Nelson T. Lluz and Catalino C. Aldeosa, vs.

Commission on Elections and Caesar

O. Vicencio, G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007

Facts:
Private respondent was a candidate for the post of punong barangay. In his
certificate of candidacy, private respondent stated his profession or occupation as a
certified public accountant (CPA). Private respondent won in the elections. After private
respondent’s proclamation, petitioners charged him with violation of B.P. 881. Petitioners
claimed they had proof that private respondent misrepresented himself as a CPA.
In his answer, private respondent maintained that he was a CPA and that he could
not be held liable for an election offense because his alleged misrepresentation of
profession was not material to his eligibility as a candidate.
The PRC produced a Certification showing that private respondent had taken the
3 October 1993 CPA Board Examinations and obtained a failing mark of 40.71%. Upon
motion of petitioners, the COMELEC En Banc by Resolution ordered the Law Department
to file an information against private respondent for violation of B.P. 881. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration which was granted.

Issue:
Whether or not an alleged misrepresentation of profession or occupation on a
certificate of candidacy punishable as an election offense under B.P. 881.

Ruling:
No. The Court discussed that a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is
material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate’s
eligibility. Conversely, a misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-material
misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. In other words, for a candidate’s certificate of candidacy to be denied due
course or canceled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a
qualification for the office sought by the candidate.

In this regard, profession or occupation is not a qualification for elective office, and
therefore not a material fact in a certificate of candidacy.
To dismiss this petition is the consideration that any complaint against private
respondent for perjury under the Revised Penal Code would necessarily have to allege
the element of materiality. The basis of the crime of perjury is the willful assertion of a
falsehood under oath upon a material matter. Thus, in the case of a certificate of
candidacy, a material matter is a fact relevant to the validity of the certificate and which
could serve as basis to grant or deny due course to the certificate in case it is assailed.
Of course, such material matter would then refer only to the qualifications for elective
office required to be stated in the certificate of candidacy.
Leonila Batulanon v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 139857, September 15,
2006

Facts:
Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as
its Cashier/Manager. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans
to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were
discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all
checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao,
Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were granted
a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the
said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the
check vouchers issued in their names.
Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents were filed against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr.
and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon
in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of
Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law
and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He claimed that
membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.
The trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document.

Ruling:
Yes, under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that
determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of
the information. The Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and
Arroyo. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private
documents and not commercial documents because they are not documents used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions nor are
they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law. Rather,
they are private documents.
Accordingly, Batulanons act of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e.,
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion,
and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the
amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that
they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan
nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.
 In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the
signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she
received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of
the modes of Falsification under Article 171. As to whether, such representation involves
fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which makes her liable for
estafa, but not for falsification.

Laurinio Goma and Natalio Umale v. The Court of the Appeals, G.R. No. 168437,
January 8, 2009
Facts:
Three barangay councilors filed a complaint alleging Goma and Umale, as
barangay chairperson and secretary, respectively, falsified a barangay resolution dated
September 24, 1995, allocating amount of PhP18, 000 as disbursement for a seminar for
the two officials when in truth and in fact no meeting was held as no quorum was mustered
on the said date.

The petitioners contend that they did not benefit from, or that the public was not
prejudiced by, the said resolution hence, they cannot be held liable for the crime charged.

Issue:
Whether or not the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or
prejudice to a third party necessary to commit the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents.

Ruling:
No. ART. 171 penalizes Falsification by Public Officer, Employee; or Notary or
Ecclesiastical Minister by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The elements of the crime of
Falsification of Public Documents, as above defined and penalized, are: 1. that the
offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2. that he takes advantage of his
official position; 3. that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding; and 4. that such person or persons did not in fact
so participate in the proceeding.
The element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender is not essential to
maintain a charge for falsification of public documents. What is punished in falsification
of public document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of
truth as solemnly proclaimed therein.
All the elements having been satisfactorily established in the case at bar,
petitioners are therefore guilty of the crime charged.

People of The Philippines vs.Edgar Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

Facts:
 Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married. On February 19, 1999, KKK
executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped
her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and
that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to
have sex with him.

The first count of rape allegedly happened in the spouse’s bedroom when
accused-appellant got angry when KKK refused to lie in bed with him because of
headache and abdominal pain. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He
rose from the bed, lifted the cot where KKK was lying on and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed. Accused-appellant then forced KKK into sexual
intercourse with him.

The second count reportedly transpired when KKK decided to sleep on the
children’s room. The accused-appellant attempted to carry her out of the room and
transfer KKK to their bedroom. MMM and OOO, their daughters, who saw this happen,
pleaded their father to let KKK stay. Accused-appellant ordered his daughters to leave
them, and proceeded to rape KKK in the children’s bedroom.

Accused- appellant posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse were
theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally
married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

Issue:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their
wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, though within the realm of marriage, if not consensual,
is rape.

It is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within

marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

The definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse.

People vs. Rodolfo Deniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017
Facts:
In an Amended Information, accused was charged with the crime of statutory rape,
as follows: that the accused feloniously, have carnal knowledge with a minor (16 years
old) AAA, whose mental age is only six (6) years old.
In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the prosecution and
also raised the defense of alibi.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of statutory rape under Article 266- A, paragraph
1 (d) of the RPC.
Ruling:
Yes. It is a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental
retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape.
In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim, at the time of the
commission of the crime, was 16 years old but with a mental age of a 6-year-old child.
The prosecution was able to establish these facts through AAA's Birth Certificate, Clinical
Abstract prepared by a medical doctor who is a psychiatrist from the National Center for
Mental Health, as well as the testimonies of the said doctor and the victim's mother, BBB.
In sum, the Court ruled that in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years
of age" under Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either
the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability,
or the mental age if intellectual disability is established.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
that accused-appellant was guilty of raping AAA.

People v. Dalag, G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003

Facts:
Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully married
to Leah Nolido Dalag. They had three children. Their marriage was far from peaceful.
Their covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at the losing end.
Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions, bruises and lumps on
different parts of her body.
On August 15, 1996, as told by their children, Armando was drinking when Leah
admonished him not to do so. Leah was then banged on the wall by Armando. Then he
pushed and kicked Leah on the left side of her body which caused her to fall on the
ground. Even as Leah was already lying prostrate, Armando continued to beat her up,
punching her on the different parts of her body. Leah then fled to the house of their
neighbour but Armando ran after her and herded her back to their house. Leah fell again
to the ground and lost her consciousness.
The medico-legal autopsy report revealed that Leah suffered severe beatings
resulting in intracranial hemorrhage which caused her death. The trial court convicted
Armando of parricide.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court correctly convicted the accused.

Ruling:

Yes. In the crime of parricide as defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code,
the prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a person is
killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the
relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate. In this case, the prosecution proved all the essential elements of parricide.
Moreover, the testimony of Francis and Princess Joy, children of the deceased and
accused-appellant, deserves full credence as they testified "in a logical, candid, and
straight-forward manner, describing in detail what they saw and heard in a manner
characteristic of witnesses who are telling the truth. The children recalled the sordid
events without any trace of bias, impelled by no other motive than to bring justice to their
mother's senseless death.
The children's testimonies are also buttressed by the findings of Dr. Canto, the
neurological surgeon who attended to Leah when she was confined in the hospital, and
Dr. Cruel of the Commission on Human Rights, who conducted the post-mortem
examination on Leah's body.

People vs. Dela Trinidad y Oballes, G.R. No. 199898, September 3, 2014

Facts:

On 27 September 2008, Naga City Police (Intelligence Section) received an information

concerning a certain Leo De la Trinidad who was allegedly involved in drug trafficking.
After having verified the report that appellant is indeed involved in drug trade, two test-
buys were conducted on different dates. Both brought forth positive result as the police
asset was able to buy marijuana cubes, dried marijuana leaves, fruiting tops worth
₱100.00 and one brick of dried marijuana leaves from the appellant.

Around 5:10 AM of 21 October 2008, the group proceeded to the residence of appellant.
They were accompanied by the DOJ and media representatives together with the local
barangay officials. Upon reaching appellant’s house, the raiding team knocked at his door
and identified themselves as police officers from the Naga City Police Office and informed
him that they are executing the search warrants issued by Judge Jaime Contreras. They
told appellant that they have witnesses with them, and read to him the contents of the
warrants and apprised him of his constitutional rights. PO2 Quintin Tusara took pictures
of everything that transpired while the operatives were executing the warrants.

When appellant was asked to produce the items enumerated in the search warrant, if
indeed he really had them, appellant voluntarily presented the items which he took under
his pillow. An inventory was then conducted right inside the house of appellant and a
certificate of inventory was prepared by SPO1 Louie Ordonez. The Certificate of
Inventory and Certification of Orderly Search were duly signed by the witnesses in the
presence of appellant.

After making the necessary markings, appellant and the items seized from him were
brought to the Naga City Police Station. The seized items were returned to the court of
origin but were subsequently withdrawn for laboratory examination. A request to the
Camarines Sur Provincial Office was subsequently madeby SPO1 Aguilar and the seized
items were immediately brought to the Crime Laboratory for field test examination. The
seized items were duly received by P/Insp. Edsel Villalobos (P/Insp. Villalobos).

When subjected to both initial and final test examinations by P/Insp. Villalobos, the seized
items were found positive for the presence of marijuana.

Appellant raised the defenses of denial and frame-up. RTC and CA ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the
crime charged.

Ruling:

No. In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following
elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which
is identified to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. As correctly ruled
by the CA, these elements were duly established by the prosecution. The finding of illicit
drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular person
raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is
sufficient to convict. Here, accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to overcome
such presumption. He merely insisted that he was framed and had no knowledge of where
the prohibited drugs came from. In the absence of any contrary evidence, he is deemed
to be in full control and dominion of the drugs found in his house.
Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus delicti and the
unbroken chain of custody. It was sufficiently established that representatives from the
media and Department of Justice and even two (2) barangay local officials were present
during the briefing and even until the conduct of the inventory. And that immediately after
seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs, the same were inventoried and
photographed in the presence of appellant and said persons, who even signed copies of
the inventory. The seized illegal drugs were marked at accused’s residence and in his
presence.

Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006

Facts:

Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, police conducted

surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music
Fair). On May 5, 1999, police officers served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who,
according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The
police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10)
different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.

The RTC convicted Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for violation of Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter appealed to the Court of Appeals but the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners’ conviction.

Ruling:

No reversible error was committed by the appellate court as well as the trial court in finding
the herein petitioners guilty as charged. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that
(a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold,
exhibited, published or gave away such materials.

In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of
Appeals affirmed such findings. The trial court in ruling that the confiscated materials are
obscene, reasoned that pictures of men and women in the nude doing the sexual act
appearing in the nine (9) confiscated magazines are offensive to morals and are made
and shown not for the sake of art but rather for commercial purposes.

Also, the Court found that petitioners are engaged in selling and exhibiting obscene
materials. Notably, the subject premises of the search warrant was the Gaudencio E.
Fernando Music Fair, named after petitioner Fernando. The mayor’s permit was under
his name. Furthermore, when he preferred not to present contrary evidence, the things
which he possessed were presumptively his.
Petitioner Estorninos is likewise liable as the store attendant actively engaged in selling
and exhibiting the obscene materials. Prosecution witness Police Inspector Tababan, who
led the search, identified him as the store attendant upon whom the search warrant was
served. Tababan had no motive for testifying falsely against Estorninos and the Court
upheld the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties.

People vs. Mamantak, G.R. No. 174659, July 28, 2008

Facts:

On December 13, 1999, Teresa lost her son Christopher after they went to a McDonald’s
outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. She and her sister frantically
looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their
continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police
detachment. The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform
the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information.

Nearly 14 months after Christopher went missing, Teresa received a call from a woman
who sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked
for ₱30,000 in exchange for the boy. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the
morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. Teresa
sought the help of the President Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Police
Officer (PO) 3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece.

Upon arriving at the meeting place, conversation ensued among Raga Sarapida
Mamantak (Mamantak), Likad Sarapida Taurak (Taurak), and Teresa. They wanted to
bring Teresa to the place where the boy was while Teresa insisted that she receive the
boy at the place agreed upon. Taurak finally agreed and returned with Christopher. Upon
seeing Christopher, Teresa immediately hugged him with tears, but the boy couldn’t
remember his mother and could only speak the Muslim dialect.

The two sisters demanded for payment whereupon Teresa motioned that it was with her
niece, Juliet. Juliet and Mamantak went outside in order for Juliet to deliver the payment.
Then and there, Mamantak and Taurak were arrested.

The sisters were charged with kidnapping for ransom. The trial court rendered a decision
finding the sisters guilty. The appellate affirmed their conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime charged.

Ruling:

Yes. The essence of the crime of kidnapping as defined and punished under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also
the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. And liberty
is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given
faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.

If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim
is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of
his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable
by death.

In the case, the two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and
was recovered only after almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them
private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire time, Taurak
unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao
del Norte. She demanded ₱30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other
hand, Mamantak’s actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the
ransom) showed without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert
with her.

Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly charged the accused and correctly
considered the demand for ₱30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which necessitated the
imposition of the death penalty.

Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Facts:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed

an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392
(Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before
the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.

Issue:

Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.

Ruling:
No, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. The issue in the civil case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. Further, the relationship between
the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case
No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at
the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

People v. Con-ui, G.R. No. 205442, December 11, 2013

Facts:

The accused-appellants, together with Kiking Mendoza (Mendoza) alias "Kiking Salahay",
Arturo Umba y Antad alias "Lico-Licoan" and two John Does, were charged with the
kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Alejandro Paquillo (Alejandro), Mae Paquillo
(Mae), Marvelous Perez (Marvelous) and Marelie Perez (Marelie).At the time of the
kidnapping, all three girls – Mae, Marvelous and Marelie – were minors.

Based on the testimony of Alejandro, Con-ui has been going to his house for three
consecutive nights, including the night of the abduction on October 14, 2001, offering to
sell his property but he refused. On the night of October 14, while the two were talking at
the terrace, five men suddenly went inside the house and pointed their guns at
Alejandro. At that time, the sisters Marvelous and Marelie were inside the bedroom of
Mae, Alejandro’s daughter and their cousin. While there, someone knocked on the
bedroom door and ordered the girls to go out of the room. Maca and Mendoza then
collared them and asked for the key to the drawer. Con-ui opened the drawer and took
the money inside. Alejandro, Mae, Marvelous, Marelie and Con-ui were then hogtied.

They were brought to the mountains of Bagayangon. The next day, Alejandro was
ordered to go home and get ₱300,000.00 ransom money. Meanwhile, in the mountains,
Mendoza ordered Con-ui to buy food but the latter refused, so it was Maca who did the
task. Maca’s father then arrived and told them that there were military men on the road
leading to Caromata and that Maca has been arrested. After a while, the group decided
to free the girls.
In his defense, Con-ui denied the charges and claimed that he was also a victim. Maca,
meanwhile, claimed alibi as defense.

Ruling:

In proving the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the prosecution has to show that: (a) the
accused was a private person; (b) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived
another of his or her liberty; (c) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (d) the victim
was kidnapped or detained for ransom. All these were proven in the criminal case at bar.

The testimony of Alejandro and Marvelous sufficiently established the commission of the
crime and the accused-appellants’ culpability. Maca was positively identified by
Marvelous as one of the men who collared her, Marelie and Mae by the bedroom, tied
them up and brought them to the mountains of Bagyangon. Con-ui, on the other hand,
was identified by Marvelous as the one who took the key to the drawer, opened it and
took the money in it.

Their testimony also established the fact that they were deprived of their liberty when they
were all hogtied and forcibly brought out of the house and into the mountains. That the
deprivation of their liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom was confirmed by
Alejandro who testified that the abductors asked him for money and even let him off so
he can come up with the ₱300,000.00 ransom.

Soriano v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 160772, July 13, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint against Mely S. Palad (Palad), a bank examiner of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, for Falsification of Public Documents and Use of Falsified Document.
The complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Acting on the
complaint, Balasbas issued a Resolution recommending that Palad be charged in court
with Falsification of Public Documents and that the charge of Use of Falsified Document
be dropped for lack of merit. It was then forwarded to 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor
Dimagiba who recommended the filing of the information. This Resolution was forwarded
to the City Prosecutor for approval.

Meanwhile, Palad filed a Motion to Re-Open Case on the ground that she was not given
a copy of the subpoena or any notice regarding the complaint filed against her. Dimagiba
recommended the reopening of the case. City Prosecutor Garcia approved the
recommendation.

The reopening of the case prompted petitioner to file with the Office of the Ombudsman
a criminal complaint against Balasbas for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner alleged that in the reopening of the case, Palad received
an unwarranted advantage or preference, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
and gross inexcusable negligence, causing undue injury to petitioner. The complaint
against Balasbas was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of the complaint
against Balasbas is proper.

Ruling:

The dismissal is proper. The elements of the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, as amended, are as follows:

1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or

official functions;

2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and

3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions

Petitioner failed to show that Balasbas acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence in issuing the subpoena. As further pointed out by the Office of
the Ombudsman in its Resolution, there was no undue injury because petitioner "had
suffered no actual damage." Also, Balasbas, as investigating prosecutor, had no power
or control over the final disposition of Palad’s motion to reopen the case. Conducting a
preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining whether there exists probable
cause to prosecute a person for the commission of a crime, including the determination
of whether to conclude, reopen or dismiss the criminal complaint subject of the preliminary
investigation, is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the provincial or city
prosecutor.
Valera v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 167278, February 27, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Gil A. Valera was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of Customs in charge of

the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group on July 13, 2001. For and on behalf of the
Bureau of Customs, he filed with the RTC a collection case for unpaid duties and taxes
against Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (SAMC). Subsequently, petitioner and
SAMC entered into a compromise agreement wherein the latter offered to pay on a
staggered basis through thirty (30) monthly equal instalments the duties and taxes sought
to be collected in the civil case.

On August 20, 2003, Director of the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group of the
Philippine National Police filed a complaint against petitioner with the Ombudsman
disclosing the he committed an administrative offense of Grave Misconduct for entering
into a compromise agreement with SAMC without authority from Bureau of Customs and
approval from the President. Moreover, he also directly and indirectly had financial or
pecuniary interest in the Cactus Cargoes Systems, Inc. (CCSI) a brokerage whose line
of business or transaction, in connection with which, he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity by way of causing the employment of his brother-in-law, Ariel Manongdo
with the said entity. Investigation also showed that he traveled to Hongkong with his family
without proper authority from the office of the President.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is administratively liable for grave misconduct.

Ruling:

Yes, Atty. Valera is guilty of committing grave misconduct for entering into a compromise
agreement with SAMC without proper authority from Bureau of Customs and approval
from the President, and also for the second and third charges against him.

Petitioner contends that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019,a brother-in-law is not
included within the scope of the word "family" and therefore, he cannot be found liable
under the said law. However, family relation is defined under Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
as "shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil
degree." Thus, a brother-in-law falls within the definition of family under Section 3(d)
thereof. Moreover, petitioner did not deny that Ariel Manongdo is his brother-in-law or
that CCSI has regular transactions with his office. Neither did he deny that he failed to
comply with the requirement of presidential authority to travel abroad. Instead of
demonstrating that he is innocent of the charges, the petitioner instead resorted to
unavailing technicalities to disprove the allegations. All told, there is substantial evidence
to hold petitioner liable for the second and third charges against him.