitted, that the
defendant twice ordered the decedent to leave the place and after delivering the order the
second time advanced toward him a peace or two. The decedent was fully warned. Yet the
witnesses of the prosecution claim that, up to the time the blow touched him, he made no move
whatever. It is unbelievable that the decedent would permit the defendant to walk up to him,
after due warning, and plant a powerful blow in his abdomen without any effort to dodge or
escape and without the slightest effort to ward off the blow by movement of body, hand, or arm.
The throwing of the arms down to protect the abdomen in such a case is involuntary and almost
inevitable; and the fact that he did not do so points strongly to the conclusion that he was not
struck as claimed.
(f) The body of decedent exhibited no external sign of injury after death.
Two witnesses were sworn by the prosecution as to signs of injury upon the body of the
decedent. One, the father of decedent, laborer, testified that at 4 o’clock of the afternoon of the
day after the alleged injury (the alleged injury occurred at about 6 a. m.) he examined the body
of decedent and found a black spot about the size of a peso on the left side. The other witness,
Alejandro Santiago, 70 years, farmer and herbalist, declared that he examined the body, he
does not remember when, and found a black spot on the ribs (he does not remember on which
side of the body) and another one on the navel. The cause of these spots, if they really existed,
is pure speculation. Certainly one blow could not make both. They may have been caused by
the decedent falling or by handling the at the time of or subsequent to death, or by ecchymosis.
No one knows. Certain it is that an examination of the body by a licensed physician, Hans Hoch,
made the day of the alleged injury, some hours thereafter, disclosed, so the physician testified,
absolutely no external sign or evidence of injury. While the absence of external signs of injury
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
is not conclusive that there was no injury, still such signs are usual in cases of this character
and their absence is significant and important.
The weight of the testimony produced seems, therefore, to be that there were no external signs
of injury upon the body of decedent — certainly none that were fairly traceable to the blow, even
if delivered in the manner and with the force claimed by the Government.
It seems to me, therefore, that there is an essential and fatal conflict in the evidence of the
prosecution. The prosecution claims (and portions of the direct testimony of some of its
witnesses tend to prove) that the defendant gave the decedent a powerful blow with his fist, full
in the left side; on the other hand, other positions of that testimony are utterly and destructively
contradictory to that claim. It is contrary to the universal experience of life to assert that a man,
receiving in his lower left side a powerful blow with the fist, a blow which, it is claimed, was
sufficiently forcible to cause death within a short time, can maintain an erect and natural posture
and exhibit absolutely no signs of pain. Experience also demonstrates that it is little short of the
impossible that one receiving such a blow would throw his arms up. I do not believe a case can
be cited where that has occurred. It is the experience of mankind that under such circumstances
the person always throws his arms down. Such a blow in or about the abdomen or in the lower
ribs produces such a shock to the nervous system, causes such a contraction of all the muscles
thereabouts, induces such a difficulty of respiration, and such great pain, that the person so
struck is not only wholly unable to throw his arms up but he is absolutely incapable of
maintaining the body in an erect position. He involuntarily and inevitably throws the arms down
the abdomen and bends the body forward at the hips. In other words, using which almost
universal experience has taught accurately describes the position necessarily assumed by the
one receiving such a blow, he would "double up like a jackknife." The claim that the blow was a
powerful one delivered with the fist is so utterly inconsistent with the appearance and conduct
of the decedent at the time of the assault subsequent thereto as to lead almost necessarily to
the conclusion that no such blow was struck. Granting such a blow, it would be little short of the
impossible, it certainly would be most extraordinary, for the decedent to exhibit no signs of pain,
maintain an erect and natural position, preserve perfectly his equilibrium with the exception of
stepping backward a little, turn in the ordinary way and walk off the premises at his usual and
natural gait and with his usual and natural carriage. The entire absence of symptoms or
evidence of injury at the time of the act complained of is, in my judgment, of the very gravest
importance. It speaks louder and stronger and clearer than all the other evidence in the case
as to whether or not the decedent was actually injured at that time.
On the other hand, the theory and claim of the defendant, that he simply stepped forward and
pushed the decedent backward lightly with the open hand, after ordering him to leave, explains
fully and satisfactorily every fact and every circumstance above mentioned as being so utterly
inconsistent with the claim of the prosecution.
(1) It explains why the decedent did not try to dodge or escape or protect himself by movement
of the body, or by using the hands and arms to defend himself from the assault of this enraged
and furious men. There was no violence from which he needed to protect himself.
(2) It explains why there was no cry of pain, no appearance of distress, no reeling, staggering,
falling, doubling up or other exhibition or sign of injury. It explains why he did not at once drop
to the ground, as he naturally and almost inevitably would on receiving a blow such as is sought
to be established by the prosecution. There was no violence or force to cause any of these
things.
(3) It explains why decedent was able to walk away promptly at his usual gait and with his
customary carriage.
(4) It explains why there was no satisfactory proof of marks of violence or external signs of injury
on the body of the decedent.
(5) It explains why nobody of all who were present heard the sound of a blow, not even the
witnesses for the prosecution.
(6) It explains why, among the twenty persons there present, only a very small per cent knew
that anything unusual had taken place.
(7) It explains why the witness Yotiga first used the word "bofetada" instead of" puñetazo" or
"golpe."
(8) It explains why the witness Leocampo testified that the defendant’s hand was open at the
very time of its contact with decedent’s person.
(9) It explains the entire lack of reason or motive on the part of defendant inducing him to inflict
on the decedent punishment as severe as would follow such a blow.
It seems, therefore, to be demonstrated from the evidence that the prosecution has not only not
sufficiently substantiated its claim that the blow was delivered with the fist, but has failed as well
to show that any blow, in the real sense of that term, was struck. Rather the strong tendency of
the proof, taken as a whole, together with all the circumstances, is to support the contention of
the defendant that he simply pushed the decedent back with the open hand. That being so, it is
perfectly apparent that such an act was utterly insufficient to produce death.
As stated at the outset, the Government rests its case wholly upon the proposition laid down by
the authorities that where there has been inflicted an injury sufficient to produce death, followed
by the demise of the injured person, the presumption arise that the injury was the cause of
death, and, if no other cause is suggested by the evidence, the conclusion becomes practically
irresistible and need not be corroborated by expert testimony. But it must always be
remembered that the basis of and the reason for that presumption is the injury sufficient to
produce death. If the injury is not one capable of producing death, ordinarily speaking, then no
such presumption can possibly arise. The law invariably requires that there be established by
clearest proof the connection between the injury and the death, making the one result of the
other. Where the injury is one capable of producing death that connection of cause and effect
is established between the injury and death by the inherent nature of the act — its sufficiency
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
to produce death. But where the act is one not sufficient to produce death, then the relation of
cause and effect is not established for the reason that the act fails of the very quality from which
the presumption of cause and effect springs, namely, its capability of producing death. In such
a case, when the Government has proved simply the injury and death, it has done nothing. The
connection between the two is wholly lacking. It is indispensable to a conviction in such case
that the Government prove the cause of death; and that cause must be proved in addition to
the fact of injury. This the Government has wholly failed to do. No effort was made to do so.
The Government rested its case entirely upon the presumption, which it assumed arose by
reason of the injury and death, to establish the relation of cause and effect between them. No
autopsy was held. No one knows the cause of death. The incident occurred at about 6 o’clock
a.m. The decedent died at about 8 o’clock the same morning. He left the scene of the event
instantly. He was not seen again by anybody, so far as the evidence shows, until the very
moment of his death. Where he was, what he did, and what happened to him during the two
hours intervening the evidence does not disclose.
It being fairly established by the evidence that the defendant simply pushed the decedent, the
remaining question is simple. The land and premises where the event transpired belonged to
the defendant. The decedent, according to the evidence, was known to the defendant as a thief
and as maker of mischief among the workers in the mines. Only two days before the event from
which this suit arose defendant had seen the decedent forcibly ejected from these same
premises by one Mann, a partner of defendant; and the defendant was at that time advised by
Mann that the decedent was a mischief-maker and a thief and should not be allowed about the
mines. The defendant had a right to protect his property from invasion particularly by such as
he believed decedent to be; and if, being upon the premises, decedent refused to leave when
given fair warning, the defendant had a right to eject him therefrom using no more force than
was necessary to that end. (Cooley, Torts, 1st Ed., 167; McCarty v. Fremont, 23 Cal., 196;
Woodman v. Howell, 45 Ill., 367; Bucher v. Parmelee, 9 Vt., 352; People v. Payne, 8 Cal., 341;
People v. Batchelder, 27 Cal., 69.)
That he did not use more force than was necessary is established by the evidence as shown
by the preceding discussion.
Wills, on Circumstantial Evidence, says on page 291:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(3) In the proof of criminal homicide the true cause of death must be clearly established; and
the possibility of accounting for the event by self-inflicted violence, accident or natural cause,
excluded; and only when it has been proven that no other hypothesis will explain all the
conditions of the case can it be safely and justly concluded that it has been caused by intentional
injury. But, in accordance with the principles which govern the proof of every other element of
the corpus delicti, it is not necessary that the cause of death should be verified by direct and
positive evidence; it is sufficient if it be proven by circumstantial evidence, which produces a
moral conviction in the minds of the jury, equivalent to that which is the result of positive and
direct evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the People v. Bennet (49 N. Y., 144) the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In determining a question of fact from circumstantial evidence, there are two general rules to
be observed: (1) The hypothesis of delinquency or guilt should flow naturally from the facts
proved, and be consistent with them all. (2) The evidence must be such as to exclude, to a
moral certainty, every hypothesis but that of his guilt of the offense imputed to him; or, in other
words, the facts proved must all be consistent with and point to his guilt not only, but they must
be inconsistent with his innocence."cralaw virtua1aw library
"On an indictment for murder, the prosecutor must prove that the blows caused the death; but,
if he proves that the blows were given by dangerous weapon — were followed by insensibility
or other alarming symptoms, and soon afterward by death; this is sufficient to impose it on the
accused, to show that the death was occasioned by some other cause." (U.S. v. Wiltberger,
Fed, Cas. No. 16738)
"On trial for murder, the State’s failure to prove by what means the deceased came to his death
is fatal to its case." (Cole v. The State, 56 Ark., 50.)
"In order that a defendant may be properly convicted by circumstantial evidence, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and, at the same time, inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent,
and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."cralaw virtua1aw library
(12 Cyc., 488; U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. Rep., 3; People v. Ward, 105 Cal., 335; Carlton v. The
People, 150 Ill., 181; State v. Vinson, 37 La. Ann., 792; Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass.,
1; People v. Aikin, 66 Mich., 460; U.S. v. Reder, 69 Fed. Rep., 965.)
The judgment of conviction should be reversed, the defendant declared not guilty and his
discharge from custody ordered
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35574 September 28, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio Sugay for defendant-appellant.
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
CUEVAS, J.:
In an amended Information 1 filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, VALENTINA
MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill her
husband, Elias Day y Pablo, with whom she was united in lawful wedlock, enter (sic) the
NAWASA building situated at Pasay City, where said Elias Day y Pablo was working as a
security guard; and the said accused, having in her possession a bottle containing gasoline
suddenly and without warning, poured the contents on the person of her husband, Elias Day y
Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said Elias Day y Pablo suffered burns and
injuries which subsequently caused his death.
Contrary to law 2
Tried after pleading "NOT GUILTY" upon arraignment, accused was convicted and thereafter
sentenced to reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P12,000.00; and to pay costs.
From the aforesaid judgment, she ventilated an appeal to the then Court of Appeals (which
referred the appeal to us considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua, assailing her aforesaid conviction and contending that the trial court erred: 1) in
convicting her solely on the basis of the alleged extrajudicial confession; 2) in finding that
Pneumonia was a complication of the burns sustained by the victim; 3) in not finding her not to
have cause the death of the deceased; and 4) in not acquitting her at least on ground of
reasonable doubt.
The prosecution's version of the incident as summarized in the People's Brief is as follows:
On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA
Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had just
purchased ten (10) centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue
which she placed in a coffee bottle (t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry of her
husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a
mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA
Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted
at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON" (t.s.n., p.
14, Id). The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the
contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14, Id). Then, she got a matchbox and set
the polo shirt of the victim a flame. (Exhs. "A" and "A-1", p. 197, Rec.)
The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written
statement (Exh. "A", p. 197, Rec.) where she admitted having burned the victim.
Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to
the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p.
208, rec.) due to pneumonia, lobar bilateral Burns 2 secondary. 3
Appellant's story on the other hand runs, thus:
It was before 10:00 o'clock p.m. when appellant returned from Olongapo City. She fed her
grandson and put him to bed. After filing the tank with water, she remembered that the next day
was a Sunday and she had to go to church. Her shoes were dirty but there was no gasoline
with which to clean them. Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby gasoline
station and bought ten centavos worth of gasoline. Then she remembered that her husband
needed gasoline for his lighter so she dropped by his place of work. (p. 13, Ibid.)
Appellant saw her husband inside a bonding of the NAWASA standing by the window. As the
iron grille was open, she entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened the door, but
when he saw his wife he shouted at her. Appellant said that she had brought the gasoline which
he needed for his lighter, but Elias, who was under the influence of liquor, cursed her thus:
"PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON". Elias continued shouting and cursing even as appellant
told him that she had come just to bring the gasoline that he wanted. Appellant trembled and
became dizzy. She was beside herself and did not know that she was sprinkling the gasoline
on her husband's face. She was tired and dizzy and had to sit down for a while. Then she
remembered her grandson who was alone in the house so she went home leaving her husband
who was walking to and fro and not paying attention to her. (pp. 13-14, Ibid., p. 2, March 20,
1969)
She went to bed but could not sleep. She went back to the NAWASA compound to apologize
to her husband. Upon reaching the NAWASA, however, she found that police officers were
present. Her husband was walking all around still fuming mad, and when he saw her he chased
her. A policeman pulled appellant aside and asked if she was the wife of Elias. When she replied
in the affirmative, the police officer accused her of burning her husband. She denied the
accusation. But the police took her to the headquarters, and prepared a written statement,
Exhibits A, A-1. Appellant was made to sign said statement upon a promise that she would be
released if she signed it. Although she did not know the contents, she signed it because of the
promise. (pp. 14-16. Id.; p. 5, March 20,1969) 4
Appellant's assigned errors boil down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether or not appellant's
extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given; and (2) whether or not the burns sustained by the
victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death.
Right after the burning incident, appellant was picked up by the police operatives of Pasay City.
She was thereafter investigated by Sgt. Leopoldo Garcia of the Pasay City Police who took her
statement in Tagalog and in Question and Answer form which was reduced into writing. 5 After
Sgt. Garcia was through taking her statement, she was brought to Fiscal Paredes who asked
her questions regarding the said statement and its execution and before whom said statement
was subscribed and sworn to by her. In that investigation, appellant categorically admitted
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
having thrown gasoline at her husband and thereafter set him aflame as evidenced by this
pertinent portion of her statement-
T Ano ang nangyari at iyong binuksan ng gasolina ang iyong asawa na si Elias Day?
S Dahil may sala siya, at sinunog niya ang aking mga damit, at may babae pa, at saka lahat ng
aming pagkain sa bahay ay hinahakot.
T Ng dahil dito sa mga binanggit mong ito ay ano ang ginawa mo sa iyong asawa?
S Ako po ay nagdilim ang aking isipan at ang ginawa ko ay naisip kong buhusan ng gasolina,
kaya ang aking ginawa ay bumili ako ng halagang 10 sentimos sa Esso Gasoline Station sa
Tall Avenue at inilagay ko sa isang boti.
T Pagkatapos na ikaw ay makabili ng gasolina sa station ng Esso sa Taft Avenue dito sa Pasay
City, ay ano ang ginawa mo?
S Ako po ay nagpunta sa kanya na pinaggoguardiahan sa Nawasa at pagdating ko nuon ay
kumatok ako sa pintuan ng Nawasa, at nang marinig niya ang aking katok sa pinto ay binuksan
niya ang pintuan, at pagkabukas ng pintuan ay nakita niya ako, at nagalit siya at ako ay minura
ng puta putan Ina mo, lalakad ka ng gabi, at namumuta raw ako, at pagkatapos na ako ay
mamura ay hinahabol pa ako ng suntok, kayat ang ginawa ko po kinuha ko ang aking dalang
bote na may gasolina at aking ibinuhos sa kanyang katawan at aking kinuha ang posporo at
aking sinindihang at hangang magliyab ang suot niyang polo shirt, na may guhit na itim at puti.
T Alam mo ba na kung ano ang iyong ginawa sa iyong asawa kanginang humigit kumulang na
mag-iika alas 11:00 ng gabi Marzo 6, 1965?
S Opo, aking sinunog ang aking asawa. (Exhs. A & A-1 Emphasis supplied)
She would now like her aforesaid extrajudicial confession discredited by asserting that she did
not understand its contents because she is not a Tagala aside from having reached only the
primary grades; and furthermore, that said statement was signed by her merely upon the
promise of the policemen that she will later be released.
We find appellant's aforesaid assertions a mere pretense too flimsy to be accepted as true. For
the truth is that appellant knew and understood Tagalog despite her not being a Tagala, having
stayed in Manila since 1951, continuously up to the time of the burning incident in question for
which she was investigated. During this period of almost fourteen years, she was in daily
association with Tagalogs communicating with them in Pilipino. This is clear from her admission
on cross-examination which runs thus-
Q But you can understand Tagalog because of the length of time that you litem been living here
in Manila?
A Yes.
Q And as a matter of fact, when you buy something from the store, you speak Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q And when you ride in a jeep or bus, you speak Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q And you were well understood by these Tagalog people?
A Yes.
Q And as a matter of fact, you can understand Tagalog?
A Yes,
Q And you can also read Tagalog?
A Yes.
Q You can read?
A Yes, but I do not litem interest to read. TSN, March 29, 1969, pp. 11-12).
All through shout the entire investigation and even at the time appellant A as before Fiscal
Paredes, before whom she subscribed and swore to the truth of an what appeared in her
statement, 6 no denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police
investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely affixed
her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be released later. We
therefore find her aforesaid claim highly incredible and a mere concoction. For why will the
police still resort to such trickery when the very sworn statement given by her proved by its
contents that appellant was indeed very cooperative. In fact, almost all the recitals and
narrations appearing in the said statement were practically repeated by her on the witness stand
thus authenticating the truth and veracity of her declarations contained therein. Moreover, We
find said statement replete with details which could not litem been possibly supplied by the
police investigators who litem no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance with her and the
victim, especially with respect to the circumstances and incidents which preceded the fatal
incident that brought about the death of the latter. We therefore find no error in the trial court's
pronouncement that appellant's sworn statement was voluntarily given by her; that she fully
understood its contents; and that she willingly affixed her signatures thereto.
Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive proof of guilt
when taken without maltreatment or intimidation 7 and may serve as a basis of the declarant's
conviction. 8 It is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proven. The burden of proof is
upon the person who gave the confession. 9 That presumption has not been overcome in the
instant case.
Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn
statement in assessing her guhit since it was given shortly after the incident took place. By then,
she had yet no time to concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the aftermath
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
consequences of her criminal design she must litem been motivated by no other purpose except
to admit the undeniable. On the other hand, when she took the witness stand, disclaiming any
responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was already January 13, 1969 . . . more than
five years after the incident and decidedly after she had the benefit of too many consultations.
That appellant has murder in her heart and meant to do harm to her husband when she went to
the latter's place of work on that fatal night and intended an the consequences of her nefarious
act finds clearer manifestation and added support in her total indifference and seemingly
unperturbed concern over the fate that had befallen the victim . . . her husband . . . especially
at times when he needed her most. Being the wife, she must be the closest to him and the
hardest hit by the mishap if she has not authored the same nor voluntarily participated therein.
She was then reasonably expected to come to his succor and alleviate him from his sufferings.
And yet, the records do not show her having seen her husband even once while the latter lay
seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and death. Neither did she attend his funeral
nor was she ever present during the wake while the victim's remains lay in state. That she was
under detention does not excuse nor justify those glaring and significant omissions. For she
could litem asked the court's permission for any of the enumerated undertakings which we
believe would not litem been denied. But she did not even attempt.
Indeed, the more we scrutinize appellant's alibi and explanation, we become more convinced
of the falsity and incredibility of her assertions. For instance, her claim that her purpose in buying
gasoline at so an unholy hour of the night, past ten o clock in the evening, solely for the purpose
of cleaning her shoes which she would wear in going to church the following Sunday, hardly
recommend acceptance. That she dropped at her husband's place of work also at the middle
of the night for no other purpose except to deliver to him gasoline for his cigarette lighter, is
likewise too taxing upon one's credulity . . . more so if we litem to consider the previous spat
she had with the deceased in the morning of that fatal day.
In her vain attempt to exculpate herself, appellant would like Us to believe that her husband
died of pneumonia because the latter drank liquor as shown by the toxicology report indicating
presence of alcohol in the victim's body. Hence, assuming she set her husband on fire, she is
not criminally liable for her husband's death.
We are not persuaded by appellant's aforesaid ratiocination
The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice to exculpate
the appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be caused by taking alcohol.
In fact, alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to produce an almost
comatose condition would not cause suffocation nor effect a diminution of the oxygen content
of the body. 10 In fine, as correctly pointed out by the Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking
of liquor was not an efficient supervening cause of his death which took place on March 10,
1965, just four days after the burning.
The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2'
secondary. There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by The post-
mortem findings immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that
pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the
immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that this could not litem resulted had
not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with
pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory.
We agree.
Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred.
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony committed by the offender. 11
The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4;
and PP vs. Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL 748, 751 is as follows —
One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes
immediately or immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes contribute to
the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if the
deceased might litem recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical
operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the
death, or that death was men." caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the
condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal
application. It lies at the foundation of criminal jurisprudence. It is that every person is held to
contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts
a wound with a deadly weapon in a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a
consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the
wound or its unskilled and improper treatment which are themselves consequences of the
criminal act, must in law be deemed to litem been among those which are in contemplation of
the guilty party and for which he must be responsible The rule has its foundation on a wise and
practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the conflicting theories of medical men
and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries it would be
easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction
and punishment.
In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon her the obligation to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased only in the amount of P12,000.00. That should now be increased to
P30,000.00.
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WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission, as may be
costs against appellant. imputable to the trial court. (People v. Valerio, Jr., L-4116, February 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 208,
231) In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the maceration of one half of the head
It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this Court of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different conclusion.
recommends her for executive clemency. For the purpose, let His Excellency, President We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the
Ferdinand E. Marcos, be furnished with a copy of this decision thru the Hon. Minister of Justice. bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does
SO ORDERED. not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur. 2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES THEREOF, PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.
— Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
Concepcion, Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., are on leave.
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado"
(he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), (People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-
30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144) the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an
Footnotes
intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be
1 Appellant was accused merely of Frustrated Parricide in the original information filed on March 8, 1965. the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. (People v.
2 Pages 44-45, Record. Mananquil, L-35574, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 196, 207). We hold that these requisites
3 Appellee's Brief, pp. 1 and 2.
4 Pages 4, 5 and 6, Appellant's Brief.
are present in this case.
5 Exhibits "A" and "A-1".
6 Exhibits "A" and "A-1". 3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE, DEFINED. — The intentional felony committed was
7 PP vs. Pincalin 102 SCRA 137; PP vs. Carias, 122 SCRA 783.
8 PP vs. Perez, 102 SCRA 313. the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by the
9 PP. vs. dela Cruz, 115 SCRA 154. physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What is material is that by the instrument
10 TSN, February 6, 1974, page 30. used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to
11 US vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310: US vs. Mallare, 29 Phil. 14.
immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and delicate part of
the body: the head. (See: People v. Diana, 32 Phil. 344 [1915]). The hacking incident happened
on the national highway where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such vehicle
passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and having barely
THIRD DIVISION negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened
by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a vehicle. Under
[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.] these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might not have
been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. Proximate legal cause
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO, is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants, FERNANDO events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-Appellants. causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee. circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants. and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate
SYLLABUS Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102
Phil. 181). In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s assault on him to the time
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; THROWS THE CASE OPEN FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW OF Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between
ALL ERRORS AS MAY BE IMPUTABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT. — While the factual findings them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a criminal liability.

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4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
WITNESSES. — We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in
favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the
prosecution witnesses. (People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 71).
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION,
WRONGLY APPRECIATED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — But we disagree with the lower court
with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view of the suddenness of
the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack, however, does not by itself
show treachery. (People v. Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 559) There must be
evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it
impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. (People v. Crisostomo, L-32243,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47). In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan followed by
the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his companions
of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiñones, Jr. was therefore placed on
guard for any subsequent attacks against them. (People v. Mercado, L-33492, March 30, 1988,
159 SCRA 455). The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise
not been met in this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient
length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989, 176 SCRA
46).
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTITUTED BY MERE KNOWLEDGE,
ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR
AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE NOR BY MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE
CRIME. — Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide.
Again, contrary to the lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take
any active part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his
running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he
was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated
and coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo
Asis must have known of the former’s criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People v. Izon, 104 Phil. 690 [1958]) Such
being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator,
a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan. (Orobio v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316) Edmundo Asis therefore
deserves exoneration.
7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND APPLYING
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW. — There being no mitigating circumstance, the
penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal
Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that within the range of
prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient
proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victim’s unrealized income and therefore, the
same is disallowed.
DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of
the decisionof the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1 convicting
them of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for
the latter’s death and P256,960 representing the victim’s unrealized income.
On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was filed against Fernando Iligan,
Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo,
municipality of Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one
another, with treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan armed
with a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, gang up and in a sudden unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiñones,
Jr., on his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latter’s face which resulted to (sic) the death
of said Esmeraldo Quiñones.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their arraignment on
January 12, 1981 Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented the following version of the commission of the
crime.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr. and his
companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo,
Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a
certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and
Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to
box him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they had no desire to fight.
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3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy
Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran for about half
an hour, passing by the house of Quiñones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing that
they were no longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiñones, Jr. invited the two
to accompany him to his house so that he could change to his working clothes and report for
work as a bus conductor. 4
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiñones, Jr., the three accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiñones, Jr. with his
bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and
Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they heard shouts of
people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May nadale na." 6
On the spot where Quiñones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already
dead with his head busted. 7 They helped the brother of Quiñones, Jr. in carrying him to their
house. 8
That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiñones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria
Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas. The
postmortem examination report which is found at the back of the death certificate reveals that
Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained the following
injuries:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple fracture of the entire half of the
frontal left, temporal, parietal and occipital bone of the head, with massive maceration of the
brain tissue.
"2. Other findings — Incised wound at the right eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4
cms. in length, 0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder and right
side of the neck." 9
The death certificate also indicates that Quiñones, Jr. died of "shock and massive cerebral
hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their
respective houses at the time the crime was committed.chanrobles law library
Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his house
to fetch his visitors at the dance hall. 10 Along the way, he met his nephew, Edmundo Asis,
whom he presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew to accompany him to the dance hall.
However, they were not able to reach their destination because Edmundo was boxed by
somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11 Instead, Fernando Iligan brought his nephew
home. 12 On their way, they were overtaken by Juliano Mendoza whom Fernando Iligan
invited to his house to help him cook. 13 After bringing his nephew home, Fernando Iligan and
Juliano Mendoza proceeded to Iligan’s house and arrived there between 1:30 and 2:00 o’clock
in the morning of the same day. 14
Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligan’s testimony. He testified that while they were walking in
front of the Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize because
there were several persons around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he
addressed his apology boxed him on his left face. He fell down and Iligan helped him. Later,
Iligan accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15 After Iligan and Juliano Mendoza had left his
house, he slept and woke up at 7:00 o’clock the following morning. 16
The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that
Quiñones, Jr. died because of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the
lower court, in its decision of May 7, 1986, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death
have shown that the victim’s death was caused by a vehicular accident. To this,
notwithstanding, the Court cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of the alleged
vehicular accident has not been fully established. Second, Esmeraldo Quiñones, Sr., (the)
father of the victim, testified that Dr. Abas told him that if his son was hacked by a bolo on the
face and then run over the entire head by a vehicle’s tire, then that hacking on the face could
not be visibly seen on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third, Exhibit ‘2’ (the
photograph of the victim taken immediately after his body had been brought home) is a hard
evidence. It will attestly (sic) show that the entire head was not crushed by any vehicle. On the
contrary, it shows that only half of the face and head, was damaged with the wound starting
on a sharp edge horizontally. There are contusions and abrasions on the upper left shoulder
and on the neck while the body downwards has none of it, while on the right forehead there is
another wound caused by a sharp instrument. Therefore, it is simple, that if the victim was run
over by a vehicle, the other half portion of his head and downward part of his body must have
been likewise seriously damaged, which there are none." 17
The lower court also found that Iligan’s group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the
group of the victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted
Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and imposed on them the aforementioned
penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which
they were convicted. For the second time, they attributed Quiñones, Jr.’s death to a vehicular
accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The
defense relies on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that the
multiple fracture on the head of Quiñones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident 18 which
opinion was earlier put in writing by the same witness in the postmortem examination. Dr.
Abas justified his conclusion by what he considered as tire marks on the victim’s left shoulder
and the right side of his neck. 19 He also testified that the incised wound located at the
victim’s right eyebrow could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so superficial that it
could not have caused the victim’s death. 20
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity of the actual occurrence of the
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
vehicular mishap. One such evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis that
when he helped bring home the body of Quiñones, Jr., he told the victim’s father, Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Sr. that "before Esmeraldo Quiñones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle, he was
hacked by Fernando Iligan." 21 When asked why he mentioned an automobile, Zaldy Asis
said that he did not notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it "because his (Quiñones,
Jr.) head was busted." 22 It is therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis had actual
knowledge of said accident but for understandable reasons he declined to declare it in court.
Defense witness Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo, also testified that
when he went to the scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the victim scattered across
the road where he also saw tire marks. 23
For its part, the prosecution, through the victim’s father, presented evidence to the effect that
Iligan authored the maceration of half of the victim’s head. Quiñones, Sr. testified that from
their house, which was about five meters away from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding
a "sinampalok" as he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased someone.
During the second time that he saw the three accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na
yan." 24 Hence, the lower court concluded that the victim’s head was "chopped" resulting in
the splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It should be emphasized, however, that the
testimony came from a biased witness and it was uncorroborated.
While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate
court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by
commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court. 26 In this instance, the lower
court erred in finding that the maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also caused
by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different conclusion. We are convinced beyond
peradventure that indeed, after Quiñones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by
Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate
Iligan from liability for the death of Quiñones, Jr.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado"
(he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential requisites
of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done
to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed
by the offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are present in this case.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That
it was considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point.
What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr. and the location of the
wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it
was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head. 29
The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30 where vehicles are expected to
pass any moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis,
running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts
of people. Quiñones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented
highway, was run over by a vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might
not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. Proximate
legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." 31 In other
words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s assault on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run
over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken
chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.chanrobles law
library
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan
because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution
witnesses. 32
But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the
lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiñones, Jr. Suddenness
of such attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. 33 There must be evidence that
the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for
the person attacked to defend himself. 34 In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan
followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and
his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiñones, Jr. was
therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. 35
The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in
this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. 36
Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again,
contrary to the lower court’s finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established
to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligan’s co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active
part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiñones, Jr., which led to his running over
by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying
a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming
from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must
have known of the former’s criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of
the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party
to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
furtherance of the common design and purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere presence
at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice
to the assault perpetrated by Iligan. 38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.
There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal
medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for
the victim’s unrealized income and therefore, the same is disallowed.cralawnad
WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of
homicide for which he is imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo
Quiñones, Jr. in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is
hereby acquitted of the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123485. August 31, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLUSAPE
SABALONES alias Roling, ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES and
EUFEMIO CABANERO, accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias Roling and ARTEMIO
TIMOTEO BERONGA,accused-appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Factual findings of trial courts which are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule,
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Alibi, on the other hand, cannot prevail over
positive identification by credible witnesses. Furthermore, alleged violations of constitutional
rights during custodial investigation are relevant only when the conviction of the accused by the
trial court is based on the evidence obtained during such investigation.
The Case
These are the principles relied upon by the Court in resolving this appeal from the Court of
Appeals (CA)[1] Decision[2] dated September 28, 1995, convicting Rolusape Sabalones and
Timoteo Beronga of murder and frustrated murder. The convictions arose from a shooting
incident on June 1, 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which resulted in the killing of two persons and the
wounding of three others, who were all riding in two vehicles which were allegedly ambushed
by appellants.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juanito M.
Gabiana Sr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7,[3] five amended
Informations charging four John Does, who were later identified as Rolusape Sabalones,
Artemio Timoteo Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and Eufemio Cabanero, with two counts of
murder and three counts of frustrated murder. The Informations are quoted hereunder.
1) Crim Case No. CBU-9257 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985, at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto
Village, Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
GLENN TIEMPO, who was riding [i]n a jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter several gunshot wounds, thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
2) Criminal Case No. 9258 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or less at Mansueto
Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and
treachery, did [then] and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
ALFREDO NARDO, who was riding on a jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter several gunshot wounds, thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
3) Crim Case No. CBU-9259 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto
Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and
treachery, did and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot REY BOLO
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
who was riding in a car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the
following injuries to wit:
laceration, mouth due to gunshot wound, gunshot wound (L) shoulder penetrating (L)
chest; gunshot wound (R) hand (palm); open fracture (L) clavicle (L) scapula; contusion (L) lung;
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
4) Criminal Case No. 9260 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto
Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
ROGELIO PRESORES, who was riding in a car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
gunshot wound, thru and thru right chest
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
5) Criminal Case No. 9261 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 oclock in the evening, more or less, at Mansueto
Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, armed with high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
NELSON TIEMPO, who was riding in a car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting
upon the latter the following injuries, to wit:
Gunshot wound neck penetrating wound perforating trachea (cricoid) thereby performing all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as a consequence but which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator,
i.e. the timely medical attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Of the four indictees in the five Informations, Teodulo Alegarbes and Artemio Timoteo Beronga
were the first to be arraigned. Upon the arrest of the two, the Informations were amended by
the public prosecutor, with the conformity of the defense counsel, by substituting the names of
the two accused for the John Does appearing in the original Informations. When arraigned, said
accused, assisted by their respective lawyers, pleaded not guilty to the five Informations.
Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the cases against him were dismissed. Accused
Cabanero remained at large. Sabalones, on the other hand, was eventually
arrested. Subsequently, he jumped bail but was recaptured in 1988 and thereafter pleaded not
guilty during his arraignment.
The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were jointly tried. Thereafter, the lower court found
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the Court finds accused ROLUSAPE SABALONES
and (ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals:
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years,
[e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months
and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased,
Glenn Tiempo, the sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years,
[e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months
and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased,
Alfredo Nardo, the sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248
in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer
the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight
(8) months of [re]clusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rey Bolo, the sum
of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248
in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer
the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight
months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rogelio Presores, the
sum of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case no. CBU-9261, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248
in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer
the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight
(8) months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Nelson Tiempo, the
sum of P20,000.00; and
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
To pay the costs in all instances. The period of their preventive imprisonment shall be credited
to each accused in full.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the CA affirmed their
conviction but sentenced them to reclusion perpetua for the murders they were found guilty
of. Accordingly, the appellate court, without entering judgment, certified the case to the
Supreme Court in accordance with Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellants Rolusa[p]e
Sabalones and Artemio Timoteo Beronga for murder in Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-
9258, and [f]rustrated [m]urder in Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260, and CBU-9261 is
hereby AFFIRMED; however, the penalties in the [f]rustrated [m]urder and [m]urder cases are
hereby MODIFIED, such that both accused-appellants are each sentenced to imprisonment of
TEN (10) YEARS of [p]rision [m]ayor medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and
FOUR (4) MONTHS of [r]eclusion [t]emporal medium as maximum in each of the three
[f]rustrated [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-9260 and CBU-9261); and are
each sentenced to [r]eclusion [p]erpetua in each of the two [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos.
CBU-9257 and CBU-9258).The indemnity to the victim in each [f]rustrated [m]urder case shall
remain. In conformity with Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, however, this Court
refrains from entering judgment, and hereby certifies the case and orders that the entire record
hereof be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.[5]
After the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court, we required appellants to file
supplemental briefs. Appellants failed to comply within the prescribed period and were deemed
to have waived their right to do so.[6] Thus, in resolving this case, this Court will address primarily
the arguments raised by the appellants in their Brief before the Court of Appeals, which assailed
the RTC Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general[7] quoted the following factual findings of the trial court:
Edwin Santos, a resident of Mambaling, Cebu City stated that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 oclock
in the evening, he was at the residence of Inday Presores, sister of Rogelio Presores, located
at Rizal Ave., Cebu City to attend a wedding. He stayed until 9:00 oclock in the evening and
proceeded to the house of Maj. Tiempo at Basak, Mambaling, Cebu City where a small
gathering was also taking place. (pp. 3-6, tsn, April 7, 1987)
Arriving thereat, he saw Nelson and Glenn Tiempo as well as Rogelio Presores, Rogelio
Oliveros, Junior Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo. (p. 7, ibid.)
At about 11:00 oclock in the evening, Stephen Lim, who was also at the party, called their group
and requested them to push his car. When the engine started, the former asked them to drive
his car home. (pp. 7-11, ibid.)
Together with Nelson Tiempo, who was at the wheel, Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros and
Junior Villoria, they drove to the residence of Stephen Lim at Mansueto Compound, Bulacao,
Talisay, Cebu. (p. 12, ibid.)
Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also went with them riding in an owner-type jeep,
driven by the latter, in order to bring back the group [as] soon as the car of Mr. Lim was parked
in his home. (p. 21, ibid.)
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car. When they
arrived at the gate of the house of Stephen Lim, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire. He
looked at the direction where the gunfire came, and saw [the] persons [who] fired at the jeep. He
identified accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga as the
persons who fired at the vehicle. Except for Teodulo Alegarbes, who was naked from [the] waist
up, the gunmen wore clothes. (pp. 21-23; 13-16; 33, ibid.)
After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the car they were riding[,] hitting Nelson Tiempo on
the throat and Rogelio Presores on the breast. Despite the injury he sustained, Nelson Tiempo
was able to maneuver the car back to their residence. (pp. 17-19, ibid.)
He immediately informed Maj. Tiempo about the incident and the lat[t]er brought the victims to
the Cebu Doctors Hospital. (p. 20, ibid.)
Rogelio Presores corroborated in substance the testimony of Edwin Santos, being one of those
who were in the car driven by Nelson Tiempo to the residence of Stephen Lim.(pp. 4-6, tsn,
Aug. 14, 1987)
He further testified that when the jeep driven by Alfredo Nardo with Rey Bolo and Glenn Tiempo
as passengers arrived at the front gate of Lims residence and while their car was 3 meters from
the rear end of the jeep, there was a volley of gunfire. He glanced at the direction of the gunfire
and saw the jeep being fired at by four persons, who were standing behind a concrete wall, 42
inches in height, and armed with long firearms. Thenceforth, he saw Alfredo Nardo, Glenn
Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the ground. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
He recognized accused, Rolusape Sabalones, as one of those who fired at the jeep. He also
identified in Court accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Timoteo Beronga and another person, whom
he recognized only through his facial appearance. (pp. 7-8, ibid.)
When the shots were directed [at] their car[,] they were able to bend their heads low. When the
firing stopped, he directed Nelson Tiempo to back out from the place. As the latter was
maneuvering the car, the shooting continued and he was hit in the breast while Nelson Tiempo,
in the neck, and the windshield of the vehicle was shattered. (p. 10, ibid.)
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Arriving at the house of Maj. Tiempo, they were brought to Cebu Doctors Hospital. He and
Nelson Tiempo were operated on. He had incurred hospital expenses in the sum of P5,412.69,
(Exh. I, K). (pp. 11-12, ibid.)
Ladislao Diola, Jr., [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit 7
stationed at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City remembered having performed a post-mortem
examination on the dead body of Glenn Tiempo on June 2, 1985 at the Cosmopolitan Funeral
Homes, Cebu City. (p. 7, tsn, Nov. 11, 1987)
He issued the necessary Death Certificate, (Exh. D) and Necropsy Report, (Exh. F) and
indicated therein that the victims cause of death was [c]ardio respiratory arrest due to [s]hock
and [h]emorrhage [s]econdary to [g]unshot wounds to the trunk. (p. 8, ibid.)
The victim sustained gunshot wounds in the right chest and left lumbar area. (pp. 10-11, ibid.)
He explained that in gunshot wound no. 1, the wound entrance[,] which [was] characterized by
invaginated edges and contusion collar[,] was located in the right chest and the bullet went up
to the left clavicle hitting a bone which incompletely fractured it causing the navigation of the
bullet to the left and to the anterior side of the body. He recovered a slug, (Exh. G) below the
muscles of the left clavicle. (p. 21, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the assailant could have been [o]n the right side of the
victim or in front of the victim but [o]n a lower level than the latter.
In both gunshot wounds, he did not find any powder burns which would indicate that the muzzle
of the gun was beyond a distance of 12 inches from the target. (p. 15, ibid.)
At the time he conducted the autopsy, he noted that rigor mortis in its early stage had already
set in which denote[s] that death had occurred 5 to 6 hours earlier. (pp. 34-5, ibid.)
Maj. Juan Tiempo, father of the victims, Glenn and Nelson Tiempo, testified that when he
learned about the incident in question, he immediately summoned military soldiers and together
they proceeded to the scene. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 12, 1988)
Arriving thereat, he saw the lifeless body of his son, Glenn. He immediately carried him in his
arms and rushed him to the hospital but the victim was pronounced Dead on Arrival. (pp. 6-
7, ibid.)
They buried his son, who was then barely 14 years old, at Cebu Memorial Park and had incurred
funeral expenses (Exhs. K, L, O). (pp. 7-8, ibid.)
His other son, Nelson, then 21 years old and a graduate of [m]edical [t]echology, was admitted
at the Cebu Doctors Hospital for gunshot wound in the neck. The latter survived but could hardly
talk as a result of the injuries he sustained. He had incurred medical and hospitalization
expenses in the sum of P21,594.22, (Exh. H), (pp. 8-10, ibid.)
He had also incurred expenses in connection with the hospitalization of the injured victims,
Rogelio Presores and Rey Bolo in the amount[s] of P5,412.69, (exh. I) and P9,431.10, (Exh. J),
respectively. (p. 11, ibid.)
He further stated that he [was] familiar with the accused, Roling Sabalones, because the latter
had a criminal record in their office in connection with the kidnapping of a certain Zabate and
Macaraya. (p. 16, ibid.)
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC/INP, Cebu Metrodiscom, had conducted
an autopsy on the dead body of Alfredo Nardo, who sustained two (2) gunshot wounds in the
lower lip and left intraclavicular region, upon the request of the [c]hief of the Homicide Section
of Cebu Metrodiscom. He issued the victims Necropsy Report, (Exh. F) and Death Certificate,
(Exh. G). (pp. 5-8, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He stated that the wound of entrance in gunshot wound no. 1 was located in the lower lip, more
or less[,] on the left side making an exit in the left mandibular region. (pp. 9-11, tsn, Dec. 4,
1987; pp. 6-8, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
In gunshot wound no. 2, the wound of entrance was in the left intraclavicular region exiting at
the back as reflected in the sketch, (Exh. F-2). This wound was fatal and [could] almost cause
an instantaneous death considering that the bullet penetrated the thoracic cavity, lacerating the
lungs and perforating the heart before making an exit. (pp. 11-13, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 13-15,
tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He found no tattooing around the wound of entrance in both gunshot wounds. (pp. 8-9, tsn, Nov.
29, 1988)
He prepared and issued th[e] Necropsy Report, (Exh. F) and Death Certificate, (Exh. G) of
Alfredo Nardo who was identified to him by the latters daughter, Anita Nardo. (pp. 26-27, ibid.)
Rey Bolo, one of the victims, testified that when the jeep he was riding [in] together with Glenn
Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, reached the gate of the residence of Stephen Lim, they were
suddenly fired upon. (pp. 5-8, tsn, March 6, 1989)
He was hit in the right palm and left cheek. He jumped out of the vehicle and ran towards the
car which was behind them but he was again shot at [,] [and hit] in the left scapular region. He
was still able to reach the road despite the injuries he sustained and tried to ask help from the
people who were in the vicinity but nobody dared to help him, [they] simply disappeared from
the scene, instead. (pp. 8-9, ibid.)
He took a passenger jeepney to the city and had himself treated at the Cebu Doctors Hospital,
and incurred medical expenses in the sum of P9,000.00. (p. 9, ibid.)
He was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. N) by his attending physician.
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Dr. Miguel Mancao, a [p]hysician-[s]urgeon, recalled having attended [to] the victims, Nelson
Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores at the Cebu Doctors Hospital on June 2, 1985. (pp. 7-
8, 11, 14, tsn, May 30, 1989)
Nelson Tiempo sustained gunshot wound[s] in the neck and in the right chest but the bullet did
not penetrate the chest cavity but only the left axilla. He was not able to recover any slugs
because the same disintegrated while the other was thru and thru. The wound could have
proved fatal but the victim miraculously survived. As a consequence of the injury he sustained,
Nelson Tiempo permanently lost his voice because his trachea was shattered. His only chance
of recovery is by coaching and speech therapy. He issued his Medical Certificate. (Exh. O). (pp.
8-11, ibid.)
With regard to the patient, Rey Bolo, the latter suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the left
shoulder penetrating the chest and fracturing the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ribs in the process, in the
right hand fracturing the proximal right thumb and in the mouth lacerating its soft tissues, per
Medical Certificate, (Exh. N) which he issued. (pp. 11-16, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the gunman could have been in front of the victim, when
gunshot would no. 1 was inflicted. (p. 30, ibid.)
With respect to the patient, Rogelio Presores, the latter suffered [a] gunshot wound in the chest
with the wound of entrance in the right anterior chest exiting at the back which was slightly lower
than the wound of entrance. He issued the victims Medical Certificate, (Exh. M). (pp. 34-
35, ibid.)
Based on the location of the wound, the gunman could have been in front of the victim but [o]n
a slightly higher elevation than the latter. (pp. 35-36, ibid.)[8]
Version of the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi. Their version of the facts is summarized by the trial
court[9] thus:
xxx Timoteo Beronga, a cristo or bet caller in the cockpit, testified that in the afternoon of June
1, 1985, he was in the Talisay Sports Complex located at Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu to attend a
cock-derby.
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening, he was fetched by his wife and they left taking a taxicab
going to their residence in Lapulapu City. After passing by the market place, they took a tricycle
and arrived home at 8:00 oclock in the evening.
After taking his supper with his family, he went home to sleep at 10:30 in the evening. The
following morning, after preparing breakfast, he went back to sleep until 11:00 in the morning.
On February 24, 1987, while he was playing mahjong at the corner of R.R. Landon and D.
Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City, complainant, Maj. Juan Tiempo with some companions, arrived and
after knowing that he [was] Timmy, [which was] his nickname, the former immediately held him
by the neck.
He ran away but the latter chased him and kicked the door of the house where he hid. He was
able to escape through the back door and took refuge in Mandaue at the residence of Nito Seno,
a driver of Gen. Emilio Narcissi.(Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-17, October 19, 1989)
On February 27, 1987, upon the advi[c]e of his friend, they approached Gen. Narcissi and
informed him of the incident. The latter brought him to the Provincial Command Headquarters
in Lahug, Cebu City to confront Maj. Juan Tiempo.
After several days, he was brought by Maj. Tiempo to the PC Headquarter[s] in Jones Ave.,
Cebu City where he was provided with a lawyer to defend him but he was instructed that he
should assent to whatever his lawyer would ask of him.
He was introduced to Atty. Marcelo Guinto, his lawyer, who made him sign an Affidavit, (Exh.
U) the contents of which, co[u]ched in the dialect, were read to him.
He also testified that before he was detained at the CPDRC, complainant brought him inside
the shop of a certain Den Ong, where he was again mauled after he denied having any
knowledge of the whereabouts of Roling Sabalones and the carbine.
At the instance of Col. Medija, he was physically examined at the Southern Islands Hospital,
Cebu City and was issued a [M]edical Certificate. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 3-36, Jan. 18, 1990).
Justiniano Cuizon, [a]ccount [o]fficer of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) South Extension
Office, who is in charge of the billing, disconnection and reconnection of electric current, testified
that based on the entries in their logbook, (Exh. 3) made by their checker, Remigio Villaver, the
electrical supply at the Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu, particularly the Mansueto
Homeowners covered by Account No. 465-293000-0, (Exh. 4-B) was disconnected on January
10, 1985, (Exh. 3-A) for non-payment of electric bills from March 1984 to January 1985 and was
reconnected only on June 17, 1985 (Exh. 4, 4-A). (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 22-27, Jan. 31, 1990).
Remigio Villaver, a checker of VECO, whose area of responsibility cover[ed] the towns of
Talisay and San Fernando, Cebu had kept the record of disconnection of electrical supply of
Mansueto Subdivision in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu and the same showed that on January 10,
1985, (Exh. 3-A), a service order was issued by their office to the Mansueto Homeowners for
the permanent disconnection of their electric lights due to non-payment of their electric bills from
March 1984 until January 1985. The actual disconnection took place on December 29, 1984.
Witness Fredo Canete made efforts to corroborate their testimony. (Tsn-Formentera, pp.3-5,
Apr. 20, 1990).
Vicente Cabanero, a resident of Mansueto Compound in Talisay, Cebu since 1957 until the
present, remembered that on June 1, 1985, between 10:00 oclock and 11:00 oclock in the
evening, he heard a burst of gunfire about 15 to 20 armslength [sic] from his residence.
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He did not bother to verify because he was scared since the whole place was in total darkness.
(Tsn-Abangan, pp. 18-23, Feb. 22, 1990).
Marilyn Boc, another witness for the accused, stated that on the date and time of the incident
in question, while she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones, younger brother of Roling
Sabalones, who died on May 26, 1985, a sudden burst of gunfire occurred more or less 60
meters away.
Frightened, she went inside a room to hide and saw accused, Roling Sabalones, sound asleep.
She came to know accused, Timoteo Beronga, only during one of the hearings of this case and
during the entire period that the body of the late Junior Sabalones [lay] in state at his residence,
she never saw said accused.
She was requested to testify in this case by Thelma Beronga, wife of Timoteo Beronga. (Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 9-13, February 28, 1990).
Dr. Daniel Medina, while then the [r]esident [p]hysician of Southern Islands Hospital, Cebu City
had treated the patient, Timoteo Beronga on March 18, 1987.
Upon examination, he found out that the patient sustained linear abrasion, linear laceration and
hematoma in the different parts of the body. Except for the linear laceration which he believed
to have been inflicted two or three days prior to [the] date of examination, all the other injuries
were already healed indicating that the same were inflicted 10 to 12 days earlier.
He issued the corresponding Medical Certificate (Exh. 2) to the patient. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 9-
13, May 21, 1990).
Atty. Jesus Pono, counsel for accused Beronga, mounted the witness stand and averred that
he [was] a resident of Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. As shown in the pictures,
(Exhs. 3, 4 & 5 with submarkings) his house is enclosed by a concrete fence about 5 feet 6
inches tall. It is situated 6 meters from the residence of accused, Roling Sabalones, which was
then being rented by Stephen Lim. Outside the fence [are] shrubs and at the left side is a lamp
post provided with 200 watts fluorescent bulb.
On June 1, 1985 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, he saw Roling Sabalones, whom he
personally [knew] because they used to be neighbors in Talisay, Cebu, at the wake of his
brother, Federico Sabalones, Jr. or Junior Sabalones, as mentioned repeatedly
hereabout. They even had a talk and he noticed accused to be physically indisposed being
gravely affected by the loss of his only brother, who met a violent death in the hands of an
unknown hitman on May 26, 1985.
He went home after he saw accused [lie] down on a bamboo bench to rest.
At about 12:00 oclock midnight, he was awakened by a rapid burst of gunfire which emanated
near his house. He did not attempt to go down or look outside. He [was] in no position to tell
whether or not the street light was lighted.
When he verified the following morning, he noticed bloodstains on the ground as well as inside
the jeep which was parked 2 to 3 meters from his fence and 50 to 70 meters from the house
where Junior Sabalones [lay] in state. He observed that the jeep was riddled with bullets and its
windshield shattered. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 3-16, June 6, 1990).
He admitted that he used to be a counsel of accused, Roling Sabalones, in several cases,
among which involved the death of a certain Garces and Macaraya, which cases were however,
dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 2-3, June 13, 1990).
Doroteo Ejares, a relative of accused, testified that when he attended the wake of Junior
Sabalones on June 1, 1985 at 8:00 oclock in the evening, he saw accused lying on a bamboo
bench in the yard of the house of the deceased.
At past 10:00 oclock in the evening, accused excused himself as he was not feeling well and
entered a room to rest while he remained by the door and slept.
At almost 12:00 oclock midnight, he was awakened by a burst of gunfire which took place more
or less 20 meters away and saw the people scamper[ing] for safety. He hid inside the room
where accused was sleeping and peeped thru the door. Not long after, Marilyn Boc entered and
in a low voice talked about the incident.
They decided to wake up the accused to inform him of what was happening, but the latter merely
opened his eyes and realizing that accused was too weak, they allowed him to go back to sleep.
When he went home at past 5:00 oclock in the morning of June 2, 1985, he saw a jeep outside
of the compound. He did not bother to investigate or inquire about the incident as he was in a
hurry to go home and prepare for the burial of Junior Sabalones.
He was requested to testify in this case by his aunt and mother of accused Rolusape Sabalones.
(Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 10-15, June 13, 1990).
Russo Sabalones, uncle of accused, Sabalones, averred that the latter was once, one of his
undercover agents while he was then the [c]hief of the Intelligence Service of the PC from 1966
until 1968.
As part of their intelligence tradition, an undercover agent is not allowed to carry his real
name. In the case of his nephew and accused, Rolusape Sabalones, the latter chose the name
Paciano Laput which name was recorded in their code of names.
When he retired in 1968, the accused ceased to be an agent and xxx likewise ceased to have
the authority to use the name Paciano Laput. (Tsn-Abangan, p. 12, July 23, 1990).
Alfonso Allere, a distant relative of the accused, remembered having received a call from Roling
Sabalones, one morning after the burial of the latters brother, asking for his advise because of
the threats [to] his life which he received thru telephone from the group of Nabing Velez and the
group of the military.
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After he had advised accused to lie low, he had not heard of him, since then.
Godofredo Mainegro of the Public Assistance and Complaint Action Office of the Regional
Unified Command 7, received a complaint from one Inocencia Sabalones on March 13, 1986.
He recorded the complaint in their Complaint Sheet, (Exh. 6) and let complainant affix her
signature.
After the document was subscribed and sworn to before him, (Exh. 6-C), he indorsed it to their
[c]ommanding [o]fficer, Apolinario Castano. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 3-10, July 24, 1990).
Ret. Col. Apolinario Castano, recalled that while he was then with the Regional Unified
Command 7, his niece, Racquel Sabalones together with her husband Roling Sabalones, came
to him for advi[c]e because the latter was afraid of his life brought about by the rampant killings
of which his brother and the son of Maj. Tiempo were victims.
Considering that accuseds problem was a police matter, they approached Gen. Ecarma, the
then [c]ommander of the PC/INP, Recom 7, and the latter referred them to his [c]hief of [s]taff,
Col. Roger Denia, who informed them that there was no case filed against the
accused. Nevertheless, the latter was advised to be careful and consult a lawyer.
Inocencia Sabalones, mother of accused, Roling Sabalones, narrated that on March 12, 1986
at past 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was roused from sleep by a shout of a man demanding
for Roling Sabalones.
Upon hearing the name of her son, she immediately stood up and peeped through the door of
her store and saw men in fatigue uniforms carrying long firearms. Thenceforth, these men
boarded a vehicle and left.
On the following morning, she was again awakened by the persistent shouts and pushing of the
gate. When she verified, the man who introduced himself to her as Maj. Tiempo, ordered her to
open the gate. Once opened, the men of Maj. Tiempo entered the house and proceeded to
search for Roling Sabalones, whom Maj. Tiempo suspected to have killed his son and shot
another to near death. When she demanded for a search warrant, she was only shown a piece
of paper but was not given the chance to read its contents.
Racquel Sabalones, wife of accused, Rolusape Sabalones, maintained that on June 1, 1985 at
1:00 oclock in the afternoon, she was at the wake of her brother-in-law, Junior Sabalones, at
his residence in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
At 11:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, together with her 3 daughters as well as Marlyn
Sabarita, Rose Lapasaran and Gloria Mondejar, left the place in order to sleep in an unoccupied
apartment situated 30 meters away from the house where her deceased, brother-in-law, Junior,
was lying in state, as shown in the Sketch, (Exh. 7 and submarkings) prepared by her. They
brought with them a flashlight because the whole place was in total darkness.
As they were about to enter the gate leading to her apartment she noticed a sedan car coming
towards them. She waited for the car to come nearer as she thought that the same belong[ed]
to her friend, but the vehicle instead stopped at the corner of the road, (Exh. 7-F) and then
proceeded to the end portion of Mansueto Compound, (Exh. 7-G). As it moved slowly towards
the highway, she rushed inside the apartment.
Few minutes later, she heard a burst of gunfire outside their gate. She immediately gathered
her children and instructed Marlyn Sabarita to use the phone situated at the third door apartment
and call the police.
After the lull of gunfire, she went to the terrace and saw people in civilian and in fatigue uniforms
with firearms, gathered around the place. One of these men even asked her about the
whereabouts of her husband, whom she left sleeping in the house of the deceased.
At 8:30 in the morning of June 2, 1985, during the burial of Junior Sabalones, they were informed
by Pedro Cabanero that Roling Sabalones was a suspect for the death of Nabing Velez and the
son of Maj. Tiempo.
She believed that the reason why her husband was implicated in the killing of Nabing Velez was
because of the slapping incident involving her father-in-law, Federico Sabalones, Sr. and
Nabing Velez which took place prior to the death of Junior Sabalones.
After the funeral, she began to receive mysterious calls at their residence in Sikatuna St., Cebu
City where they began staying since 1978. She also noticed cars with tinted windows strangely
parked in front of their residence.
Frightened and cowed, they decided to seek the advice of Col. Apolinario Castano, who after
relating to him their fears, advised her husband to lie low and to consult a lawyer.
To allay their apprehension, accused, Roling Sabalones, left Cebu City for Iligan, Manila and
other cities to avoid those who were after him. When she learned about the threat made by Maj.
Tiempo on her husband, she forewarned the latter not to return to Cebu.
Marlyn Sabarita, an illegitimate daughter of Rolusape Sabalones, stated that in the night in
question, she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones and saw her Papa Roling, the herein
accused, lying on the lawn of the house of the deceased.
She was already in the apartment with her Mama Racquel when she heard a burst of
gunfire. Upon instructions of the latter, she went out to call the police thru the phone located [in]
the third apartment occupied by a certain Jet. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 3-15, Oct. 15, 1990).
Edward Gutang, [a]sst. lay-out [e]ditor and [a]sst. [s]ports [e]ditor of Sun-Star Daily, while then
a military and police reporter had covered the shooting incident which took place on June 1,
1985 at the Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
At past 1:00 oclock dawn, together with their newspaper photographer, Almario Bitang, they
went to the crime scene boarding the vehicle of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes.Arriving
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thereat, they decided not to proceed inside the compound because of fear. The place was then
in complete darkness.
Upon being informed that the victims were brought to Cebu City Medical Center, they rushed to
the place and met Maj. Tiempo hugging the dead body of his 14-year old son.His photographer
took a picture of that pathetic scene. (Exh. 8-B).
Samson Sabalones, a retired [a]mbassador and uncle of Rolusape Sabalones, posted a bail
bond for his nephew with Eastern Insurance Company, when a warrant for his arrest was issued
by the Municipal Court, on March 12, 1986 because he was bothered by the fact that the latter
was being unreasonably hunted by several groups. He even advised the accused to appear in
[c]ourt to clarify the nature of the case filed against him.
Virgincita Pajigal, a resident of Butuan City, met accused, Rolusape Sabalones, who introduced
himself to her as Paciano Laput nicknamed, Ondo, in a massage clinic where she was working.
For less than a year, they lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
because according to her the accused was married but separated from his wife, whose name
was never mentioned to her. For such a short span of time being together, her love for the
accused developed to the extent that whatever happen[ed] to him, she [would] always be there
to defend him.
With the help of Maj. delos Santos, who advised her to always stay close [to] the accused, she
was able to board the same vessel. She saw the latter clad in green T-shirt, (Exh. 14) and pants,
handcuffed and guarded.
Reaching Cebu City, they took a taxicab and as the vehicle went around the city, she was
instructed by Maj. Tiempo to place the towel, (Exh. 15) which she found inside her bag, on the
head of the accused. They stopped at the Reclamation Area and Maj. Tiempo pulled them out
of the vehicle but she held on tightly to Ondo, ripping his shirt. This pulling incident happened
for several times but complainant failed to let them out of the vehicle.
The accused was finally brought to the Provincial Jail while she stayed in the residence of the
accused. She returned to Butuan after a week. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 5-33, Jan. 22, 1991).
Accused, Rolusape Sabalones, alias Roling, in his defense, with ancillary incidental narrations,
testified , that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 oclock in the evening, he was at the wake of his only
brother, Junior Sabalones, who was killed on May 26, 1985.
He had no idea as to who was responsible for the killing of his brother inasmuch as the latter
had plenty of enemies. He also did not exert effort to look into the case and to place it under
police authority since he had lost faith in the capabilities of the police. The matter was however
reported by his uncle, Ambassador Sabalones, to the authorities.
He stayed at the wake until 10:00 oclock in the evening because he was not feeling well. He
retired in a small room adjacent to the sala of the house of the deceased. Not long after, he felt
somebody waking him up but he merely opened his eyes and went back to sleep as he was
really exhausted.
At 6:30 the following morning, he was roused by his wife so he could prepare for the burial. He
came to know about the burst of gunfire which took place the previous night upon the information
of his wife. He did not take the news seriously as he was busy preparing for the burial of his
deceased brother, Jun.
The funeral started at past 8:00 oclock in the morning and he noticed the presence of Maj. Eddie
Ricardo and his men, who were sent by Col. Castano purposely to provide the burial with military
security, upon the request of his wife.
He had a conversation with Maj. Ricardo who inquired about the shooting incident which
resulted in the death of the son of Maj. Tiempo and others in his company. Also in the course
of their conversation, he came to know that Nabing Velez was killed earlier on that same night
in Labangon, Cebu [C]ity.
On the same occasion, Pedro Cabanero also notified him that he was a suspect in the killing of
Nabing Velez, a radio commentator of ferocious character, who was engaged in a protection
racket with several under his control.
He remembered that a month prior to the death of Nabing Velez, his father, Federico Sabalones,
Sr. and the deceased while matching their fighting cocks at the Talisay Sports Complex, had
an altercation and the latter slapped his paralytic father and challenged him to ask one of his
sons to avenge what he had done to him. He came to know about the incident only after a week.
He did not deny the fact that he was hurt by the actuation of the deceased for humiliating his
father but it did not occur to him to file a case or take any action against the deceased because
he was too busy with his business and with his work as a bet caller in the cockpit.
He advised his father to stay in Bohol to avoid further trouble because he knew that the latter
would frequent the cockpit[,] being a cockfight aficionado.
Likewise, during the burial, he was informed by a PC soldier, Roger Capuyan, that he was also
a suspect in the killing of the son of Maj. Tiempo and even advised him to leave the place.
On the following days after the burial, his wife started to notice cars suspiciously parked in front
of their house and [she] also received mysterious calls.
Together with his wife, they decided to see Col. Apolinario Castao to seek his advise. The latter
verified from the Cebu Metrodiscom and learned that there was no case filed against him.
In the evening of June 6, 1985, he left for Iligan and after a month, he transferred to Ozamis
and then to Pagadian. He likewise went to Manila especially when he learned that his uncle,
Samson Sabalones, had arrived from abroad. The latter posted a bond for his temporary liberty
immediately after being informed that a case was filed against him, before the Municipal Court
of Talisay.
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Despite xxx the bond put up by his uncle, he did not return to Cebu City because it came to his
knowledge that Maj. Tiempo inquired from the bonding company as to his address.
He also stayed in Marikina in the house of his friend and during his stay in the said place, he
registered as a voter and was issued a Voters Affidavit, (Exh. 19; Exh. R for the prosecution)
which bore the name Paciano Mendoza Laput which [was] his baptismal name. He explained
that the name[s] Mendoza and Laput [were] the middle name and surname, respectively of his
mother. The name Rolusape was given to him by his father and the same [was] not his
registered name because during the old days, priests would not allow parents to name their
children with names not found in the Almanac; thus, Paciano [was] his chosen name and the
same appeared in his Baptismal Certificate, (Exh. 20) issued by the Parish of the Blessed Trinity
of Talibon, Bohol. In his Birth Certificate, it [was] the name Rolusape which appeared based
upon the data supplied by his father.
He had used the name Paciano during the time when he [was] still a secret agent under his
uncle, Gen. Russo Sabalones, when the latter was still the [c]hief of the C-2 in 1966 until 1967
and as such, he was issued a firearm. He likewise used said name at the time he was employed
at the Governors Office in Agusan and when he registered in the Civil Service Commission to
conceal his identity to protect himself from those who were after him.
From Marikina he proceeded to Davao and then to Butuan City where he was made to campaign
for the candidacy of Gov. Eddie Rama. When the latter won in the election, he was given a job
at the Provincial Capitol and later became an agent of the PC in Butuan using the name,
Paciano Laput.
During his stay in Butuan, he met Virgie Pajigal, a manicurist who became his live-in partner.
On October 23, 1988 while he was at the Octagon Cockpit in Butuan with Sgt. Tambok, he was
arrested by Capt. Ochate and was brought to the PC Headquarter[s] in Libertad, Butuan City
and was detained. Among the papers confiscated from him was his Identification Card No. 028-
88, (Exh. 21) issued by the PC Command bearing the name Paciano Laput.
On October 26, 1988 he was taken from the City Jail by Capt. Ochate and some soldiers, one
of whom was Maj. Tiempo whom he met for the first time.
On their way to Nasipit to board a vessel bound for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo made him lie flat on
his belly and stepped on his back and handcuffed him. He cried in pain because of his sprained
shoulder. A certain soldier also took his watch and ring.
Arriving in Cebu at 7:00 oclock in the morning, he and Virgie Pajigal, who followed him in the
boat, were made to board a taxicab. Maj. Tiempo alighted in certain place and talked to a certain
guy. Thereafter, they were brought to the Reclamation Area and were forced to go down from
the vehicle but Virgie Pajigal held him tightly. They were again pulled out of the taxi but they
resisted.
From the Capitol Building, they proceeded to CPDRC and on their way thereto, Maj. Tiempo
sat beside him inside the taxi and boxed him on the right cheek below the ear and pulled his
cuffed hands apart.
At the Provincial Jail, he was physically examined by its resident physician, Dr. Dionisio Sadaya,
and was also fingerprinted and photographed, (Exh. 21). He was issued a Medical Certificate,
(Exh. 22).
He further stated that he [was] acquainted with his co-accused Timoteo Beronga, known to him
as Timmy being also a bet caller in the cockpit. (Tsn-Formentera, pp. 5-23, Feb. 26, 1991; Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 3-33, Feb. 27, 1991; Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-18, Apr. 10, 1991).
As surrebuttal witness, accused Rolusape Sabalones denied that he bribed a certain soldier
because at the time he was arrested, his wallet as well as his wristwatch and ring
worth P2,000.00 each were confiscated and his hands tied behind his back.
He also denied the allegation of Maj. Tiempo that he offered the latter the amount
of P1,000.000.00 to drop the case against him, the truth being that while they were on board a
vessel bound for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo compelled him to tell [who] the real killers of his son
[were] because he knew that he (Rolusape Sabalones) was not responsible.The former also
inquired from him as to the whereabouts of the carbine.
He also rebutted complainants testimony that upon their arrival here in Cebu City and while on
board a taxicab, he directed the former [to] first go around the city to locate a certain Romeo
Cabaero, whom he did not know personally.[10]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Giving full credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts Decision convicting appellants of two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated
murder. Like the trial court, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery and rejected
appellants defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the penalties imposed by the trial court were
erroneous. Hence, for each count of murder, it sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. For
each count of frustrated murder, it imposed the following penalty: ten years (10) of prision
mayor (medium), as minimum, to seventeen years (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal (medium), as maximum. Sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals
awarded indemnity of P20,000 to each of the victims of frustrated murder. However, it was silent
on the indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial court to the heirs of each of the two deceased.
Having imposed reclusion perpetua on the appellants, the Court of Appeals, as earlier
noted, refrained from entering judgment and certified the case to the Supreme Court for review,
in conformity with Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this appeal before this Court.[11]
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The Issues
In his Brief,[12] Appellant Sabalones raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
I case, such assessment is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As this Court has reiterated often
The court a quo erred in finding that accused Sabalones and his friends left the house where
his brother Sabalones Junior was lying in state and went to their grisly destination amidst the
dark and positioned themselves in defense of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang
of the supporters of Nabing Velez.
II
The court a quo erred in finding that accused Sabalones and his two co-accused were identified
as among the four gunmen who fired at the victims.
III
The court a quo erred in overlooking or disregarding physical evidence that would have
contradicted the testimony of prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores that
the gunmen were shooting at them from a standing position.
IV
The court a quo erred in holding that the instant case is one of aberratio ictus, which is not a
defense, and that the defense of alibi interposed by the accused may not be considered.
V
The court a quo erred in not finding that the evidence of the prosecution has not overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
VI
The court a quo erred in not acquitting the accused on ground of reasonable doubt.
In a Manifestation dated December 20, 1995, Appellant Beronga, through counsel, adopted as
his own the Brief of Sabalones.[13]
The foregoing assignment of errors shall be reformulated by the Court into these three issues
or topics: (1) credibility of the witnesses and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2) defense
of denial and alibi, and (3) characterization of the crimes committed and the penalty therefor.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence
Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses, absent any indication or showing that the trial court has
overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion,[14] especially where, as in this
enough, the matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand is best and most
competently performed or carried out by a trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can
weigh such testimony in light of the accuseds behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial.[15] Giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court
concluded:
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, this Court, given the evidence, finds that there is more
realism in the conclusion based on a keener and realistic appraisal of events, circumstances
and evidentiary facts on record, that the gun slaying and violent deaths of Glenn Tiempo and
Alfredo Nardo, and the near fatal injuries of Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores,
resulted from the felonious and wanton acts of the herein accused for mistaking said victims for
the persons [who were] objects of their wrath.[16]
We stress that factual findings of the lower courts, the trial court and the Court of Appeals are,
as a general rule, binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.[17] We find nothing in the
instant case to justify a reversal or modification of the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that appellants committed two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder.
Edwin Santos, a survivor of the assault, positively pointed to and identified the appellants as
the authors of the crime. His categorical and straightforward testimony is quoted hereunder:[18]
COURT:
Q You stated there was a gun fired. What happened next?
WITNESS:
A There was a rapid fire in succession.
Q When you heard this rapid firing, what did you do?
A I tried to look from where the firing came from.
Q After that, what did you find?
A I saw persons firing towards us.
Q Where were these persons situated when they were firing towards you?
A Near the foot of the electric post and close to the cemented wall.
Q This electric post, was that lighted at that moment?
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A Yes, sir, it was lighted. Corroborating the foregoing, Rogelio Presores, another survivor, also pointed to Timoteo
Beronga, Teodulo Alegarbes and Roling Sabalones as the perpetrators of the crime. His
Q How far were these persons firing, to the place where you were? testimony proceeded in this manner:[19]
A From here to there (The witness indicating the distance by pointing to a place inside the Q When you arrived at the residence of Stephen Lim, can you remember of any unusual incident
courtroom, indicating a distance of about 6 to 7 meters, making the witness stand as the point that took place?
of reference).
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to know how many persons fired towards you?
Q What was that?
A I only saw 3 to 4 persons.
A When the jeep arrived, the car was following.
Q How long did these persons fire the guns at you?
Q What happened next?
A Until we went home. The persons were still firing, until we went home.
A When the jeep was near the gate, the car was following.
Q You stated that you saw these persons who were firing at you. Do you know these persons?
Q The car was following the jeep, at what distance?
A I can identify [them] when I [see] them.
A 3 to 4 meters.
Q Try to look around this courtroom, if these persons you saw who were firing at you are present
in the courtroom[.] Q While the car was following the jeep at that distance of 3 to 4 meters, what happened?

A Yes, sir. A All of a sudden, we heard the burst of gunfire.

Q Can you point to these persons? Q From what direction was the gunfire?

A Yes, sir. A Through the direction of the jeep.

Q Point at them. Q After hearing the gunfire, what happened?

COURT INTERPRETER: A We looked at the jeep.

The Court directed the witness to go down from the witness stand and [point] at them, Beronga Q What did you see?
and Alegarbes.
A We saw Alfredo Nardo and Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the ground. There were only
FISCAL GABIANA: 3.

I would like to make it of record that on the bench of prisoner, only the two accused were seated. Q Who was driving the jeep at that time?

COURT: A Alfredo Nardo.

Make it of record that only two prisoners were present. Q What happened after that?

Q Now, Mr. Santos, aside from these two accused you identified as among those who fired [at] A So, I looked, whence the burst of gunfire came from.
you on that evening, were there other persons that you saw on that particular occasion who
fired at you? Q What did you see from that gunfire?

A Yes, sir, there were[;] if I can see them, I can identify them. A I saw 4 persons standing at the back of the fence.

Q What were those 4 persons doing when they were standing at the back of the fence?

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A They were bringing long firearms.
Q Did you recognize these persons?
A I can clearly recognize one and the 3 persons[.] I can identify them, if I can see them again.
Q If you are shown these persons, can you recognize them? Can you name these persons?
A No, sir. Only their facial appearance.
Q What about the 3 persons?
A Thats why the 3 persons, I do not know them. I can recognize only their facial appearance.
Q What about one person?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the name of the person?
A Roling Sabalones.
Q If Roling Sabalones is inside the courtroom, can you recognize Roling Sabalones?
A Yes, sir, he is around.
Q Can you point to Roling Sabalones?
A Yes, he is there (The witness pointing to the person who answered the name of Roling
Sabalones).
Q I would like [you] again to please look around and see, if those persons whom you know
through their faces, if they are here around?
A The two of them (The witness pointing to the 2 persons, who, when asked, answered that his
name [was] Teofilo Beronga and the other [was] Alegarbes).
Indeed, we have carefully waded through the voluminous records of this case and the
testimonies of all the fifty-nine witnesses, and we find that the prosecution has presented the
required quantum of proof to establish that appellants are indeed guilty as charged. Appellants
arguments, as we shall now discuss, fail to rebut this conclusion.
Positive Identification
Appellants allege that the two witnesses could not have properly identified the appellants
because, after the first burst of shooting, they both crouched down, such that they could not
have seen the faces of their assailants. This contention does not persuade. Both eyewitnesses
testified that the firing was not continuous; thus, during a lull in the firing, they raised their heads
and managed a peek at the perpetrators. Edwin Santos testified as follows:
Atty. Albino, counsel for accused Beronga:
Q You mean to say that when you bent you heard the successive shots, [and] you again raised
your head. Is that correct?
A There were times that the shots were not in succession and continuous and that was the time
I raised my head again.[20]
Like Santos, Rogelio Presores also stooped down when the firing started, but he raised his
head during a break in the gunfire:
Atty. Albino:
Q So, what did you do when you first heard that one shot?
A So, after the first shot, we looked towards the direction we were facing and when we heard
the second shot, that was the time we stooped down.[21]
He further testified:
Atty. Acido: [Counsel for Appellant Sabalones]
Q And you said you stooped down inside the car when you heard the first firing to the jeep. Is
that what you want the Court to understand[?]
Presores:
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you never saw who fired the successive shots to the car as you said you stooped down
inside the car?
A The bursts of gunfire stopped for a while and that was the time I reared of [sic] my head.
Q And that was the first time you saw them?
A Yes, sir.[22]
The records clearly show that two vehicles proceeded to the house of Stephen Lim on that
fateful day. The first was the jeep where Alfredo Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo were
riding. About three to four meters behind was the second car carrying Nelson Tiempo, Guillermo
Viloria, Rogelio Oliveros and the two prosecution witnesses -- Edwin Santos and Rogelio
Presores.[23] As stated earlier, said witnesses attested to the fact that after the first volley of
shots directed at the jeep, they both looked at the direction where the shots were coming from,
and they saw their friends in the jeep falling to the ground, as well as the faces of the
perpetrators.[24] It was only then that a rapid succession of gunshots were directed at them,
upon which they started crouching to avoid being hit.
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Hence, they were able to see and identify the appellants, having had a good look at them after
the initial burst of shots. We stress that the normal reaction of a person is to direct his sights
towards the source of a startling shout or occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar,[25] the most
natural reaction for victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of their
assailants and to observe the manner in which the crime is committed.
In bolstering their claim that it was impossible for the witnesses to have identified them,
appellants further aver that the crime scene was dark, there being no light in the lampposts at
the time. To prove that the service wire to the street lamps at the Mansueto Compound was
disconnected as early as December 1984 and reconnected only on June 27, 1985, they
presented the testimonies of Vicente Cabanero,[26] Remigio Villaver,[27] Fredo Canete[28]and
Edward Gutang.[29] The trial court, however, did not lend weight to said testimonies, preferring
to believe the statement of other prosecution witnesses that the place was lighted during that
time.
The Court of Appeals sustained said findings by citing the testimonies
of defense witnesses. Fredo Canete of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO), for instance,
admitted that it was so easy to connect and disconnect the lights. He testified thus:
Atty. Kintanar:
Q Now, as a cutter, what instruments do you usually use in cutting the electrical connection of
a certain place?
Canete:
A Pliers and screw driver.
Q Does it need xxx very sophisticated instruments to disconnect the lights?
A No, these are the only instruments we use.
Q Ordinary pliers and ordinary screw driver?
A Yes, sir.
Q And does [one] need to be an expert in electronic [sic] in order to conduct the disconnection?
A No, sir.
Q In other words, Mr. Canete, any ordinary electrician can cut it?
A That is if they are connected with the Visayan Electric Company.
Q What I mean is that, can the cutting be done by any ordinary electrician?
A Yes, sir.[30]
Said witness even admitted that he could not recall if he did in fact cut the electrical connection
of the Mansueto Compound.[31] The Court of Appeals further noted that none of the above
witnesses were at the crime scene at or about the exact time that the ambush occurred. Thus,
none was in a position to state with absolute certainty that there was allegedly no light to
illuminate the gunmen when they rained bullets on the victims. [32]
Even assuming arguendo that the lampposts were not functioning at the time, the headlights of
the jeep and the car were more than sufficient to illuminate the crime scene.[33] The Court has
previously held that the light from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can
give ample illumination to enable a person to identify or recognize another.[34] In the same vein,
the headlights of a car or a jeep are sufficient to enable eyewitnesses to identify appellants at
the distance of 4 to 10 meters.
Extrajudicial Statement of Beronga
Appellants insist that Berongas extrajudicial statement was obtained through violence and
intimidation. Citing the res inter alios acta rule, they also argue that the said statement is
inadmissible against Sabalones. Specifically, they challenge the trial courts reliance on the
following portions of Berongas statement:
Q After Roling knew that Na[b]ing Velez was killed, have you observed [if] Roling and his
companions prepared themselves for any eventuality?
A It did not take long after we knew that Na[b]ing was killed, somebody called up by telephone
looking for Roling, and this was answered by Roling but we did not know what they were
conversing about and then Roling went back to the house of Junior after answering the
phone. And after more than two hours, we heard the sound of engines of vehicles arriving, and
then Meo, the man who was told by Roling to guard, shouted saying: They are already here[;]
after that, Roling came out carrying a carbine accompanied by Tsupe, and not long after we
heard gunshots and because of that we ran towards the house where the wake was. But before
the gun-shots, I heard Pedring Sabalones father of Roling saying: You clarify, [t]hat you watch
out for mistake[n] in identity, and after that shout, gunshots followed. [sic] Then after the gun-
shots Roling went back inside still carrying the carbine and shouted: GATHER THE EMPTY
SHELLS AND MEO[,] YOU BRING A FLASHLIGHT, and then I was called by Meo to help him
gather the empty shells of the carbine and also our third companion to gather the empty shells.
These arguments have no merit. In the first place, it is well to stress that appellants were
convicted based primarily on the positive identification of the two survivors, Edwin Santos and
Rogelio Presores, and not only on the extrajudicial statement, which merely corroborates the
eyewitness testimonies. Thus, said arguments have no relevance to this case. As the Court
held in People vs. Tidula:[35] Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.
In any case, we sustain the trial courts holding, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
extrajudicial statement of Beronga was executed in compliance with the constitutional
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requirements.[36] Extrajudicial confessions, especially those which are adverse to the declarants A I observed that their reactions were so queer, - as if they were running.
interests are presumed voluntary, and in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the
declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession shall be upheld.[37] xxxxxxxxx

The exhaustive testimony of Sgt. Miasco, who undertook the investigation, shows that the Q In that evening of June 1, 1985, when you went there at the house of Jun Sabalones, have
appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and you seen an armalite?
independent counsel of his own choice.[38] Said witness also stated that Beronga was assisted A Yes, sir.
by Atty. Marcelo Guinto during the custodial investigation. [39] In fact, Atty. Guinto also took the
witness stand and confirmed that Appellant Beronga was informed of his rights, and that the Q Where did you see this armalite?
investigation was proper, legal and not objectionable. Indeed, other than appellants bare
A At the table where they were conversing.
allegations, there was no showing that Berongas statement was obtained by force or duress.[40]
Q How many armalites or guns [did you see] that evening in that place?
Equally unavailing is appellants reliance on the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which provides: A Two (2).
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may xxxxxxxxx
be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. Q This armalite that you saw, - how far was this in relation to the groups of Sabalones?

Appellants assert that the admission referred to in the above provision is considered to be A There (The witness indicating a distance of about 4 to 5 meters).
against a co-conspirator only when it is given during the existence of the conspiracy. They
ATTY. KINTANAR:
argue that Berongas statement was made after the termination of the conspiracy; thus, it should
not be admitted and used against Sabalones. Q When you looked xxx through the window and saw there were two vehicles and there were
bursts of gunfire, what happened after that?
The well-settled rule is that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding only upon
himself and is not admissible as evidence against his co-accused, it being mere hearsay A I did not proceed to look xxx through the window because I stooped down.
evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.[41] But this rule admits of exception. It does
not apply when the confession, as in this case, is used as circumstantial evidence to show the Q When you stooped down, what happened?
probability of participation of the co-accused in the killing of the victims[42] or when the
A After the burst of gunfire, I again opened the window.
confession of the co-accused is corroborated by other evidence.[43]
Q And when again you opened the window, what happened?
Berongas extrajudicial statement is, in fact, corroborated by the testimony of Prosecution
Witness Jennifer Binghoy. Pertinent portions of said testimony are reproduced hereunder: A I saw two persons going towards the jeep.
Q While you were at the wake of Jun Sabalones and the group were sitting with Roling Q What transpired next after [you saw] those 2 persons?
Sabalones, what were they doing?
A When they arrived there, they nodded their head[s].
A They were gathered in one table and they were conversing with each other.
Q After that, what happened?
xxxxxxxxx
A So, they went back to the direction where they came from, going to the house of Sabalones.
Q On that same date, time and place, at about 10:00 [i]n the evening, can you remember if there
was unusual incident that took place? Q While they were going to the direction of the house of Sabalones, what transpired?

A I heard over the radio at the Sabalones Family that a certain Nabing Velez was shot. A I saw 5 to 6 persons coming from the highway and looking to the jeep, and before they
reached the jeep, somebody shouted that its ours.
Q That [a] certain Nabing Velez was shot? What else xxx transpired?
Q Who shouted?
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A The voice was very familiar to me.
Q Whose voice?
A The voice of Roling Sabalones.
Q What else have you noticed during the commotion [when] wives were advising their husbands
to go home?
A They were really in chaos.[44]
A careful reading of her testimony buttresses the finding of the trial court that Rolusape
Sabalones and his friends were gathered at one table, conversing in whispers with each other,
that there were two rifles on top of the table, and that they became panicky after hearing of the
death of Nabing Velez on the radio. Hence, the observation of the trial court that they went to
their grisly destination amidst the dark and positioned themselves in defense of his turf against
the invasion of a revengeful gang of supporters of the recently slain Nabing Velez.[45]
Alleged Inconsistencies
Appellants also allege that the prosecution account had inconsistencies relating to the number
of shots heard, the interval between gunshots and the victims positions when they were
killed. These, however, are minor and inconsequential flaws which strengthen, rather than
impair, the credibility of said eyewitnesses. Such harmless errors are indicative of truth, not
falsehood, and do not cast serious doubt on the veracity and reliability of complainants
testimony.[46]
Appellants further claim that the relative positions of the gunmen, as testified to by the
eyewitnesses, were incompatible with the wounds sustained by the victims. They cite the
testimony of Dr. Ladislao Diola, who conducted the autopsy on Glenn Tiempo. He declared that
the victim must necessarily be on a higher level than the assailant, in the light of the path of the
bullet from the entrance wound to where the slug was extracted. This finding, according to
appellant, negates the prosecutions account that the appellants were standing side by side
behind a wall when they fired at the victims. If standing, appellants must have been on a level
higher than that of the occupants of the vehicles; if beside each other, they could not have
inflicted wounds which were supposed to have come from opposite angles.
We are not persuaded. The defense presumes that the victims were sitting still when they were
fired upon, and that they froze in the same position during and after the shooting. This has no
testimonial foundation. On the contrary, it was shown that the victims ducked and hid
themselves, albeit in vain, when the firing began. After the first volley, they crouched and tried
to take cover from the hail of bullets. It would have been unnatural for them to remain upright
and still in their seats. Hence, it is not difficult to imagine that the trajectories of the bullet wounds
varied as the victims shifted their positions. We agree with the following explanation of the Court
of Appeals:
The locations of the entry wounds can readily be explained. xxx Glenn Tiempo, after looking in
the direction of the explosion, turned his body around; and since the ambushers were between
the jeep and the car, he received a bullet in his right chest (wound no. 1) which traveled to the
left. As to wound No. 2, it can be explained by the spot where Major Tiempo found his fallen
son.
Atty. Kintanar:
Q: Upon being informed by these occupants who were ambushed and [you] were able to return
the car, what did you do?
Major Tiempo:
A: I immediately got soldiers and we immediately proceeded to the area or to the place where
my fallen son was located and when we reached x x x the place, I saw my fallen son [in] a
kneeling position where both knees [were] touching the ground and the toes also and the
forehead was touching towards the ground. (TSN, Feb. 12, 1988, p. 6)
In such position, the second bullet necessarily traveled upwards in relation to the body, and
thus the entry wound should be lower than the exit wound. There is no showing that both
wounds were inflicted at the same time.[47]
In any event, the witnesses saw that the appellants were the gunmen who were standing side
by side firing at them. They could have been in a different position and in another hiding place
when they first fired, but this is not important. They were present at the crime scene, and they
were shooting their rifles at the victims.
Aberratio Ictus
Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in conjecture in ruling that there
was aberratio ictus in this case. This allegation does not advance the cause of the appellants. It
must be stressed that the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the
appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even
assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the appellants, this does not
detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the
discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on
the extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These
pieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of having
killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against
them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the
avenging men of Nabing Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were
mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court has held that mistake in the identity of
the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. [48]
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Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-taken. The case is
better characterized as error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather
than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting
the other due to imprecision in the blow.
Second Issue:
Denial and Alibi
Appellants decry the lower courts disregard of their defense of alibi. We disagree. As constantly
enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine requires the accused to prove not only that
he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but that it was physically
impossible for him at the time to have been present at the locus criminis or its immediate
vicinity.[49] This the appellants miserably failed to do.
Appellant Beronga testified that, at the time of the incident, he was in his residence in Lapulapu
City, which was not shown to be so remote and inaccessible that it precluded his presence in
Mansueto Subdivision. The alibi of Sabalones is even more unworthy of belief; he sought to
establish that he was a mere 20-25 meters away from the scene of the crime. He was allegedly
in the house of his brother who was lying in state, which was so near the ambush site that some
of the defense witnesses even testified that they were terrified by the gunfire. Clearly, appellants
failed to establish the requisites of alibi.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the
appellants.[50] As aptly held by this Court in People v. Nescio:[51]
Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance from the scene of the
crime. The defense of alibi is further offset by the positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses. Alibi, to reiterate a well-settled doctrine, is accepted only upon the clearest proof that
the accused-appellant was not or could not have been at the crime scene when it was
committed.
Flight
Appellants further object to the finding that Sabalones, after the incident, made himself scarce
from the place of commission. He left for Manila, thence Mindanao on the supposition that he
want[ed] to escape from the wrath of Maj. Tiempo and his men for the death of Glenn Tiempo
and the near fatal shooting of the other son or from the supporters of Nabing Velez. x x x On
his supposedly borrowed freedom, he jumped bail and hid himself deeper into Mindanao, under
a cloak of an assumed name. Why, did his conscience bother him for comfort?[52]
Appellants rationalized that Sabalones was forced to jump bail in order to escape two groups,
who were allegedly out to get him, one of Nabing Velez and the other of Major Tiempo. Their
ratiocination is futile. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence
to indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of
guilt may be drawn.[53] It must be stressed, nonetheless, that appellants were not convicted
based on legal inference alone but on the overwhelming evidence presented against them.
Third Issue:
Crime and Punishment
We agree with the appellate court that accused-appellants are guilty of murder for the deaths
of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo. The allegation of treachery as charged in the Information
was duly proven by the prosecution. Treachery is committed when two conditions concur,
namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and that such means, methods and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person.[54] These requisites were evidently present when the accused, swiftly and unexpectedly,
fired at the victims who were inside their vehicles and were in no position and without any means
to defend themselves.
The appellate court also correctly convicted them of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained
by Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. As evidenced by the medical certificates
and the testimony of Dr. Miguel Mancao who attended to the victims, Nelson Tiempo sustained
a neck wound which completely shattered his trachea and rendered him voiceless, as well as a
wound on the right chest which penetrated his axilla but not his chest cavity. [55] Rey Bolo
sustained three injuries which affected his clavicle, ribs and lungs.[56] Rogelio Presores, on the
other hand, sustained an injury to his lungs from a bullet wound which entered his right chest
and exited through his back.[57]
The wounds sustained by these survivors would have caused their death had it not been for the
timely medical intervention. Hence, we sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that appellants
are guilty of three counts of frustrated murder.
We also uphold the Court of Appeals modification of the penalty for murder, but not its
computation of the sentence for frustrated murder.
For each of the two counts of murder, the trial court imposed the penalty of fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal (medium), as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal (maximum), as
maximum. This is incorrect. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellate court
correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred in computing the penalty for each of the three counts of
frustrated murder. It sentenced appellants to imprisonment of ten years of prision
mayor (medium) as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion
temporal (medium) as maximum. It modified the trial courts computation of eight (8) years
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of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum.
Under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a frustrated felony is the next lower
in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony x x x.The imposable penalty
for frustrated murder, therefore, is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its medium period.[58] Because there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstance as the Court
of Appeals itself held,[59] the penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its medium
period. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty for frustrated
murder should be 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal(minimum) as maximum.
Although the Court of Appeals was silent on this point, the trial court correctly ordered the
payment of P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of each of the two murdered victims. In light of
current jurisprudence, this amount is awarded without need of proof other than the fact of the
victims death.[60] The trial court and the CA, however, erred in awarding indemnity of P20,000
each to Nelson Tiempo, Rogelio Presores and Rey Bolo. There is no basis, statutory or
jurisprudential, for the award of a fixed amount to victims of frustrated murder. Hence, they are
entitled only to the amounts of actual expenses duly proven during the trial.
Thus, Nelson Tiempo, who was treated for a gunshot wound on the neck which shattered his
trachea, should be awarded indemnity of P21,594.22 for his medical expenses. This is
evidenced by a statement of account from Cebu Doctors Hospital. [61]
Rogelio Presores, who was likewise treated for gunshot wound in the same hospital, presented
a statement of account amounting to P5,412.69 for his hospitalization.[62]Hence, he is likewise
entitled to indemnity in the said amount.
Rey Bolo, on the other hand, incurred an expense of P9,431.10 for the treatment of his gunshot
wounds, as evidenced by a statement of account from the same hospital.[63] This amount should
be awarded to him as indemnity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. However, the
penalties are hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, the accused-appellants are each hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased, Glenn Tiempo, in the sum of P50,000;
2) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, the accused-appellants are each hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased, Alfredo Nardo, in the sum of P50,000;
3) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are each
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to
14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and
severally pay the victim, Rey Bolo, in the sum of P9,431.10 as actual damages;
4) In Crim Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to
14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and
severally indemnify the victim, Rogelio Presores, in the sum of P5,412.69 for actual damages;
5) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261 for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to
14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and
severally indemnify the victim, Nelson Tiempo, in the sum of P21,594.22 as actual damages.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Interior and Local Government and the
Secretary of Justice so that Accused Eufemio Cabanero may be brought to justice.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by J. Jesus M. Elbinias and concurred in by JJ. Buenaventura J. Guerrero and B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz.
[2] CA Rollo, pp. 205-236.
[3] Presided by Judge Generoso A. Juaban.
[4] RTC Decision, pp. 31-32; CA Rollo, pp. 58-59.
[5] CA Decision, pp. 31-32; CA Rollo, pp. 235-236.
[6] SC Resolution of September 9, 1996; Rollo, p. 11.
[7] The Appellees Brief was signed by Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta and Solicitor Ma. Cielo Se-Rondain; CA Rollo, pp.
171-178.
[8] Appellees Brief, pp. 7-14; CA Rollo, pp. 171-178.
[9] The Appellants Brief contained no statement of facts.
[10] RTC Decision, pp. 14-26; CA Rollo, pp. 41-53.
[11] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on August 29, 1997, upon receipt by the Court of the confirmation of the detention of
Appellant Beronga at the National Bilibid Prisons.
[12] Brief of Accused-Appellant Sabalones before the CA, pp. 3, 8, 21, 29 and 39, signed by Atty. Pedro L. Albino.
[13] CA Rollo, p. 78.
[14] People v. Turingan, GR No. 121628, December 4, 1997; People v. Sumbillo, 271 SCRA 428, April 18, 1997; People v. Ombrog, 268
SCRA 93, February 12, 1997; People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406, October 26, 1993.
[15] People v. Aranjuez, GR No. 121898, January 29, 1998, per Romero, J.; People v. Castillo, 273 SCRA 22, June 12, 1997.
[16] RTC Decision, p. 26; CA Rollo, p. 53.
[17] Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 432, January 29, 1996, per Romero, J.; Aspi v. CA, 236 SCRA 94, September 1, 1994;
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. CA, 229 SCRA 151, January 27, 1994.
[18] TSN, April 7, 1987, pp. 13-17.
[19] TSN, December 19, 1988, pp. 27-29.
[20] TSN, August 7, 1987, p. 10.
[21] TSN, October 15, 1987, p. 6.
[22] TSN, January 26, 1989, p. 14.
[23] TSN, December 19, 1988, p. 26.
[24] Ibid., pp. 28-29; TSN, April 7, 1987, pp. 14 and 23.
[25] 231 SCRA 414, March 24, 1994, per Puno, J.; People v. Satagoda, 221 SCRA 251, April 7, 1993.
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[26] TSN, February 22, 1990, pp. 22-23. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
[27] Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[28] TSN, April 20, 1990, pp. 3 and 5. JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
[29] TSN, December 11, 1990, pp. 1-4.
[30] TSN, April 20, 1990, p. 6. This was quoted in the CA Decision, pp. 20-21; CA Rollo, pp. 224-225.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
[31] TSN, April 20, 1990, p. 4.
[32] CA Decision, p. 18; CA Rollo, p. 222.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for
[33] TSN, April 7, 1987, p. 23. appellee.
[34] People v. Briones, 202 SCRA 708, October 15, 1991, per Paras J.; citing People v. Vacal, 27 SCRA 24; People v. Pueblas, 127

SCRA 746; People v. dela Cruz, 147 SCRA 359; People v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 404.
[35] GR No. 123273, July 16, 1998, per Panganiban, J.
PER CURIAM, J.:
[36] RTC Decision, p. 27; CA Rollo, p. 54.
[37] People v. Nimo, 227 SCRA 69, October 5, 1993, per Romero, J.; People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36, July 3, 1992; People v. Quijano, This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the
197 SCRA 761, May 31, 1991. Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C.
[38] TSN, May 31, 1989, pp. 4-23.
[39] TSN, June 2, 1989, pp. 4-10.
Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
[40] Ibid., pp. 18-19 and 24-25. murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify
[41] People v. Liwag, 225 SCRA 46, August 3, 1993; People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109, November 7, 1979.
[42] People v. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364, September 5, 1991; People v. Vasquez, 113 SCRA 772, April 27, 1982.
the of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
[43] People v. Victor, 181 SCRA 818, February 6, 1990; People v. Paz, 11 SCRA 667, August 31, 1964; People v. Agdeppa, 30 SCRA

782, December 24, 1969. Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the
[44] TSN, November 28, 1988, pp. 5-20.
information.
[45] RTC Decision, p. 27; CA Rollo, p. 54.
[46] People v. Gaorana, GR Nos. 109138-39, April 27, 1998.
[47] CA Decision, p. 29; CA rollo, p. 233. Underscoring supplied.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided
[48] People v. Pinto, Jr., 204 SCRA 9, 31, November 21, 1991, per Fernan, CJ; Calderon v.. People, 96 Phil. 216 (1954); People v. over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the
Esteban, 103 SCRA 520, March 30, 1981.
[49] People v. Tulop, GR No. 124829, April 21, 1998; People v. Ballesteros, GR No. 120921, January 29, 1998; People v. Sumbillo, supra.
prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
[50] People v. Arellano, GR Nos. 119078-79, December 5, 1997; People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713, April 4, 1997; People v. Castillo,

supra. In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment,
[51] 239 SCRA, December 28, 1994, per Romero, J.
counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The
[52] RTC Decision, p. 29; CA Rollo, p. 56.
[53] People v. Gomez, 251 SCRA 455, December 19, 1995, per Davide, Jr. J. court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions
[54] People v. Castillo, GR No. 120282, April 20, 1998, per Panganiban, J.; People v. Maalat,, GR No. 109814, July 8, 1997; People v. propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from
Tuson, 261 SCRA 711, September 16, 1996.
[55] TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 10, 22 and 23.
any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be
[56] Ibid., pp. 13 and 23. examined by medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and,
[57] TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 15 and 24.
[58] As earlier noted, the penalty for consummated murder is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death.
according to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the
[59] CA Decision, p. 31; CA Rollo, p. 235. National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the
[60] People v. Cayabyab, 274 SCRA 387, June 19, 1997; People v. Dones, 254 SCRA 696, 710, March 13, 1996.
heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
[61] TSN, February 12, 1988, p. 9

[62] Ibid., p. 11. FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS

Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a single
moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.

The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this motivation
was determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was successful was checked
up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only reveal any conflict or complex
that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.

Republic of the Philippines Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr. Julio C.
SUPREME COURT Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully aware
Manila of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner or
form.
EN BANC G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950

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His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative thereto, the
motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an individual
with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision he
executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza
Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some overt
acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in la
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano, a Span-wanted to abuse
the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman
with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged
Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken
speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship especially
in relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but
is an individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional
Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary
opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the
court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he
committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the
Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement
between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of
the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held
in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic.
According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to
redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election
campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas,
instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval
of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President
Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular
meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd,
President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies
and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that
purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners
of the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting
American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having
lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given
him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two
bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either
by going to Malacañan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for
instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having
encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at
Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to
prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the
preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion
of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it proper
to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its
original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out
all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own
conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives to spare,
I would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare
of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their
sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were
frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he
had deceived the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than to entice them;
he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons
he should not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
of eighteen million souls. And why should I not give up my life too if only the good of those
eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the
consequences of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am
sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his
nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for
which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at
Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a
paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a
plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he
stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he
hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being
congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without
losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards
an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and,
covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The
grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing
close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that
the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) — who died on
the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade
(Exhibits F and F-1) — Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the
occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw
how a person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the
explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda.
Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and
had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia
and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the
real criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while
the City Mayor and some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair,
one Manuel Robles volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was
wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the
previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the
explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours
after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the
platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although
at the same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and
marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-
1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement
which contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila
Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary
statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the
witness stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned
allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for
the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the
Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; andfourth,
"in considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt
of public authorities in the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused,
shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him
two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas,
he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at
President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around
his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive
nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page
96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that
his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were
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some people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who
surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those
persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter.
In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the
President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing
the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of
homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less
serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different
felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be
imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted
with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance
with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words
of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice
nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should
qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the
actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code,
vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil.,
232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y
habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre ambos disputa
alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye
la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el
acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C y si solo al estanquero,
cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de c de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala
de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse
anos de reclusion por el homivcidio y a un año de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte
de que la muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse
ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera
ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino que tambien debio
declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo;
y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio
imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto
en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha
sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este
apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de
18 junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The
case before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that
a throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave
felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted
murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the
case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the
defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could
in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it
was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the
account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who
became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a
hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a
felony by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the
injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated
murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation
of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed
among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were
directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure
to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the
Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate
allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a
finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with
the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various
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aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But
we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event
article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious
of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)
It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided
by it upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we
hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with
article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working
day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded.
It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres,
JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38773 December 19, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GINES
ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment appealed from finds the appellants Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of
homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living children,
has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and has lost
control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work since he suffered the
stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters was named Maria and another, are married, while still
another one is a nun. With the exemption of the other married daughter and the nun, of all of
them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom they depend for
support.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate
relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that
the appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house.
The relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The
appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such
extremes, that he had to be deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather's
house in Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The
appellant learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with her
child.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has appeared
sad and worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because
the child meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for support. For some
time the appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and threatening and at other times
entreating the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to support
her and his child. Although the deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way
of support, he never complied with his promise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the
deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went
downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that
occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the
appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that
the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude,
the deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on the
face with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of the movement of his arm, the weapon
landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death
of the deceased. We find that his conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony the
appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a
permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the
hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his plan
of compelling him to marry or, at least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this
intention in some of his letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his
proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased
resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore
mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the
blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the
neck.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the
death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into
consideration in favor of the appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted in
legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping
out and brandishing his penknife.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which
refers to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the accused, should
be applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been
interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime befalls a different person (decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 28,1899), which is not the case
herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article 249
of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of three
mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in
degree, that is prision mayor, should be imposed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8) years
and (1) day of prision mayor, affirming the judgment appealed from in all other respects, with
the costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,
ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian,
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado
Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the
passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated
to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the
witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the
driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At
about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or
ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave
the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the
passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the
bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the
bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from
the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and
rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made
to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying
a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank
on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the
call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were removed
and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva,
in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from
Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by
Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because
of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers
and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety
of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of
the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for
hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination,
Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of
the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by
the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging,
there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied
the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been
running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and
turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only
question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire
started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still
alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by
him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case
under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only
on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural
or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for
help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry
a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were
not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the
coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What
is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known
that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that
gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on
the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced,
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that
the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation,
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 JDCRIM1| III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS | FELONIES and OFFENSES
this to include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are
entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not
only in the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs
prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS
for the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be
disturbed.

There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the evidence,
one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and while
in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his visit,
she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires
of the bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he
had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not
taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the
tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite
his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there
is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the
death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and
destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and
with his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses
on whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were
reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several witnesses,
passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said
driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be
pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers
on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and
the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and
from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan
and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.
L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

101