CATALAN VS.

CATALAN

DOCTRINE:

Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

FACTS:

Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen, allegedly obtained a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor.
He then contracted a second marriage with petitioner.

When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children
of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that
petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy
was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol.

However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that divorce
was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action
for declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be
a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that petitioner had never been
married to Bristol.

The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was
valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file said petition. The
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.

RULING:

It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC.

1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that petitioner was never married to
Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and
was valid.

2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. It is well-
settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States
and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

REPUBLIC vs. TOBORA-TIONGLICO

FACTS:

Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship.
When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both their parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well
as he was worried how it would affect his image and how his parents would take the situation. They got married on July 22, 2000.
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting
so much that they went their separate ways most of the time.

Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on
December 30, 2000. Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run
a family. Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. Katrina noticed that Lawrence was
alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of immaturity. Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight
with him and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs of
Lanz.

Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions-from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the
way she treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments, often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina
remembered and missed her youngest brother who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to stop
crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop.

In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents' home and never to come back. They have been
separated in fact since then. Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano, who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way.

Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche; and that it was
present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and
irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his wife.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage as void ab initio. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage may be nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity in this case.

RULING:

NO! Psychological incapacity has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals has set out the guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically
all declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We have decided:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. xxx
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. Xxx

Using these standards, we find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
duties expected of a husband. Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base
their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings. Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly wanting.

First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's statements. It bears to stress
that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited
to do so.
In this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina,
but cannot be said to be indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to
conclude that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving
statements. To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content
of such evidence.

Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated
husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These
acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.

SINGSON VS. SINGSON

On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, Concepcion and Benjamin L. Singson were married before the Rev.
Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal
age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense
of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually," and a compulsive gambler; that Benjamin was immature, and was unable
to perform his paternal duties; that Benjamin was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that Benjamin's abnormal
behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or
assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.

Concepcion also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, Benjamin was confined at Metro Psych Facility, a rehabilitation institution
in Pasig City; and that Benjamin's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio, made diagnosis on Benjamin. Also, Concepcion
claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to govern their propety relations as husband and wife and
that they had no conjugal assets or debts.

Benjamin claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not
present in the instant case. Also, Benjamin and Concepcion had conjugal assets and debts; that the land where their family home is built
came from his earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay
City, as well as bank accounts that are in Concepcion's name only; and he and Concepcion also have investments in shares of stocks,
cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they came from petitioner's salaries and
his own inheritance money.

Trial ensued. Concepcion's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson, and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio. The RTC granted the
Petition and declared the marriage void ab initio on the ground of the Benjamin’s psychological incapacity. The CA overturned RTC.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
(2) Whether or not the testimonies of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio and son Jose are meritorious.

RULING:

(1) NO! We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that Benjamin's psychological incapacity was grave and
serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "Benjamin had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his property;
provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and their children."

Upon the other hand, Concepcion testified that Benjamin had a job as the latter "was working at a certain point." This is consistent with
the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence,
respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where Concepcion was applying for a job and
where Benjamin was employed as a credit investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage.

It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized summary dated February 18, 2010
which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City
which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses
from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their family budget, such as their children's education, the
payments for association dues, and for electric bills came from this money.

(2) NO! As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. Equally bereft of merit is Concepcion's claim that Benjamin's alleged psychological
incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence has
been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught"
and that respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges which
must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a
specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.

Needless to say, Concepcion cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological incapacity existed before or at
the time of marriage. It has been held that the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long
after his birth."

MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III v. NORA REYES BAKUNAWA

FACTS:

Manuel and Nora met in 1974 and became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel got married on July 26, 1975.
They lived with Manuel's parents. Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father. Manuel assigned to provincial projects and came
home only during weekends. Whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments, he chose to spend his limited time with
friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel
depended on his father and on Nora for their family's needs.

Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. Their verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence. In, 1977, Nora gave birth
to their 2nd child. However, nothing changed in their relationship. Eventually, Manuel left Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with
his girlfriend. However, in 1985, Nora became pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their 3rd child.

In 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive
Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Also, Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora
with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with
Manuel. Her findings were based on her interview with Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred when it upheld the validity of the marriage of the parties despite more than clear and convincing evidence
to declare its nullity due to the psychological incapacity of either or both parties to perform their marital obligations

RULING:

NO! The totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological
evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, the Court held that "if the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why
such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's
examination and report." In Toring v. Toring, et al., the Court stated that:Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from
persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity
already present at the time of marriage.

In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who
could not be considered as a reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family
Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician, much less be subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

DEL LA FUENTE VS. DE LA FUENTE

FACTS:

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong City after being in a relationship for five
(5) years. They had two children. While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was
prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so severe that he even poked a gun
to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the latter feel maltreated and molested. Sometime in
1986, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked
a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity before the
RTC-Quezon City. As support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an expert witness. However,
Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present
evidence.
Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the OSG to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal
offer of evidence. The OSG was also directed to submit its certification. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with
the trial court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the OSG. On August 14,
2002, the trial court promulgated its decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On August 20, 2002, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration. On September 13 2002, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration. The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. It argued that the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required
certification from the Office of the Solicitor General, and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality
disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. Still,
Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a Comment stating that he was not
opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

RULING:

YES! the CA erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that
there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge
the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower
court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis
of respondent's mental and psychological condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or
invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves
only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that
respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person
with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This
was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest,
and a doctor, and suggested couples counseling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional
help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of giving
love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the marriage be annulled.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as
well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and
partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had
exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their
marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for
this Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable.

CASTRO vs. CASTRO

FACTS:

A petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was filed by Lamberto
R. Castro against Isabelita Castro on July 1, 1998. Summons was allegedly received by Isabelita's nephew on her behalf at her residence.

For failure of Isabelita to file an answer, the RTC ordered the state prosecutor to conduct an investigation and to submit to the court a
report thereon. The state prosecutor submitted a report stating that no collusion existed between the parties in the filing of the petition.
The petition was set for hearing on August 18, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. For failure of Isabelita to appear and to file any responsive pleading to
contest the petition, the trial court allowed Lamberto to present his evidence ex parte in the presence of the state prosecutor. At the ex-
parte hearing, Lamberto stated that he married Isabelita in 1958. They have 4 children but they have been living apart for a number of
years. Lamberto alleged that their relationship did not last because Isabelita was irresponsible, violent, and had failed to show love and
affection towards him and their children, and had an illicit affair with the family driver which prompted him to file an adultery case against
her. He added that Isabelita had neurotic and psychotic tendencies, and was always mad at him for no apparent reason.
To support Lamberto's petition, Regine Marmee C. Cosico, a clinical psychologist, was presented to testify on Isabelita's psychological
incapacity based on the psychological tests that she conducted on both parties. According to her, the tests revealed that Isabelita is
psychologically incapacitated, hence, unable to perform her marital obligations. On August 19, 1998, public respondent Judge Jaime F.
Bautista granted the petition.

On September 8, 1998, Isabelita filed a Motion to Set Aside/Declare Judgment Null and Void on the ground that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person for failure to serve summons and a copy of the petition. Lamberto filed an Opposition to Motion to
Set Aside Judgment asserting that summons was properly served on petitioner. The trial court granted the motion of Isabelita.

Isabelita's counsel filed a motion for postponement which was granted by the trial court and was reset to May 5, 1999. Again, it was reset
on April 21, 1999, however, petitioner's counsel again moved for the postponement of the May 5, 1999 hearing to June 16, 1999. The
trial court, considering the motions to postpone, deemed to have waived her right to present evidence.

Petitioner received a copy of the Order on May 7, 1999. She filed a motion for reconsideration on May 19, 1999, asserting that private
respondent neither opposed the motion for postponement nor did she receive any order from the court denying the same. She likewise
pointed out that public respondent should have allowed her the chance to present contrary evidence in court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Isabelita and Lamberto was nullified.

RULING:

YES! The trial court's decision had already become final and executory, and judgment was entered on October 29, 1999. For this reason
and on account of private respondent's death on January 14, 2004, the judgment is binding on both parties. Section 24 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides:

Sec. 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - '(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity
or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular
courts.

REPUBLIC VS. ROMERO

FACTS:

Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972. Reghis was still a student at the time. Less than a year into their relationship, Reghis
tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals.
Olivia refused to end their relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latter’s dormitory overnight. Reghis declined and, instead,
made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female dormitory. The next day, Reghis brought Olivia home and while
nothing happened between them the previous night, Olivia’s parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get married.
Reghis initially objected to the planned marriage. However, Olivia’s parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would
support them until they are financially able.

The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and jealous fits. Reghis could not forgive Olivia
for dragging him into marriage and resented her condescending attitude towards him. In 1986, the couple parted ways. On June 16, 1998,
Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC-QC citing his psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations. In support of his petition, Reghis testified that he married Olivia not out of love but out of the desire to please
the latter’s parents who were kind and accommodating to him. Reghis further maintained that he was not prepared to comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time, as his mind was geared towards finishing his studies and finding employment to support his
parents and siblings. He also added that Olivia is in a relationship with Eddie Garcia.

Reghis also presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio, a clinical psychologist, who submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report and testified
that Reghis suffered from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD). According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis’ behavioral disorder gave
him a strong obsession for whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such
as those pertaining to his roles as father and husband.

For her part, Olivia maintained that she and Reghis were capacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations before, at the time,
and after the celebration of their marriage. She also averred that the petition is barred by res judicata inasmuch as Reghis had previously
filed petitions for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage on the ground the she is allegedly psychologically incapacitated, but said
petitions were dismissed. Olivia, however, was unable to present evidence due to the absence of her counsel which was considered by
the RTC as waiver of her right to present evidence. The OSG, representing the, opposed the petition.

RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It was also affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:

YES! To warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down definitive guidelines on the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Among
others, it clarified that the illness must be grave enough to bring about the incapacity or inability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage such that "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.48

As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to comply with his marital obligations which, therefore,
negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque City.
Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was
a good provider to them. That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis
is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Moreover, the OCPD which Reghis allegedly suffered from was not shown to have juridical antecedence. Other than Dr. Basilio’s
conclusion that Reghis’ "behavioral disorder x x x existed even prior to the marriage or even during his adolescent years," no specific
behavior or habits during his adolescent years were shown which would explain his behavior during his marriage with Olivia. Simply
put, Dr. Basilio’s medical report did not establish that Reghis’ incapacity existed long before he entered into marriage.

In like manner, Dr. Basilio simply concluded that Reghis’ disorder is incurable but failed to explain how she came to such conclusion. To
the Court’s mind, this is a glaring deficiency that should have prompted the RTC and the CA to be more circumspect and critical in the
assessment and appreciation of Dr. Basilio’s testimony.

Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but
these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility
of the marital tie. After all, marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State. Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the whim of
the parties, especially where the pieces of evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.

REPUBLIC VS. ENCELAN

FACTS:

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On
June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. In 1991, Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16,
1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity. Lolita
denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that
she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima and found that she was not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness, but had been unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship; her transferring of job depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions; and her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.

RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void on the ground of Lolita’s psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The OSG appealed to the CA which was originally granted. However, upon Cesar’s motion for reconsideration, CA set aside
its original decision and affirmed the RTC’s decision. CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological incapacity
that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling. The OSG then filed the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage may be nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

NO! Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part
of the errant spouse, The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration
of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.

Here, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged
affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he
learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness
and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the
essential marital obligations.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The
psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s
interpersonal problems with co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of
her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and
responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts.

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution. protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. 32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor
by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.

KALAW VS. FERNANDEZ; 2011 Decision

FACTS:

Tyrone Kalaw and Ma. Elena Fernandez met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November
4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay). Shortly after
the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano, who gave birth to a son in March 1983.

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore
him three more children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the US with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with
Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the
children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn’s permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only
to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy
and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans
with their father.
On July 6, 1994, 9 years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn’s following acts: (a) she
left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; (b) she left the house to party with male
friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and (c) she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered
in flagrante delicto. Also, they agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery but agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.

Tyrone presented psychologist, Dra. Gates, and a Canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy to testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity. Dr.
Gates explained that Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends – may
reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter
disregard of her significant others. Malyn’s NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.

RTC granted the petition and nullified their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling
because it does not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility
in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Kalaw has sufficiently proved that Malyn suffers from psychological incapacity

RULING:

NO! A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The
burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her
actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must
be incurable.

In the case at bar, Tyrone failed to prove that his wife suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed
expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Tyrone’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity
of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

For instance, Kalaw alleged that Malyn constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a
week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive
need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had
affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner
was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that
voids a marriage.

KALAW VS. FERNANDEZ, 2015 REVERSAL

FACTS:

Kalaw presented the testimonies of two expert witnesses who concluded that Malyn is psychologically incapacitated. Kalaw’s experts
heavily relied on Kalaw’s allegations of Malyn’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery,
and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the
ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

YES! The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they
relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be
so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity”
obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on
“all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only
relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no
legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is
important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.”

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value
only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay
that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine
the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment,
least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and
affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases
for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known
that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on
her family life, particularly on her very young children.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties,
but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling
on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification
of her own personal and escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
parent to safeguard and protect her children.

BACCAY VS.. BACCAY

FACTS:

Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua where both took up Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990,
they were introduced by a mutual friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous
pursuit that Maribel accepted Noel’s proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-
get type, which traits he found attractive.

Noel’s family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy
when around his family so to bring her closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive occasions
like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to avoid Noel’s invitations and whenever she attended
those occasions with Noel’s family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to any of
his family members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family and she would promise to change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with another woman. He tried to break up with
Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept Noel’s relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever their ties.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments together. Noel took
these episodes of sexual contact casually since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then, sometime in
November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Then, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel.

After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noel’s family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all
the time she lived with Noel’s family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come
and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the family’s coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their
support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel.

Surprisingly, despite Maribel’s claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribel’s
office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in
January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a
miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.

Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which
woke up the whole household. Noel’s mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam" at her. Because
of this, Noel’s mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel
left Noel’s house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house
nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls. 6

On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC
of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not participate in the proceedings. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel.

The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic
Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. On appeal
by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

The CA further held that Maribel’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not constitute a ground to find her psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with Maribel before their marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

NO! Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases
of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically
incapacitated. Noel’s evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that
she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the
CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential
obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that
it would be difficult for her to sustain one.24 Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.

The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder,
but also that such psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 25 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

CAMACHO-REYES VS. REYES

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when
they were both nineteen (19) years old. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship.

At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was
not diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.

Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had
dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.

In 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner
was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the
respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All livingexpenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the couple’s respective
salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his
salary. When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their
marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner.
When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow
advancement within the family business. Respondent’s game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels
and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days
on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change. To prod respondent into
assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement
engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household,
respondent’s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful.
Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family’s financial woes and further straining the parties’ relationship
was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother
respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.

After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s mother. But the new set up
did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.

In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and
he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.

In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family,
respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was
not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and
their family.

One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst.
Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and
played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner
felt that she had had enough of respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.

Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored
the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve
the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.

In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to “determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning.” As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent
to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the
latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. After trial (where the
testimonies of two clinicalpsychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. CeciliaVillegas, were presented in
evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological
incapacity. The CA reversed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. –YES.

Whether the marriage should be declared null and void under Art. 36. –YES.

RATIO:

Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the
evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is]
of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the
marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed “psychological incapacity” which pertains to the inability
of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually
observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a
fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any
slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder
which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the
uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim
of his structural constellation. Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person
based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal
knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the
respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump
the clinical findings of experts.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents alleged in the petition and established during
trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations as shown by his:

(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations;
(6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.

PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL

FACTS:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel before the
RTC-Quezon City.On 7 February 2005, Joselito received summons to appear before the RTC-Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, Joselito filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC-Quezon City on the ground of the existence of
a prejudicial question. Joselito asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City denied the motion and ruled that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in criminal case are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question.
On appeal, the CA denied the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

RULING:

NO! Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for parricide. The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial
question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

A prejudicial question is defined as one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person "who shall kill
his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." The relationship
between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment
of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender
and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case,
since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case
the petition in civil case is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses
is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the
Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned."

JARILLO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag,
then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding
ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan.

Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy at the City Court of Pasay City before then
Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979. On April 16, 1995, Victoria and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a
church wedding in Manila.

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed for annulment of marriage before the RTC-Manila. Thereafter, Victoria was charged with bigamy before the
RTC-Pasay City. On October 5, 2000, Victoria filed against Alocillo, before the RTC-Makati, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
She alleged that that her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain
Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; Also, their marriage were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license;
and the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

RTC-Pasay found accused Victoria guilty for the crime of bigamy. On appeal to the CA, Victoria’s conviction was affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Victoria is guilty of the crime of bigamy.

RULING:

YES! In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court categorically stated that he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended
on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.

The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent
was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of Victoria’s marriage to Alocillo had no bearing upon the determination of her innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting
at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, Victoria’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the
crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo,
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.

BEUMER VS. AMORES

FACTS:

Willem Beumer, a Dutch national, married Avelina Amores, Filipina, on March 29, 1980. Their marriage was declared null by the RTC on
November 10, 2000 by reason of Willem’s psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership and
distribution of properties which he claimed were acquired during their marriage. The lots acquired by purchase by way of inheritance. In
defense, Amores averred that she purchased lots and its improvements using her own money.

On February 28, 2007, the RTC ruled against Willem. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Beumer may claim a right of half or whole of the purchase price of the real properties purchased.

RULING:

NO! The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut
Muller, the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against
foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that,
because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations
showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should
not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.

As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief
by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.

In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity
of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,
he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the
law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto,
under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

DINO VS. DINO

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent
was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
FACTS:

Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño got married on 14 January 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. On 30 May 2001,
petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.

The trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that adecree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RULING:

YES! Decree of absolutenullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RATIO:

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union
of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,
such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.

The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution
of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply
to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under
the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of
the properties of the parties.

In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership
of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since
the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance
with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

MBTC VS. PASCUAL

FACTS:

Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. TCT covering the purchased
lot was canceled and was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nicholson Pascual".

In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC-Quezon declared the
marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. RTC further ordered
the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate
ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.

On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from Metrobank. To
secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several REMs on their properties, including the subject lot. Florencia
submitted documents to procure the loan which includes the copy of TCT of subject lot, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC
decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of
Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in question.

Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999,
initiated foreclosure proceedings. Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale on three issues of Remate. At the auction sale
on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.

Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC-Makati, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property.
Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank alleged that the lot,
being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith. The RTC
Declared the REM null and void.

RTC found the said lot to be conjugal, the same having been acquired during the existence of the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia.
RTC also found the deed of waiver Florencia submitted to Metrobank to be fatally defective. On appeal by Metrobank, CA affirmed with
RTC's Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and
Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.

RULING:

NO! While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership,
the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation
and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal
partnership’s assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185)
of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of
the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.

In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.

In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed
the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right
to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However,
the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned.

Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not
having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half. The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly
waived his share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly executed by
Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged
signature, not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may become
the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for value.

Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only
to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nic holson. As
owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there is hardly a need to discuss at length whether
or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the
general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable. 20 Unlike private
individuals, it behooves banks to exercise greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment
of the status or condition of the property offered as security and the validity of the mortgagor’s title must be standard and indispensable
part of the bank’s operation.21 A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee,22 as
here.

VALDEZ VS. RTC

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of
nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free
to choose which they prefer.

Consuelo sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions
without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

The trial court clarified that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply.

As to the issue of the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said that the Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be
governed by the rules on ownership. The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the absolute community of property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated.

RULING:

YES! The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively
live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law
now expressly provides that —

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during
the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children;
in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants,
or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of
nullity of the marriage.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband
and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.

The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of
the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage,
the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and
42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to
the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.

MELGAR VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration
of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code. Trial court granted the petition.

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.
She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage." The trial court clarified that Art. 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during
their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will
be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal
shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found
in the Civil Code shall apply.

In addressing the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said that it has already declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall
be governed by the rules on ownership. The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the absolute community of property.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court is correct in declaring that properties shall be governed with Art. 147 of the Family Code after their marriage
has been declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

YES! In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively
live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"7 of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." 8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law
now expressly provides that —

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during
the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children;
in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants,
or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of
nullity of the marriage.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife, only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.

The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of
the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void m arriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage,
the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and
42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to
the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.

AAA VS. BBB

FACTS:

AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children. In May of 2007, BBB started working
in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his
address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March of 2010,
when AAA and their children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City.
AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically. This compelled her TO take on additional jobs to augment
her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son, and physical and
sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with
whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation
at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids. As can be gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of
varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish
through his alleged marital infidelity. The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able
to secure a Hold-Departure Order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BBB may be tried for violation of RA 9262 in the Philippines even the offense was committed in Singapore.

RULING:

Yes! "Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common." In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to encompass in a non-limiting manner the various
forms of violence that may be committed against women and their children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a se xual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but
not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or .unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to
the following:
xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out the essential
elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial.

Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary
to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed
out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women
and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite
in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the
crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in
any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence,
the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

DIMANLING VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

On the night of March 14, 2007, Ricky Dinamling and a friend came from a drinking session and went to the boarding house of AAA. At
that time, Dinamling and AAA were in an ongoing five-year relationship and they had two common children. Dinamling and his friend
arrived as AAA was putting the two children to bed. Suddenly, Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children. AAA initially did not want
to leave as she could not carry the children and their things, but she left when Dinamling threw a baby's feeding bottle outside the house.
In the past, there were similar incidents that happened between Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her hair and
kick her. When AAA went to the police, but Dinamling was, at that time, a policeman himself.

Six days later, another incident occurred. AAA was at the house of CCC when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA
to come out. When she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled. AAA left for the barangay captain's
house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down AAA's pants and
panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle. AAA stayed at her friend's home until
she felt some back pain in the next morning. She found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to
the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was hospitalized for four days.
Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts. As a result, Ricky Dinamling was charged in 2 criminal Informations in the
RTC for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of RA No. 9262.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ricky violated RA 9262.

RULING:

YES! Section 5. of RA 9262 provides the following:

Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any
of the following acts:
xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may
be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.

The elements have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman who was then in a five-year
ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling had two common children. AAA was often in fear of
petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal abuse. In the evening of March 14, 2007, an incident occurred in which she and her
children were actually evicted by Dinamling from a boarding house. Dinamling, in the presence of his own friend and the children, accused
AAA of using the boarding house as a "whore-house" and alleged that AAA brought sexual partners in that place. Dinamling further
humiliated AAA by telling her to pack her clothes in a trash bag and in a carton box used to pack ducklings. He then threw a baby bottle
outside and broke it. This forced AAA to hastily leave even without her children. Dinamling also left and took with him the elder child and
left the baby behind. AAA had to ask for her friends to fetch the children but the latter found only the baby. According to AAA and her
mother DDD, that incident was not an isolated one, as similar incidents had happened previously.

As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In addition to the first two elements of the
victim being a woman and in a relationship with the offender, the prosecution was able to prove another incident of mental or emotional
anguish through public ridicule or humiliation when it showed Dinamling acting in the following manner: a) by calling and counting down
on AAA for the latter to come out of the house where she was staying;

b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;

c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling her "good-for-nothing;"
d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he would just pay her;
e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her pants and underwear (panty) and calling her worthless;
f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while shouting AAA's family name as he left.

All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the public, highlighting the public ridicule and humiliation done on AAA
and causing her mental and emotional pain. AAA's suffering is so much that even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put fear in
her.

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and
children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in
other sub-parts of Section 5.

The law defines psychological violence as acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such
as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family
to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary
to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. All of this was complied with in the case at bar

As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, or even the complete disregard of
any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to petitioner Dinamling's acquittal. Like the physical injuries that was discussed above,
the fact of AAA's miscarriage or incomplete abortion is not essential to proving the elements of the crime, unless it is alleged to have
caused mental or emotional suffering. It is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it is not abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the
victim at the time of commission which is an aggravating circumstance, not an element, of the offense.

It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any of the crime's elements, as indeed the information
itself did not allege the same. However, from the fact of miscarriage one may logically derive the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an
aggravating circumstance for the crime and which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is proven by AAA's unrebutted
testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she presented in the course of such testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized
and suffered an "incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling."

Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case, denies having caused the incomplete abortion or miscarriage, he does not
deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did not present contradictory evidence during trial to controvert the prosecution's assertions and
proof of pregnancy. The pregnancy was never put in issue during trial and on appeal. Neither is the same in question in this petition.
Therefore, it may be safely concluded that the fact of AAA's pregnancy has been established and it may be taken account of and
considered as a circumstance that aggravates Dinamling's criminal liability.

Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the same offense as defined in RA 9262 and are punishable by the same range of
penalties as prescribed in the said law. However, due to the greater ignominy of the acts done by the accused in Criminal Case No. 1702,
the minimum and maximum lengths of the sentence imposed should therefore be greater than in Criminal Case No. 1701.

ANG VS. CA, SAGUD

FACTS:

Irish and Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora. Rustan courted Irish and became on-and-off sweethearts. When
Irish learned that Rustan had taken a live-in partner whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Rustan, however, got in touch
with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the
proposal. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Irish replied
to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

Irish, later on, received through MMS a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure. The
sender’s cellphone number was one of the numbers that Rustan used. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages
from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the
picture he sent through the internet. Irish filed a case of violation of R.A. No. 9262 against Rustan.

Rustan argued that he cannot be held liable under R.A. No. 9262. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women
includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Hence, Rustan claims that,
being romantically involved, implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, romance
implies a sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning
to the word romance used as a verb, i.e., to make love; to make love to as in he romanced her. Rustan also claims that since the
relationship between Irish and him was of the on-and-off variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed over
time and on a continuing basis.

ISSUES:
a) Whether “dating relationship” exist even without sexual intercourse.
b) Whether the on-and-off relationship (away-bati) of Irish and Rustan can be considered as dating relationship as contemplated by law.

RULING:

a) YES! The dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those
involved.

The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb romance that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have
romanced the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun romance to describe a couples relationship, i.e., a love affair. R.A. 9262 provides
in Section 3 that violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while Section 3(f) defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a single sexual act
which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child. The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist
even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

b) YES! An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the
romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.

THINGS DECIDED:

a) The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment under R.A. No. 9262 are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

b) The dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.

c) An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the
romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.

GO-TAN VS. TAN

FACTS:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle
and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological,
and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance
of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

RULING:

YES! While RA 9262 provides that the offender be ralted or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Sec. 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly
provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

SANTOS VS. SANTOS

FACTS:

On July 27, 2007, RTC-Tarlac declared Celerina Santos presumptively dead after her husband, Ricardo Santos filed for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008. He alleged
that his business did not prosper, and as a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. He
stated that she left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again. Ricardo further stated that he exerted efforts to locate her.

He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about
her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of
his RTC petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. According to Celerina, her true residence
was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989
until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose
the petition declaring her presumptively dead.

Celelerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go to
an employment agency in February 1995. She also claimed that it was not true that she... had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was
aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with
another woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false
allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished
copies of Ricardo's petition. The CA dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a
fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.

RULING:

YES! The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment
of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.

Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually
absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death. She added
that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. She insisted that an action for
annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently. Celerina further argued that filing
an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal
effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the RTC's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the
following are present:

1. The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2. The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3. There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4. There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.

Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. If, as Celerina
contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent
marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage
but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children
of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages." If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still
be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.

CARLOS VS. SANDOVAL

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except
cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

FACTS:

Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos. Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son.

Upon Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 registered in the name of Teofilo were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad. In August
1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents for the declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner asserted that the marriage
between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case
before the trial court. But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Petitioner
opposed the motion for summary judgment and lodged his own motion for summary judgment. RTC rendered judgment: defendants
(respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows: Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license. In the appeal, respondents argued that the
trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the one who is not a spouse may bring an action for nullity of marriage.

RULING:
YES! (if the marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family code and the plaintiff is a real party-in-interest). A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage
cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses
[Sec. 2(a)]. The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding
for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective
in its application.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated
on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.

But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage? NO. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for
any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.

CARINO VS. CARINO

FACTS:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao Carino with whom he had two
offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988,
Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceasedfrom various government agencies. Nicdao was able to
collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00.

Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio
because their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to
pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license.

RULING:

YES! Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case
at bar, the marriage does not fall within any of those exception sand a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it.
This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage
of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack
of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148
of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

NINA VS. BAYADOG

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulmentof marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage
license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

RULING:

NO! On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage,
that five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period
should be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitationcharacterized by exclusivity—
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-
year cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.

VITANGCOL VS. PEOPLE

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed
with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

FACTS:

On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice). Born into their union were three (3) children. After some time, Alice
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a
marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence a Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife,
Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to
establish the legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of
the crime of bigamy.

ISSUE:
Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto
A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

RULING:
No. The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true,
it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications
by the civil registrar. For more than 7 years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage
declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Ratio:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he
married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

LASANAS VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

On February 16, 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the MTC-San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of Noel Lasanas and Socorro
Patingo without the benefit of a marriage license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo remarried in the San Jose Church in
Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose. Both ceremonies were evidenced by the
corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage
certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single. On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage
and damages against Socorro in the RTC-Iloilo City. The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and
fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity
had caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award of damages.

In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City. After due proceedings, the
accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20, 1998 in the RTC, viz: That on or about the 27th day
of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas being previously
united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve or annulled, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.

On November 24, 1998, RTC dismissed the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him
and Socorro valid. On October 30, 2000, RTC found Noel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Bigamy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage
should apply in this purely criminal prosecution.

RULING:

YES! The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between
the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent
marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The Family Law
Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure
a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or
her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy.

In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.

The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the records show that he had filed a
complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him but after he had
already contracted his second marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC dismissed his
complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus confirming the validity of
his marriage to Socorro. Considering that the accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of
bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of
nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity
of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage.

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's
penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.

MORIGO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. The lost contacts when the school year ended. When Lucio
received a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant communication took place between them. They later became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On
September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be
free from the bigamy case.

RULING:

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of
his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

REPUBLIC VS. TAMPUS

FACTS:

Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days thereafter, or on December 2,
1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since
then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed before
the RTC a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33)
years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dante should be declared presumptively dead

RULING:

NO! Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the
absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there
is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3)
that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence
of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate,
or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and
neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however,
Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her
own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have
inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind,
therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents,
relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.

REPUBLIC VS. SAREGONON JR.

FACTS:

On November 4, 2008, Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. filed a Petition before the RTC-Ozamiz for the declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon. Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin, Misamis Occidental in 1991. They later became sweethearts
and on August 10, 1996, they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as husband and wife for a
month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts.

While still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie's parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned
home after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie's relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know
where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he
could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code. Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel
Sareñogon, and by Netchie's aunt, Consuelo Sande.

The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed
already dead. The Republic, through the OSG, elevated the judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
The CA held that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The CA perceived no error at all in the RTC's judgment granting Jose's Petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of his wife,
Netchie.

The Republic's appeal sought to correct or review the RTC's alleged misappreciation of evidence which could not translate into excess
or lack of jurisdiction amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The Republic insists that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the proper remedy to challenge an RTC's immediately final and executory Decision on a presumptive death. The
Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose's alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-founded belief
that the latter is probably dead. Finally, the Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he wanted to have Netchie declared
presumptively dead because he intends to get married again, an essential premise of Article 41 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged efforts of Jose in locating his missing wife do not sufficiently support a "well-founded belief" that respondent's
absent wife is probably dead.

RULING:

YES! The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort
and not a mere passive one.

In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose’s "well-founded belief that Netchie was already dead upon the following grounds:

(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie's parents while he was still out of the country, but did not reach them as they had allegedly left
Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead because when he returned home, he was not able to obtain any information
that Netchie was still alive from Netchie's relatives and friends;
(3) Jose's testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence must be presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose's older brother,
and by Netchie's aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose) and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and...
that after this, there had been no information as to Netchie's whereabouts.

Given the Court's imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code,
it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC's finding that Jose's Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family
Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief” standard. If anything, Jose's pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are
notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had...
inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie's whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or
persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that
he... sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media, Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough,
determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years were), and naming the particular places,
provinces,... cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to
in the course of his search.

SSC VS. AZOTE

FACTS:

On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS, were married in civil rites. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted
Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older children as designated beneficiaries. Thereafter, Edgardo submitted another Form
E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries.

On January 13, 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a
deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 with a different set
of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer),as dependent. Consequently, Edna’s
claim was denied. Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as the legal guardian of her minor children. Edna
filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the
legitimate wife of Edgardo.

In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published
in a newspaper of general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the publication, no answer was filed and Rosemarie
was subsequently declared in default. SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC further wrote that the National Statistics
Office (NSO) records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to one Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982.
Consequently, it opined that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had been annulled
or dissolved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Edna should be adjudged as the widow of the deceased, thus, entitled to the benefits

RULING:
NO! The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the
legal spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case, there is a concrete proof
that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged
his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse.

It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when the Family Code was already in force.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or
that the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that "whoever
claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence." Edna could not adduce
evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that
Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary
of the death benefits of Edgardo.

VALDEZ VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because
Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until
in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when
he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had
never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for
naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition
seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

RULING:

YES! Petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. Pursuant to Article 83 of the Civil
Code, any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court.

Therefore, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption
to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October
1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the
marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

ARMAS VS. CALISTERIO

FACTS:

On April 1992, Teodorico died intestate leaving parcel of land with an estimated value of P 604,750 Teodorico was survived by his wife
respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds on
13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later without court declaration that James
presumptively dead. On October 9, 1992 petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition entitled “In
matter of Intestate Estate of the deceased Teodorico Calisterio, claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heirof Teodorico Calisterio,
the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta being bigamous and thereby null and void. On January 17 1996, the lower
court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia. On appeal the Court of Appeal rendered decision in favor of Marietta
declaring her marriage to Teodorico valid and entitling her to estate of Teodorico.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Marietta between the deceased Teodorico valid that in turn would determine her right as surviving spouse.

RULING:
YES! The marriage of Marietta having contracted during the regime of the Civil Code should be thus deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of judicial declaration of marriage of presumptive death of James Bounds. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta,
upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should be rightly divided one portion to the surviving spouse and the other
portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.

NOVERAS VS. NOVERAS

FACTS:

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California
court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the
3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to
administer... all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal
properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price
as share of

Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.

David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties
in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.

Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment
had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to the
Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez,
who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital... where David was once confined, testified
that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated
for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A.

RULING:

NO! We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and
Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country... where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community properties
in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes. Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil
Code, the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.