SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL

REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected
as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner,
vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.

Revelation 3:5

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna
Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation
of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.

The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.

The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and
Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs
name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let
him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they
anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother
and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language
since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.[1]

On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.[2] The trial court found that the
reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be
discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of
the child. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to
bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be
taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when
petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name by
dropping his middle name.[3]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution dated 20
May 2004.[4] The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name
does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study
there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application
of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would
not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the
petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.[5]

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)[6] arguing that the trial court
has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not
dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174[7] of the Family Code. Petitioner
contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on
the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and
harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the child.[8] It is argued that
convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State
and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment
and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration
in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied
the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to
use, contrary to previous cases[9] decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of
name.[10]

The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The OSG filed
its Comment[11] positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG
argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames
of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the
same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is
in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for
change of name and/or cancellation of entry.[12] The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown
any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that
matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and
difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial
court that the dropping of the childs middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding
the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang,
there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is
customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle
name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.[13]

We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.

The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a
right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of
birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.[14]

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which
the change is sought.[15] To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.[16]

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left
to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and
not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of
the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative
for making such determination being lodged in the courts.[17]

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to change
the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name
altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with
requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the
given name[18] and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow
one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.

A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this point. We quote, thus:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in
the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by
which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he
bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.
Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of
persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that,
when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual
from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a
name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good
cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and
intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19]

This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names
have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of
a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has.

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.[20] The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of
the father and the mother,[21] while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless
their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.[22]

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a
given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by
the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.

Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle
name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.

Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him
to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v.
Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which, however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome, and a
Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina
Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected
Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese
surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no
showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public
interest.

In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting
through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina
Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The Court
held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best
interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner
to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her
illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of
any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury
to the interests of the State or of other people.

Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code gives the
legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that
the child could use only one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner
therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S.
Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voters
registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while
Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of
her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which she is
entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to
avoid confusion.

Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set in the
cases he cites to support his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least,
and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to the case
at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the
petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are
considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to
change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the
petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling grounds
therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time
against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of
Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since
childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not used her registered name in
her school records and voters registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to
confusion.

Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf of her
illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach
the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in
granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the
minor petitioner therein.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society
easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority.[26] As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand
and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] RTC Decision, penned by Judge Enriqueta Loquillano-Belarmino, Rollo, p. 21.

[2] Id. at 20-23.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Id. at 24-25.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Id. at 3-58; with Annexes.

[7] Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and mother,
in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; .

[8] Rollo, p. 5.

[9] Petitioner cites the following cases: Tse v. Republic, No. L-20708, 31 August 1967, 20 SCRA 1261;
Calderon v. Republic, 126 Phil. 1 (1967); and Republic v. Lee Wai Lam, No. L-22607, 30 July 1969, 28 SCRA
1043. In these three cases, the Court allowed the minor to petition for change of name. Ibid.

[10] Ibid.
[11] Rollo, pp. 63-80.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Id. at 71.

[14] Republic v. Lee Wai Lam, No. L-22607, 30 July 1969, 28 SCRA 1040, 1047-48, citing Yu Chi Han v.
Republic, No. L-22040, 29 November 1965 and Yap Ek Siu v. Republic, No. L-25437, 28 April 1969.

[15] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88202, 14 December 1998, 300 SCRA 138.

[16] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189. See also Republic v.
Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, 9 February 1996, 253 SCRA 509.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Go v. Republic, No. L-20160, 29 November 1965; In re: Flaviano C. Zapanta v. Local Civil Register, G.R.
No. 55380, 26 September 1994; Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, 9 February 1996.

[19] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra at note 16.

[20] Article 364, Civil Code.

[21] Article 174, Family Code. Supra at note 7.

[22] Article 176, Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children to Use the Surname of Their Father, Amending for the Purpose Article 176 of Executive Order
No. 209, Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines), which took effect on 19 March 2004,
by allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission
in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.

[23] 125 Phil. 1098 (1967).

[24] Supra note 9.

[25] No. L-51201, 29 May 1980, 97 SCRA 858.

[26] In Republic v. Marcos, G.R. No. 31065, 15 February 1990, 182 SCRA 223, and Padilla v. Republic, 199
Phil. 226 (1982), the Court denied the petitions for change of name filed by mothers in behalf of their
minor children for prematurity.

2.G.R. No. 206023, April 03, 2017

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LORENA OMAPAS SALI, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to annul and set
aside the February 11, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03442, which
affirmed in toto the February 23, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Baybay City,
Leyte, granting the Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules filed by respondent
Lorena Omapas Sali (Sali).

The CA narrated the undisputed factual antecedents.

Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition, dated November 26, 2008, for Correction of Entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC with the following material averments:

1. Petitioner is a Filipino, of legal age, single and a resident [of] 941 D. Veloso St.[,] Baybay, Leyte;

2. The respondent is located in Baybay City, Leyte and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
where it can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court;

3. All parties herein have the capacity to sue and be sued;

4. Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and Almarina A. Albay who was born on
April 24, 1968 in Baybay, Leyte. A copy of the Baptismal Certificate issued by the Parish of the Sacred
Heart, Sta. Mesa, Manila is hereunto attached as Annex "A";

5. Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay,
Leyte[,] thru inadvertence and mistake[,] erroneously entered in the records the following: Firstly, the
first name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY" instead of "LORENA" and Secondly, the date of birth of the
petitioner as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." A copy of the Certificate of Live Birth of
Dorothy A. Omapas issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO) and Certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Baybay, Leyte are hereunto attached as Annex "B" and Annex "C" respectively.

6. The petitioner has been using the name "Lorena A. Omapas["] and her date of birth as "April 24,
1968" for as long as she (sic) since she could remember and is known to the community in general as
such;

7. To sustain petitioner's claim that the entries in her Certificate of Live Birth pertaining to her first name
and date of birth should be corrected so that it will now read as "LORENA A. OMAPAS" and "April 24,
1968" respectively, attached hereto are: the Certificate of Marriage of Morsalyn [D.] Sali and Lorena A.
Omapas, and a photocopy of the Postal Identity Card of the petitioner as Annex "D" and Annex "E"
respectively; [and]
8. This petition is intended neither for the petitioner to escape criminal and/or civil liability, nor affect
the hereditary succession of any person whomsoever but solely for the purpose of setting the records of
herein petitioner straight.

[Sali] then prayed for the issuance of an order correcting her first name from "Dorothy" to "Lorena" and
the date of her birth from "June 24, 1968" to ["]April 24, 1968."

After [Sali] proved her compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, reception of evidence followed.
The Clerk of Court was then appointed as a commissioner to receive the evidence in support of the
petition. Subsequently, she rendered a Report relative thereto.

On February 23, 2010, the trial court issued the assailed Decision in favor of [Sali], the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court, hereby resolves to GRANT this petition for correction of the erroneous entries
in the Birth Certificate of Lorena A. Omapas-Sali, specifically her first name from "DOROTHY" to
"LORENA" and her date of birth from "JUNE 24, 1968" to "APRIL 24, 1968", and ordering the Local Civil
Registrar of Baybay City, Leyte, and the National Statistics Office to effect the foregoing correction in the
birth record of Lorena A. Omapas-Sali, upon finality of this decision, and upon payment of the proper
legal fees relative thereto.

Furnish copy of this decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay City,
Leyte, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the petitioner and her counsel.

SO ORDERED.2

On March 24, 2010, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo because the title of the petition and the
order setting the petition for hearing did not contain Sali's aliases.
The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication that Sali is known by a
name other than "Lorena," hence, it would be absurd to compel her to indicate any other alias that she
does not have; (2) Sali not only complied with the mandatory requirements for an appropriate
adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules but also gave the Republic an opportunity to timely
contest the purported defective petition; and (3) the change in the first name of Sali will certainly avoid
further confusion as to her identity and there is no showing that it was sought for a fraudulent purpose
or that it would prejudice public interest.

Now before Us, the grounds of the petition are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT APPLIED RULE 108 INSTEAD OF RULE
103, THEREBY DISPENSING WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF STATING THE RESPONDENT'S ALIASES IN THE
TITLE OF THE PETITION.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.3

The Republic argues that although Sali's petition is entitled: "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH OF DOROTHY A. OMAPAS," it is actually a
petition for a change of name. The first name being sought to be changed does not involve the
correction of a simple clerical, typographical or innocuous error such as a patently misspelled name, but
a substantial change in Sali's first name. This considering, the applicable rule is Rule 103, which requires
that the applicant's names and aliases must be stated in the title of the petition and the order setting it
for hearing, and that the petition can be granted only on specific grounds provided by law. Further,
assuming that a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy, the petition
should not have been granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided for under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9048.

The petition is partially granted.

Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for correction
of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were committed in
the recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations allowed in one's
name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule
108.4 The evidence5 presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the name "Lorena."
Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her name. What she seeks is simply the
removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name
she grew up with.6

Nevertheless, at the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect.7 Section 1 of the
law states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. -
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis ours)

The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has
been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that
first name in the community.8 The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either
appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.9 We stressed in
Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines:10

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.11

Recently, the Court again said in Onde v. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City:12

In Silverio v. Republic, we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v.
Cagandahan, we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law removed
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus
petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother's first name.13

In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within the RTC's
primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e., filing of
the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the
RTC should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.

On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24,
1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into
law amending R.A. No. 9048.14 As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and month in the date of
birth and sex of a person, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. -
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex
of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the
entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis ours)

Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 10815 is the appropriate remedy in seeking to
correct her date of birth in the civil registry. Under the Rules, the following must be
observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

The Republic did not question the petition to correct Sali's birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24,
1968." In fact, it did not contest the CA ruling that the requirements for an appropriate adversarial
proceeding were satisfactorily complied with. The appellate court found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

Here, [Sail] filed with the court a quo a verified petition for the correction of her first name from
"Dorothy" to "Lorena" as well as the date of her birth from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968." In the
petition, she aptly impleaded the Civil Registrar of Baybay City, Leyte as respondent. Thereafter, the trial
court issued an Order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition. The Order for hearing was
then published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province to notify the persons having or claiming any interest therein. Moreover, said Order was posted
in four public and conspicuous places within the locality. Subsequently, the Civil Registrar, Solicitor
General and Assistant Provincial Prosecutor were furnished copies of the Petition and Order to give them
the opportunity to file their respective oppositions thereto. x x x.16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The February 11, 2013 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03442, which affirmed in toto the February 23, 2010
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas with respect to
her first name is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its filing with the local civil registrar concerned.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014

FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner,

vs.

THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders1 dated October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043.
The RTC dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P. Onde for correction of entries in his certificate
of live birth.

The antecedent facts follow:

Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R TC and
named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent. Petitioner
alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his
birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's
first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth
certificate be corrected as follows:

Entry From To

1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married

2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde

3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground
thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the
first correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was
further held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city
civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil
Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of
First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this
Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as it found no
proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the
first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2)
whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring
adversarial proceedings; (3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries;
and (4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married
on December 23, 1983.

Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of entries in the civil
registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,3 the case cited by the RTC, we have
actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents were not married will be presented during the trial,
not during the filing of the petition for correction of entries.

In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly dismissed the
petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be
corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not
married" is a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial
proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.

We deny the petition.

On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in
his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that
petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point.4 Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048,
clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name
can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as
amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there
was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipalcivil registraror consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v.
Cagandahan,7 we said that under R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt the correction of clerical or typographical
errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s
first name.

On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial
correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy
and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,8 we held that
corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversaryproceedings.9

On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of entries. As
mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he sought on his and his
mother’s first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained
to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries before the RTC bereinstated since the same
petition includes the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.

We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner can avail ofthe
administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first name.1âwphi1 He can also file a
new petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his
parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City:10
x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court]provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x

xxxx

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or
harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner
and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature,
however, are now allowed under Rule 108in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided
that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead
as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition
for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by
the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Eleosida,11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as the
procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In
Republic v. Uy,12 we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements
of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father
and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as petitioner will
have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when
he files the new petition for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pifias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The
dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a
male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result
of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition,
docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He
was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought
and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped
in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of
Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE.
5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that
the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in
the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP
Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As
found by the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
(emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11
A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13
In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. –
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as
the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at
all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from
the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a
person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis
supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal
to petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of
birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father
is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f)
such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova
or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35
Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time
a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make
or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof
must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a
person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized
as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 166676

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and
seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33
of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by
Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate:
(1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to
have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged
that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and
was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his
appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that
respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and
the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting
of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body
as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and
wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed
fees:

a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and

b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned
ruling.

The issues raised by petitioner are:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH;
AND,

II.

CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA
DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents
petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends
respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as
mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known
as CAH does not make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not
formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person
and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or
gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]

Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103

CHANGE OF NAME

SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at
least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order
reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct
that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive
weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best.
The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.

SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.

SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order
has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be
changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall
forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

Rule 108

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries
in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights
of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served
upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule
108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to
be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable
party without whom no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable
parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of
the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the
civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which
states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil
registrar.

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17]
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.[19]

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.[20]

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with
the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian
tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice,
facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a
living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.

Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex
individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of
modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia
have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More
commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold
the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is
some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male
nor truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the
birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the

subjects birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age
of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons,
like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has
instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one
who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness
and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm
other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid
and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition
and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but
respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering
the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant
to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents.

SYLLABUS

FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF LAWS
MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The categorical
statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective seeks to prevent
abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to
due process and to information on matter of public concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the
decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request
for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it
is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and
that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not
binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the
Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the
interval administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be published;
that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the
decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this
Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."cralaw virtua1aw library

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief
Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."cralaw virtua1aw
library

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall
become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.cralawnad

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It
is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter
of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on
the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government
agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose
was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in
the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the
people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the
need for due publication without indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the
present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding
decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of
publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has
been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we
have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we
find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to
interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that
under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a
different period provided by the legislature.chanrobles law library

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect
to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by
the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever
reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at
this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory
opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society,
with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance.
This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of
their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and
their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval,
or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16384 April 26, 1962

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE THE NAME OF GO CHANG TO JAYME S. TAN,

JAYME S. TAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Francisco E. F. Remotigue for petitioner-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On March 12, 1959, Go Chang, a citizen of the Republic of Nationalist China, but born in the Philippines,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, a verified petition for change of name (Sp. Proc. No. 189-R),
to Jayme S. Tan. The jurisdictional facts as to age, status, citizenship, residence, place of birth and name
of parents were alleged. In the petition it was further stated that he (petitioner), was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar and the Immigration Bureau under the name of Go Chang; baptized as Jaime Descals
Go Chang; that at tender age, he was taken under the care of an uncle; that in his studies (from Grade I
to 2nd year in College), he has been enrolled under the name Jayme S. Tan, Tan being the surname of his
uncle and the middle initial "S" standing for the surname of his mother Lim Sy; that all his friends know
him as Jayme S. Tan; and that by seeking the change of his name it was not his intention to conceal or
hide any unfavorable record but to correct an error.

During the hearing, documentary evidence (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-3), consisting of the affidavit of the
Publisher of the "La Prensa", and clippings of the order (of hearing), respectively, were presented to
prove compliance with the legal requirement of publication. The motion for Bill of Particulars, presented
by the Provincial Fiscal was denied by the trial court on the ground that same was improper and would
serve only to delay the proceedings. The petitioner testified that when he started schooling at the
"Colegio de Santa Maria", San Juan, Rizal, he was enrolled under the name of Jayme S. Tan, which name
he has continuously used up to College; that he desires to change his name to clear up an error and
avoid confusion and that because of the discrepancy about his name in his school records and alien
certificate of registration, the Board of Medical Examiners refused to issue him a "Medical Number" to
be considered as a medical student, unless he secures a court order, allowing him to use the name Jayme
S. Tan, appearing in his school records.

The Provincial Fiscal, who represented the Solicitor General filed no written opposition to the petition
but attended the hearing and cross-examined the petitioner. After trial, the lower court on August 29,
1959, render judgment, pertinent portions of which read —

The evidence presented proved the truth of the petitioner's allegations in his petition. Besides, it has
also been established in evidence that the petitioner has no pending obligation with the Government;
that he has never been accused any offense, nor any suit filed against him and that his purpose in asking
that he be allowed to use his name of Jaime S. Tan by which he was enrolled in school and known by
friends is to have same as his sole official name; that without a judicial authority to use the name, he
would not be allowed by the Board of Medical Examiners to take the Board examinations for physicians;
that it is in good faith that he asked the authority and no confusion of identity will be caused created by
the use of said name and furthermore he is not intending to change his Chinese nationality by the use of
said name.

The Court under these circumstances feels fully justified in granting the petition, under the authority of
Rule 103, the Rules of Court, and said petition is hereby granted and, from now on the petitioner will
use, as his official name, identify himself, the name JAIME S. TAN after this name is duly registered in the
office of corresponding local Civil Registrar.

Under date of September 3, 1959 the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu, moved for the reconsideration of the
above judgment. The motion was denied on September 12, 1959. The appeal of the State is anchored on
two points, viz: —

(1) The lower court erred in taking cognizance of the instant petition for change of name filed despite
the fact that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of a substantial defect in the petition
and publication of the Order for hearing; and .

(2) The lower court erred in granting the petition despite the fact that the petitioner failed to adduce any
proper and reasonable reason for changing his name.

A discrepancy exists in the petition and the published Order. Whereas in the published Order the name
of petitioner was spelled Jaime S. Tan, the verified petition spell his name as Jayme S. Tan (Exhs. A-1 to A-
3). Even in the affidavit of the publisher of "La Prensa" (Exh. A), the name appearing is Jaime S. Tan.
Petitions for change of name being proceedings in rem, strict compliance with the requirement of
publication is essential, for it is by such means that the court acquires jurisdiction (Aida Jacobo V.
Republic, 52 O. G. No. 9, p. 2928). Considering the fact that the proceedings is one for change of name,
the defect in the petition and the order, as to the spelling of the name of the petitioner, is substantial,
because it did not correctly identify the party to said proceedings. As the Solicitor General has aptly
observed —

.... Not only was it misleading to the courts of Justice, but also prejudiced the interests of the general
public. By said act, he made it difficult or virtually impossible for anyone who might have an adverse
interest to oppose his petition. In the eyes of the law therefore, petitioner has not complied strictly with
the legal requirement regarding publication, thereby rendering the entire proceeding had in the court
below null and void. 1äwphï1.ñët

It may be argued that the difference in the spelling is minor, that is the "i" has been erroneously
typewritten as "y" or vice versa. The difference of one letter in a name may mean the distinction of
identity of one person with that of another. If the projected change means so great to the petitioner, he
should, at least, have exerted efforts to correct the mistake, if it was a mistake at all.

We find also that no reasonable circumstance exists or was proven to warrant petitioner's change of
name. Petitioner in his petition alleges that he was baptized as Jayme Go Chang and that throughout his
school days he has been enrolled under the name of Jayme S. Tan. His own documents, however, belie
said allegations because his baptismal certificate (Exh. D), shows that his baptismal name is "Jaime
Descals Go Chang". Except his own testimony, no other evidence was introduced to show that in school
and to his friends he was using and/or was known by the name of Jayme S. Tan. Because of the
discrepancy existing in his school records and his alien certificate of registration, the Board of Medical
Examiners allegedly refused to give him a "Medical number" to be considered a medical student, unless
he secures a court order allowing him to use the name Jayme S. Tan. No corroborative evidence was
adduced to show the veracity of his assertion. The fact that the Certificate of Enrollment issued by the
"Southwestern College" (Exh. E), mentions a certain Jaime S. Tan as officially enrolled in the College of
Medicine, would show that what petitioner has alleged to the effect that since his first enrollment Grade
I until college, he was continuously using the name Jayme S. Tan, cannot be true. If the purpose of
changing his name is to correct an error or avoid confusion, the petitioner should retain the use of his
name "Go Chang" appearing in the Civil Registrar and Bureau of Immigration, the real and official name,
rather than change it. The real name of a person is that given him in the Civil register, not the name by
which he was baptized in his church or by which he has been known in the community, or which he has
adopted (Chomi v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, G. R. No. L-9203, Sept. 28, 1956, 52 O. G. No. 15, p.
6541). There was no reason for the Medical Board to require the change of his name to Jayme S. Tan,
considering the fact that the Certificate of Enrollment from the Southwestern College mentions already
of a medical student bearing a similar name. It would seem that change of name sought for in the
petition, would only add confusion to the already confused state of things. There would also be no
practical purpose in allowing name to be changed, in order to give him a "medical number" as he claims,
because not being a Filipino, he could not be admitted to take the Medical Board Examinations.
Moreover, petitioner-appellee has continuously been violating the Anti-Alias Law (Comm. Act No. 142),
for having been using the name Jayme S. Tan, for various purposes. The granting of the instant petition
would in effect sanctioning an illegal act, which we cannot do.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the petition of Go Chang to change his
name to Jayme S. Tan denied. Costs taxed against the petitioner-appellee.