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Appendix 8:
Electric power utility system
February 2003
Report n°GTR-RSK 0101-152av7
Vulnerability assessment of lifelines and essential
facilities (WP06): methodological handbook
Appendix 8:
Electric power utility system
M. ALEXOUDI
with the collaboration of
O. MONGE
February 2003
Report n°GTR-RSK 0101-152av7
An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014
Contents
1 EP1: Power – generating facilities ........................................................................ 6
1.1 Description ............................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Classification ............................................................................................................ 6
1.3 Typology................................................................................................................... 9
1.4 Damage, consequences or losses.............................................................................. 9
1.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 11
1.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 14
2 EP2: Electric substation....................................................................................... 15
2.1 Description ............................................................................................................. 15
2.2 Classification .......................................................................................................... 17
2.3 Typology................................................................................................................. 17
2.4 Damage, consequences or losses............................................................................ 18
2.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 19
2.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 24
3 EP3: Transmission and distribution lines .......................................................... 25
3.1 Description ............................................................................................................. 25
3.2 Classification .......................................................................................................... 25
3.3 Typology................................................................................................................. 28
3.4 Damage, consequences or losses............................................................................ 28
3.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 28
3.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 30
4 References ............................................................................................................. 31
List of illustrations
FIGURES
TABLES
PHOTO.
VULNERABILITY MODELS
RESTORATION MODELS
1.2 CLASSIFICATION
In order to classify Power Generation Station one or several of the following points
(Table 1) should be considered.
1
The range of values (Megawatt) that define the size of Power Generation Plant can be changed
according to European Inventory
2
Nuclear Plants produce a huge amount of energy and so they are very important to national economy,
although, nuclear disposals can be very dangerous for public health and quite hazardous for the
environment. Strict regulations exist as to ensure the reduction of radiation.
3
Hydroelectric plants generally are combined with dams. A probable damage of the dam can be lethal for
human (inhabitant area can be flooded) or can imbalance the eco-system. Flood of cultivated fields can
lead to direct economical losses in agriculture session in national or local level. Many times dams create
artificial lakes (fish pond) and destruction can harm the local economy.
4
Diesel, Gas- Oil plants can cause explosions with many victims and environmental pollution.
5
Nuclear reactors can be used by military purposes.
6
The energy produced from Hydroelectric, Coal fired, Gas-oil, Diesel, Geothermal plants can be used to
warm the water for housing.
1.3 TYPOLOGY
Power generation plant may be described (Hazus ’99) with respect to whether:
- Its size is small, or medium – large7;
- The subcomponents (equipment and backup power) are anchored8 or unanchored.
7
Respectively, ≤200 Mw or ≥200 Mw according to Hazus ’99
8
Anchored means equipment designed with special seismic tie downs and tiebacks while unanchored
means equipment with manufactures normal requirements.
1.5 VULNERABILITY
Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for power-
generating facilities (EP1) are provided (Vulnerability model 1, Hazus ’99) according
to:
- Typology (small or medium / large power-generating facilities, with anchored or
unanchored components);
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.
Damage Median
Typology Serviceability β
state PGA (g)
/ Complete 0.78 0.50
Extensiv
Small, with Not repairable 0.48 0.50
e
anchored components
Usable after
(Figure 1) Moderate 0.21 0.55
repairs
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.55
/ Complete 0.58 0.55
Small, Extensiv
Not repairable 0.42 0.50
with unanchored e
components Usable after
Moderate 0.17 0.50
(Figure 2) repairs
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.50
/ Complete 0.92 0.55
Extensiv
Medium / Large, Not repairable 0.52 0.55
e
with anchored components
Usable after
(Figure 3) Moderate 0.25 0.60
repairs
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.60
/ Complete 0.79 0.50
Medium / Large, Extensiv
Not repairable 0.49 0.50
with unanchored e
components Usable after
Moderate 0.22 0.55
(Figure 4) repairs
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.60
Vulnerability model 1: EP1, power-generating facilities subject to ground shaking.
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
1.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves (Figure 5) are continuous (means and
standard deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time
(Restoration model 1, according to ATC-13 in Hazus ’99). However, it is mainly
recommended to interview system manager / owner to adapt or improve the proposed
model according to each country and organization abilities
EP1: Power
Normal
generating Discrete function
distribution
facilities
Damage state Mean (days) σ 1 day 3 days 7 days 30 days 90 days
Complete 65.0 30.0 2 2 3 13 80
Extensive 22.0 21.0 16 19 24 65 100
Moderate 3.6 3.6 24 44 83 100 100
Minor 0.5 0.1 100 100 100 100 100
Restoration model 1: EP1, Power generating facilities.
Restoration Curves
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
percent functional
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)
Transmission and distribution substations have similar types of equipment that serve
similar functions. Substation equipments can be:
- Entirely enclosed in buildings where all the equipment is assembled into one metal
clad unit;
- Located outside the substation building.
The substation components usually consist of (SCHIFF, 1999; DIKKERS et al., 1996):
- Circuit breakers;
- Power transformers;
- Bus (conductors used to carry power between equipment and throughout the
substation);
- Bus support structures;
- Control house;
- Disconnect switches;
- Capacitive- coupling voltage transformers;
- Current transformers;
- Lightning arrestors;
- Wave traps;
- Some other equipment
© transelectrica (www.transelectrica.ro)
© RTE (www.rte-france.com)
Photo. 2: Different substations in Romania (above) and France (below)
2.2 CLASSIFICATION
Classification should be a result of “urban system analysis” (WP03) whose first
objective is the “classification of elements at risk”. In order to classify Power
Generation Station one or several of the following points (Table 1) should be
considered.
In addition to the bus voltage station’s operational features are important factors of
system importance. High priority should be given to Manned switching centres as the
system is controlled from these locations. The next highest consideration should be
given to Generation sources since they are the supply points for the power system.
Multi- loop stations have greater importance to the network than single loop stations
because much of the system is interconnected at these locations. Lower priority should
be given to tap stations compared with single loop stations due to the smaller number of
customers served.
2.3 TYPOLOGY
Electric substation may be described (Hazus ’99) with respect to whether:
- Its voltage,
o High voltage (350 kV and above)- 500 kV substations
o Medium voltage (150 kV to 350 kV)- 230 kV substations
o Low voltage (34.5 kV to 150 kV)- 115 kV substations
- The subcomponents (equipment and backup power) are anchored9 or unanchored.
9
Anchored means equipment designed with special seismic tie downs and tiebacks while unanchored
means equipment with manufactures normal requirements.
Beyond common damage states (level I), alternate expressions of losses (level II) seem
relevant for electric substations (Table 4):
- Serviceability (without repairs, After repairs; Not repairable).
- Replacement value (%);
2.5 VULNERABILITY
Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for electric
substation (EP2) are provided (Vulnerability model 2, Hazus ’99) according to:
- Typology (low, medium or high voltage, with anchored or unanchored
components);
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.
As a more advanced study (level II), a fault tree can be developed for each examined
substation according to:
- Site-specific studies as HWANG and. HUO (1995);
- Substation configuration.
Damage Median
Typology Serviceability β
state PGA (g)
/ Complete 0.90 0.45
Low voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.45 0.45
with anchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.29 0.55
(Figure 7)
Reduced use Minor 0.15 0.70
/ Complete 0.70 0.40
Low voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.35 0.40
with unanchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.25 0.50
(Figure 8)
Reduced use Minor 0.15 0.60
/ Complete 0.47 0.40
Medium voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.20 0.35
with anchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.15 0.45
(Figure 9)
Reduced use Minor 0.11 0.50
/ Complete 0.74 0.40
Medium voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.34 0.40
with unanchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.26 0.50
(Figure 10)
Reduced use Minor 0.13 0.65
/ Complete 0.50 0.40
High voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.30 0.40
with anchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.20 0.50
(Figure 11)
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.60
High voltage, / Complete 0.38 0.35
with unanchored components Not repairable Extensive 0.17 0.35
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
Figure 11: Fragility curves of high voltage substation with anchored components
subject to ground shaking.
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
Figure 12: Fragility curves of high voltage substation with unanchored components
subject to ground shaking.
2.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves (Figure 13) are continuous (means and
standard deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time
(Restoration model 2, according to ATC-25). The curves estimated in ATC-25, based
upon expert judgment, are not consistent with the detailed system analysis performed by
SHINOZUKA et al. (1994, 1996). However, it is mainly recommended to interview
system manager / owner to adapt or improve the proposed model according to each
country and organization abilities
Restoration Curves
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
percent functional
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)
Transmission lines connect generation plants and high voltage substation. While sub-
transmission lines connect:
- High Voltage Substation – Medium voltage Substation;
- Medium voltage Substation – Low voltage Substation.
3.2 CLASSIFICATION
Classification should be a result of WP03: urban system analysis whose first objective
is the “classification of elements at risk”. In order to classify transmission and
distribution lines one or several of the following points should be considered (Table 5).
© RTE (www.rte-france.com)
Photo. 3: Different types of transmission lines.
Photograph by O. MONGE
Photograph by O. MONGE
Photo. 5: Pole – mounted and above ground Photo. 6: Electric tower
transformers. damaged by ground failure.
3.3 TYPOLOGY
Distribution lines may be described (Hazus ’99) with respect to whether distribution
circuits are standard or seismic.
3.5 VULNERABILITY
Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for distribution
lines (EP3) are provided (Vulnerability model 3, Hazus ’99) according to:
- Typology (seismic or standard distribution circuits);
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.
11
According to FEMA 202
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
Figure 14: Fragility curves of seismic distribution circuits subject to ground shaking.
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)
3.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves are continuous (means and standard
deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time for
Distribution circuits (Restoration model 3, Figure 16, according to ATC-13 in
Hazus ’99).
However, it is mainly recommended to interview system manager / owner to adapt or
improve the proposed model according to each country and organization abilities
Restoration Curves
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
percent functional
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)
4 References
ANAGNOS TH.. (1999). Development of an Electrical Substation Equipment
Performance Database for Evaluation of Equipment Fragilities. Final Report and
Appendix C. Prepared for Pacific Gas and Electric and the Pacific Earthquake
Engineering Centre.
ANG A.H., PIRES J.A., VILLAVERDE R. (1996). A model for the seismic reliability
assessment of electric power transmission systems. Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, 51, pp. 7- 22.
CHANG S.E., SELIGSON H.A., EGUCHI R.T. (1996). Estimation of the economic
impact of multiple lifeline disruption: Memphis light, gas and water division case
study. NCEER-96-0011. 150 p..
DIKKERS R.D, CHUNG R.M, MOHRAZ B, LEW H.S, WRIGHT R.N. (1996).
Proceedings of a workshop on developing and adopting seismic design and
construction standards for lifelines. NISTIR 5907.
HONGNAN L., SUYAN W., MING L., QUANXIN W. (1991). Aseismic calculations
for transmission tower. Proceedings of the 3rd U.S Conference. TCLEE.
Monograph n°4. ASCE, New York.
HWANG H.H.M., HUO J.-R. (1995). Seismic fragility analysis of equipment and
structures in a Memphis electric substation. NCEER- 95-0014. 105 p.
LI H.N., WANG S.Y., RU J.P. (1998). Response analysis of transmission tower system
to horizontal and rocking earthquake excitations. Proceeding of Eleventh
European Conference on Earthquake Engineering. Edited by BISCH P.,
LABBE P., PECKER A., Balkema, Rotterdam.
LLAMBIAS J.M. (1995). The use of the uniform risk spectra in the seismic PSA for a
PWR power Station. Nuclear Engineering and Design, 154, Elsevier Science S.A,
pp.193-203.
LOPEZ L.A., AGUIRRE R.J., ELIZALDE M.A. (1998). Experimental and analytical
study for seismic evaluation of transmission substation equipment in Mexico.
Proceeding of Eleventh European Conference on Earthquake Engineering. Edited
by BISCH P., LABBE P., PECKER A., Balkema, Rotterdam.
O’ROURKE T.D (1996) Lessons learned for lifeline engineering from major urban
earthquakes. Proceedings of 11th World Conference on earthquake Engineering.
Edited by Sociedad Mexicana de Ingenieria Sismica. A.C, Acapulco, Mexico.
SCHIFF A.J (1991). Seismic design practices for power systems: evolution, evaluation
and needs. Proceedings of the 3rd U.S Conference. TCLEE monograph n°4.
ASCE. Edited by M Cassaro. New York, pp. 336- 343.
SCHIFF A.J., BUCKLE I.G. (1995). Critical issues and state-of-the-art in Lifeline
earthquake engineering. TCLEE monograph n°7. ASCE. 92 p..
SCHIFF A.J (1996). Characterizing power systems for seismic response or risk
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Design of Lifeline Facilities and Countermeasures Against Soil Liquefaction.
Edited by Hamada M., O’Rourke TD. Technical Report NCEER- 96-0012.
pp.697- 710
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SHINOZUKA M., CHENG T.C., FENG M.Q., MAU S.T. (1997, 1999). Seismic
Performance Analysis of Electric Power Systems. MCEER, Research Progress
and Accomplishments.
WAHA J.P., SERRANI A., MANDOZZI M.E. (1998). The operation of interconnected
systems in the market. Proceedings of two-days meeting for the new framework
of electric power systems. Technical Chronicle, TEE (in Greek).