Cadastral and Administrative Issuance of Patents

G.R. No. 77541 November 29, 1988

HEIRS OF GREGORIO TENGCO, petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE and VICTORIA ALIWALAS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Jorge A. Pascua for petitioners.

Perpetuo C. Travino for private respondents.

Daniel C. Florida collaborating counsel for private respondents.

CORTES, J.:

The instant case stemmed from an action to quiet title instituted by the late Victoria L. Vda. de Aliwalas
against the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco, the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.

The facts as found by the Court of First Instance of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch VI, in Civil Case No.
4308, are as follows:

The evidence adduced by the parties in this case shows that Lot No. 3563 of the Arayat Cadastre was
originally a part of the public domain and it was so declared on October 12, 1933 (Exh. "A-2").
Thereafter, Dr. Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for the issuance of a homestead patent
covering this lot. On December 12, 1936, the Director of Lands granted this application and issued in
favor of Jose Aliwalas Homestead Patent No. 38588 (Exh. "E"). This patent was duly registered in the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8, 1937 after the corresponding fees thereon were paid (Exhs.
"D-5" and "D-6"). On the same day, the Register of Deeds of Pampanga issued OCT No. 159 (Exh. "D") in
the name of Jose Aliwalas. From that time on, Dr. Aliwalas did the corresponding land taxes thereon
(Exh. "I", "I-1 " to "I-25") after having declared the land for taxes (sic) purposes in his name (Exh. "F", "G"
and "H").

As owner of this property, Jose Aliwalas, thru his overseer Espiridion Manaul, had this parcel fenced and
vegetables were planted in some portions thereof. Other portions were dedicated initially to cattle
raising until the last war broke out.

After the war, palay was planted on some. portions of this land, by the tenants of Jose Aliwalas who gave
the owner's share to him, thru his caretaker and overseer Espiridion Manaul. Other crops were also
planted on the land as well as ipil-ipil trees for firewood purposes. There were also planted mango trees
which ultimately bore fruit which were harvested by the caretaker of Aliwalas in this property and who
delivered them to Jose Aliwalas until he died in 1962 when the administration and management was
assumed by Jose Aliwalas, Jr., a son of Dr. Aliwalas.

When the properties left by Dr. Jose Aliwalas were petitioned among his surviving heirs, the lot in
question was alloted in favor of the plaintiff Victoria L. Vda. de Aliwalas as indicated in the amended
project of partition (Exh. "B") executed by her mind her nine children, one of whom is Jose Aliwalas, Jr.
After this amended project of partition was approved (Exh. "C") and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga, OCT No. 52526-R (Exh. "A") was issued in the name of the plaintiff on November 14,
1966 (Exh. "A-1"). Thereafter, the tax declaration pertaining to this parcel of land was also transferred to
her name (Exhs. "O", "P" and "A"). She also paid the real estate taxes thereon (Exhs. "N", "N-1 " to "N-
14", Exhs. "R-1" to "R-53").

On the other hand, the evidence further show that on October 31, 1973, the defendant Ponciano Tengco
in representation of the defendants Heirs of Gregorio Tengco filed an application with the Bureau of
Lands, thru its District Land Office here in San Fernando, Pampanga. Among other things, he alleged in
his application that this parcel of land had been occupied and cultivated originally and continuously
thereafter by Gregorio Tengco. After being given due course, this application was approved by the
Director of Lands who issued Free Patent No. 557692 covering this lot on February 5, 1974 (Exh. "3"
Tengco; Exh. "6" Dir. of Lands).

This free patent issued in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco was predicated on the assumption that
the lot still formed part of the public domain and on the findings of the Public Land Inspector Romeo
Buenaventura who conducted an investigation thereon and who also reported that the land in question
was possessed and occupied by the applicant, Heirs of Gregorio Tengco (Exh. "2"-Tengco and Exh. "5"-Dir
of Lands ) who had planted different kinds of trees on the land aside from rice and corn.

The defendants Heirs of Gregorio Tengco also adduced evidence tending to show that their late
grandfather Gregorio Tengco had occupied this parcel of land exclusively years before the last (sic) and
after he died in 1934, his children succeeded him in its possession and enjoying the fruits from the
different trees planted thereon, and that the possession of Gregorio Tengco and his successors-in-
interest have not been disturbed by anyone including the Aliwalas family.

On rebuttal, the plaintiff adduced evidence showing that the prewar records of the Bureau of Lands
pertaining to public land applications were burned during the war as indicated in the certification issued
by the Chief of the Records Management Division of the Bureau of Lands. This is to explain why the
Bureau has no more record pertaining to the Homestead Patent issued in favor of Jose Aliwalas in i936
which gave rise to the issuance of OCT No. 159 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga on April 8, 1937.
The certification also attests that what is now found in the files of the Bureau of Lands is Free Patent V-
557692 issued on February 5, 1974 in favor of the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco pertaining to Lot No. 3563.
(Rollo, pp. 1820.)

On the basis of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the herein plaintiff Victoria Vda. de Aliwalas as the true owner of Lot No. 3563 of Arayat
Cadastre embraced in TCT No. 52526-R of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga in her name;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT Nos. 132263-R, 132264-R and 132349-R in
the name of Cipriano Tengco, Ponciano Tengco, et al., and Eugenia Tengco, respectively, covering
portions of this Lot No. 3563;

3. Ordering the herein defendants-Heirs of Gregorio Tengco to vacate the land in question and to pay the
amount of P 5,000.00 a year to the plaintiff beginning from the year 1974 until the land is vacated by
them and turned over to the plaintiff; and
4. Ordering the defendants-Heirs of Gregorio Tengco to pay the plaintiff the sum of P 2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus costs. [Rollo, p. 17-18.]

Dissatisfied with the trial court's judgment, the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G. R. CV No. 69706. The appellate court, adopting the trial court's
findings of fact, affirmed the latter's judgment [Rollo, pp. 17-24.] Petitioners moved for reconsideration
but their motion was denied [Rollo, pp. 25-26.] Hence, the instant petition.

Private respondents filed a comment to the petition, to which petitioners replied. On September 16,
1987, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda. After the petitioner filed a reply to private respondent's memorandum, the case
was deemed submitted for decision.

In their petition the Heirs of Gregorio Tengco have ascribed several errors to the Court of Appeals, which
involved mixed questions of fact and law [Rollo, p. 4.] But, as stated in their memorandum, the issues
may be limited to the following:

(a) Whether or not the court of origin and/or, subsequently, the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals,
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and pass upon, the instant case;

(b) Whether or not the claim or contention of the private respondents will hold true and prosper before
a proper forum; and

(c) Whether or not the private respondents, assuming for the sake of argument, that they have
proprietary rights on and to the land in question, have not long lost such rights by laches and/or
prescription. [Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 6.]

1. Petitioners contend that the trial court (and, consequently, the Court of Appeals) had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and pass upon the instant case as private respondents have failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. They point out that instead of bringing her case to the Bureau of Lands, Victoria
Vda. de Aliwalas went directly to the court.

On the other hand, private respondents argue that since a homestead patent and an original certificate
of title had already been issued to their predecessor-in-interest, the land had ceased to be part of the
public domain and, hence, the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction over the controversy. Private
respondents add that since an original certificate of title had been issued pursuant to the homestead
patent, their title to the property had become conclusive, absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible.

In rebuttal, petitioner contend that private respondents' title had not acquired said qualities as it was
derived from a homestead patent. Petitioners advanced the view that only titles based upon a judicial
declaration can be vested with the attributes of conclusiveness, indefeasibility and imprescriptibility.

Petitioners' theory is not supported by the jurisprudence on the matter. The rule is well-settled that an
original certificate of title issued on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a
certificate of title issued in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the
disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the
issuance of the patent. [Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227 (1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo 107 Phil. 498
(1960); Lopez v. Padilla, G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44.] A homestead patent, once
registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title. [Pamintuan v. San
Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144
(1961); Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676, June 30, 1971, 39 SCRA 676.]

The contention of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the theory that the case should have
been brought before the Director of Lands, had already been rejected by the Court in earlier decisions.
Thus, while the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long
as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once
the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain
and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction
[Sumail v. Judge of Court of First Instance, 96 Phil. 946 (1955); Republic v. Heirs of Carle, supra.]

2. Anent the second issue, petitioners contend that petitioners' title to the property was defective for
the following reasons: (a) Dr. Jose Aliwalas was not qualified to be a homesteader being a rich landed
person; and (b) private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have never been in actual or
physical possession of the property, unlike petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest who have been
in continuous and open possession of the property since 1918. Thus, petitioners rely on a report
prepared by a certain Librado B. Luna, hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands, attesting to such facts
[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 13.]

But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas' title to the property
having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been
any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor
General would be the proper remedy [Sec. 101, C.A. No. 141; Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-
14702, May 21, 1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra.]

3. Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent have lost their title to the property through laches
and prescription. They assert that private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have never
actually possessed the property while petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest have been in actual,
open, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property since 1918.

But as stated above, title acquired through a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration
Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner.

Moreover, as found by the Court of Appeals:

... The allegation of defendants-appellants (petitioners herein) that plaintiff-appellee (Victoria L. Vda. de
Aliwalas) and her predecessor-in-interest slept on their rights for over 40 years, since 1936 when the
patent was issued to Aliwalas is untenable. It has been established that Jose Aliwalas through his
overseer Espiridion Manaul planted the subject land to vegetables and raised cattle therein until the last
war broke out. After the war, the land was planted with palay, seasonal crops, ipil-ipil trees and mango
trees. When Jose Aliwalas died in 1962, the administration and management of the farm was assumed
by his son, Jose Aliwalas, Jr. Upon the partition of the properties left by the late Jose Aliwalas, the subject
property was allotted to and registered in the name of plaintiff-appellee. It was in 1974 when the
defendants-Heirs of Gregorio Tengco wrested possession of the subject land from plaintiff-appellee's
caretaker and deprived her of its produce. On October 14, 1976, the plaintiff filed her second amended
complaint. The foregoing facts show that plaintiff-appellee and her predeccessor-in-interest occupied,
possessed and exercised rights of ownership over the subject land prior to the filing of the instant suit
[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the appellate court's findings, in the absence of a clear
showing that the facts have been misapprehended.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 69706 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168848 June 30, 2009

HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA,1 represented by JOSE DE LUZURIAGA, JR., HEIRS OF MANUEL
R. DE LUZURIAGA, HEIRS OF THE LATE REMEDIOS DE LUZURIAGA-VALERO, and THE LATE NORMA DE
LUZURIAGA DIANON, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 169019 June 30, 2009

HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA, represented by JOSE DE LUZURIAGA, JR., and HEIRS OF THE
LATE REMEDIOS DE LUZURIAGA-VALERO AND THE LATE NORMA DE LUZURIAGA-DIANON, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before us are two petitions under Rule 45 interposed by the heirs of the late Jose De Luzuriaga, assailing
the November 26, 2004 Decision2 and May 25, 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 75321. The first is a Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari under G.R. No. 169019, while the
second is styled Supplemental Petition and docketed as G.R. No. 168848.

The assailed CA decision and resolution reversed and set aside the Orders dated August 31, 2001 4 and
October 24, 20025 in Cadastral Case No. 97-583 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 51 in Bacolod
City.

The Facts

Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 1524 of the Bacolod Cadastre, particularly described as
follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 1524 of the Cadastral Survey of Bacolod), with the improvements thereon,
situated in the Municipality of Bacolod. Bounded on the N. and NE., by the Lupit or Magsungay Pequeño
River; on the SE., by Calle Araneta and Lots Nos. 440, 442 and 441; on the SW., by the Sapa Mamlot; and
on the W. by Creeks x x x; containing an area of [TWO HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED AND SEVENTY TWO (268,772) square meters], more or less. 6
On May 16, 1997, petitioners filed an Application for the Registration of Title, docketed as Cad. Case No.
97-583 before the RTC. In it, the subject lot was specifically identified as Lot No. 1524, AP-06-005774,
Cad. 39, Bacolod Cadastre, situated in the City of Bacolod, Island of Negros. The survey plan, conducted
by Geodetic Engineer Eluminado E. Nessia, Jr. and duly approved on May 17, 1997 by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Office, Iloilo City; and the technical description of
the subject lot, prepared by the Office of the Regional Technical Director, Land Management Services,
DENR, Region VI, Iloilo City, were submitted to the RTC.

On May 12, 1998, the application was amended to state, thus: "x x x that the parcel of land in question
be ordered registered and that an original Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the late Jose R.
[De] Luzuriaga, Sr. pursuant to Decree No. 22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre." 7

Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order of general default except as against respondent Republic of the
Philippines, which entered its due appearance through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which, in
turn, designated Bacolod Assistant City Prosecutor Abraham Bayona to represent the OSG at the trial.

Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the hearings was a copy of Decree No. 22752 8 dated
October 7, 1916, issued by the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) pursuant to the decision in the
cadastral case confirming and granting unto the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga full ownership of Lot No. 1524.

RTC Decision Granting Application for Registration of Lot 1524

By Decision9 dated May 24, 1999, the trial court ratified its order of general default and judicially
confirmed the incomplete title of the late De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 pursuant to Decree No.
22752. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of general default previously entered is ratified and
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered confirming the title of the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524
of Bacolod Cadastre under Decree No. 22752 dated October 7, 1916 (Exh. "K" & "L") identified in the
approved Survey Plan (Exh. "M") and technically described in the Technical Description (Exh. "N").

As soon as this decision becomes final, let an Original Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the
late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr., pursuant to Decree No. 22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre in
accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

The OSG, for the Republic, received a copy of the Decision on June 22, 1999, but opted not to file an
appeal.

Pursuant to the above decision the Bacolod Registry issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-58
in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr.

DAALCO Sues for Quieting of Title

Meanwhile, in September 1999, Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Co., Inc. (DAALCO) filed a Complaint 10 against
petitioners before the RTC for Quieting of Title, Annulment and Cancellation of [OCT] No. RO-58 with
prayer for injunctive relief and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10924 and entitled Dr. Antonio A.
Lizares Co., Inc., (DAALCO) v. Jose R. De Luzuriaga, III, et al.11 In gist, DAALCO claimed that its
predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Lizares, was the registered, lawful, and absolute owner of Lot No. 1524
as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 190-R (T-247 [T-19890]) issued by the Register of
Deeds (RD) of Bacolod City on February 8, 1939. Said TCT served to replace OCT No. 2765 in the name of
Lizares and was issued pursuant to Decree No. 22752, GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 55 as early as November 14,
1916 and registered in the registration book of the Office of the RD of Negros Occidental, at Vol. 10, p.
283.

To buttress its case, DAALCO pointed to the fact that the RD, after the finality of the May 24, 1999 RTC
Decision, did not issue an OCT in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr., as prayed for in the application of
petitioners and as ordered by the cadastral court. What the RD instead issued––owing to the issuance in
1916 of OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares––was a reconstituted title, i.e., OCT No. RO-58. Finally,
DAALCO maintained having been in actual, open, and continuous possession as registered owner of the
subject lot.

The Petition for Relief from Judgment by the Republic

On November 24, 1999, or six months after the RTC rendered its Decision, the Republic through the OSG,
however, sought the annulment thereof via an unverified Petition for Relief from Judgment 12 filed before
the same RTC which rendered the above decision in Cad. Case No. 97-583.

To support its prayer for annulment, the Republic alleged, first, that petitioners failed to indicate in their
application all the heirs of the late De Luzuriaga, Sr. and their corresponding authorization for the
application in their behalf.

Second, the Republic asserted that petitioners cannot use Decree No. 22752 as basis for the application
of land registration as said decree effectively barred said application. It invited attention to Section 39 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, which requires the simultaneous issuance of the decree of
registration and the corresponding certificate of title. As argued, the policy of simultaneous issuance
prescribed in the decree has not been followed in the instant case.

Third, the Republic, relying on Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of
Appeals,13 contended that no new title over the subject lot can be issued in favor of the applicant, the
same lot being already covered by a title, specifically OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares.

Fourth, again citing jurisprudence, 14 the Republic maintained that the applicant, even if entitled to
registration by force of Decree No. 22752, is already barred by laches, the same registration decree
having been issued 83 long years ago.

In the meantime, Judge Anita G. Chua replaced retired Judge Ramon B. Posadas as presiding judge of the
RTC, Branch 51 in Bacolod City.

The Ruling of the RTC

By Order dated August 31, 2001, Judge Chua, on the finding that the "petition for relief from judgment is
not sufficient in form and substance and having been filed out of time," 15 denied the petition.
Specifically, the RTC found the Republic’s petition to be unverified and filed beyond the 60th day from
receipt on June 22, 1999 of a copy of the May 24, 1999 RTC Decision.

Subsequently, the Republic moved for reconsideration 16 of the above denial order arguing that its
procedural lapses are not fatal to its case. It cited Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,17 in which the Court
held that the merits of the substantive aspects of the case are deemed a special circumstance or
compelling reason for the reinstatement of its petition and prayed for the relaxation of the Rules.
Moreover, the OSG alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583
inasmuch as the corresponding amended application for registration dated May 5, 1998 was not
published and a copy of which the Republic was not served.

Finally, the Republic raised anew the argument on the unavailability of Decree No. 22752 as basis for the
application of land registration in view of the implementation of Sec. 39 of PD 1529.

The Republic later filed a Supplement (To Motion for Reconsideration) reiterating the merits of its case.

The RTC denied the Republic’s motion for reconsideration through an Order of October 24, 2002. In the
same order, the trial court observed that the Republic is actually asking the present presiding judge to
review the decision of her predecessor, Judge Posadas, and to annul the same decision. Pursuing the
point, the RTC, citing Miranda v. Court of Appeals18 and Nery v. Leyson,19 ratiocinated that a judge who
succeeds another has no reviewing and appellate authority and jurisdiction over his predecessor’s final
judgment on the merits of a case, such authority residing, as it does, in the ordinary course of things,
with the appellate court.

Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case before the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75321, the petition raised the sole issue of whether the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in denying its petition for relief from judgment.

The Ruling of the CA

On November 26, 2004, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting certiorari and
ordered the remand of the instant case to the trial court for reception of evidence to determine whether
the RTC’s Decision confirming the title of the late Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot 1524 will result in a double
titling of the subject lot. The fallo of the CA’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is
remanded to the court a quo for reception of evidence in order to resolve the issue of whether or not
the Decision dated May 24, 1999 confirming the title of the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No.
1524 of Bacolod Cadastre really resulted to "double titling" and thereafter, to rule on the merits of the
petition for relief from judgment.

SO ORDERED.20

The CA predicated its ruling on the following factors: (1) the merits of the petition for relief from
judgment far outweigh the procedural technicalities that obstruct it, i.e., not verified and filed out of
time; and (2) the Republic was able to make out a prima facie case of "double titling," supported by a
Letter/Report21 issued by the Bacolod City RD on December 7, 2001 showing that Lot No. 1524 was
already registered under, and an OCT already issued in, another man’s name.

Through the equally assailed May 25, 2005 Resolution, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, we have these petitions, with the supplemental petition filed on July 28, 2005; while the main
petition for review on certiorari was filed on August 11, 2005, which explains the lower docket number
of the former.
The Issues

Petitioners raise as ground for review in G.R. No. 169019 the following issues and assignment of errors:

A. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S OFFICE, WITHOUT MAKING A DEFINITE FINDING OF ACTUAL
PRESENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, COMMITTED BY THE LOWER COURT, VIOLATING THE WELL-
KNOWN PRINCIPLE THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT PROPER WHERE THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AND WHEN THERE ARE UNSETTLED FACTUAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE CASE;

B. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE [CA] IN ITS HEREIN CONTESTED DECISION x x x DIRECTLY
VIOLATED THE LONG-HELD PRINCIPLE OF "JUDICIAL STABILITY" THAT HOLDS THAT NO REVIEW CAN BE
HAD BY ONE COURT OF A DECISION OF ANOTHER COURT OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION, AND THE
RULE THAT NO SUCCEEDING JUDGE CAN REVIEW A DECISION OF THE PREVIOUS PRESIDING JUDGE, AS
HELD BY THE SUPREME COURT IN HACBANG V. LEYTE AUTOBUS CO., INC. 62 O.G. 31, Aug. 1, 1966,
MIRANDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 71 SCRA 295, AND NERY VS. LEYSON, 339 SCRA 23;

C. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SUBJECT DECISION OF THE HONORABLE [CA] VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE
OF RES JUDICATA OR FINALITY OF JUDGMENT;

D. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING THE OSG’S PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, WHICH WAS CLEARLY RESORTED TO FOR THE FAILURE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL TO SEASONABLY FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NOTICE OF APPEAL, OR
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OF THE ORDER OR OF THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT, RTC BRANCH 51, IN THE CASE A QUO, WHICH RESORT OR DEVISE IS THOROUGHLY FROWNED
UPON IN OUR JURISDICTION;

E. THE HONORABLE [CA], WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS AN
"EXCEPTIONAL CASE" IN THIS ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE WHICH JUSTIFIES THE GRANT OF THE PETITION,
WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, THERE IS NONE;

MOST IMPORTANTLY:

F. A POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS CONFLICT OF DECISIONS HAS BEEN CREATED BY THE ORDER OF THE
HONORABLE [CA] WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IN REMANDING THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO
THE COURT A QUO, WHEN THERE IS ALREADY A SIMILAR CASE INVOLVING PRINCIPALLY THE SAME ISSUE
OF ALLEGED "DOUBLE TITLING" IN ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE [RTC] OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL NAMELY,
BRANCH 46, IN THE CASE ENTITLED DAALCO VS. LUZURIAGA, ET AL. WITH CIVIL CASE [NO.] 99-10924,
FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.22

In G.R. No. 168848, petitioners raise the sole issue in their Supplemental Petition of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 26, 2004 AND RESOLUTION DATED MAY 25,
2005 WERE CONTRARY TO LAW AND/OR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT 23

In the meantime, on September 12, 2005, DAALCO filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, 24 apprising the
Court of, among other things, the pendency of its complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10924.

The Court’s Ruling

The core issue in these petitions is whether the appellate court gravely abused its discretion in granting
the Republic’s petition for relief from judgment despite: (1) the May 24, 1999 Decision in Cadastral Case
No. 97-583 having become final and executory; and (2) the issue of double titling having been raised in
DAALCO’s complaint in Civil Case No. 99-10924 for quieting of title and cancellation of OCT No. RO-58
before the RTC, Branch 46 in Bacolod City.

The petitions are bereft of merit.

The CA acted within its sound discretion in giving, under the factual premises and for reasons set out in
the assailed decision, due course to the Republic’s petition for relief from judgment and remanding the
case to the trial court for reception of evidence. Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
we agree with the appellate court’s holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for relief from the May 24, 1999 Decision.

Procedural Issue: Relaxation of the Rules to

Promote Substantial Justice

We can concede that the unverified petition for relief from judgment of the OSG was filed out of time.
Such a petition must be filed within: (a) sixty (60) days from knowledge of judgment, order, or other
proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order, or other
proceedings.25 In the case at bar, the OSG admits receiving the May 24, 1999 Decision on June 22, 1999.
Thus, when it did not file a notice of appeal of said decision within the 15-day reglementary period for
filing an appeal, the OSG was left with the remaining remedy of relief from judgment subject to the
conditions provided under Secs. 1 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. But, as thing turned out, the
OSG, for the Republic, belatedly filed its petition only on November 24, 1999, or more than five months
from receipt or knowledge of the May 24, 1999 RTC Decision.

The Republic ascribes its failure to file a timely notice of appeal or a petition for relief from judgment on
the negligence of the OSG person––in charge of receiving all pleadings assigned to Asst. Solicitor Josefina
C. Castillo––who belatedly gave the copy of the RTC Decision to the latter due to oversight. And the
Republic prays for the relaxation of the rigid application of the Rules based on the merits of its petition
for relief from judgment.

While the reglementary periods fixed under the rules for relief from judgment are mandatory in
character,26procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance may, in the interest
of substantial justice, be relaxed.27 Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, they are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would
clearly defeat the very rationale for their existence. In line with this postulate, the Court can and will
relax or altogether suspend the application of the rules, or except a particular case from the rules’
operation when their rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. 28

The peculiarities of the instant case impel us to do so now. Foremost of these is the fact that the
Republic had properly made out a prima facie case of double titling over the subject lot, meriting a
ventilation of the factual and legal issues relative to that case.

Apropos the matter of verification which the OSG failed to observe, it cannot be over-emphasized that
the requirement on verification is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings. Non-compliance
with it is not jurisdictional, and would not render the pleading fatally defective. 29 A pleading required by
the Rules of Court to be verified may be given due course even without a verification if the
circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice. 30 So it must be here.

Substantive Issue: Prima Facie Case of Double Titling

Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no
other available or adequate remedy.31 And its determination rests with the court. In the instant case,
certain attending facts and circumstances, as shall be set forth below, make for an exceptional case for
allowing relief from judgment.

Register of Deeds report shows doubling titling when another OCT is issued for subject lot

First. The Letter/Report32 issued by the Bacolod City RD on December 7, 2001, ineluctably indicating the
registration of subject Lot No. 1524 and the subsequent issuance of an OCT in the name of another
person, provides a reasonable ground to believe that a case of double titling would result should another
title issue for the same lot in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr. Thus, there exists a compelling need for
another hard look at Cad. Case No. 97-583 and for the trial court to address the likelihood of duplication
of titles or "double titling," an eventuality that will undermine the Torrens system of land registration.

OCT already issued for subject lot

Second. The prior issuance on November 14, 1916 of OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares over Lot No.
1524 persuasively buttresses a prima facie case on the issue of double titling. Civil Case No. 99-10924 for
quieting of title filed by DAALCO before the RTC, Branch 46 in Bacolod City tends to show that DAALCO’s
predecessor-in-interest, Lizares, was issued OCT No. 2765 in 1916 ostensibly pursuant to Decree No.
22752, GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 55. This is confirmed by the adverted Letter/Report.

Decree No. 22752 is the same decree petitioners relied upon in Cad. Case No. 97-583 for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title over subject Lot No. 1524. Obviously, one and the same decree cannot
serve as basis for a valid grant of separate titles in fee simple over the same lot to two different persons.

Ownership of subject lot best ventilated in civil case

Third. Since petitioners and DAALCO separately claim owning Lot No. 1524, the ownership issue would
be best litigated in Civil Case No. 99-10924 filed by DAALCO for quieting of title. Lest it be overlooked,
both parties anchor in a way their ownership claim on Decree No. 22752. It ought to be stressed,
however, that an OCT was issued several months after Decree No. 22752 was rendered, and the
certificate was issued to Lizares, not to De Luzuriaga, Sr. De Luzuriaga, Sr., during his lifetime, never
contested or assailed the title issuance to Lizares, suggesting the possibility of a lawful transfer of
ownership from one to the other during the period material. In any case, for purposes of Cad. Case No.
97-583, the fact that an OCT was already issued for the subject lot would, perforce, foreclose the
issuance of another OCT for the same lot.

As has been consistently held, neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a
land registration case. 33 In line with this doctrine of the inapplicability of prescription and laches on
registration cases, the Court has ruled that "the failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do
their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership
of the land."34 Following these doctrinal pronouncements, petitioners argue that they can rightfully bank
on Decree No. 22752 to defeat the claim of DAALCO.
Petitioners’ above posture may be given cogency but for the issuance, pursuant to the same decree, of
OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares. Nothing on the records adequately explains, nor do petitioners
attempt to do so, how a registration decree adjudicating Lot No. 1524 to De Luzuriaga, Sr. became the
very medium for the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Lizares. Consequently, whatever rights
petitioners might have over the subject lot as heirs of De Luzuriaga, Sr. ought to be litigated against the
successors-in-interest of Lizares to put a final rest to their clashing claims over Lot No. 1524.

Issuance of reconstituted title beyond the judgment in the cadastral case

Fourth. OCT No. RO-58 was issued by the RD of Bacolod City purportedly in execution of the final and
executory decision in Cad. Case No. 97-583. Yet the Court notes that the title issuance went beyond the
scope of the judgment sought to be executed. The second paragraph of the fallo of the May 24, 1999
RTC Decision granting and confirming ownership of subject Lot No. 1524 unto the late Jose R. De
Luzuriaga clearly ordered, thus:

As soon as this decision becomes final, let an Original Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the
late Jose R. De Luzuriaga, Sr., pursuant to Decree No. 22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre
in accordance with law.35

But the RD of Bacolod City––in grave abuse of discretion, instead of issuing an OCT in the name of De
Luzuriaga, Sr., as directed by the court––issued a reconstituted title over Lot No. 1524 in the name of the
heirs of De Luzuriaga, Sr. Not lost on the Court is the fact that a reconstituted title is ordered issued in an
ordinary civil case, not in a cadastral proceeding for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over
unregistered property, as in the instant case.

Basic is the rule that execution must conform to what the decision dispositively decrees. 36 Logically, an
execution is void if it does not strictly conform to every essential particulars of the judgment
rendered.37 Be that as it may, the issuance of the reconstituted title is rendered moot and ineffective by
the grant of relief from judgment.

Cadastral Case and Quieting of Title Case can proceed independently

Fifth. Petitioners’ contention that a petition for relief from judgment and the special civil action for
quieting of title cannot proceed separately is without solid basis. Cad. Case No. 97-583 and the suit for
quieting of title in Civil Case No. 99-10924 each involves different concerns and can proceed
independently. The cause of action of the Republic’s petition for relief from judgment of "double titling"
of the subject lot is different from DAALCO’s quest for quieting of title. From another perspective,
DAALCO basically seeks to nullify the issuance of OCT No. RO-58 in the name of the De Luzuriaga heirs,
while the Republic’s petition assails the grant of ownership to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of land duly
registered under OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares, who thereafter transferred the title to his heirs or
assigns. In fine, both actions may proceed independently, albeit a consolidation of both cases would be
ideal to obviate multiplicity of suits.

The RTC Had Jurisdiction in Cadastral Case

The Republic, after participating in the proceedings below, has raised the issue of jurisdiction, drawing
attention to the non-publication of the amended application for registration during the trial of Cad. Case
No. 93-857. The Court cannot see its way clear to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the Republic. As it
were, the Republic entered its appearance in Cad. Case No. 97-583 represented by prosecutor Bayona.
The petitioners in that case appeared to have complied with the essential jurisdictional requirement of
publication. The required survey plan, technical description, and original tracing cloth have been duly
presented and submitted as evidence. Prosecutor Bayona obviously found the cadastral proceedings to
have been in order, else, he would have duly protested and assailed the same.

We hardly can subscribe to the Republic’s argument that the publication of the amendment in
petitioners’ application is a condition sine qua non for the RTC, acting as cadastral court, to acquire
jurisdiction. Sec. 738 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35 39 of PD 1529,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for the publication of the application for
registration and the schedule of the initial hearing. This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like
ordinary administrative registration, are in rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice,
procedure, and evidence. Due publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim
and identity of the property that will be surveyed. And any additional territory or change in the area of
the claim cannot be included by amendment of the plan or application without new publication,
otherwise the cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction over the additional or amended claim. But
where the identity and area of the claimed property are not the subjects of amendment but other
collateral matters, a new publication is not needed.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that due publication was made for Lot No. 1524, its identity and
area. The amendment in petitioners’ application in the relief portion neither altered the area and
identity of the subject lot nor added any territory. Thus, no new publication is required. Besides, the
Republic, through Prosecutor Bayona, has been duly notified of such amendment. Consequently, the
Republic could not plausibly argue that it was deprived of its day in court.1avvphi1

Anent DAALCO’s motion to intervene and interest over the subject lot, it may address its motion to the
lower court, although intervention may no longer be necessary in the light of Civil Case No. 99-10924
pending before the RTC, Branch 46 in Bacolod City, where DAALCO can properly ventilate its ownership
claim as against that of petitioners, who, incidentally, are impleaded in said case as
respondents/defendants.

A final consideration. A petition for relief is in effect a second opportunity for an aggrieved party to ask
for a new trial.40 Once granted either by the trial court or the appellate court, the final judgment whence
relief is sought is deemed set aside and the case shall stand as if such judgment had never been
rendered. In such a case, "the court shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration had been granted by it." 41

Here, the presiding judge of the RTC, Branch 51 in Bacolod City, by the remand to the court of Cad. Case
No. 97-583, is not asked to review and/or annul a final judgment of his or her predecessor or of another
RTC, as there is nothing for the presiding judge to nullify in the first place, the annulling act having been
taken by the CA. Hence, the trial court’s invocation, as seconded by petitioners, of the teachings
of Nery,42 is off-tangent. Nery, it is true, held that a trial court is without jurisdiction to annul a final
judgment of a co-equal court. Nery was, however, cast against a different factual and legal milieu. Suffice
it to state for the nonce that Nery involved a final judgment of the RTC against which no petition for
relief has been interposed. In view of the first reason, the final judgment was not effectively set aside,
unlike here.
WHEREFORE, the Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari and Supplemental Petition are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the CA’s November 26, 2004 Decision and May 25, 2005
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 75321 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35778 January 27, 1983

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO MARTINEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, l983

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:

The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions dated October 9, 1972 and
October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan, Branch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in LRC No. N-206,
respectively, involve a common issue. For convenience, they are hereby decided jointly.

G.R. No. L-35778:

On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for registration of
title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing
an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less.

On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic of the
Philippines and the Province of Bataan.

On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the
application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic, not subject to private appropriation.

On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading:

Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez during the hearing of August
8, 1972 that this land, subject matter of this application, was a subject of cadastral proceeding and that
this land was assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn, August 3, 1972, page 41), this case is ordered re-opened and
the Land Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his report and/or comment as to whether this
lot is covered by the Mariveles Cadastre within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

xxx xxx xxx

On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the lower court a report
stating.

That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of
the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097.

xxx xxx xxx

Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old,
testified that he is the owner of the land applied for, having inherited the same from his parents,
consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8
hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy is
also planted thereon; that he declared the land for taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the
records were lost during the war, and that possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the
concept of owner.

Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito Martinez; that
the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or less; that since 1938, applicant has possessed this land; that
eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia are the ones
tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike between applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and
Silvestre Garcia, on the other; that eighteen (18) hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.

While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked on the land of the
applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or less; that said Luisito Martinez inherited the land
from his parents; that he plants palay only on four (4) hectares; that there are 42 mango trees on the
land,

G.R. No. L-35779:

On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496
in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-
41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of Mariveles, province of
Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or
less, respectively, and more particularly described and Identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles
Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431, respectively.

On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the Commissioner of
Land Registration.

On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report within ten (10) days
if the land subject of the application has been issued patents or is the subject of any pending application
for the issuance of patents. Likewise, the lower court directed the Commissioner of Land Registration to
submit within the same period his report if the land applied for has been issued a title or is the subject
of a pending decree.
On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in the lower
court, stating that the parcels of land applied for registration "do not appear to have been passed upon
and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative Code."
Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed in the lower court
another report or manifestation stating "that Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206,
LRC Record No. N-41884, when plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the Commission does not
appear to overlap with any previously titled property under Act 496; that the plan and records of said
Land Registration application will be subjected to further examination as soon as the decision to be
rendered by this Honorable Court is received in this Commission to determine whether or not a patent
or title has in the meantime been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles."

At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the lower court issued an Order of
General Default against all persons, with the exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry, represented by the Office of the provincial fiscal, and the oppositor Eliseo Martinez represented
by Atty. Angelino Banzon, who were directed to file their respective oppositions,

On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands and of
Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.

Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein), testified in her
behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, and Agapito del Rosario,
50 years old, as well as her documentary evidence in support of her application for registration. On the
other hand,. Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the government, and submitted documentary proof in
support of the opposition filed by the provincial fiscal's office in this case.

At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she
had possessed the land "openly, adversely, notoriously and in the concept of owner since February 2,
1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed this land" in the same
manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.

Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were the ones working on the
land before 1935 and due to the illness of his parents, on their request to owner Elisa Llamas, he became
overseer up to 1970 when the same was sold to applicant; that 16 hectares of these lands were planted
to palay while others were devoted to pasture land and planting vegetables.

Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood, he had known Elisa Llamas
to be the owner of the land applied for; that she was the one managing the planting and improving of
the land; that he used to see Leopoldo de Guzman and another one also named Agapito del Rosario
worked on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa Llamas informed him that in 1970 she sold the
land to Thelma Tanalega.

At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the government,
submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of Leonides B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan
(Exhibit 3) which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan containing an
approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and described in the attached
photostat copy of Plans in two sheets, as surveyed for Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within
the Alienable and Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by the Director of Forestry
as such on February 16, 1972."

The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to testify on the
alleged possession of the land. The applicant also failed to present Guillermo Ramirez, who was hired by
her as overseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the
applicant had possessed the land as owners.

In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and
October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of
applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.

In the instant petitions for review the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, argued
that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated
October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496. Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in
question can no longer be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been
subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.

The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order.

It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land subject
matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles,
Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No. 626
were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that "portion declared Public Land as per decision
dated October 11, 1937."

In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition
is required by Section 9 of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within such
further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of the
claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be;
(3) Name of the barrio and municipality, township or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4)
Names of the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no
express grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need
state the length of time property was held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the
length of time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession; (6) If claimant is
not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest claimed by him and
the time and manner of its acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed
value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as
known. In the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.

In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid
cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying,
otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them.
The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already
become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the
doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this
2
doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final judgment.

Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the lands
subject matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant
cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area
applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious
so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however long the
period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual,
peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the
period required by law.

Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not approved by the Director
of Lands but by the Land Registration Commission. The Land Registration Commission has no authority
to approve original survey plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by
respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided in
favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of
mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director
of Lands, the same are not of much value. 4

WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9,1972 and October 16, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are hereby reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA. DE
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAUSTINO J. PERFECTO,
RAFFY SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other DOES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of
the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park." The facts of the case are as follows.

On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued
Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park purposes some 440,530 square meters of land
situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of
the Philippine Commission. 1

Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United States of America,
ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40 in the name of Diego
Palomo on December 9, 1916; 2 December 28, 3 and January 17, 1917. 4 Diego Palomo donated these
parcels of land consisting of 74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificates
of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173 5 to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two
months before his death in April 1937. 6

Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio
Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. 7 The
Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime
in October 1953. 8

On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced
by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the
Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public
Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).

The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon 9 and
introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner
Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels
of land covered by TCT 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands.

In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of Albay for Injunction with
damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales,
Salvador Doe and other Does who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered
the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no
less than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.

On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and
cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered in the name of the
petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.

The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the
Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the parties and on July 31,
1986, the trial court rendered the following decision:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the complaint
for injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.

Costs against the plaintiffs.

In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14, 1953, as well as the
Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153, 10 169, 173 and 176 and Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-
3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds of Albay and all transactions based on said titles.

(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the lands in question that
are found therein and introduced by the defendants;

(3) Declaring Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9,10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21, 11 3 and 4 of Plan
II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park;

(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the alleged Original Certificates
of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.

Costs against the defendants.

So Ordered. 12

The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos have established
property rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-
American War at the end of the century. The court further stated that assuming that the decrees of the
Court of First Instance of Albay were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the
properties because these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this
point, we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as one of the
Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his reamended report that of the
3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation
area,13 the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.

The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court;
hence this petition raising the following issues:

1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the decision
of the lower court.

2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent transfer certificates of
titles of the petitioners over the properties in question is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the
matter.

3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the premises in favor of the
government is against our existing law and jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original certificate of titles issued
pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953
pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.

Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the
19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino citizens and the American
government had no inherent power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare them part of
any kind of government reservation. They allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in
1916-1917. Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-general
Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property without due process of law.

In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of the Court of First
Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America which state that the predecessors
in interest of the petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open and adverse possession of
the lands from 20 to 50 years at the time of their registration in 1916.

We are not convinced.

The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the
Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be
acquired through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or
Royal Grant," (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase and (4)
Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or
under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.

Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title from an
old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O.
Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated
December 28, 1916; Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente
No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O. Record No.
9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United
States of America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that their predecessors in interest were in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years. 14 The aforesaid "decisions" of
the Court of First Instance, however, were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of
notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court.

Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands
were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo.
Curiously , in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the
government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park
purposes. If the petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a number
of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the
inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue
that the government had no right to include these properties in the reservation when the question
should have been raised 83 years ago.

As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without government
opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title
which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of
estoppel, does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents. 15

Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were really issued, the lands are still not capable
of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.

There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the public domain. As
testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show that the subject lands were
never declared as alienable and disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the
present. 16 Moreover, as part of the reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the
forest zone.

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into
private property, 17 unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land
inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land
registration cases. 18

Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of
improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was
already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also
apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition
for reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order
Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in
1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands dated
September 11, 1948 19 contains the following note, "in conflict with provincial reservation." 20 In any
case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the government to oppose the
registration of the lands in question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in
introducing improvements on the lots.

Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the
reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid area. Inasmuch as the
bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-143, 21 were within the perimeter of the
national park, 22 no pronouncement as to damages is in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT
3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling within the reservation zone.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER
OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in
behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL
TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure
titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo,
Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003
inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National
Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. 7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos
later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation
No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial.
They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. 10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, 11 as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was
misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-
claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were
planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or
less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-
claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. 12

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No.
1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to
forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective
memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and
30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the
Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their
lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to
have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled
that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. 18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership
of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging
private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as
part of the forest reserve.22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court. 24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. 25 Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on
each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, 27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other
landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior
vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots
in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. 31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. 32 Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is
a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island. 33

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any
legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in
Boracay Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED
BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR
OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141
[AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS
TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR
SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE
SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN
BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 36 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; 37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed
to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and
executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public
domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes
as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. 43 Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. 48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall
be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. 52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law 53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws
of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant
Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree. 54 Under Section 393 of the
Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the
Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, 56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation
of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. 58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions
which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and
(5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant
(freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). 62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of
"agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of
1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64

x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system. 66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first
Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase
lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second
Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For
judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or
since July 26, 1894, was required. 69

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To
this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands, 70 and privately owned
lands which reverted to the State. 71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, 72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now
provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74

The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for
registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on
February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. 78 It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands
only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified." 82

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. 86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot
accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. 87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural
lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old
cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919) 88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
(1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926.
There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." 90

Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of
converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration
courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber,
mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were
free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do
so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. 91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late
Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through
Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These
cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the
Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief
Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral,
timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a
presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands
of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands.
By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural
lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be
utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the
provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act
No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued
to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the
end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the
courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that
whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere
fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that
one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been
given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we
think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act
No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some
mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the
timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid
growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be
differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case,
having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the
land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by
the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient
for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to
one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of
Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case,
whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what
portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each
case, except those that have already became private lands. 96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, 98 did not
present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the property’s land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874
in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the property’s land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision 99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.103

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue
in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands;
and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was
prohibited by the 1935 Constitution 104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots.
Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already
stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the
land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 106 ipso facto converted the island into
private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing
the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations
for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land
Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act
No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands
are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority 110 certify that
Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which
lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects
titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out
of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest
cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution 112 classifying lands of the public
domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to
large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. 113 The
discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry 114 is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest
lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. 115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. 116 At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial
establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist
zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural
land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands" 117 and "areas declared as alienable and
disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3
provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in
public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island
can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5
of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the
island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did
in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance
in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands
for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability. 119

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few.
If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and
opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. 121

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office
of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. 122 Absent such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. 123

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares
of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the
center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation
No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that
since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval
of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall
have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from
later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public
domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, 124 the Court stated that
unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public
forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had
never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification
under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice 126 on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat,
to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification
for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent
forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to
agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot,
apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry
Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code. 127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No.
141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902,
Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land
Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear
from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the
land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. 130

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to
prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants
complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that
the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island
for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say
their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally
rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give
them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to
apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their
continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a
number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates
with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and
it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote
their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can
take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of
applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead 131 or sales patent,132 subject to the
conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied
lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such
bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law
is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to
private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy
balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are not
just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction
of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez
in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz: 134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed
with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often,
about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development and
reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands
produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up;
rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas
become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the
fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that
wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention
precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman’s
decalogue.135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133168 March 28, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,1

vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO, Respondent.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision2dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50298 affirming an
earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-3899, entitled
"Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 in the
name of Benjamin Guerrero, Registry of Deeds of Quezon City."

The assailed decision of the CA recites the facts as follows:

Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands
Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-83191 covering a parcel of land situated
at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City, consisting of 256 square meters. Upon favorable report and
recommendation of the District Land Officer, Guerrero’s application was approved per Order of Award
(Exhibit "B"), with the boundaries of the land awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-
Culiat Creek; E-Road; and W-Public Land. A sketch of the land awarded is contained at the back of the
Order of Award.

Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982 was issued in favor of
respondent. Pursuant thereto the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 was issued on
August 27, 1982.

On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that
respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of material
facts considering that 174 square meters awarded to respondent covered the land where her house is
situated and where she has been residing since 1961.

A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the Director of Lands issued an
order dismissing the protest of Angelina Z. Bustamante. The dismissal of the protest was affirmed by the
then Minister of Natural Resources and by the Office of the President in a Decision dated July 22, 1985.

Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated July 22, 1985. Acting on the motion
for reconsideration, the President, …, ordered that the case be remanded to the DENR [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources] for the latter’s office to conduct an ocular investigation and
resurvey of the disputed area. The said directive is contained in the Order dated October 30,
1987(Exhibit "J").

Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation and relocation survey was
conducted by the DENR. A report (Exhibit "K") was thereafter submitted with a finding that 83 square
meters of the titled property of Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under ACTUAL PHYSICAL
POSSESSION of Marcelo Bustamante (husband of Angelina Bustamante) with only 91 square meters
under the physical possession of Guerrero. It was also found out that OCT No. 0-28 is supposed to be
traversed by a road 3 meters wide, as even the Order of Award in favor of Guerrero, shows by the
boundaries of the land indicated therein, viz: bounded on the N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801, S-Culiat Creek,
E-Road and W-Public Land.

On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the [DENR] Ocular Investigation and
Relocation Survey Report (Exhibit "K") …, issued an order directing the DENR to implement the … Report
for the ‘proper correction’ of the technical description of the land covered by OCT No. 0-28 issued to
respondent.

Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands [on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines] instituted the instant action [Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical
Description of OCT No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero] on November 7, 1989.

On April 6, 1990, the [respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss the petition …, alleging
among other things, that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the Director of Lands’
petition and that the said petition was defective in form and substance, inasmuch as it failed to name
[Guerrero] who holds a certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) over the properties subject of the petition, as
respondent in the action, and that the title sought to be amended was irrevocable and can no longer be
questioned.
In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Trial of
the petition followed with the Director of Lands, on one hand, and [Guerrero], on the other, presenting
their respective evidence and witnesses. 3 [Words in bracket added.]

On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to prove its allegation that
respondent obtained the sales patent and the certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation,
rendered judgment finding for the latter. The trial court likewise ruled that the original certificate of title
(OCT No. 0-28) in the name of respondent acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the
expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration.

Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a decision dated February 12, 1998,
affirmed that of the trial court, rationalizing as follows:

It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is
as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued upon private lands in ordinary or
cadastral registration proceedings. The effect of registration of a homestead or any other similar patent
and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land,
in the same manner as if ownership had been determined by final decree of the court, and the title so
issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable.

In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be reviewed or reopened within one year
after the entry thereof, upon a charge of actual fraud, a patent awarded in accordance with the Public
Land Law may be reviewed within one year from the date of the order for the issuance of the patent also
on the ground of actual fraud.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx there is no showing … that at the time the [respondent] applied for his miscellaneous sales patent,
there were third persons who had been in occupation of the land applied for. While subsequent survey
documents, prepared as a consequence of the protest filed by the Bustamentes, report the possession of
the Bustamantes of a portion of the land, and the erection of their house thereon, these reports do not
indicate if such structures were existing at the time the application of the [respondent] was filed in 1964.

There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent] was guilty of actual fraud in the
acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent, and subsequently, OCT No. 0-28. 4 (Words in bracket added)

Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied by the
appellate court in its resolution of March 23, 1998. 5

Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the appellate court erred in holding -

I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is conclusive and
indefeasible despite the fact that respondent’s title was procured through fraud and misrepresentation.

II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition
of his miscellaneous sales patent despite the final ruling of the Office of the President from which ruling
respondent did not appeal.
III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of possession of a third person of the land, or a
portion thereof, after the award and issuance of the patent to the applicant despite the obvious fact that
the protest was filed within one year from the issuance of patent. 6

Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and certificate of title through fraud
and misrepresentation. To support its basic posture, petitioner points to the verification survey
conducted by Engr. Ernesto Erive of the DENR, which, to petitioner, argues for the proposition that
respondent’s entitlement to a public land award should have been limited to a 91-square meter area
instead of the 174 square meters eventually granted.

On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he secured pursuant to a sales
patent is conclusive and indefeasible under the Torrens system of registration. As such, his title can no
longer be altered, impugned or cancelled.

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this Petition ― the presence of
fraud ― is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters, as only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. And as the Court has consistently
held, factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on
this Court,7 save when the judgment of the appellate court is based on a misapprehension of facts or
factual inferences manifestly incorrect or when that court overlooked certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 8 Obviously, petitioner is invoking these
exceptions toward having the Court review the factual determinations of the CA.

The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent procured Miscellaneous Sales Patent (MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28
through fraud and misrepresentation.

It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and
disposed of via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of
public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land
Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue
an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property
described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or
reserves.9 As it were, the Torrens system aims to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the
right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of
inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that
he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the
covered land.10

Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:

SEC. 122. Whenever public lands … belonging to the Government of the [Republic of the Philippines] are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty
of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to
cause such instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a
certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner’s duplicate certificate
issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the Government shall not take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the Government
and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The
act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act
registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. xxx.
(Words in bracket added)

Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land.
Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in
favor of the person whose name appears thereon. 11

However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an
action to reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. Section 38 of Act No. 496
says so:

SEC. 38. ― xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to
the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the [Republic of the Philippines] and all the branches thereof, …. Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, minority, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees, subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of the land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a petition for review of the
decree of registration within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title
issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx. (Emphasis and words in bracket
supplied)

Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional
deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive
fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury
upon other persons.12

Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court
and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the
applicant.13

The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is
contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted
to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that
the lots are not contested when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other
claims; or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an
application; or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant
causing the former to withdraw his application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from
presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. 14

We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud
goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided.
Thus, we have underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud consisted in the
presentation at the trial of a supposed forged document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing
the judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of
the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case. 15

Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of the decree
constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that
respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding
certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over
the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such fraud. In fact, other than its
peremptory statement in its petition filed before the trial court that "the patentee, Benjamin Guerrero,
obtained the above indicated sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of
material facts,"16 petitioner did not specifically allege how fraud was perpetrated by respondent in
procuring the sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the
allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.

Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of
proof.17 The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It
may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways. 18 Thus, the law
requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing
evidence.19

Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report 20 which stated that respondent Guerrero was
entitled to only 91 square meters of the subject lot instead of 174 square meters which was awarded to
him. There is, however, no proof that the area eventually awarded to respondent was intentionally and
fraudulently increased. It was never proven that respondent was a party to any fraud that led to the
award of a bigger area of 174 square meters instead of 91 square meters. Petitioner even failed to give
sufficient proof of any error which may have been committed by its agents who had surveyed the subject
property nor had petitioner offered a sensible explanation as to the reason for such discrepancy. Thus,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions must be respected.

This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the subject lot was made in
accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act.21 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the
purpose of ascertaining the veracity of the material facts set out in the application. 22 The law also
requires sufficient notice to the municipality and barrio where the land is located in order to give
adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims. 23

In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day after respondent filed his
miscellaneous sales application, an actual investigation and site verification of the parcel of land was
conducted by Land Investigator Alfonso Tumbocon who reported that the land was free from claims and
conflicts.24 Likewise, the notice of sale of the lot in question was posted at the District Land Office in San
Miguel, Manila, at the Quezon City Hall, and at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City for 30 consecutive days from
February 17, 1965 to March 17, 1965 which was the date scheduled for the sale of the lot. The said
notice was worded as follows:

If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at the Bureau of Lands, Manila on or
before the date of the sale; otherwise such claim shall forever be barred. 25

Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the "Issuance of Patent" 27 dated June 28,
1982 were both duly signed by the Director of Lands. The "Order of Award" even declared that Guerrero
has in good faith established his residence on the land in question. On the other hand, the "Issuance of
Patent" stated that the land consisting of 174 square meters is free from any adverse claim and that
Guerrero has fully paid the purchase price of the lot. Having complied with all the requirements of the
law preliminary to the issuance of the patent, respondent was thus issued MSP No. 8991 dated August
16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding OCT No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982 in the name of
respondent Guerrero.

At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have regularly performed their official
duties. Thus, the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of MSP No. 8991 and OCT No.
0-28 in respondent’s name are presumptively regular and proper. To overturn this legal presumption will
not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system.
Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless
verbiage.28 Besides, this presumption of regularity has not been overcome by the evidence presented by
petitioner. We, therefore, cannot sustain petitioner’s contention that fraud tainted the sales patent
granted to respondent Guerrero, as well as the certificate of title issued in consequence thereof.

Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to avail itself of the
remedy within the prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration must be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree.

In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the issuance of the
patent by the government.29

In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16, 1982, while petitioner
instituted an action to amend respondent’s certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or after the lapse of
more than seven (7) years from the issuance of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to timely avail of the
remedy to contest Guerrero’s title.

Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully acquired property is not
barred by prescription. Thus, it can still recover the land granted to respondent.

True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter may still bring an action, even
after the lapse of one year, for the reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently
granted to private individuals.30 However, this remedy of reversion can only be availed of in cases of
fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title. In the present case,
petitioner cannot successfully invoke this defense for, as discussed earlier, it was never proven that
respondent’s patent and title were obtained through actual fraud or other illegal means.
Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent and the corresponding certificate of
title ceases to be part of the public domain. As such, it is considered a private property over which the
Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. 31

Petitioner likewise insists that respondent’s title had yet to attain the status of indefeasibility. As argued,
Angelina Bustamante was able to timely file a protest on July 29, 1983, which was well within the one-
year prescriptive period.

We do not agree.

While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in favor of respondent, the
protest was, however, filed with the Bureau of Lands instead of with the regional trial court as mandated
by the aforequoted provision of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said provision expressly states that a petition
for review of a decree of registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance" (now Regional
Trial Court). The law did not say that such petition may be filed with an administrative agency like the
Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what the law contemplates in allowing a review of the decree of registration
is a full-blown trial before a regular court where each party could be afforded full opportunity to present
his/its case and where each of them must establish his case by preponderance of evidence and not by
mere substantial evidence, the usual quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings. The
concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. 32On
the other hand, substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.33

As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of land titles and the
Torrens system, a full-blown trial on the merits before a regular court is necessary for the purpose of
achieving a more in-depth and thorough determination of all issues involved.

Hence, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante with the Bureau of Lands
cannot be considered in the context of a petition to review the decree of registration issued to
respondent. It was only on November 7, 1989 that such petition was filed by the Director of Lands with
the RTC and obviously, it was way beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.

It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be
the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his
acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this
were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to
be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The
further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The
government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the
validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. 34

Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the amendment of OCT No. 0-28,
derogates the very integrity of the system as it gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like herein
respondent, that their titles can be questioned by the same authority who had approved their titles. In
that case, no Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land, for
land registration officers can question his title any time they make a finding unfavorable to said title
holder. This is all the more frustrating for respondent Guerrero considering that he had bought the
subject lot from the government itself, the very same party who is now impugning his title.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of
titles to lands,35 justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to
quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that
were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto.36 Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and
inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.37

Respondent’s certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was thus vested with
the garment of indefeasibility.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
CADT

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY
JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT,
ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T.
DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS,
SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG
AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.
MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M.
EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-
PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371),
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP),
the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples
and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or
to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae
and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a
serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in
turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private
but community property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable
for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation." 2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
"ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner
of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement
of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor
of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
the indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371;
and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources." 7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law,
which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by
the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant
to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 114.
2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
3
Id. at 23-25.
4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
5
Rollo, pp. 25-27.
6
Id. at 27-28.
7
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses
and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner 1 wrote:2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-
dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient
practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and
interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are
obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into
the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state
ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be
appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion
attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA
was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous
cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical
injustice to our indigenous people.

This Opinion discusses the following:

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A. Indigenous Peoples

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A. Legislative History

IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not
constitute part of the land of the public domain.

1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2. The concept of native title

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government

(b) Indian Title to land

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in their development
and exploitation.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of
the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.

(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph
3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.

(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized with
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.

A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian
Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of
the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal
crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant
be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition,
but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such
time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms,
plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this
purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and
receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us
to be disposed of at our will." 4

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became
the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of
distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and
civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the
various modes of land grant from the Crown. 6

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree
of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the
Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees. 8 This was the last Spanish land law
promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands,
otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.

Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903,
the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first
Public Land Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano

In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation
or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant's
predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in
1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land
by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year
adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had
given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the
land, could not validly transmit it.

The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which
from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." 10 The question
posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as
to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the
Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific
colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was
decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands
should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal
Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court
interpreted it as follows:

"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the
Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This
statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king.
It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private
person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants
of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed
by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in
their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of
time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the
part of the authorities."12

The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the
kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown. 13 For those lands granted by the king, the decree
provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land
should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown. 14

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's principal
subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:

"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x
cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue
of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a
just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be
granted to others."15

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied" by
private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case
fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier
ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for
a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the
absolute owner."16

In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these
Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any
action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession.
Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the
provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from
earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has
been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the Philippine Bill
of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands
in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,"
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for
the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public
Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government;19 and that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. 20 The term "public land" referred to all lands
of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands.22

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed
under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it
is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory
provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par
with Filipino citizens and corporations. 24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the
Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and
private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of
the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and
procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after
the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue
an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property
described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or
reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land
are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and
negotiation.27

D. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating
objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural
resources of the country.28There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the
principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. 29 State
ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's
power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. 30 The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural
resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued
and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the
Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. 31

Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources," reads as follows:

"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use
may be the measure and the limit of the grant."

The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National Economy
and Patrimony," to wit:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

x x x."

Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein,
whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that
petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples,
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is
simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which
traces its origin to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:

- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right to stay in the territories;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

- the right to claim parts of reservations;

- the right to resolve conflict;32

- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary
laws and traditions of the community concerned;

b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a
non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an
unconscionable consideration.33

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance
and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect their culture,
traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and
technologies.36

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven
(7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the
Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and
the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central
Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the
Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were
merged under a revitalized structure.38

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. 39 The NCIP's
decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or
unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with customary
laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00 and
obliged to pay damages.40

A. Indigenous Peoples

The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)
or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the
contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 41 and
the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 42

ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:

"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under
claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing
common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include
peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which
inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced
from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous

societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories
under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs,
traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from
the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time
of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao,
Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110
tribes and are as follows:

1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga,
Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan;
Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of
Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.

2. In Region III- Aetas.

3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan,
Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of
Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.

4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of
Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon
of Masbate and Camarines Sur.

5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental;
the Corolano and Sulod.

6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.

7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of
Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.

8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog,
Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan
del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and
Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and
Bukidnon.

9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of
Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of
Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato;
the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo,
Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.

10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon. 43

How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000
B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos,
Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural
features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences
from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic
strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and
traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society. 45

The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became supplementary
activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil. 46 From the
hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous
culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout
the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical
climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences. 47 Life was essentially
subsistence but not harsh.48

The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages
that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily
communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods. 49 They fashioned concepts
and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their
lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and
life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang
Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos
adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as
something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to their daily life, indicating
the importance of the relationship between man and the object of nature. 51

The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word
"balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores. 52 The barangay was basically a
family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different
and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and
promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of
government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of
war.53

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation to
generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and
chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community. 54 The written laws were those that the
chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose. 55 The oldest known
written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are
the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu. 56 Whether customary or written, the laws
dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and
punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were
decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as
"jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a
board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters. 57

Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs
merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the
family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated
in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of the
barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing
of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was
non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of
lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended
for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land
communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of
importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and
sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to provide them
with the leadership and means of survival. 61

Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate
of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi,
Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug,
Yakan and Subanon.62The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao
territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 63

The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but
was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a
provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer,
cession or sale of land.64

The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most
production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They
were not economies geared to exchange and profit. 65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay
membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands
into numerous small and separate communities.66

When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in
barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on
the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As
early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the
natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less
fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material
advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." 69

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be
constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the church
and the unbaptized were invited to do the same. 70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to
"tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the
Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt
Hispanic culture and civilization. 71

All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not
assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to
the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72

The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public
domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law. 73 The
concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was
imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land. 74

Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the
Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First were
the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were
the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.75

The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and
was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the
lowest classes.76

The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and
the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into
the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest,
and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect,
relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not only
able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves
from the newly evolved Christian community.78 Their own political, economic and social systems were
kept constantly alive and vibrant.

The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of
suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the
other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace
through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos. 79

President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the
existence of the infieles:

"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs."80

Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization, the
American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with
the national conscience."81

The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos.
The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly,
"to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities."82

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253
creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's
primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in
Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about
their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with
American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and
produced a wealth of valuable materials about them. 83

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then
was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.

In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and
complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or
national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said
national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples
into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National
Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American
regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation
understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship. 85

The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and
Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal
wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide
open spaces in Mindanao.86Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system
resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government initiative and
participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples
were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name of national
development.87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:

"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities
in the formulation and implementation of State policies." 88

For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were
addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural
communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and
their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the formulation
and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions
to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate
the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time "protect
the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community." 89 In short,
while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve
their way of life.90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands
Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national
cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims. 91 In 1979, the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the
expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos. 92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and
Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power
Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries
Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by law in
1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in
Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives. 93 Timber concessions, water
projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not
only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction
of their natural environment.94

The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office
of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities all under the Office of the President.95

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly
guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right
to live in a culture distinctly their own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are
non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-
government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the
Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of
the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked
well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs
and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration,
represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems
were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The
economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The
social structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was
maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and
ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant. 98

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of
permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to
the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards
of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the
land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of
"trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the
future ones as well.99

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and
spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards. 100 Customary law has a strong
preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or
families who are related by blood or by marriage, 101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who
may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws
draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The
Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and
swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds
should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common right to a common
economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual
ownership.The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual
ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the
property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil
Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged
except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in
the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member
before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-member of
the ili.105

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of
individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our
national land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent. 106

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and
House Bill No. 9125.

Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four
proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of
Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth
Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous
peoples in the Philippines, to wit:

"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the
dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian
brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the
hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive
exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they became
marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against
the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to
their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine
Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal
Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale
landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional
areas of the ICCs."109

Senator Flavier further declared:

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land long
before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled
themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the
mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their
existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-
cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on
it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples." 110

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based
on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.

According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the
State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v.
Insular Government where:

"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural
communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has
not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases." 111

Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529,
R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or
implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of
ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented the
policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown
during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when
government organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."

Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral land.
The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power of the
State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons suffering
from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their
relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.

Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and
none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural
Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor by Rep.
Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113

Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would
promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity
and development.

Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain that
these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that
remained long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need,
Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into
reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be
considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114

Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the
Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular
Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the
Spanish and American regimes.115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was
approved on Second Reading with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not
Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral
lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b]
of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim
of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally
or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and
which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains
comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable
or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators. 116

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except
that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also
utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but
are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. 117

The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala. 118 DAO No. 2 allowed the
delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA
on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 119 The guiding principle in identification and
delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the
boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto. 121

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52
of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.

Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by
the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT) in the name of the community concerned. 122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral
domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs
concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions. 123 With respect to ancestral lands
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). 124

CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in
the place where the property is situated. 125

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory
reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands
and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." 126

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and
are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be
recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be
embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated. 128

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however,
is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The
IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public
land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never
been public lands and are private.

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government.130 Cariñofirmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any
royal grant from the State.

In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares of
land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and
occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property
for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in
accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no
document issued from the Spanish Crown. 131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land
under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American colonial government, however, ignored his
possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his property
in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S. military reservation 133 was
proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment was detailed on the property
with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land. 134

In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the land. Both
the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet
which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine Supreme
Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that
Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required
registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the
absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed part of the public domain.

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held
from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized
as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true,
also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States
may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of
the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side,
sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon
the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts,
are matters for it to decide."137

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new
colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.

The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due process" as
well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives." 138 It was based on the strong mandate
extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:

"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of
the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking
over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with
paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the
natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369,
section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are
to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose that the
attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its
attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the
safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the
declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to
declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it
meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part
of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native
custom and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their
own."139

The Court went further:

"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held
in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a
case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit
of the doubt."140

The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory
went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to "never have been
public land."

Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904
decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees
did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize that
the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the
preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were
admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:

"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it
was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees
and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives
were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at
will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a
contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others,
when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by
good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal
overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse.
The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this
recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141

The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over unconquered
territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives
that failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of such land. The
registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had
read every word of it."

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank
enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under
Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various
interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong
"due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title. 142 This title was
sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens
certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice
the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental
principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law
and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of
what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143

Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio
Municipality in his name.144

Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as
"native title." It simply said:

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the
Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to
anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish
Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the
technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights
and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect
seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon, at least,
for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to
enforce."145

This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of
the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to
Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law
from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law
Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor
Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and
development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used the term "native title"
to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.

(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined by
Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians. 148 This is
not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime, government policy
towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans. 149 This was clearly
demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to
remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao,
Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans,
including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus
claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground
of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the
only successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving their
health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they roamed. 151 Speaking through Justice
Malcolm, the court said:

"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in
its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with
that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it
is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of
pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may
be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.152

x x x.

As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United
States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located,
they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the
country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that
when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental
system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as
existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States." 153

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation is
a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes
of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be
established by custom and prescription. 155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal
right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual
occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such
lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation. 157 It is a right
which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous
instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and
delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries. 158

American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have held and
occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement
by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's
Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two (2)
Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private
persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of
the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates
of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world
by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it
necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle
that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery
was made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right
of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the
court further stated that:

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by
themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be
the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use
it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it.

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted
the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have
been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy."161

Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire Indian
land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or Holland-
did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right
nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or
conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her
subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them,
it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title
paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:

"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has
never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with
this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right." 162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal
recognition of this principle.163

The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without having
to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens. 164

Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia enacted
a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from
the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs,
who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation of the
Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties established
between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating
intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States government and the
Indians as:

"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the
supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their
country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection
of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the
Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They
assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.

This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that of
individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master." 166

It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial
boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:

"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm
purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802,
which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.

x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as
well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct
from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties
and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by
our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." 168

The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all
other European governments. Designated as the naked fee, 169 this title was to be consummated by
possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians'
legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the
land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by
purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the
discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while
the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the
ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves. 170

As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied
by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the discovering
European nation and later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in the
Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting
the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of
complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the
whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by
Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property
right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as sovereign, possessed
exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will. 174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as
legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long
time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and
customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen. 176 Such title as Indians
have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual
Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe
generally being held in communal ownership. 177

As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to designate
such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. 178 Indian land which has been
abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain. 179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part
of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians. 180 Once set apart by
proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished, no
one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of,
them.181

The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous
Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property
systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison
of Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title,
however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be
cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their
land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The
aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by
Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than
the Federal Government. 185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native
Americans' ownership of these lands, 186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained
firmly entrenched.187

Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral domains
and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its application
in the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of
each case.

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is
private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes
native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character
of ancestral domains and lands. Cariñowas cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of
acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the
Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions
specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed
to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. 189 The land ceases to be part of the
public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
the prescribed statutory period.

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all
lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public
domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had
been private property even before the Spanish conquest. 193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the
provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive
prescription under the said Act.

All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open
and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens 194 and members
of the national cultural minorities 195 that converts the land from public into private and entitles the
registrant to a torrens certificate of title.

(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.

The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by
the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of
registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary
implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural
land simply for registration purposes. To wit:

"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-
owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or
for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral
lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually
used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of
this Act."196

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be
individually, not communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept
of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the
individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands
regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements of
the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with
lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or
concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated
by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so." 199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows registration only of
private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP
wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land,
regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over, 200 from private to public
agricultural land for proper disposition.

The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a
limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date
of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the
1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or
timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral
lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To
classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a
nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The
IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital
concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs. 201

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." 202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs
distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this
constitutional mandate.

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership
under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to
Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete
titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles. Thus:

"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four
hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been
occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not
since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this
section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real
property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law. 203

x x x.

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof." 204

Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural land
but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial
confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is
sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be
confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.

A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights of
ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428
and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through
the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily
includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and
dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, 205 the right to consume
the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned, 207 and
the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner has
not transmitted such thing.208

1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of
ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:

"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed
or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the
ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral
domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held. 209 These communal rights,
however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code. 210 Co-ownership gives
any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly
provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. 211 To allow such a
right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the
very community itself.212

Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less
corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to
an extension of another fifty years in any single instance. 213 Every stockholder has the right to
disassociate himself from the corporation. 214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved
voluntarily or involuntarily.215

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all
generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the
ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold
or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.

Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal.
These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of
the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of
redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs.

Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains," 216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces
a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary law. 217

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of
law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no
codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil
Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities. 220

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and
coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration. 221

To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely
a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:

"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by
virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of
the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."

The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land, being
people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the
faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the
land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings
between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man. 222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7
provides for the rights over ancestral domains:

"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:

a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to
benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the
right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation
and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of
the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No
ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other
than eminent domain. x x x;

d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the
State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary
life support systems: x x x;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into their domains;

f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated
systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;

g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have
been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare
and service;

h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the area
where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable
settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary."

Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:

"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights
to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned.

b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of
any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent
of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall
have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of
transfer."

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a)
lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d)
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural
resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d)
the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to
claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance
with customary laws.

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8
gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs
or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over
the ancestral lands, but not to domains.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does Not
Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or,
it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution."223

All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision,
and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:

1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or qualified corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;

4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake
the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through
co-production,224joint venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a
period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the small-
scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these
resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may
enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
(R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing, may
apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities
which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or
heavy mining equipment."229

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains
includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"

The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made
by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not
mention bodies of water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the
traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places,
etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership
under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, floraand fauna and all other natural
resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.

The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with
the Regalian doctrine.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of
the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.

The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:

"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These
rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right
to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and
natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any
form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."

Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and
natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a)
of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land
does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found on or under
the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a)
speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b)
and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do
not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.

The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the
Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law,
it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the
ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:

"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resourceswithin the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit
and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose
of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of
the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the
following rights:

a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations;

c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein;

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws;

e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just
and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;

f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights. 233

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit
and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions
for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and
conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to
the exploitation and development of natural resources.

Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or
negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the
natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the
"utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and
customary laws.234

The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale
utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural
resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in
recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly
situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival." 235 Section 7 (b) also
expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and
ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization
in a large-scale.

(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 57 of the IPRA provides:

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and
utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not
more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the
ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to
allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate
action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."

Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources

within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral domains
obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or
other extensive use that require technology other than manual labor. 236 The law recognizes the
probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization
of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be
entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural
resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation
thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not
necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that
owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to
whosoever itself chooses.

Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine
that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by
implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution 237 in
relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake
the development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may
recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are
found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them.
The State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement
with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the
agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25
years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State, as
owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the
development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the
ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may
enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or
foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.

The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-
scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give
priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which
option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely
undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must
undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the State does
not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the
law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural
resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.

Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following
provision:

"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-
based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That
no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of
the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-
owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing
agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have
the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the
requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural resources
shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral
domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been
conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance
with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by
any department or government agency.

As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession,
license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area
subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP
with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any
concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs
have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the
certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral
domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.

V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL

MOVEMENT.

The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to
prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources. First,
the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their
own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human
Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North
American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for
fundamental rights and freedoms.

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and during the 1980's,
indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the
first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's Alliance
that carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they
have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world. 240

Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a
result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and
the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national governments'
inability to deal with the situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda. 242

International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and
specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on IPs
as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America. 243 The World Bank now seeks to apply
its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for
the projects of the Asian Development Bank. 244

The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State
policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development. 245 The IPRA
amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of IPs, 246 and is heavily
influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations
(UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 247

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO
No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new
international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist orientation
of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their
own institutions, ways of life and economic development." 250

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious
differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through
the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. 251 Largely
unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically,
the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of
Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. 252 It is through the IPRA
that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and
biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a
centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into
a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate
fully in the task of continuing democratization, 253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of
indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our
national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997.

G.R. No. 97282 August 16, 1991

ATTY. PLARIDEL M. MINGOA, petitioner,

vs.
LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR, respondent.

Plaridel M. Mingoa for and in his own behalf.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The facts of this case are simple. A deed of donation of several parcels of land was executed by
petitioner in favor of his children on July 15, 1987. The deed was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of
Romblon for registration by registered mail on September 9, 1988. It was entered in the primary entry
book of the Register of Deeds on September 20, 1988 under Entry No. 181. Said Register of Deeds
suspended registration of the donation until the petitioner has secured the proper clearances from the
Department of Agrarian Reform on the ground that under Section 6 of Republic Act 6657, any disposition
of private agricultural lands made prior to June 15, 1988, when the Act took effect, must be registered
within three (3) months from said date or on before September 13, 1988 to be valid.

The matter was elevated by petitioner en consulta with the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority LTA. On November 27,1990 the LTA Administrator issued a resolution sustaining the stand of
the Register of Deeds that unless the proper clearances from the Department of Agrarian Reform are
secured, the deed of donation may not be registered.

Hence this petition for certiorari whereby petitioner contends that Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court should apply in a suppletory manner in that the date of the mailing should be considered the date
of filing of the document in the office of the Register of Deeds.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides, among others:

SEC. 6. Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise provided in its Act, no person may own or retain, directly
or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility
as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of
age, and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their
direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of its Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the
landowner; Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is
tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in
the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to
remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a
beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he
loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this
option with a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for
retention.

In all cases the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on the land prior to the approval of this
Act shall be respected.

Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of
possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and
void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the
Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all
Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any
transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares. (Emphasis supplied)

The said law was approved by the President of the Philippines on June 10, 1988. Section 78 thereof
provides that it "shall take effect immediately after publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation." It appears the law took effect on June 15, 1988.

Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 also provides:

SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies.—Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry
book in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception, all
instruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as
a preliminary process in registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all
instruments, in the order in which they were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the
time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when made on the certificate of title to which
it refers, shall bear the same date: Provided, that the national government as well as the provincial and
city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to
entry and registration.

Every deed or other instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, so filed with the Register of Deeds
shall be numbered and indexed and endorsed with a reference to the proper certificate of title. All
records and papers relative to registered land in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the
public in the same manner as court records, subject to such reasonable relations as the Register of
Deeds, No. 97282 under the direction of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may prescribe.

All deeds and voluntary instruments shall be presented with their respective copies and shall be attend
and sealed by the Register of Deeds, endorsed with the file number, and copies may be delivered to the
person presenting them.

Certified copies of all instruments filed and registered may also be obtained from the Register of Deeds
upon payment of the prescribed fees.

The foregoing provision requires the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the entry fees, to enter in the
primary book of entry, in the order of reception, all instruments including copies of writs and processes
filed with him relative to registered land; the date, hour and minute shall be noted in said book which
shall be regarded as the date of registration of the instrument; and the memorandum of each
instrument on the certificate of title shall bear the same date.

Section 34 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 likewise provides:

SEC. 34. Rules of procedure.—The Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient.

Consequently, Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is applicable to this case in a suppletory character
as it provides:

SEC. 1. Filing with the court, defined.—The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and
other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them personally with the
clerk of the court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk shall endorse on the
pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or
any other papers or payments or deposits as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the
registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope
shall be attached to the record of the case.

The foregoing rule clearly provides that the date of mailing of the motion, pleading, or any other papers,
which may include instruments as the deed of donation, is considered the date of filing as shown by the
post office stamp on the envelope or registry receipt.

The Court therefore finds and so holds that the date of mailing of an instrument to the Register of Deeds
for purposes of registration should be considered the date of filing and receipt thereof by the Register of
Deeds. It is this date that should be entered in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds which
shall be regarded as the date of its registration.

Since in this case, the deed of donation was admittedly sent by registered mail to the Register of Deeds
on September 9, 1988, said date is in effect the date of filing, receipt and registration of the instrument,
although the instrument was actually received by said office only on September 20, 1988.

WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course and is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolution of the
public respondent Administrator of the Land Registration Authority dated November 27,1990 is hereby
SET ASIDE and it is hereby directed that the registration of deed of donation subject of this petition be
effected by the Register of Deeds of Romblon.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 192916 October 11, 2010

MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU
CITY, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No.
1956-A and Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to
petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. 1 Manuel accepted the
donation.
In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and
Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute
Sale over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.

On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s nephew, filed a petition for the
settlement of Vicente’s intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s
donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor
of Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuel’s petition to approve the donation and his action for
annulment of the contracts of sale.2 The RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of
Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the
donation. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision. 3 The CA held that since the donation in
favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills
should have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation
clause and was therefore void.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari

Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of
a will to Vicente’s donation mortis causa. He insists that the strict construction of a will was not
warranted in the absence of any indication of bad faith, fraud, or substitution in the execution of the
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. He argues that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed
of donation, which contains the "import and purpose" of the attestation clause required in the execution
of wills. The Acknowledgment reads:

BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay, Cebu, personally appeared
VICENTE S. Echavez with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu known to
me to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donartion Mortis
Causa before the Notary Public and in the presence of the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this
instrument before and in the presence of each other and of the Notary Public and all of them
acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and deed. [Emphasis in the original.]

THE COURT’S RULING

The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by
law for the validity of wills,4 "otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect." 5 Articles 805
and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied.

As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written.lavvphilThe exception to this rule
in Singson v. Florentino 6 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,7 cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts
of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that
although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the
number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present
case.

Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not
prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of
the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts
that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a
competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will
refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument
before them and to the manner of its execution. 81avvphi1

Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses
to the execution of a decedent’s will. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of
Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation
clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

Finding no reversible error committed by the CA, the Court hereby DENIES Manuel’s petition for review
on certiorari.

SO ORDERED.