POLICY BRIEF | AUGUST 2019

POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SINJAR, IRAQ

WHAT THE AFTERMATH OF CONFLICT AND HISTORICAL NEGLECT MEAN FOR

RECOVERING THE LOCAL ECONOMY

Sinjar district provides an important case study in post-conflict economic recovery

given the heavy toll the ISIL-conflict and its aftermath have taken on the land and its
people. This, coupled with significant historical marginalization, have made returning
to even a pre-conflict economic status quo difficult. In mapping previous and existing
value chains in the district, this briefing highlights where and how they have changed
or broken down and the means by which they may start to be restored.

Since the arrival of ISIL into Sinjar district in 2014, its population experienced widespread
displacement, serious mass violations of human rights, large-scale destruction, and the emer-
gence of a multiplicity of foreign and local armed groups to protect the area once ISIL was
pushed out. The ethno-religious diversity of the district, made up of predominantly Ezidi
populations as well as Sunni and Shia Arabs and Kurds, was also affected by the conflict
and its aftermath. An asymmetric return of these groups began in 2015 – with some still
prevented from coming back due to perceived ISIL affiliation in the absence of agreed upon
accountability and reconciliation efforts.1 A cause and compounding factor to all of this is
that Sinjar has historically been one of the most neglected places in Iraq – at the fringe of
the country geographically, politically, and economically.

While the pre-conflict status quo was far from good, current recovery and stabilization efforts
have yet to turn the tide for Sinjar. Based on a comparative evaluation of living conditions
in conflict-affected areas of Iraq, Sinjar remains a location with some of the most severe
physical and social circumstances for returning populations to come back to.2 Low-level but
prolonged violence and insecurity continue, oftentimes linked with the very complex and
fragmented security configuration.3 The restoration of governance structures have begun,
but not without triggering protests over their legitimacy.4 Promises of development from au-
thorities in Mosul, Baghdad, and Erbil (these latter two power centers, symptomatic of the
district’s disputed nature) have not yet materialized. Given these dynamics, it is important to
ask: how do they impact the ability of conflict-affected people to restore their basic means of
subsistence?

Sinjar is thus a relevant case study to look at for lessons on post-conflict recovery. Taking a
political economy lens, this briefing explores the challenges for the district’s recovery brought
on by the ISIL-conflict as well as the scenario that has emerged in the subsequent four years.
Understanding these challenges and the implications they have on affected livelihoods can
help increase the efficacy of development and recovery interventions, making them respon-
sive to needs on the ground.

1
Rania Abouzeid, “When the Weapons Fall Silent: Reconciliation in Sinjar after ISIS,” ECFR Policy Brief (London: European
Council on Foreign Relations, 2018), https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/when_the_weapons_fall_silent_reconciliation_
in_sinjar_after_isis; and IOM, Returns Working Group, and Social Inquiry, “The Growing Role of Reconciliation in Return
Movements: Snapshots from the Return Index,” Return Index Thematic Series 2 (Erbil: IOM, 2019).
2
IOM, Returns Working Group, and Social Inquiry, “Return Index Findings Round 4,” (Erbil: IOM, 2019), https://www.social-
inquiry.org/s/Return-Index-Findings-Round-Four.pdf.
3
Christine van den Toorn, Sarah Mathieu-Comtois, and Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Sinjar after ISIS: Returning to Disputed
Territory,” (Utrecht: PAX, 2016), https://www.paxforpeace.nl/stay-informed/news/sinjar-after-isis-returning-to-disputed-territory.
4
International Crisis Group, “A Way Forward for Sinjar,” International Crisis Group, December 14, 2018, https://www.
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/way-forward-sinjar.
 POLICY BRIEF | POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SINJAR

Figure 1. Map of Sinjar district and locations assessed

TECHNICAL FACTSHEET
–– 17 qualitative semi-structured interviews with individuals involved in different aspects of the
value chains in the farming, livestock, manufacturing, and retail sectors in Sinjar Center, Sinuni,
and Kursi in November 2018 (Figure 1). Information was further clarified through a validation
session with the field team.
–– These interviews covered only the Ezidi actors in the district as this was the largest and most
acccesssible ethno-religious population that had returned to the district at the time. Analysis
presented here however indirectly touches on the changes in roles and impacts on other ethno-
religious groups within Sinjar’s political economy, including the Sunni Arab tribes who had
previously lived in these areas. While their return slowly began in mid- to late 2018, most are
still not yet able to come back.

A VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS FOR POLITICAL ECONOMY

The findings presented here aim to dissect Sinjar’s current socio-economic challenges through
looking at the functioning of local value chains before conflict and at present, examining
changes in actors, systems, and networks as well as their ability (or not) to cope currently.
This helps in guaging the impact of conflict on Sinjar’s political economy.

To cover all these elements, this work maps the main value chains and different actors across
them, from raw producers to traders, support service suppliers, processors, and end-of-chain re-
tailers. This was carried out across agriculture (extensive cereal farmers as well as fruit producers),
livestock, manufacturing, and retail sectors (Figure 2).

Before exploring the post-conflict situation, this initial mapping provides a broad overview of the
fundamentals of the value chains and the local economy of Sinjar. The main elements are as
follows:

–– Significant level of economic diversity. This is not only in terms of crops (the landscape offers for
multiple possibilities beyond mainstream cereal cultivation, like grapes, tobacco, figs, etc.),
but also in terms of small-scale manufacturing. This work mapped the existence of industries
dedicated to the production of aluminum, bottled water, gypsum, ice cream, salt, and pickles,
among others, that usually provided employment to 20-30 families in each factory. Most of
these value chains are currently broken due to conflict and are struggling to restart.

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–– Length of value chains are short. In spite of the diversity in production, agricultural products gen-
erally remain unprocessed. Manufactured goods undergo minimal transformation and sale
usually takes place at local markets. Actors tend to make small profits which, in the absence of
financial alternatives, implies a low investment capacity in furthering activities.

–– When a value chain extends, it is usually toward the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, mainly Duhok Governorate.
While ties between these regions have historically been strong for cultural reasons, the further
displacement of Ezidis into these areas as a result of conflict have strengthened them.5

Figure 2. Value chain elements assessed

KEEPING THE ECONOMY ALIVE AFTER CONFLICT (OR NOT)

Existing technical literature on conflict and livelihoods has analyzed the different pathways by
which violent events can break the systems, processes, and relationships that link a value chain.6
Using the stylized impacts that this literature defines, it is noteworthy to find that all the potential
impacts described have, to some extent, affected the economy of Sinjar. The below provides a
discussion for each, giving insight into what it may mean for Sinjar district to overcome the chal-
lenges that impedes its recovery to, at least, pre-conflict economic dynamics.

Stylized impact #1: Destruction of critical infrastructure and disruption of upstream/

downstream markets
Both ISIL’s brief take-over of the district as well as the military operations to remove the group
have taken a heavy toll on the physical capital of Sinjar. Beyond widespread residential destruc-
tion, productive assets have largely been destroyed or stolen across the district. ISIL caused much
of this destruction, but the mulitple changes in security forces in control since also brought similar

5
A further point on geographical linkages is to note that the western half of Sinjar is relatively well connected with the area across
the border in Syria under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which facilitates the supply of goods from mainly Kurdish
towns such as Hasaka and Qamishlo.
6
See, for example, Lisa Curtis et al., Private Sector Development in Conflict-Affected Environments: Key Resources for Practitioners
(London: Donor Committee for Enterprise Development, 2010), https://www.enterprise-development.org/wp-content/uploads/
PSDinCAE_KeyResourcesforPractitioners_Final.pdf; and Canan Gündüz and Diana Klien, Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Value-
Chain Development (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2008), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADY232.pdf.

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consequences, according to respondents. This affects both public and private infrastructure. For
example, the government silo was destroyed and the electricity network severely damaged – with
only the latter now slowly being restored. For farmers, wells and pumps indispensible for
agriculture as well as heavy equipment were destroyed. Part of the land was also rendered
unusable due to mines. None of the factories and workshops mapped in this assesssment were
left intact, and equipment and machinery was stolen to be sold or taken elsewhere. One of
the biggest impacts for the population is the condition in which the large concrete factory was
left in (see box below). In the towns’ central bazars, retailers mentioned that the vast majority
of stores were looted, raided, or destroyed.

Although all economic actors interviewed across sectors were affected by such damage and de-
struction, the majority were able to reinvest capital, replace assets, and restart activities upon their
return to Sinjar. The average investment made ranged between 10 and 18 million Iraqi dinars
(between $8,000 and $15,000) and came from a combination of their own wealth and support
from family networks. The majority of these respondents, however, mentioned not being able to
reach pre-conflict activity levels, for example in terms of land farmed or livestock owned, not be-
cause of lack of money to invest, but due to the weak economic outlook in the district.

This is further affected by the disruption of neighboring markets, cutting supply links. Previ-
ously, some inputs were often available in the nearby markets of Tal Afar and Mosul. These
linkages are now generally broken or limited as these neighboring local economies, also hard-
hit by conflict, themselves recover.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SINJAR’S LARGEST EMPLOYER

It is common in Iraq to find state-owned heavy industries established in the 1970s strategically spread across the
country, especially in areas with few other sources of livelihoods. This is the case, for example, of the oil refineries in
Baiji (Salah al-Din Governorate), the phosphate factory in Al-Qaim (Anbar Governorate), and the cement factory
in Sinjar.

Located close to Sinjar Center, on the road to Tal Afar, this high-capacity factory employed about 900 people,
including Arabs, Kurds, and to a lesser extent Ezidis, from Sinjar and Tal Afar, for almost 30 years. It is owned by
the Northern Cement State Company, dependent on the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, and operated until 2014
by a Turkish contractor. It was partially destroyed and had its equipment stolen by different armed groups and
security entities during and after the conflict. Its continued closure significantly affects the local economy given the
large number of families that relied on it. Reopening the factory necessitates reinvestment from the state, but some
respondents pointed out that they fear the government ordered the transfer of the factory’s activities to another part
of Iraq. The evidence they highlighted for this is that no effort has been made in four years to restart operations.
They also referred to the former contractor’s concerns on reopening it due to the security situation in the area and
the lack of support from the government.

The continued inactivity of the cement factory in Sinjar is indicative of how destruction of critical infrastructure,
weakened state instutions, and security risks impact a major actor in the value chain.

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Stylized impact #2: Weakened (or absent) state institutions and policies to regulate
the value chain
Before the conflict, the majority of
farmers would obtain seeds and fer-
tilizer directly from the local branch
of the Ministry of Agriculture and
sell produce to government silos at
above market prices – a system that
is a legacy of the former regime’s
mixed economy. Similarly, livestock
producers relied on the technical
services provided by government de-
partments, such as veterinary care
and disease controls. The state, in
short, was essential in participating
in and establishing an enabling mar-
ket environment, that is, the support-
ing institutions, policies, norms, and
public infrastructure necessary to run
economic activities – with the pros
and cons that this interventionism
implies.
The relative economic security pro-
vided by the state’s structures in ag-
riculture and livestock was disman-
tled after the irruption of ISIL and
its aftermath. The government grain
silo that used to provide supplies in
ON STATE PARTICIPATION IN AGRICULTURE
Under the banner of national food security, the Government of Iraq
has for decades aimed to organize virtually all stages of agricultur-
al production, making farmers over-reliant on the state and almost
exclusively focused on basic crops like wheat and barley.
The linchpin of this system is the state purchasing program. Farmers
submit their wheat or barley production plans for the season to
local branches of the Ministry of Agriculture and, upon delivery of
their crops to publicly-managed grain silos, the government pays
farmers at prices significantly above what the private market would
pay. This generates enormous incentives for farmers to stick to basic
crops and traditional agricultural practices. Additionally, local min-
istry branches provide farmers with the necessary seeds and fertil-
izers for their production – in some cases with fertilizers produced
by inefficient state-owned factories.
All in all, for farmers, agriculture was meant to be a stable and
secure livelihood, provided that the state machinery works prop-
erly. While the system guarantees good revenues, it handicaps the
modernization and growth of the sector due to a lack of incentives
for farmers to invest in better productivity or in diversifying produc-
tion. Access to seeds and fertilizers is tightly controlled by the state,
hindering the private market. Outside of wheat and barely, the lack
of agricultural planning for other crops makes local farming unable
to compete with foreign imports. Thus, with this over-reliance on the
public system, it should not be assumed that a farmer would be able
(or know how) to adapt agricultural livelihoods in the absence of the
state. This is precisely the case in Sinjar district now.

addition to taking in harvests was se-

verely damaged during the conflict and has not been operational since 2014. For the livestock
sector, the displacement of key technical public staff, such as veterinarians, has also made work
difficult. These offices provided livestock owners with free vaccines throughout the year and
medicines at minimal cost, in addition to engaging in awareness campaigns to improve animal
husbandry practices. At the time of fieldwork, only the government veterinary office in Sinuni
had reopened, providing as much coverage as materially possible for the whole district as the
office in Sinjar Center remains inoperative.

Thus, four years after the end of the conflict in Sinjar, institutions and public infrastructure
remains in a state of neglect that has partly impeded the restoration of dependent value chains.
Lack of financial means from provincial authorities as well as a seemingly purposeful lack of
attention paid to rural areas from provincial authorities have contributed to further postponing
the state’s presence in Sinjar.7 Absence of regulation and provision, however, has allowed for
the emergence of illegal supplies of fertilizers and medicines through smuggling and informal
clinics – this, according to respondents, has become the one coping strategy at reach for those
willing to re-start livelihood activities without waiting for the state’s return.

7
Interview with a stabilization actor working in Ninewa Governorate, conducted in Erbil in June 2018; and interview with
technical staff of the Ninewa Provincial Council, conducted in Erbil in March 2019.

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Stylized impact #3: Disappearance and migration of value chain participants

leading to a loss of human financial assets
Beyond destruction of assets and the absence of the state, the primary challenge as agreed by all
respondents is the lack of people returning to Sinjar district. This is corroborated by existing data
on return trends. Four years after ISIL was pushed out, 84% of the people displaced due to these
events have still not returned – this includes Ezidis, Arabs, and Kurds.8 Their stated willingness to
return in the short to medium term is very low, with the vast majority undecided on whether to
return, remain in displacement, or attempt migration abroad. An additional subset of this popu-
lation is also blocked from return.

One of the main consequences is a relative abandonment of farming and livestock because the
owners are not back. This is even more stark for the workshops and small factories mapped in
this assessment, as very few of the proprietors have reinvested in these activities. Most are either
still displaced within Iraq, particularly in the Kurdistan Region, or have migrated outside of
the country. Along with the disappearance of upstream actors and employers, some respondents
pointed out that many returnees that usesd to work as seasonal workers now sought a different
livelihood (such as within the multiple security forces or armed groups that have sprouted up since
2014). Prior to this, up to 50 people, both men and women, were employed per farm per season in
many cases. The farmers and livestock owners that willingly restarted their activities complained
of critical gaps in the market since it became particularly challenging to source inputs and to
trade. The value chain is broken in many cases, for example due to the lack of supply of fertilizers
or seeds, absence of traders that can move produce out of Sinjar, and/or the limited number of
heavy agricultural equipment available for rent. Farmers and business owners have had to find
alternative ways to supply the necessary quantity of inputs given that no new actors in the local
value chains have stepped in to occupy missing links. The livestock sector, in particular, experienced
a surge in prices and competition: the absence of traders as well as the reduced number of farmers
supplying local fodder pushed livestock prices up. Finally, looking at the end points of these value
chains, the size of demand has significantly shrunk given the low population return levels to the
district. This is critical as most of the economic sectors here are reliant on local consumption.

The existential root causes of conflict in the first place seem to be the main forces keeping
Ezidis, in particular, from returning to Sinjar. Concerns about whether it is possible to restore
their livelihoods, access financial assets, and make a living, seem to play a minor role in Ezidi
decision-making, according to respondents. Instead, as a former factory worker pointed out, the
main problem is about “belief,” or trust, in being able to remain in Sinjar and not go through
the same tragedy again. Employers and landowners in general remain wary of reinvesting in
their former activities in Sinjar due to uncertainty in the political environment and concerns
that anything could happen to once again disrupt their livelihoods – be it asymmetric attacks
by extremist groups or another full-scale conflict.

This absence of returns could, however, be the seed for new opportunities: as many displaced
Ezidis establish themselves in other areas in Iraq, such as the Kurdistan Region, or even in
Europe, new trade and financial networks could be brokered between them and the residents
of Sinjar.

8
IOM, Reasons to Remain: An In-Depth Analysis of the Main Districts of Origin (Erbil: IOM, 2019), http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDT-
MRound/IDP_Districts_of_Origin_Factsheets.pdf.

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 POLICY BRIEF | POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SINJAR

Stylized impact #4: Broken linkages resulting from mistrust between groups due
to conflict
Pre-conflict economic relations and cooperation between Sinjar’s Ezidi and Sunni Arab tribes
was unanimously qualified as positive by all respondents. Historically, the agriculture sector was
a mechanism by which the different communities residing in the district connected with one an-
other, through a number of means.9 Ezidi landowners would lease land to Arab farmers. Arab
farmers in Sinjar Center as well as in neighboring Rabbia would hire Ezidi agricultural workers
and likewise Ezidi farmers would make use of Arab labor. For livestock, the main market spaces
are located in the predominantly Ezidi town centers in Sinuni and Sinjar Center, where Arab
tribesmen would arrive for trade. Only respondents from Sinjar Center noted sporadic incidents
between these communities before this conflict, including the fear of terrorist attacks when farm-
ing and allowing animals to graze in the lands within Qayrawan, a mixed Ezidi-Arab subdistrict
south of Sinjar Center.

This connection is no longer the norm in the district. As one actor in the livestock sector in Sinjar
Center explained, “There was cooperation with Arabs based on ancient historical relations and being neighbors,
but after the entry of ISIL, so far we cut any relationship.” Thus, the future for long-term sustainable
economic recovery is dependent on rebuilding trust and meaningful coexistence between the
populations of the district, particularly as Arabs are now slowly starting to return. As it stands, the
current “no contact” situation has uneven implications on livelihoods. Ezidis are gradually able to
restore their livelihoods and operate within their former value chains, such as farming, livestock,
manufacturing, and retail. The financial recovery of the Arabs returning in 2018 onward, how-
ever, seems to be dependent on Ezidis, particularly as market places are in Ezidi towns and they
currently have predominance over the economic and security spheres of the district. This may
constrain Arabs’ ability to even access goods let alone restore livelihoods, especially considering
that some of these populations that have returned are unable to leave their villages freely.

Stylized impact #5: Security risks impacting value chain actors, structures, and
processes
Interlocutors across farming, livestock, and manufacturing sectors also pointed to the continued
existence of security threats as an impediment to post-conflict redevelopment. For example, in
one of the interviews, an agricultural worker claimed that many are concerned about renewed
attacks targeting farmers. Livestock owners also indicated that grazing lands are less available
compared to before the conflict, given the restrictions imposed by security actors in the area
as well as the presence of mines in the fields. Business owners also feared being targets amidst
general instability and political violence.

These concerns relate to the uncertainty reported above in relation to the fear of a repetition
of previous violence and upheaval. While not anywhere close to the same level of violence as in
2014, recent incidents on the ground, including fighting between security actors, ISIL attacks,
and arson lend credence to these fears.10

9
Nelida Fuccaro, “Communalism and the State in Iraq: the Yazidi Kurds, c.1869-1940,” Middle Eastern Studies 35 (1999), 1-26.
10
See, for example, Rudaw, “Yezidi Convoy Says it was Ambushed by Iraqi Army in Shingal,” Rudaw, March 18, 2019, https://
www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/18032019; Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “ISIS Carries Out Rare Attack in Shingal
Region,” Kurdistan24, June 13, 2019, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/15be5a2c-66ee-4b89-8d1d-d7164ec327e4;
and Tom Westcott, “Crop Fires Hit Newly Returned Iraqis Hard,” The New Humanitarian, July 8, 2019, https://www.
thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/07/08/crop-fires-sinjar-newly-returned-iraqis.

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Stylized impact #6: Embargoes and illegal taxation by security forces or armed
groups on economic actors, restricting their access to end markets and inputs,
imposing burdens on their ability to operate
Last but not least, an emerging characteristic of post-conflict Sinjar is the multiplicity of different
security forces and armed actors immersed in territorial competition dynamics. Such a complex
security configuration has ramifications on local political economies in general across Iraq.11

In Sinjar, this includes significant ad hoc burdens imposed on the transport of goods and equip-
ment through checkpoints, as indicated by the traders and farmers interviewed. In some cases,
this involves import restrictions including preventing the entry of pesticides and fertilizers to
Sinjar in sufficient quantities to supply market needs, or limiting the amount of livestock able to
move across checkpoints at a time. It also affects those industrial owners aiming to bring in new
heavy equipment from Erbil. Thus, for these actors, the role of smugglers has become extreme-
ly important to overcome such restrictions – with the additional costs it implies. In addition, all
the different armed actors in control of the roads through which trucks have to pass allegedly
charge taxes without any legal mandate or justification to do so. This affects all routes, with
state security forces and affiliated armed groups taxing goods coming and going from Ninewa
Governorate,12 and the YPG/PKK taxing those at the Syrian border. Arbitrary movement
restrictions and informal taxation, in sum, affect different key parameters in the value chains,
from availability of inputs to access to end markets, with a direct impact on price fluctation and
general profitability.

One security aspect recently resolved relates to the reopening of the Sahela checkpoint,
connecting Sinjar with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq – the shortests (and safest) route to the main
markets in Duhok, Zakho, and Sumel, where most Ezidi traders have historically operated.
Closed between 2017 and early 2019 for political reasons after the change in security actors
from the Kurdish Peshmerga to the Iraqi Army, this caused severe market disruption. Even
before 2017, the traffic through the checkpoint was subject to heavy restrictions due to intra-
Kurdish political maneuvering.13

11
Erica Gaston and Mario Schultz, “At the Tip of the Spear: Armed Groups’ Impact on Displacement and Return in Post-ISIL Iraq,”
(Berlin: GPPI, 2019), https://www.gppi.net/2019/02/18/at-the-tip-of-the-spear; and Mark A. DeWeaver, “Decentralized Rent-
Seeking in Iraq’s Post-ISIS Economy: A Warning from the Concrete Block Industry,” (Sulaimani: IRIS, 2017), https://auis.edu.krd/
iris/sites/default/files/IRIS%20Iraq%20Report_Decentralized%20Rent-Seeking%20post-ISIS%20Iraq_DeWeaver.pdf.
12
In July 2019, the Iraqi Prime Minister issued a decree to integrate all recognized Iraqi groups under the state security forces,
which would in theory provide greater oversight in preventing such activitiy, if implemented. See, Ali Mamouri, “Iraq Orders Mili-
tias to Fully Integrate into State Security Forces.” Al-Monitor, July 2, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/contents/articles/
originals/2019/07/iraq-pmu-iran-abdul-mahdi-shiite-militias.html.
13
Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: KRG Restrictions Harm Yezidi Recovery,” Human Rights Watch, December 4, 2016, https://www.
hrw.org/news/2016/12/04/iraq-krg-restrictions-harm-yezidi-recovery; and Alex MacDonald, “Sinjar Becomes Proxy Battle Amid
Rising Kurdish Tensions,” Middle East Eye, March 8, 2017, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-sinjar-becomes-proxy-
battle-amid-rising-kurdish-tensions.

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY

The social context of Sinjar district has changed multiple times in the last four years: its ethno-
religious diversity, conflict history, and fragmented security and political landscape make it all
the more complex to operate in, and all the more necessary to develop context- and conflict-
sensitive approaches to intervention. There is room to address the concerns highlighted in this
briefing and to help the communities in Sinjar recover their livelihoods – but to be sustainable,
this has to come from a multi-faceted approach tackling more structural issues as well.

Micro-level intervention. There are many entry points for national and local authorities,
donors, and local and international civil society to support recovery of agriculture and other
productive activities in Sinjar. Some have already been undertaken at the local level and in-
creasing their scale can help in redressing the historical neglect of the region.

–– Promote investment in pre-existing small-scale public assets and infrastructure, such as mar-
ket places, roads, and individual irrigation systems, that can immediately alleviate pressing
constraints on value chains – leaving large capital investments to partnerships between the
state and development agencies and/or private contractors.

–– Explore in greater detail direct financial support options for private entrepreneurship by
residents. For instance, through asset replacement programs that focus on substituting or
replacing productive losses suffered by individual farmers and livestock owners. On a bigger
scale, this could also involve the distribution of higher-sum micro-grants to restart larger
businesses in the district. This could entail organizing savings groups and matching the
amount of funds the groups pool in order to increase investment capacity, which is relatively
limited in the district. Some such programs have already been implemented and should be
expanded to cover more locations as the return of displaced populations continue.

–– Recent evidence around cash-for-work programming in Sinuni indicates that this mecha-
nism helps in revitalizing communities and is associated with better perceptions of social
wellbeing, a sense of purpose, and greater trust.14 As such, it may be a useful model of
programming to continue, provided it covers all areas that experience returns in the district
and has the capacity to double back in case returns continue in areas already targeted by
this assistance.

–– Promote an expansion of the existing value chains in Sinjar district through facilitating
agricultural extension programs, which are currently not in place. This should support in-
creased productivity of farming and allow farmers to adopt new techniques and crops (such
as the production of winter crops through greenhouses).

–– Given the complexity of the district, particular attention must be given to ensure that inter-
ventions cover all populations and locations in need. Doing so requires deep awareness of
the context and strategies for mitigating tensions between communities, taking a conflict-
and context-sensitive approach to do no harm. As it stands, programming and interventions
prioritize certain groups and locations over others. This too causes harm and excludes those
in need.
14
Social Inquiry and GIZ, “From Dinars to Development: Cash-for-Work and the Economic Transformation of Northern Ninewa,”
(Erbil: GIZ, 2018).

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Macro-level intervention. The open question that remains with micro-level recommenda-
tions is how effective they can be in an environment that is not at all conducive to recovery.
Changing this environment requires a multi-level strategy, especially in terms of advocacy to
national and local authorities.

–– Advocate for the return of the state to the district. In the immediate term, the Government
of Iraq needs to restore its presence related to its personnel and service provision linked to
farming and livestock, including veterinary services and seed and fertilizer distribution as
well as the reconstruction of key infrastructure such as silos. Looking forward, the state
needs to further redress the historic neglect of the district through larger investments and
by resolving its disputed status.

–– Advocate with authorities to ensure that checkpoints halt any ad hoc taxation of goods
coming in and out of Sinjar district and ease restrictions on trading, like limiting the num-
ber of livestock able to come through. Such measures may further build back trust among
local investors, particularly if security actors are held accountable for these actions.

–– Promote a balance between security and the free circulation of goods, including within the
informal economy which relies heavily on smuggling given supply restrictions. Curtailing
the black market for necessary supplies can be counterproductive until formal channels for
value chain function are restored.

–– Increase funding and allocation for demining efforts in the district as this is another sig-
nificant obstacle to restoring value chains in the farming and livestock sectors. This affects
populations across the entire district.

–– Contribute to alleviating the uncertainty nearly all residents in the district feel about their
future safety and prospects through appropriate mechanisms for redress, acknowledgement,
and accountability for all conflict-affected people and groups. This includes addressing the
structural root causes of grievances.

ABOUT SOCIAL INQUIRY

Social Inquiry is an Iraq-based not-for-profit research institution focused on influencing policy
and praxis that establishes civic trust and repairs social fabric within and between fragile
communities, and communities and the state.

This report is co-authored by Roger Guiu and Sogand Afkari.

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