Baranda vs.

Gustilo
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between
petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land.
However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of
petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new
certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case pending in
the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This
prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.

ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of
lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?

HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that
the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court
of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds,
encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did
not have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him
to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the
register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real
or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.

If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the
presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of
his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the other hand,
Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper
step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other
instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the
action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall
be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest through the Register of Deeds.”

Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur

G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969

FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate
copy of the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting
that the latter be annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have
donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation
for being “legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that previously annotated
in the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed by
Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each
received their co-owner’s duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of CTs had
not been presented by petitioners, the register of deeds refused to make the requested
annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld
the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.

ISSUE:
W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper

HELD:
YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their integrity may be affected if
an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If
different copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens
registration would cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of donor
Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina, “there should first be a liquidation of the
partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance.” Assuming the conjugal
nature of the property, the donation bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of
registration, namely, the fact that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more
than ½ his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of
the same land to 3 other parties.
Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s civil status, character of land and
validity of conveyances are in issue, the registration may await the outcome of said case and
parties may protect their rights by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She
G.R. No. L-17587, 12 September 1967
Castro, J.
FACTS:
Justina Santos and her sister own a piece of land in Manila, while Wong Heng is a long-time
lessee of the property. Eventually, Justina became the owner of the property. Already in advanced
age, Justina trusted various tasks to Wong including the delivery of rental payments to her
property.
In November 1957, in grateful acknowledgement of his personal services, Justina executed a
contract of lease in favor of Wong covering a portion property, and later, the entire property for 50
years with right to withdraw at any time. In December 1957, Justina executed a contract for option
to buy the leased property with a condition that Wong obtain Philippine Citizenship then pending
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. However, the application was withdrawn because it
was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. In October 1958, Justina filed a petition to
adopt Wong and his children in the belief that adoption would confer him Philippine Citizenship.
Discovering there was error, the proceedings were abandoned.
In November 1958, Justina executed two other contracts extending the lease to 99 years, and
fixing the term of option to buy at 50 years. Both were written in Tagalog. In two wills executed on
August 1959, Justina bade her legatees to respect the contracts entered into with Wong.
However, Justina appeared to have a change of heart, and claimed that the contracts were made
through machinations and inducements practiced by Wong. Thus, Justina directed her executor
to secure the annulment of the contracts.
In November 1959, a complaint was then filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila on the
said grounds, and asked the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the
registration of the contracts. Wong denied having taken advantage of the trust and confidence
given to him by Justina. The CFI rendered its decision annulling all the contracts, except the lease
contract, and condemned Wong to pay Justina the unpaid rentals.
Both parties filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. Justina (through Petitioner Philippine
Banking Corporation) maintained that the lease contract should have been annulled as it lacks
mutuality, that it was obtained in violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties, and that her
consent was obtained through undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lease contract is valid, thus, granting rights to Wong.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the least contract is valid. The lease contract does not lack mutuality because
Wong was never an agent of Justina. The relationship between the parties were admittedly close,
but did not amount to an agency. Actually, it was cited that the lease contract was made on the
basis of the data of Wong given to the lawyer who prepared the contract, and that Justina told
him that whatever Wong wants must be followed. Despite the words supplied by Wong, it was
testified that Justina was unyielding and firm in her decision to follow Wong. Undue influence
cannot stand as well given that the contract was signed in the presence of Justina’s close friend
and maid, who could have testified against it. Further, Justina’s consent was given freely and
voluntarily as shown by her recited in the Deed of Conditional Option and emphatic avowal
gratitude in the lease contract that Wong saved her and her sister from the fire that destroyed
their house during the liberation of Manila. All told, the lease contract stands to be valid.
However, despite validity of the lease contract, it also gives the clue to a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition against transfer of land to aliens. Taken singly, the contracts show
nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to
subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alient for
a reasonable period is valid. So is the option giving an alien the right to buy the property on
condition that he is granted Philippine Citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this is to last for 50
years, is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of
the right to enjoy the land but also the right to dispose of it – rights the sum total of which makes
up ownership.
RULING:
Contracts in question were annulled and set aside. Subject land ordered to be returned to the
estate of Justina Santos.

Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez

Maria Luisa Palacios v. Marcelle vda. de Ramirez, et.al.
G.R. No. L-27952, 15 February 1982
Abad Santos, J.
FACTS
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir.
His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X. The
administratrix of the estate submitted a project of partition giving one part of the estate to the
widow “en pleno dominio” in satisfaction of her legitime while the other part of the “free portion” to
his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez. Furthermore, one third of the free portion is
charged with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining two thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda Wrobleski.
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed the project of partition, as well as the substitutions provided
by the testator as to the usufructs of the widow and of Wanda. Nonetheless, the lower court
approved the project of partition in its order dated May 1967. Jorge and Roberto appealed before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the usufruct over real property in favor of Wanda violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ownership of lands by alien.
HELD
The Court upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law, but also testamentary succession. Any alien
would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land. In the present case, the usufruct in favor of Wanda,
although a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary. It is the vesting of title in
favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
RULING
Estate of Eugenio Ramirez was distributed according to the SC’s order.

ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,

vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands.

Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller got married and lived in
Germany owned by the respondent parents but then they decided to reside in the Philippines
permanently. The respondent had inherit the house in Germany from his parents which he sold
and used to proceeds for purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and he registered it in the
name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and maltreatment of respondent to the petitioner, the spouses eventually
separated.
The respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before RTC Quezon City. The court
granted said petition and ordered equal partition of personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property the court ruled that he cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not, respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
Held:
No, Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the property
under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to
do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.

Ting Ho vs Teng Gui GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008

Facts:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their
brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and
the improvements which should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho,
and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father
Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate. According to
petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of
respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese
citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines; and that upon the death of
Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit
to their exclusion and prejudice.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void

Ruling:
No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the price is simulated,
the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act
or contract. The sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a donation. The
law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since the finding was
based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE, respondent-appellant. G.R. No. L-6776 May 21, 1955

FACTS: The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of
donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a
parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered religious organization “Ung Siu Si Temple”,
operating through three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by
Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation
and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.
CFI upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds. Basis: sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by
such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question
should not be admitted for admitted for registration.
Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si Temple
has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious
purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing
as follows:
SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination,
whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of other country, or not incorporated
at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches, parsonages, or
educational or charitable institutions.
SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three
Trustees for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our
Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].
ISSUE: whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization
whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.
HELD:
The provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since
the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing that, —
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain in the Philippines,
the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations.
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape
the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. To
permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to
drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country.
The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 124293, 2005

FACTS:
The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation,
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the
construction, operation and management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc., later became the
Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and
Kawasaki would maintain a shareholding proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the
right of first refusal in case of a sale.
Through a series of transfers, NIDCs rights, title and interest in PHILSECO eventually went to the
National Government. In the interest of national economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should
be privatized by selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private entities. After
negotiations, it was agreed that Kawasakis right of first refusal under the JVA be exchanged for
the right to top by five percent the highest bid for said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings,
Inc. (PHI), in which it was a stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead.
During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, because of the right to
top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG Summits bid. JG Summit protested,
contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public utility and, hence, must observe the 60%-
40% Filipino-foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% of PHILSECOs capital stock at bidding,
Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than 40% of the stock.
In the year 2000 case, it was settled by the Court that PHILSECO is a public utility and is therefore
required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the constitution.
On the other hand, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total
shares of stock should not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock due to the constitutional and
contractual proscriptions. NIDC being a government corporation may purchase even beyond the
60% of the total shares.
Separate motions for reconsideration were filed and the Court held in a Resolution in 2003 that:
1)PHILSECO is not a public utility because by nature, a shipyard is not a public utility; 2) Nothing
in the JVA prevents Kawasaki from owning more than 40 % of the total capitalization; 3) the right
to top did not violate the principles in bidding. Petitioner now assails the SC decision through a
motion for reconsideration and motion to elevate the case en banc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PHILSECO continues to violate the Constitution by owning longterm leasehold
rights which are real rights within the meaning of immovable property under Art. 415 of the Civil
Code
HELD: Petitioner cites Article 415 of the Civil Code alleges that PHILSECO continues to violate
the constitution by owning long-term leasehold rights. It states that in the definition of immovable
property, it includes: contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property.
The Court ruled that whether or not owning long-term leasehold rights are questions of fact, the
veracity of which would require introduction of evidence and the Court needs to validate these
factual allegations based on competent and reliable evidence. As such, the Court cannot resolve
the questions they pose. Second, J.G. Summit misreads the provisions of the Constitution cited
in its own pleadings, to wit:
Petitioner has consistently pointed out in the past that private respondent is not a 60%-40%
corporation, and this violates the Constitution x x x The violation continues to this day because
under the law, it continues to own real property To review the constitutional provisions involved,
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (the JVA was signed in 1977), provided:
“Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.”
This provision is the same as Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
It was correctly observed by the public respondents that the prohibition in the Constitution applies
only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined under
Article 415 of the Civil Code which embraces real rights. Otherwise, we would be confronted with
a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and growing
fruit attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only.
Moreover, since PHILSECO is not a public utility, it is not covered by the constitutional proscription
regarding ownership. No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a landholding
corporation even if the latter will exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is
the corporation from owning land.
A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy
real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years,
then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership which is prohibited
by law.
The MOTION for RECONSIDERATION is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The 2003 Supreme Court
Resolution is AFFIRMED.

Strategic Alliance vs. Radstock Securities December 4, 2009

Facts:
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) was incorporated in 1966. It
was granted a franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and South
Luzon Tollways and Metro Manila Expressway.
CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained loans from Marubeni
Corporation of Japan (Marubeni). A CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans
although there was no CDCP Board Resolution authorizing the issuance of such letters of
guarantee. CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still
privately owned and managed.
In 1983, CDCP s name was changed to Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) in
order to reflect that the Government already owned 90.3% of PNCC and only 9.70% is under
private ownership. Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid.
On 20 October 2000 and 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board of Directors (PNCC Board) passed
Board Resolutions admitting PNCC s liability to Marubeni. Previously, for two decades the PNCC
Board consistently refused to admit any liability for the Marubeni loans.
In January 2001, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock Securities Limited (Radstock),
a foreign corporation. Radstock immediately sent a notice and demand letter to PNCC. PNCC
and Radstock entered into a Compromise Agreement. Under this agreement, PNCC shall pay
Radstock the reduced amount of P6,185,000,000.00 in full settlement of PNCC s guarantee of
CDCP Mining s debt allegedly totaling P17,040,843,968.00 (judgment debt as of 31 July 2006).
To satisfy its reduced obligation, PNCC undertakes to (1) "assign to a third party assignee to be
designated by Radstock all its rights and interests" to the listed real properties of PNCC; (2) issue
to Radstock or its assignee common shares of the capital stock of PNCC issued at par value
which shall comprise 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC; and (3) assign to Radstock
or its assignee 50% of PNCC s 6% share, for the next 27 years, in the gross toll revenues of the
Manila North Tollways Corporation.
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) moved for reconsideration. STRADEC
alleged that it has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of the National Government s shares,
receivables, securities and interests in PNCC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between PNCC and Radstock is valid in relation to
the Constitution, existing laws, and public policy
Held:
Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Its office address is
at Suite 14021 Duddell Street, Central Hongkong. As a foreign corporation, with unknown owners
whose nationalities are also unknown, Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines
pursuant to Section 7, in relation to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the
Philippines. Contrary to the OGCC s claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of any
land in the Philippines because Radstock cannot lawfully own the land itself. Otherwise, there will
be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution, which prohibits a foreign private corporation from
owning land in the Philippines. In addition, Radstock cannot transfer the rights to ownership of
land in the Philippines if it cannot own the land itself. It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot
assign or sell something he does not own at the time the ownership, or the rights to the ownership,
are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer.