TITLE: FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS, MELQUIADES BETIOS, CRESENCIANO FERNANDEZ,

SANCHO PEREZ and AGATON POSA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., VICTORIAS MILL DISTRICT PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
INC., and, ALL SUGARCANE PLANTERS OF SUGARCANE PLANTATIONS SITUATED IN THE
VICTORIAS MILLING DISTRICT, WHO HAVE AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, SINCE JUNE 22, 1952,
MILLED THEIR SUGARCANE IN THE MILL OF VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. NO. [L-41161] DATE: [September 10, 1981.]
PONENTE: BARREDO, J NATURE: Constitutionality, legislative intent, legislative
purpose & legislative meaning.

FACTS:

Four separate petitions of the respective parties concerned for the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47298-R, entitled Federation of Free Farmers, et al. vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc., et al.,
of August 12, 1975. August 12, 1975. the Court of Appeals held that notwithstanding the provisions of the
Sugar Act of 1952, Republic Act 809, that providing of any increase in the share of the proceeds of milled
sugarcane and derivatives obtained by the planters from the centrals in any sugar milling district in the
Philippines, 60% of said increase shall correspond to and should be paid by the planters to their respective
laborers, the laborers of the planters affiliated to the Victorias Milling District who are members of or represented
by the Federation of Free Farmers, one of the petitioners, have not been fully paid their share thus provided by
law, corresponding to crop years 1955 to 1974, in spite of clear evidence in the record showing that the increase
of 4% in the share of the Planters, Victorias Milling District, corresponding to all the years since the enforcement
of the aforementioned Act had already been paid by petitioner Victorias Milling Co., Inc. to said planters. That
even the shares of the laborers corresponding to crop years 1952-1955, when by operation of the Act, the
increase was 10% had not been paid, and the planters of the district and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. are jointly and
severally liable to the said laborers for all said alleged unpaid amounts.

The four parties that involve in the said case namely Federation of Free Farmers (FFF), Planters, the
individual planters Santos and Tikol and lastly Central (Victoria) a milling company.
 The Federation of Free Farmers allegedly that they have not been paid from 1952-53 despite the 10%
increase and from 1953-1974 with the 4% increase. CA ruled planters and Victorias jointly and severally
liable. FFF claimed that Planters and Victorias entered into an agreement when they have no legal right
because the law has already provided the ratio of division.
 Victorias claimed that they should not be held jointly and severally liable. The action filed was not founded
on torts but on either an obligation created by a contract or by law, and even if on torts, the action has
prescribed. They have paid the Planters so the Planters should only be the one sued and is Republic Act
No. 809, otherwise known as the 'Sugar Act of 1952,' constitutional, and did the Court of Agrarian Relations
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the laborers' suit at the time the same was filed on November 9,
1962, which is the starting point of this case.
 The Planters claim they have freedom to stipulate ration as they might agree. And that they have paid the
laborers.
 Individual Planters Santos and Tikol claimed that among the planters in the Victorias District, complain that
the decision of the the Court of Appeals ignored their plea of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over their
persons in spite of their proven claim that they had not been properly served with summons, and that the
portion of said decision holding them jointly and severally liable with VICTORIAS and the PLANTERS to the
latter's laborers for the amounts here in question has no factual and legal basis, considering they were not
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 parties to the pertinent questioned agreements.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not R.A. 809 is constitutional.
2. Whether or not there was freedom of the centrals and the planters to agree on how they would share the
proceeds of the milled sugarcane, regardless of the ratios specified in Section 1, of the R.A 809 Act.
3. Whether or not the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdictions over cases involving between planters and
their workers.
4. Whether or not the liability of the class suit and its propriety is to be shared among others.
DOCTRINES | HELD:
a) Yes, R.A. 809 is constitutional. The court held that R.A. 809, as a social legislation sounded not only on
police power but more importantly on the social welfare mandates of the Constitution, is undoubtedly
constitutional in all its aspects and relevant to the instant cases.
b) Yes, the court held that there is nothing in said law that excludes the right of the parties to enter into new
contracts, and in said new contracts, they could provide for a ratio of sharing different from that stipulated
in Section 1 of the Act, provided that any increase in their share in the proceeds of milling that the
PLANTERS would get, 60% thereof must be paid by them to their respective plantation laborers.
Considering the purpose, the legislative meaning, which is not clearly disclose in the language of the act,
thus indicated, which is to give the laborers a share for as long as sugar is produced, and the planters
receive an increased participation. The legislative intent is, thus, to make the act operative irrespective
whether there exists a milling agreement between the central and sugar planters.
c) Yes, The Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction to such circumstances. The court held that the Court
of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over controversies between sugar planters and their plantation
workers. Considering the number of laborers involved, the class suit initiated by the laborers and the
FEDERATION was proper. The court specifically stated “By and large, Sections 1 and 7 of Republic Act
1267, which created the Court of Agrarian Relations, and which was the law at the time of the filing of the
FEDERATION'S suit on November 10, 1962, contemplated the transfer from the Court of Industrial
Relations of all controversies of whatever nature involving agricultural laborers, particularly those referring
to the employer-employee relationship with the respective employers which naturally include the sugar
planters and their plantation workers. Hence, it cannot be said that the trial court, the Court of Agrarian
Relations of Bacolod City, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the vital petition that spawned the instant
cases before Us.”
d) The court held that under the statute, only the PLANTERS, including appellants Primo Santos and Roberto
Tirol, are solidarily liable to the LABORERS for the amounts due them from 1952 to 1973, per their own
admission in their complaint and the extant evidence, however, the LABORERS had already been paid their
share in the 1952-53 to 1954-55 crop years, except for the unpaid balance of P180,679.38 and in all other
respects, the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed insofar as the liability of the PLANTERS
to their laborers are concerned.
RULING:
Judgment affirmed with modifications.

NOTES:
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; REPUBLIC ACT 809 (SUGAR ACT OF
1952); CONSTITUTIONALITY THEREOF REAFFIRMED IN CASES AT BAR. — Republic Act 809 (Sugar Act of
1952), as a social legislation founded not only on police power but more importantly on the social welfare mandates

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of the Constitution, is undoubtedly constitutional in all its aspects and relevant to the instant cases. The position of
the Court of Appeals thereon is well studied and discussed and totally correct, being as they are substantially in
line with the pertinent considerations on the same point expressed in the Court's decision in the case of Associacion
de Agricultores de Talisay- Silay, Inc., 88 SCRA 294, which upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 809.

CONNECTION TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: LEGISLATIVE INTENT, LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE &

LEGISLATIVE MEANING.
 LEGISLATIVE INTENT — The intent of the legislature is the law, and the key to, and controlling factor in,
its construction or interpretation. It comprehends the purpose and meaning. It is the vital part the essence
of the law.
 LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE — The reason why a particular statute was enacted by the legislature, why the
statutes should be so construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.
 LEGISLATIVE MEANING — it is what being sought of the legislative intent it is what the law, by its
language, means.

AT THE CASE AT BAR “The purpose of the R.A. 809 is shown it is to compel the continuous production of sugar
and to grant planters’ laborers a share in the increased participation of the planters in the sugar produce.
Considering the purpose, the legislative meaning, which is not clearly disclose in the language of the act, thus
indicated, which is to give the laborers a share for as long as sugar is produced, and the planters receive an
increased participation. The legislative intent is, thus, to make the act operative irrespective whether there exists a
milling agreement between the central and sugar planters.”