Diario Lex Studiosum (Diar y of a Law

Student)
Tu e s d a y, S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 2 0 1 4

Digested Cases in Legal Prof 21 - 25

21 DIR OF LEGAL AFF AIRS V B AYOT

FACTS:
§   Bayot was charged with malpr actice by publishing “Marriagelicense promptly secured thru our as sistance & the anno yance of
delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arr anged to wishes of parties. Consultation on an y matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.” In the Sunda y Tribune
§   Bayot first denied the publication but later on admitted, and ask ed for mitigation sa ying:
o    I only did it once. I won’t repeat it again!
o    I never had an y case by reason of the publication
ISSUE: WoN Bayot can be charged with malpr actice?
HELD: YES.
1.        The publication is tantamount to a solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the pr actice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either perso nally or thru paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpr actice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a tr ade.
2.        In In re Tagorda , 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the pr actice of law for the period of one mo nth for
advertising his services and soliciting work from the public b y writing circular letters. That case, h owever, was more
serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elabor ate and insistent..Considering
his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the
respondent should be, as he hereb y is, reprimanded.
3.         "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of char acter and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

22 ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC

                                               

FACTS:
§   Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing advertisement similar to or of the same tenor as that
of annexes A and B (p381).  Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of said advertisement that claims that it is not engage
in the pr actice of law but in the rendering of legal support services through par alegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machine.

ISSUE:
§   W/N the services offered b y Legal Clinic as advertised b y it constitutes pr actice of law
§   Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement complained of

HELD:
§   According to the IBP , notwithstanding the manne r by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the 2 terms, legal support
services and legal services, common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
 distinction.  The use of the name the Legal Clinic gives the impression that the respondent corpor ation is being managed b y
lawyers and that it renders legal services.  The advertisement in question is meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy .  This is in violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 tha t is counseling illegal
activities.
§   Practice of law means an y activity, in or out of court which requires that application of law , legal p rocedures, knowledge,
training and experience.  Applying the case Ca yetano vs. Monsod, the court agrees that the activities of the respondent Legal
Clinic constitute the pr actice of law .  Such a conclusion will not be altered b y the fact that respondent does not represent
clients in court since law pr actice is not limited merely to court appear ances. 
§   Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Profession Responsibility provides that a
lawyer, in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, and objective information or statement of facts. 
The proscription against advertising of legal services rests on the fundamental postulate that the pr actice of law is a
profession.
§   Exceptions:
o    Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed b y the canon
o    Ordinary, simple professional card.  The card ma y contain only the statement of his name, the law firm, address and
branch of law pr acticed.
§   Considering that Atty . Nogales who is the prime incorpor ator, major stockholder and proprietor of the legal clinic is a member
of the Philippine Bar, he is hereb y reprimanded with a warning that the repetition of the same or s imilar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely .

23 SAN JOSE HOMEO WNERS V R OMANILLOS

Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty . Roberto Romanillos, for representing conflicting interests and for using the title

“Judge” despite having been found guilty of gr ave and serious misconduct (in Zar ate v Romanillos).

Apparently, Romanillos was previously an active board member as corpor ate secretary of Durano Corp. Inc. (DCI). 

But it allowed itself to represent San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc (SJHAI) before the human Settlements

Regulation Commission in a case against the same DCI.

Irrelevant info:  the case above was an alleged violation of DCI of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer ’s

Protection Act.  DCI sold a land designated as a school site, without disclosing it as such.  (page 106)

When SJHAI’s petition over the land was denied, the SJHAI’ s Board terminated Romanillos’ services.

Also, Romanillos acted as counsel for Lydia Dur ano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI.

Thus, a disbarment case was filed for conflicting interests.

The IBP handled the case, but he was merely reprimanded.

In spite of this, he still continued to serve as counsel for Durano-Rodriguez.  Thus, a second disbarment case was

filed.  It also included his use of “judge” although he was found guilty of gr ave and serious misconduct.

Issue:
W/N Romanillos should be disbarred

Held:
Yes.

It is inconsequential that SJHAI never questioned the propriety of respondent’ s continued representation of Dur ano-

Rodriguez.  The lack of opposition does not mean consent.  As long as the lawyer represents 2 or more opposing

clients, he is guilty of violating his oath.

 His continued use of  “judge” violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01.  The penalty imposed on him in the Zar ate case forfeiture of

all leave and retirement benefits and privileges:  including the title judge.  (he was a judge before, but he resigned

instead of being booted out)

The title “judge” should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, an not to those who were dishonor ably

discharged from the service.

24 DIMATULAC v VILLON

Facts:
§   In the prosecution of the Y abuts for the murder of Dimatulac, the Office of the Public Prosecutor (p articularly the Asst
Prosecutor) and two Judges (who handled the case) committed serious procedur al flaws resulting i n the impairment of due
process (prejudicial to both the offended party and the accused).
§   Procedur al irregularities in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor:
o    Warrants of arrest were issued b y the MCT C, with no bail recommended, but the Y abuts were not a rrested or were
never brought unto the custody of the law . Yet, Asst Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes conducted a reinvestigation. Though a
prosecutor ma y disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigati on (and conduct
his own), the circumstance that the accused waived the filing of their counter-affidavits left Alfonso-Reyes no other
choice but to sustain the MCT C findings—which she did not do. And later on, Alfonso-Reyes allowe d the Yabuts to
file their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender b y virtue of the standing warrants of
arrest.
o    Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the Y abuts despite the fact that they were charged o f homicide and
that they were fugitives from justice (having avoided service of warr ant of arrest).
o    Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private prosecution’ s appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. (The s ubsequent
resolution of the DOJ Secretary exposed her blatant errors.) And despite the pending appeal, she filed the
Information. It would be more prudent to wait for the DOJ resolution.
o     Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the trial court of the pending appeal to the DOJ Secretary .
§   Judge Rour a’s procedur al lapses:
o    Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until “such time that all the accused who are out on
bail are arr aigned”
o    Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that “private prosecution has not shown an y indication that
the appeal was given due course b y DOJ”
§   Judge Villon’ s procedur al lapses:
o    Ordered arr aignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a ten-da y period with which the complainants can file
petition with the CA; resolution of the CA ordering the Y abuts to comment on the complainants’ ac tion; pending
appeal with the DOJ.

Issue:
Can the orders of Judge Rour a and Judge Villon be sustained despite procedur al defects?

Held:
No. The orders of Judge Rour a denying Motion to Defer proceedings are void and set aside. The order of Judge Villon on the
arraignment, and the subsequent arr aignment of the Y abuts are void and set aside. Office of the Pr ovincial Prosecutor is ordered to
comply with the DOJ Secretary’ s resolution.

Prosecutors are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy , but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
every case but that justice be done.  They are servants of the law whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape and innocence shall
not suffer.
The judge “should alwa ys be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and
properly administer justice”. The judge’ s action must not impair the substantial rights of the accus ed, nor the right of the State and
offended party .

When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case b y reason of gr ave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the
acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case is void.

25 TRIES TE v SANDIGANB AYAN

FACTS
§   TRIESTE was charged with 23 separ ate violations of the Anti Gr aft and Corrupt Pr actices A ct* beca use while being the
Municipal Ma yor and member of the Committee on A ward of the Municipality of Numancia in Akl an and having financial
or pecuniary interest in TRIGEN A gro-Industrial Development Corpor ation, he awarded purchases of construction materials
by the said municipality from the said corpor ation and signing the vouchers as evidence of said purchase
§   The Sandiganba yan found TRIES TE guilty and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate penalty of imprisonment and perpetual
disqualification
§   TRIESTE, in his defense, alleges that he signed the vouchers only after all the purchases had alread y been made, delivered and
paid for b y the Municipal Treasurer hence he cannot be guilty under the provisions of the Anti Gr aft and Corrupt Pr actices
Act

ISSUE                     W/N TRIES TE IS GUIL TY UNDER THE ANTI GRAFT AND CORR UPT PRA CTICES A CT

HELD                     NO

RATIO
§   TRIESTE already sold his shares to a certain MRS TU ASON before he assumed office and despite the absence of it in the SEC
records, the court finds this fact immaterial as there is no law requiring submission of reports regarding sales and disposal
of stocks (what is required is only submission of annual financial reports)
§   The Municipal Treasurer testified that there was never a public bidding hence if there is no bidding then there could be no
awarding b y TRIESTE
§   Testimonial and documentary evidence both confirm that TRIES TE signed vouchers after pa yment and since what is
contemplated in the Anti-Gr aft Law is the actual intervention in the tr ansaction which one has financial or pecuniary
interest in, TRIES TE cannot be held liable under such Law
§   TRIGEN did not gain an y undue advantage in the tr ansaction such that there is no complaint for non-delivery , underdelivery
or overpricing in the tr ansactions
§   Hence, TRIES TE should be acquitted

NOTE
*Section 3.  Corrupt Pr actices of Public Officers

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in an y business, contr act or tr ansaction in connection with
which he intervenes or tak es part in his official capacity , or in which he is prohibited b y the Consti tution or b y any law from
having an y interest

JuLand at 10:33 PM

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