Latest Constitutional Law Cases

NO.
04
RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE
IN
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
PROF. LAURO D. GACAYAN

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
(Bill of Rights)
January, 2018 Edition
By:
ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN

Professor of Law, College of Law
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Baguio City
BAR REVIEWER IN CONSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL LAW
VILLASIS LAW CENTER

Quezon City and Manila
(And other Bar Review Centers)
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IS THE HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS

AND MASS AT THE JUSTICE HALL OF
QUEZON CITY VIOLATES THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE OR
AN ACT FAVORING A SPECIFIC RELIGION?
In re: LETTER OF TONY VALENCIANO TO CHIEF

JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO REGARDING THE REGULAR
HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF
JUSTICE OF QUEZON CITY, A. M. No. 10-4-19 SC, March
7, 2017
The facts:
Tony Valenciano wrote then Chief Justice Reynato Puno

complaining tha the basement of Quezon City Justice Hall had been
Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard 2
Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street)
* www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com /
villasislawcenter@gmail.com / mvplawoffice@gmail.com
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
converted into a Roman Catholice Chapel, complete with offertory table,
images of Roman Catholic icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a
projector. He claims that the said practice violates the sepatation of church
and state provision of the Constitution as well as the prohibition embodied
under Section 29 [2] of the Constitution prohibiting the appropriation of
public money or property in support of any religion, sect or denomination.
He claims that the said act clearly favors Roman Litigants and the
rehearsal of the choir caused great disturbance to other employees.
Held:
The holding of religious rituals in the Halls of Justice does not

amount to a union of church and state. It is just an “accomodation” by the
State.
This is just a way where the Roman Catholics express their worship
through the Holy Mass and to stop them would tantamount to regressing
to the free exercise of religion which is prohibited by Section 5, Article III
of the Constitution.
Please take note that our Muslim Brethren who are government
employees are allowed to worship their Allah even during office hours
inside their government offices and they are not prohibited. The Seventh
Day Adventists are exempted from rendering Saturday duty because their
religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. All these are deemed
in respect to the worker’s right to the free exercise of their religion.
Since the masses are being conducted only during noon braks and
were not disruptive of public services, it is valid. No court proceedings
were being distracted or interrupted and the judiciary employees are not
being adversely affected. It is a simple case of accomodation by the
government, not establishment of religion as held in the landmark case of
Estrada vs. Escritur.
Read:
Estrada vs. Escritur, 408 SCRA 1

Estrada vs. Escritur, 492 SCRA 1
May the Municipal Trial Court issue a

Search Warrant in connection with a crime
which falls under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court like
violation of RA No. 9165 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act or
where the place to be searched is outside
its territorial jurisdiction?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. EDMAR P.

CASTILLO, SR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 6,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, APARRI, CAGAYAN AND
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
JEOFREY JIL RABINO Y TALOZA, G.R. No. 204419,
November 07, 2016
The Facts:
1. On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of

Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45, against private
respondent because “there is probable cause to believe that a
Violation [of] R.A. 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drug, has been and
is being committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
that JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street,
Maura, Aparri, Cagayan has in his possession or control
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu;
2. Thereafter, elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

(PDEA) and officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) enforced
the same yielding one (1) sachet containing residue of suspected
methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private respondent
Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan.
3. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime

Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for qualitative
examination, the test gave positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Hanroblesla
4. Thus, an Information dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private
respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165;
5. Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private
respondent Rabino filed before the respondent judge a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence on
the ground that the issuing Court does not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place to be searched.
6. The respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its Joint
Resolution dated May 14, 2012, which reads:
It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum

penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years, which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of
six (6) years. A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the application for and to issue Search Warrant No. 45.
As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null and void. [Corollary]
thereto, all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and
void.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is

GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 45 is hereby ordered QUASHED.
Consequently, all evidence obtained in the execution of Search
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Warrant No. 45 are likewise ordered SUPPRESSED. There being
no more evidence to support them, the Informations in the above-
captioned cases are hereby dismissed.
7. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the

same court in its Joint Order7dated September 24, 2012.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
May the MTC validly issue a search

warrant in a place outside its territorial
jurisdiction as well as the crime involved is
outside the jurisdiction of the MTC to try and
decide?
Held:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search

warrant and eventually dismissed the case based merely on the fact that
the search warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan,
proceeding from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous
Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court.
The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the

search warrant. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for
as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must
only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
Note that the Constitution used the word “judge” without

qualification.
Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was

committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within
the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the
same judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons,
the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search
warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in
Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search
warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said
application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for
compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly
complied with.
If the testimony of the rape victim is

unbelievable and contrary to common
human experience, the accused is entitled
to acquittal based on his constitutional
presumption of innocence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN RICHARD

TIONLOC Y MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 212193, February 15,
2017
The facts:
1. The accused-appellant was convicted by the RTC of Manila, Branch 37, for
Rape;
2. That at the time the alleged rape took place, the accused was 18 years old why
the victim was 24 years old;
3. The information alleges:
That on or about September 29, 2008 in the

City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with one whose true
name, real identity and present whereabouts are
still unknown and mutually helping each other, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, commit sexual abuse upon the person
of "AAA" by then and there making her drink
liquor which made her dizzy and drunk,
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
depriving her of reason or otherwise
unconsciousness, bringing her to a room and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her,
against her will.
4. The complainant testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29,

2008, she was having a drinking session with appellant and Meneses
in the house of appellant. After some time, she felt dizzy so she took
a nap. At around 11:00 p.m., she was roused from her sleep by
Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into her
vagina. She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the
knife which they used to cut hotdog and now lying on top of a table
nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted.
5. Meneses left after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and
shivering, appellant approached her and asked if he could also have
sex with her. When she did not reply appellant mounted and raped
her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to reposition her body.
She then left appellant's house and immediately returned to the
house she shared with her live-in partner.
Issue:
Is the prosecution’s evidence, particularly the testimony of the rape

victim, enough to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence
in favour of the accused?
Held:
In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or

intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element
of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The
prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by
accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its
cause.
Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the
purposes which the accused had in mind.
It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-

year old man who had sexual intercourse with the complainant, a woman
who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there was no evidence
to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation during his sexual
congress with the complainant. She testified that appellant and Meneses
are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the house of appellant. At
around 7:00 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she again went to the house of
appellant and chatted with him and Meneses while drinking liquor.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Her testimony is unbelievable and contrary to common human
experience and could not overcome the presumption of innocence in favour
of the accused under the Constitution.
After Meneses has sexual intercourse with her, the accused asked
her to have sex with him also. She did not resist. She could have
resisted right from the start. But she did not, and chose not to utter a
word or make any sign of rejection of appellant's sexual advances. It was
only in the middle of their sexual congress when she tried to move which
can hardly be considered as an unequivocal manifestation of her refusal or
rejection of appellant's sexual advances. After the sexual intercourse, she
immediately returned to the house she shared with her live-in partner.
Finally, she insinuates that she fell was shivering after Meneses had
sexual intercourse with her that is why she did not resist accused’s
advances at the beginning. However, their age gap negates force, threat or
intimidation; he was only 18 while she was already 24, not to mention
that they were friends. In addition, per her own declaration, Meneses and
appellant did not also utter threatening words or perform any act of
intimidation against her.
Her testimony is unbelievable and contrary to common human

experience and could not overcome the presumption of innocence in favour
of the accused under the Constitution. It has been ruled repeatedly
that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. The burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles
appellant to an acquittal based on his presumption of innocence under the
Constitution.
When bail is allowed in a non-bailable case

like Plunder.
SENATOR JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

(THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015
THE FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in
the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). In accordance with the Plunder Law, no bail was recommended for his
provisional liberty
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital , and his Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which were
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of the motions,
Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him
would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was
not a flight risk, and his (d) age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
Senator Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail
because while he is charged with plunder, “the maximum penalty that may
be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua.”
He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on
the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily
surrendered. “Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against
Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable.”
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying

Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, where it held:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented

its evidence and the Court shall have made a determination
that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile
can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then
will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the

Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application
for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused
Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
ISSUE:
MAY THE COURT GRANT BAIL IN A NON-

BAILABLE OFFENSE WITHOUT THE
PROSECUTION GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE
EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG?
HELD:
Yes, in the present case of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be

presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the
guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused.
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused
from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfil this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the
accused’s presence at trial.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or
restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no
right to bail shall be recognized.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon

conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense,
and that he voluntarily surrendered. Enrile’s averment has been mainly
uncontested by the Prosecution.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court
indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time
many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his
solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of
public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another

compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the

Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a
geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted
at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple

drug therapy;
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the

following:
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with

carotid and vertebral artery disease;
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications;
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications.
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by

Holter monitoring;
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip

syndrome
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular

s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections;
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber
intraocular lens.
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

. b High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain)
in 2014;
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or

collectively, could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under
stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary
artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they
could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity,
dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients
with asthma or COPD.
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced

age and ill health required special medical attention.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling
his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
The Supreme Court therefore granted bail to Senator Enrile in the

amount of P1,000,000.00.
Bail is now allowed in Malversation

through falsification of public documents
cases even though the same is punishable
by reclusion perpetua as maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZVIMINDA S.

VALDEZ AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION), G.R. Nos. 216007-09, December 08, 2015
THE FACTS:
The cases stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by Sheila S.

Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the
Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit
of the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government.
Among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of
private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of
Bacolod City, particularly:
1. D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to P80,000.00;
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
2. D.V. No. 220 dated March 24, 2004 amounting to P68,000.00;
3. D.V. No. 278 dated April 13, 2004 amounting to P19,350.00; and
4. D.V. No. 325 dated April 30, 2004 amounting to P111,800.00 for
Cash Slip No. 193402.
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official
receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to
claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total amount of P279,150.00
instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate over-claim of P274,306.75.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317
to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the
remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Since the amount involved is over P22,000.00 in the case of Malversation

through Falsification of Public Documents, no bail was recommended applying Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code.
She filed a “Motion to Fix Bail” before the Sandiganbayan which granted it in the
amount of P200,000.00.
Hence, this petition by the prosecution.
I S S U E:
IS MALVERSATION THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

INVOLVING OVER P22,000.00 WHICH IS PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION
PERPETUA A BAILABLE OFFENSE?
HELD:
Yes.
The trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in
charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of
the complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent
offenses were the subject of separate prosecutions. Where a complex
crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of
the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense
proven.
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of

Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an
aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For
purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the
supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of
committing malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of
one of the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or
worse, none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and
grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex
crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in
depriving the accused person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly
committing a complex crime that is not even considered as inherently
grievous, odious and hateful.
Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an

accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
palpable when compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which is a
heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 and R.A. No. 9346. Observe that bail is not a matter of right in
plunder committed through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate
amount or total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired must be at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast,
an accused who is alleged to have committed malversation of public funds
thru falsification of official/public documents, which is not a capital offense,
is no longer entitled to bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds
P22,000.00, or as low as P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair
and could not have been contemplated by the law.
The judge is correct in granting bail

to an accused charged of Murder if
after the prosecution presented its
evidence, only the crime of Homicide
was proven. There is no need for the
accused to file a petition for bail or
for the court to conduct a separate
hearing for the Petition for Bail filed
by the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BONCALON

G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Raising only questions of law, the People’s petition for review on

certiorari assails the January 31, 2007 Decision] of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the November 12, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Surigao City, Br. 29 in Criminal Case No. 5144 (the case) fixing
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
bail for the temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza alias Loloy Plaza
(respondent) who was indicted for Murder.
The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC

presided by Judge Floripinas Buyser (Judge Buyser).
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court,
filed a Demurrer to Evidence.The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser
by Order of March 14, 2002, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is

sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, but only for the crime of homicide and not for murder,
as charged. This is because the qualifying circumstance of
treachery alleged in the information cannot be appreciated in
this case.
The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which

respondent filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in
view of Judge Buyser’s ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to
prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the
bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he claimed
was the usual bond for Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao
del Norte.
In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond the prosecution

contended, in the main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as
the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public
prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the
accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed a
motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail
bond; that the accused had already waived his right to apply for bail at that
stage of the proceedings; that Judge Buyser’s March 14, 2002 Order, being
a mere opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive part thereof, produced no
legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter outside
the Demurrer; and that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove
the existence of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested its case.
During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior
State Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buyser’s
impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit himself and to order the case
transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC for further proceedings.
Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the
Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond.
By Order of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the

finding of Judge Buyser that since the prosecution evidence proved only
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Homicide which is punishable by reclusion temporal and, therefore,
bailable, ruled that respondent could no longer be denied bail. He
accordingly granted respondent’s Motion and fixed the amount of his bond
at P40,000.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of

Judge Tan was denied for lack of merit .
Respondent was subsequently released after he posted a P40,000

bond.
Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victim’s brother, impleading the People

as co-petitioner, assailed the trial court’s orders via petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals.
Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for
bail having been filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory
hearing to determine whether or not the prosecution’s evidence is strong.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Roberto’s

argument that the grant of bail to respondent without any separate hearing
is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.
By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that

the allegations in respondent’s Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond
constituted an application for bail, dismissed Roberto’s petition and
affirmed Judge Tan’s orders .
In its present petition, the People contends that
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF

SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE HEARING
CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE
PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL
.
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.”
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended,

thus provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail
to an accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. Stressing this point, this Court held:
. . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether

summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first
be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or
lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an
intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
A summary hearing is defined as “such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for the
purposes of bail.” On such hearing, the court does not sit to
try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted.
The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
.
examination and cross examination (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of

the prosecution evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latter’s
statement that the evidence was sufficient to convict respondent of
Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine whether
respondent was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the
evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution.
The People’s recourse to Section 5 , ] Rule 114 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure to support its contention that respondent should be
denied bail is unavailing, for said Section clearly speaks of an application
for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of conviction has already been
handed down by the trial court.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS

DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN
THE OMBUDSMAN REFUSED TO FURNISH
HER A COPY OF THE SWORN
STATEMENT OF HER CO-RESPONDENT,
RUBY TUASON, WHO WAS LATER ON
ADMITTED AS STATE WITNESS.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
JESSICA LUCILA REYES VS. OMBUDSMAN, G.
R. No. 212593-94, March 15, 2016
JESSICA LUCILA REYES VS. SANDIGANABAYN
3rd DIVISION, G. R. No. 213475-76, March 15,
2016
The petitioner was charged of Plunder and/or violation of Section 3

(e) of Republic Act No. {RA) 30197 together with Janet Lim Napoles, and
others, including one Ruby Tuazon, as co-conspirators for their respective
participations in the anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fµnd
(PDAF) scam, involving, as reported by whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy),
Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Sufias (Sufias), the illegal utilization and
pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total amount of Pl
72,834,500.00.
Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material

to this case, was charged for fraudulently processing the release of Senator
Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements - through: (1) project identification and
cost projection; (2) preparation and signing of endorsement letters, project
reports, and pertinent documents addressed to the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) and the Implementing Agencies and (3)
endorsement of the preferred JLN23-controlled Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) to undertake the PDAF-funded project - and for
personally receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds
representing Senator Enrile 's "share," "commissions," or "kickbacks"
therefrom, as well as her own.
Ruby Tuason executed a Sworn Statement implicating the petitioner.

Thereafter, Tuazon was officially declared a state witness and granted
immunity from criminal prosecution for the PDAF scam-related cases.
Thereafter, Reyes wrote a letter to the Ombudsman requesting for a

copy of the Sworn Statement of Tuazon but was denied. Again, in a letter
dated May 7, 2014 to the Ombudsman, requested for a copy of the
immunity agreement that it entered into with Tuason. Again, the
Ombudsman denied Reyes's request for the reason that 'the immunity
agreement is a "privileged communication which is considered confidential
under Section 3, Rule IV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing [RA]
6713," 101 otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees."
The Sworn Statement of Ruby Tuazon was one of the documents

relied upon by the Ombudsman in declaring the existence of probable to
charge the petitioner of Plunder and violation of Section 3 [e] of RA No.
3019.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Hence, this petition.
I S S U E:
MAY THE SUPREME COURT INTERFERE

WITH THE FINDING OF PROBALE CAUSE BY
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN?
WAS THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS OF LAW VIOLATED WHEN THE
OMBUDSMAN DID NOT FURNISH HER OF A
COPY OF THE SWORN STATEMENT OF HER
CO-RESPONDENT, RUBY TUAZON?
H E L D:
It is the consistent policy of the Supreme Court to maintain non-

interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of
probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such
discretion. This observed policy is based not only on respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much
the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if
they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. "A
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction." "[P]robable cause, for the
purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does
not mean 'actual or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not

the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's
evidence, and that the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
As held in the case of SENATOR JINGGOY ESTRADA VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, failure to furnish a respondent in a criminal case with
the Counter-Affidavit of his or her co-respondent does not violate the right
of the former to due process of law, unlike in an administrative case.
Due process: May a respondent in a

criminal case before the Office of the
Ombudsman or Prosecutor’s Office
entitled to be furnished copies of the
Counter-Affidavits of his co-
respondents to be able to answer
and/or comment on it?
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO vs. OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 212140-41,
January 21, 2015
The Facts
1. On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a

copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0313, filed by the NBI and Atty.
Levito Baligod, which prayed, among others, that criminal
proceedings for Plunder as defined in RA No. 7080 be conducted
against Sen. Estrada.;
2. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9

January 2014. On 3 December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon
Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-13-0397, filed by
the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that
criminal proceedings for Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080, and for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against Sen.
Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0397
on 16 January 2014.
3. Eighteen of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed

their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March
2014.
4. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished

with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits
of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313.
Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b],
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman).
5. On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in

OMB-C-C-13-0313. The pertinent portions of the assailed Order read:
This Office finds however finds [sic] that the

foregoing provisions [pertaining to Section 3[b],
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 4[c],
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman] do not entitle respondent [Sen.
Estrada] to be furnished all the filings of the
respondents. Rule 112 (3) (a) & (c) of the Rules of
Court provides [sic]: n(a) The complaint shall state
the address of the respondent and shall be
accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, as well as other
supporting documents to establish probable cause
…
6. On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313

and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a Joint Resolution9 which found probable
cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with one count
of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint
Resolution dated 28 March 2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada
prayed for the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges
against him.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s

27 March 2014 Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the
present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set
aside the 27 March 2014 Order.
I S S U E:
Sen. Estrada raised the following ground in his Petition:
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING

THE CHALLENGED ORDER DATED 27 MARCH
2014, ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED
SEN. ESTRADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS OF LAW .
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
HELD:
The Ombudsman’s denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen.

Estrada’s Request did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the
denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to

furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to
due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which
states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent
with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule
II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estrada’s claim.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require

is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This
is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman when it states, “[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant
and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue
an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting
documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x.” At this point, there is still no
counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b)
refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the
affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the
co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant.
No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for
the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s
Request. Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent “shall have access
to the evidence on record,” this provision should be construed in relation
to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a) states that “the investigating officer
shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits
to substantiate the complaint.” The “supporting witnesses” are the
witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.
Second, Section 4(b) states that “the investigating officer shall issue
an order attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all other supporting
documents, directing the respondent” to submit his counter-affidavit. The
affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the
affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The provision in
the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a
respondent shall have “access to the evidence on record” does not stand
alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of Section 4(a and b)
of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with the “affidavits and other supporting documents” submitted
by “the complainant or supporting witnesses.” Thus, a respondent’s
“access to evidence on record” in Section 4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsman’s
Rules of Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting documents of
“the complainant or supporting witnesses” in Section 4(a) of the same
Rule II.
Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides that “[t]he respondent shall have the right to examine
the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have
been furnished and to copy them at his expense.” A respondent’s right to
examine refers only to “the evidence submitted by the complainant.”
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
or under Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no
requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the correspondents
should be furnished to a respondent.
Justice Velasco’s dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the

Ombudsman v. Reyes (Reyes case), an administrative case, in which a
different set of rules of procedure and standards apply. Sen. Estrada’s
Petition, in contrast, involves the preliminary investigation stage in a
criminal case. Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes
case, while Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estrada’s
Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character
or by analogy.
In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of the counter-

affidavits happened in the administrative proceedings on the merits,
which resulted in Reyes’ dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estrada’s
Petition, the denial of his Request happened during the preliminary
investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for
the purpose of determining whether an information should be filed, and
does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial.
We should remember to consider the differences in adjudicating cases,
particularly an administrative case and a criminal case:
Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quantum of proof and adjective
rules vary depending on whether the cases to which they are meant to
apply are criminal, civil or administrative in character. In criminal actions,
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction; in civil actions
and proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a judgment;
and in administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary

investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable
cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it
is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his
rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
The quantum of evidence now required in

preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to “engender a well founded belief” as
to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
It is a fundamental principle that the

accused in a preliminary investigation has no
right to cross-examine the witnesses which the
complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a
counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the
fiscal sets a hearing to propound, clarificatory
questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine.
Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation.

The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him
does not apply in preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a
preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the
witnesses against him. A preliminary investigation may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the
due process clause to a fair trial.
Ref:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES, 658 SCRA
626 (October 5, 2011)
The right of the accused to due process of law

and impartial trial are violated if the Prosecutor
who handled his case will be the Judge to decide
the same---regardless of the extent of his
participation as the Public Prosecutor.
NELSON LAI Y BILBAO v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175999, July 01, 2015
THE FACTS:
1. The petitioner was accused of the crime of Homicide which was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 17446 and raffled at RTC Branch 42;
2. That at that time, the Public Prosecutor assigned to the said sala was
Prosecutor Fernando Elumba;
3. Thereafter, Prosecutor Elumba was appointed as the Presiding Judge

of RTC Branch 42, Bacolod City, and heard the petitioner’s case;
4. After trial, the petitioner was convicted by Judge Elumba of Homicide;
5. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration pointing out the said
anomalous situation where he was the prosecutor handling his case
and yet he decided it but still, the Judge denied his Motion for
Reconsideration;
6. His Appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND

IMPARTIAL TRIAL WERE VIOLATED SINCE THE PROSECUTOR WHO
HANDLED HIS CASE IS ALSO THE JUDGE DECIDING THE SAME.
HELD:
As the records indicate, Judge Elumba had been assigned on March

23, 1998 as the public prosecutor in Branch 42 of the RTC in Negros
Occidental to replace the previous public prosecutor, but became the
Presiding Judge of Branch 42 on April 27, 2000. Branch 42 was the trial
court hearing and ultimately deciding Criminal Case No. 17446 against the
petitioner. As such, Judge Elumba should have disqualified himself from
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
having anything to do with the case once he became the trial judge
because he was compulsorily disqualified. The petitioner pointed to the
need for Judge Elumba's disqualification in his Motion for Reconsideration,
but the latter ignored his concerns upon the excuse that he had appeared
in Criminal Case No. 17446 only after the Prosecution had rested its case.
Judge Elumba argued that he did not personally prosecute the case, and
that, at any rate, the petitioner should have sought his disqualification prior
to the rendition of the judgment of conviction.
The appellant claims that he was denied due process because the
judge who rendered the assailed decision was also, at one time, the public
prosecutor of the instant case.
It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law

cannot be denied to any accused. The Constitution has expressly ordained
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair
trial before his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be
condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a case,
and decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due process. The
Court has said:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold

neutrality of an impartial judge' as the indispensable imperative of
due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an
added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The
litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that
when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give
them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to
him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they
will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be
no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring

compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play.
Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a
judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants
shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties
are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to
a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will
reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments
are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Reprising Section 1 of Rule 137 is Section 5, Canon 3 of the New

Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which pertinently
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
demands the disqualification of a judge who has previously served as a
lawyer of any of the parties.
To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public

prosecutor was passive, or that he entered his appearance as the public
prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the
petitioner did not really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules
on disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the judge's degree of
participation in the case before becoming the judge. He must be reminded
that the same compulsory disqualification that applied to him could similarly
be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of
them should be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The purpose
of this stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect
the life, liberty and property of the petitioner as the accused should be
conducted and determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent.
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the
duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a
judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that
reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide
it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The
purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of
justice
Moreover, to say that Judge Elumba did not personally prosecute or

supervise the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 17446 is to ignore that all
criminal actions were prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. That a private prosecutor had appeared in the case was
of no consequence, for such private prosecutor still came under the direct
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
Finally, had the Court of Appeals had thoroughly sift and scrutinize
the records of the trial court to search for errors that would reverse or
modify the judgment in favor of the accused, it would have quickly noticed
a hard indication existing in the trial records of Criminal Case No. 17446
exposing Judge Elumba to have actually taken an active participation in the
trial. The indication was in the form of the Motion to Present Rebuttal
Evidence that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had filed on January 25,
2000, the text of which is reproduced herein:
MOTION TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
x x x That, however, after going over the records of the case, the
prosecution feels that there is a need to present rebuttal
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that the prosecution be allowed to
present rebuttal evidence to refute the evidence presented by the
accused.
(Sgd.)
FERNANDO R. ELUMBA
Trial Prosecutor
The text of the motion disclosed that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had
come to the conclusion that "there is a need to present rebuttal evidence"
after his having gone over the records of the case. Clearly, he had formed
an opinion that was absolutely adverse to the interest of the petitioner.
Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to

the contrary, could not be expected to render impartial, independent and
objective judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His non-
disqualification resulted in the denial of the petitioner's right to due process
as the accused. To restore the right to the petitioner, the proceedings held
against him before Judge Elumba and his ensuing conviction have to be
nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case No. 17446 should be remanded
to the RTC for a partial new trial to remove any of the prejudicial
consequences of the violation of the right to due process. The case shall be
raffled to a Judge who is not otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba
under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners were deprived of their

right to due process when they were
found guilty of direct contempt by
respondent judge himself who is the
complainant against them.
ALLEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ AND REGIDOR

TULALI VS. JUDGE BIENVINIDO BLANCAFLOR,
G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011
Allen Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is the Provincial Prosecutor of

Palawan; and Regidor Tulali (Tulali), is a Prosecutor I of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor (Judge
Blancaflor) is the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial
Court, Palawan (RTC).
In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners

Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of direct contempt and ordered them to issue a
public apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge Blancaflor
suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No.
22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan
Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.
During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a

controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan
(Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor but under the payroll of
the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez
(Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and
the dismissal of the arson case thereby impliedly implicating the judge.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the

decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation
withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of
misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy
of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed by his superior,
Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan.
On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting

Ami of the crime of arson.
In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the

petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct contempt and
violation of their oath of office as lawyers on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-Parte
Manifestation.
On October 13, 2009 after the submission of petitioners’ respective

position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued his Decision finding petitioners
guilty of direct contempt and imposed the penalty of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00
each.
Held:
The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all

courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly
administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the
power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in
view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that
the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on
the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the
retaliatory, idea of punishment. Such power, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in
the interest of justice.
Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a

court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so.
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Assistant Provincial

Prosecutor in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed
as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt.
Neither should Provincial Prosecutor Rodriguez be liable for direct

contempt as he had no knowledge of the subject manifestation. It was
signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the
arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan and signed by
Prosecutor Rodriguez was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor,
and not with the RTC so it could not be the basis of a contempt charge.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the

elementary procedure which requires written charge and due hearing. He
was the complainant, prosecutor and judge rolled into one. Judge
Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality expected of a
magistrate. He had clearly prejudged petitioners.
Due Process; Right to counsel;

Accused was represented by a fake
lawyer when the prosecution
presented its evidence although he
was assisted by a lawyer when he
presented his evidence.
PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No.

179462, February 12, 2009
The petitioner, who was charged of Robbery before the Regional

Trial Court of Makati City, was represented by “Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes”
from arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of evidence by the prosecution.
Before he presented his evidence, petitioner replaced “Atty. Jocelyn P.
Reyes”. Since she “seems not a lawyer” and indeed, she was not a
member of the bar. Thereafter, petitioner was represented by Atty.
Rainald C. Paggao from the Public Defender’s (Attorney’s) Office of Makati
City.
He was convicted by the RTC. On Appeal, he claims that his right to

due process was violated because he was not represented by counsel
when the prosecution presented his evidence.
Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member

of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense, albeit
unsuccessfully, then he cannot now be heard to complain about having
been denied of due process.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar
but he was afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys’
Office during the presentation of his evidence which satisfies the
requirements of due process before a judicial tribunal. Re-trial is not
justified.
Compare with:
EMMA DELGADO VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, November 10, 1986
Whether the rights to due process

and impartial trial was violated by
reason of the comments made by the
judge in the course of the trial; Extent
of questions that judges may ask by
way of clarificatory questions.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENANCIO

MORTERA, G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010
During the pre-trial of the murder case against the accused, he was
asked by the Judge what is his defense. After talking to the accused, his
lawyer manifested that it is DENIAL or that he is interposing a negative
defense. When the accused was testifying on direct examination, it was
very apparent that he changed his defense of denial to self-defense.
As a result of that, the judge commented:
“Well, if he had nothing to do with the death of said person,

negative defense. So, if you are not telling the truth to your
lawyer, how would I know now that you are telling the truth?…
Anyway if you killed a person you will have to pay for it Mr.
Mortera, do you agree also? You are just making a story.”
After trial, he was convicted of murder.
On appeal, he claimed that his rights to due process and impartial

trial were violated as a result of the “prosecutor-like conduct” of the judge.
He was allegedly denied “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge”. He
further claimed that the judge had allied himself to the prosecution as
shown by his comments. As such, he prays for his acquittal like in the case
of People vs. Opida.
Held:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
In the case of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held
that:
The Court has acknowledged the right of a

trial judge to question witnesses with a view to
satisfying his mind upon any material point which
presents itself during the trial of a case over which
he presides. But not only should his examination be
limited to asking clarificatory questions, the right
should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the
rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as
possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the
conduct of trial… hardly in fact can one avoid the
impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself
with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels
for the prosecution in proving the case against
Tabuena and Peralta…. The “cold neutrality of an
impartial judge” requirement of due process was
certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the
court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual
role of magistrate and advocate… A substantial
portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority
opinion not to focus on “numbers” alone, but more
importantly to show that the court questions were in
the interest of the prosecution and which thus
depart from the common standard of fairness and
impartiality. (emphasis added)
The situation in the case at bench is, however, different. Although the
trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not
amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial
trial.
Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a
negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not
candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended
defense.
The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could
have proceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to discharge
the burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that
the killing was justified should have been his.
The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks,
notwithstanding the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone
cannot lead us to conclude that the trial judge “had taken the cudgels for
the prosecution.”
Compare with:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
1. PEOPLE VS. OPIDA, June 13, 1987
2. IMELDA MARCOS VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN, October 6,
1998
The right to Due Process of Mayor

Maliksi was violated when he was not
notified of the dates when the
COMELEC conducted decryption and
printing of the ballot images
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI VS. COMELEC

and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302,
April 13, 2013
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers

proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus,
Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209
clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes,
and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly
elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from
performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the
COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for
execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving

notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the
printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order
dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount
necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the
ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for
Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying

the RTC’s decision and declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor .
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied
his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption
proceedings.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny

Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this case.

Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Supreme Court,
by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court
concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he
had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the First
Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to
raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The
Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in
deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining
that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but
considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the
official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First
Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered
had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading
discovered during the revision.
In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi insisted

that his right to due process was violated by the COMELEC.
Held:
By the same vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court reversed itself in a

period of one (1) month.
Indeed, Mayor Maliksi was furnished copies of the Orders of the

COMELEC directing Saguilayan to post cash deposit for the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images and later on to augment
the earlier cash deposit for the decryption and printing of the ballot images
BUT NO DATES WERE MENTIONED THEREIN SO THAT HE COULD
HAVE PARTICIPATED.
The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration, and reverses the decision promulgated on March 12,
2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him
the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and
printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of
the ballot images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have
conducted the assailed recount proceedings because it was then
exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure
allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount
proceedings authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions
only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial
and city officials, not in cases of appeals.
We should not ignore that the parties’ participation during the revision
and recount proceedings would not benefit only the parties, but was as vital
and significant for the COMELEC as well, for only by their participation
would the COMELEC’s proceedings attain credibility as to the result. The
parties’ presence would have ensured that the requisite procedures have
been followed, including the required authentication and certification that
the images to be printed are genuine.
The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of
any of the parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the concern of the
Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a denial of
the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely

Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; and
DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En Banc to conduct proceedings
for the decryption of the picture images of the ballots involved in the protest
after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by using the
printouts of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the
parties or their representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down
by Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by Resolution
No. 9164.
Due process: Is there violation of the

petitioner’s right to due process of
law if he did not present evidence in
his behalf in the Sandiganbayan but
merely “adopted” the evidence
presented by his co-accused therein
based on the advise of his lawyer?
EDELBERT C. UYBOCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 211703, December 10,
2014
THE FACTS:
On January 9, 2014, petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan

for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, together with his co-accused,
Governor RODOLFO G. VALENCIA. His Motion for Reconsideration was
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
denied by the Sandiganbayan on March 14, 2014. Hence, this Petition
before the Supreme Court claiming violation of his right to due process
because “insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer”.
ISSUE:
Was he denied due process of law because of “insufficient legal

assistance by his former lawyer” who advised him just to adopt the
evidence of his co-accused and not to present his own evidence?
HELD:
Petitioner was not denied due process of law.
According to petitioner, he was “accorded grossly insufficient legal

assistance by his former lawyer” who informed him that “there was no
necessity to present any evidence.” His former counsel also “failed to
cross examine the main prosecution witness because said counsel was
inexplicably absent on the trial date” and even “failed to prepare and file a
memorandum” and “merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers
of co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other
accused and all their pleadings and manifestations, even when these were
clearly not applicable to petitioner’s defense.” Thus, petitioner avers that his
constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and of law
and to competent counsel were violated.
In its Comment dated September 30, 2014, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor opposed petitioner’s plea to reopen the case on the ground of
denial of due process. In citing Lagua v. CA, they claim there is no basis
to set aside the assailed decision and resolution since “a client is bound
by the action of his counsel.”
The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that

petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard during trial. This opportunity
to be heard is the essence of due process. While petitioner claims that
he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the
presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate
mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that
would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not once did
petitioner refute, or at the very least, address the Sandiganbayan’s finding
that he had expressly consented to the waiver of the presentation of
evidence by affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation
submitted by his former
Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel “failed to

prepare and file a memorandum for him” since the records show that
petitioner’s former counsel had belatedly filed a memorandum on his
behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of justice.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Ref:
TAN VS. TAN, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010

DBP VS. COURT OF APPEALS, January 29, 1999
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY and ENGR. CHRISTINE O. BAUTISTA vs.
WINSTON JOSEPH Z. CORDERO and SPS. LUCIO CORDERO, and
EVELYN CORDERO, G.R. No. 144118, July 21, 2004.
Due process: Failure to present

evidence by the lawyer is not gross
negligence which results in violation
of the client’s right to due process of
law.
ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. vs. ALEXIS C.

ALMENDRAS, G.R. No. 179491, January 14,
2015.
.
THE FACTS:
The petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to

House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr.
Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion
of the first and second letters reads as follows:
This is to notify your good self and your staff

that one ALEXIS "DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a
brother, is not vested with any authority to
liaison or transact any business with any
department, office, or bureau, public or
otherwise, that has bearing or relation with my
office, mandates or functions. x x x.
Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that

Mr. Alexis “Dodong” C. Almendras, a reknown
blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded
election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of
my father, the late Congressman Alejandro D.
Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family
when he filed cases against us: his brothers and
sisters, and worst against his own mother. I
deemed that his act of transacting business that
affects my person and official functions is
malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
part of a larger plan of harassment activities to
perforce realise his egoistic and evil objectives.
May I therefore request the assistance of your
office in circulating the above information to
concerned officials and secretariat employees
of the House of Representatives.
These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and

published by petitioner, assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao
del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to
destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter filed
an action for damages arising from libel and defamation against petitioner
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City.
In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any
evidence, except his Answer, despite several rescheduling of hearings at
his instance. The trial court thus submitted the case for decision, and
eventually ruled that respondent was libeled and defamed. For the
sufferings, social ridicule, defamation and dishonor caused by petitioner’s
letters, respondent was awarded damages, as follows: “P5,000,000.00 as
moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and attorney’s fees in the amount of 25% of whatever
amounts actually received by plaintiff for this judgment.” Petitioner moved
for reconsideration and/or new trial, but the same was denied by the trial
court. He appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming violation of his right to
due process of law. The CA, however, ruled that petitioner was not denied
due process. It noted that petitioner was given full opportunity to present
his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the proceedings by merely
absenting himself from trials without valid excuses. The appellate court also
ruled that the letters were not privileged communications, since petitioner
was not acting as a member of the Congress when he sent them.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process;
xxx
HELD:
Petition denied.
Petitioner anchors his appeal on the ground that his letters are
covered by privileged communications. He insists that he has the legal,
moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, being then a Congressman duty-bound to insulate his
office and his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful pursuits of his
elder brother.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Moreover, the letters were also not meant to be circulated or
published. They were sent merely to warn the individuals of respondent’s
nefarious activities, and made in good faith and without any actual malice.
Respondent’s testimony that he learned the existence of the letter from
others cannot be countenanced, as no witness corroborated this. At best, it
is only hearsay.
On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he

maintains that his own counsel Atty. Leonardo D. Suario categorically
admitted that he did not know of petitioner’s ailment and thus did not make
the proper manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the hearing was not
of his own volition, but because of his doctor’s strict advice since he earlier
underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass at the St. Luke’s Medical
Center-Heart Institute in Quezon City on 16 July 2001, just a day before the
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was filed. While his counsel
represents him, the latter’s mistakes should not deprive him of his day in
court to present his side.
Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his

counsel. The only exception is when the negligence of the counsel is
so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in
court. In such instance, the remedy is to reopen the case and allow the
party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence. However,
perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule.
Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or

to clarify his medical constraints in court, but he did not do so, despite
knowing full well that he had a pending case in court. For petitioner to feign
and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of an
important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although he
rightfully expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot just sit
back, relax and await the outcome of the case. In keeping with the normal
course of events, he should have taken the initiative “of making the proper
inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his case.”
For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The Court cannot
allow petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel
admitted having no knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will set a
dangerous precedent of never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege
their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain
remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.
Presumption of innocence: Failure of

the apprehending policemen to
comply with the “chain of evidence
rule” under Section 21 of RA No.
9165, including the 24-hour period to
turn over to the Crime Laboratory an
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
alleged confiscated prohibited drugs
against a suspect, entitles the latter
to acquittal based on presumption of
innocence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS

SUMILI, G.R. No. 212160, February 4, 2015
The Facts
On June 30, 2006, an Information was filed before the RTC charging
Sumili of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 stating that “That, on or
about June 7, 2006, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without having been
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell one (1) sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug
commonly known as Shabu for the amount of P200.00…”
According to the prosecution, on June 7, 2006, the Philippine Drug

Enforcement Agency Iligan City Sub-Office received a report from a
confidential informant that Sumili was selling shabu. Acting on the same,
SPO2 Edgardo Englatiera (SPO2 Englatiera) dispatched SPO2 Diosdado
Cabahug (SPO2 Cabahug) to conduct surveillance on Sumili, which
confirmed the truth and veracity of the aforesaid report. Consequently,
SPO2 Englatiera organized a team divided into two (2) groups and briefed
them on the buy-bust operation. He also prepared the marked money,
consisting of one (1) two hundred peso (P200.00) bill, with serial number
L507313.
At around 5:10 in the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team
headed to the target area. Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached
Sumili’s house to buy shabu. After Sumili let the poseur-buyer in, the latter
gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale has been consummated. Almost
immediately, the buy-bust team stormed the house but Sumili escaped by
jumping through the window, throwing the marked money at the roof beside
his house. The poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to
SPO2 Englatiera, who marked the same with “DC-1,” representing the
initials of SPO2 Cabahug. SPO2 Englatiera then prepared a request for
laboratory examination and instructed Non-Uniform Personnel Carlito Ong
(NUP Ong) to bring the sachet together with the request to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong failed to do so on the
same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed. It was only
on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP
Ong was able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP
Crime Laboratory.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Upon examination, it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
The Issue
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sumili’s conviction for
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
The Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In order to convict an accused for violation of RA 9165, or the crime

of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the concurrence
of the following elements: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. Note that what remains material for conviction is the proof that
the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the
court of the corpus delicti. It is also important that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items be preserved. Simply put, the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an accused must
be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement
removes any unnecessary doubts regarding the identity of the evidence.
As held in
People v. Viterbo:
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous

drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
following elements must concur: (a) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, object, and
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the corresponding payment for it. As
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and
key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is
therefore essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug, from the
moment it was seized from the accused up to
the time it was presented in court as proof of the
corpus delicti. Elucidating on the custodial chain
process, the Court, in the case of People v.
Cervantes [(600 Phil. 819, 836 [2009])], held:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would
ideally include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a
way that everyone who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition
in which it was received, and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. x x x.
The chain of custody requirement “ensures that

unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the
evidence are minimized if not altogether removed.”
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
To expand, Section 2129 of RA 9165 provides the “chain of custody

rule” outlining the procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary
value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial
custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take
photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom such items were seized, or the accused’s or the person’s
representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department
of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of
the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP
CrimeLaboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination
purposes.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly
confiscated from Sumili due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody,
thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As may
be gleaned from the established facts, the buy-bust operation was
conducted on June 7, 2006. When SPO2 Englatiera seized the sachet from
Sumili, he marked the same with the initials “DC-1” and, later, he returned
to the police station to prepare the request for the examination of the
sachet’s contents. Thereafter, he ordered NUP Ong to bring the sachet as
well as the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
However, NUP Ong failed to do so within 24 hours after the buy-bust

operation as he only delivered the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory on
June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation. Undoubtedly,
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.
It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal

drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of
the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are
the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as a consequence
of his right to be presumed innocent.
Ref:
IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES AND

VIOLATION OF SECTION 21, RA 9165, ENTITLES
THE ACCUSED OF ACQUITTAL.
• PEOPLE VS. NACUA, January 30,

2013….marking was done at the police station
• PEOPLE VS. SAMMY ABDUL UMAPING,

April 25, 2012…The marking were obviously made
at the police station because it was there that the
police learned of the complete initial of the accused
as “SAU” which was the markings in the seized
shabu.
• PEOPLE VS. MARAORAO, June 20

2012…a maroon bag was confiscated by the police
when one of two (2) persons allegedly selling shabu
escaped. There is doubt on who of the 2 men was
holding it because 1 policeman testified it was
dropped by the man who was able to escape while
another policeman testified that it was dropped by
Maraorao.
• PEOPLE VS. KIMURA, April 27, 2004…the
shabu was marked at the police station;
• PEOPLE VS. ALCUIZAR, April 6, 2011…The

accused was arrested in a buy-bust operation in the
street. After his arrest, the police searched his
house revealing more shabu. The shabu was
marked only in the police station;
• PEOPLE VS. PAJARIN, January 12,

2011…it was marked by the police investigator to
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
whom the seized shabu was turned over. Obviously,
it was marked at the police station;
• PEOPLE VS. ULAT, October 5, 2011---the

private poseur buyer said he affixed his signature to
the sachet of shabu upon seizure but the policeman
claims it was he who marked the same..
• ULEP VS. PEOPLE, June 11, 2011…RTC

Laoag City…The Police Chief Inspector claimed
that he received the tip from an asset so that they
went to arrest the accused. Another policeman
claims that he received the tip from the asset then
they went to arrest the accused;
• PEOPLE VS. GARRY DE LA CRUZ, June 8,

2011 no photographs submitted as evidence; no
inventory;
• BONDAD VS. PEOPLE, December 10,

2008…No pictures
• PEOPLE VS. SAPIA ANDONGAN, June 29,

2010…only one sachet of shabu taken from the
alleged shabu queen. Unbelievable and contrary to
common human experience.
• JULIUS CACAO VS. PEOPLE, January 20,

2010. One policeman claimed in his testimony
that he was the one who delivered a single
sachet of shabu recovered from the accused to
the evidence custodian. Then, another policeman
claimed that it was he who delivered it.
The Reproductive Health Law is

Partly Constitutional and Partly
Unconstitutional. The Constitutional
Rights involved in the Reproductive
Health Law are the Right to life,
freedom of religion, freedom of
expression, right to privacy, family,
etc.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
JAMES IMBONG, ET AL VS. HON. PAQUITO
OCHOA, ET AL., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
and 13 companion cases
Perez, J.
These fourteen (14) cases question the constitutionality of the

Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, RA No.
10354, known as the RH Law because it allegedly violates several
constitutional provisions.
ISSUES RAISED BY THE

PETITIONERS AND HOW THE
SUPREME COURT RESOLVED THEM
1. The right to life (Section 12, Art. II, Constitution) because of

its declared policy allowing the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives despite the policy of the law against abortion.
The petitioners claim that though the law prohibits abortion, it

allows contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother’s womb thus sanctioning
contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation contrary to the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
The respondents are of the view that life begins upon
“implantation” of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
Majority of the members of the Supreme Court are of the view

that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided though the ponente is of the
belief that life begins at “fertilization” or when there is union
between the male sperm and the female ovum..
Based from the deliberation of the framers of the Constitution,

life begins at “conception” under Art. II, Section 12. The
Constitution, however, did not ban contraceptives. Contraceptives
that kill or destroy a fertilized ovum should be deemed abortive but
contraceptives that prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum which takes place before fertilization SHOULD NOT
BE DEEMED ABORTIVE AND THUS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PERMISSIBLE. What the RH Law prohibits are abortifacients.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
2. The right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products because contraceptives are hazardous to
one’s health as it causes cancer and other health problems;
The petitioners claim that the law is unconstitutional because it

allows the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intraurine devices,
injectables, and family products and supplies though the risk of
developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in
women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who
never use them.
Section 15, Art. II, Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Art. XIII as well
as Section 9 of Art. XVI of the Constitution all deals with the right
to health of the citizen and these provisions are all self-executory.
There exists adequate safeguards in the RH Law to ensure the
public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to
the public because the distribution and dispensation of
contraceptives shall still require the prescription of a physician.
3. The right to equal protection is violated because it

discriminates against the poor because it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use.
The argument has no basis. There is real and substantial

distinction. In fact, Section 11, Art. XIII of the Constitution
recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people.
4. The right to free speech and religious freedom are violated

because the law requires a conscientious objector [to the RH
Law] to refer a patient to another who is willing to do a
particular procedure if it is against his belief and it also uses
government money to procure contraceptives.
The Supreme Court held that the provision which states that the
conscientious objector to the RH procedure sought (who could be
a physician) has the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive
health services and information to another medical practitioner
who would be able to provide for the patient’s needs is
unconstitutional. It amounts to requiring a conscientious objector
to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do thereby violating
his or her religious beliefs.
Section 5 of Art. III provides two guarantees: the Establishment

Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The first “principally
prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
religion as against other religions”. It mandates strict neutrality in
affairs among religious groups. Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources
for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this, the State is
prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestation of
one’s belief and faith.
In case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the

State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.
As held in Estrada vs. Escritur, “benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit,
intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom,

the “cpompelling state interest test” is proper. Underlying the
compelling state interest test s the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to
strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court held that IT IS NOT WITHIN ITS

PROVINCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE USE OF
CONTRACEPTIVES OR ONE’S PARTICIPATION IN THE
SUPPORT OF MODERN REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MEASURES
IS MORAL FROM A RELIGIOUS STANDPOINT OR WHETHER
THE SAME IS RIGHT OR WRONG ACCORDING TO ONE’S
DOGMA OR BELIEF. The SC declared that matters dealing with
“faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of civil courts.
Finally, the provision which punishes a health care service

provider who fails or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who
declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient due
to his religious beliefs is unconstitutional for it violates his freedom of
religion.
5. It violates the constitutional provision on involuntary

servitude because medical practitioners are compelled to
provide 48 hours of pro bono services to indigent women to
be accredited under the PHILHEALTH Program, under threat
of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment.
The argument has no merit because the imposition is within the

powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
practitioners with PhilHealth being a mere privilege and not a right.
The practice of medicine is imbued with public interest and it is
both a power and duty of the State to control and regulate such
profession in order to protect and promote public health as it
directly involves the life of the people.
6. It violates the equal protection of the law because it

discriminates against the poor as it makes them the target of
the RH Law that promotes contraceptive use. Likewise, the
IRR which provides that provincial, city or municipal health
officers, chiefs of hospitals, head nurses…who by virtue of
their offices are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of this act CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS is
unconstitutional for violative of the equal protection clause.
Such provision is indeed unconstitutional. There is no real and

substantial distinction why medical practitioners are allowed to refuse
to perform a procedure because it violates their religious beliefs but
the foregoing officials are not allowed to follow their religious beliefs
on the matter. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT
EVEN A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR MAY BE FORCED TO
PERFORM A REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROCEDURE EVEN IF IT
IS AGAINST HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN LIFE-THREATENING
CASES. THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE MOTHER SHALL BE GIVEN
PREFERENCE CONSIDERING THAT REFERRAL TO ANOTHER
MEDICAL PRACTITIONER WOULD AMOUNT TO DENIAL OF
MEDICAL SERVICE WHICH WOULD UNNECESARILY PLACE
THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER IN GRAVE DANGER.
7. The RH Law is avoid for vagueness in violation of the due

process clause because the law suffers from vagueness
when it mentions “private health service provider” who could
be held liable but the same was not defined by the law.
The argument lacks merit since the law defines a public health
care service provider and “private health care service
provider”. The fact that “private health service provider” was
used in Section 7 should not be a cause of confusion since it is
definitely analogous to “private health care service provider”.
8. The RH Law violates the constitutional provisions on the

family when it allows a spouse, without the knowledge and
consent of the other, in undergoing a procedure like
vasectomy or tubal ligation.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
The SC held this is indeed unconstitutional. This is so because
“family” is shared by both spouses. One person cannot found a
family. There should be “mutual decision-making.”
The provision which allows minors or minors who are already

parents or has had miscarriage to undergo a procedure without the
consent of the parents is also unconstitutional. It is precisely in these
situations when the minor needs the comfort, care, advice and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort.
This is based from the constitutional provision giving the parents the
natural and primary rights and rearing their children for civic efficiency
under Section 12, Art. III of the Constitution. BUT ACCESS TO
INFORMATION BY A MINOR ON MATTERS OF REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH PROCEDURES WITHOUT THE PARENTS’ CONSENT IS
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL BUT NOT ACCESS TO
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH PROCEDURES AND MODERN FAMILY
PLANNING METHODS THEMSELVES WITHOUT THE
KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE PARENTS.
9. The law violates academic freedom when Section 24

mandates the teaching of age-and development appropriate
reproductive health education under threat of fine and
imprisonment. This is so because it effectively forces
educational institutions to teach reproductive health
education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to
be taught to their students.
The Supreme Court held that this attack on the said provision
of the RH Law is premature considering that the Dep Ed has
yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive
health education.
10. The RH Law violates the non-delegation of legislative

power;
It does not because the law is already complete in itself and

that no other act is to be done except to implement it.
11. The Implementing Rules and Regulations is invalid as it

changes the definition of “abortifacient” which is “any drug
or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” as
defined in the law to “any drug or device that PRIMARILY
INDUCES ABORTION OR THE DESTRUCTION OF A FETUS
INSIDE THE MOTHER’S WOMB or the prevention of the
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb” as per said IRR.
The argument if valid. The IRR is invalid. The inclusion of the

word “primarily” is ultra vires.
12. The RH Law violates the ONE SUBJECT rule under Section
26 [1], Art. VI of the Constitution;
The petitioners claim that while the subject of the law in its title
is REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RESPONSIBLE
PARENTHOOD, but its true intent is to act as a population
control measure in violation of due process.
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners that the whole
idea of contraception pervades in the entire RH Law because it
provides for a full range of family planning products and methods
but also has provisions on pre-natal and post natal care. Be that
as it may, the same does not violate the one subject rule citing
CAWALING, JR. VS. COMELEC AND REP. FRANCIS JOSEPH
ESCUDERO where the Supreme Court held that “the one title-one
subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the eneactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. THE
RULE IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED WITH IF THE TITLE IS
COMPREHENSIVE ENOUGH AS TO INCLUDE THE GENERAL
OBJECT WHICH THE STATUTE SEEKS TO EFFECT, AND
WHERE, AS HERE, THE PERSONS INTERESTED ARE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE, SCOPE AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE PROPOSED LAW AND ITS OPERATION.” As such,
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth in achieving sustainable human development.
13. The RH Law violates the Natural law.
The Supreme Court held that the court does not duly recognize it
as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Its only
guidepost is the Constitution.
14. The RH Law violates the autonomy of local government

and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao because
they are also tasked to implement the RH Law.
The said contention has no merit. Local autonomy is not

absolute. The national government has still the say when it comes
to national priority programs which the local government is called
upon to implement like the RH Law. Congress cannot be
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on
all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.
Most provisions of the “Online Libel

Law” are constitutional and not
violative of the freedom of
expression. Other provisions are
violative of the freedom of
expression, right to privacy and
search and seizure provisions of the
Constitution.
JESUS DISINI ET AL. VS. THE SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335, February 18,
2014, and companion cases
Abad, J.
THE FACTS:
The above cases seek to declare as unconstitutional the following

provisions of RA No. 10175, the Cybercrime prevention Act of 2012:
1. Section 4 [a] (1) on Illegal Access;

2. Section 4 [a] (3) on Data interference;
3. Section 4 [a] (6) on Cyber-squatting;
4. Section 4 [b] (3) on Identity Theft;
5. Section 4 [c] (1) on Cybersex;
6. Section 4 [c] (2) on Pornography;
7. Section 4 [c] (3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications;
8. Section 4 [c] (4) on Libel;
9. Section 5 on Aiding or abetting and attempt in the
commission of cybercrimes;
10. Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher;
11. Section 7 on the prosecution both under the Revised
Penal Code and RA No. 10175;
12. Section 8 on penalties;
13. Section 12 on real-time collection of traffic data;
14. Section 13 on preservation of computer data;
15. Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of
computer data;
16. Section 17 on destruction of computer data;
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
17. Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer
data;
18. Section 20 on Obstruction of justice;
19. Section 24 on cybercrime investigation and coordinating
center (CICC); and
20. Section 26 [a] on CICC’s powers on the crime of Libel.
21. Some petitioners likewise raised the constitutionality of
related Articles 353, 354, and 362 of the RPC on the crime
of Libel.
Held:
1. Section 4 [a] (1) on Illegal Access provides that it is an

“offense against the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of computer data systems” for “the access to the whole or
any part of a computer system without right”.
The said provision is CONSTITUTIONAL. The SC held that

nothing in the said Section calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom like speech is
involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act---
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a
universally condemned conduct.
[NOTE: The strict scrutiny standard deals with the test on the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or
persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden, in these cases, is on the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest. Later on, the strict scrutiny standard was used
to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion
from its earlier applications to equal protection. (WHITE LIGHT
CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, 576 SCRA 416)]
2. Section 4 [a] (3) provides that it is an “offense against the

confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data
systems” for “the intentional or reckless alteration,
damaging, deletion, or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document or electronic data message, without
right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
The petitioners claims that this section suffers from “overbreadth”

in that while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and
deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedom.
Under the “overbreadth doctrine”, a proper governmental purpose,

constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by
means that unnecessarily sweep its subject BROADLY , thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms (SOUTHERN
HEMISPHERE VS. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, 632 SCRA 146).
Section 4 [a] (3) does not encroach on these freedoms because it
SIMPLY PUNISHES WHAT ESSENTIALLY IS A FORM OF
VANDALISM, THE ACT OF WILLFULLY DESTROYING WITHOUT
RIGHT THE THINGS THAT BELONGS TO OTHERS, IN THIS
CASE, THEIR COMPUTER DATA, ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT, OR
LECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE. SUCH ACT HAS NO CONNECTION
TO GUARANTEED FREEDOMS. THERE IS NO FREEDOM TO
DESTROY OTHER PEOPLE’S COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND
PRIVATE DOCUMENTS.
Of course, all penal laws have an inherent chilling effect on the

citizens. But to prevent the State from enacting laws of this nature
would render the State powerless in addressing and penalizing
socially harmful conduct.
3. Section 4 [a] (6) or “cyber-squatting” provides that it is an

“offense against the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of computer data systems” for “the acquisition of domain
name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
the reputation and deprive others from registering the same,
if such domain is: [i] similar, identical or confusingly similar
to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name
registration; [ii] identical or in any way similar to the name of
the person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and [iii] acquired without right or with intellectual
property interests in it.”
The petitioners claim that the said provision violates the equal
protection clause because it will cause a user using his real name to
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of
another in satire, parody or any other literary device. The law is
constitutional because the law is reasonable in penalizing him for
acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same. The challenge based on equal
protection is baseless.
4. Section 4 [a] (6) on “Identity theft” punishes the “intentional

acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
deletion of identifying information belonging to another,
whether natural or juridical, without right; Provided, that if no
damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be
one degree lower.
The petitioners claim that this provision violates the due process,
privacy of correspondence and freedom of the press provisions of the
Constitution.
The right to privacy or the right to be let alone, is created by the

constitutional provisions on the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures and the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence.
In this case, the right to privacy is not violated. The law punishes
those who acquire or use such identifying information without the
right, implicitly to cause damage. The usual identifying information
regarding a person includes his name, citizenship, his residence
address, hisa contact number, his place and date of birth, the name
of his spouse, if any, his occupation, and similar data.
The claim that the same is overbreadth will not hold water since
the specific conducts prohibited do not intrude into guaranteed
freedoms like speech. It simply regulates acquisition, use, misuse,
transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of personal identification
data of another. THERE IS NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
ACQUIRE ANOTHER’S PERSONAL DATA.
5. Section 4 [c] (1) on Cybersex or the “wilful engagement,

maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of
any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity,
with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.”
The petitioner claims that the above section violates the freedom
of expression clause of the Constitution because they fear that
private communications of sexual character between husband and
wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the
penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done “for favor”
in cyberspace.
The said section is not unconstitutional where it stands a

construction that it applies only to persons engaged in the business of
maintaining, controlling or operating, directly or indirectly, the
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of
a computer system as Congress has intended.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
This is based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee
of Congress which show a lack of intent to penalize a “private
showing between and among two private persons…although that
may be a form of obscenity to some. The understanding of those who
drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of “engaging in a
business” is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex.” The Act
actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, pornography for favor and
consideration which includes interactive prostitution and pornography
via the Webcam.
6. Section 4 [c] (2) on Pornography or the pornography

described in RA No. 9775 committed through a computer
system provided that the penalty imposable shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for in RA No. 9775.
This is constitutional because of the “potential uncontrolled

proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded
in the cyberspace is incalculable.
7. Section 4 © (3) on unsolicited commercial communication or

“spam” is constitutional though transmitting spam amounts
to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out
spam enters the recipient’s domain without permission. But
these spam do not reduce the efficiency of computers. They can
be read or deleted outright by the recipient. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expressions and do not
violate the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
8. Whether the Libel provisions of the Revised Penal Code and

Section 4 © 4 of the Cyber Crime Law are unconstitutional.
The SC held that these are constitutional because freedom of

expression is not absolute and the government has the right to
protect the citizens from defamation.
9. Section 5 which deals with “aiding or abetting in the

commission of cybercrime” is valid but unconstitutional if it is
to be applied to people who “Like”, “share” or “Comment” to a post.
This is so because they are not the “author” of the libellous
articles.
10. Section 6 and Section 8 which imposes a stiffer penalty on

cyber Libel is constitutional. Fixing of penalties for crimes is a
legislative prerogative. Further, the offender in using the internet
often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or
cause greater harm. As such, the higher penalties appear to be
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The distinction,
therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes. It
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
does not violate the equal protection clause by reason of the
graver penalty. If the same article, however, was published in print
and also posted online or vice versa, CHARGING THE
OFFENDER UNDER BOTH LAWS WOULD BE A BLATANT
VIOLATION OF THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. Likewise, charging the offender under Section 4 © 2
and the Anti-Child Pornography Act separately would likewise be
tantamount to double jeopardy.
11. Section 12 which allows law enforcement authorities, WITH

DUE CAUSE, to collect or record by technical or electronic
means traffic data in real-time which includes the
communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration or type of underlying service, BUT NOT ITS
CONTENT NOR IDENTITIES,
The said provision IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The authority given

to the authorities is too sweeping and lacks restraint. Nothing can
prevent law enforcement authorities holding these data in their hands
from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the
data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked
information, or worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these
agencies. The power is virtually limitless enabling the authorities to
engage in fishing expedition choosing whatever communication they
want based on “due cause”. This provision violates a person’s right to
privacy. In WHALEN VS. ROES, 429 US 589, the United States
Supreme Court classified PRIVACY into two categories: [1]
decisional privacy and [2] informational privacy. Decisional
privacy involves the right to independence in making certain
important decisions while informational privacy refers to the interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Informational privacy is
violated by Section 12. Further, informational privacy has two
aspects: [1] the right not to have private information disclosed,
and [2] the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.
In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to
privacy, the Supreme Court had laid down a two-fold test. The first is
the subjective test where one claiming the right have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is
an objective test where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.
12. Section 13 on preservation of computer data for a

minimum period of 6 months by the service provider is
constitutional because the service provider has no obligation
from keeping said data forever, The user ought to have a copy
of the said data and he could keep it. No violation of his right.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
13. Section 14 which allows disclosure of a data obtained
through a search warrant is constitutional since it does not
violate the search and seizure provision nor the privacy of
communication since the same is done only after JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION.
14. Section 15 which provides for securing a computer

system, make and retain a copy of the computer data, and
maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data
AFTER THE SEIZURE BY VIRTUE OF A SEARCH WARRANT is
constitutional. It merely enumerates the duties of the law
enforcement authorities to ensure the preservation of computer
system or data after seizure based from a search warrant.
15. Section 17 which provides for the destruction of computer data

under preservation and examination obtained by means of a
search warrant is valid in order to prevent the storage system of
the service provider for overloading. Such destruction of
computer data does not violate the right of a person to due
process of law for deprivation of property because if wants to
preserve the same, he could save them in his computer.
16. Section 19 which authorizes the Department of Justice

to restrict or block access to computer data IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for it violates the search and seizure
provision and freedom of expression. This would in effect
allows the government to seize and places a computer data
under its control and disposition without a warrant. The DOJ
Order could not supplant a judicial search warrant. It would
make the government the judge, jury and executioner rolled
into one. It also restrains free speech.
17. Sections 24 and 26 (a) on the creation of a Cybercrime

Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) is not a undue
delegation of legislative power because the law is already
complete in itself. It is just mandated to formulate and implement a
national cybersecurity plan.
LITO BAUTISTA vs. SHARON CUNETA-

PANGILINAN, G. R. No. 189754, October 24,
2012
The petitioners who are editor and assistant editor of the tabloid
Bandera were charged of two (2) counts of Libel before the RTC of
Mandaluyong City based on the complaint of actress Sharon Cuneta-
Pangilinan.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4,
2002 reads:
That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001,

in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with x x x with deliberate intent to bring
SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public
dishonor, shame and contempt, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice
and ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid),
with circulation in Metro Manila, which among
others have the following insulting and slanderous
remarks, to wit:
MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!
Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-

actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-
dead. Mukhang totoo yata yung sinasabi ng
kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.
Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong

hindi ito totoo. xxx Dios mio perdon, what she
gets to see are those purportedly biting
commentaries about her katabaan and
kaplastikan but she has simply refused to
acknowledge the good reviews we’ve done on
her.
xxx
In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4,

2002 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001,

in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officers of Bandera Publishing x x x with
deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-
PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and
contempt did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to
publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Metro Manila, which, among others, have the
following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
“She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as

a senator because when that happens,
mawawalan siya ng hold sa kanya,” our caller
opines. Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is
treating her husband like a wimp.
“In public,” our source goes on tartly, “pa kiss-

kiss siya. Pa embrace-embrace pero kung
silang dalawa [na] lang parang kung sinong
sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko.” My God
Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really
intelligent as compared to Sharon who
appears to be brain dead most of the time.
Upon arraignment, petitioners each entered a plea of not guilty.

Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the cases ensued.
On November 14, 2006, after the prosecution rested its case,

petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer
to Evidence. In their Demurrer to Evidence, which was appended to the
said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's evidence
failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor,
respectively, of the publication Bandera; that that the subject articles
written by Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence of malice.
On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners’

Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the above criminal cases. On August
19, 2008, respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the RTC Order dated April 25,
2008 which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the
dismissal of the cases against them.
In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's

petition, thereby reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25,
2008 and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception
of petitioners' evidence. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009.
Hence, petitioners filed this petition claiming that the petition for
Certiorari filed by Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan violated their right against
double jeopardy.
Held:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008,
granting the Demurrer to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As
such, the prosecution can no longer interpose an appeal to the CA, as it
would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that respondent's
petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the
allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its
jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the
nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a
petition for certiorari with the CA.
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural

misstep, and the view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to
represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court
and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all
other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The
OSG is the law office of the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the

dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor
General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the
offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the
civil liability of the accused is concerned.
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which
the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the
private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally
feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal.
The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA
essentially questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the
civil aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition should have been filed
by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the
CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have been
outrightly dismissed by the CA.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Finally, although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to
reverse and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would
violate petitioners’ constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy.
Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously
considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the
reversal of the Order of the RTC.
The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be

exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the
accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be vindicated of
the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is
acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more
remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be
wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus,
judges are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties as members of the Bench, always bearing in
mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the individuals
who come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could
be possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the
appropriate actions against them.
May an accused charged of “selling”

marijuana in the criminal information
be convicted of “possession” of
marijuana without violating his
constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation
against him?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHAD

MANANANSALA, G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013
The information filed on October 20, 1994 against the accused

alleges:
“That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day

of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being lawfully authorized did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage
in selling, delivering, giving away to another and
distributing more or less 750 grams or ¾ kilo of
marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited
drugs, found in his possession and control.
CONTRARY TO LAW. “
To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed that on October

18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted
a test-buy operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana.
On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained
a search warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant
No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in
Manansala’s residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay
East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City.
SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied

by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac,
conducted the search of Manansala’s house at around 5:30 a.m. on
October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana
leaves subject of the information, which the search team recovered from a
wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of
P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills bearing serial numbers
SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used during the test buy.
After trial, accused was convicted of “possession” of marijuana only

under Section 8 of RA No. 6425 instead of Section 4. The said decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Was his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of

accusation against him violated when he was charged of “sale” of
marijuana under Section 4 of RA No. 6425 but was convicted of
“possession under Section 8 of the same law--- which entitles him to
acquittal?
Held:
The crime charged in the information was clearly for violation of

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 or “sale” of prohibited drugs, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Arraigned under such information,
Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty of the
crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for violation of Section 8,
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
The accused now questions said conviction based on the alleged

violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be
had under the present circumstances, the established principle is that
possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the
seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the
prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are
probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In this
case , it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana
confiscated from accused-appellant were the same prohibited drugs
subject of the original Information. In this light, the trial court and the Court
of Appeals committed no reversible error in convicting the accused-
appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article
II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine

whether the conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the
information did not allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the
information alleged, was not in violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against him.
The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in
the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court
(1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes
that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter.
Non-compliance of Section 21 of RA
No. 9165 entitles the accused to
acquittal based on his constitutional
presumption of innocence.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAMMY

UMIPANG, G.R. No. 190321, April 25, 2012
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named

Sam was selling drugs along Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village,
Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the [Station Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special
Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was
dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer
(PO) 2] Gasid was assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a
₱500.00 marked money. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant
sauntered the length of the street while the other members of the team
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
strategically positioned themselves. The confidential informant saw the
man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential informant and PO2
Gasid then approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said
“Sam, pa-iskor kami.” Sam replied “Magkano ang iiskorin nyo?” The
confidential informant said “Five hundred pesos.” Sam took out three (3)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price
tags–500, 300, and 100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the
marked ₱500.00 to Sam who received the same.
Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid immediately

grabbed and arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team
joined them. PO1 Ragos handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets
containing the same white crystalline substance were recovered from Sam.
PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials “SAU” [which stood for
Sammy A. Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of
accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith brought to the police station where
he was booked, investigated and identified as accused-appellant Sammy
Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the
crime laboratory for testing. The specimens all tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as “shabu,” a
dangerous drug.
THERE WAS NO INVENTORY NOR PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN

BEFORE THE CONFISCATED ITEMS WERE BROUGHT TO THE CRIME
LABORATORY FOR TESTING.
Despite the above lapses, accused was convicted by the RTC and
the Court of Appeals.
Before the Supreme Court, accused moves for his acquittal because
said non-compliance of Section 21, RA No. 9165 is fatal and in furtherance
of his constitutional presumption of innocence.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of
the RTC Joint Decision in all respects because there is no evidence of
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely
against accused-appellant, the testimony must be given full faith and
credence.
Held:
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a
buy-bust operation conducted by the SAID-SOTF.
Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance

of the official duties of law enforcers, we stress that the step-by-step
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which
cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The
provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address
potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed
may be life imprisonment.
Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall
be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused. Otherwise, “the procedure set out in the law will be mere lip
service.” The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with
defects, which raises doubts on the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items from accused-appellant.
First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the

seized items. According to his testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials
of the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-
appellant in order to mark the confiscated sachets. The marking was
done immediately after Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful
perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal that
his prior knowledge of the complete initials of accused-appellant,
standing for the latter’s full name, was not clearly established.
Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had

prior knowledge of the complete name of accused-appellant,
including the middle initial, which enabled the former to mark the
seized items with the latter’s complete initials. This suspicious,
material inconsistency in the marking of the items raises questions as
to how PO2 Gasid came to know about the initials of Umipang prior to
the latter’s statements at the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud
of doubt on the issues of where the marking really took place and
whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who
asked accused-appellant about the latter’s personal circumstances,
including his true identity, and that the questioning happened when
accused-appellant was already at the police station.
Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient

effort to seek the third-party representatives enumerated under
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the law, the inventory and
photographing of seized items must be conducted in the
presence of a representative from the media, from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public
official.
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical

inventory and the marking of the seized items does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact
the barangay chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is
no indication that they contacted other elected public officials. Neither do
the records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch with any
DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable
reason for failing to do so – especially considering that it had sufficient time
from the moment it received information about the activities of the accused
until the time of his arrest. Thus, we find that there was no genuine and
sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police officers to look for
the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable – without so much
Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of

Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to Section 21(1)
of R.A. 9165. As pointed out by the defense during trial, the Certificate of
Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of PO2 Gasid – the
arresting officer who prepared the certificate – thus making the certificate
defective. Also, the prosecution neither submitted any photograph of the
seized items nor offered any reason for failing to do so. We reiterate that
these requirements are specifically outlined in and required to be
implemented by Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.
Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not
automatically exonerate an accused from the crimes of which he or she
was convicted especially true when the lapses in procedure were
“recognized and explained in terms of justifiable grounds.” There must
also be a showing “that the police officers intended to comply with the
procedure but were thwarted by some justifiable consideration/reason.”
However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards
prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is
generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution
presented in evidence. This uncertainty cannot be remedied by simply
invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural
safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official
duties. As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have failed to fully
establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on
the criminal liability of the accused which entitles him to acquittal based on
his constitutional presumption of innocence.
When the evidence is susceptible to two

(2) interpretations, one consistent with
the guilt of the accused and the other,
his innocence, the presumption of
innocence was not overcome and the
accused is entitled to acquittal as a
matter of right.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
PEOPLE VS. ZAFRA MARAORAO, G.R. NO.
174369, June 20, 2012
Appellant was charged under an Information dated January 4, 2001 filed

before the RTC of Manila for illegal possession of shabu.
On March 19, 2001, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to

the offense charged against him. Thereafter, trial ensued.
For the prosecution, PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November

29, 2000, they received reliable information at Police Station No. 8 of
the Western Police District (WPD) that an undetermined amount
of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early
morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m.,
he and PO2 Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman
Gamit went to the Islamic Center. While walking along Rawatun Street in
Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each other. Upon noticing them, one
ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to
apprehend him.
Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on
the pavement. He was about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1
Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The man was later identified as appellant
Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the contents of the
bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline
substance, which they suspected to be shabu. At the police station, the
investigator marked the plastic sachet “ZM-1” in the presence of the police
officers.
The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
laboratory chemical analysis. When examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp.
Miladenia O. Tapan, the 1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance
gave a positive result to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug. Her findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-
1121-00 .
In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at

around 7:00 a.m., he was going to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the
Islamic Center to get a letter from his mother. He went there early because
he had to report for work at the Port Area in Manila at 8:00 a.m. On his
way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house number
which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed
his bag down. When they turned around, they saw four men in civilian attire
walking briskly. He only found out that they were police officers when they
chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran away, the man dropped
his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware
of what was inside the bag .
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
He was convicted by the RTC of illegal possession of shabu which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Held:
Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This

is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Now, in order to convict appellant for illegal possession of a

dangerous drug, or the shabu in this case, the prosecution evidence must
prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the appellant
was in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or
dangerous drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3)
the appellant freely and consciously possessed the drug. In this case, the
fact of possession by appellant of the bag containing the shabu was not
established in the first place.
The testimony of PO3 Vigilla reveals a glaring discrepancy which

both the trial and the appellate courts overlooked. In their Joint Affidavit,
arresting officers PO3 Vigilla, PO2 Abella, PO1 dela Cruz and SPO1
Gamit stated that they spotted two unidentified persons standing and
seemingly conversing a few meters ahead of them. “However, when one of
them noticed our presence, he hastily r[a]n away heading towards the
Muslim Center leaving behind the other person and a maroon colored bag
with ‘Adidas’ marking in the pavement.” In other words, the maroon bag
was left behind by the man who ran away. But at the trial, PO3 Vigilla
testified during direct examination that they spotted two persons talking to
each other, and upon noticing them, “one of them scampered away and
was chased by my companions while the other one dropped a bag, sir .
Presumably, under his testimony, the bag was now held by the one who
did not run away referring to the accused-appellant. Later, in another part
of his testimony, he again changed this material fact. When he was asked
by Prosecutor Senados as to who between the two persons they saw
talking to each other ran away, PO3 Vigilla categorically answered, “[t]he
one who is holding a bag, sir .
Such material inconsistency leaves much to be desired about the

credibility of the prosecution’s principal witness and casts reasonable doubt
as to appellant’s guilt for it renders questionable whether he in fact held the
bag with intention to possess it and its contents.
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond

reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged and the complicity
or participation of the accused. While a lone witness’ testimony is sufficient
to convict an accused in certain instances, the testimony must be clear,
consistent, and credible—qualities we cannot ascribe to this
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
case. Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be
believed, it must both come from a credible witness and be credible in itself
– tested by human experience, observation, common knowledge and
accepted conduct that has evolved through the years. Clearly from the
foregoing, the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant was indeed in possession of shabu, and that he freely
and consciously possessed the same.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a

basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place
on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the
offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence is
susceptible to two (2) interpretations, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other his innocence, the prosecution’s evidence failed to
overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to
an acquittal.
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment.

Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even
though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution
presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy
of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and
exoneration granted as a matter of right .
Private complainant could not file a Motion

for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court
Decision acquitting the accused based on
misappreciation of facts without violating
the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.
PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No.

176864, January 18, 2011 and LEJANO VS.
PEOPLE, G. R. No. 176389, January 18, 2011
On December 14, 2010 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of

the Court of Appeals (CA) and RTC of Paranaque and acquitted the
accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong
of the charges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an

immediate relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision,
claiming that it “denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously
misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a
manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave
abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses.”
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered

because it places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution
provides in Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in

jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in

jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been
absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal
cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is
no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he
has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the State for a
sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm the accused
in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:
[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting

the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second
judgment for the same offense would arm the government
with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision
therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty. Society’s awareness of the heavy
personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the
individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to
limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of
criminal laws.
Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an

acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when
the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting
in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases,
the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65.
He ascribes grave error on the Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a
credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
evidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the
Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on
such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a
repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction. The judgment
acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed. Double
jeopardy has set in.
State’s right to due process of law;

when the State may validly question
by Certiorari under Rule 65 a
decision acquitting and accused or to
increase the penalty without violating
the rule against Double jeopardy
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN, IMELDA MARCOS, JOSE
CONRADO BENITEZ and GILBERT DULAY, G.R.
No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012
The private respondents were the accused in two criminal

informations filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging them with the crime
of malversation of public funds, defined and penalized under Article 217,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The charges arose
from the transactions that the respondents participated in, in their official
capacities as Minister and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Human
Settlements (MHS) under the MHS’ Kabisig Program.
After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases

ensued. The prosecution’s chief evidence was based on the lone testimony
of Commission of Audit (COA) Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the
documentary evidence used in the audit examination of the subject funds.
COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not conduct a
physical inventory of these motor vehicles; it based its report on the
information given by the Presidential Task Force. She emphasized that the
audit team found it highly irregular that the motor vehicles were registered
in the name of University of Life (UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for
this reason, she believed that no proper liquidation was made of these
vehicles by MHS.
After COA Auditor Cortez’ testimony, the prosecution submitted its

formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
Subsequently, separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by

way of demurrers to evidence, were filed by Zagala and the respondents on
November 15, 1997, January 5, 1998 and January 28, 1998; on January
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
27, 1998, the prosecution filed a Manifestation stating that it was not
opposing the demurrers to evidence.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and

acquitted the respondents in its assailed decision dated March 22,
2002. In dismissing these criminal cases, the Sandiganbayan found no
evidence of misappropriation of the subject funds in the two criminal cases
considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit report.
The Issues
1. Whether the prosecutor’s actions and/or omissions (of not

presenting other witnesses and for not opposing the Demurrer to
Evidence of the accused) in these cases effectively deprived the
State of its right to due process; and
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in

granting the demurrers to evidence of the respondents [and as
such, double jeopardy has not set in] for a review by the Supreme
Court of the guilt or innocence of the private respondents.
Held:
The petitioner claims that the State was denied due process because
of the nonfeasance committed by the special prosecutor in failing to
present sufficient evidence to prove its case. It claims that the prosecutor
failed to protect the State’s interest in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. To support its position, petitioner cites the case
of Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 345, where the Court
nullified the dismissal of the criminal cases due to the serious nonfeasance
committed by the public prosecutor.
The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that resulted
in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the State’s interest when it took the
demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the presentation of
additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public
funds involved and the special prosecutor’s failure to oppose the demurrers
to evidence.
As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant

amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused
would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy
(PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 559 SCRA 449). Notably, the
proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on
errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes
two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
of jurisdiction, PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 491 SCRA 185, June
16, 2000; and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party’s due process
rights, PEOPLE VS. VELASCO, 340 SCRA 207, SEPTEMBER 13, 2000.
A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the
ground of denial of due process implies an invalid or otherwise void
judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of
acquittal is considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and
does not have the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double
jeopardy will not lie in such a case.
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan

granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence may be done via the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In the present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of

discretion on the Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence,
without requiring the presentation of additional evidence and despite the
lack of basis for the grant traceable to the special prosecutor’s
conduct. The special prosecutor’s conduct allegedly also violated the
State’s due process rights.
The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to
give effective legal representation to enable the State to fully present its
case against the respondents, citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals where
we considered the following factual circumstances - (1) the public
prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced
was insufficient; (2) the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other
witnesses available to take the stand; (3) the knowledge of the trial court
of the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence when the demurrer to
evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial court’s failure to require the
presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the demurrer to
evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted in the denial of the
State’s right to due process, attributable to the inaction of the public
prosecutor and/or the trial court.
In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special
prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available evidence or that other
evidence could be secured.
We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this Court is

as much a judge in behalf of an accused-defendant whose liberty is in
jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of the State, for the purpose of
safeguarding the interests of society. Therefore, unless the petitioner
demonstrates, through evidence and records, that its case falls within the
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
narrow exceptions from the criminal protection of double jeopardy, the
Court has no recourse but to apply the finality-of-acquittal rule.
Double jeopardy when not applicable in a

petition under Rule 65 to increase the
penalty as a result of grave abuse of
discretion by the trial court.
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012 AND
people of the Philippines vs. THE HOMORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 154954, February 1, 2012
[THE LENNY VILLA HAZING CASE]
FACTS
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de

Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar “Bogs”
Asuncion, Samuel “Sam” Belleza, Bienvenido “Bien” Marquez III, Roberto
Francis “Bert” Navera, Geronimo “Randy” Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and
Leonardo “Lenny” Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some
members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law
School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner.
Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan,
who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The
latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they
could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three
days. After their “briefing,” they were brought to the Almeda Compound in
Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan

“initiation rites.” These rites included the “Indian Run,” which required the
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the “Bicol Express,” which obliged the
neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the
“Rounds,” in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by
the “auxiliaries” (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to
neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist
blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
the “Auxies’ Privilege Round,” in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity
members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) arrived and
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to “paddling”
and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in
breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by

Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the

following 35 Aquilans
After trial, the court held that:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,

Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim,
Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and
Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony

Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) –
were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to
20 days of arresto menor.
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio

Villareal – were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The People of the Philippines filed a Petition under Rule 65

questioning the acquittal and the lower penalty on the four (4) accused and
also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to
the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court’s
finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the
commission of the crime.
Held:
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal

justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense,
and the case is terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
manner without the consent of the accused – the accused cannot again be
charged with the same or an identical offense. This principle is founded
upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil
law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and
undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the State from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed
either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an
appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant’s
express consent.
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower
court’s acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the
following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial, People vs. COURT OF APPEALS
& GALICIA, 516 SCRA 383 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion. The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross
abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse
of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to
dispense justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of
double jeopardy. The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which
seeks the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of
Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence. The Solicitor General also assails the finding that
the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation
of Lenny Villa’s consent to hazing. In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we
reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties. In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be
attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ
of certiorari. Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to
deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
The assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug – the
four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries has to be modified.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the

exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and
Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature.
However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise
means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical
attendance required. xxx And when proof of the said period is absent,
the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical
injuries.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in
and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own
findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple
injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should
redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction
of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to
suffer cardiac arrest.
The CA Decision was therefore MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson were found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
The Decision of acquittal could not be reviewed for it would violate the accused’s
right against double jeopardy since it was not done with grave abused of discretion nor
violated the State’s right to due process of law.
A case for reckless imprudence resulting to

homicide, slight physical injuries and
damage to property may not be the subject
of more than one information. Acquittal or
conviction in either bars prosecution in the
other based on the right against double
j e opa r dy .
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA

ROWENA MODESTOSAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City,
and EVANGELINE PONCE, G.R. No. 172716,
November 17, 2010
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler

(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband
Deputy Executive Secretary Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in

Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two

cases.
Issue: Is the right against double jeopardy violated?
Held:
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No.

82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366 . Double jeopardy has set in.
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be “twice put in

jeopardy of punishment for the same offense” protects him from, among
others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior
verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information. It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case
No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No.
82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the “same offense.” Petitioner
adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the
same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding
that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property “as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not.”
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its

Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
As held by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a

subsequent prosecution for “serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence” because of the accused’s prior acquittal
of “slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,” with both charges
grounded on the same act, the Court explained:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act.
For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus
the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity
of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of

multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act

defined as a felony but “the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,” a single mental
attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Equal protection clause was violated when

the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
singled out only the officials and
employees of the “previous administration”
to be investigated for graft and corruption
and other crimes committed by public
officers.
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE

TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 192935 :
December 7, 2010
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
2010
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby

created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily
seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate
reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of
the people, committed by public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to
be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice
shall be served without fear or favor.
The Philippine Truth Commission’s (PTC) primary task to investigate reports of

graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION,
and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman.
The petitioner claims that Executive Order No. 1 is unconstitutional for violative of
the equal protection clause as it discriminates the public officials under the
administration of former President Gloria Arroyo even though there are reports of
corruptions also in the administrations before that of Pres. Arroyo.
Held:
Executive Order No. 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in
a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of
undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases
of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration of former President Gloria Arroyo is plain, patent and
manifest.
That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional
as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the
assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even
mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative
commissions created in the past. “The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful
and intentional discrimination.”
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Whether the grant of COLA to military
and police personnel to the exclusion
of other government employees
violates the equal protection clause.
VICTORIA C. GUTIERREZ, et al vs. DEPARTMENT

OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, G.R. No.
153266, March 18, 2010
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the

Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, to rationalize the
compensation of government employees. Its Section 12 directed the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being
enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted
certain additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from
such consolidation particularly those in the Armed Forces and the
Philippine National Police.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and

police personnel to the exclusion of other
government employees violates the equal
protection clause.
Held:
Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and

police to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The continued grant of COLA to the uniformed personnel to the

exclusion of other national government officials does run afoul the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal
protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the

following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the
same class.
Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel

differently from other national government officials. Being in charged of the
actual defense of the State and the maintenance of internal peace and
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country.
They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost
areas. Since their basic pay does not vary based on location, the
continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the effects of living
in higher cost areas.
Is the provision of the Omnibus

Election Code declaring appointive
officials deemed resigned from their
positions upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy while
elected officials are not violative of
the equal protection clause?
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO TOLENTINO,

JR. VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February
22, 2010
The main issue in this case is whether or not the second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678, providing that appointive officials are deemed automatically resigned
from their jobs upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy (while the
elected officials are not) violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court through Justice Antonio

Nachura held that the questioned provisions of the above-mentioned laws
are unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause. The
COMELEC moved for a reconsideration of the said Decision.
Held:
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not

absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials

and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of
the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled
to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Accused are entitled to acquittal despite the
positive identification of a witness who is
not credible and whose testimony is full of
inconsistencies and contrary to common
human experience
PEOPLE VS. HUBERT WEBB ET AL, G.R. No.

176864, December 14, 2010 and LEJANO VS.
PEOPLE, G. R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela,

nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in
Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a
group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial
court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI

announced that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica
M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime.
She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy”
Lejano, Artemio “Dong” Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio “Pyke”
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel “Ging” Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the
culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessory after the fact.
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided

over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since
Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. The prosecution
presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the
crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi
appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the
ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of
witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In
addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation
for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the

events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It
noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony,
undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained
unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22,
1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect
her former boyfriend, accused Estrada and convicted all the accused..
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Held:
Since Jessica Alfaro’s testimony is contrary to common human

experience and full of inconsistencies, her positive identification could not
prevail over the documented alibis of Hubert Webb. Positive identification
to be superior over denial and alibi, it should come from a credible witness.
Inconsistent testimonies of
prosecution’s witnesses on material
points entitles the accused of
right to be presumed innocent.
ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008
On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house
of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos
Sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to
P600,000.00 . The Cabugao Police applied for a search warrant which was
granted by the MTC One of the target premises was the residence of
petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime.
On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the

premises of petitioner's house located in Sitio Padual, Barangay Pug-os,
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and
ammunitions which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and,
consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651-K,
for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner
before the RTC.
The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the

enforcement of the search warrant against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm
was found in the latter's house. In particular, SPO1 Cabaya testified that while
poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the lower
shelf. The gun is a .38 caliber revolver with five live ammunitions which he
immediately turned over to his superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.
Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and
his wife Lorna assert that petitioner does not own a gun Lorna testified that she
saw a “military” man planting the gun.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated July 7, 1999, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error in
giving little credence to his defense that the firearm found in his residence was
planted by the policemen. He also alleges material inconsistencies in the
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which amounted to
failure by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
therefore entitled to acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of
innocence.
HELD:
The accused should be acquitted.
In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of SPO1

Cabaya, who testified that he discovered the subject firearm in a closed cabinet
inside the former's house. The trial court brushed aside petitioner's defense of
denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC justified giving full credence to
Cabaya's testimony on the principles that the latter is presumed to have
performed his official duties regularly; that he had no ill motive to frame-up
petitioner; and that his affirmative testimony is stronger than petitioner's negative
testimony.
The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually

entered the house and conducted the search, who “discovered” the gun, and who
witnessed the “discovery” are material matters because they relate directly to a
fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the house of
petitioner; or to a fact to which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made
as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue.
The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several

contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses. Especially damaged is the
credibility of SPO1 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on material points jibes
with those of the other prosecution witnesses. The inconsistencies are material
as they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not SPO1 Cabaya
really found a firearm in the house of petitioner.
SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other
policemen, among whom were SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe
Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he does not remember.
While searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet
near the door. He said that SPO1 Jara was standing right behind him, at a
distance of just one meter, when he (Cabaya) saw the firearm and that he picked
up the gun, held it and showed it to SPO1 Jara. He asserted that SPO2 Renon
was not one of those who went inside the house.
However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SPO1
Cabaya's testimony, related a different story as to the circumstances of the
firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he merely conducted perimeter
security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the house.
SPO1 Jara testified that he remained outside the house throughout the search,
and when SPO1 Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was seven to eight
meters away from him. He could not see the inside of the house and could see
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Cabaya only from his chest up. He did not see the firearm at the place where it
was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his arm to show the gun, which
was a revolver. He is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the
latter discovered the firearm. He further testified that SPO3 Ocado, who,
according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of those near him when he (Cabaya)
discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.
While the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up
is easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the rather
shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember that the
prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on
its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the
prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. The constitutional presumption
is that the accused is innocent even if his defense is weak as long as the
prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court held that

where there was material and unexplained inconsistency between the testimonies
of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to inconsequential details but to
the alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent improbable
character of the testimony given by one of the two principal prosecution witnesses
had the effect of vitiating the testimony given by the other principal prosecution
witness. The Court ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable testimony of
one officer and adopt the testimony of the other that is more plausible. In such a
situation, both testimonies lose their probative value.
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of
the same sale transaction, which allegedly took place before their very eyes, on
the same physical location and on the same occasion?
In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses generate serious doubt as to whether a firearm was really
found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution utterly failed to discharge its
burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms beyond
reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has
not been demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the crime he
was with.
Accused in a rape case is entitled to

presumption of innocence when the
rape victim failed to immediately or
spontaneously identify the alleged
attacker when presented to her.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY
TUMAMBING, G.R. No. 191261, March 2, 2011
THE FACTS:
The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing

(Tumambing) with rape in Criminal Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila.
DK, the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26,
2004 she went to sleep, leaving the lights on, at her cousin’s rented room.
She was startled when somebody entered the room after she had turned
off the lights. The intruder, a man, poked a knife at DK and threatened to
kill her if she made any noise. He removed DK’s clothes and undressed
himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was about
to leave, DK turned the light on and she saw his face. Later, she
identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her rapist.
On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises,

hematoma, or any sign of resistance on her body but found several fresh
lacerations on her genitals.
Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June

26, 2004 he slept at the house of his employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went
to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and woke up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that
he never left his employer’s house that night. Ledesma corroborated his
story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and he went, thinking that
it had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was shocked,
however, when he learned that he had been suspected of having
committed rape.
When the accused was summoned by the Barangay Captain, the

complainant did not spontaneously identify the former.
HELD:
A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on

proof of two things: the identification of the author of the crime and his
actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been
committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the
offender’s identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an
accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of
uncertainties.
DK’s identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from

categorical. A reading of her testimony shows that she was quite reluctant
at the beginning but eventually pointed to him when it was suggested that it
might be him after all. Several witnesses attested to DK’s uncertainties
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
regarding the rapist’s identity when the barangay chairman arranged for her
to meet Tumambing.
DK’s above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused

Tumambing gives the Court no confidence that, as she claimed in her
testimony, she was familiar with the looks of her rapist because she saw
him on the previous day as he passed by her cousin’s rented room many
times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing
would have been one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not
reluctance in pointing to him despite the barangay chairman’s assurance
that he would protect her if she identified him. In assessing the testimony
of a wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the
alleged assault is of critical value.
There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a
yellow shirt. But this is inconsistent with her testimony that after the
stranger in her room was done raping her, “bigla na lang po siyang
lumabas x x x sinundan ko siya ng tingin.” Since DK did not say that the
man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his
clothes and carried this out when he left the room. Since DK then turned
on the light for the first time, she had a chance to see him clearly. But, if
this were so and he walked out naked, why was she so certain that he wore
a yellow shirt?
With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DK’s rapist,
the Court cannot affirm the conviction of accused Tumambing as a result of
the accused’s constitutional presumption of innocence.
Delay in complaining of the alleged

rape coupled with the fact that the
alleged rape victim visited the
accused in jail six (6) times entitles
the accused to an acquittal based on
the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

JERWIN QUINTAL y BEO, VICENTE BONGAT y
TARIMAN, FELIPE QUINTAL y ABARQUEZ and
LARRY PANTI y JIMENEZ, G.R. No. 184170,
February 2, 2011
PEREZ, J.:
On 2 May 2001, appellant Vicente, together with 15-year old Jerwin

Quintal y Beo (Jerwin), 16-year old Felipe Quintal y Abarquez (Felipe) and
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Larry Panti y Jimenez (Larry) were charged in an Information for Rape
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about August 29, 2002, at around 9:30 o’clock

in the evening, in barangay [XXX], municipality of Virac,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another for a common
purpose, with force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously lie and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of [AAA], a minor 16 years of age, against her will
and without her consent.
That the crime of rape was committed with an

aggravating circumstance of minority, the fact that [AAA] is a
minor 16 years of age when she was raped by the herein-
named four (4) accused.
On Appeal, the Supreme Court based on the accused’s constitutional

presumption of innocence, brought about by doubts as to the credibility of
the testimony of the alleged rape victim, the accused are acquitted.
This Court cannot disregard this nagging doubt with respect to the
credibility of AAA’s testimony, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
barangay tanod and barangay kagawad, the purported confession put into
writing and signed by all the accused; and the subsequent incidents
relating to the case.
First, AAA testified that she does not personally know Jerwin and
Felipe. However, when the two allegedly invited her to go with them to a
party, she readily accepted the invitation and in fact, went with them.
Moreover, AAA was seen playing cards with Jerwin and his group in the
wake, as testified by Maria, Felipe, Jerwin and Federico.
Second, AAA recounted that the nipa hut where she was brought by
the accused was very dark. And yet, AAA readily identified Vicente and
Larry inside the hut, as two of those who raped her.
Third, the medical certificate only contained one finding, that

there was a “round-the-clock abrasion in the labia minora.” This is not at all
conclusive nor corroborative to support the charge of rape. At most, this
indicates that AAA had sexual intercourse, not raped.
Fourth, AAA’s belated reporting of the rape incident has relevance in

this case, especially when it appears that she really had no intention at all
to inform her mother, not until the latter actually asked her why she was
walking in an unusual manner.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
xxx
Seventh, in an unusual twist, records show that AAA was seen

visiting Jerwin in jail for at least six (6) times. These incidents are
documented in a logbook presented in court by the defense and
which was not refuted by the prosecution.
Right to cross examine; effect of the

death of a witness before she could
be cross-examined through no fault
of the adverse party
SPOUSES REUBEN DELA CRUZ AND

MINERVA DELA CRUZ vs. RAMON PAPA IV,
G.R. No. 185899, December 8, 2010
ABAD, J.
This case is about the plaintiff’s lone witness who passed away due
to illness before the adverse party could cross-examine him.
In 1994, the Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an

action for cancellation of titles, recovery of properties worth millions of
pesos, and damages against several defendants, including petitioner
spouses Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz (the Dela Cruzes) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City in Civil Cases 94-3447 and 95-
3816. On October 21, 1999 the Estate presented Myron C. Papa , its
executor, to testify on the substance of the complaint. At the conclusion of
Myron’s testimony on that day, the RTC required the Estate and the latter
agreed to present Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing to identify the
originals of certain exhibits, after which counsels for the defendants, would
begin to cross-examine him.
But the Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand.
He was taken ill and diagnosed as suffering from stage four colon and liver
cancer, prompting respondent Ramon C. Papa IV (Ramon), the Estate’s
co-administrator, to seek repeated postponements of hearings in the case
to allow Myron undergo intensive treatment. Later, the Estate filed a
motion for leave to have the defendants cross-examine Myron by
deposition at the hospital where he was confined. The RTC granted the
motion on February 22, 2001 and eventually set the deposition-taking on
September 7, 2001 but Myron passed away on August 16, 2001.
On November 15, 2001 one of the defendants moved to expunge

Myron’s direct testimony which the RTC granted.
The Issue:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myron’s testimony after the
RTC ordered the same stricken off the record for depriving the defendants
of the opportunity to cross-examine him.
Held:
But having their turn to cross-examine Myron is different from their

being accorded an opportunity to cross-examine him. The RTC set the
deposition taking on September 7, 2001 but Myron died before that date,
on August 16, 2001. Consequently, it was not the defendants’ fault that
they were unable to cross-examine him.
Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the
same authenticated through Myron’s testimony, it stands to reason that the
striking out of the latter’s testimony altogether wiped out the required
authentication for those exhibits. They become inadmissible unless the
RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the
Estate to rectify its mistakes.
Ref:
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE SENERIS, 99 SCRA 92
ORTIGAS VS. LUFTHANSA, 64 SCRA 610
Right to information; right of an

examinee in the CPA Board
examination to look at her answer
sheet, questionnaire and answer sheets
HAZEL MA. ANTOLIN VS. ABELARDO

DOMONDON, ET AL., G.R. No. 165036 & 175705,
July 5, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified

Public Accountant [CPA] Board Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy
(the Board) in October 1997. The examination results were released on October
29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner
did not make it. When the results were released, she received failing grades in
four out of the seven subjects.
Subject Petitioner’s
Grade
Theory of Accounts 65 %
Business Law 66 %
Management Services 69 %
Auditing Theory 82 %
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Auditing Problems 70 %
Practical Accounting I 68 %
Practical Accounting II 77 %
Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to

respondent Abelardo T. Domondon (Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board
of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected. On
November 3, 1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these
consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she
failed the exam. Thus, on November 10, 1997, she again wrote to the Board to
request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects (b) her
answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an
explanation of the grading system used in each subject (collectively, the
Examination Papers).
Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner’s request on two grounds:

first, that Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only
permitted access to the petitioner’s answer sheet (which she had been shown
previously), and that reconsideration of her examination result was only proper
under the grounds stated therein:
Sec. 36 An examinee shall be allowed to have access or

to go over his/her test papers or answer sheets on a date not later
than thirty (30) days from the official release of the results of the
examination. Within ten (10) days from such date, he/she may file
his/her request for reconsideration of ratings. Reconsideration of
rating shall be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in the
grading of his/her test papers or answer sheets, or malfeasance.
Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was

precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than petitioner’s answer
sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994,
which provides:
Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprofessional

Acts – The hereunder acts shall constitute prejudicial, illegal, grossly
immoral, dishonorable, or unprofessional conduct:
A. Providing, getting, receiving, holding, using or
reproducing questions
xxxx
3. that have been given in the examination except if the

test bank for the subject has on deposit at least two
thousand (2,000) questions.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
After a further exchange of correspondence, the Board informed petitioner
that an investigation was conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical
error found in the grading of her test papers.
Undeterred, on January 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus

with Damages against the Board of Accountancy and its members before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 33, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-86881. The Petition included a prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Board of
Accountancy and its members (the respondents) to furnish petitioner with copies
of the Examination Papers. Petitioner also prayed that final judgment be issued
ordering respondents to furnish petitioner with all documents and other materials
as would enable her to determine whether respondents fairly administered the
examinations and correctly graded petitioner’s performance therein, and, if
warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA.
On February 5, 1998, respondents filed their Opposition to the Application

for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and argued, inter alia, that
petitioner was not entitled to the relief sought, that the respondents did not have
the duty to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers, and that
petitioner had other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, namely, recourse to the PRC. Respondents also filed their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim in the main case, which asked that the Petition for
Mandamus with Damages be dismissed for lack of merit on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the petition
stated no cause of action because there was no ministerial duty to release the
information demanded; and (3) the constitutional right to information on matters
of public concern is subject to limitations provided by law, including Section 20,
Article IV, of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Petition (which was

admitted by the RTC), where she included the following allegation in the body of
her petition:
The allegations in this amended petition are meant only to

plead a cause of action for access to the documents requested, not
for re-correction which petitioner shall assert in the proper forum
depending on, among others, whether she finds sufficient error in
the documents to warrant such or any other relief. None of the
allegations in this amended petition, including those in the following
paragraphs, is made to assert a cause of action for re-correction.
If only to underscore the fact that she was not asking for a re-checking of
her exam, the following prayer for relief was deleted from the Amended Petition:
“and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA.”
On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to

Dismiss Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, on the ground
that petitioner had taken and passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
and had taken her oath as a CPA. Petitioner filed her Opposition on July 8,
1998. Subsequently, on October 29, 1998, respondents filed their Answer with
Counterclaim to the amended petition. They reiterated their original allegations
and further alleged that there was no cause of action because at the time the
Amended Petition was admitted, they had ceased to be members of the Board
of Accountancy and they were not in possession of the documents sought by
the petitioner.
Issues
The petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the
examination papers so she can determine for herself why and how she failed
and to ensure that the Board properly performed its duties. She argues that the
Constitution as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees support her right to demand access to the Examination
Papers. Furthermore, she claims that there was no need to exhaust
administrative remedies, since no recourse to the PRC was available, and only a
pure question of law is involved in this case. Finally, she claims that her demand
for access to documents was not rendered moot by her passing of the 1998
CPA Board Exams.
Held:
Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997 examination

cannot be compelled by mandamus. This much was made evident by the
doctrine laid down in Agustin-Ramos v. Sandoval:
After deliberating on the petition in relation to the other

pleadings filed in the proceedings at bar, the Court resolved to
DENY said petition for lack of merit. The petition at bar prays for the
setting aside of the Order of respondent Judge dismissing
petitioners’ mandamus action to compel the other respondents
(Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional Regulation
Commission) “to reconsider, recorrect and/or rectify the board
ratings of the petitioners from their present failing grades to higher or
passing marks.” The function of reviewing and re-assessing the
petitioners’ answers to the examination questions, in the light
of the facts and arguments presented by them x x x is a
discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial
and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the writ of
mandamus. The obvious remedy of the petitioners from the
adverse judgment by the Medical Board of Examiners was an
appeal to the Professional Regulation Commission itself, and
thence to the Court of Appeals.
The crux of this case is whether petitioner may compel access to the
Examination Documents through mandamus. As always, our inquiry must
begin with the Constitution. Section 7, Article III provides:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes
full disclosure and transparency in government, viz:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the

State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not

absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public
concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving
public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law". The
Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and
"public concern." As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:
In determining whether x x x a particular information is of

public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public
concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition.
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of

confidentiality on some matters, such as national security, trade secrets and
banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters.
We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as

the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general,
and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair
and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those
qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters
pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of
assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the
art and science of accounting.
On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit
access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam.
More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist
inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and
checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a
party to these proceedings. They have not been given an opportunity to explain
the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the
Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of
this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the
PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to
remand these cases to the RTC for further proceedings.
Right to be informed of the nature and

cause of accusation; Civil liability
imposed despite acquittal of the
accused-when it is proper and when
it is not.
FELIXBERTO ABELLANA VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174654, August 17, 2011
Facts:
The petitioner was charged before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 13, of
Estafa through falsification of a public document but was convicted of the crime
of falsification of public document by a private individual. On Appeal, the Court of
Appeals ACQUITTED the accused for he was convicted of a crime he was not
charged of in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him. However, the Court of Appeals SUSTAINED
the RTC Decision imposing civil liability on the petitioner despite his acquittal.
Issue:
The only issue therefore is whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held
civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state

whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the
exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal
action. In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.”
Here, the CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted petitioner of an
offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall,
petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the RTC
found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally
appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
of falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioner’s conviction cannot be
sustained because it infringed on his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The CA, however, found no reversible error on the civil liability of
petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus sustained the same.
In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., we elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite his
exoneration in this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise

to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage
to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise
to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable
to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the
spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the
petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the
spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the
transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties’
respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge was without basis as the spouses
Alonto indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged.
Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the
notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily
nullify or render void ab initio the parties’ transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. “To
overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to
exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof,
the deed must be upheld.” And since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate
the Deed of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner
remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the
cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and
thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.
Presumption of innocence vs. presumption

of regularity in the performance of official
duties; non-compliance of the police of
section 21 of RA No. 9165 in drugs cases
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAPIA

ANDONGAN, G.R. No. 184595, June 29, 2010
Accused was allegedly arrested in a buy-bus operation in Manila

particularly in Abad Santos Avenue along Bambang Street, a street with
many people at that time, at around 7:50 p.m. of June 25, 2004. She
allegedly sold shabu worth P500.00 for one (1) sachet containing 0.146
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
grams . No other sachet of shabu was confiscated on her person though
she allegedly a drug dealer.
HELD:
The chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not
shown to have been substantially complied with.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties

could not prevail over the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.
For, among other things, it is incredible for an allegedly known drug-

peddler to be standing at a corner of a street at 7:50 in the evening instead
of plying her trade secretly, and with only a 0.146-gram sachet worth
P500.00 of prohibited drugs in her possession the value of which happens
to be what a poseur-buyer wants to buy.
Whether the COMELEC was correct

in denying Ang Ladlad as a party-list
group on moral grounds; freedom of
expression and right to religion.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R.

No. 190582, April 7, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution)
and December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228
(PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the
COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009,
Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a

marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims
of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid
out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the

COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating
that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.

Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound

emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than one
gender.”
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear

that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates

sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F:
‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and
lesbians who are already of age’. It is further indicated
in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In
2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the
Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is
the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every

contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation.
Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the
Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the

Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks,
defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil
Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art
1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‘Contracts whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy’ are
inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community,

the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows’ as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene

publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. —
The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or

proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration to the COMELEC EN BANC,

three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando
Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and
Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for
the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution,
stating that:
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in

the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its
under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that
Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the

purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the
ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the
party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law.
The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are
also the nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought
to the attention of the nation because of their under representation.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under
the party-list system will remain just that.
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and

acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that
Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will
remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of
Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
The COMELEC likewise used the Holy Bible and the Koran in denying
Ladlad’s application.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s
application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010
elections by January 25, 2010.
HELD:
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the

ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA
7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani

stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the
law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies
with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Custodial investigation conducted by
“Bantay Bayan” groups or Barangay
tanods; whether the right of the suspect to
be informed of his expanded Miranda
Rights is already applicable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO

LAUGA, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010
PEREZ, J.:
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, the

real name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other
information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those
of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this
decision.
The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000, the appellant was

accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the

evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of
Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father
of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have
carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old
minor against her will.
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. During

the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and
admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical
certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only
thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c)
that AAA is the daughter of the appellant. On trial, three (3) witnesses
testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; her brother BBB; and one
Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan” in the barangay. Their testimonies
revealed the following:
The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that, the trial
court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because: (1)
there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB;
(2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the
assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and (3) AAA’s
accusation was ill-motivated.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
HELD
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged

confession with a “bantay bayan” and the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial

Confession before a “Bantay Bayan”
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy

Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence
because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of
such requirement.
The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the

Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the
Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of
the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay

Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-
appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2
January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only
one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was,
therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights
guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been
observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to
Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the
‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted
without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the
Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay
Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are
inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x

[T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations
do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by
the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case
at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza,
one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant].
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs
to ascertain whether or not a “bantay bayan” may be deemed a law
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the
Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion

to mention the nature of a “bantay bayan,” that is, “a group of male
residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping
peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x
x PNP.”
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based

volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case
of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the local government unit to
perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at
the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority
to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color
of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a
suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which

was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the

conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed
extrajudicial confession but “from the confluence of evidence showing his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.”
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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NO.

PROF. LAURO D. GACAYAN

ATTY. LARRY D. GACAYAN

BAR REVIEWER IN CONSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL LAW

VILLASIS LAW CENTER

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

IS THE HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS

In re: LETTER OF TONY VALENCIANO TO CHIEF

Tony Valenciano wrote then Chief Justice Reynato Puno

The holding of religious rituals in the Halls of Justice does not

Estrada vs. Escritur, 408 SCRA 1

May the Municipal Trial Court issue a

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. EDMAR P.

1. On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of

2. Thereafter, elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

3. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime

It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is

7. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the

Hence, the present petition.

May the MTC validly issue a search

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search

The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the

Note that the Constitution used the word “judge” without

Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was

If the testimony of the rape victim is

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN RICHARD

That on or about September 29, 2008 in the

4. The complainant testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29,

Is the prosecution’s evidence, particularly the testimony of the rape

In rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat or

It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-

Her testimony is unbelievable and contrary to common human

When bail is allowed in a non-bailable case

SENATOR JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented

To be sure, no such determination has been made by the

MAY THE COURT GRANT BAIL IN A NON-

Yes, in the present case of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile.

Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon

Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another

In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced

The Supreme Court therefore granted bail to Senator Enrile in the

Bail is now allowed in Malversation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZVIMINDA S.

The cases stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by Sheila S.

1. D.V. No. 6 dated January 8, 2004 amounting to P80,000.00;