3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12
June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED
and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21,
2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14,
2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-
3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered
UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001
and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in
the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Isabela; and
Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe"
Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T.
Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela,
which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of
private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4
Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted
all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2
Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to
this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed
a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and
SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June
2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard
by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T.
Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and
issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he
ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He
likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but
the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and
Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October
2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No.
15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while
referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the
petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as
well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting
aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21,
2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-
3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6,
2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal
Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering
the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the
order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’
ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either
through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764,
November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before
the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise
deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act
on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications
for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright
dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno
(232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable
cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254
SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance
pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301
SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC
which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the
same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either
by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not
yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested
by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other
hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is
not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not
have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to
bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our
pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently
ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the
body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify
that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary
appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he
purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is
in the custody of law.’" The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send
another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2)
in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the
very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking
the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody
of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to
accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their
persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the
person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC
from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings
and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to
cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of
warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for
bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail
to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford
the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the
offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of
arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not
genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who
issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in
his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really
did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant
continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any
day and at any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the
accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy
a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due
process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad.
Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the
petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his
doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second,
after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal
cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing
so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda
appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity,
a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge
Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of
arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the
assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for
review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash
the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the
filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to
appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as
premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in
order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted
constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112,
Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or
issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular
Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe"
Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been
violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting
evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find
that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is
apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of
probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a
separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could
be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the
fiscal’s certification.28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that
he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order even indicated the
contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to
determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by
supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v.
Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and
Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge
Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on
the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find
probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for
the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy
for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a
"politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other
along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro,
and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the
findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within
the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not
a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than
"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that
there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary
of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution,
Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the
basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch
41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the
mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the
October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly
makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the
decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in
his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." This
Court agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal’s statements when
the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2)
cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his
statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001,
praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest
decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R.
No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence
presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder
filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision
and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of
the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting
the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We
never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on
circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of
the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The
accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it
is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to
permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt
actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such
probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two days after
we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him
from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations
were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the
temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this
Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the
motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set
aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall
or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge
Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an
error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable
cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest
or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is
merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be
allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other
dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals
had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of
arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by
Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to
carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge
Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants
of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest
based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for
them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court
of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this
Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification
of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the
determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved
in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge
reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory.
According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private
respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the
assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by
private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled
validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38 in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of
Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14
November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent
Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the
City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within
ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer
of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal
cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;

Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt
places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of
Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14
November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more
serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases
upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent
Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as
disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect
contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of
respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of
said 14 November 2001 Order.
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this
Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance;
and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said
cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of
arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio,
Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby
LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not
constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not
been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40

As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his
motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow
the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
De la Cruz, De Loso and Sison Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos, in this Petition for certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
seeks to set aside the Order dated 9 September 1977 issued by respondent Municipal
Court Judge Nicolas P. Garcia in Criminal Case No. 77-1848 (entitled " People of the
Philippines, plaintiff vs. Alfredo Cuyos y Tulor, accused") denying petitioner's Motion to
Transfer said case to the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for trial on the merits.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, with
homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property, through reckless
imprudence. Petitioner was driver of a cargo truck which had collided with a Volkswagen
automobile in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death of one (1) person and
physical injuries to four (4) other people. The Amended Complaint against petitioner read as
follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June 1977, at about 6:10 P.M., at the
MacArthur Highway, barrio San Isidro, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a truck bearing
plate No. V 139 T Filipinos 1977, willfully and unlawfully drive and operate
the same in a negligent, imprudent and careless manner, and without due
regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations, and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, imprudence and carelessness, the
said truck driven and operated by him bumped and hit a Volkswagen car
bearing plate no. E 604 Filipinos 1977, then driven by Antonio M.
Concepcion, as a result of which one of the occupants of the said car,
Victoriana Miranda Concepcion died in the said accident, and the other
occupants namely: Antonio Concepcion, Rhinna Lin Capili, Renee Ann
Capili and Lourdes Concepcion sustained serious physical injuries, and
the said car suffered damages in the amount of P18,000.00, belonging to
Antonio Concepcion, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
parties.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After arraignment, respondent
Judge set the case for trial on 12,14 and 16 September 1977.
Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed on 6 September 1977 a " Motion to
Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance for Trial" , alleging lack of jurisdiction over
the case on the part of the Municipal Court. Petitioner's argument was that the amended
criminal complaint alleged that the Volkswagen car involved in the accident had suffered
damages amounting to P18,000.00, and that under paragraph 3, Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime with which he was charged would carry a fine in an amount ranging
from the amount of the damage to three (3) times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x
P18,000.00 or P54,000.00). Petitioner urged in his Motion that because under Section 87
(e) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended (Republic Act No. 296 as amended), the
respondent Municipal Court of the Provincial Capital of Pampanga, had jurisdiction only
over offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00, the case had to be transferred
to the Court of First Instance. On the same date, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Postpone the trial of the case relying on the same grounds set out in his Motion to Transfer
the Case to the Court of First Instance.
After a joint hearing of the two (2) Motions filed by petitioner, the respondent Municipal
judge issued an order dated 9 September 1977 denying the Motion to transfer the Case to
the Court of First Instance and set the trial of the case for 5 October 1977. A verbal Motion
for Reconsideration by petitioner was denied.
Hence the present Petition for Certiorari, assailing the jurisdiction of the respondent court to
try the criminal case against petitioner on the merits.
By a Resolution dated 26 September 1977, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the respondent Municipal Court from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 77-
1848.
The sole issue raised in this Petition is whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated 27 October 1977, agreed with and adopted the
position taken by petitioner that respondent Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try
Criminal Case No. 77-1848. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General.
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical
injuries and damage to property, resulting from reckless imprudence. Under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, in a prosecution for a complex crime constituted by two (2) or more
grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime is to be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. In the present case, one might, as respondent
Municipal Judge did, look only at the acts which constitute the offenses comprising the
complex crime here involved. One is likely to do so through eyes which are culturally
conditioned and so is likely to assume, as did respondent Municipal Judge, that the most
serious offense of which petitioner is accused is homicide through reckless imprudence.
Under paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable upon
petitioner, should he be found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would
be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions contained in this Article shall not be applicable:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
automobile law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the
defendants shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
At the time of the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner before the Municipal
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, such Municipal Court in the capital of the Province of
Pampanga had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine not exceeding P6,000. 00 or both. The applicable provision was the fourth
paragraph of Article 87 (c) of Republic Act No. 296 as amended which provided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and
judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their
respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years
or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of
the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the
Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the basic assumption made earlier as to the relative gravity of homicide through
reckless imprudence and damage to property through reckless imprudence were correct,
the respondent Municipal Judge would have to be vested with jurisdiction over the criminal
charges against petitioner.
As a technical legal proposition, however, the relative seriousness of offenses is determined
by the seriousness of the penalties attached by the law to the several offenses. It was noted
earlier that the imposable penalty in case of homicide through reckless imprudence
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., a correctional penalty in the
scale of penalties set up in Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon the other hand, the
penalty for damage to property through reckless imprudence is provided for in the third
paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
When the execution of the Act covered by this Article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of paid
damages to three-times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than P25.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 26 of the same Code, a fine may be an afflictive penalty (i.e., if it exceeds
P6,000.00) or a correctional penalty (i.e., if it is P200.00 or more but does not exceed
P6,000.00). The offense so penalized with a fine may be a grave felony (i.e. if the imposable
fine is afflictive in nature) or a less grave felony (i.e., if the imposable fine is merely
correctional). 1 In the instant case, the maximum fine which may be imposed upon petitioner
is P54,000.00 (3 x P18,000.00), obviously an afflictive penalty and hence, in the scheme of
the Revised Penal Code, more serious than the penalty imposable for homicide through
reckless imprudence.
In complex crimes, it is not uncommon that one constitutive offense carries with it an
afflictive penalty while the other or other constitutive offenses carry with them only a
correctional or even a light penalty. Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime must logically
be lodged with the trial court having jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most serious
penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the complex crime. A complex crime must
be prosecuted integrally, as it were, and not split into its component offenses and the latter
made the subject of multiple informations possibly brought in different courts. This is the
thrust of our case law on the matter.
In Angeles, etc., et al, v. Jose, et al., 2 the Court had occasion to deal with a criminal
information against one Domingo Mejia before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
charging him with the crime of damage to property in the sum of P654.22 and with less
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, committed, in one single act. There,
the respondent Court of First Instance dismissed the criminal information upon the ground
that the penalty prescribed by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code was only arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court. The prosecution then invited attention to the fact that the fine which could
be imposed by the respondent court on account of the damage to property through reckless
imprudence was a sum ranging from P654.22 to P1,962.66 (P654.22 x 3) which amount
was beyond the jurisdiction of a Municipal Court to impose as fine. In setting aside the order
of dismissal by the respondent Court of First Instance and remanding the case to the trial
court further proceedings, the Supreme Court said:
[The third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code] simply
means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein
shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there, should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into
two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property,
for both the injuries and the damage committed were caused by one
single act of the defendant and constitute what may be called a complex
crime of physical injuries and damage to property. It is clear that the fine
fixed by law in this case is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court
and within that of the court of first instance. 3(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Angeles, we held that the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance of the case
must be determined, not by the penalty for the physical injuries charged but by the fine
imposable for the damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Damage to
property through reckless imprudence need not be a lighter offense than less serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Because the maximum fine (P1,962.66)
imposable upon the accused in the Angeles case was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court of Manila to impose, the criminal case fell within the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Manila.
People v. Villanueva 4 followed the rule set out in Angeles. In Villanueva, the accused was
charged before the Justice of Peace Court of Batangas, Batangas with the crime of serious
and less serious physical injuries, with damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00,
through reckless imprudence. The Justice of Peace Court subsequently declared itself
without jurisdiction to try the case and forwarded the same to the Court of First Instance.
The latter court then declared itself similarly without jurisdiction over the complex crime
charged in the information, upon the ground that the penalty for the graver offense of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was only arresto mayor in its, maximum and
medium periods which penalty, even if applied in its maximum degree (in view of the
complex -nature of the crime), would remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace
Court. Upon appeal by the prosecution, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the complex crime there
involved:
We find the appeal well taken, for this case comes squarely under the rule
laid down by us in Angeles, et al. v. ,rose, et al. [96 Phil. 151 (1954)],,
wherein we held that.—
xxx xxx xxx
Consider that it is the court of first instance that would undoubtedly have
jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted from appellant's imprudence
were the damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, it would be
absurd to hold that for the graver offense of serious and less serious
physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless
imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the peace court. The
presumption is against absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to
interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results. Our system of
apportionment of criminal jurisdictions among the various trial courts
proceeds on the basic theory that crimes cognizable by the Courts of First
Instance are more serious than those triable injustice of the peace or
municipal courts.
Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the prosecution may not
be able to prove all the supposed offenses constituting the complex crime
charge. Were we to hold that it is the justice of the Peace court that has
jurisdiction in this case, if later the prosecution should fail to prove the
physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to
property in the amount of P2,636.00, the inferior court would find itself
without jurisdiction to impose the fine for the damage to property
committed, since such fine can not be less than the amount of the
damage. Again, it is to avoid this further absurdity that we must hold that
the jurisdiction lies in the court of first instance in this case. 5
The applicable rule on the allocation of jurisdiction between an inferior court on the one
hand and the Regional Trial Court on the other, in respect of complex crimes involving
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, was
summarized by Mr. Justice Barrera in People v. Malabanan: 6
It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case of Lapuz v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6382, March 30,1954 (40 O.G. 18 supp.), in
imposing the corresponding penalty, to the quasi-offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to property, Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. However, there may be
cases, as the one at bar, where the imposable penalty for the physical
injuries charged would come within the jurisdiction of the municipal or
justice of the peace court while the fine, for the damage to property, would
fall on the Court of First Instance. As the information cannot be split into
two, one for damages and another for the physical injuries, the jurisdiction
of the court to take cognizance of the case must be determined not by the
corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged but by the fine
imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless
imprudence. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
It remains only to point out that under B.P. Blg. 129, the law presently in effect, we would
have to reach the same result: i.e., that the criminal case against petitioner falls within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Under Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months, or a
 fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they should have exclusive original jurisdiction where
the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00, and the maximum
imprisonment imposable (for the homicide through reckless imprudence) is six (6) years,
clearly, the criminal charge involved falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court
and consequently within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga.

WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9 September 1977 is hereby
SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on
26 September 1977 is hereby made PERMANENT. Because the proceedings before the
respondent Municipal Court are null and void, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga will have to
file a new information against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143375 July 6, 2001
RUTH D. BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION IV,
and SUSAN ALOÑA, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents a new dimension in the ever controversial Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 or The Bouncing Checks Law. The question posed is whether the
drawer of a check which is dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds can be prosecuted
under BP 22 even if the check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from its due
date. The burgeoning jurisprudence on the matter appears silent on this point.
Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent Susan
Aloña Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated 8 May 1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on
Metrobank Cavite City Branch. According to private respondent, petitioner assured her that
the check would be sufficiently funded on the maturity date.
On 20 October 1998 private respondent presented the check for payment. The drawee bank
dishonored the check because it was drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of
Cavite City.1 In addition to the details of the issuance and the dishonor of the check, she
also alleged that she made repeated demands on petitioner to make arrangements for the
payment of the check within five (5) working days after receipt of notice of dishonor from the
bank, but that petitioner failed to do so.
Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that
presentment of the check within ninety (90) days from due date thereof was an essential
element of the offense of violation of BP 22. Since the check was presented for payment
166 days after its due date, it was no longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit. She also claimed that she already assigned
private respondent her condominium unit at Antel Seaview Condominium, Roxas Boulevard,
as full payment for the bounced checks thus extinguishing her criminal liability.
On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing
of an Information against petitioner for violation of BP 22, which was approved by the City
Prosecutor.
On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for
Region IV a petition for review of the 22 April 1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the petition
in a one (1)-page resolution dated 25 June 1999. On 5 July 1999 petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied on 31 August 1999. According to the ORSP,
only resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable for review
by that office, citing Department Order No. 223.
On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the
resolution of the ORSP, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999 as well as the order dated 31 August
1999 denying reconsideration. The appellate court issued the assailed Resolution dated 26
October 1999 denying due course outright and dismissing the petition.2 According to
respondent appellate court -
A petition for review is appropriate under Rule 42 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, filed in the Court of Appeals. Rule 43 x x x provides for appeal, via a
petition for review x x x from judgment or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's "Petition for
Review" of the ORSP resolution does not fall under any of the agencies mentioned
in Rule 43 x x x x It is worth to note that petitioner in her three (3) assigned errors
charged the ORSP of "serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion." The
grounds relied upon by petitioner are proper in a petition for certiorari x x x x Even
if We treat the "Petition for Review" as a petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to
allege the essential requirements of a special civil action. Besides, the remedy of
petitioner is in the Regional Trial Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
x x x x (italics supplied)
First, some ground rules. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to "appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions."3
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-
judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG,4 Koh v. Court of Appeals,5 Andaya v. Provincial
Fiscal of Surigao del Norte6 and Crespo v. Mogul.7 In these cases this Court held that the
power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement
holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the
similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-
judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making."8
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees,9 we held that a
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency, hence his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
This is so because the awards of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the
lapse of the period to appeal;10 and since their awards determine the rights of parties, their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the proper remedy from
an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for
appellate review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.11 While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.12
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finality only where the
penalty prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the
imposable fine,13 the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion,
is to present her defense in the trial of the case.
Besides, it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal to
determine the specificity and adequacy of the offense charged. He may dismiss the
complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he finds no
ground to continue with the inquiry; or, he may otherwise proceed with the investigation if
the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form.14
In the present recourse, notwithstanding the procedural lapses, we give due course to the
petition, in view of the novel legal question involved, to prevent further delay of the
prosecution of the criminal case below, and more importantly, to dispel any notion that
procedural technicalities are being used to defeat the substantive rights of petitioner.
Petitioner is accused of violation of BP 22 the substantive portion of which reads -
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of
the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank x x x x (italics
supplied).
An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two (2) distinct
acts: First, making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank; and, second, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check
if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.15
In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the
check at the time of its issuance, while in the second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient
funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety
(90) days from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the offense is
consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit.
The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of issuance since the drawer
had neither sufficient funds in nor credit with the drawee bank at the time, while that
involved in the second offense is good when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when issued.16 Under the first offense, the ninety (90)-day
presentment period is not expressly provided, while such period is an express element of
the second offense.17
From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that petitioner is being prosecuted for
violation of the first paragraph of the offense.
Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP 22 on the simple
ground that the subject check was presented 166 days after the date stated thereon. She
cites Sec. 2 of BP 22 which reads -
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
 days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee (italics supplied).
Petitioner interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90)-day presentment period is an
element of the offenses punished in BP 22. She asseverates that "for a maker or issuer of a
check to be covered by B.P. 22, the check issued by him/her is one that is dishonored when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from date of the check. If the dishonor
occurred after presentment for payment beyond the ninety (90)-day period, no criminal
liability attaches; only a civil case for collection of sum of money may be filed, if warranted."
To bolster this argument, she relies on the view espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan in his
treatise - 18
Although evidentiary in nature, section 2 of the law must be taken as furnishing an
additional element of the offense defined in the first paragraph of section 1
because it provides for the evidentiary fact of "knowledge of insufficiency of funds
or credit" which is an element of the offense defined in said paragraph; otherwise
said provision of section 2 would be rendered without meaning and nugatory. The
rule of statutory construction is that the parts of a statute must be read together in
such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be
construed as contradicting each other. The same section cannot be deemed to
supply an additional element for the offense under the second paragraph of
section 1 because the 90-day presentment period is already a built-in element in
the definition of said offense (italics supplied).
We are not convinced. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged
in the complaint or information, and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined
by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes.19
The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.20
The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a
dishonored check presented within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of
the offense. Since knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself
creates a prima facie presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of drawing,
issuing or making a check, the payment of which was subsequently refused for insufficiency
of funds.21 The term prima facieevidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or
to counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.22
The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the
presentation of evidence to the contrary.23 Neither does the term prima facie evidence
preclude the presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove the existence or
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or lack of credit. Surely, the law is not so circumscribed
as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the dishonor of the subject check when
presented within the prescribed ninety (90) day period. The deliberations on the passage of
BP 22 (then known as Cabinet Bill No. 9) between the author, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, and Bataan Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove insightful -
MR. ROMAN: x x x x Under Section 1, who is the person who may be liable under
this Section? Would it be the maker or the drawer? How about the endorser, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. MENDOZA: Liable.
MR. ROMAN: The endorser, therefore, under Section 1 is charged with the duty of
knowing at the time he endorses and delivers a check . . . .
MR. MENDOZA: If the endorser is charged for violation of the Act then the fact of
knowledge must be proven by positive evidence because the presumption of
knowledge arises only against the maker or the drawer. It does not arise as
against endorser under the following section (italics supplied).
MR. ROMAN: But under Section 1, it says here: "Any person who shall make or
draw or utter or deliver any check." The preposition is disjunctive, so that any
person who delivers any check knowing at the time of such making or such
delivery that the maker or drawer has no sufficient funds would be liable under
Section 1.
MR. MENDOZA: That is correct Mr. Speaker. But, as I said, while there is liability
even as against endorser, for example, the presumption of knowledge of
insufficient funds arises only against the maker or drawer under Section 2.
MR. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is true; however, under Section 1, endorsers of
checks or bills of exchange would find it necessary since they may be charged with
the knowledge at the time they negotiate bills of exchange they have no sufficient
funds in the bank or depository.
MR. MENDOZA: In order that an endorser may be held liable, there must be
evidence showing that at the time he endorsed the check he was aware that the
drawer would not have sufficient funds to cover the check upon presentation. That
evidence must be presented by the prosecution. However, if the one changed is
the drawer, then that evidence need not be presented by the prosecution because
that fact would be established by presumption under Section 2 (italics supplied).24
An endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22, even though the
presumption of knowledge does not apply to him, if there is evidence that at the time of
endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the foregoing
deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge
and not to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge.
Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within ninety
(90) days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other
evidence. Whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the
information is addressed to the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not
controllable by certiorari. Certainly, petitioner is not left in a lurch as the prosecution must
prove knowledge without the benefit of the presumption, and she may present whatever
defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.

The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of
the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate
facts.25Applying this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the
ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check
presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.

It is worth reiterating that courts will not normally interfere with the prosecutor's discretion to
file a criminal case when there is probable cause to do so. Probable cause has been
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.26 The prosecutor has ruled
that there is probable cause in this case, and we see no reason to disturb the finding.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 1999
which dismissed the petition for review questioning the resolution of the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999, and its order dated 31 August
1999 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Mendoza, Buena, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181658 August 7, 2013
LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, PETITIONER,
vs.
CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007 Decision2 and the
January 31, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The
CA affirmed the Orders4 dated August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a) the Omnibus Motion5 for the exclusion of a private
prosecutor in the two criminal cases for perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the
Motion for Reconsideration6 of the said order denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.
The facts follow:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI),
a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the
pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of
intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent
Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioner’s siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons
took over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC.
Petitioner and other factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This
incident led to the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee
and 972-V-99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and
respondent, which are now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City.7
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary’s Certificate8 issued by
Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petition9 for the Issuance of an
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 23223810 which covers a
property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said court an Affidavit
of Loss11 stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President of CHI, he had in his custody
and possession the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238 issued by the Register of
Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner’s copy of TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost or
misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted diligent
efforts in locating the said title but it had not been found and is already beyond recovery;
and (4) said title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment
of any obligation with any person, credit or banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in
support of the foregoing averments during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order12 dated
September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue a new Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among
others, that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully
well that respondent was in possession of the said Owner’s Duplicate Copy, the latter being
the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that
petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage
the same with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owner’s
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC
recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order.13
In a Complaint-Affidavit14 dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila,
respondent alleged the following:
1. I am a stockholder, Board Member, and duly elected treasurer of Centillion
Holdings, Inc. (CHI), which corporation is duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws.
2. As duly elected treasurer of CHI, I was tasked with the custody and safekeeping
of all vital financial documents including bank accounts, securities, and land titles.
3. Among the land titles in my custody was the Owner’s Duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 232238 registered in the name of CHI.
4. On June 14, 1999, Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, filed a VERIFIED PETITION
for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of the aforementioned certificate
claiming under oath that said duplicate copy was in his custody but was lost.
xxxx
5. Paul Lee likewise executed an affidavit of loss stating the same fact of loss,
which affidavit he used and presented as exhibit "D".
xxxx
6. On August 18, 1999, Paul Lee testified under oath that TCT No. 232238 was
inadvertently lost and misplaced from his files.
xxxx
 7. Paul Lee made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified
petition, affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly knew that I was in possession of
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.
8. I and my brother Nixon Lee opposed the petition of Paul Lee and even produced
in open court the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.
Such fact was contained in the Order of Branch 4, RTC, Manila, dated November
12, 1999, x x x.
9. I and Paul Lee are involved in an intra-corporate dispute, which dispute is now
pending with the SEC.
10. Paul Lee needed to have a new owner’s duplicate of the aforementioned TCT
so that he could mortgage the property covered thereby with the Planters
Development Bank, even without my knowledge and consent as well as the
consent and knowledge of my brother Nixon Lee who is likewise a shareholder,
board member and officer of CHI.
11. If not for the timely discovery of the petition of Paul Lee, with his perjurious
misrepresentation, a new owner’s duplicate could have been issued.
x x x x15 (Italics supplied.)
On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit16 to clarify that she was
accusing petitioner of perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by
declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the contents in his petition filed with the RTC
of Manila concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in his possession but was lost; (2)
by declaring under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by testifying
under oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.
The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. However, in the
Review Resolution17 dated December 1, 2000 issued by First Assistant City Prosecutor
Eufrosino A. Sulla, the recommendation to dismiss the case was set aside. Thereafter, said
City Prosecutor filed the Informations18 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 352270-71 CR for
perjury, punishable under Article 18319 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, against
petitioner before the MeTC of Manila, Branch 28.
At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private
prosecutor with the consent and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
After the prosecution’s presentation of its first witness in the person of Atty. Ronaldo Viesca,
Jr.,20 a lawyer from the Land Registration Authority, petitioner’s counsel moved in open court
that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be excluded from participating in the
case since perjury is a public offense. Said motion was vehemently opposed by Atty.
Macam.21 In its Order22dated May 7, 2003, the MeTC gave both the defense and the
prosecution the opportunity to submit their motion and comment respectively as regards the
issue raised by petitioner’s counsel.
Complying with the MeTC’s directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned Omnibus
Motion23 asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a
private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case. Petitioner argued that
perjury is a crime against public interest as provided under Section 2, Chapter 2, Title IV,
Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, where the offended party is the State
alone. Petitioner posited that there being no allegation of damage to private interests, a
private prosecutor is not needed. On the other hand, the Prosecution filed its Opposition24 to
petitioner’s Omnibus Motion.
The MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion in the Order25 dated August 15, 2003, as follows:
[W]hile criminal actions, as a rule, are prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor, however, an offended party may intervene in the proceeding, personally
or by attorney, especially in cases of offenses which cannot be prosecuted except at the
instance of the offended party. The only exception to this rule is when the offended party
waives his right to [file the] civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the
termination of the case, in which case he loses his right to intervene upon the theory that he
is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. And, in any event, whenever an
offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must
always be subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor. (Lim Tek Goan vs.
Yatco, 94 Phil. 197).
Apparently, the law makes no distinction between cases that are public in nature and those
that can only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. In either case, the law
gives to the offended party the right to intervene, personally or by counsel, and he is
deprived of such right only when he waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute
one. Such is not the situation in this case. The case at bar involves a public crime and the
private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, subject to the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.26
The MeTC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.27
Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition28 for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner
prayed, among others, for the CA to enjoin the MeTC and respondent from enforcing the
MeTC Orders dated August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003, and likewise to enjoin the
MeTC and respondent from further allowing the private prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings below while the instant case is pending.
By Decision29 dated May 31, 2007, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the
presence of the private prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the
rules. The CA ratiocinated that respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the
private complainant therein, hence, an aggrieved party.30 Reiterating the MeTC’s invocation
of our ruling in Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco31 as cited by former Supreme Court Associate Justice
Florenz D. Regalado in his Remedial Law Compendium,32 the CA ruled that "the offended
party, who has neither reserved, waived, nor instituted the civil action may intervene, and
such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved."33
Without passing upon the merits of the perjury cases, the CA declared that respondent’s
property rights and interests as the treasurer and a stockholder of CHI were disturbed
and/or threatened by the alleged acts of petitioner. Further, the CA opined that petitioner’s
right to a fair trial is not violated because the presence of the private prosecutor in these
cases does not exclude the presence of the public prosecutor who remains to have the
prosecuting authority, subjecting the private prosecutor to his control and supervision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 but the CA denied it under Resolution35 dated
January 31, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED
PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST;
AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
UPHELD THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN
UPHELD THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENT, AN ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF
CHI, TO INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION WITHOUT ITS
AUTHORITY.36
Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does not offend
any private party but is a crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly
administration of laws. He opines that perjury is a felony where no civil liability arises on the
part of the offender because there are no damages to be compensated and that there is no
private person injured by the crime.
Petitioner argues that the CA’s invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited by
Justice Regalado in his book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a
civil interest in the criminal case in order to intervene through a private prosecutor.
Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner points out that said case involved the crime of grave
threats where Lim Tek Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the
crime of grave threats did not have any civil liability to be satisfied, petitioner claims that Lim
Tek Goan, as a matter of right, may still intervene because he was one of the offended
parties.
Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent
respondent in this case despite the fact that the latter was not the offended party and did not
suffer any damage as she herself did not allege nor claim in her Complaint-Affidavit and
Supplemental Affidavit that she or CHI suffered any damage that may be satisfied through
restitution,37 reparation for the damage caused38 and indemnification for consequential
damages.39 Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent is not the proper offended party that
may intervene in this case as she was not authorized by CHI. Thus, he prayed, among
others, that Atty. Macam or any private prosecutor for that matter be excluded from the
prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam
intervened be set aside and that the same be taken anew by the public prosecutor alone.40
On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the private
prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact,
an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private
complainant. Thus, she submits that pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the
right to intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case.41
The petition has no merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that "[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable."42 Underlying this legal
principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two
entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State,
whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission.43
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor
is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.—Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an
offended party as "the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,44 this Court rejected petitioner’s theory that it is
only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that
from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume
that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom
the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is
civilly liable is the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that Under Section 16, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private
individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by
the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is
damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a
legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to
recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has
the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil
liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential.
The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering
CHI’s property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt,
injurious to respondent’s personal credibility and reputation insofar as her faithful
performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI.
The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondent’s
timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in
the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both
MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial
court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of
tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the
proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended
party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover,
is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.48
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private
respondent who is also the corporation’s Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public
documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholder’s Meeting) was instituted by the City Prosecutor
against petitioner and his wife. After private respondent’s testimony was heard during the
trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that she
failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC granted the motion and
ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court
reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private prosecutors in the prosecution
of the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which
dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private
prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the
offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for
an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is
the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a
person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or
the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member
of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious
because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime
but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is
really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil
liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the damage
caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus,
we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondent’s testimony in the inferior court did not establish
nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioner’s alleged acts
of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were proven therein, then
the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the
civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the
damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such
indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal
proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve
the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no
waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of
injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the
offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in
the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed,
and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the private
prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to exclude Atty.
Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31,
2007 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81510 are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-91-764. November 6, 1992.]
PETE M. PICO, Complainant, v. JUDGE ALFONSO V. COMBONG, JR.,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, Negros
Occidental, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; APPLICANT FOR ADMISSION
TO BAIL MUST BE IN CUSTODY OF THE LAW OR OTHERWISE DEPRIVED OF HIS
LIBERTY. — A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of
the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of
that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the
whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body
of the accused before considering the application for bail.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION FOR BAIL FROM PERSON CHARGED WITH
CAPITAL OFFENSE MUST BE SET FOR HEARING; GRANT OF APPLICATION FOR
BAIL ABSENT ANY TAKING OF EVIDENCE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED WAS STRONG, CONSTITUTES ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND
WHIMSICAL ACTION. — It is well-settled that an application for bail from a
person charged with a capital offense (now an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua) must be set for hearing at which both the prosecution and the
defense must be given a reasonable opportunity to prove (in the case of the
prosecution) that evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of
the defense) that such evidence of guilt was not strong. In the instant case,
where the offense charged is murder and punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death, respondent Judge’s deliberate failure to set the application for bail for
hearing effectively deprived the People of its right to due process. Granting the
application for bail and fixing the amount thereof, absent any taking of evidence
as to whether or not the guilt of the accused was strong, constitutes arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical action. Such inexcusable conduct reflects either gross
ignorance of the law or a cavalier disregard of its requirements. Respondent
Judge’s alleged impression that the probability of flight on the part of the
accused was "practically nil," was obviously not based on evidence of record; he
had no right to act on the basis of such merely personal impression. He himself
had issued the warrant of arrest stating that no bail was recommended and
then, inexplicably, without any evidence being presented to support the
application for bail, released the accused on bail of P50,000.00.
3. JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; JUDGES REQUIRED TO
ACT WITH COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE AT ALL TIMES. —
The above circumstances make clear that respondent Judge’s acts were
inconsistent with the Code of Judicial Conduct. That Code requires judges to act
with competence, integrity and independence and so to behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant Pete M. Pico is the brother of Father Narciso M. Pico, a minister of
the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, who was brutally shot to death on 10 January
1991 in his Parish, Diocese of Negros Occidental at Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. According to a report of an investigation conducted by the
Commission on Human Rights, rebel "returnees" or "surrenderees" identified
with the "Brotherhood of Organized Returnees" in Negros Occidental were
responsible for the slaying.
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental filed, on 3 July 1991, an
information charging one Eddie Villegas with the murder of Father Narciso M.
Pico. The Provincial Fiscal recommended that no bail be granted. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 667 in the Regional Trial Court of La Carlota City,
presided over by respondent Judge.chanrobles law library : red
On 17 July 1991, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the
accused Eddie Villegas; in this warrant, the words "no bail recommended" were
typed in on the appropriate space. The warrant of arrest was forwarded to the
Superintendent of the Philippine National Police ("PNP"), Negros Occidental, for
service. A return of the warrant was submitted by the 332nd PNP District
Command, located in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, on 5 September 1991,
about three (3) towns away from La Carlota City.
On 6 August 1991, complainant Pico went to the Regional Trial Court of La
Carlota and discovered, to his surprise, that accused Villegas had been granted
bail on 2 August 1991 and, upon posting a P50,000.00 bond, had been
released.
In the present administrative case filed on 24 August 1991, complainant
charges respondent Judge with serious misconduct and grave abuse of
discretion for having granted bail to the accused, who had been charged with an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing and even
before the accused had been arrested or detained. Complainant alleges that
respondent Judge granted the motion for bail on the same day that that motion
was filed, i.e., on 2 August 1991, without setting the motion for bail for hearing
and without giving the prosecution an opportunity to challenge the application
for provisional liberty. A copy of the motion for bail, according to the complaint,
was received by the prosecution only on 7 August 1991, and the prosecution
moved for a hearing on the application for bail on 9 August 1991. Complainant
also directs the attention of this Court to an order of respondent Judge dated 14
August 1991, rescheduling the arraignment of accused Villegas due to lack of
proof of the arrest or detention of the accused.chanrobles law library : red
Respondent Judge, in his comment dated 3 August 1992 on the complaint,
denied that he had granted the application for bail even prior to the arrest or
detention of the accused. He, however, admits having failed to hold a hearing
on the application for bail. Respondent Judge contends that on the day the
motion for bail was filed, he as Judge had jurisdiction over the same, even if the
accused had not personally surrendered to the court and even if the return of
the warrant of arrest had not as yet been filed in court. He claims that his
failure to require defense counsel to show proof that the accused had been
taken into custody by the police authorities, was due to oversight on his part,
and that he had not been motivated by any illegal or immoral consideration
when he granted bail and ordered the release of accused Villegas. He had
deliberately omitted holding a hearing because he had been fully convinced that
the possibility of the accused jumping bail "was practically nil." 1
We cannot countenance respondent Judge’s actions.
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. 2 A person who has not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.
Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the
applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail.
It is well-settled that an application for bail from a person charged with a capital
offense (now an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for
hearing at which both the prosecution and the defense must be given a
reasonable opportunity to prove (in the case of the prosecution) that evidence
of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of the defense) that such
evidence of guilt was not strong. 3 In the instant case, where the offense
charged is murder and punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, respondent
Judge’s deliberate failure to set the application for bail for hearing effectively
deprived the People of its right to due process. Granting the application for bail
and fixing the amount thereof, absent any taking of evidence as to whether or
not the guilt of the accused was strong, constitutes arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical action. 4 Such inexcusable conduct reflects either gross ignorance of
the law or a cavalier disregard of its requirements. Respondent Judge’s alleged
impression that the probability of flight on the part of the accused was
"practically nil," was obviously not based on evidence of record; he had no right
to act on the basis of such merely personal impression. He himself had issued
the warrant of arrest stating that no bail was recommended and then,
inexplicably, without any evidence being presented to support the application
for bail, released the accused on bail of P50,000.00.
The above circumstances make clear that respondent Judge’s acts were
inconsistent with the Code of Judicial Conduct. That Code requires judges to act
with competence, integrity and independence and so to behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 5
Respondent Judge manifested to this Court that accused Villegas whom he had
released on bail, was shot dead on 22 February 1992 at Barangay Cambaong,
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. If true, this circumstance renders review and
setting aside of respondent Judge’s order fixing bail academic and unnecessary;
otherwise, recall of the order of release of accused Eddie Villegas and (if
necessary) his arrest, and the setting for immediate hearing of the application
for provisional liberty would be necessary.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alfonso V. Combong is hereby found guilty of
serious misconduct in office and is hereby FINED Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). In addition, the Court Resolved to CENSURE and WARN the
respondent Judge to exercise much greater care and diligence in the
performance of his duties as a judge and that the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Judge is also hereby
REQUIRED to furnish the Court a certified true copy of the Death Certificate of
the accused Eddie Villegas, plus reasonable proof that the deceased Eddie
Villegas is the Eddie Villegas who was charged with murder in Criminal Case No.
667, Regional Trial Court of La Carlota City.
A copy of this Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent
Judge in the Office of the Court Administrator.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J. and Medialdea, J., are on leave.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156081 October 19, 2005
FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEÑA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE
TAGLE, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
WILSON GO, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated September 2, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, as well as its Resolution2 dated November 12, 2002,
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The appellate court dismissed the petition
for review under Rule 433 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for being an erroneous mode
of appeal from the Resolution4 of the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary had modified the
Resolution5 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in I.S. No. PSG 00-04-10205
and directed the latter to file an information for estafa against petitioners.
The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).
On October 17, 1995, FEPI allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila
Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop several
parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC. Under the terms of the
Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a first-class
residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said Project
Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.
Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. Lot 17 measured
approximately 1,079 square meters and the purchase price agreed upon was ₱4,304,000.
The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI.
Under the terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a downpayment of
₱1,291,200 and a last installment of ₱840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In turn,
FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owner’s
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) upon complete payment of the purchase
price.
Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract. FEPI, however, failed to develop the
property. Neither did it release the TCT to Go. The latter demanded fulfillment of the terms
and conditions of their agreement. FEPI balked. In several letters to its clients, including
respondent Go, FEPI explained that the project was temporarily halted due to some
claimants who opposed FEPI’s application for exclusion of the subject properties from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Further, FEPI’s hands were
tied by a cease and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Said
order was the subject of several appeals now pending before this Court. FEPI assured its
clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and would resume developing the
properties once the disputes had been settled in its favor.
Go was neither satisfied nor assured by FEPI’s statements and he made several demands
upon FEPI to return his payment of the purchase price in full. FEPI failed to heed his
demands. Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). He likewise filed a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 3166 and
3187 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City
against petitioners as officers of FEPI. The complaint for estafa averred that the Contract to
Sell categorically stated that FEPI was the owner of the property. However, before the
HLURB, FEPI denied ownership of the realty. Go alleged that the petitioners committed
estafa when they offered the subject property for sale since they knew fully well that the
development of the property and issuance of its corresponding title were impossible to
accomplish, as the ownership and title thereto had not yet been acquired and registered
under the name of FEPI at the time of sale. Thus, FEPI had grossly misrepresented itself as
owner at the time of the sale of the subject property to him and when it received from him
the full payment, despite being aware that it was not yet the owner.
Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the
preliminary investigation on the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the
contract was not executed nor were the payments made in Pasig City. Besides, countered
petitioners, none of the elements of estafa under Articles 316 and 318 were present. They
averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with authority to sell
under a joint venture with MSDC, who is the real owner. They further denied that FEPI ever
made any written nor oral representation to Go that it is the owner, pointing out that Go
failed to positively identify who made such misrepresentation to him nor did Go say where
the misrepresentation was made. According to petitioner, there being neither deceit nor
misrepresentation, there could be no damage nor prejudice to respondent, and no probable
cause exists to indict the petitioners. Petitioners likewise insisted that they could not be held
criminally liable for abiding with a cease-and-desist order of the DAR.
In his reply, Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had jurisdiction over the
case. He argued that the Contract to Sell specifically provided that payment be made at
FEPI’s office at Pasig City and the demand letters bore the Pasig City address. He averred
that FEPI could not disclaim ownership of the project since the contract described FEPI as
owner without mentioning MSDC. Additionally, the acts executed by FEPI appearing in the
contract were the acts of an owner and not a mere developer.
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for
estafa, thus:
Wherefore, the case for estafa, under Articles 316 and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, filed
against the respondents Ferdinand Santos, Robert [John] Sobrepeña, Federico Campos,
Polo Pantaleon and Rafael Perez de Tagle, Jr. is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.8
The City Prosecutor found no misrepresentation stating that, (1) the Contract to Sell did not
mention FEPI as the owner of the property; (2) since no Deed of Sale had been executed by
the parties, then petitioners are not yet bound to deliver the certificate of title since under
both the Contract to Sell and Section 259 of Presidential Decree No. 957,10 FEPI was bound
to deliver the certificate of title only upon the execution of a contract of sale; and (3) the City
Prosecutor disavowed any jurisdiction since it is the HLURB, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving the sale of lots in commercial
subdivision including claims involving refunds under P.D. No. 1344.11
Go appealed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in
turn reversed the City Prosecutor’s findings, and held, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of
Pasig City is directed to file an information for estafa defined and penalized under Art. 316,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code against respondents Ferdinand Santos, Robert [John]
Sobrepeña, Federico Campos, Polo Pantaleon and Rafael Perez De Tagle, Jr. and report
the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.12
The DOJ found that there was a prima facie basis to hold petitioners liable for estafa under
Article 316 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, pointing out that the elements of the offense
were present as evidenced by the terms of the Contract to Sell. It ruled that under the
Contract, the petitioners sold the property to Go despite full knowledge that FEPI was not its
owner. The DOJ noted that petitioners did not deny the due execution of the contract and
had accepted payments of the purchase price as evidenced by the receipts. Thus, FEPI
was exercising acts of ownership when it conveyed the property to respondent Go. Acts to
convey, sell, encumber or mortgage real property are acts of strict ownership. Furthermore,
nowhere did FEPI mention that it had a joint venture with MSDC, the alleged true owner of
the property. Clearly, petitioners committed acts of misrepresentation when FEPI denied
ownership after the perfection of the contract and the payment of the purchase price. Since
a corporation can only act through its agents or officers, then all the participants in a
fraudulent transaction are deemed liable.
Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and Federico Campos
and Polo Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was deferred
since Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause,
which was granted by the trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of
Appeals, a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67388. Accordingly, the trial
court deferred the arraignment of petitioners until the petition for review was resolved.
On September 2, 2002, the appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition, HAVING NO MERIT, is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE AND ORDERED DISMISSED, with cost to Petitioners.
13
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot be availed
of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies
only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. The decision to file an
information or not is an executive and not a quasi-judicial function.
Herein petitioners seasonably moved for reconsideration, but the motion was likewise
denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CANNOT BE AVAILED OF TO APPEAL THE RESOLUTIONS OF
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.14
(2) THE DOJ SECRETARY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE AND
RESOLVED TO FILE AN INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA UNDER ART. 316, SEC. 1 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AGAINST PETITIONERS, CONSIDERING THAT: (A) Petitioners
did not pretend that they, or FEPI, were the owners of the subject property; (B) FEPI need
not have been the owner at the time the Contract to Sell was furnished to respondent Go;
(C) There was no prejudice caused to respondent Go; (D) There is no personal act or
omission constituting a crime ascribed to any of the Petitioners, therefore, there can be no
probable cause against them; and (E) There was no deceit or even intent to deceive.15
To our mind, the sole issue for resolution is whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a
proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor
to file an information in a criminal case. In the course of this determination, we must also
consider whether the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasi-
judicial function.
Petitioners submit that there is jurisprudence to the effect that Rule 43 covers rulings of the
Secretary of Justice since during preliminary investigations, the DOJ’s decisions are
deemed as "awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions", and its prosecutorial offices are
considered quasi-judicial bodies/officers performing quasi-judicial functions.
Respondent counters that the herein petition is a dilatory tactic and emphasizes that
"injunction will not lie to restrain criminal prosecution."
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the
Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals
or quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of
Justice is not among the agencies16 enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius.
We cannot agree with petitioners’ submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-
judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of evaluation and examination of evidence, which is the province of a full-blown trial on the
probable cause. merits.

In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,17 we held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi- Second, courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the
judicial proceeding, thus: offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient
in form or substance, or without any ground. Or, he may proceed with the investigation if the
[t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of complaint in his view is sufficient and in proper form.22 The decision whether to dismiss a
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion of the prosecuting fiscal and,
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice.23 Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not
who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion.24 In this case, petitioners
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailing
that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable jurisprudence.
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the
that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.18 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, dated September 2, 2002 and
November 12, 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
Though some cases19 describe the public prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial Costs against petitioners.
bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point.20 A quasi-judicial body is as an organ SO ORDERED.
of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.21 A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an
information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of
Justice is reviewing the former’s order or resolutions.

Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose
decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa
is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for review.

Notwithstanding that theirs is a petition for review properly under Rule 45, petitioners want
us to reverse the findings of probable cause by the DOJ after their petition for review under
Rule 43 from the court a quo failed. This much we are not inclined to do, for we have no
basis to review the DOJ’s factual findings and its determination of probable cause.

First, Rule 45 is explicit. This mode of appeal to the Supreme Court covers the judgments,
orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or any authorized court and should raise only pure question of law. The Department of
Justice is not a court.

Also, in this petition are raised factual matters for our resolution, e.g. the ownership of the
subject property, the existence of deceit committed by petitioners on respondent, and
petitioners’ knowledge or direct participation in the Contract to Sell. These are factual issues
and are outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. The cited questions require
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a)
the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b)
the Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner
(Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens
with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as
G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said
case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She
alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which
provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo,
pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice
Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at
8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there
was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of
particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48).
The motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the
application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it
lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the
names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.
No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the
two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
the motion for the bill of particulars).
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution
stated categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to
admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-
126).
On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated
March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting
the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds
within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32
Amended Informations was set for
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated
March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from
sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court
and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail
bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication
of is letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged"
the validity of the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to
change the conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he
sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the
July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July
11, 1992 a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a
"perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding
Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice
Francis Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from
going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against
her. Some of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone,
left and returned to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any
kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes of this country's
outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The
Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I
contend this is the kind of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p.
156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds
objectionable, reads as follows:
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are
pending of her intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where
she is charged with soliciting donations from people transacting with her
office at Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged
with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien
Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where her petition is
still pending (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having
favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order
was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No.
324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the
same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of
the official and administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of
the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as
uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity
and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in
court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the
letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have
been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against
the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the
Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among
the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606,
Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's
fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v.
Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).
Re: Claim of denial of due process
Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by
reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her,
while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information
was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo,
p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case.
In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors
inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled
because of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original
information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the
January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory
process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor
Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned
to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the
investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case
was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of
the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review,
normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in
March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case
No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the
preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a
piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of
spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in
the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in
not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who
arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution
of her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No.
324, that petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of
Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons
qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused
"undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable
element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as
claimed by petitioners although there may be instances where both
elements concur.
Re: Delito continuado
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the
Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We
also noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32
Amended Informations, the splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the
furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant,
which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case,
and hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued
crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind
that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult
as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are
united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in
reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised
Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent
or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the
following cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by
the accused at the same time and at the same period of time (People v.
Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the
same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA
563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
(People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every
time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that
the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun,
10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were impelled by
the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts
of collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People v.
Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from
January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July
1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were
committed on two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and
falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and October
1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one
purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v.
Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the
failure of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the
other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing
machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of
collections from customers of the employer made on different dates
(Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been
applied to crimes penalized under special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following
up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special
laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the
Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special
laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single
offense or separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed
American courts as shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking
of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and
place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny
doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also
abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the
accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37
ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the
different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done
on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson,
81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee
against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could
be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life
(Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
under the law to enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii)
was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original
information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each
amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that
they would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32
aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division):

On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded

categorically that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago
consists of one violation of the law represented by the approval of the
applications of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien
Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the
concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is categorical
that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval
of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke
of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars
that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated
November 13, 1992 stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and
prejudice to the government is concerned, the same is represented not
only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the
adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in granting
citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in
Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended
Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one
offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143375 July 6, 2001
RUTH D. BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR, REGION IV,
and SUSAN ALOÑA, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents a new dimension in the ever controversial Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 or The Bouncing Checks Law. The question posed is whether the
drawer of a check which is dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds can be prosecuted
under BP 22 even if the check is presented for payment after ninety (90) days from its due
date. The burgeoning jurisprudence on the matter appears silent on this point.
Sometime in April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent Susan
Aloña Metrobank Check No. 005014037 dated 8 May 1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on
Metrobank Cavite City Branch. According to private respondent, petitioner assured her that
the check would be sufficiently funded on the maturity date.
On 20 October 1998 private respondent presented the check for payment. The drawee bank
dishonored the check because it was drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of
Cavite City.1 In addition to the details of the issuance and the dishonor of the check, she
also alleged that she made repeated demands on petitioner to make arrangements for the
payment of the check within five (5) working days after receipt of notice of dishonor from the
bank, but that petitioner failed to do so.
Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that
presentment of the check within ninety (90) days from due date thereof was an essential
element of the offense of violation of BP 22. Since the check was presented for payment
166 days after its due date, it was no longer punishable under BP 22 and therefore the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit. She also claimed that she already assigned
private respondent her condominium unit at Antel Seaview Condominium, Roxas Boulevard,
as full payment for the bounced checks thus extinguishing her criminal liability.
On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing
of an Information against petitioner for violation of BP 22, which was approved by the City
Prosecutor.
On 13 May 1999 petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) for
Region IV a petition for review of the 22 April 1999 resolution. The ORSP denied the petition
in a one (1)-page resolution dated 25 June 1999. On 5 July 1999 petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied on 31 August 1999. According to the ORSP,
only resolutions of prosecutors dismissing a criminal complaint were cognizable for review
by that office, citing Department Order No. 223.
On 1 October 1999 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the
resolution of the ORSP, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999 as well as the order dated 31 August
1999 denying reconsideration. The appellate court issued the assailed Resolution dated 26
October 1999 denying due course outright and dismissing the petition.2 According to
respondent appellate court -
A petition for review is appropriate under Rule 42 (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, filed in the Court of Appeals. Rule 43 x x x provides for appeal, via a
petition for review x x x from judgment or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's "Petition for
Review" of the ORSP resolution does not fall under any of the agencies mentioned
in Rule 43 x x x x It is worth to note that petitioner in her three (3) assigned errors
charged the ORSP of "serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion." The
grounds relied upon by petitioner are proper in a petition for certiorari x x x x Even
if We treat the "Petition for Review" as a petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to
allege the essential requirements of a special civil action. Besides, the remedy of
petitioner is in the Regional Trial Court, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
x x x x (italics supplied)
First, some ground rules. This case went to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to "appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions."3
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-
judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG,4 Koh v. Court of Appeals,5 Andaya v. Provincial
Fiscal of Surigao del Norte6 and Crespo v. Mogul.7 In these cases this Court held that the
power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement
holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the
similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-
judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making."8
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees,9 we held that a
voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency, hence his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
This is so because the awards of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the
lapse of the period to appeal;10 and since their awards determine the rights of parties, their
decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the proper remedy from
an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for
appellate review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.11 While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.12
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finality only where the
penalty prescribed for the offense does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of the
imposable fine,13 the only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion,
is to present her defense in the trial of the case.
Besides, it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal to
determine the specificity and adequacy of the offense charged. He may dismiss the
complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient in form or substance or if he finds no
ground to continue with the inquiry; or, he may otherwise proceed with the investigation if
the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form.14
In the present recourse, notwithstanding the procedural lapses, we give due course to the
petition, in view of the novel legal question involved, to prevent further delay of the
prosecution of the criminal case below, and more importantly, to dispel any notion that
procedural technicalities are being used to defeat the substantive rights of petitioner.
Petitioner is accused of violation of BP 22 the substantive portion of which reads -
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of
the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank x x x x (italics
supplied).
An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two (2) distinct
acts: First, making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank; and, second, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check
if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.15
In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the
check at the time of its issuance, while in the second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient
funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety
(90) days from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the offense is
consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit.
The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of issuance since the drawer
had neither sufficient funds in nor credit with the drawee bank at the time, while that
involved in the second offense is good when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank when issued.16 Under the first offense, the ninety (90)-day
presentment period is not expressly provided, while such period is an express element of
the second offense.17
From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that petitioner is being prosecuted for
violation of the first paragraph of the offense.
Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP 22 on the simple
ground that the subject check was presented 166 days after the date stated thereon. She
cites Sec. 2 of BP 22 which reads -
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
 days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee (italics supplied).
Petitioner interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90)-day presentment period is an
element of the offenses punished in BP 22. She asseverates that "for a maker or issuer of a
check to be covered by B.P. 22, the check issued by him/her is one that is dishonored when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from date of the check. If the dishonor
occurred after presentment for payment beyond the ninety (90)-day period, no criminal
liability attaches; only a civil case for collection of sum of money may be filed, if warranted."
To bolster this argument, she relies on the view espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan in his
treatise - 18
Although evidentiary in nature, section 2 of the law must be taken as furnishing an
additional element of the offense defined in the first paragraph of section 1
because it provides for the evidentiary fact of "knowledge of insufficiency of funds
or credit" which is an element of the offense defined in said paragraph; otherwise
said provision of section 2 would be rendered without meaning and nugatory. The
rule of statutory construction is that the parts of a statute must be read together in
such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be
construed as contradicting each other. The same section cannot be deemed to
supply an additional element for the offense under the second paragraph of
section 1 because the 90-day presentment period is already a built-in element in
the definition of said offense (italics supplied).
We are not convinced. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged
in the complaint or information, and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined
by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes.19
The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and, (c) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.20
The ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a
dishonored check presented within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima
facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of
the offense. Since knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself
creates a prima facie presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of drawing,
issuing or making a check, the payment of which was subsequently refused for insufficiency
of funds.21 The term prima facieevidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or
to counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.22
The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the
presentation of evidence to the contrary.23 Neither does the term prima facie evidence
preclude the presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove the existence or
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or lack of credit. Surely, the law is not so circumscribed
as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the dishonor of the subject check when
presented within the prescribed ninety (90) day period. The deliberations on the passage of
BP 22 (then known as Cabinet Bill No. 9) between the author, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, and Bataan Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove insightful -
MR. ROMAN: x x x x Under Section 1, who is the person who may be liable under
this Section? Would it be the maker or the drawer? How about the endorser, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. MENDOZA: Liable.
MR. ROMAN: The endorser, therefore, under Section 1 is charged with the duty of
knowing at the time he endorses and delivers a check . . . .
MR. MENDOZA: If the endorser is charged for violation of the Act then the fact of
knowledge must be proven by positive evidence because the presumption of
knowledge arises only against the maker or the drawer. It does not arise as
against endorser under the following section (italics supplied).
MR. ROMAN: But under Section 1, it says here: "Any person who shall make or
draw or utter or deliver any check." The preposition is disjunctive, so that any
person who delivers any check knowing at the time of such making or such
delivery that the maker or drawer has no sufficient funds would be liable under
Section 1.
MR. MENDOZA: That is correct Mr. Speaker. But, as I said, while there is liability
even as against endorser, for example, the presumption of knowledge of
insufficient funds arises only against the maker or drawer under Section 2.
MR. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is true; however, under Section 1, endorsers of
checks or bills of exchange would find it necessary since they may be charged with
the knowledge at the time they negotiate bills of exchange they have no sufficient
funds in the bank or depository.
MR. MENDOZA: In order that an endorser may be held liable, there must be
evidence showing that at the time he endorsed the check he was aware that the
drawer would not have sufficient funds to cover the check upon presentation. That
evidence must be presented by the prosecution. However, if the one changed is
the drawer, then that evidence need not be presented by the prosecution because
that fact would be established by presumption under Section 2 (italics supplied).24
An endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22, even though the
presumption of knowledge does not apply to him, if there is evidence that at the time of
endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the foregoing
deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge
and not to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge.
Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within ninety
(90) days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other
evidence. Whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the
information is addressed to the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not
controllable by certiorari. Certainly, petitioner is not left in a lurch as the prosecution must
prove knowledge without the benefit of the presumption, and she may present whatever
defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.

The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is
analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of
the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate
facts.25Applying this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the
ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check
presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.

It is worth reiterating that courts will not normally interfere with the prosecutor's discretion to
file a criminal case when there is probable cause to do so. Probable cause has been
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.26 The prosecutor has ruled
that there is probable cause in this case, and we see no reason to disturb the finding.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 1999
which dismissed the petition for review questioning the resolution of the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999, and its order dated 31 August
1999 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
 That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm
(armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH
gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a
consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO
and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby
inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused the death
Republic of the Philippines of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts
SUPREME COURT of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
Manila consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance
SECOND DIVISION rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their
death. 1
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
xxx xxx xxx
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant. accurately the facts as follows:

SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing
the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the
approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing
death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us
whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith,
he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an
appeal.
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny,
had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the
accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife
was left behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn,
Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte.
On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores,
Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch
the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the station in the afternoon
to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and could not
leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then proceeded to the
residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived at his
residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).

The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco
Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed
as follows:
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley
Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the
accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The
accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the
house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30
p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V
 & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He
proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley
Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh
three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina
Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh
was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp.
34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of
multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn,
Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and
operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17,
1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the
hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold
Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not
able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent
P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the
same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion
whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder as charged in the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of
the Revised Penal Code which does not consider the effect of mitigating
or aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to death, to
indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000,
complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and
defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila; that
the accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his
wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived him
of the capacity to reflect upon his acts. Considering all these
circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco Abarca is
deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if
not a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of
the Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF
ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated
murder. Article 247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. — Any legally married person who, having surprised his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person,
shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to
parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and
their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant
case. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim
in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the
deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1)
that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in
convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-
appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the
latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that
the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his
spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly
thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But
the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not
have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the
accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an
offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the
above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants
a privilege or benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an
adequate punishment — to a legally married person or parent who shall
surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who
would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide,
murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only
with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is
intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment.
(People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries other than
serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect,
therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned
therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or
serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to
result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines
and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances
which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral
elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to
plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an
interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much
less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the
crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the offense"
should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance
which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not
being an essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense
that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded.
(Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when
we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was
found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering
crimes against persons. There can, we think, hardly be any dispute that
as part of the general provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a
distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does
not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or
benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious
physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is
intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a
punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries
suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the
accused-appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double
frustrated murder against the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense,
proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have
the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is
liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts
to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing
murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any
responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots
at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing
at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not
enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We
nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part,
second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple
imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for
one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the
extent of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to
fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is
sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within
which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is
furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as
and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's
loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 96009 September 15, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDMUND EMPLEO Y MAQUILAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Escolastico A. Daitol for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
In a complaint,1 filed by Elisa Cordova y Urdaneta, herein accused-appellant Edmund
Empleo y Maquilan was charged with the crime of rape allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1989, at about 8:20 p.m. in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, by the use of force upon
the undersigned complainant, Elisa Cordova y Urdaneta, to wit: by
grabbing her under a point of a gun, forced her to lie on the ground and
forcibly tore her underwear, kiss (sic) and with the use of superior
strength, did then, and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with said Elisa Cordova against the latter's will.
on the basis of which he was arraigned and, on his plea of not guilty, thereafter tried on the
merits with the assistance of his counsel de parte at all stages.
Considering the importance and primacy given by appellate courts to the factual findings of
trial courts, especially on the issue of credibility of testimonial evidence, we reproduce
hereunder the ambient facts of the sexual assault as culled from the prosecution's evidence
and the submissions of the defense in its version of the incident, all as perspicaciously
synthesized by the court a quo:
On March 14, 1989, at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, private complainant,
Elisa Cordova, a 16 year old student in the local university, went with her
friends and classmates, namely: Collen Parreño, Robert de la Cruz and
Gemma Amadeo, to the Top Hills in Lahug, Cebu City, to view the scenic
lights of the city. While they were enjoying the scenic attractions and
windy atmosphere atop the hill, three (3) men approached them. One of
them whom complainant later identified, was accused Edmund Empleo,
who dragged her under gun point to the bushes some 24 meters away
from her friends. She was forcibly laid on the rocky ground amidst the
bushes. She pushed and kicked her attacker on the stomach and struck
him with stone but the accused, with his gun pointed at her, boxed her in
the abdomen or her solar plexus, causing her to lose consciousness, her
skirt was raised, her panty removed, and she felt excruciating pains on
her vagina.
When the accused left her, she crawled and a person from nowhere,
whom she not recognize, lifted her and brought her to a house near the
bridge. She was later taken to the Cebu City Medical Center for the
injuries she sustained.
On the following day, March 15, 1989, she was examined by
Dr. Suga Sotto-Juvienco, at her clinic. She reported the incident to the
Mabolo Police Station and described to them the appearance of the
person who molested her. She did not know the name of the accused
then. She came to know about the arrest of Edmund Empleo when she
was fetched by a PC soldier and brought her to the Mabolo Police Station,
where she was made to identify the accused. She readily identified the
accused, Edmund Empleo, as the man who ravished her.
Gilberto Magallon, a Physician of the Cebu City Medical Center, issued
medical certificate, Exh. "A". He treated the victim, Elisa Cordova, on
March 14, 1989 whey the latter was admitted to the Emergency Room of
the hospital as a victim of rape. He examined the patient's genitalia and
his examination revealed the following pertinent findings:
 Genitalia — Grossly, normal, female
Introitus — Hyperemic, including the labia majora
— Sand particles noted
Hymenal ring — with old laceration at
6 o'clock (Exh. "A-2")
He explained that the entrance of the vagina was hyperemic. There was
noted an increase of vast blood flow in the area because of an injury
which may have been caused by hard object. Immediately after he
examined the patient he referred her to the Surgery Department because
of the bruises which the victim also sustained.
Collen Parreño, corroborated the testimony of the victim, Elisa Cordova,
being one of the latter's companions on the date and time of the incident.
She narrated that when the three (3) unidentified persons approached
them, they introduced themselves as PC soldiers and announced that
they were under arrest. Although surprised as they have not committed
any crime, they pleaded for mercy. She was hogtied instead. Gemma
Amadeo likewise. Their male companion, Robert de la Cruz was mauled.
The victim, Elisa Cordova, was pulled from (them) to a grassy place about
15 meters away by one of the men, whom (they) later recognized as the
accused, Edmund Empleo. Her friend, Elisa Cordova, struggled. When
the latter was able to free herself, she ran away. Edmund Empleo
overtook her. From her place she witnessed when accused forced Elisa
Cordova to lie down against the bushes. She did not know what
happened thereafter because Elisa was dragged further to the thicket.
They were taken to a place, farther from the scene of the incident where
they were untied by the companions of the accused, who took pity on
them. They asked help from the house of her friend, Gemma Amadeo,
and when they returned to the place, the policemen were already there
and took the victim to the hospital.
Manuel Ampo, also a physician, attended to the victim, Elisa Cordova.
She was referred to him, from the Obstetrics Gynecology Department of
the Cebu City Medical Center. He conducted a medical examination on
the patient, who suffered more or less 8 injuries, consisting of linear
abrasions in the neck, left breast, anterior chest, right forearm, right hand,
left knee and back, as shown in the Medical Certificate
(Exh. "B") he issued. The injuries could have been due to the forcible
contact of the skin with rough objects.
The gravity of the abrasions in the forearm, chest, breast and knee
indicated that the victim, was held by the hands and those found below
the scapula may have been caused when the patient was forcibly laid
down on a rocky or rough surface. These abrasions at the time of his
examination were fresh. Scab formations were absent. His findings as
well as that of the OB-GYNE Department were reflected in the
Emergency Logbook of the hospital and it appeared in Entry No. 2,383.
The patient, who was a rape victim, was examined by the OB-GYNE
people twice, on March 14, 1989 at 10:30 in the evening and on March
15, 1989, at 1:30 in the afternoon (Exh "1").
The defense, upon the other hand, presented one Reynaldo Orofeo, a
close friend and neighbor of the accused, Edmund Empleo. He averred
that on March 14, 1989, at 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while he was on
his way to work, he met the accused. The accused had just arrived from
Butuan City. Not having seen his friend for a year, he wanted to have a
longer conversation with him. He invited the accused to his house that
evening. At 6:00 o'clock in the evening of that same day, after having
supper together at his residence, they partook of drinks and (he) even
invited the accused anew for the advanced birthday celebration of his
daughter. During the time that they were having a drink, he remembered
that the accused went out of the house only to urinate in their yard. They
parted 9:40 in the evening with his friend going home to the residence of
Col. Tiburcio Fusillero at Green Valley Subdivision, Capitol Hills, Cebu
City. The accused works at the residence of Col. Fusillero.
They met each other again during the birthday celebration of his daughter
on March 19, 1989 where accused took his lunch and left at 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon. (O)n that same evening, he learned from his nephew,
Arturo Orofeo, that Edmund Empleo was arrested by elements of the
Visayas Command (VISCOM).
As a very close friend of the accused, he visited the latter at the Mabolo
Police Station and inquired as to the reason of his arrest and detention.
The accused informed him that he was a suspect in a rape case which
happened at the Top Hills and requested him to testify for him.
Virgilio Oronan, Security Officer of the Land Bank, and who resides more
or less 100 meters from the Top Hills, could not remember of (sic) any
unusual incident that happened in their vicinity in the evening of March
14, 1989. When accused was flashed on the TV screen, as the one who
committed rape, he could not believe that Edmund Empleo would commit
such crime because there were previous incidents of rape which
happened in the same place while the latter was still in Mindanao. He
knew the accused for the first time only when he visited him at BBRC,
because the latter's brothers and sisters are his friends.
Accused, Edmund Empleo, averred that he lives in the house of
Col. Tiburcio Fusillero at Green Valley Subd., Capitol Hills, Cebu City. He
enlisted in the Philippine Army and while waiting for the oathtaking,
Col. Fusillero sent him to Butuan City to work in a logging company
owned by a certain Magsaysay, in July 1988. On March 13, 1989, he left
Butuan City, after he received a letter from his brother informing him that
the Civil Engineering Battalion was receiving applicants for enlistment at
Camp Lapulapu of this city. He arrived in Cebu City on March 14, 1989 at
6:00 o'clock in the morning.
 On his way to the residence of Fusillero, he passed by the house of his
friend, Reynald Orofeo in Camputhaw, about, 80 to 100 meters from the
Top Hills and which would take him 2 to 3 minutes by walking. They had a
brief conversation. He returned to his friend's house in the evening, upon
the latter's invitation. After partaking dinner, they drank 5 bottles of
"macho beer". After 9:00 o'clock in the evening, he went straight home
and did not leave the house thereafter. On March 19, 1989, he returned to
his friend's house, to attend the birthday of the latter's daughter and as
usual, they dr(a)nk together until 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. In the
evening, he met his brother, Edgar, who was in the company of two (2)
PC soldiers.
Shortly after 8:00 o'clock in the evening, his brother returned with Sgt.
Estelito Parreño. The latter talked to him in private and inquired as to the
whereabouts of a certain Jack, who also lived in the residence of
Col. Fusillero, and who was responsible for a series of robberies at Top
Hills.
When he informed Sgt. Parreño that he has not seen Jack since his
return from Mindanao, he was fingered by said Sergeant, that he was the
one who held up his daughter, Collen Parreño. He was then arrested and
brought to VISCOM Headquarters where he was interrogated. He was
detained at the Mabolo Police (Station). On March 20, 1989, he was
brought to the Fiscal's Office and was investigated regarding the rape and
the robbery cases filed against him. Presently, he is detained at the
BBRC. The case for Robbery which was filed by Roberto de la Cruz, one
of the companions of complainant is now pending with RTC Branch 13.
He came to know Elisa Cordova and Collen Parreño only at the Fiscal's
Office. But he had no reason to suspect that they would testify against
him.2
On September 28, 1990, the court below rendered judgment3 finding appellant, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the victim, Elisa
Cordova, in the sum of P3,000.00, as well as to pay the costs.
I. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape on the basis of the testimonies of complainant Elisa Cordova and
prosecution witness, Collen Parreño, which are allegedly replete with contradictions and
inconsistencies on material point. His impugnation, of complainant's testimony4 may be
condensed in the following precis:
1. In the second paragraph of her affidavit, she declared that while she
was lying on the ground appellant tore her underwear and she was
denuded but in her testimony on cross-examination, she told the court
that she was not naked when appellant's penis penetrated her vagina.
Her panty was removed and she was also undressed.
2. In the third paragraph of said affidavit, complainant alleged that she
became unconscious after the incident in question happened, but in her
direct testimony, she told the court that while appellant was having carnal
knowledge of her, she resisted, but she was boxed and lost
consciousness and when she regained consciousness, appellant told her
to lie down. Again, appellant boxed her and she lost consciousness.
3. During her testimony, complainant stated that while she was lying flat
on the ground and while appellant was already on top of her, she picked
up a stone and struck his head but she failed to hit it. She picked up the
stone while the penis of appellant was already inside her vagina. During
cross-examination, she testified that she was forced to lie down and at the
point of a gun she was boxed on the stomach, particularly on her solar
plexus, for which reason she became unconscious. After she was
sexually abused, she was again boxed by appellant on her abdomen
because she resisted and again she became unconscious. She was
boxed only two times, that is, before and after she was sexually abused.
This material matter was never alleged by complainant in her sworn
affidavit.
4. Complainant further alleged during the cross-examination that she
reported the incident to the police authorities only after appellant was
arrested and brought to the police station, that is, on March 19, 1989 or
five days after the incident in question. Before said date, she did not
execute any affidavit because appellant was not yet arrested and she did
not know whether he was the same person who sexually abused her. In
other words, before the arrest of appellant, complainant did not know his
identity until he was arrested brought to the Mabolo Police Station, Cebu
City. However, in answer to the question propounded by the trial court,
she testified that at the time of the incident she knew the person of
appellant but she did not know his name, which was the reason why she
executed the affidavit only after appellant was arrested.
5. During her cross-examination, complainant told the court that the scene
of the incident was dark, with no electric light posts, but at the time of the
incident the moon was very bright. However, as shown by the calendar for
the month of March, 1989, the new moon emerged on March 8 and the
first quarter was on March 15, 1989, hence it cannot be said that at the
time of the incident the moon was really very bright.
6. Complainant even failed to present before the court the panty which,
according to her, was forcibly taken from her body and the school uniform
she was wearing at the time, to show how the panty was torn and how the
school uniform got dirty since, according to her, she forcibly resisted by
moving her body to evade the sexual attack of appellant.
Similarly, the testimony of the other prosecution witness, Collen Parreño, allegedly
contradicts that of complainant. Appellant asserts' that nowhere in the testimony of Parreño
can it be gleaned that the person who allegedly raped the victim had a gun, whereas
complainant claimed that appellant was carrying a gun. Said witness also testified that the
place was then lighted by a 15-watt bulb, contrary to the testimony of complainant that at
the time of the incident there was no illumination, except the light coming from the moon.
The basic issue posited here primarily devolves on the credibility of complainant and her
witness. As we have earlier noted, the long settled proposition is that when an appealed
conviction hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the assessment of the trial court is
accorded the highest degree of respect. Absent any proper reason to depart from this
fundamental rule, factual conclusions reached by the lower court, which had the opportunity
to observe and evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses while on the witness stand, should
not be disturbed.5
In the case at bar, we are persuaded to uphold the finding of guilt by the trial court in light of
its pronouncement as to the demeanor of the complainant during her testimony which,
according to the court, "bears the hallmark of truth and sincerity," and "was straightforward,
though punctuated by her shyness, naivet(e) and tearful increments, that stood the test of
rigorous cross-examination by the defense counsel." Be that as it may, we shall judiciously
discuss and assay the validity of the alleged errors imputed to the lower court by appellant.
First, while there may exist a variance between some statements of complainant in her
affidavit and her testimony in open court, the alleged inconsistencies are more apparent
than real. The truth is that in her testimony before the trial court, complainant merely gave a
more detailed narration of how appellant sexually abused her on that fateful night of March
14, 1989. Such fact, of course, does not necessarily signify that her open court testimony
conflicts with her affidavit.
The contradiction between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness may be explained by
the fact that an affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and will oftentimes and without
design incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences
narrated.6 Being taken ex parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from want of suggestions
and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory
and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the
subject.7 It has thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to
open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiant's mental
faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the
incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the
declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and
the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to him.8
The exception to the rule is where the omission in the affidavit refers to a very important
detail such that the affiant would not have failed to mention it, and which omission could
affect the affiant's credibility. Such exceptive circumstance does not obtain in the present
case. The alleged omissions in the affidavit of complainant are not that vital and substantial
as to affect her credibility. The more important detail which is really material to the case, and
which is categorically declared and explained both in the affidavit and in complainant's
testimony, is the fact that appellant had carnal knowledge of complainant without her
consent.
Second, there is no discrepancy in the statements made by complainant in her affidavit,
where she declared that she was stripped naked during the assault, and in her oral
testimony, where she said that she was not naked when appellant did the sexual act. This
seeming inconsistency was later clarified by complainant in her testimony where she
explained that what she really meant by the word "naked" is that she had no underwear but
she had her uniform on.9
Third, the defense claims that if it were true that complainant was able to recognize her
assailant, it is highly questionable why she came to know the identity of appellant only after
the latter had been arrested and brought to the Mabolo Police Station. The argument is
specious.
Complainant testified in no uncertain terms that although she did not know the name of her
assailant at that time, nevertheless she was able to describe him as a fat person with a big
stomach, long hair and dark complexion, thus:
Q Did you give any description of (sic) identifying marks
of the person or suspect to the police authorities?
A Yes, sir.
Q What identifying marks did you give or furnish the
police authorities?
A At that time, he was still fat with big stomach.
ATTY. DAITOL:
Q Fat and big stomach. What else?
A Long hair and now his hair is already short.
Q What else?
A Black complexion. 10
Even during her cross examination wherein the defense counsel tried to mislead and
confuse her as to the identity of her assailant, this excerpt of the transcript shows that
complainant did not waver in her identification of appellant as the one who raped her:
ATTY. DAITOL:
 Q But he did not mention to you the name of Edmund
Empleo?
A No, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Miss Cordova, there are several
persons residing near Top Hills. Right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you cannot be positive that there is only one (1)
person living there at (sic) with a big stomach, a fat
person, long hair and black skin?
A I was informed by the people there that there is no
other person who has a big stomach, long hair and fat.
Q Did you examine or see one by one the residents
living in that locality known as Top Hills?
A After the incident, I did not go to that place anymore.
Q And as a matter of fact the description of a person
with a (sic) long hair, big stomach, black skin and fat
was given only to you by somebody?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A I really saw him and (he) has a big stomach. 11
More importantly, it is significant that complainant was able to identify appellant in open
court despite the fact that the latter, obviously to evade identification, had already had his
hair cut short and there was a slight change in his physical build. Hence, by the bare fact
alone that complainant did not know the name of herein appellant, we cannot safely
conclude that the identity of the assailant was not sufficiently established. In one case we
held that:
. . . It is the appellants' view that the identities of the malefactors of a
crime can be established only if the witnesses know the names of the
malefactors.
This is puerile reasoning. Identification of a person is not established
solely through knowledge of the name of that person. Familiarity with the
physical features, particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to
identify the person.
. . . One may be familiar with the face but not necessarily the name. It
does not follow therefore, that to be able to identify a person, one must
first know his name. 12
Fourth, the fact that complainant testified that she was able to recognize appellant because
at that time the moon was very bright, when in truth and in fact it was a first quarter moon,
does not serve to discredit her entire testimony. Even where a witness is found to have
deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, and it was not shown that there was such
intended prevarication by complainant in this case, it is not required that the entire testimony
be rejected, since such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. 13 It is
perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts. 14
At any rate, the declaration of complainant is not really incredible. The other prosecution
witness, Collen Parreño, testified that the place was lighted by a lamp post with a 15-watt
bulb. It is not inconceivable that complainant may have wrongly perceived the light coming
from the lamp post as having come from the moon. Furthermore, even assuming that there
was no electric light which directly illuminated the spot where she was sexually abused, that
does not suggest that there was total darkness in the area, preventing her from identifying
her assailant. Appellant did not conceal his identity with a mask or the like. Evidently, it was
during the struggle, between them, which lasted for some time, that complainant was able to
recognize the face of appellant and to take note of his complexion and physical build. 15
Finally, the allegation that the failure of the prosecution to present the underwear and torn
uniform of complainant casts doubts on the latter's credibility, has no logical or rational leg to
stand on. Time and again, we have said that the non-presentation of the torn dress and
underwear of the complainant does not destroy the case for the prosecution, there being
sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the rape charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Those clothes are not essential and need not be presented, as they are not indispensable
evidence to prove rape. 16The absence thereof does not negate the truth of a rape complaint
and the credibility of a victim's testimony. 17
Contrary to appellant's pretension, the testimony of complainant is consistent with and
amply corroborated by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Dr. Manuel Ampo and
Collen Parreño. Dr. Ampo declared as follows:
COURT/to witness:
Q Dr., what must have caused these abrasions you
found on the body?
A The patient there has (sic) some sort of resistance.
Q What do you mean by your answer?
 A Probably as I gathered in this case, this patient was Q What was she doing when you and your other female
raped. companion were tied by an old man, companion of the
accused?
Q We want facts, what could have caused these
abrasions? A Edmund Empleo forced Elisa to lie down.

A Actually these are (sic) forcible contact with rough
objects.
Q When you said that there was contact of that body
with rough objects, how could it happen on the basis of
your findings as to the gravity of the abrasions and the
durations?
A The forearm, the chest, the breast and the knee
Q What must have been done to her?
Q In other words, you could still see Elisa being forcibly
laid down while you and your companion were being
tied by an old man?
A Yes, sir.
Q The Court heard you say that Elisa Cordova when
forced to lay (sic) down on the ground struggled to free
herself and succeeded in freeing herself, what did Elisa
Cordova do in freeing herself from the clutches of
Edmund Empleo?

A Maybe she was held by the hand. A So, she ran away going towards us but she was
again chased by Edmund Empleo.
Q You mean, she must have been held forcibly?
xxx xxx xxx
A Forcibly.
Q Now, the Court heared you say that Edmund Empleo
caught her up (sic). When she was caught up (sic) by
Q That abrasion you found below the scapula, what Empleo, what did the latter do to her?
must have caused that abrasion?
A Edmund Empleo forced Elisa again to lie down on the
A Maybe the patient laid (sic) on the ground, Your ground. 19
Honor.
On her part, complainant testified in the following manner:
Q If she just lay on the ground normally, without the use
of force, could that abrasion be indicated therein?
Q Are you trying (sic) this Court to understand that
while the accused was holding a gun in his right hand,
A No, Your Honor. at the same time the accused held your two (2) hands
in his right hand?
Q In other words, that abrasion below the scapula may
have been caused when the patient was forcibly laid A Yes, sir.
down. Is that what you want to say?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, possible. 18
Q And as a matter of fact, when the accused had his
Along the same vein, prosecution witness Collen Parreño affirmed these facts: penis penetrated into your vagina, he was no longer
holding your left and right hands?
 A His right hand was still holding me
xxx xxx xxx
Q When your two (2) legs were released from his holds
(sic), did you use your legs to kick the accused?
A I tried to wriggle from himself (sic) but he boxed me.
Q You tried to wriggle hard and harder in order to
release from the holds (sic) of the accused. Right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the very place where you were lying down was a
stony place?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, it was a rock surface?
A Yes, sir. 20
II. Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in not taking into consideration the
results of the medical examination conducted on private complainant, the report on which
was admitted as Exhibit B.
The medical report shows that the complainant gave the information that she was raped at
about 6:00 p.m. of March 14, 1989. However, in her testimony she claimed that the incident
happened at around 8:30 in the evening. Additionally, in the information in Criminal Case
No. CBU-15094 for robbery filed against appellant by Roberto de la Cruz, one of the
companions of complainant, it is stated that appellant robbed De la Cruz at around 9:30
p.m. Appellant contends that it was impossible for him to have raped the victim act 6:00 p.m.
and then again at 8:30 p.m., and thereafter rob the victim's companion at 9:30 p.m., all on
the same night. Such sophistry in reasoning betrays desperation in argument.
An erroneous reckoning or mis-estimation of time is too trivial and immaterial to discredit the
testimony of a complainant,21 especially in this case where time is not an essential element
or has no substantial bearing on the fact of commission of the crime. Minor inconsistencies
are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on straightforward attestations. Far from being badges
of fraud and fabrication, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses may on the
contrary justifiably considered as indicative of the truthfulness on material points of the facts
testified to. These minor deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed.
The most candid witness may make mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not
necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility, 22 more so where the alleged inconsistencies do
not touch on the very facts constitutive of the actual commission of the
crime. 23Furthermore, where the prosecution witnesses are able to positively identify the
appellant as the author of the crime and the testimonies are, on the whole, consistent on
material points, the contradictions become insignificant. 24
Also, is not denied, as in fact complainant admitted, that she was drinking beer prior to the
incident. Appellant now contends that since she was in a state of drunkenness, it would
have been impossible for her to identify her assailant, considering further that the night was
dark.
Such postulation is premised on the erroneous assumption that complainant was drunk at
that time. The medical findings of the physician who examined complainant shows that she
was positive for alcoholic breath, but this fact alone does not sufficiently establish that she
was in such a state of intoxication as would completely deprive her of her sense of
perception and which would pervert her otherwise coherent and credible testimony. At most,
she could only have been tipsy and it would not have been impossible for her to know what
was happening, as in fact she was able to vividly recall and narrate with candidness every
important and material detail of the sexual assault committed against her.
This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that generally a person under the influence of
liquor, even if not to the point of inebriation as in this case, is prone to be impulsive,
irascible, or combative and less inhibited in his reaction to whatever offends him. 25 Hence,
contrary to appellant's contention, the physical condition of complainant at that time only
served to fortify, rather than debilitate, her testimony to the effect that she struggled hard to
resist the assault upon her, to wit:
COURT:/ to witness:
Q The Court heard you say that you resisted. In what
did your resistance consist of?
A I picked up a stone.
Q What did you do with the stone?
A I struck his head.
Q Was he hit?
A No, sir.
Q What did he do when you struck him?
A He squeezed my hand.
Q When did you strike him with the stone, when you
were already lying on the ground?
A When I was lying flat on the ground.
Q When he was already on top of you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you pick up a stone?
A Near the place where I was lying flat, there were
plenty of stones.
Q Was it before he inserted his penis in your vagina,
doing the sexual intercourse?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q In other words, you struck him with a piece of stone
while he was on his sexual act maneuver?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you were forced to lie down, did you expect
him to do something evil against you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What did you expect him to do when you (were) first
made to lie down?
A That he will rape me.
Q So, expecting him to rape you as you were made to
lie down, what did you do?
A I tried my best to run away.
Q Were you able to run away?
A Yes, but he chased me.
Q The Court heard you say that you were already lying
flat on the ground; he mounted on you and he removed
your underwear. Why, what was your attire then?
A I was in uniform, skirt and blouse.
Q Who removed your underwear?
A (Witness pointing to the accused Edmund Empleo).
Q What did he do with your skirt?
A He opened my skirt.
Q When he opened your skirt, what resistance did you
do to prevent him?
A I kicked him.
Q Was he hit?
A He was hit on his stomach but he was strong. 26
To round off her account, we present her testimony on further cross-examination, a part of
which has earlier been quoted:
Q When your two (2) legs were released from his holds
(sic), did you use your legs to kick the accused?
A I tried to wriggle from himself (sic) but he boxed me.
Q You tried to wriggle hard and harder in order to
release from the holds (sic) of the accused. Right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the very place where you were lying down was a
stony place?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because of wriggling hard and harder in order to
release from the holds (sic) of the accused, you
 suffered bruises in your body especially that you were Consequently, the rule is that the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the fact of
naked at that time? rape. What is essential is that there was genital penetration, which was unequivocally
testified to by complainant. 29
A Yes, sir.
III. In the present case, the defense relies heavily on denial and alibi. We need merely to
Q Particularly at the back of your body? point out that denials constitute self serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. 30 On his defense of alibi, appellant avers that at the time of the incident,
A In my thighs. he was at the house of his friend, Reynaldo Orofeo, and that he left at past 9:00 p.m. The
distance between the house of Orofeo and Top Hill where the incident took place is more or
Q Only on your thighs? less 80 to 100 meters and can be negotiated by walking for two to three minutes. From Top
Hill to the house of Col. Fusillero, where accused lives, is a distance of 180 to 200
A At my back also and my uniform was dirty. meters. 31 It was, therefore, not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Q In other words, while you were sexually abused by

the accused, your uniform was still there? Once again we reiterate that for the defense of alibi to prosper it must be so convincing as
to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place
of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission. 32 The requisites of time and place
A Yes, sir. must be strictly met. 33 In this case, alibi cannot prosper where the residence of the accused
is within walking distance from the scene of the crime. 34 Courts always receive with caution,
Q As a matter of fact, your uniform got dirty because if not suspicion, evidence of alibi, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but
you were still, wearing it? also because of its easy fabrication. To overcome the evidence of the prosecution, an alibi
must satisfy the test of full, clear, and satisfactory evidence. 35
A Yes, sir. 27
Furthermore, alibi is held not to be a proper defense where no improper motive was shown
against the witnesses who identified the accused. 36 In his testimony, appellant admitted that
It is true that while complainant testified that appellant had sexual intercourse with her, the
he is not aware of any reason why the prosecution witnesses, especially complainant
medical findings showed that she was negative of sperm cells. However, in People
herself, would falsely testify against him.37 The absence of any evidence as to the existence
vs. Balane, et al., 28 we held that:
of an improper motive sustains the conclusion that no such improper motive exists, and the
testimony of the witness should be given full faith and credit. 38
. . . The accused-appellants argue that if there was really sexual
intercourse, much more rape, it would be the height of improbability, that
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
nothing unusual was found, not even a smear of spermatozoa in the
vagina of the victim by the examining physician.
SO ORDERED.
We ruled in People vs. Selfaison (1 SCRA 235) that such a defense lacks
merit. This Court stated: "The absence of such spermatozoa, however
does not necessarily mean that the complainants had not in fact been
raped. The very authority cited stated that such absence does not
necessarily mean that the girl subject of examination has not had any
sexual intercourse. It need hardly be said here that in the crime of rape,
the slightest penetration is enough."

Resolving a similar issue in People vs. Carandang (52 SCRA 259)

and People vs. Ytac (95 SCRA 644) this Court ruled that the absence of
spermatozoa in the vagina is no legal obstacle to holding that rape has
been committed.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch
19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J:
For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - - whether an information
filed by a state prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the city or
provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor should be dismissed after the accused has
entered his plea under the information.
Petitioner comes before us with a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, seeking to declare as null and void the Orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 dated February 26, 20021 and April 3,
20022 which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the case of People vs. Serafin Saballegue,
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation
to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the "Social
Security Act," in an information which reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi
City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press with
business address at 16 San Mateo St., Peñafrancia Ave., Naga City for Violation of Section
22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise known as the Social
Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines,
within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue
Printing Press, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and
continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for his employee to the SSS in the
amount of SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (₱6,533.00),
Philippine Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums for the period from January 1990
to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of
ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (₱11,143.28)
computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-
cited provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in
general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO
State Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS Cases in Region V3
The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino
which states:
I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been conducted by the
undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance with law and under oath as officer of the
court, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense has been committed, that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and that the filing of the information is with the prior
authority and approval of the Regional State Prosecutor.4
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by
respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On September 24, 2001, accused Serafin
Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial.5 Three days
thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground that the information was
filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.7
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition,8 against which the
accused filed a rejoinder.9The People filed a reply to the rejoinder10 on December 21, 2001.
A rejoinder to the reply11 was filed by the accused on January 21, 2002.
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its
first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to wit:
After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so
resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule
112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, thus:
‘Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.’
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been
approved by the City Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendant’s plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion
to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules
and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings (People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).
The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibañez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of authority of the officer
who filed the information and on jurisdiction at the same time, pertinent portions run as
follows:
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is
contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the information. The contention is
correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication,
if not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line
of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. Now, the objection to the respondent’s actuations goes to the very foundations
of jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject
matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in the
information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated to assist the City
Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all SSS cases by the Regional State
prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V, then that authority may be
given to other than the City Prosecutor. The Court finds this contention to be devoid of merit.
The Regional State Prosecutor is not the alter ego of the Secretary of Justice but a mere
subordinate official and if ever the former files cases, it is by virtue of a delegated authority
by the Secretary of Justice. Potestas delegada non potesta delegare (sic) – what has been
delegated cannot be redelegated.
In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum dated June 22, 2001
by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan addressed to Provincial Prosecutor and
City Prosecutors of Region V directing them to inhibit and to append the following
NOTATION after the certification in the Information for filing.
NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case and the
Special Prosecution Team on SSS Cases in Region V is authorized to dispose of the case
without my approval in view of the request for inhibition of the SSS Regional Manager as
granted by the Regional State Prosecutor.
A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that nowhere in the Information
has the City Prosecutor of Naga City appended the above-quoted notation/inhibition. At
most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the conduct of preliminary
investigations and the prosecution of cases after they are filed. The Court, however,
believes that the filing of this Information must be in conformity with the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, particularly Section 4 of Rule 112.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the Court hereby resolves
to DISMISS this case without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a special prosecutor
designated by the regional state prosecutor to handle SSS cases within Region V, State
Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the information involving violations of the SSS law
without need of prior approval from the city prosecutor. 13 Letters of commendation from
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño14 and Secretary Hernando Perez15 were offered as
proof to show that State Prosecutor Tolentino’s authority to file the information was
recognized. In response, the defense pointed out in its opposition that the motion for
reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, hence it is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper. 16
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order which reads:
Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino,
Special Prosecutor on SSS cases in Region V, and it appearing that the same has failed to
comply with the requirement of notice prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court, the same is hereby DENIED for being a mere scrap of paper.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan
and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Petitioner attributes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge, viz:18
1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE
REQUIRED SUPPORTING FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES;
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION
WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE
WORD "MAY" IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT
MANDATORY;
 3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DELIBERATELY
IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY KNOWN INHIBITION OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN
INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF FILING AN
INFORMATION BY RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING OFFICER TO
FILE THE INFORMATION.
19
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment in compliance with this Court’s
Resolution dated September 23, 2002.20 It opines that the dismissal of the information is
mandated under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Private respondent contends that:21 1) the instant petition was filed out of time; 2) the
special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information; and 3) the City Prosecutor did not
expressly inhibit himself from handling SSS cases nor signing the information.
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that the motion for
reconsideration filed on April 1, 2002 is late because it was filed eighteen days after March
14, 2002, the date when petitioner received the first questioned order. Respondent has
overlooked that the 15th day after March 14 is a Good Friday. Hence, petitioner’s last day to
file the motion for reconsideration was on the next working day after Good Friday, April 1.22
Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap of paper, the motion
for reconsideration of the petitioner did not toll the running of the reglementary period.
Respondent, however, erroneously assumes that the present case is an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45. As stated at the outset, this is an original petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65.
Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that "(a) pro forma motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal." (emphases
supplied) Hence, the same provision has no application in the case at bar.
The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and not the receipt of the
first. Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by En Banc Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC,
September 1, 2000, provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration
or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)- day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
xxxxxxxxx
As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order dated February 26,
2002 on March 14, 2002.23 A motion for reconsideration was timely filed on April 1,
200224 which was dismissed for lack of notice of hearing in an Order dated April 3,
2002.25 This second questioned order was received by petitioner on April 11, 2002.26 A
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari was filed on April 18,
2002.27 A motion for leave to file and admit the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus
was filed on May 29, 2002.28Having been filed within the reglementary period, petitioner’s
motion for leave to file the instant petition was granted in this Court’s Resolution dated July
15, 2002.29
We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority and approval of the city
or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is
no longer required. It is contended that the Regional State Prosecutor has already directed
the city or provincial prosecutor to inhibit from handling SSS cases.30 Petitioner cites the
letter of Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan to SSS Regional Director in Naga
City dated June 6, 199731 and copies of Regional Orders No. 97-024-A32 and 2001-
03333 dated July 14, 1997 and September 28, 2001, respectively, showing the designation
of State Prosecutor Tolentino as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V. Petitioner
relies on Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.34 and Sanchez v. Demetriou, et al.35 to prop
up its contention that given the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino, the city
prosecutor need not participate in the filing and prosecution of the information in the case at
bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a Regional State
Prosecutor are as follows:
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State Prosecutor. -
The Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the control of the Secretary of Justice, have the
following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules
and regulations of the Department of Justice relative to the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city fiscals
and other prosecuting officers of provinces and cities comprised within his region.
c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.
d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and city fiscals
within his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may
be necessary; and approve transfers of subordinate personnel within the
jurisdiction of the regional office.
 2) Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other
prosecuting officers within his region and submit his recommendation
thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof, submit
the appropriate recommendation to the Office of the President: Provided,
that where the Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds for the filing
of charges, he may render a decision of dismissal thereof.
3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of
the region and submit his recommendations thereon to the Secretary of
Justice who shall have the authority to render decision thereon.
(emphases supplied)
The power of administrative supervision is limited to "the authority of the department or its
equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards
and guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms
of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but
may not increase or add to them."36 This is distinguished from the power of "supervision and
control" which includes the authority "to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted
by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe
standards, guidelines, plans and programs."37
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative
supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial
prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their
inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial
prosecutors is questionable to say the least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those cases, the special
prosecutors were acting under the directive of the Secretary of Justice. They were
appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional state prosecutor
granted the power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file an
information without the prior written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No. 1275 provides the manner by which special prosecutors
are appointed, to wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service require the creation of
positions of additional counsel to assist provincial and city fiscals in the discharge of their
duties, positions of Special Counsels may be created by any province or city, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Justice, and with salaries chargeable against provincial or city
funds. The Secretary of Justice shall appoint said Special Counsels, upon recommendation
of the provincial or city fiscal and regional state prosecutors concerned, either on permanent
or temporary basis.
Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be allowed not more
than the salary rate provided in this Decree for the lowest rank or grade of assistant fiscal in
the province or city where assigned. (emphases supplied)
Under Department Order No. 318,38 "Defining the authority, duties and responsibilities of
regional state prosecutors," then Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III ordered
the appointed regional state prosecutors (which included Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan for Region V) to, among others, "(i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the directive
of the Secretary of Justice, specific criminal cases filed within the region." (emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the Secretary of
Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases
filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare reading of the alleged letter of commendation by
then Secretary Hernando Perez would show that it does not amount to a directive or even a
recognition of this authority. In fact, while the letter of Secretary Perez commends the efforts
of Regional State Prosecutor Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also
negates his authority to prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State
Prosecutor’s attention to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that all important
cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel.39 Thus, Regional State Prosecutor Turingan cannot be considered a special
prosecutor within the meaning of the law.
Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior
written approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an
interpretation. Whether the word "may" is mandatory or directory depends on the context of
its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word "may" should be read
together with the other provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph
immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It
states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. – x x x
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the
record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from
their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis
supplied)
Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or chief state
prosecutor should have been obtained, we shall now resolve the more important issue:
whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor in
the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as an
objection before arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand illumination
are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule 112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.—The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis supplied)
Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority or approval
by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an infirmity in the information
that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is
a defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even after arraignment, the respondent
judge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss based on this ground. As basis, they cite
the case of Villa v. Ibañez, et al.40 where we held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is
contended that by his plea he waived all objections to the informations. The contention is
correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication,
if not by express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (now Section 9 of
Rule 117), and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondent’s actuations
goes to the very foundation of the jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent
officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity
in the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express
consent.41 (emphasis supplied)
The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of the filing
officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the case is invested by the act of
plaintiff and attaches upon the filing of the complaint or information.42 Hence, while a court
may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, like a violation of the SSS Law, it does not
acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the
information.
In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional requirement upon
which a defendant stands trial. Thus, it has been ruled that in the absence of probable
cause, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the criminal offense.43 In our jurisdiction, we have
similarly held that:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more courts
having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a matter of procedure and not jurisdiction, as
suggested by appellant, the moment such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes
jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information
is filed with the court having jurisdiction over the crime, and said court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, from which time the right and power of
the court to try the accused attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for the defendant to
exercise that choice, which is lodged upon those who may validly file or subscribe to
the complaint or information under sections 2 and 3 of Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court. 44 (emphasis supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In that case, Atty.
Abelardo Subido, Chief of the Division of Investigation in the Office of the Mayor of Manila,
was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as special counsel to assist the City Fiscal of
Manila in the cases involving city government officials or employees. Pursuant to his
appointment, Atty. Subido filed an information against Pedro Villa for falsification of a
payroll. Atty. Subido’s authority to file the information was challenged on the ground that he
was disqualified for appointment under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, to wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. — The Secretary of Justice may appoint any
lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a competent person not in the public
service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties,
and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or
Solicitor General.45
We held, viz:
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, were upheld in Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al., 44 Official
Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al., (47 Official Gazette, 5092). But in
those cases, the appointees were officials or employees in one or another of the bureaus or
offices under the Department of Justice, and were rightly considered subordinates in the
office of the Secretary of Justice within the meaning of section 1686, ante.
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions. Attorney Subido
is a regular officer or employee in the Department of Interior, more particularly in the City
Mayor’s office. For this reason, he belongs to the class of persons disqualified for
appointment to the post of special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be either an
employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so manifest from a bare reading of
section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as to preclude construction. And the
limitation of the range of choice in the appointment or designation is not without reason.
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the Secretary of Justice
can exercise exclusive and absolute power of supervision. An appointee from a branch of
the government outside the Department of Justice would owe obedience to, and be subject
to orders by, mutually independent superiors having, possibly, antagonistic interests.
Referring particularly to the case at hand for illustration, Attorney Subido could be recalled
or his time and attention be required elsewhere by the Secretary of Interior or the City
Mayor while he was discharging his duties as public prosecutor, and the Secretary of
Justice would be helpless to stop such recall or interference. An eventuality or state of
affairs so undesirable, not to say detrimental to the public service and specially the
administration of justice, the Legislature wisely intended to avoid.
The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances where the person who
filed the information is disqualified from being a special prosecutor under Section 1686 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, but has been extended to various cases
where the information was filed by an unauthorized officer as in the case at bar. In Cruz, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,46 the Court held that it is a fundamental principle that when on its
face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be cured
nor resurrected by amendment. In that case, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) conducted an investigation and filed an information with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging him with graft and corruption.
The petitioner sought to quash the information on the ground that the crime charged did not
constitute a "Marcos crony related crime" over which the PCGG had authority to investigate
and file an information. The Court found that the crime alleged in the information was not
among those which PCGG was authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No. 1 and
14 of then President Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null and void. Of
similar import is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al.47 where we ruled that the information
having been filed by an unauthorized party (the PCGG), the information was fatally flawed.
We noted that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form, but a defect that could
not be cured.1awphi1.net
In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,48 we also reiterated the Villa ruling. The accused in that
case was apprehended in Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal possession of firearms and was
brought to Angeles City where the headquarters of the arresting officers was located. The
City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City. We invalidated the information filed by the City Prosecutor because he had no
territorial jurisdiction, as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his
territorial jurisdiction was only in Angeles City. We held that an information, when required
by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.49 Otherwise, the
court does not acquire jurisdiction.50 It is a valid information signed by a competent officer
which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused and the subject matter thereof. The accused’s plea to an information may be a
waiver of all formal objections to the said information but not when there is want of
jurisdiction. Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it,
cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.51
Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of information contained in the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure under which Villa was decided, the 1951 Villa ruling
continues to be the prevailing case law on the matter.52
The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the defendant fails to
move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto, he shall be taken to
have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except (1) "when the
complaint or information does not charge an offense" or (2) "the court is without jurisdiction
of the same." (emphasis ours) Among the enumerated grounds for a motion to quash under
Section 2 of the same Rule was "(t)hat the fiscal has no authority to file the information."
With only the above two exceptions provided by the 1940 Rules, the Court nevertheless
made the Villa ruling that if the filing officer lacks authority to file the information, jurisdiction
is not conferred on the court and this infirmity cannot be cured by silence or waiver,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal changes introduced, the
1964 Rules of Court contained provisions on unauthorized filing of information similar to the
above provisions of the 1940 Rules.53
Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of the officer who filed
the information was also a ground for a motion to quash under these rules. The 1985 Rules
also provided for waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash under Rule 117, Section 8, but
enumerated the following exceptions to the waiver: (a) the facts charged do not constitute
an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the
person of the accused; (c) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) the
accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged. Apparently, the want of jurisdiction under the 1985 Rules refers to
jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the case as in Villa where the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for lack of authority of the officer who filed the
information. Still, despite the enumeration, the Court continued to apply the Villa ruling as
shown in the afore-cited Cruz and Cudia cases.

The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also
provide for lack of authority of the filing officer as among the grounds for a motion to quash
and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate
the exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c)
that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Under the regime of the
2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated the Villa ruling in the above-cited Romualdez case. With
the enumeration of the four exceptions, which was almost a replica of the enumeration in
the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules did not intend to abandon Villa. The Villa ruling subsisted
alongside the enumerated exceptions under the 1985 Rules, and it remains to do so under
the enumerated exceptions under the 2000 Rules. Neither the Rationale of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules of Court evinces any intent to abandon the doctrine enunciated in
Villa.

In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating
State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval
of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No.
RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in
the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge
did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The respondent court’s orders
dated February 26, 2002 and April 3, 2002 are AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-
0597 is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new information by an authorized
officer.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153284 April 17, 2007
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SANTIAGO M. TURINGAN, as alter ego of the
Secretary of Justice in Region V and STATE PROSECUTOR and SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR ON SSS 1 CASES IN REGION V ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO, in their
official capacities and for and in representation of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and MARITES C. DE LA TORRE, in her official capacity as counsel for the
complainant Social Security System Bicol Cluster, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19, and MURIEL C. APOLINAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for certiorari and mandamus2 seeks the nullification of the March 13, 2002 and
April 12, 2002 orders of respondent Judge Zeida Aurora B. Garfin3 in Criminal Case No.
RTC 2001-0582 entitled People of the Philippines v. Muriel C. Apolinar. The orders granted
private respondent Muriel C. Apolinar’s motion to quash and denied petitioner state
prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino’s motion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 arose from an Information charging Apolinar for violation
of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of RA 82824 for non-remittance of
social security and employees’ compensation5 premiums of his workers for the period
January 1997 to December 1998, and nonpayment of the 3% monthly penalty for late
remittance. The Information, signed by state prosecutor Tolentino, read:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi
City, accuses MURIEL C. APOLINAR, as a registered trimobile operator with business
address at 108-1 San Mateo Street, Peñafrancia Avenue, Naga City, for Violation of Section
22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282[,] otherwise known as the Social
Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1997 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused while being a registered
trimobile operator, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and
continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for (sic) his employee to the SSS in
the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SIX PESOS (₱2,256.00),
Philippine Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums, for the period from January 1997
to December 1998, and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of TWO
THOUSAND FORTY EIGHT PESOS and 26/100 (₱2,048.26) computed as of 30 July 2000,
despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-citied provisions of the law, to the
damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.61ªvvphi1.nét
The accompanying certification, also signed by state prosecutor Tolentino, read:
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE HAS BEEN
CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW AND UNDER OATH AS OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT THERE IS
REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN COMMITTED,
THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY GUILTY THEREOF AND THAT THE FILING OF THE
INFORMATION IS WITH THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE REGIONAL
STATE PROSECUTOR.7
Prior to his arraignment, Apolinar moved for the quashing of the Information on the ground
that state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to sign it.
On February 13, 2002, Tolentino opposed Apolinar’s motion. He contended that he was
clothed with the authority to investigate, file the necessary Information and prosecute SSS
cases in view of his designation as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V under
Regional Order No. 97-024-A dated July 14, 1997.
In an order dated March 13, 2002,8 respondent Judge Garfin dismissed Criminal Case No.
RTC 2001-0582 for lack of jurisdiction. State prosecutor Tolentino moved for reconsideration
but the motion was denied in an order dated April 12, 2002.9 Thus, this petition.
The petition must be dismissed.
The issue in this petition — whether or not state prosecutor Tolentino had the authority to
file the Information for violation of RA 8282 despite the absence of a written authority or
approval of the provincial or state prosecutor — is similar to that in People v. Garfin.10 In that
case, the same state prosecutor Tolentino charged Serafin Saballegue also for violation of
Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of RA 8282. The certification
accompanying the Information (which was identical to the certification in the Information
against Apolinar) was also signed by Tolentino. The case was also raffled to the sala of
respondent Judge Garfin.
Three days after pleading not guilty to the charge, Saballegue filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the Information was filed without the written authority or approval of the city
prosecutor. This was opposed by Tolentino.
After considering the arguments of the parties, respondent Judge Garfin granted
Saballegue’s motion. She denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Tolentino.
Tolentino filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in this Court assailing respondent
Judge Garfin’s orders granting Saballegue’s motion to dismiss and denying the motion for
reconsideration. This Court, thru Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno, dismissed the
petition and declared:

[I]n the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor
Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information
by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597
was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information
constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.11

In this case, state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to file the Information in Criminal
Case No. RTC 2001-0582 because there was neither a directive from the Secretary of
Justice designating him as special prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of the
Information by the city prosecutor. In accordance with Garfin, the Information suffered from
a jurisdictional defect. Respondent Judge Garfin correctly dismissed the case against
Apolinar for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Costs against state prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and
defendant-appellant.
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees.
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio.
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant-appellant
Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced
Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid,
plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court
against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a
counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred
to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after
making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court
issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's
bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp.
49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon
the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the
Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond
but also the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability,
if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground
solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the
judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to
satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the
counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's
counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its
failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding
writ was issued.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued
without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from
such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its
record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief
raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2,
1957, by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary
hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in
Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution
against the herein bonding company-appellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of
execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent
motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of
execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962,
decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a
motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two
days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially
that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the
recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of
which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where
the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction
to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of
Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963
the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed
to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its
decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as
follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for
collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was
originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But
about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17,
1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of
original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not
more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an important
one which merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July
19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and
throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction
until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be
worthy of consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs.
Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956;
Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591,
September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme
Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of appellants submitting their case
for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction when adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue"
(See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no choice but to
certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme Court.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended,
let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in
accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a
month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as
the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts
and circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the
opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for
the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948, that is, almostfifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January
12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the
Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it
filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin
(Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific
obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17,
Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65
Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only
filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon
the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a
quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the
Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the
Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute
of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed.
715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton
vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of
the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well
as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et
al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The
Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100
Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings
in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts
to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was
only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up
to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would
in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary
once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for
collection of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants'
properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently discharged under Section
12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied,
plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution
against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the obligation of the bond. But
the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was
"no showing that a demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the bonding
company for payment of the amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal,
p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of
the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again
filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the
surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the
surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's
counsel asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so an
order was issued in open court, as follows:1äwphï1.ñët
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday, November 6,
1957, to file his answer to the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this
incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu City,
Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZA
Judge
(Record on Appeal, pp.
64-65, emphasis ours)
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period
given him, the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs'
motion for execution against the surety; and on December 12, 1957, the
corresponding writ of execution was issued.
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on
the ground that the same was "issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule
59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with," more specifically, that the
same was issued without the required "summary hearing". This motion was denied
by order of February 10, 1958.
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-
stated order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of March 26,
1958.
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 —
denying the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for
reconsideration, respectively — the surety has interposed the appeal on hand.
The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the
writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing
required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads;
"Sec. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond.
— If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety
or sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of this role to
secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on such
bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due
under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or
sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action." (Emphasis
ours)
the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in
our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59,
"to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the
action," and stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, after the
judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is "returned
unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond
automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against
the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the
surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which

ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which
a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in
preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is
essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an
opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which
follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to
the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion
of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the
incident up for consideration.

In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution
and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the
surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon
his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file
an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection.
The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for the
simple reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion
even if the same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is
obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will show
that when the motion was called, what the surety's counsel did was to ask that he
be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order
given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the four-day
period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed submitted for
resolution"; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his
instance and he interposed no objection thereto.

It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no
need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against