Read Assign

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma,plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as the Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.
This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth
Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act.
Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a declaration of emergency, due to the threat to our industry by the
imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential
position in the United States market"; wherefore, the national policy was expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived
from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality
of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes."
In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis,
on each picul of sugar manufactured; while section 3 levies on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar
cane and ceded to others for a consideration, on lease or otherwise —
a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount
representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land.
According to section 6 of the law —
SEC. 6. All collections made under this Act shall accrue to a special fund in the Philippine Treasury, to be known as the 'Sugar
Adjustment and Stabilization Fund,' and shall be paid out only for any or all of the following purposes or to attain any or all
of the following objectives, as may be provided by law.
First, to place the sugar industry in a position to maintain itself, despite the gradual loss of the preferntial position of the
Philippine sugar in the United States market, and ultimately to insure its continued existence notwithstanding the loss of that
market and the consequent necessity of meeting competition in the free markets of the world;
Second, to readjust the benefits derived from the sugar industry by all of the component elements thereof — the mill, the
landowner, the planter of the sugar cane, and the laborers in the factory and in the field — so that all might continue profitably
to engage therein;lawphi1.net
Third, to limit the production of sugar to areas more economically suited to the production thereof; and
Fourth, to afford labor employed in the industry a living wage and to improve their living and working conditions: Provided,
That the President of the Philippines may, until the adjourment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, make
the necessary disbursements from the fund herein created (1) for the establishment and operation of sugar experiment
station or stations and the undertaking of researchers (a) to increase the recoveries of the centrifugal sugar factories with
the view of reducing manufacturing costs, (b) to produce and propagate higher yielding varieties of sugar cane more
adaptable to different district conditions in the Philippines, (c) to lower the costs of raising sugar cane, (d) to improve the
buying quality of denatured alcohol from molasses for motor fuel, (e) to determine the possibility of utilizing the other by-
products of the industry, (f) to determine what crop or crops are suitable for rotation and for the utilization of excess cane
lands, and (g) on other problems the solution of which would help rehabilitate and stabilize the industry, and (2) for the
improvement of living and working conditions in sugar mills and sugar plantations, authorizing him to organize the necessary
agency or agencies to take charge of the expenditure and allocation of said funds to carry out the purpose hereinbefore
enumerated, and, likewise, authorizing the disbursement from the fund herein created of the necessary amount or amounts
needed for salaries, wages, travelling expenses, equipment, and other sundry expenses of said agency or agencies.
Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from
the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years
1948-1949 and 1949-1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry
exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutioally levied. The action having been
dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintifs appealed the case directly to this Court (Judiciary Act, section 17).
The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise
of the taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and particularly of section 6 (heretofore quoted in full), will show that the tax is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act
is primarily an exercise of the police power.
This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a
leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great
source of the state's wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the
plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly
to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry
should be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of benefits
therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain
(Sligh vs. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 59 L. Ed. 835; Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So. 853; Maxcy Inc. vs. Mayo, 103 Fla.
552, 139 So. 121).
As stated in Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, with reference to the citrus industry in Florida —
The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or
indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population of the State is affected to such an extent by public
interests as to be within the police power of the sovereign. (128 Sp. 857).
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that
the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here,
the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means
provided in section 6 of the law (above quoted) bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective
and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution
and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power (Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. vs. Grosjean, 301 U. S.
412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U. S. vs. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579).
That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it appears
rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. At
any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
"inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation"
(Carmichael vs. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245, citing numerous authorities, at p. 1251).
From the point of view we have taken it appears of no moment that the funds raised under the Sugar Stabilization Act, now in question,
should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other
industries are also in need of similar protection; that the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of "all or
none." As ruled in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson vs. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 84 L. Ed. 744, "if the law presumably hits the evil where
it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied;" and that "the
legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach" (N. L. R. B. vs. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893).
Even from the standpoint that the Act is a pure tax measure, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental stations
to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by-products and solution of allied problems, as well as to the
improvements of living and working conditions in sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such money being channeled directly
to private persons, constitutes expenditure of tax money for private purposes, (compare Everson vs. Board of Education, 91 L. Ed. 472,
168 ALR 1392, 1400).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON
CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized
Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively, which are being imposed by the respondents.
The Case
On October 17, 2011,1 respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011,2 or the Socialized Housing Tax of
Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides:
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed value of land in excess of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing
Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be
established for the purpose.
Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) shall be utilized by the Quezon City Government for the following projects:
(a) land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land development; (d)
construction of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public-private
partnership agreement of the Quezon City Government and National Housing Authority (NHA) with the private sector.3 Under certain
conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly paying the special assessment:
SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment tax as imposed by this ordinance shall enjoy a tax credit.
The tax credit may be availed of only after five (5) years of continue[d] payment. Further, the taxpayer availing this tax credit must
be a taxpayer in good standing as certified by the City Treasurer and City Assessor.
The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner, which
shall be given as follows:
1. 6th year - 20%
2. 7th year - 20%
3. 8th year - 20%
4. 9th year - 20%
5. 10th year - 20%
Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not be continued by the subsequent property owners
even if they are buyers in good faith, heirs or possessor of a right in whatever legal capacity over the subject property.4
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December 16, 2013 and took effect ten days after when it was
approved by respondent City Mayor.6 The proceeds collected from the garbage fees on residential properties shall be deposited solely
and exclusively in an earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections. 7 Section 1 of the
Ordinance set forth the schedule and manner for the collection of garbage fees:
SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in relation to Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991 HEREBY IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE AND MANNER FOR THE ANNUAL COLLECTION OF
GARBAGE FEES, AS FOLLOWS:
On all domestic households in Quezon City;

LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00
201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 40 sq. m. PHP25.00
41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP50.00
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP75.00
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PHP100.00
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP200.00
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high- rise condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the
total size of the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall be collected based on area
occupied for every unit already sold or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the
entire apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit occupied.
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and shall be paid simultaneously with the payment of the real
property tax, but not later than the first quarter installment. 8 In case a household owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of the
garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof, shall be charged. 9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in Quezon City which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216288, and that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the garbage
fee in the sum of Php100.00.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on February 5, 2014, which enjoined the enforcement of Ordinance
Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 and required respondents to comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course
thereto.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents filed their Comment12 with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on February 17, 2014. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply
and a Memorandum on March 3, 2014 and September 8, 2014, respectively.
Procedural Matters
A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since they are not tribunals, boards or officers exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner, however, counters that in enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, the Quezon
City Council exercised quasi-judicial function because the ordinances ruled against the property owners who must pay the SHT and
the garbage fee, exacting from them funds for basic essential public services that they should not be held liable. Even if a Rule 65
petition is improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of cases like in Rosario v. Court of Appeals,13 has taken
cognizance of an improper remedy in the interest of justice.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogatives.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights
of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some
specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties.14
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The enactment by the Quezon City Council of the assailed ordinances was done in the exercise
of its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC), local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city.15 Said law likewise is specific in
providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge, or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the local
government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance. 16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it essentially seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and
illegality of the questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus, over which We exercise original
jurisdiction, in cases with far-reaching implications or one which raises transcendental issues or questions that need to be resolved for
the public good.18 The judicial policy is that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the redress sought cannot be obtained in
the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise
of Our primary jurisdiction.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a petition for prohibition may be filed:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified therein,
or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person – whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions – who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that
judgment be rendered, commanding the respondents to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the
petition. In this case, petitioner's primary intention is to prevent respondents from implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-
2235. Obviously, the writ being sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding desistance.
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor are performing ministerialfunctions. A ministerial function
is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the
exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. 20 Respondent Mayor, as chief executive of the
city government, exercises such powers and performs such duties and functions as provided for by the LGC and other
laws.21 Particularly, he has the duty to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are collected, and that city funds are applied
to the payment of expenses and settlement of obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance. 22 On the other hand, under
the LGC, all local taxes, fees, and charges shall be collected by the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay treasurer, or their duly-
authorized deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among others, of ensuring that all laws and policies governing the appraisal
and assessment of real properties for taxation purposes are properly executed.23Anent the SHT, the Department of Finance (DOF)
Local Finance Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16, 1997, is more specific:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Id.ntified LGU shall:
a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its jurisdiction which shall be subject to the levy of the Social
Housing Tax (SHT) by the local sanggunian concerned;
b. inform the affected registered owners of the effectivity of the SHT; a list of the lands and registered owners shall
also be posted in 3 conspicuous places in the city/municipality;
c. furnish the Treasurer’s office and the local sanggunian concerned of the list of lands affected;
6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:
a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real Property Tax, SEF Tax and other special assessments;
b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local Government Finance, and the Mayor’s office the monthly collections on
Social Housing Tax (SHT). An annual report should likewise be submitted to the HUDCC on the total revenues raised
during the year pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the manner in which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse to Us should be allowed. Aside from presenting a
novel question of law, this case calls for immediate resolution since the challenged ordinances adversely affect the property interests
of all paying constituents of Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a test case for the guidance of other local government units
(LGUs). Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim,24 the Court cited the case of Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement & Gaming
Corp.,25 where We ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
x x x This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. 26
B. Locus Standi of Petitioner
Respondents challenge petitioner’s legal standing to file this case on the ground that, in relation to Section 3 of Ordinance No. SP-
2095, petitioner failed to allege his ownership of a property that has an assessed value of more than Php100,000.00 and, with respect
to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by what standing or personality he filed the case to nullify the same. According to respondents, the petition
is not a class suit, and that, for not having specifically alleged that petitioner filed the case as a taxpayer, it could only be surmised
whether he is a party-in-interest who stands to be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in this case.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-
interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced."27
“Legal standing” or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance.28 The concept has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged.29 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show “not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.” It must be shown that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained
of.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file the petition. He is a real party-in-interest to assail the
constitutionality and legality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 because respondents did not dispute that he is a registered co-
owner of a residential property in Quezon City and that he paid property tax which already included the SHT and the garbage fee. He
has substantial right to seek a refund of the payments he made and to stop future imposition. While he is a lone petitioner, his cause
of action to declare the validity of the subject ordinances is substantial and of paramount interest to similarly situated property owners
in Quezon City.
C. Litis Pendentia
Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis pendentia. They claim that, as early as February 22, 2012, a
case entitled Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Herbert Bautista, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12-7-820,
has been pending in the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, which assails the legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095. Relying
on City of Makati, et al. v. Municipality (now City) of Taguig, et al.,32 respondents assert that there is substantial identity of parties
between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs in the civil case filed their respective cases as taxpayers of Quezon
City.
For petitioner, however, respondents’ contention is untenable since he is not a party in Alliance and does not even have the remotest
identity or association with the plaintiffs in said civil case. Moreover, respondents’ arguments would deprive this Court of its
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of laws under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis
pendens and auter action pendant.34 While it is normally connected with the control which the court has on a property involved in a
suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court.35 In Film
Development Council of the Philippines v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,36 We elucidated:
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against
multiplicity of suit and authorizes a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.
x x x x
The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentiaare: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such
as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other.
x x x x
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same
subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not
be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of
the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether
the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case
may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of litis pendentia is inextricably linked with that
of res judicata, each constituting an element of the other. In either case, both relate to the sound practice of including, in a single
litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to a cause of action that is before a court. 37
There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the
second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case. 38 Moreover, the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e.,
the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice-versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes
of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading connected with the alleged civil case pending before the
Quezon City trial court. Granting that there is substantial identity of parties between said case and this petition, dismissal on the
ground of litis pendentia still cannot be had in view of the absence of the second and third requisites. There is no way for Us to
determine whether both cases are based on the same set of facts that require the presentation of the same evidence. Even if founded
on the same set of facts, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could be different. Moreover, there is no basis to rule that the two
cases are intimately related and/or intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of
which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his non-compliance with Section 187 of the LGC,
which mandates:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. – The
procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided,
That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided,
however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the
tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-
day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court
of competent jurisdiction.
The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim,40 has been construed as mandatory41 considering that –
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to
raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential
to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay
in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are
required to be done within certain time frames. x x x. 42
The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market Vendor Asso. v. Municipality of Hagonoy:43cralawlawlibrary
x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a “mere technicality” that
can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory. x x x Being its lifeblood,
collection of revenues by the government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of
basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue
measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail
the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances.”44
Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones,45 held that there was no need for petitioners therein to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts, considering that there was only a pure question of law, the parties did not
dispute any factual matter on which they had to present evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. v. City of
Cagayan de Oro,46We relaxed the application of the rules in view of the more substantive matters. For the same reasons, this petition
is an exception to the general rule.
Substantive Issues
Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of garbage are basic and essential
duties and functions of the Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage fee, the latter has shown a penchant and
pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that could be covered by its revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land,
business, transfer, amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) from the National Government. For petitioner, it
is noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon City Government is in dire financial state and desperately
needs money to fund housing for informal settlers and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its revenue collection
in 2012 is in the sum of P13.69 billion.
Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by the Quezon City Government as an exercise of its
power to create sources of income under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. 47 According to petitioner, the constitutional
provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself admits
of guidelines and limitations.
Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage of the assessed value of the property, which
is subject to revision every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in the market value of the property. The SHT and the garbage
fee are actually increases in the property tax which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its reassessment every
three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC. 48ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235,
invoking Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,49People v. Siton, et al.,50 and Hon. Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-
Delorino.51 They argue that the burden of establishing the invalidity of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party challenging its
constitutionality. They insist that the questioned ordinances are proper exercises of police power similar to Telecom. & Broadcast
Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.53 and that their enactment finds basis in
the social justice principle enshrined in Section 9, 54 Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette
is not necessary so long as it is not punitive in character, citing Balbuna, et al. v. Hon. Secretary of Education, et al. 55 and Askay v.
Cosalan.56 Thus, Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication, while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its
approval on December 26, 2013.
Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle found in Sections 1 and 2, Article XIII 57 of the 1987
Constitution and Sections 2 (a)58 and 4359 of R.A. No. 7279, or the “Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA).
Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La Fuente,60 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias,
etc.,61 respondents assert that Ordinance No. SP-2095 applies equally to all real property owners without discrimination. There is no
way that the ordinance could violate the equal protection clause because real property owners and informal settlers do not belong to
the same class.
Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with the UDHA. While the law authorizes
LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers properties
with an assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the
special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in the sixth (6 th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount to a penalty imposed on real property owners due to
the failure of respondent Quezon City Mayor and Council to perform their duty to secure and protect real property owners from
informal settlers, thereby burdening them with the expenses to provide funds for housing. For petitioner, the SHT cannot be viewed
as a “charity” from real property owners since it is forced, not voluntary.
Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class legislation that violates the right of property owners to equal
protection of the laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy property not their own and pay no taxes over law-abiding real
property owners who pay income and realty taxes.
Petitioner further contends that respondents’ characterization of the SHT as “nothing more than an advance payment on the real
property tax” has no statutory basis. Allegedly, property tax cannot be collected before it is due because, under the LGC, chartered
cities are authorized to impose property tax based on the assessed value and the general revision of assessment that is made every
three (3) years.
As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn, was based on Section 43 of the UDHA, petitioner asserts
that there is no specific provision in the 1987 Constitution stating that the ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social function.
And even if there is, it is seriously doubtful and far-fetched that the principle means that property owners should provide funds for
the housing of informal settlers and for home site development. Social justice and police power, petitioner believes, does not mean
imposing a tax on one, or that one has to give up something, for the benefit of another. At best, the principle that property ownership
and enjoyment bear a social function is but a reiteration of the Civil Law principle that property should not be enjoyed and abused to
the injury of other properties and the community, and that the use of the property may be restricted by police power, the exercise of
which is not involved in this case.
Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT collected. Bistek is the monicker of respondent City
Mayor. The Bistekvilles makes it clear, therefore, that politicians will take the credit for the tax imposed on real property owners.
On the Garbage Fee
Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police power, collects on the average from every household a
garbage fee in the meager amount of thirty-three (33) centavos per day compared with the sum of P1,659.83 that the Quezon City
Government annually spends for every household for garbage collection and waste management.62ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee. Even assuming that the garbage fee is a tax, the same
cannot be a direct duplicate tax as it is imposed on a different subject matter and is of a different kind or character. Based
on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo63 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,64 there is no “taxing twice” because
the real property tax is imposed on ownership based on its assessed value, while the garbage fee is required on the domestic
household. The only reference to the property is the determination of the applicable rate and the facility of collection.
Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as an exercise of police power. The cases of Calalang v.
Williams,65Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals,66 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.,67 which were cited by
respondents, are inapplicable since the assailed ordinance is a revenue measure and does not regulate the disposal or other aspect of
garbage.
The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage fee only from domestic households and not from
restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other commercial dining places that spew garbage much more than residential property
owners.
Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double taxation because garbage collection is a basic
and essential public service that should be paid out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community tax
certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the Quezon City Government. To bolster the claim, he states that the revenue collection of the
Quezon City Government reached Php13.69 billion in 2012. A small portion of said amount could be spent for garbage collection and
other essential services.
It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 47 68 of R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological
Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing,
adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan, and that LGUs have access to the Solid Waste Management (SWM) Fund
created under Section 4669 of the same law. Also, according to petitioner, it is evident that Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with
R.A. No. 9003 for while the law encourages segregation, composting, and recycling of waste, the ordinance only emphasizes the
collection and payment of garbage fee; while the law calls for an active involvement of the barangay in the collection, segregation,
and recycling of garbage, the ordinance skips such mandate.
Lastly, in challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of its approval
had not yet elapsed. He notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already included the garbage fee.
The Court’s Ruling
Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open to judicial inquiry. Much
should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless
the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which has gained
acceptance is that factors relevant to such an inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made
subject to imposition.70
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any
statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.71 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the
ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under
the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).72ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. 73 If not, it is
void.74 Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution.75 As to conformity with existing statutes, Batangas
CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals76 has this to say:
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in
conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently
expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the
spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is
an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this
Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that:
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first
place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless
there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent
it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere
tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions
in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that
Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall.
True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power
to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.77
LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was
never intended by the drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political
subdivision independent of a single sovereign state. 78 “[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as
local units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation,
does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire
state; or divest itself of any power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was
granted.”79ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature; they are mere agents
vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. 80“Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the
delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power
of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise
of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional
and statutory limitations.” 81ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues in financing
and supporting myriad activities of the LGUs for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. 82 As this Court opined in National Power Corp. v. City of
Cabanatuan:83cralawlawlibrary
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to
realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries as well as public
welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth,
the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees
and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
“Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.”
This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and
promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the country’s highly centralized government structure has bred a culture
of dependence among local government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also “dampened the spirit of initiative, innovation
and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government leaders.” The only way to shatter this
culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate
their own sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, Section 3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a
local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, set the guidelines and limitations to this grant of
taxing powers x x x84
Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet 85 that:
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is summarized in Icard v. City Council of Baguio:
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute
must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed
in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the
municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions – all these – have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal
corporation. [Underscoring supplied]
x x x x
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, “the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies
are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges.” Nevertheless, such authority is “subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide.”
In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters. 86
Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law
or by the statute.87 “Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power
must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule
is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers.
Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional; the constitutional objective
obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature
must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each
local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly
disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.”88ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, every LGU is now empowered and
authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively to the local
government unit as well as to apply its resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or
furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions. 89 The relevant provisions of the LGC which establish the
parameters of the taxing power of the LGUs are as follows:
SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. – The following fundamental principles shall govern the exercise of the taxing and other
revenue-raising powers of local government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay;
(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition
by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and,
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise
of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds of customs fees, charges
and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of
local government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form
whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4)
years, respectively from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on
petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise
provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire
and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving
thereof, except tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as otherwise provided herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810
and Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938) otherwise known as the “Cooperative Code of the
Philippines” respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges
which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly
urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not more than
fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.
SECTION 186. Power To Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or
charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or
charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a social function
and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.90 The Court already recognized this in Social Justice Society (SJS),
et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:91cralawlawlibrary
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but also a social function insofar
as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society. The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient.92
Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law), is the
plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety and general welfare of the people.93 Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. 94 In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may
be made the implement of the state’s police power. 95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php100,000.00.
This special assessment is the same tax referred to in R.A. No. 7279 or the UDHA. 96 The SHT is one of the sources of funds for urban
development and housing program.97Section 43 of the law provides:
Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax. – Consistent with the constitutional principle that the ownership and enjoyment of property bear a
social function and to raise funds for the Program, all local government units are hereby authorized to impose an additional one-half
percent (0.5%) tax on the assessed value of all lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City Government with sufficient funds to initiate, implement and
undertake Socialized Housing Projects and other related preliminary activities;
WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing Programs and Projects of the City Government, specifically
the marginalized sector through the acquisition of properties for human settlements;
WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market value of properties in the city[.]
The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to implement in their respective localities in
coordination with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the national housing agencies, the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector, and other non-government organizations.98 It is the declared policy of the State to
undertake a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program that shall, among others, uplift the conditions
of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in resettlement areas, and provide for the rational use and
development of urban land in order to bring about, among others, reduction in urban dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely
affect public health, safety and ecology, and access to land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless citizens.99 Urban renewal
and resettlement shall include the rehabilitation and development of blighted and slum areas 100 and the resettlement of program
beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions of the UDHA. 101ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under the UDHA, socialized housing102 shall be the primary strategy in providing shelter for the underprivileged and homeless. 103 The
LGU or the NHA, in cooperation with the private developers and concerned agencies, shall provide socialized housing or resettlement
areas with basic services and facilities such as potable water, power and electricity, and an adequate power distribution system,
sewerage facilities, and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal system; and access to primary roads and transportation
facilities.104 The provisions for health, education, communications, security, recreation, relief and welfare shall also be planned and be
given priority for implementation by the LGU and concerned agencies in cooperation with the private sector and the beneficiaries
themselves.105ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in coordination with the NHA, are directed to implement the
relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places like sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. 106 In coordination with the NHA, the LGUs shall
provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities
sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families. 107ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Aside from the specific authority
vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which
include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings.108 The collections made accrue to its
socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a
regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly
imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless
constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property
investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the
poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional limitations and is subject to the requirement that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.109 In the words of City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.:110cralawlawlibrary
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to
due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental
law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
x x x x
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of
the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights – a
violation of the due process clause.111
As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful
method or, to be precise, if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 112ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real property owners because it burdens them with expenses to
provide funds for the housing of informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation since it favors the latter who occupy properties which
is not their own and pay no taxes.
We disagree.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.113 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 114 Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give
undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.115 The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. 116ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
class.117ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program, the disparities between a
real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The
differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution.
Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor
one over another.118 It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation. 119 Inequities which result
from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation. 120ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being
imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. As pointed out by respondents, while the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT
on lands with an assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value
exceeding P100,000.00. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the
special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity. Far from being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject
ordinance are fair and just.
On the Garbage Fee
In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a municipality to regulate garbage falls within its police power
to protect public health, safety, and welfare.121 As opined, the purposes and policy underpinnings of the police power to regulate the
collection and disposal of solid waste are: (1) to preserve and protect the public health and welfare as well as the environment by
minimizing or eliminating a source of disease and preventing and abating nuisances; and (2) to defray costs and ensure financial
stability of the system for the benefit of the entire community, with the sum of all charges marshalled and designed to pay for the
expense of a systemic refuse disposal scheme.122ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of validity. 123 Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of U.S.
cases addressing a city's authority to impose mandatory garbage service and fees have upheld the ordinances against constitutional
and statutory challenges.124ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of garbage within its corporate limits. 125 The LGC
specifically assigns the responsibility of regulation and oversight of solid waste to local governing bodies because the Legislature
determined that such bodies were in the best position to develop efficient waste management programs. 126 To impose on local
governments the responsibility to regulate solid waste but not grant them the authority necessary to fulfill the same would lead to an
absurd result.”127 As held in one U.S. case:
x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject matter, the manner and means of exercising those
powers, where not specifically prescribed by the legislature, are left to the discretion of the municipal authorities. x x x Leaving the
manner of exercising municipal powers to the discretion of municipal authorities "implies a range of reasonableness within which a
municipality's exercise of discretion will not be interfered with or upset by the judiciary." 128
In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers under Section 22 of the same,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. 129 Section 16 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs. 130 The provisions related
thereto are liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community.131Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of
the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests since the Sanggunian is in the best
position to determine the needs of its constituents. 132ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the provisions of the LGC and national policies, the LGUs shall
share with the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their
territorial jurisdiction.133 In this regard, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which
include, among others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities related to general
hygiene and sanitation.134 R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,135 affirms this authority as it
expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of its provisions within their respective
jurisdictions while establishing a cooperative effort among the national government, other local government units, non-government
organizations, and the private sector.136ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for services
rendered.137 “Charges” refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while “Fee” means a charge fixed by
law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or activity.138ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. The basis for
this could be discerned from the foreword of said Ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines in terms of population and urban geographical areas,
apart from being competent and efficient in the delivery of public service, apparently requires a big budgetary allocation in order to
address the problems relative and connected to the prompt and efficient delivery of basic services such as the effective system of
waste management, public information programs on proper garbage and proper waste disposal, including the imposition of waste
regulatory measures;
WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the city’s waste management system, the City Government through
the Sangguniang Panlungsod deems it necessary to impose a schedule of reasonable fees or charges for the garbage collection services
for residential (domestic household) that it renders to the public.
Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. In Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar,
Batangas,139 the Court had the occasion to distinguish these two concepts:
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that “if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose
and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue
is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax.”
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that the purpose and effect of the imposition determine
whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such imposition gives the presumption that the same is a tax.
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the imposition is properly a license
tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of
the ordinance. Thus, “[w]hen no police inspection, supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to
establish, or that he agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business designated, without qualification or
hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of
conduct and under no guardian eye, but according to the unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and licensee, the
presumption is strong that the power of taxation, and not the police power, is being exercised.”
In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been consistently treated as a fee and not a tax. 140 In another U.S.
case,141 the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather than a tax as it was actually a fee for a service given by the city
which had previously been provided at no cost to its citizens.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation142 must
necessarily fail.
Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a municipal corporation, it must be reasonably
commensurate to the cost of providing the garbage service.143 To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce revenue in
excess of the cost of the regulation because such fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the regulation
exceeds the cost of the regulation.144ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 47 of R.A. No. 9003, which authorizes
LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan,
and that it has access to the SWM Fund under Section 46 of the same law. Moreover, Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with R.A.
No. 9003, because the ordinance emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee with no concern for segregation, composting
and recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate of the law calling for the active involvement of the barangay in the collection,
segregation, and recycling of garbage.
We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.
Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste
management program which shall, among others, ensure the proper segregation, collection, transport, storage, treatment and
disposal of solid waste through the formulation and adoption of the best environmental practices in ecological waste
management.145 The law provides that segregation and collection of solid waste shall be conducted at the barangay level, specifically
for biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the
responsibility of the municipality or city.146 Mandatory segregation of solid wastes shall primarily be conducted at the source, to
include household, institutional, industrial, commercial and agricultural sources. 147Segregation at source refers to a solid waste
management practice of separating, at the point of origin, different materials found in solid waste in order to promote recycling and
re-use of resources and to reduce the volume of waste for collection and disposal. 148 Based on Rule XVII of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2001-34, Series of 2001,149 which is the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9003, barangays shall be responsible for the collection, segregation, and recycling of biodegradable,
recyclable, compostable and reusable wastes.150 For the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF), which shall receive
biodegradable wastes for composting and mixed non-biodegradable wastes for final segregation, re-use and recycling, is to be
established in every barangay or cluster of barangays. 151ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management board, is mandated by law to prepare a 10-year solid waste
management plan consistent with the National Solid Waste Management Framework. 152 The plan shall be for the re-use, recycling and
composting of wastes generated in its jurisdiction; ensure the efficient management of solid waste generated within its jurisdiction;
and place primary emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-use, recycling, and composting programs while identifying the
amount of landfill and transformation capacity that will be needed for solid waste which cannot be re-used, recycled, or
composted.153 One of the components of the solid waste management plan is source reduction:
(e) Source reduction – The source reduction component shall include a program and implementation schedule which shows the
methods by which the LGU will, in combination with the recycling and composting components, reduce a sufficient amount of solid
waste disposed of in accordance with the diversion requirements of Section 20.
The source reduction component shall describe the following:

(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;
(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources necessary to carry out such activities;
(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be considered, provided that such technologies conform with the
standards set pursuant to this Act;
(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;
(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of solid wastes to be diverted from disposal at a disposal facility
through re-use, recycling and composting; and
(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be needed to implement re-use, recycling and composting.
The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and identification of rate structures and fees for the purpose of
reducing the amount of waste generated, and other source reduction strategies, including but not limited to, programs and economic
incentives provided under Sec. 45 of this Act to reduce the use of non-recyclable materials, replace disposable materials and products
with reusable materials and products, reduce packaging, and increase the efficiency of the use of paper, cardboard, glass, metal, and
other materials. The waste reduction activities of the community shall also take into account, among others, local capability, economic
viability, technical requirements, social concerns, disposition of residual waste and environmental impact: Provided, That, projection
of future facilities needed and estimated cost shall be incorporated in the plan. x x x 154
The solid waste management plan shall also include an implementation schedule for solid waste diversion:
SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. – Each LGU plan shall include an implementation schedule which shows that
within five (5) years after the effectivity of this Act, the LGU shall divert at least 25% of all solid waste from waste disposal facilities
through re-use, recycling, and composting activities and other resource recovery activities: Provided, That the waste diversion goals
shall be increased every three (3) years thereafter: Provided, further, That nothing in this Section prohibits a local government unit
from implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities designed to exceed the goal.
The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste characterization result 155that each LGU is mandated
to undertake.156ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In accordance with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003, the LGUs are entitled to avail of the SWM Fund on the basis of their approved solid
waste management plan. Aside from this, they may also impose SWM Fees under Section 47 of the law, which states:
SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees – The local government unit shall impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay
the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan prepared pursuant to this Act. The fees shall be
based on the following minimum factors:
(a) types of solid waste;
(b) amount/volume of waste; and
(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.

The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting the local fees. In determining the amounts of the fees,
an LGU shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the plan and the setting and collection
of the local fees.
Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:
Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees. – The Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall impose fees on the
SWM services provided for by the LGU and/or any authorized organization or unit. In determining the amounts of the fees, a Local
SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the SWM
Plan and the setting and collection of the local fees. This power to impose fees may be ceded to the private sector and civil society
groups which have been duly accredited by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board; provided, the SWM fees shall be covered
by a Contract or Memorandum of Agreement between the respective board and the private sector or civil society group.
The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a SWM Plan prepared pursuant to the Act. Further, the fees
shall also be used to pay the actual costs incurred in collecting the local fees and for project sustainability.
Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees
Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to the following minimum factors:
a) Types of solid waste to include special waste
b) amount/volume of waste
c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility
d) capacity or type of LGU constituency

e) cost of construction
f) cost of management
g) type of technology
Section 3. Collection of Fees. – Fees may be collected corresponding to the following levels:
a) Barangay – The Barangay may impose fees for collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from
households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of Barangay MRFs. The computation of the fees shall be
established by the respective SWM boards. The manner of collection of the fees shall be dependent on the style of administration of
respective Barangay Councils. However, all transactions shall follow the Commission on Audit rules on collection of fees.
b) Municipality – The municipal and city councils may impose fees on the barangay MRFs for the collection and transport of non-
recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. The level and procedure for exacting fees shall be
defined by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board and supported by LGU ordinances, however, payments shall be consistent
with the accounting system of government.
c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group – On the basis of the stipulations of contract or Memorandum of Agreement, the private sector
or civil society group shall impose fees for collection, transport and tipping in their SLFs. Receipts and invoices shall be issued to the
paying public or to the government.
From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and
transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill. Barangays, on the other hand,
have the authority to impose fees for the collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from
households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. This is but consistent with Section 10 of
R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and collection of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes shall be conducted at the
barangay level, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or
city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage fee is the volume of waste currently generated by
each person in Quezon City, which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the increasing trend of waste generation for the
past three years.157 Respondents did not elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes
generated – whether residential, market, commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural, agro-industrial,
institutional, etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such amount pertains to the totality of wastes, without any
distinction, generated by Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees extends
only to those related to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day refers only to non-recyclable and special wastes, still,
We cannot sustain the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the provisions
of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.158ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot,
condominium, social housing project or apartment. For easy reference, the relevant provision is again quoted below:
On all domestic households in Quezon City;
LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00
201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 40 sq. m. PHP25.00
41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP50.00
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP75.00
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PHP100.00
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP200.00
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high rise condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total
size of the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional garbage fee shall be collected based on area
occupied for every unit already sold or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the
entire apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule prescribed herein for every unit occupied.
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an
occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output
produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable.159ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized
housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with
an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of
whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of “promoting shared responsibility
with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in generating
waste.”160 Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes
generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household age and size, accessibility to waste
collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003 may
also be looked into for guidance. Under said law, SWM service fees may be computed based on minimum factors such as types of solid
waste to include special waste, amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility, capacity
or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction, cost of management, and type of technology. With respect to utility rates set by
municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify consumers under reasonable classifications based upon factors such as the cost
of service, the purpose for which the service or the product is received, the quantity or the amount received, the different character
of the service furnished, the time of its use or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a ground of
distinction.161cralawlawlibrary
[A] lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The establishment of classifications and the
charging of different rates for the several classes is not unreasonable and does not violate the requirements of equality and uniformity.
Discrimination to be unlawful must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between those in like circumstances having equal
rights and privileges. Discrimination with respect to rates charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without a reasonable fact
basis or justification.162
On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No. SP-2235, which states:
SECTION 3. Penalty Clause – A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof (interest)
shall be charged against a household owner who refuses to pay the garbage fee herein imposed.
lacks the limitation required by Section 168 of the LGC, which provides:
SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges. – The sanggunian may impose a surcharge not exceeding
twenty-five (25%) of the amount of taxes, fees or charges not paid on time and an interest at the rate not exceeding two percent (2%)
per month of the unpaid taxes, fees or charges including surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case shall the total
interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.
Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that
he paid his realty tax on January 7, 2014 which already included the garbage fee. Respondents counter that if the law provides for its
own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not penal in nature. Allegedly, Ordinance No. SP-
2095 took effect after its publication while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its approval on December 26, 2013.
The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:

SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. – (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the
local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is
posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at
least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the
entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government
unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language or dialect understood
by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a
book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where
the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of
such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted
or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided,
That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies
of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a
newspaper of local circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local
circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places. (Emphasis supplied)
On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, which provides that it would take effect after
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. 163 On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, which was passed by the City
Council on December 16, 2013, provides that it would be effective upon its approval. 164 Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on
December 26, 2013, respondent City Mayor approved the same. 165ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation that respondents did not comply with the posting
and publication requirements of the law. Thus, We are constrained not to give credit to his unsupported claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the
“Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City,” is SUSTAINED for being consistent with Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7279. On the other
hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums of money
collected relative to its enforcement.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2095. In contrast,
respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further action to enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.
SO ORDERED.
8.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA,
MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on
November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution
No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent
Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for
being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that copies thereof be served
on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action as they may deem proper to take. In
due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and considering
that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined
involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief
Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and considering that with
the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately protected already, the Court had to
limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success
of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B.
Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been
allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be
duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave to intervene or
to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties, the latter in
representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with the records and the Court acknowledges
that they have not been without value as materials in the extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and
June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the
implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be
composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as
those required of Members of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to the people for their
ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution
No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its
preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to
amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER
THE VOTING AGE TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be
without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its
unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no savings
or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention
implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention
Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL

DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition
that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election returns and tally
sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment of said ballots
and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be
distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the
elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of the above
proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then transmitted them
to the Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of the plebiscite
in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of transmittal above
referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate
Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to November 9,
1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution
and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the
authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the
Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof
subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-
incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all
of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and
void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as
a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed
amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to
be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix
the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose
is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that this
power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may
direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of
the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a
political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by
petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has
joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the
jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21
SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other matters therein involved,
were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of
the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of
the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very
case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but
comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court — speaking through one of the leading
members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel —
declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political
one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied
the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened,
however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14,
1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961).
In the first we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and
control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by
Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of
the party having the second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as
members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an
act of Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of
each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant
of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent
powers of the people — as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11,
Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV,
Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members of the House
of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When
acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the
Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or
not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at
naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our
Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,
(And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the
Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates the
Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this
view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition
and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents and intervenors are seemingly
reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and
derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people
directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either
a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la
coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely without restrain and omnipotent all
wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by
Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came into being only because it was
called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present
Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any
department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with the purpose for which the
convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the
people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional
grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention
notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the
performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other
authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or the
freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such
Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property without just compensation or for the imposition or
exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and the
state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the
existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as being among those not
granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is
of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question
must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated system of government established by our founding
fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and
craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales,
so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the opinion written for a
unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression
of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as
a harmonious whole, under a system of check and balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly the limitations
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this
manner the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less
to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must be
ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the authority of their Constitution." In the last and
ultimate analysis then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible
of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of
the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of the
Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as
the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European
types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to
follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be
the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the
validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of
the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of
1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature
of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask
these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional
system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to
conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all such conflicts between and among
these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the
electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We
see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors,
why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people,
since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes without saying
that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but
simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason
and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to
resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention
of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years
the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution
No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue
which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional extension of the
right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that,
in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people
for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation
of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most laudable undertaking.
Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within
the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject question
implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of
common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering
other reforms or amendments affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly
provides, that the amendment therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other portions of the entire Constitution." In
other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the
individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should
be allowed to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the
Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may be presented
to the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the absolute
necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of adhering always to the rule of
law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the
problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because of the pressure brought to
bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for a
peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental
institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of the underprivileged
classes of our people as well as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and the national patrimony,
as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at
times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in
general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and
order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of
things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow
itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable
provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other departments of the government or any
other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by
interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof.
Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced
that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any obstruction or impediment
to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the
existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks
only of amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the
seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of
things, as they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the complete
substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this
grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional
duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and intervenors have joined in
an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to
express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and
unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the
Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that
it would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a
very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is
no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the
other coordinate departments of the government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in
that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into being by a call of a joint
session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate also that
as to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the
Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We
hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article
XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same
should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued
power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation,
and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and
every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of
care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste
without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less
importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation.
From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations,
restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent conventions
called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and
as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed
to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies
of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods
or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the
people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the
original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such
conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the scope and extent of the
amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly
discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be
proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power
can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not perceive
absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus
among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the
essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh,
We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us.
After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution
which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No.
1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention
must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be
submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose
of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a
constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as
to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that
"such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or
plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or
convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending
the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution
is as important as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be
viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct
but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of
the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune
with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved,
the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less
they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can
examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all
or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the
existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing
constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned
resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that
will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of
suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may
already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels
are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether
they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the
Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would
be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters
for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention
is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social
and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect
of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not
given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly
held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per
se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the
present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to
amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein
the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present
Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of
the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be
drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the
six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court
want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has
its own duties to the people under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not
the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in
providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been
called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same
violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are
only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but
together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971
and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8,
1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and
void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby
enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
9.
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the incumbent President of
the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not
been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October
16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of
his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending
the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting
and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted
in the footnote below.2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued
opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the
purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article
XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa
which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines,
representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by
their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives
shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the,
manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members thereof.
However, it shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the members, convene the
interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the
Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is
organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the
regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister)
may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers
as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or
whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any
reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or
letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and composition may be altered
by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called at any time the
government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter whether of national or local
interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by I majority
of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-
Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General principally
maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at
this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-
plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE
M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of
the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of
the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL,
JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the
forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a
constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount
to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and
above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to
challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source
of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its
enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that
the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the
effective implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its
provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money
sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards
taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to
exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of judicial review. We
disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. 8This is especially true in cases where
the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition
(See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution).
The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly
the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments,
written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the
issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article
X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties
and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated
and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been
discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers
to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is
not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority
to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that
power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of
that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's
authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately
lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore,
the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who
exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes
the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must
be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the Court's majority to treat
such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of
the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15,
1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in
nature. Subsequently in the Ratification Cases12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No.
1102. announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," partakes
of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question
raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We
rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on
January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable
one. With Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority
to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same
reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively
refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the
same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were
carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our
decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight
by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.

1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon
a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a
vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit
the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that
amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote
of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition.
In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote
of all the Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as
to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said:
"The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez,
himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the
Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when
he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the
proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the
convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973,
at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National
Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the
convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the
interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion
since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not
in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar
power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While
ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the
Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. 17 Such being the case, approval of
the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to
the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today are more or less concentrated
in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a
corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been
regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches
executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or
more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the
very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By
this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and
its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of
purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The
more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion
in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In
the former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be
to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The power
of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and
legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting
aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind
such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so
that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear authority of the
President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and shall preside
over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and
prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and
the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim
President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this
Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President
shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or
the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional Convention, while
giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened
soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there
would be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any
constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the
Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a
cause for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino
people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater
than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction
of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in
meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.

1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition
period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And,
in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon
special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President
decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President
to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is
yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he
cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although
peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent
assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only
the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme
Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that
actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal
times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns
supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had
already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about
the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60
cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly.
Other issues concerned the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang
Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 .28 The Batasang
Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials
with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan
voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the
Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the
submission of the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of
amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the
questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a republican and unitary
state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them .30In its fourth meaning, Savigny would
treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power
exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In
consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express
constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment." 34 "The
necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted to permanently
fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional
legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated
thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the
government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite
expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said
that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside
somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? - is a referendum
question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of
the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding
question on the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as
contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years
old and above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the
referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in
consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional
amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot
boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing
the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen
shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the
referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is
simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is
derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President. 39 It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen,
regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts .40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the
constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding
the election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the amending
process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the freedom to dissent. That speaks
of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded
no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total
suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of
expression and assembly The President himself had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views
on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at
hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed
amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government
employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand
on the referendum-plebiscite issues.44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the
referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The people have been living with them since
the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That
notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional
amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled
plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-
Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com.
Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice
President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette
was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the
independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep.
Act No. 73)."45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held,
but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v.
Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant
conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant
cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as
unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in
time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable
implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression
of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the
Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that
sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time
proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the President
possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for
the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper
submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo,
Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while
Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin
voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando,
conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that
there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President
to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view
that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo
and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and
Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate
Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA
774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the
constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient
information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of
Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the three
petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices
Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
10.
VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Petitioners,

vs.
JOSE J. CAFE, GLICERIO L. ALERIA, RUDY G. ADLAON, DAMASCENO AGUIRRE, RAMON PARING, MARIO ARGUELLES, ROLANDO STA.
ANA, NELLIE UGDANG, PEDRO ATUEL, RUBY BONSOBRE, RUTH FORNILLOS, DANIEL GATCHALIAN, RUBEN GUTIERREZ, JULIET
GATCHALIAN, ZENAIDA POBLETE, ARTHUR LOUDY, LILIAN LU, ISABEL MEJIA, EDUARDO ARGUELLES, LAO SUI KIEN, SAMUEL
CONSOLACION, DR. ARTURO MONTERO, DRA. LILIOSA MONTERO, PEDRO LACIA, CIRILA LACIA, EVELYN SANGALANG, DAVID CASTILLO,
ARSENIO SARMIENTO, ELIZABETH SY, METODIO NAVASCA, HELEN VIRTUDAZO, IRENE LIMBAGA, SYLVIA BUSTAMANTE, JUANA
DACALUS, NELLIE RICAMORA, JUDITH ESPINOSA, PAZ KUDERA, EVELYN PANES, AGATON BULICATIN, PRESCILLA GARCIA, ROSALIA
OLITAO, LUZVIMINDA AVILA, GLORIA OLAIR, LORITA MENCIAS, RENATO ARIETA, EDITHA ACUZAR, LEONARDA VILLACAMPA, ELIAS
JARDINICO, BOBINO NAMUAG, FELIMON NAMUAG, EDGAR CABUNOC, HELEN ARGUELLES, HELEN ANG, FELECIDAD PRIETO, LUISITO
GRECIA, LILIBETH PARING, RUBEN CAMACHO, ROSALINDA LALUNA, LUZ YAP, ROGELIO LAPUT, ROSEMARIE WEE, TACOTCHE RANAIN,
AVELINO DELOS REYES and ROGASIANO OROPEZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Vivencio V. Jumamil seeks to reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 2000 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 35082, the dispositive portion of which read:
With the foregoing, the assailed Decision of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court of Panabo Davao dated 26 November 1990 in Sp. Civil Action
No. 89-1 is hereby AFFIRMED.2
The Regional Trial Court dismissed petitioner’s petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of
restraining order, and ordered the petitioner to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱1,000 to each of the 57 private respondents.3
The factual antecedents follow.
In 1989, petitioner Jumamil4 filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief
with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against public respondents Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution No. 7, Series of 1989
(Resolution No. 7).
Resolution No. 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance No. 111, provided for an initial appropriation of ₱765,000 for the construction of
stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market5 which was destroyed by fire.
Subsequently, the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution No. 49, series of 1989 (Resolution No. 49), denominated as
Ordinance No. 10, appropriating a further amount of ₱1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the same public market.6
Prior to the passage of these resolutions, respondent Mayor Cafe had already entered into contracts with those who advanced and
deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of ₱40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends
and/or relatives of the public respondents.7 The construction of the stalls which petitioner sought to stop through the preliminary
injunction in the RTC was nevertheless finished, rendering the prayer therefor moot and academic. The leases of the stalls were then
awarded by public raffle which, however, was limited to those who had deposited ₱40,000 each. 8 Thus, the petition was amended
anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents. 9
Petitioner alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were:
…passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents who deposited the amount of ₱40,000.00 for
each stall, and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract to award the would be constructed stalls to all private respondents.…
As admitted by public respondents some of the private respondents are close friends and/or relatives of some of the public
respondents which makes the questioned acts discriminatory. The questioned resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any
notice of publication that the special privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the private respondents maybe (sic) availed of
by anybody who can deposit the amount of ₱40,000.00. 10
Neither was there any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered into by public and private respondents for the
construction of stalls to be awarded to private respondents that the same can be availed of by anybody willing to deposit ₱40,000.00. 11
In this petition, petitioner prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and a declaration of the unconstitutionality,
illegality and nullity of the questioned resolutions/ordinances and lease contracts entered into by the public and private respondents;
for the declaration of the illegality of the award of the stalls during the pendency of this action and for the re-raffling and award of the
stalls in a manner that is fair and just to all interested applicants; 12for the issuance of an order to the local government to admit any
and all interested persons who can deposit the amount of ₱40,000 for a stall and to order a re-raffling for the award of the stalls to
the winners of the re-raffle; for the nullification of the award of attorney’s fees to private respondents on the ground that it was
erroneous and unmeritorious; and for the award of damages in favor of petitioner in the form of attorney’s fees. 13
At the outset, we must point out that the issue of the constitutionality of the questioned resolutions was never ruled upon by both
the RTC and the CA.
It appears that on May 21, 1990, both parties agreed 14 to await the decision in CA G.R. SP No. 20424,15 which involved similar facts,
issues and parties. The RTC, consequently, deferred the resolution of the pending petition. The appellate court eventually rendered
its decision in that case finding that the petitioners were not entitled to the declaratory relief prayed for as they had no legal interest
in the controversy. Upon elevation to the Supreme Court as UDK Case No. 9948, the petition for review on certiorari was denied for
being insufficient in form and substance. 16
The RTC, after receipt of the entry of the SC judgment, 17 dismissed the pending petition on November 26, 1990. It adopted the ruling
in CA G.R. SP No. 20424:
xxxxxxxxx
We find petitioners’ aforesaid submission utterly devoid of merit. It is, to say the least, questionable whether or not a special civil
action for declaratory relief can be filed in relation to a contract by persons who are not parties thereto. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, any person interested under a deed, will, contract, or other written instruments may bring an action to determine any
question of the contract, or validly arising under the instrument for a declaratory (sic) of his rights or duties thereunder. Since contracts
take effect only between the parties (Art. 1311) it is quite plain that one who is not a party to a contract can not have the interest in
it that the rule requires as a basis for declaratory reliefs (PLUM vs. Santos, 45 SCRA 147).
Following this ruling, the petitioners were not parties in the agreement for the award of the market stalls by the public respondents,
in the public market of Panabo, Davao, and since the petitioners were not parties to the award of the market stalls and whose rights
are never affected by merely stating that they are taxpayers, they have no legal interest in the controversy and they are not, therefore,
entitled to bring an action for declaratory relief.18
WHEREFORE, the petition of the petitioners as taxpayers being without merit and not in consonance with law, is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
As to the counterclaim for damages, the same not having been actually and fully proven, the Court gives no award as to the same. It
is not amiss to state here that the petitioners agreed to be bound by the outcome of Special Civil Case No. 89-10.
However, for unnecessarily dragging into Court the fifty-seven (57) private respondents who are bonafide businessmen and stall
holders in the public market of Panabo, it is fitting and proper for the petitioners to be ordered payment of attorney’s fees.
Accordingly, the herein petitioners are ordered to pay ONE THOUSAND (₱1,000.00) PESOS EACH to the 57 private respondents, as
attorney’s fees, jointly and severally, and for them to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.19
From this adverse decision, petitioner again appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35082 which is now before us for
review.
The appellate court, yet again, affirmed the RTC decision and held that:
Res judicata does not set in a case dismissed for lack of capacity to sue, because there has been no determination on the merits.
Neither does the law of the case apply. However, the court a quo took judicial notice of the fact that petitioners agreed to be bound
by the outcome of Special Civil Case No. 89-10. Allegans contraria non est audiendus. (He is not to be heard who alleges things
contradictory to each other.) It must be here observed that petitioners-appellants were the ones who manifested that it would be
practical to await the decision of the Supreme Court in their petition for certiorari, for after all the facts, circumstances and issues in
that case, are exactly the same as in the case that is here appealed. Granting that they may evade such assumption, a careful evaluation
of the case would lead Us to the same conclusion: that the case for declaratory relief is dismissible. As enumerated by Justice Regalado
in his "Remedial Law Compendium", the requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:
(a) The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or
regulation, or ordinance;
(b) The terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
(c) There must have been no breach of the documents in question;
(d) There must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
(e) The issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
(f) Adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.
In Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy, et al, 90 Phil. 83, 88, the Supreme Court ratiocinated the requisites of justiciability of an action
for declaratory relief by saying that the court must be "satisfied that an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one, exists between
parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will be a practical help in ending the
controversy."
The petition must show "an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a
real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue. The question is whether the facts alleged a substantial controversy between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory relief. In GSISEA and GSISSU
vs. Hon. Alvendia etc. and GSIS, 108 Phil. 505, the Supreme Court ruled a declaratory relief improper or unnecessary when it appears
to be a moot case, since it seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is none. In Kawasaki Port Service
Corporation vs. Amores, 199 SCRA 230, citing Dy Poco vs. Commissioner of Immigration, et al., 16 SCRA 618, the rule was stated: "where
a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights,
statuses and other relations, commonly expressed in a written instrument, the case is not one for declaratory judgment."
Indeed, in its true light, the present petition for declaratory relief seems to be no more than a request for an advisory opinion to which
courts in this and other jurisdiction have cast a definite aversion. The ordinances being assailed are appropriation ordinances. The
passage of the ordinances were pursuant to the public purpose of constructing market stalls. For the exercise of judicial review, the
governmental act being challenged must have had an adverse effect on the person challenging it, and the person challenging the act,
must have "standing" to challenge, i.e., in the categorical and succinct language of Justice Laurel, he must have a "personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." Standing is a
special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
A careful analysis of the records of the case at bar would disclose that petitioners-appellants have suffered no wrong under the terms
of the ordinances being assailed – and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Judicial exercise cannot be
exercised in vacuo. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on a constitutional question and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. The issue is not the
ordinances themselves, but the award of the market stalls to the private respondents on the strength of the contracts individually
executed by them with Mayor Cafe. To reiterate, a person who is not a party to a contract cannot file a petition for declaratory relief
and seek judicial interpretation of such contract (Atlas Consolidated Mining Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 166). Not having
established their locus standi, we see no error committed by the court a quo warranting reversal of the appealed decision.
With the foregoing, the assailed Decision of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court of Panabo Davao dated 26 November 1990 in Sp. Civil Action
No. 89-1 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
Thus, both the RTC and the CA dismissed the case on the ground of petitioner’s lack of legal standing and the parties’ agreement to
be bound by the decision in CA G.R. SP. No. 20424.
The issues to be resolved are the following:
(1) whether the parties were bound by the outcome in CA G.R. SP. No. 20424;
(2) whether petitioner had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief;
(3) whether Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional; and
(4) whether petitioner should be held liable for damages.
Locus Standi and the
Constitutionality Issue
We will first consider the second issue. The petition for declaratory relief challenged the constitutionality of the subject resolutions.
There is an unbending rule that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are
satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must
have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.21
Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term "interest"
means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest.22 Unless a person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal
standing.
The CA held that petitioner had no standing to challenge the two resolutions/ordinances because he suffered no wrong under their
terms. It also concluded that "the issue (was) not the ordinances themselves but the award of the market stalls to the private
respondents on the strength of the contracts individually executed by them with Mayor Cafe." Consequently, it ruled that petitioner,
who was not a party to the lease contracts, had no standing to file the petition for declaratory relief and seek judicial interpretation
of the agreements.
We do not agree. Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte 23 and not
in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances and entering into the
lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. 24 Atlas Consolidated
Mining & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals 25 cited by the CA does not apply because it involved contracts between two
private parties.
Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation.26 The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds.27 The resolutions being assailed were appropriations ordinances. Petitioner alleged that these ordinances were "passed for the
business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents" 28 (that is, allegedly for the private benefit of respondents)
because even before they were passed, respondent Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease contracts for
the construction and award of the market stalls. 29 Private respondents admitted they deposited ₱40,000 each with the municipal
treasurer, which amounts were made available to the municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits, however, were
needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was gutted by a series of fires.30 Thus, the award of the
stalls was necessarily limited only to those who advanced their personal funds for their construction. 31
Petitioner did not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the "Remark to Comment" he filed in this Court
did he first assert that "he (was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested to occupy a market stall." 32 Such claim was obviously
an afterthought.
Be that as it may, we have on several occasions relaxed the application of these rules on legal standing:
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance
or paramount importance to the people. Recently, after holding that the IBP had no locus standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP v.
Zamora nevertheless entertained the Petition therein. It noted that "the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents." 33
―oOo―
Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are procedural matters. Considering the
importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated
in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits
of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit.34
―oOo―
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.35
But, even if we disregard petitioner’s lack of legal standing, this petition must still fail. The subject resolutions/ordinances appropriated
a total of ₱2,280,000 for the construction of the public market stalls. Petitioner alleges that these ordinances were discriminatory
because, even prior to their enactment, a decision had already been made to award the market stalls to the private respondents who
deposited ₱40,000 each and who were either friends or relatives of the public respondents. Petitioner asserts that "there (was) no
publication or invitation to the public that this contract (was) available to all who (were) interested to own a stall and (were) willing
to deposit ₱40,000."36 Respondents, however, counter that the "public respondents’ act of entering into this agreement was
authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo per Resolution No. 180 dated October 10, 1988"37 and that "all the people interested
were invited to participate in investing their savings."38
We note that the foregoing was a disputed fact which the courts below did not resolve because the case was dismissed on the basis
of petitioner’s lack of legal standing. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to prove the subject ordinances and agreements to be
discriminatory. Considering that he was asking this Court to nullify the acts of the local political department of Panabo, Davao del
Norte, he should have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and who were
thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice.
Furthermore, there was the time-honored presumption of regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary. 39 And this is
not to mention that:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are
valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of
separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and
found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved. 40
Therefore, since petitioner had no locus standi to
question the ordinances, there is no need for us to discuss the constitutionality of said enactments.
Were the Parties Bound by the
Outcome in CA G.R. SP. No. 20424?
Adverting to the first issue, we observe that petitioner was the one who wanted the parties to await the decision of the Supreme
Court in UDK Case No. 9948 since the facts and issues in that case were similar to this. Petitioner, having expressly agreed to be bound
by our decision in the aforementioned case, should be reined in by the dismissal order we issued, now final and executory. In addition
to the fact that nothing prohibits parties from committing to be bound by the results of another case, courts may take judicial notice
of a judgment in another case as long as the parties give
their consent or do not object.41 As opined by Justice Edgardo L. Paras:
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case,
of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of
public records on file in the same court. In addition, judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in
another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case between different
parties in the same court.42
Damages
Finally, on the issue of damages, petitioner asserts that he impleaded the 57 respondents in good faith since the award of the stalls to
them was made during the pendency of the action. 43 Private respondents refute this assertion and argue that petitioner filed this
action in bad faith and with the intention of harassing them inasmuch as he had already filed CA G.R. SP. No. 20424 even before
then.44 The RTC, affirmed by the CA, held that petitioner should pay attorney’s fees "for unnecessarily dragging into Court the 57
private respondents who (were) bonafide businessmen and stall holders in the public market of Panabo." 45
We do not agree that petitioner should be held liable for damages. It is not sound public policy to put a premium on the right to litigate
where such right is exercised in good faith, albeit erroneously.46 The alleged bad faith of petitioner was never established. The special
circumstances in Article 2208 of the Civil Code justifying the award of attorney’s fees are not present in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35082 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of attorney's fees to private respondents is deleted.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma,plaintiff-appellant,

According to section 6 of the law —

1. 6th year - 20%

2. 7th year - 20%

3. 8th year - 20%

4. 9th year - 20%

5. 10th year - 20%

On all domestic households in Quezon City;

A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari

D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:

On the Socialized Housing Tax

On the Garbage Fee

The Court’s Ruling

Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;

(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;

(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;

(b) Documentary stamp tax;

(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;

On the Garbage Fee

We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.

The source reduction component shall describe the following:

(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;

(b) amount/volume of waste; and

(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.

Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees

c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility

d) capacity or type of LGU constituency

The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:

Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.

Intervenors in their own behalf.

xxx xxx xxx

CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1

BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:

September 28, 1971

The Commission on Elections Manila

Thru the Chairman

xxx xxx xxx

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION

We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976

RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.

Justiciability of question raised.

The amending process as laid out

in the new Constitution.

in the President during

Authority of the incumbent

amendments to the Constitution.

The People is Sovereign

rendered nugatory by the

participation of the 15-year olds.

Time for deliberation

The three issues are

VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Petitioners,