1

Miranda v. Imperial
(Decision of Court of Appeals)

"In view, however, of the rule that a creditor's return need not be limited
to the statutory rate when it is affected by a contingency putting the whole of it at
hazard, a contract is ordinarily not usurious under which the creditor is to
receive, in consideration of his loan or forbearance, property or services of
uncertain value, even though the probable value is greater than lawful interest,
unless the excess is no palpable as to slow a corrupt intent to violate or evade the
usury laws, unless the contract is made for the purposes of such violation or
evasion."
"Where the lender is to receive something else than money for his loan,
as property or services, the value of such profit being necessarily uncertain, the
contract is not usurious, even though the probable value greater than legal
interest, unless the consideration so given is so palpably in excess of the certain
profit allowed by law as to show a corrupt intent to violate the usury laws."
"So, an agreement that instead of interest, the lender of money should
receive the parts and profits of certain land for a term of years, is not usurious
where no intention to evade the statute is shown; and the fact that such rents and
profits happen to warrant." |||

2
 Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank
G.R. No. 46158
November 28, 1986
FACTS:
● Plaintiff-appellee: Tayug Rural Bank
● Defendant-appellant: Central Bank of the Philippines
● Tayug Rural Bank, Inc. is a banking corporation in Tayug, Pangasinan.
● December 28, 1962 to July 30, 1963: obtained thirteen (13) loans from Central Bank of the
Philippines, by rediscounting ( 1/2 of 1% per annum from 1962 to March 28, 1963 and 2-
1/2% per annum)
● July 30, 1963: The loans, amounting to P813,000.00, were all covered by corresponding
promissory notes prescribing the terms and conditions of the aforesaid loans.
● July 15, 1969: the outstanding balance was P444,809.45
● December 23, 1964: Central Bank of the Philippines, through the Director of the
Department of loans and Credit, issued Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8, informing all
rural banks that an additional penalty interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum would
be assessed on all past due loans beginning January 4, 1965.
● Memorandum Circular was actually enforced on all rural banks effective July 4, 1965.|||
● June 27, 1969, Tayug sued Central Bank in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
III
● Tayug: a.) to recover the 10% penalty imposed by Appellant amounting to P16,874.97
(September 27, 1968) b.) to restrain Appellant from continuing the imposition of the
penalty.
● Central Bank filed a counterclaim for the outstanding balance and overdue accounts of
Tayug in the total amount of P444,809.45 plus accrued interest and penalty at 10% until
full payment.
● Central Bank: (penalty imposition by affirmative and special defenses) a.) it was legally
imposed under the provisions of Section 147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations
Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board on September 5, 1958, under
authority of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended

"Section 147. Duty of Rural Bank to turn over payment received for papers discounted or
used for collateral. — A Rural Bank receiving any payment on account of papers
discounted or used for collateral must turn the same over to the creditor bank before the
close of the banking day next following the receipt of payment, as long as the aggregate
discounting on loan amount is not fully paid, unless the Rural Bank substitutes the same
with another eligible paper with at least the same or earlier maturity and the same or greater
value.
 "Sec. 148. Default and other violations of obligation by Rural Bank, effect. — A Rural
Bank becomes in default upon the expiration of the maturity period of its note, or that of
the papers discounted or used as collateral, without the necessity of demand.

● November 11, 1970 Memorandum: Tayug also asserts that Appellant had no basis to
impose the penalty interest inasmuch as the promissory notes covering the loans executed
by Appellee in favor of Appellants do not provide for penalty interest rate of 10% per
annum on just due loans beginning January 4, 1965.
● March 3, 1970, lower court: only a legal question has been raised in the pleadings" case in
favor of plaintiff Rural Bank.
● Central Bank appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, for
determination of questions of facts and of law.
● However, April 13, 1977, the Court of Appeals, a.) no controverted facts and taking in
its pre-trial and that only a legal question has been raised ruled. b.) the resolution of the
appeal will solely depend on the legal issue of whether or not the Monetary Board had
authority to authorize Central Bank to impose a penalty rate of 10% per annum.

● April 20, 1977, case was forwarded to Second Division Court.

Appellant assigns the following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT IS BEYOND
THE REACH OF THE MONETARY BOARD TO METE OUT PENALTIES
ON PAST DUE LOANS OF RURAL BANKS ESPECIALLY SINCE NO
PENAL CLAUSE HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE PROMISSORY NOTES.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY IS AN IMPAIRMENT OF THE
OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS.

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING JUDGMENT

AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR 10% COST OF COLLECTION OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE AS PROVIDED THEREIN.

● |||May 20, 1977, First Division ordered the case decided.

RULING:
● The Central Bank cannot validly impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's past overdue
loans beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 dated
December 23, 1964.
● RA 720, no authority given to Monetary Board to mete out additional penalties to rural
banks on past due accounts.
"SEC. 10. The power to supervise the operation of any Rural Bank by the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank as herein indicated, shall consist in placing limits to the
maximum credit allowed any individual borrower; in prescribing the interest rate; in
determining the loan period and loan procedure; in indicating the manner in which
technical assistance shall be extended to Rural Banks; in imposing a uniform accounting
system and manner of keeping the accounts and records of the Rural Banks; in
undertaking regular credit examination of the Rural Banks; in instituting periodic surveys
of loan and lending procedures, audits, test check of cash and other transactions of the
Rural Banks; in conducting training courses for personnel of Rural Banks; and, in
general, in supervising the business operation of the Rural Banks.
● While Monetary Board possesses supervisory powers as they adopted rules governing
rural banks, administrative penalties cannot be taken as supervisory in character and will
cause retroactive effect. (Additional penalty was not part of the promissory notes signed
by Tayug)
Appellant inserted the clause in the revised DLC Form No. 11 to make it a part of the
contractual obligation of rural banks securing loans from the Central Bank, after
December 23, 1964. Thus, while there is now a basis for the imposition of the 10%
penalty rate on overdue accounts of rural banks, there was none during the period that
Appellee contracted its loans from Appellant, the last of which loan was on July 30, 1963.
Surely, the rule cannot be given retroactive effect.|||
● Administrative rules have force and effect but limited. Implement legislation by
conforming and not contradicting.
● Rules and regulations cannot go beyond the basic law.
● Appellant is entitled to the 10% cost of collection in case of suit.
● It is provided in all the promissory notes signed by Appellee that in case of suit for the
collection of the amount of the note or any unpaid balance thereof, the Appellee Rural
Bank shall pay the Central Bank of the Philippines a sum equivalent to ten (10%) percent
of the amount unpaid not in any case less than five hundred (P500.00) pesos as attorney's
fees.
● Thus, Appellee cannot be allowed to come to Court seeking redress for an alleged wrong
done against it and then be allowed to renege on its corresponding obligations

3
Tenchavez vs. Escano
G.R. No. L-19671
 November 29, 1965
FACTS:

● Plaintiff-appellant: PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ,

● Defendants-appellees: VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL.
● Direct appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civil Case No.
R-4177) denying the claim of Tenchavez for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages against his wife and parents-in-law.
● Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino
family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala")
● Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer
● 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where Vicenta was enrolled
as a second year student of commerce, exchanged marriage vows with Tenchavez
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
the house of one Juan Alburo.
● The marriage was the culmination of previous love affair and was duly registered with
the local civil registrar.
● Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between planned out their marital future whereby
Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy
bank.
● A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned
the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao.
● Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return and they reconciled.
● They planned to get married and then elope. Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to
the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
● Elope did not materialize. When Vicenta went back to her classes after the marriage, her
mother was already waiting for her at the college.
● Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor.
Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of
Vicenta, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage
would provoke.
● The Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a celebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church,
due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest.
● The recelebration did not take place. 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed a
letter coming from San Carlos College students and disclosing relationship between
Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel.
● Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new
marriage.
● Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Vicenta continued
living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila.
● Her letter of 22 March 1948 while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as
endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.|||
● She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor , but her letters
became less frequent as the days passed.
● As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged.
● Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her
marriage stirred in Cebu society.
● A lawyer filed for her petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her
marriage. She did not sign the petition.
● The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing.
● 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in
her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, that she was domiciled
in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years.
● The application was approved, and she left for the United States.
● On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff
in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of
Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
● On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court
by the said tribunal.|||
● 1951, Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul
their daughter's marriage to Pastor.
● 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage.
● July 1955, Tenchavez initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta and her parents whom
he charged with a.) having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband
b.) and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, c.) asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
● Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her
present husband, Russell Leo Moran.
● Her parents denied that they had in anyway influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.|||
● The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation but freed the plaintiff from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife.
● It allowed the counterclaim of Vicenta’s parents for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against the Tenchavez, to the extent of P45,000.00.
● The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño
liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;
 2. In not holding the defendant parents Don Mamerto Escaño and the heirs of Doña
Mena Escaño liable for damages;

3. In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the
defendant parents on their counterclaim; and
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
RULING:

● Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.

Escaño;
● Vicenta’s marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
“intercourse with a person not her husband” from the standpoint of Philippine Law,
and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of “legal separation under our
law, on the basis of adultery” (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from
the standpoint of our civil law when both parties were then above the age of
majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized
under civil law to solemnize marriages.|||

Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the
undue influence of Pacita Noel. Even true, such vices did not render her marriage
void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a
competent civil court. Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of
Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.|||

● The marriage remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine Law,

notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained from
the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada At the time the
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.
● She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Republic Act. No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
"Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of person are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."

● Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation.
● For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a violation of the Article 17 of the
Civil Code: "Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
 ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country."

4
Del Socorro v Van Wilsen
G.R. No. 193707
December 10, 2014
FACTS:
● Petitioner, Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent, Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage
in Holland on Sept. 25, 1990.
● They had a son named, Roderigo Van Wilsem who at the time of the filing of the instant
petition was just sixteen (16) years old.
● Their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of Divorce Decree at the Court of
Holland
● Petitioner and son came home to the Philippines
● Respondent also went back to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu and
continued residence there
● All parties, including their son, Roderigo Van Wilsem were presently living in Cebu
 ● On Aug. 28, 2009, petitioner sent a letter to the respondent demanding for support
however was respondent refused to receive letter
● Petitioner filed a complaint of affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu against
respondent in violation of Sec. 5 par. 2 of R.A. No. 9262 which states “Depriving of
threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due to her of
her family”
● Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against respondent
● Upon motion and after hearing the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent. Consequently, respondent was arrested but posted bail
● Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss on the grounds of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
offenses charged and (2) prescription of the crime changed
● RTC-Cebu assailed order dismissing the criminal case against respondent since the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he
being an alien

ISSUES:
1. Does the foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the
Philippine Law - YES
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child - YES

RULING:
● It is true that the respondent being a citizen of Holland or the Netherland is subject to the
laws of his country and not the Philippine Law as to whether he is obliged to provide
financial support. If in his country there is really such law wherein it does not require to
provide support to the children, he shall prove that such law exits. Which the respondent
failed to do so. This does not however mean that the respondent is not obliged to support
their son. While the defendant pleaded the laws of Netherlands in advancing his position,
foreign law should not be applied when application would provide undeniable injustice to
the citizens of the forum. Since, to give justice is the most important function of the law,
a law or judgement that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws. Therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto.
● The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A. No. 9262) because the foreigner is
residing here in the Philippines and committed the offense here (Art. 14 of Civil Code)
 5
Lavadia v Heirs of Luna
G.R. No. 171914
July 23, 2014

FACTS:

● Petitioner: SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA

● Respondents: HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA
and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA
● Atty. Juan Luces Luna: A practicing lawyer, Was at first a name partner in the prestigious
law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time
when he was living with his first wife
● Intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (First Wife): Married to Atty. Juan Luces
Luna, in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in
San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948.
● In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA: They have 7 children
1. Regina Maria L. Nadal,
2. Juan Luis Luna
3. Araceli Victoria L. Arellano
4. Ana Maria L. Tabunda
5. Gregorio Macario Luna
6. Carolina Linda L. Tapia
7. Cesar Antonio Luna
● After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to
live apart from each other in February 1966
● Agreed to separation of property, Dated November 12, 1975
● They entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT"
● They agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property.
● On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic.
● On January 12, 1976, Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, ATTY. LUNA also contracted
another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
● ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband
and wife until 1987
● 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner
● On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang
Sora Development Corporation
● The 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project (condominium unit) at Gamboa
St., Makati City
● Consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00,
● To be paid on installment basis for 36 months starting on April 15, 1978.
● The condominium unit was to be used as law office of LUPSICON.
● After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed
on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was
registered bearing the following names:
1. JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100)
2. MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100)
3. GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100)
4. TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
 ● 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761
was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
1. JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100)
2. MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100)
3. TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
● In 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners, still registered under CCT No. 21716.
● The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit
would be 25/100 share.
● ATTY. LUNA established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz
and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office.
● The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997
● After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the law
books, office furniture and equipment found were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna
(ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage)
● Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging
to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
● 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law
books, office furniture and equipment
● The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of
the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts
● Since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the
death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of
● ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties
● ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s
last will and testament
● The heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her
share in the subject properties.
● The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the
subject properties
● that the same be partitioned
● that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of
SOLEDAD be conducted
● That a receiver be appointed to preserve and administer the subject properties
● That the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s fees and costs of the suit to
SOLEDAD.

RULING:
● On March 13, 2006 The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
● On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, holding and
ruling
● EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s
death on July 12, 1997.
● The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction.
● Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death
● The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court
approval (Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code)
● Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired
during their marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership (Article 71 of the Civil
Code) (Article 144 of the Civil Code)
● SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contention in this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the
New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code
● As to the 25/100pro-indiviso share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit,
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said
property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed
used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit.
● The sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium
unit, and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
● The Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
 6
Bayot vs CA
GR No. 155635
November 7, 2008
FACTS:
● Petitioner: Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
● Respondents: Court of Appeals; Vicente Madrigal Bayot
● Vicente (Filipino) and Rebecca (American) married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de
San Jose
● Rebecca was born in Agana, Guam
o Father: Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay (American)
o Mother: Helen Corn Makapugay (American)
● November 27, 1982: Rebecca gave birth to Maria Josephine Alexandra (Alix) in San
Francisco
● February 22, 1996: Rebecca filed divorce in Dominican Republic
● Civil Decree No. 362/96: dissolution of their marriage but giving them joint custody over
Alix
● Civil Decree No. 406/97: the conjugal property they acquired during their marriage
consists only of 502 Acacia Avenue Alabang Muntinlupa
● May 29, 1996: Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgement stating under oath
that since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately and that she’s pregnant of a
child not of Vicente’s
● March 21, 2001: Rebecca filed a petition for nullity of marriage in the Muntinlupa RTC
on the ground of psychological incapacity (Civil Case No. 01-094)
 ● Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains and for Vicente
to pay monthly support for their daughter the amount of PhP220,000
● June 8, 2001: Vicente filed for a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action
● RTC denied Vicente’s motion
● CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094
ISSUE:
● Whether or not the divorce in Dominican Republic is valid
RULING:
● Yes, Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are both valid
● Rebecca was an American citizen and remains to be one, and as a citizen, she was bound
to the national laws of the US, which allows divorce
● The foreign divorce decree is sufficient
● The reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained

7
Garcia vs Recio
GR No. 138322
October 2, 2001

FACTS:

● Petitioner: Grace J. Garcia

● Respondent: Rederick A. Recio
● March 1, 1987: Rederick (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson (Australian) in
Malabon
● May 18, 1989: a divorce decree dissolving their marriage was issued by an Australian
Family court
● June 26, 1992: Rederick became an Australian citizen
● January 12, 1994: Rederick (now an Australian citizen) married Grace Garcia (Filipina)
in Cabanatuan
● In the marriage license, Rederick was declared as “single” and “Filipino”
● October 22, 1995: lived separately
● May 16, 1996: their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations
● March 3, 1998: Grace filed a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy
● November 1997: according to Grace, this was the time she learned about Rederick’s
previous marriage
 ● Rederick said that he has revealed to Grace his previous marriage way back in 1993. His
divorce was validly dissolved under a decree in Australia in 1989, thus he was legally
capacitated to marry Grace in 1994.
● July 7, 1998: Rederick was able to secure a divorce in Australia
● The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved
on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there
was no more marital union to nullify or annul

ISSUE:

● Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

● The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued
was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized
Australian.
● However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to
marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree.
● The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence
primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it
will be used.
● Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either:
○ an official publication or
○ a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
■ accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and
■ authenticated by the seal of his office.
● Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity
to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
 8
Van Dorn vs Romillo
GR No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

FACTS:

● Petitioner: Alice Reyes Van Dorn

● Respondents: Hon. Manuel Romillo; Richard Upton
● 1972: Alice Reyes (Filipina) and Richard Upton (American) married in Hongkong
● They resided in the Philippines
● They have 2 children born April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975
● 1982: They were divorced in Nevada
● Alice married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada
● June 8, 1983: Responded filed a suit (Civil Case 1075-P) of the RTC stating that Alice’s
business in Ermita (Galleon Shop) is conjugal property of both parties
● Richard is asking Alice to be ordered to render an accounting of the business and that
Richard gain right to manage the business
● Alice moved to dismiss the case since in the divorce proceedings in Nevada, Richard
acknowledged that they have “no community property” as of June 11, 1982
● The court denied the motion saying that the property is located in the Philippines so the
Divorce decree in Nevada has no bearing

ISSUE:

● Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise

control over conjugal assets?
RULING:

● The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.

● The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may
obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are
valid according to their national law.
● From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with the
petitioner.
● Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets.
● He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property.
 9
Republic v Orbecido
G.R. No. 154380
Oct. 5, 2005

FACTS:
● Petitioner: Republic of PH (Solicitor General)
● Respondent: Cipriano Orbecido III
● Cipriano married Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24 1981 in Ozamis City, Zambonga.
They had children namely, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
● In 1986, the wife left to work in the US bringing along their son.
● Years later, Cipriano discovered his wife’s already an american citizen through
naturalization.
● In 2000, Cipriano learned from his son his wife had filed a divorce and married a guy
named Stanley to which they had a child together and resided in San Gabriel, California.
● PA: Petition to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
● Petition for Declaratory relief
● RA: Solicitor General (OSG) assails that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not applicable to the case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage (Filipino +
Foreigner).
● The proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
● OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation.
● The OSG argued that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.

RULING:
● Court’s Decision: Courts decided Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not
present competent evidence showing his wife had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried.
● Legal Basis/ Provision: Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of Family Code:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

Main point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

10
Pilapil v Ibay-Somera
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989.

FACTS:
● Petitioner: Imelda M. Pilapil (Fil wife)
● Respondent: HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA (Presiding Judge of RTC Manila)
● Couple married on Sept 7, 1979 before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany and had a child Isabella Pilapil Geiling on
April 20 1980.
● After 3 and a half years of marriage, couple filed for divorce initiated by the husband in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.
● Petitioner( the wife) , subsequently filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on
January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866
● Jan 15, 1985 German RTC granted the divorce on the grounds of marriage failure bet
spouses. Wife gained custody of their child. German law provides the divorce to be
locally and internationally recognized and its dissolution be legally founded as authorized
by the applicable of Germany’s jurisdiction.
● June 27, 1986 2 complaints of adultery were filed before the City Fiscal of Manila by the
private respondent, alleging affairs with William Chia and Jesus Chua during their
marriage.
● Case was dismissed due to insufficient evidence
● But upon review by the respondent city fiscal, cases were The complaints were
eventually filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. Cases were entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided
by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of
Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.
● Pilapil with James Chua, her co- accused filed petition for thedismissal of the cases with
sec of justice
 - Petitioner deferred arraignment in both criminal cases filed against her and to suspend
further proceedings.
- On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash
- On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and,
upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner.

ISSUE:
● Whether private respondent (Ibay- Somera) can prosecute petitioner on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was
already issued.

RULING:

● Legal Basis/ Provision: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
● Court ruled that the person who can legally file the complaint is the offended spouse.
● In this case the respondent the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
● Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
 11
San Luis v San Luis
G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007

Petitioner: Edgar San Luis

Respondent: Felicidad San Luis

FACTS:
● During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 w/ six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
● He then married Mery Lee Corwin (w/ 1 son: Tobias) on May 1 1968. Merry filed for
divorce before the Family Court in Hawaii on Dec 14 1973 and gained custody over their
child.
● Felicisimo then married respondent Felicidad San Luis on June 20, 1974 in L.A,
California. Didnt have children w/ her but was married for 18 years until he died on Dec
18 1992
● Respondent then sought for the dissolution of their conjugal assets and the settlement of
his estate.
● Dec 17 199, filed petition for letters of administration before the RTC
● Feb 4 1994, Rodolfo San Luis, (first marriage kid) filed motion to dismiss her petition on
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state the cause of action. He claimed the
petition for letters of administration should've been filed in Laguna where his father
resided when he died.
● Further claimed that respondent has no legal personality bc she was the mistress of
felicismo back then when he was still legally married to Merry Lee.

ISSUE:
1. Whether venue was properly laid, and
2. Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on
June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
3. Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.

RULING:
● Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid.
● Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province
of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage
to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate
children.
● CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
● Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which
he resides at the time of his death."
● For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate.
● Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.
● The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
● With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
 judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case
should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
● Y. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

12
Barretto Gonzalez v Gonzalez
 G.R. No. 37048

March 7, 1933

● Plaintiff-Appellee: MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ,

● Defendant-Appellant: AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET
AL., intervenors-appellees,

FACTS:

● Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present
residents of the City of Manila.
● They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919
● Lived together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926.
● They voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived together as man and
wife.
● Four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of age.
● Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued
for several months
● It was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her
children, five hundred pesos monthly
● This amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain
properties to be put in her name.
● After this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook himself to Reno,
Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of
desertion, which decree was dated November 28, 1927.
● The defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928
● On the same date that he secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms
of marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a
result of that marriage.
● Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had
agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and four minor children and has
not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
● After his return his wife brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree
of divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada
● Section 9 of Act No. 2710: The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of
property as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of
matrimony until one year thereafter.
 ● The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the
spouse who, having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to
the guardian appointed by the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent
of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died
intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.

ISSUE

● Whether or not any foreign divorce relating to the citizens of the Philippine
Islands will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause and under
conditions for which the court of the Philippines Island would grant the divorce.

RULING:

● No, Securing the Jurisdiction of the courts to recognize and approve the divorce done in
Reno, Nevada can’t be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the
question of divorce.
● Articles 9 and 11 of the civil code and Divorce Law of the Philippines doesn’t allow such
to be done the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines
● Litigants cannot compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal
relations of the citizens of the Philippines to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in
manner which out government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.
● The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be
reversed and defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action.
● This, however, without prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the
intervenors may have against defendant.

13
Bellis v Bellis

G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

FACTS:
 ● Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States
● By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, 5 legitimate children
○ Edward A. Bellis
○ George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy)
○ Henry A. Bellis
○ Alexander Bellis
○ Anna Bellis Allsman

By his second wife Violet Kennedy, 3 legitimate children

● Edwin G. Bellis
● Walter S. Bellis
● Dorothy Bellis

3 illegitimate children

● Amos Bellis, Jr.

● Maria Cristina Bellis
● Miriam Palma Bellis

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines

He directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:

$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;

P120, 000.00 to his three illegitimate children or P40, 000.00 each

After the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives

July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.

His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15,
1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
3 illegitimate children amounts totaling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00
 On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed
its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition"

It reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her
of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies in the amount of P40, 000.00 each
or a total of P120,000.00.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower
court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's
final account, report and administration and project of partition.

Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June
11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.

ISSUE:

Which law must apply in executing the will of the deceased – Texas Law or Philippine Law?

RULING:

· In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas
and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.

· So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
 · As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they
argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:

- The order of succession;

- The amount of successional rights;

- The intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and

- The capacity to succeed.

· Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,

· It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals.

· For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

· Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern
his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate

· A provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.

Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

The order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants.
 14
Miciano v Brimo
G.R. No. 22595
November 1, 1924
FACTS:
● The partition of the estate left by the deceased, Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case
● Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen
● The judicial administrator of the estate, Juan Miciano filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brother of the deceased, opposed it. However, the court approved it
● Errors which the appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of the said scheme of partition;
(2) the denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) denial for Motion for
Reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase
made by Pietro Lanza of the deceased’s business and deed of transfer of business; and (5)
the declaration of Turkish laws in are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of scheme of partition and deed of transfer of business requested in
reference to Turkish laws
 ● Appellant’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question are not in
accordance with the laws of the Turkish nationality being in violation to Art. 16 of the
Civil Code “Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of
their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.”
● However, appellant did not prove that the testamentary position are not in accordance
with the Turkish Laws
● There was no evidence that the national law of the testator, Joseph Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions, not contrary to our laws in force. Therefore, must be
complied with and executed

ISSUES:
● Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph
Brimo’s estates – YES

RULING:
● Though the last part of the second clause of his will expressly said that "Second. I
likewise desire to state that although, by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my
wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request."
● The said condition is void, being in contrary to law and expressly ignores the testator’s
national law when according to Article 16 of the Civil Code provides “Intestate and
testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the nation law of the person whose succession is under construction,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.”
● Thus, national law of the testator shall govern
 15
Edward Christensen
G.R. No. L-16759
January 31, 1963

FACTS:
● Edward Christensen though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided
for 9 years and was considered a California citizen
● He came to the Philippines in 1913 where he became a domiciliary until death
● Made only rare and short visits to California and appears never to have owned or
acquired a home or properties in that State which would indicate that he would ultimately
abandon Philippines and make home in the State of California
● Died at St. Lukes Hospital on April 30, 1953
● In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir and left her with all the remainder of his properties whether
real, personal or mixed but a sum of money amounting to 3,600 pesos to Helen
Christensen Garcia
● Both were acknowledged as natural child
 ● Under Philippine law, intestate and testamentary successions shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration
● Under California law, testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner
he desires
● Appellee, Lucy Christensen, argues that since deceased was a citizen pf the State of
California the internal law thereof, should govern the validity of will
● Appellant on the other hand, insists that in the accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of testamentary provision in question
should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile in the Philippines
● Renvoi: When a court is faced with a conflict of law and must consider the law of another
state, referred to as private international law rules (PIL). According to this theory the
“law of the country” means the whole of its law
● Domicile: country that a person treats as their permanent home

ISSUES:
● Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of
Christensen – YES

RULING:
● The laws of California prescribed two sets of laws for its citizen, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
● In result, based on California law regarding domicile, it should enforce the conflict of
laws for the citizens domiciled abroad.
● The Conflict of laws rule in California, Art. 946 of Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar.
● The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to California as such
action would be like a football tossed back and forth between two states.
● The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the
state of the decedent.
 1
Geluz v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-16439
July 20, 1961
FACTS:
● Nita Villanueva was impregnated by her present husband before they were legally
married
● To conceal her pregnancy from her parents she underwent abortion
● The abortion was done by Antonio Geluz
● After she got married she got pregnant again but was aborted again by Geluz because she
was then employed in COMELEC
● Less than 2 years later, she got pregnant again and aborted the two-month old fetus but
without her husband’s consent
● Oscar Lazo, the husband sued Antonio Geluz for the damages from the third abortion
ISSUES:
● Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his
parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING:
● Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It
is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered
as never having possessed legal personality
 ● An action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or
heirs of an unborn child
● The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the fetus, on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations
● In this case, however, the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions of his wife,
clearly indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
expectations
● The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed

2
Joaquin v. Navarro
G.R. Nos. L-5426-28
May 29, 1953

FACTS

● PETITIONER: RAMON JOAQUIN

● RESPONDENT: ANTONIO C. NAVARRO
● February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging
● The spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters,
Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife,
Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club
at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City.
● During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around,
and the Club was set on fire.
● Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, especially
those who were trying to escape.
● The three daughters were hit and fell off the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven.
● They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them
● Joaquin Navarro Sr, Joaquin Navarro Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend
and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice.
● As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped.
● The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets.
● Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside,
presumably including Angela Joaquin.
● "Joaquin Navarro, Angela Conde and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby
● They stayed there for about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to
leave the shelter because the shelling tore it open.
● They fled toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met
Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and Angela Conde
his daughter in law.
● At the time of the massacre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70
● Wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old
● Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30
● Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother
● While the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquín, were between 23 &
25
● The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez Who
miraculously survived the holocaust
● And upon them the Court of Appeals opined that:
● "As between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of
survivorship is uncertain and insufficient"
● And the statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its
conclusion is thus stated:
● "It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of
the death of only one of the parties but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive
when the other had already died.
● Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club in the
company of his father and the witness and that the burning edified entirely collapsed
minutes after the shooting of the son
● But there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer
the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from the
instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died.
● All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left
her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after,
from a variety of causes.
 ● She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling beams from
the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the
exploding shells.
● We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point.
● All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her side, and that there is
no proof when she died.
● Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died later than her son
● Indeed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be
precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these.
● Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother,
Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age

(Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court)

● The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question
whether she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity.

- There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the
deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila.

- A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle
are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a
variety of cause of death can operate in the source of combat.

- During the same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or
drowning. It is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as
an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.

● The trial court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled
that son outlived his mother.

ISSUE:

● Whether or not the son/mother died first before the other...

(If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession.)

(If mother died first, respondent Antonio, son of Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit)

HELD:

● It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive.
● Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the
presumption therein provided be certain.
● It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are
required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence.
● In speaking of inference the rule cannot mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never
certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact."
● In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based
purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the
evidence.
● The opposite theory that the mother outlived her son is deduced from established facts
which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong
probability.
● Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this
inference ought to prevail.
● The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances from
which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen,
undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions
raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into.
● As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857,
"Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible
witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted.
● But when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned
and the only issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted
upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue
is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."
● The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to
be invoked is a question of law.
● The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to
decisions supported by substantial evidence.
● By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable
men may disagree.
● Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the
exception to the general rule.
● We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court.
● This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which
was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that
of her son. Without costs.
 3
THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.
JUAN CODINA ARENAS AND OTHERS, DEFENDANTS.; VICENTE SIXTO
VILLANUEVA, APPELLANT

· Dec. 15, 1908: Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara Del Pino (as principals)
along with Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and (the Chairman) Siy Ho (as
sureties) assumed obligation to pay – jointly and severally – to the plaintiff-appelle
the sum of P3,305.78 for three months from this date, plus an interest at P1 per
month.

· April 5, 1909: The standard oil sued five debtors for payment of sum, together w/
the interest thereon at rate of 1% per month from date assumed obligation
(12/15/08) and the costs; Defendants were summoned, w/ record that showed
summons was served on Vicente Sixto Villanueva on April 17.

· May 12: Villanueva and Ho were declared to be in default, notified (14th for latter
and 15th for former)

· Aug.23: The court of 1st Instance (of the city og Manila) sentenced all defendants
to pay (jointly and severally) to plaintiff company the aforementioned sum, w/
interested thereon at 1% a month from Dec.15, 1908 until complete payment of
principat plus costs.

· While judgement was in course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva (the wife
of Vicente), appeared and alleged the ff:

- July 24, 1909: latter was declared to be insane by Court of 1st

Instance (manila)
 - She was appointed his guardian by the same court

- Oct. 11: she was authorized by the court as his guardian to institute
the proper legal proceedings in the present cause

- She as the guardian was not aware of the proceedings had against
his husband and was only by chance informed of it

- When his husband gave the bond, he was already permanently

insane and was in such a state when summoned and still continued
to do so.

In conclusion, she petitioned to the court to relieve her husband from compliance and to
reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence on his behalf, with respect to his
capacity at the time of the bond’s execution.

Issues: Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the
conclusion that the person does not have the capacity to act

Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into contract at the time
the bond was executed on Dec.15, 1908

Held: The court granted the petition, thus trial was reopened for introduction of
evidence. And after due consideration, the court decided that Vicente Villanueva
executed bond in question, he understood perfectly the nature and consequences of the
act performed by him. The supreme court held that there is no evidence to warrant the
conclusion, and therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a contract.

For the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that at the date of giving
of the bond, (Dec.15,1908), the appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity.
 4
Martinez v. Martinez
G.R. No. 445
March 31, 1902

FACTS:
● Pedro Martinez Illustre (son, legal compulsory heir, plaintiff-apellant) filed a declaration
of prodigality against Francisco Martinez Garcia (his father)
● Allegations of Pedro (son/P.A):
- That his father is dissipating (spend/ use up foolishly and wastefully) and
squandering his estate through donations made to his second wife Doña Anastacia
Ilustre and to her parents of properties amounting to $200,000
- That his father has turned over the administration of his estate to the management
of his wife
- That his father has a propensity for litigation (preference towards court trials) and
has instituted groundless actions against his son so that his wife and her relatives
may acquire his property.
● Counter Arguments of Francisco(father, defendant)
- That he has executed general power of attorney where his son has administered the
community estate for several years.
- That Plaintiff (son: Pedro) registered ships that belonged to the estate under his
name (Germana, Don Francisco, Balayan) without his consent; and is
misappropriating and mismanaging the estate’s property
- And that the litigation brought about him against his son was due to his son’s
attitude who revoked the power of attorney, also refused to render an account of his
administration.
● The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff (son/Pedro) and
adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to the court.

ISSUES:
● Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son?

RULING:
● The court dismissed the petition of prodigality against defendant.
● Acts that constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of
applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations
of persons.
● The declaration of prodigality must be made in an ordinary action (en juicio
contradictorio). (Art. 221 of the Civil Code.)
● Under our law it maybe inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of
mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely
to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable
part of the estate.
● Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All
persons who can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the
Civil Code.)
● Donations may comprise all the actual property of the donor, except such as is required for
the support of the donor in a condition corresponding to his circumstances. (Art. 634 of the
Civil Code.) And with further limitation that no person can give by a donation more than
what he can give by testament.
● Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon
the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by
public policy may well be regarded as unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as
destroying the incentive to acquire property
● The father's estate consisted of city property in Manila; of farms and of certain vessels, two
of which are steamships. There is no evidence offered to show any transfers by sale or
mortgage of these properties. Donations of real property must be made in a public deed
(art. 633 of the Civil Code), and the acquisition of vessels must also be included in a written
instrument, and produces no effect with regard to third person if not recorded in the
Commercial Registry. (Art. 573 of the Code of Commerce.)
● There is no proof that there was any money belonging to the estate, or other personal
property, the transfer of which could not be easily traced.The son has been in possession
of a greater part of the estate since November, 1897, collecting the revenue from the ships
and rents from the city property. The farms have been non-productive on account of the
disturbed conditions of the country, and the revenue from even these has been in part
collected by the son.
● While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased
since her marriage, there is no evidence to show that there has been any perceptible
diminution of the defendant’s property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that
the father, so far from being a prodigal(incompetent), is still in the full exercise of his
faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation
of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-
half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.
 ● A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff
himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his
father.

5
Poe vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 221697
March 8, 2016

FACTS:
● Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Three days after, petitioner was registered as a
foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.”
● At 5 years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.
● On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name
be changed to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." However, the lawyer failed to secure
new birth certificate but her mother issued new birth certificate on May 4, 2006.
● At 18, petitioner was a registered voter at San Juan City and applied passport at DFA 2
years after.
● She pursued degree in Developmental Studies at UP Diliman and continued study in
abroad at Boston College and finished Political Studies in 1991.
● Married his husband, Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (PH and US citizen) at
Sanctuario De San Jose Parish in San Juan City.
● Gave birth to eldest son in 1992 in US while two daughters born in PH in 2008 and 1994.
● Oct. 18, 2001, petitioner became naturalized American Citizen and obtained US Passport.
● April 8, 2004, came back to the PH to support father’s presidential candidacy and gave
birth to youngest daughter. They returned to US in July 8, 2004.
● Dec. 13, 2004, rushed back to the PH when petitioner’s father died and decided to stay in
PH until Feb. 3, 2005.
● In the first quarter of 2005, the petitioner decided to move permanently in PH and
prepared for resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will
be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester; coordination with property
movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the
Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be
followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.
● As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.
● Petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately
followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects
as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.
● In 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal
of some of the family's remaining household belongings. 29 She travelled back to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006.
● In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. The family home was
eventually sold on 27 April 2006.
● Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the
country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.
● In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home and to this day, is where the
couple and their children have been residing.
● On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003.
● She filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor
children on 10 July 2006.
● 18 July 2006, the BI declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.
● On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
● Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship."
● The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI and
took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Petitioner stopped using her
American passport.
● 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."
● On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul
wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October
2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.
● In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the
U.S.,specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from
May 2005 to present.
● On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.
 ● 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months"
to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Proclaimed
Senator on 16 May 2013

Estrella Alamparo’s petition:

● Raffled to Comelec Second Division
● Believes Comelec has jurisdiction over her petition.
● Petitioner is not a natural born citizen because she is a foundling so she cannot reacquire
Filipino citizenship under RA 9255 because not a natural born Filipino to begin with.
● Committed material representation when petitioner stated in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and resided 10 years and 11 months as of May 9, 2016
elections.
● Even petitioner is a natural-born Filipino, she lost status when became American citizen
and natural-born must be continuous from birth.
● Petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six (6) years and six (6)
months as of May 2013 Elections.
● Assuming petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225,
she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her
residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired
Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner’s response to Alamparo:

● COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition
for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential
elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the
BI's July 18, 2006 Order
● The petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which,
if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
● Did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and
residency qualifications

1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution: The Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is GRANTED.
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.
Other complaints:

Francisco S. Tatad
● Foundling is excluded and not included as natural-born Filipino citizen.
● Burden lies on petitioner to prove citizenship.
● No standard state practice confers foundlings as natural-born citizens.
● Cannot reacquire citizenship.
● Did not comply with 10-year residency requirement. Petitioner acquired domicile in QC
after American citizenship was renounced in 2010 or 2011.

Amado Valdez:
● Petitioner did not meet 10-year residency requirement.
● Petitioner is not a natural born citizen because she is a foundling so she cannot reacquire
Filipino citizenship under RA 9255 because not a natural born Filipino to begin with.

Antonio P. Contreras:
● Petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not
possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made
false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.
● Reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from
18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved
by the BI.
● Petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an
American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.

Petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an
ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
● Whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the
exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation. (NO)

RULING:
● Temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its
representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC.
● The COMELEC cannot itself, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
● The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
● The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National
Elections.
● Article VII, Section 4 provides that SC as the sole judge.
● The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an
authority properly vested with jurisdiction.
● If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate
of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications.
● The petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable.
● The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That
said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino.
● The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos (Section 4, Rule 128).

6
 Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 119976
September 18,1995

FACTS:
● Petitioner: Imelda Romualdez - Marcos
● Respondent: Commission on Elections
● Imelda filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.
● March 23, 1995: Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.
● In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months
to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
● May 11, 1995: COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the
First District of Leyte.
● The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number
of votes.
● In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the
one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative - YES

RULING:
● The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
● Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining
a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution.
● An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences
in different places.
● In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness
as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed incurred.
● It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
● It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
● Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for
a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25 are set aside.
● Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte