Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29956 May 5, 1981
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, HON. TEOFILO SANTOS and THE DISTRICT
FORESTER, Mr. AMBROCIO JUINIO, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MARIANO V. BENEDICTO, Presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija and THE NEW TIMBERLAND CORPORATION, represented by NICANOR
ABES, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:1äwphï1.ñët

Reliance by the Director of Forestry 1 on the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 2
in this appeal by certiorari from a decision of the then Judge Mariano V. Benedicto now
deceased, declaring that 417 pieces of logs in General Tinio, Nueva Ecija, had been legally
cut by private respondent New Timberland Corporation, but ordering it to pay to the
government the amount of P711.07 still due from his forest charges or fees, and to refrain
from cutting any log in its concession as its license had in the meanwhile been cancelled by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is more than justified. To allow private
respondent to retain possession of the logs in question when no permission had been granted
by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources would be violative of the
constitutional mandate as to the nationalization and conservation of natural resources. As so
clearly set forth in the opinion of Justice Sanchez in Muñoz. "The view this Court takes of the
cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest
lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development, and
reforestation." 3 The judiciary is thus ever called upon to see to it that no dubious claim to
forest products should be recognized.
The facts are undisputed. The case arose from an action for injunction with prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction filed by private respondent Timberland Corporation with
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, then presided by respondent Judge. 4 The then
Director of Forestry and the then District Forester, petitioners now but then respondents,
opposed the granting of a preliminary injunction based on lack of jurisdiction and pendency
of another case between the same parties. 5 They then filed their answer, raising the special
and affirmative defenses that the respondent Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction, whether permanent or preliminary, enforceable outside Nueva Ecija to control the
acts of the Director of Forestry; that assuming arguendo that the court had jurisdiction, the
Timberland Corporation was without a cause of action because its proposed license over the
forest area pursuant to which the disputed logs were cut was disapproved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that respondent Timberland had not exhausted all
administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention. 6 At the hearing, it was
disclosed that without the required approval of a proposed license by the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondent Timberland Corporation took the risk of
operating in the areas formerly licensed to its incorporators, thus enabling one of them to cut
and haul about 417 pieces of logs deposited in his log pond at General Tinio. Petitioners did
stop the respondent in its logging operations, inventoried the logs and seized the said logs in
the care of one Nicanor Aves. Thereafter, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
on July 2, 1968, disapproved the proposed license in favor of the New Timberland
Corporation, as directed by the President of the Philippines. His decision was duly
communicated to respondent on July 10, 1968. Nonetheless, then respondent Judge rendered
the decision as above set forth, basing his decision on the proposed license of a former
Director of Forestry disregarding such lack of approval by the then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. Hence, this appeal. This Court gave due course to the petition and
directed the stay of the execution of the judgment sought to be reviewed. After the answer
was filed by respondents, petitioners filed their brief to be followed by respondents. There
being no reply brief on the part of petitioners, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
Fidelity to the Muñoz doctrine extensively relied upon by petitioners calls for a reversal. It
must be noted likewise that in the recent case of Director of Lands v. Abanzado, 7 where
Muñoz likewise provided the main support for the conclusion reached, reference was made to
cases decided even before the 1935 Constitution to demonstrate that this Court had rigorously
adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as a corollary to which the alleged
right to them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often
than not rejected. 8 We do so again.
1. Why the judgment should be adverse to respondents is categorically asserted in the
excerpt from the briefs of petitioners: "The ruling is plainly erroneous and untenable, in law
and in fact. In the first place no license was ever issued and released to respondent
Timberland, for such kind of license is not issuable upon the sole authority of the Director of
Forestry, but is subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources." 9 Support for such a view comes from Forestry Administrative Order No. 11,
Section 14 of which requires that for a licensee to do what was done by private respondent,
there must be an approval of the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the
proposed timber license involving the cutting of 1,000 cubic meters or more for a period not
exceeding four years. As pointed out in the brief: "Since the license proposed to be issued to
respondent corporation was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the same is not a license granted in accordance with the regulations (Forestry
Administrative Order No. 11, particularly Sec. 14, thereof). It is a mere proposal conferring
no right upon the respondents to commence the conduct of logging operations. Forestry
Administrative Order No. 11 was published in the Official Gazette; it was issued and
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (Natural Resources) pursuant to
Sections 79 (b) and 1817 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon the recommendation of
the Director of Forestry. It has the force and effect of law. While Section 1831 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from
any forest only upon license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a
subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head
or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Sec. 79 (c), Rev. Adm. Code), who,
therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate
officer."10 It should not be lost sight of that Forestry Administrative Order No. 11 was
recommended by no less than the Director of Forestry himself and thereafter approved by the
then Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the department entrusted with such matters in
1934. As further contended by petitioners: "What is more, in this case, the Director of
Forestry himself submitted the proposed license to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources 'for approval' thereby implying that he was not exercising the statutory power
vested in him under the Revised Administrative Code, to issue a license." 11 In the absence of
a valid license, therefore, the cutting of logs as was done by private respondent was clearly
unauthorized. As they were illegally cut, private respondent had no right to the possession of
the disputed 417 pieces of logs.
2. The force of the above contention must have been evident to counsel for private
respondent for in the eight-page brief submitted, there was hardly any attempt to dispute the
soundness of the legal proposition as above set forth. The stress was on good faith. That does
not suffice, as the property involved clearly belongs to the State. On the facts as duly proved,
the judgment certainly was without support.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside and the petition for
injunction filed by private respondent against the present petitioners dismissed. Costs against
private respondent Corporation.
Barredo, Aquino Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes1äwphï1.ñët

1 The Director of Forestry was then petitioner Teofilo Santos and the District Forester,
his co-petitioner, was Ambrocio Juinio
2 L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183.
3 lbid, 1214.
4 The New Timberland Corporation, now private respondent, was the petitioner.
Petitioners before this Court were named respondents.
5 Appeal by Certiorari, par. 7.
6 Ibid, par. 9.
7 L-21814, July l5, 1975, 65 SCRA 5.
8 Cf. Nicolas v. Jose, 6 Phil. 589 (1906); Municipality of Luzuriaga v. Director of
Lands, 24 Phil. 193 (1913); Municipality of Hagonoy v. Archbishop of Manila, 29 Phil. 320
(1915); Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 (1915); Ramos v. Director of Lands,
39 Phil. 175 (1919); Vano v. Government, 41 Phil. 161 (1920); Director of Lands v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil. 644 (1935).
9 Brief for the Petitioners. 4.
10 Ibid, 7.
11 Ibid, 8-9.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS,
ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO BUGTAI, respondents.
Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.

Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition — the
correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove
and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in
Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on September 31, 1992.

On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious
violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a
complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative
remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987, 1 and the
motion for reconsideration on February 15, 1988. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to
the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated July 4,
1988, 3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration.
4

The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could
be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable
exception was the urgent need for judicial intervention, which it explained thus:
The lower court found out that sometime on July 1981, the City Council of Pagadian in its
Resolution No. 111 requested the Bureau of Forest Development to reserve 1,000 hectares in
Lison Valley. This request remained unacted upon. Instead in 1982, a TLA covering 29,500
hectares, including the area requested, was given to petitioner.

Then the fear expressed by the City Council of Pagadian in its resolution became reality.

"As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the defendant
has caused heavy siltation not only in the Labangan River (as predicted by the City Council
of Pagadian City in 1981) but also in the Tukuran River, Salug River, Sindangan River, and
Sibuguey River. In other words, the adverse effects of the logging operations of the defendant
have already covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely affected by the City
Council of Pagadian City.

Floods are unknown phenomena in heavily forested areas years back, particularly in the
Island of Mindanao. When the grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of
forests. . . . It is common knowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areas/places
adjoining logging concessions. (Resolution dated December 11, 1987, p. 5).

Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. Irreparable damage would ensue
unless the court intervenes. Reliance on the DENR may not be enough, judging from its
inaction on the council's request seven years back.

The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v. Cloribel, 5
where "irreparable damage and injury" was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow
Transportation Corporation v. Board of Transportation, 6 where the doctrine was waived
because of "the strong public interest in having the matter settled" as soon as possible.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing
out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action
whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits,
patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation,
utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and
the lower courts by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited
Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 7 where several presidential decrees were
declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just
compensation in expropriation cases.

The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the
Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure
to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the
court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins
upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily
(albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the
administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their
particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be
rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that
administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the
rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which
otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets. 9

As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances

when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately.
Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 10 2) when
the administrative body is in estoppel; 11 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12
4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13 5) when the claim involved is small;
14 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15 7) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; 16 8) when strong public interest is involved; 17 9) when the subject of
the controversy is private land; 18 and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. 19

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because
forestry laws do not require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial
action; the question they are raising is purely legal; application of the doctrine will cause
great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.

We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to
administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would
suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still
be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to
regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country's forests"
and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest
Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations 21
here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the
very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy
coming under its express powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable.
The private respondents have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and
in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner has
violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and
regulations. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting
evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing
their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the
courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.

As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the
case on the national interest, the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily
established these extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the doctrine by
exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact,
this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention that it
has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the
DENR.

In the Petition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its
logging operations had been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on February 23,
1988, by the District Forester from the Regional Executive Director of the DENR,
Zamboanga City; reading as follows:

DISTRICT FORESTER
PAGADIAN CITY

QUOTED HEREUNDER IS RADIO MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 22, 1988 FROM

SECRETARY FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. QUOTE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY
CMA SUSPEND ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS OF SUNVILLE IN VIEW OF SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF FOREST PROTECTION AND REFORESTATION UNQUOTE SUBMIT
REPORT ASAP.

RED BATCAGAN

The petition now before us contains the allegations that the "petition for cancellation of
petitioner's TLA is still pending up to this date and that petitioner's logging operations (were)
ordered suspended by the Secretary of the DENR pending further investigation." 23

In the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that "the Secretary
of the DENR suspended petitioner's logging operations until further investigation. The
suspension is still in force up to this date after the lapse of almost 3 years." 24

These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before
the respondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent
court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a
result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to
determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been
violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility
of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the
administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the
eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.
In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to
declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of
constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be decided on some other available
ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same question must
await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the
Court "to make the hammer fall, and heavily," in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is
warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated July 4,
1988, and its resolution dated September 27, 1988, as well as the resolutions of the trial court
dated December 11, 1987 and February 15, 1988, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil
Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 CA Rollo, p. 35.

2 Ibid., p. 48.

3 Rollo, p. 23; Penned by Melo, J. with Herrera M. and Imperial, JJ., concurring.

4 Ibid., p. 29.

5 14 SCRA 269.

6 63 SCRA 193.

7 149 SCRA 305.

8 Pineda v. Court of First Instance of Davao, 1 SCRA 1020; Atlas Consolidated Mining
and Development Corporation v. Mendoza, 2 SCRA 1064; Pestanas v. Dyogi, 81 SCRA 574;
Aboitiz and Co. Inc. v. The Collector of Customs, 83 SCRA 265; Abe-Abe v. Manta, 90
SCRA 524.

9 Cruz, Carlo L., Philippine Administrative Law, 1991 ed., op. cit., pp. 85-96.

10 Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256.

11 Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil. 377.

12 Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377.

13 Aquino v. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177.

14 Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291.

15 De Lara v. Cloribel, supra.

16 National Development Company v. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429.

17 Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Board of Transportation, supra.

18 Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116.

19 Corpus v. Cuaderno, 4 SCRA 749.

20 Paragraphs 12 and 15, Section 4, Chapter I, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 292.

21 Section 5 of P.D. 705.

22 CA Rollo, p. 7.

23 Rollo, p. 17.

24 Ibid., pp. 60-61.

25 Zandueta v. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615.