G. R. No.
L-30026, January 30, 1971  Existence of a denial of a constitutional right
PETITIONER and APPELLATE: MARIO GUMABON,
BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO
PADUA AND PATERNO PALMARES
RESPONDENT and APPELLANT: DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS
 Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied
upon by petitioners, five in number, for their
release from imprisonment.
 The ruling for the People v. Hernandez doctrine
was not handed down until after their convictions
had become final.
 Whereas in Pomeroy v Director of Prisons
likewise petitioned for habeas corpus and the
court denied the petition.
 The then again plead for a new look on the
matter.
 They argued that in the Hernandez decision once
promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under
the explicit mandate of the RPC even if at the
time of their application a final sentence has
been rendered "and the convict is serving the
same." These arguments carry considerable
persuasion.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
 Gumabon plead guilty and was sentenced on
May 05, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua
for the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping.
 While Agapito, Palmares and Padua pleaded
guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with
murder and other offenses and made to
suffer same penalties on March 08, 1954 for
the first two and December 15, 1955 for the
third.
 Bagolbagol was gulty for complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other
offenses on January 12, 1954 and penalized
with reclusion perpetua.
*All five has been since then imprisoned by virtue of
the above convictions. Has served more than 13
years.
 In the case of People v Hernandez the court
ruled that his crimes was not warranted
under Article 134 of RPC, there being no such
complex offense.
 The petitioners feared that the case of
Pomeroy would become an obstacle to their
release they decided that they are going to
resolve their petition without the help of the
case.
 The plea made was not convincing due to
failure to invoke the contentions pressed by
their counsel (Atty. Diokno).
would suffice to raise jurisdictional question
and retroactive effect.
o This is favorable to one already
sentenced to a final judgement under
Art. 22 of the RPC.
o Due to this the court would have to
grant the petition
o The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus under
the circumstances disclosed.
 Latudinarian scope- assure
that illegality of restraint and
detention be avoided.
 Writ of Habeas Corpus is also
known as writ of liberty.
 Ascertains whether there is
any legal justification for a
deprivation of physical
freedom.
 If there is a valid sentence it
cannot be extended beyond
the period provided for by the
law.
 If there are deviations from
legal norms calls for
termination of imprisonment.
 The liberality with which the judiciary is to
construe habeas corpus petitions even if
presented in pleadings on their face devoid
of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v.
Quilen.
 Likewise, in Conde v. Rivera, one that
broadens the field of the operation of the writ,
that a disregard of the constitutional right to
speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and
entitles the accused if "restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom."
 The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state
action.
o The scope and flexibility of the writ —
its capacity to reach all manner of
illegal detention — its ability to cut
through barriers of form and
procedural mazes — have always
been emphasized and jealously
guarded by courts and lawmakers.
o The very nature of the writ demands
that it be administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential to
ensure that miscarriages of justice
within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.
 Where, however, the detention complained of
finds its origin in what has been judicially
ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas
corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed.
  If "the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order," the writ does not lie.
 Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is
shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction
and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
to assail the legality of the detention.
 Thus, the continued incarceration after the
12-year period when such is the maximum
length of imprisonment in accordance with
our controlling doctrine, when others similarly
convicted have been freed, is fraught with
implications at war with equal protection.
 Where a sentence imposes a punishment in
excess of the power of the court to impose,
such sentence is void as to the excess, and
some of the courts hold that the sentence is
void in toto;
o but the weight of authority sustains
the proposition that such a sentence
is void only as to the excess imposed
in case the parts are separable, the
rule being that the petitioner is not
entitled to his discharge on a writ of
habeas corpus unless he has served
out so much of the sentence as was
valid.
 The only means of giving retroactive effect to
a penal provision favorable to the accused is
the writ of habeas corpus.
 Insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is
concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is
the only means of benefiting the accused by
the retroactive character of a favorable
decision holds true. Gumabon, et. al. clearly
have thus successfully sustained the burden
of justifying their Constitutional Law II, 2005
( 7 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) release.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is

GRANTED, and it is ordered that petitioners be
forthwith set at liberty.