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Chinese Political Science Review (2019) 4:303–326

https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-019-00128-y

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Geo‑Political Dynamics of the China–Pakistan Economic

Corridor: A New Great Game in South Asia

Mehmood Hussain1   · Ahmed Bux Jamali2

Received: 27 June 2018 / Accepted: 20 June 2019 / Published online: 29 June 2019
© Fudan University 2019

Abstract
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is designed to connect Pakistan with China
through a robust network of roads, railways, and energy and gas pipelines from the
Pakistani port of Gwadar to China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. It is a compre-
hensive project with mammoth potential for South-Center regional connectivity and
integration. The corridor will transform the domestic equations of China–Pakistan,
the dividends of its potentialities will be extended to other regional countries. How-
ever, the implementation brought about geopolitical tensions in the region, as India
rejected the investment in Pakistan controlled Kashmir through raising apprehen-
sions for violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Meanwhile, the US, a
major player in the regional politico-security dynamics has tenuous relationship with
Pakistan over Islamabad’s proclivity towards China and support for terrorism. Such
emerging developments will have far reaching consequences for regional stability
and cooperation. Therefore, the present article intends to explore evolving geopoliti-
cal trends in South Asia by probing the following questions. To what extent CPEC
triggered the geo-political rivalry and what strategies are being adopted by the rival
stakeholders? It is found that although China envisions to achieve economic and
infrastructure development through the economic corridor, the Chinese involvement
in South Asia has activated the geopolitical tensions. To contain Chinese influence,
India and the US have established a strategic partnership. As a matter of fact, New
Delhi intensified the cooperation with Afghanistan and Iran to connect South Asia
with Central Asia through Chahbahar port and Iran–Afghan trans-border corridor,
but the significance of CPEC for regional connectivity and economic development is
greater than the Indian proposed corridor.

Keywords  CPEC · Geo-politics · China–Pakistan · South Asia · United States ·

Iran · India · Afghanistan

* Mehmood Hussain
mhussain328@gmail.com
1
Women University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Bagh, Pakistan
2
School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Jilin University China, Changchun, China

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1 Introduction

The concept of geopolitics is as old as the state itself. Geopolitics claim that the
geographical location, space, size and natural resources of a state determine its
political position in world affairs. Karl Haushofer in 1928 inscribed that “Geopol-
itics is the science of conditioning of political process by the earth. It is based on
the broad foundation of geography, especially political geography as the science
of political space organisms and their structure” (Scholvin 2016). In simple term,
geography plays the ultimate role in the making of strategies and policies, which
obstruct or enhances the actions of states in the global domain (Cohen 1964).
Geopolitics turned into the leading phenomena during the Cold war period,
when the history witnessed two dominant powers namely the United States and
the Soviet Union were competing to expand their areas of influences (Mackinder
1904). The former Soviet Union occupied the dominant position in Eurasia, and
the United States followed the policy of containment to further weaken the spread
of communism. Washington aligned alliances with countries situated in Rim-land
through the NATO in Europe, CENTO in West Asia, SEATO in South East Asia
and ANZUS in Pacific Oceanfront (Scholvin 2016).
In the contemporary age, the rise of China and its developing posture in inter-
national politics reinvigorated the concept of geopolitics. The Chinese declara-
tion to revive the ancient Silk Road sparked skepticism in many regions. The
ambitious plan of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was envisioned by the Chinese
President Xi Jinping in 2013. The program is motivated to support slow domes-
tic growth by exporting excessive infrastructure material and China’s economic
model, and simultaneously it has the potential to transform the global geopoliti-
cal landscape. It is estimated that the project will connect China with 65 coun-
tries across the globe, benefiting 4.4 billion peoples through 40% of world GDP
and winning new friends and allies for Beijing (Hussain 2016). Although China
firmly rejected the geopolitical connotations of the project by illuminating geo-
economic aspects, the skeptics contend that it would trigger the geopolitical con-
flict. For example; the US and Japan are reluctant to join BRI, and simultane-
ously India raised its apprehensions over the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), which is a flagship project of BRI (Hussain 2017).
Some critics hold the view that the construction of CPEC is a geopolitical
move by Beijing (Munir 2017). They believe that the ever-growing Chinese pres-
ence in Pakistan and the Indian Ocean altered the American and Indian national
interests. The two strategic partners view that China is planning to turn the Gwa-
dar port into a potential naval base, which is a serious risk to regional security
(Hanif 2018). Despite the negative interpretation, it is appropriate to mention
that CPEC is an economic project and Gwadar port will be used for commercial
operations. This corridor determines to connect Xinjiang region of China with
Pakistani Gwadar port located on the conduit of three commercially vital regions
namely West Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia, through an exclusive network
of overland roads, railways and energy pipelines. The achievements of this mega

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project will enable China to import energy supplies from the Middle East and
Africa and trade with the wider world through the Gwadar Port (Talwar 2015).
By keeping in mind the prospects and challenges, the present article is designed
to trace the economic and infrastructure development potentialities of CPEC for
China and Pakistan, as well as scope for regional integration. In their study of
regional press framing the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, Yousaf & Ji (2017)
found that CPEC offers economic, cultural, and regional connectivity prospects for
the countries as well re-shaped the geopolitics of the region and forged new alli-
ances and re-shaped the existing one. They argued that the media’s farming of this
initiative is national interests orientated. Therefore, this article elucidates how CPEC
will benefit the two friendly nations, meanwhile it illuminates the geopolitical impli-
cations and counter strategies of opposite poles.
The article is empirical in nature and is supported by primary and secondary data
sources. The primary sources include the interviews of prominent experts and state-
ments and policy documents of governments involved. The secondary data gath-
ered from journal articles, monographs, books, newspaper article, and other inter-
net sources are also used. The article is structured as follows. The subsequent part
highlights the nature of CPEC and its viability for China and Pakistan, followed by
existing debates on CPEC. Section Four is explaining the geopolitical dynamics of
CPEC in South Asia and counter-strategies, and the fifth part is designed to appraise
the implications and prospects for regional integration. The final section assesses the
approach of the incumbent Pakistani government towards CPEC and conclusion.

2 CPEC Viability for China–Pakistan

After more than two decades of export-oriented rapid economic growth, Beijing
finally acknowledged the fault lines in its economic policy and made a shift for sus-
tainable economic growth in 2013. Low domestic consumption, world economic
shock, excessive production of infrastructure material and higher costs of labor per-
suaded the policymakers to make adjustments in economy, which gave birth to acro-
nym “New Normal” (Qing 2015). The New Normal is attributed to utilizing exces-
sive construction material, calling for export of skilled and semi-skilled surplus
labor and Chinese economic model and technology to foreign countries through the
resurgence of the old Silk route.
The BRI is a brainchild of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Its official announce-
ment was made during his trips to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013. The project
has two main domains, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Mari-
time Silk Road. The land-based Silk Road Economic Belt begins from Xian China
and connects the rest of Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Russia. It also
includes South Asia and Southeast Asia. The Maritime Silk Road associates China
with Europe via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific
Ocean through the South China Sea (Grieger 2016). The revival of Silk Road is
anticipated to deepen the economic cooperation amongst the countries along the
“Belt” and “Road” routes through roads, railways, pipelines and ports connectivity.
The corridor will expand the Chinese trade and political relationship with Asia and

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Europe and it will further gear up growth through exporting capital, technology, and
capacity globally (BDO 2015). It is projected that execution of BRI projects will
exceed Chinese trade with participating countries to $25 trillion.
China is an emerging power and rapidly expanding its economic clout. By doing
so its indigenous natural resources are steadfastly drying up, which has been increas-
ing Beijing’s dependence on imported energy and gas resources to upsurge the eco-
nomic growth. At present, about 75% of Beijing’s crude oil imports pass through the
Malacca Strait (Hussain 2017). The Strait of Malacca is a narrow strip separating
Sumatra Island of Indonesia from the Malay Peninsula by only 1.7 miles. The Chi-
nese reliance on Malacca Strait imposed serious energy security threats because the
peripheral region is prone to the disruption that can breakdown the smooth supply
of crude oil to Beijing. Any act of pirates, oil spills, and shipping mishaps would all
intersect traffic through the Strait, which is a serious concern for policy makers in
Beijing (Brutlag 2011) (Fig. 1).
Therefore, the primary objective behind CPEC is to address the Chinese Malacca
Dilemma by opening up a new avenue for Beijing. It will reduce the Chinese energy
and trade route from 12,000 km via sea to around 3000 km via land from Gwadar to
Kashgar in China (Akram 2016). The strategic and economic potential of CPEC is
massive for China; it aimed at transforming Beijing from one-to-two oceans coun-
try, circumventing $4000 billion trade from Malacca Strait and other potential choke
points (Mahmood 2016). Professor An Ran, Director of India–Pakistan Research
Centre made the following statement. “CPEC determine to minimize security threats
especially stemming from the western region of Xinjiang. China hopes that eco-
nomic and infrastructure development can achieve security in the vulnerable region.
Investment in infrastructure intends to create jobs, reduce anti-state sentiments and
generate public resources for additional improvements in law and order. By tackling
the threat of terrorism in Pakistan, Beijing hopes to bolster security on its own terri-
tory” (Ran 2019).
For Pakistan, the corridor will end its rampant energy shortfalls by generating
nearly 25,000  MW electricity by 2030 (Paul 2016). The corridor has various pro-
jects including electricity generation, development, and rehabilitation of road and
rail infrastructure, the establishment of special economic zones, educational, health
institutions and ports development. The investment in CPEC related projects is
equivalent to Pakistan’s total inward investment since 1970 and is nearly six times

Fig. 1  China’s crude oil

imports, by mode of transporta-
tion Source: energy information 19%
administration
9%
72%

Malacca Strait Overland Routes Unknown

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the $7.5 billion US aid package (Singh 2016). A 5-year plan of CPEC revealed that
it would value 17% of Pakistan’s GDP, and would enhance the existing strategic
cooperation between China and Pakistan. Please see Table 1 for energy-related pro-
jects in details.
The infrastructure and social development Projects under the CPEC will start a
new chapter of economic development in Baluchistan, which is ranked second with
estimated $7.1 billion under the initial CPEC investments in transportation, energy,
and development of Gwadar city and port. CPEC will thus transform Pakistan into
a gateway of trade and energy supplies to and from Central Asia, West Asia, and
Europe via overland routes (Khetran 2017). Please have a look at Table 2 for infra-
structure related projects.
Besides connectivity, the long-term plan document revealed that special eco-
nomic zones (SEZs) and industrial Parks will also be part of the new development
model. In the contemporary age, SEZ’s and IP’s are considered to be engines of high
economic growth and rapid industrialization, meeting the demands of domestic con-
sumption and export-oriented economy. So far, nine SEZs are approved to be built
along the corridor belt in the next few years and the feasibility study of some has
already been completed (CPEC Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 2018). Please see
Table 3 for future SEZs.

3 Existing Debates on CPEC

In July 2013, China and Pakistan channelized a series of agreements to construct the
CPEC. The historic visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pakistan in April 2015
laid the structural foundations of the mega project with an initial investment of $46
billion dollars in infrastructure and energy schemes. Since then, the CPEC has been
extensively under discussion in academia and policy-making circles. For example,
Rizvi states that CPEC will have positive impacts on the development of Pakistan
and the Western region of China. The corridor will improve the regional connectiv-
ity and integration through economic connectivity and uninterrupted movement of
services, goods, and peoples across the defined boundaries of states. Concurrently,
it will become an integral asset of Chinese soft power to promote its benign image
across the region and the wider world. The proposed corridor enhance connectiv-
ity options of China and Pakistan with the Middle East, West Asia, Central Asia
and ultimately Europe (Rizvi 2015). Ahmar has evaluated the strategic meaning of
CPEC in three aspects. In his opinion, the corridor is the brightest example of the
long-lasting friendship between the two countries to help to bond and strengthening
the China–Pakistan time-tested relationship. The strategic location of the economic
corridor will be an efficient and capable source in the shipping of millions of tons of
goods from China to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe via the Gwadar Port. Sim-
ilarly, the economic corridor will pave the way for billions of dollars investments in
the country including the most deprived areas of Pakistan (Ahmar 2015).
It is predicted that people to people contacts and cultural exchanges through the
proposed corridor will swiften the communication between different civilizations
and coordination of diplomatic strategies will build a harmonious neighborhood

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 Table 1  Energy projects under CPEC Source: CPEC Secretariat, Ministry of Planning and Development Pakistan
308

# Project name MW Estimated cost ($ M)

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Energy priority projects
 1 2 × 660 MW coal-fired power plants at Port Qasim Karachi 1320 1912.2
 2 Suki Kinari Hydropower Station, Naran, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa 870 1707
 3 Sahiwal 2 × 660 MW Coal-fired Power Plant, Punjab 1320 1912.2
 4 Engro Thar Block II 2 × 330 MW Coal-fired Power Plant  660  995.4 
TEL 1 × 330 MW Mine Mouth Lignite-Fired Power Project at Thar Block-II, Sindh, Pakistan  330  497.7 
Thal Nova 1 × 330 MW Mine Mouth Lignite-Fired Power Project at Thar Block-II, Sindh, Pakistan 330 497.7
Surface mine in block II of Thar Coalfield, 3.8 million tons/year 1470
 5 Hydro China Dawood Wind Farm(Gharo, Thatta) 49.5 112.65
 6 300 MW Imported Coal Based Power Project at Gwadar, Pakistan 300 Yet to be determined
 7 Quaid-e-Azam 1000 MW Solar Park (Bahawalpur) Quaid-e-Azam 300  1302
600 
100
 8 UEP Wind Farm (Jhimpir, Thatta) 99 250
 9 Sachal Wind Farm (Jhimpir, Thatta) 49.5 134
 10 SSRL Thar Coal Block-I 6.8 mtpa &SEC Mine Mouth Power Plant(2 × 660 MW) (Shinghai) 1320 1912.12 + 1300
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 11 Karot Hydropower Station 720 1698.26

 12 Three Gorges Second Wind Power Project  49.5  150
Three Gorges Third Wind Power Project 49.5
 13 CPHGC 1,320 MW Coal-fired Power Plant, Hub, Balochistan 1320 1912.2
 14 Matiari to Lahore = 660 kV HVDC Transmission Line Project 1658.34
Matiari (Port Qasim)-Faisalabad Transmission Line Project 1500
 15 Thar Mine Mouth Oracle Power Plant (1320 MW) & surface mine 1320 Yet to be determined
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 Table 1  (continued)
# Project name MW Estimated cost ($ M)

Energy actively promoted projects

 16 Kohala Hydel Project, AJK 1100 2364.05
 17 Rahimyar khan imported fuel Power Plant 1320 MW 1320 1600
 18 Cacho 50 MW Wind Power Project 50
 19 Western Energy (Pvt.) Ltd. 50 MW Wind Power Project 50
Potential energy projects
 20 Phandar Hydropower Station 80
 21 Gilgit KIU Hydropower 100
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Table 2  Infrastructure projects Source: CPEC Secretariat, Ministry of Planning and Development Paki-
stan
# Project name Length (km) Estimated cost (US$ M)

Road
 1 KKH Phase II (Thakot -Havelian Section) 118 1315
 2 Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Multan-Sukkur Section) 392 2889
 3 Khuzdar-Basima Road N-30 (110 km) 110 19.19 Billion Rupee
 4 Upgradation of D.I.Khan (Yarik)—Zhob, N-50 Phase-I 210 195
(210 km)
 5 KKH Thakot-Raikot N35 remaining portion (136 km) 136 Rs. 8.15 Billion
Rail sector projects
 6 Expansion and reconstruction of existing Line ML-1 1830 8172
 7 Havelian Dry port (450 M. Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units) 65
 8 Capacity Development of Pakistan Railways

Table 3  Special economic zones # Project name

under CPEC Source: CPEC
Secretariat, Ministry of Planning
and Development Pakistan
1 Rashakai Economic Zone, M-1, Nowshera
2 China Special Economic Zone Dhabeji
3 Bostan Industrial Zone
4 Allama Iqbal Industrial City (M3), Faisalabad
5 ICT Model Industrial Zone, Islamabad
6 Development of Industrial Park on Paki-
stan Steel Mills Land at Port Qasim near
Karachi
7 Special Economic Zone at Mirpur, AJK
8 Mohmand Marble City
9 Moqpondass SEZ Gilgit-Baltistan

(Khalid 2015). Back in April 2015 at the end of Xi Jinping’s tour, both countries
issued a joint statement indicating to promote cultural connections and public diplo-
macy. The statement reflected that CPEC would not only facilitate the economic
activities but also enhance cultural ties between different civilizations to make it as a
useful tool to implement the idea of inter-civilization. The two countries also signed
an agreement for joint production of films and dramas, which would help ordinary
peoples to understand the dynamics of opposite civilizations.
South Asia is considered to be the least developed region based on socio-eco-
nomic and infrastructure development indicators, this region somehow has not
witnessed the potential foundation to enhance regional stability and integration for
boosting its economic cooperation and infrastructure development. However, there
is a ray of hope that CPEC will be an excellent opportunity for improving the eco-
nomic stability and security situation in Pakistan and its neighboring countries.
The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, termed it a ‘Game Changer’

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for Pakistan and the entire region. Similarly, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang
Yi described it as a ‘flagship project’ of BRI. According to an agreement signed in
November 2014 for energy cooperation, 61% of CPEC investment is allocated to
generate energy and overhauling of existing electric infrastructure (Esteban 2016).
Michael Kugleman, a Wilson Centre fellow reported that Pakistan’s interminable
energy crisis is costing its economy 2–2.5% annually. Yet, even early harvest pro-
jects (2017–2018) alone added some 10,400  MW to the Pakistani energy system,
which alleviated the chronic electric shortfalls (Kugelman 2015).
Regarding challenges and hindrances, it is worthy to mention here that CPEC
would face serious challenges in its execution. The major challenge to the mega-
development project is terrorism emanating in Pakistan and China’s northwest
region of Xinjiang. Though the security situation has significantly improved after the
military operation by the Pakistan army, remnants of terrorist organizations are still
prevailing across the country (Sial 2014). The most volatile region is Baluchistan
where a large share of the CPEC investment would be spent. The well-renowned
separatist Baloch leaders have chalked the negative implication of CPEC for Balu-
chistan, and some have even cautioned China to stay away from Gwadar (Esteban
2016). For instance, Nawabzada Brahamdagh Bugti, the self-exiled leader of Baloch
Republican Party claimed in an interview with ‘DW’ that CPEC was not a deal
between China and Pakistan, but an agreement between Punjab and China, and they
did not allow Punjab and China to use Baluchistan for their benefits (Bugti 2015).
To dismantle the terror threat to CPEC, Pakistan has established a 12,000-strong
force devoted to protecting Chinese workers in Pakistan. Thus, it can be claimed that
terrorism and insurgency would not be a major issue in the way of effective execu-
tion of CPEC, because the perks of the corridor would develop more opportunities
of viable peace and stability in the country through employment and gigantic eco-
nomic activities.
From the Chinese perspective, CPEC is the hope of durable stability and har-
mony for its most volatile region Xinjiang. In the past, China has experienced the
insurgency in predominantly Muslim northwest region Xinjiang, and the Commu-
nist Party of China (CPC) leadership in Beijing is anxious that it would further give
rise to anarchy in the region if quick responses are not taken into serious considera-
tions. Thus, the primary motivation behind the Chinese decision to invest billions
of dollars in CPEC is what impacts it will have on Pakistan. Beijing is hoping that
the corridor gives Xinjiang an outlet to the sea and its investment in Pakistan will
help stabilize the region and with it China’s increasingly disturbed western periph-
ery (Bhattacharjee 2015).
On the strategic dimension of CPEC, Sushant Sareen miscalculated the eco-
nomic significance of the whole project by saying that when the Karakoram High-
way (KKH) was being built, the then Pakistani military ruler Ayyub Khan had said
that “in order of priority the first urgency was strategic and one of immediate sig-
nificance” and the “economic and commercial importance of the highway” was only
“the second objective” for Pakistan (Sareen 2016). In, more than KKH, however, the
strategic location of Gwadar alarmed the military and strategic planners around the
globe. At the turn of the 21st Century, the US media had coined the term ‘String of
Pearls” a network of seaports developing or developed by China and Gwadar is one

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of them developed and operationalized by Beijing. India and the US are of the view
that Gwadar port will accord China a potential staging ground to exercise power
along some of global busiest shipping routes passing through the Persian Gulf (Ash-
faq 2015). Moreover, the US media also saw Chinese involvement in Gwadar as
opening a new front in the India–Pakistan rivalry. The KKH allows China to provide
military aid to Pakistan in case of Indo-Pak military confrontation (Sareen 2016).
Nonetheless, the CPEC is a purely economic project for infrastructure develop-
ment and regional connectivity that will not only uplift Pakistan’s economy but
also provide easy access to China from the Indian Ocean through the Gwadar Port
linking Baluchistan with Xinjiang. The strategic location of Gwadar makes it most
attractive for Beijing because it will be safer and the shortest overland route and it
will cut down millions of dollars in energy supply expenses and time cost. Chinese
press briefings explained that China has no geopolitical and geostrategic intentions
in CPEC and Gwadar port. Yet, the Indian conservative security community claims
that CPEC will enable China to increase its leverage in Pakistan and to contain
Indian Influence in Afghanistan, Iran and the Central Asian States (Wolf 2016).
Many Indian hawkish observers believe that CPEC is a Chinese move to expand
influence in the wider Indo-Pacific region to achieve a strategic hold of India in
South Asia (Ranjan 2015). India as a regional power has raised somber concerns
over Chinese involvement in Pakistan. New Delhi argues that China is violating its
sovereignty and territorial integrity by investing money in projects running through
the disputed territory of ‘Pakistan administered Kashmir’ and Gilgit Baltistan. To
reverse Beijing’s decision Indian leadership strongly objected the project, which is
rejected by China through highlighting economic aspects of CPEC.
The above-mentioned studies highlight the various perspectives on CPEC; for
example, benefits for Pakistan and China and challenges to CPEC, the potential for
regional connectivity and economic growth, impacts on cultural integration. But the
critical review found that the existing knowledge somewhat missed the geopoliti-
cal dynamics of the project. Therefore, to fill this gap, the present article intends to
investigate the concerns of various regional and extra-regional stakeholders through
the prism of geopolitics.

4 CPEC and Geopolitics in South Asia

Since the commencement of CPEC in April 2015, geopolitics has taken new direc-
tions in the wider South Asian region, home to eight countries. Among them, Paki-
stan and India are nuclear capable with enduring territorial disputes since 1947. The
region covers about 4.5 million sq. km with a population of nearly 1.749 billion or
about one-fourth of the world’s population (Recorder 2017). The geo-strategic posi-
tion of the region makes it vibrant for regional and global powers, and thus with
CPEC’s inauguration, the politics, economy, and security of the region have been
widely discussed in policy-making and scholarly circles. The following sections of
the article thoroughly confer the regional geopolitical dynamics through enlight-
ening bilateral relations of the United States–Pakistan, India–Pakistan rivalry and
Indo-Iran and Afghan nexus.

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4.1 Trump and Pakistan’s Uneasy Relations with the US

Since holding the presidential office, except one or two occasions President Don-
ald J. Trump assumed a belligerent attitude towards Pakistan and accused the major
non-NATO ally of harboring terrorists on its soil. It is not the first time that America
has accused her most difficult ally of spreading terrorism; earlier President Bush and
President Obama put the similar approach too. However, President Trump took the
most stringent approach to deal with Pakistan, and after almost 8 months of review,
on 21st August 2017 at Fort Myer, President unveiled the new American strategy for
the war in Afghanistan and bitterly criticized Pakistan for providing safe havens for
terrorists. He claimed, “We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dol-
lars. At the same time, they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting. But
that will have to change. And that will change immediately” (The Atlantic 2017).
He categorically stated that the US administration would not “be silent about Paki-
stan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups that pose
a threat to the region and beyond” (Bhattacharjee 2017). On the other hand, Trump
announced to further strengthen the American strategic partnership with India and
requested New Delhi to play a greater role to restore peace and stability in Afghani-
stan. The new American strategy announced that America wanted to achieve victory
in Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan.
The American Afghan policy exacerbated the already acrimonious relations
between the two states. On 24 August, the National Security Committee (NSC)
held an emergency meeting to discuss Trump’s South Asia Strategy headed by the
former Prime Minister Abbasi along with the Chief of Army Staff, General Bajwa.
The NSC outrightly rejected the allegations, stating that Pakistan was being made
a scapegoat for the mistakes and failures of the US in stabilizing Afghanistan. On
its part, Pakistan has taken indiscriminate action against all terrorist networks and
sacrificed more than 60,000 civilians and troops in the American war (Zakria 2017).
In dissent, Pakistan suspended the visit of Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells
and conveyed its deep suspicions over India’s role in Afghanistan, accusing India
of repeatedly using Afghan territory to foment terror and violence in Pakistan (Gul
2017).
On the other hand, India’s policymakers were restless after President Trump’s
victory in the 2016 US presidential election. Many were scared that Trump
might reorient the Indo-US relations if not exactly in the reverse. However,
apprehensions diminished after the fruitful visit of Prime Minister Modi to the
United States from June 25–26, 2017 in which he was cordially welcomed and
Trump called him a “true friend of United States” (Bipindra 2017). Prime Min-
ister Modi and Trump’s joint statement used the strict language against Pakistan
and designated Syed Salahuddin the ‘supreme commander’ of Hizb-ul-Mujahi-
deen a global terrorist. They cited Pakistan twice. The first was Pakistan guar-
anteed the United States and India for not using its territory in terror activities
against other states, and the second was that it ensured to take appropriate meas-
ures to bring culprits of 26/11, Mumbai, Pathankot and other cross border inci-
dents to justice (Smith 2018). The two leaders also expressed discontentment on
Chinese involvement in CPEC by urging respect for sovereignty and territorial

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integrity and reiterated for the autonomy of navigation, unhindered overflights,

and peaceful settlement of territorial and maritime disputes. The statement reaf-
firmed that India and US were standing together to circumscribe the expanding
influence and presence of China in the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific region
(Sajjanhar 2017).
India and the US have common interests to constrain rising Chinese threat,
and Trump has amplified the Indo-US strategic partnership. His speech to
American soldiers deployed in Japan recognized the Indian greater role in the
region. He implanted the idea of Indo-Pacific by accepting the Indian influence
far beyond the Chinese backyard and the tiger economies of East Asia. The new
rhetoric of American foreign policy can be seen that Trump administration is
interested in engaging New Delhi for its ambitions to encircle Beijing (Khan
2017).
Prior to the visit of President Trump to New Delhi, the U.S Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson presented the idea of “Road and Port Connectivity” to his
Indian counterpart. The fundamental motive behind the “Road Connectivity” is
to connect India with Central Asia and the rest of South Asia, while the port
connectivity is planned to implement through the Indo-Pacific strategy under
the strategic partnership of Washington and New Delhi. The reason D’état of
Indo-Pacific strategy is to gear up the role of India in the regional political and
security affairs of the Asia–Pacific. The conceptualization of Indo-Pacific would
mean the beginning of a new wave of conflicts in the Asian region where India
would act as the major US agent (Khan 2017).
The US Defense Secretary James Mattis with the Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Joseph Dunford confirmed before the Senate’s Armed Services
committee that CPEC passed through the disputed territory claimed by India.
The opposition came after the trip of US Defense Secretary James Mattis to
India. In his testimonial, he informed the Senate’s Armed Services Committee,
“In a globalized world, there are many belts and many roads, and no one nation
should put itself into a position of dictating one belt, one road” (The Hindu
2017). The testimony depicted that Washington accepted the Gilgit–Baltistan
and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) as disputed territories between Pakistan and
India but offered nothing to resolve the seven-decade-long dispute. China and
Pakistan abruptly and vocally rejected the comments by Mattis and argued that
America could not see the human rights violations in the Indian-occupied Kash-
mir and the economic development in GB and AJK under the framework of BRI
(Malik 2017).
President Trump went further on accusing Pakistan on 1st January 2018 by
tweeting, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion
dollars in aid over the last 15  years, and they have given us nothing but lies &
deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe havens to the terrorists we
hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more” (Trump 2018). Afterward, the US
suspended a package of $255 million military assistance to Pakistan over what it
saw a failure by Pakistan to adequately clamp down on terror groups within its
territory. The State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert told media, “We

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will not be delivering military equipment or transfer security-related funds to

Pakistan unless it is required by law” (Koran 2018).

4.2 Impacts of Indo–Pak Rivalry on CPEC

Since August 1947 India and Pakistan have been tied in the enduring rivalry. Many
factors are contributing to this dyad, yet the dispute over Jammu & Kashmir remains
the flashpoint for conflict. The two countries fought three full-fledged wars and a
limited adventure in Kargil to pursue resolution, but neither has been able to inte-
grate Kashmir by force. India is a status quo power, and the prevailing power asym-
metry between the two antagonistic neighbors restrains them from finding a dura-
ble solution. New Delhi is a much bigger power in terms of territory, population,
economy and overall military forces, but conventional superiority was vanished in
the late 1990s by Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons (Paul 2006). Meanwhile,
the absence of sound economic and trade relations further fuels the fire in animos-
ity, and sometimes a terrorist attack in either country totally disrupts the efforts of
the peace process and mutual trust. Though the threat of full-fledged war was abated
after the nuclear explosives of May 1998, both countries have waged covert war
against each other.
Pakistan is abundant with geostrategic location which connects energy-affluent
Central Asia and the Middle East with energy-starved South Asia. It is also the
neighbor of two Asian giants, China and India. Back in the 1960s, Pakistan and
China formed a cordial relationship based on common geostrategic and geopolitical
interests which are now diversified to other areas. For instance, China is investing in
mega development and energy projects which are critical for the Pakistani state and
society (Ghani 2013). So far, CPEC is the biggest infrastructure project financed by
Beijing, which will be a game changer for the whole region.
The Chinese investment in CPEC projects predominantly in Gwadar Port alarmed
the ring bells in India. The leadership views CPEC an intrusion to its territorial sov-
ereignty, and foreign policy pundits in New Delhi claim that China is encircling
India through economic and commercial activities around its periphery. Foreign
and security policy experts emphasize that Gwadar port has a minimum economic
potential and that it is designed to become a potential naval base for Chinese expan-
sionist naval fleet and operations throughout the Indian Ocean (West 2016). Thus,
the Indian officials and PM Modi have lodged complaints to Beijing protesting cur-
rent and future projects passing through the disputed territory of Gilgit–Baltistan
claimed by India (Alam 2015).
India was the only South Asian country who declined to attend the BRI forum
held in Beijing to demonstrate its objections on CPEC. China and India are emerg-
ing powers and flexing their muscles in the Indian Ocean. But from New Delhi’s
perspective, Indian Ocean is an area of its influence and it cannot ignore the Chi-
nese incursions to breach its rightful claim. Simultaneously, India is anxious that
the growing Chinese investment in Pakistan controlled-Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan
will change the status quo of the area, as New Delhi is claiming Kashmir and Gilgit
Baltistan integral parts of the Indian Union based on accession instrument signed

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between Maharaja Harri Singh and New Delhi (Zulfqar 2016). On the other hand,
Pakistan asserts that Kashmir is an unsettled agenda of Indian partition plan of 1947
and can be settled through resolutions of UN. New Delhi is anxious that when CPEC
will be fully operational and start bearing fruits for China and Pakistan, it will prob-
ably internationalize the core issue of Kashmir (Dar 2018). At present, China is fol-
lowing the policy of non-interference, but India contends that in future Beijing will
change its posture and might persuade New Delhi to resolve the dispute as per UN
resolutions.
CPEC is not a bilateral economic development project, but rather it is a mega-
regional connectivity project and has the potential to offer benefits to every involved
stakeholder. The same is true for India. If India joins, it can increase New Delhi’s
connectivity with South and Central Asia via Afghanistan, boost its trade and reduce
energy shortcomings. At present trade between India and Pakistan is only allowed
through Wagah–Attari border land route, but inclusion in CPEC will open two other
trade routes in Pakistani and Indian Punjab. The Ferozpur–Kasur and Fazilka–Sahi-
wal border points will assist two neighbors (Ranjan 2015). Besides these points,
numerous trade routes can be opened in Kashmir Sindh and Baluchistan. Conse-
quently, India will have overland trade access to Central Asia via Pakistan. To mate-
rialize the dream of connectivity, the Pakistan army has already invited India to join
CPEC. Lt. General Amir Riaz, Commander of Southern Command, openly invited
India to come and join the project for sharing the fruits of future development (The
Express Tribune 2016)). Similarly, the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs spokes-
person said in a statement that “it is an open and inclusive project for all and we are
ready to welcome India to join us” (The Indian Express 2017).
But the Indian obsession towards Pakistan intensified after the announcement of
CPEC, and New Delhi accelerated its clandestine activities to sabotage the mega
development project. The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General
Zubair Mahmood Hayat, revealed that “RAW established a new cell with a special
allocation of over $500 million in 2015 to disrupt the CPEC projects in Pakistan”
(The Express Tribune 2017). He added that New Delhi’s covert intervention in Paki-
stan is revealed in sponsoring Tehreek-I-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP), Baloch and other
sub-nationalist outfits and many other terror groups (Dawn News 2017a). New Delhi
views that an economically developed and politically stable Pakistan will generate
enormous funds for the army, which will be in a position to challenge its hegemonic
aspirations in South Asia (Hanif 2018).
RAW is functioning from Afghanistan and other places to provoke anarchy in
Pakistan specifically in Baluchistan claimed Gen. Zubair Hayat. “Their designs and
oblique actions to sabotage CPEC are also well known”, he added. Former defense
secretary Gen (retd) Alam Khattak has also pointed out a special cell in RAW to
disrupt CPEC, and the plan was implemented via Afghanistan (Abrar 2017). He
revealed, “RAW and Afghan NDS have launched joint secret operations against
Pakistan by using three Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sha-
rif”. Gen. Hayat outlined that Pakistan pursued a harmonious co-existence with all
countries but he warned that Pakistan’s quest for peace and stability was not a “one-
way traffic” and Pakistan would beat back the enemy’s design (Dawn News 2017b).

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Pakistan captured an Indian spy from Chaman when he allegedly crossed the
Iran–Pakistan border. General Bajwa, former director general of ISPR, a public rela-
tions wing of the army, briefed media that Kulbushan Jadhav was a serving Naval
officer and due to retire in 2022 (Dawn News 2016a). In a video released by ISPR,
Jadhav confessed that he was a RAW agent and a contact man of Anil Kumar Gupta,
the joint secretary of RAW. Back in 2002, he started intelligence-based operations
and in 2003 he established a small business in Chabahar, Iran to hide his identity.
He was tasked to approach Baloch separatists and perform terrorist activities with
their support. An unidentified Pakistani official told media reporters that Jadhav had
acquired boats at the Iranian port of Chabahar to target Karachi and Gwadar ports
in a terrorist incident (Shah 2016). He further revealed that Jadhav was an expert of
naval fighting and was allegedly training Baloch separatists to target Pakistani port
facilities.
Indian PM Modi opened a new geopolitical Pandora box by mentioning Balu-
chistan in his speech on 70th Independence Day of India. Baluchistan is underdevel-
oped and a rebellious province of Pakistan. For years, the Indian intelligence agency
is allegedly destabilizing the province through providing weapons and training to
Baloch separatists. Although New Delhi persistently denies its involvement, Modi
broke the taboo by denouncing Pakistan’s “atrocities” and human rights violations
in Baluchistan. In a speech at Red Fort New Delhi, he extended an unprecedent-
edly public approach to people from across Pakistan who had taken social media
to thank him for his outspokenness. He said, “I am grateful to the people of Balu-
chistan, Gilgit and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir who have thanked me in the past few
days” (Dawn News 2016b). Meanwhile, PM Modi intentionally denied mentioning
that Pakistan was pouring its resources to uplift peoples of Baluchistan, Pakistani
Kashmir, and Gilgit. Contrary, the Indian leadership needs to reevaluate its approach
to deal Kashmir dispute. Since January 1989 to 31st January 2018, 94,906 Kash-
miris have been killed in the enduring conflict, which is a serious concern for the
international community (KMS 2018). In a statement, Sartaj Aziz, a former cabinet
minister in charge of foreign affairs said, “Prime Minister Modi’s reference to Balu-
chistan which is an integral part of Pakistan, only proves Pakistan’s contention that
India through its main intelligence agency RAW has been fueling terrorism in Balu-
chistan” (Bearak 2016).

4.3 Three‑Axis: India–Afghanistan and Iran

The geopolitical rivalry is increasingly making ways in South Asia. This can be
credited to the presence of big powers in the region and their realignments. CPEC
is expected to change the geography of the region after massive development. This
has opened a new geopolitical competition. For instance, India raised its geopoliti-
cal and geostrategic concerns that CPEC was an attempt by China to encircle New
Delhi. Therefore, to counter the geostrategic importance of Gwadar port and CPEC,
in October 2014 India–Iran signed an agreement to develop the Chabahar Port. This
cooperation is a part of the trilateral agreement signed between India, Iran, and
Afghanistan. India wanted to get access to energy-rich Central Asia, and its rejection

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Fig. 2  Map of gwadar and chabahar port Source: IndraStra

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to join CPEC left Chabahar port the only workable opportunity to increase its trade
volume and energy connections with CAR’s (Khetran 2017) (Fig. 2).
Afghanistan is a central player in the Indian-led geopolitical game, where New
Delhi is deeply penetrated in economic and security spheres. Back in 2011, India
and Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership agreement to boost security coop-
eration, including the transfer of military equipment. New Delhi transferred four
combat helicopters to Kabul (Mohan 2017). Since 2002, India has been the big-
gest regional donor of Afghanistan with $3 billion assistance and has built the new
Afghan parliament, completed major hydroelectric projects like the Salma Dam, and
constructed over 2500 miles of roads. Despite the lack of direct land connection,
bilateral trade has also increased in recent years. For instance, in 2014 and 2015
the trade figures stood at $684.47 million. Afghan imports from India increased to
$422.56 million and exports to India reached a worth of $261.91 million during the
same period (Maqsood 2017).
Afghanistan is a landlocked country and depends on Pakistan for transit and
trade. But, India opened a trade route between Afghanistan and Iranian Chahbahar
port through the construction of 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram. The port was
inaugurated by the Afghan President and Indian External Affairs Minister in January
2009 (MEA-GOI 2012). To make Chahbahar port a success, Indian Shipping Minis-
try’s arm Ports Global, Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, and the Kandla Port announced
a joint venture to invest $85 million in developing the two container berths with a
length of 640 m and three multi-cargo berths. Iran handed over the port operational
rights to India for 10 years which is extendable. Similarly, the state-run railway body
IRCON international has a plan to lay down a railway line at Chabahar to supply
goods right up to Afghanistan. The proposed 500 km railway line between Chabahar
and Zahedan will connect New Delhi to the rest of Iran’s railway network.
In longer-term plans, a free trade zone is also on the making for India with a total
investment of Rs 1 lakh crore, and Indian companies will set up a range of industries
from aluminum smelter to urea plants in the region. The sea-land route of Chahba-
har port will circumvent Pakistan in shipping goods to Afghanistan and would coun-
ter the Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea (Chowdhury 2016). The Indian analysts
claim that PM Modi’s initiative to develop Chabahar port is an attempt to undermine
the strategic importance of Gwadar port by killing two birds with one stone.

5 Implications and Prospects for Regional Integration

The geopolitical realignments in the South Asian region have altered the security
paradigms for China and Pakistan. India and the US have developed a robust strate-
gic partnership based on common interests of the 21st century, and there is a broad
consensus in India that Washington and New Delhi are “natural allies” or “indispen-
sable partners” (Teja 2014). India is determined to achieve high economic growth
and become a regional hegemon, whereas Washington’s strategic interests in the
region are bound to include maintaining de-facto hegemony, eradication of terrorism
from Afghanistan, and containment of rising China through shaping alliances with
the regional powers. President Bush called Beijing a “strategic competitor” rather

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than a “strategic partner”. Thus, the China factor has been playing a fundamental
role in strengthening the Indo-US strategic partnership (Fani 2009).
India is a regional power and also has developed a close strategic partnership with
Afghanistan and Iran. It is relatively possible that they would coordinate to compete
with the CPEC (Amin 2017). India has signed an agreement with Iran to construct
the Chabahar port which is 75 km away from Gwadar port, and analysts argue that
Indo-Iran agreement is an attempt to undermine the strategic and economic signifi-
cance of Gwadar port.
On the other hand convergence in interests is bridging the gap between old rivals
and recently Russia expressed its intentions to join the CPEC, which was welcomed
by Pakistan and China. The Cold War rivalry is going to be turned into friendship
by setting new stages for national interests to occupy a dominant role. Pakistan
approved the Russian request to join CPEC and Moscow expressed its willingness to
transfer military hardware and weapons to Pakistan (Zaafir and Saleh 2016).
Pakistan being a neighboring country is indeed strongly dedicated to restoring
peace in Afghanistan, but India and the U. S. accuse Islamabad of harboring terror-
ists. To counterweight the Indo-US allegations against its all-weather friend, China
has emerged as a dominant stakeholder in regional political and Security Theater.
Beijing recently initiated and hosted the foreign minister level trilateral dialogue
among China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The meeting was held in Beijing to dis-
cuss counter-terrorism efforts, peace, and regional connectivity. In the end, the Chi-
nese foreign minister stated that Pakistan and Afghanistan had agreed to increase
cooperation and address their differences appropriately (The News International
2017). The trilateral dialogue reflects that being a responsible regional player China
wants to restore peace and stability in the region through holding peace conferences
and economic development.
Besides external engagement, internally Pakistan must take notice of Indo-Afghan
influences and devise an effective security plan. China can assist Pakistan through
training its combat forces deployed on CEPC projects. Moreover, both countries
must share intelligence information and launch Ariel intelligence to monitor the
security-related threats to CPEC projects. Besides the security front, CPEC is likely
to generate 2.32 million direct jobs (Pakistan Today 2017), and it is advisable that
the Pakistani government should equally distribute the employment opportunities
among four provinces. The Chinese Ambassador is very optimistic about CPEC’s
potential for socio-economic development. He stated “CPEC projects-related jobs
will transform the living standards of local inhabitants and will empower them to
stand against terrorism. He advised that officials in Pakistan government take a
holistic approach in the distribution of projects among provinces. The construc-
tive and positive approach will mature the unity and cohesiveness among federation
units, and prove to eliminate the misperception that CPEC is a China–Punjab project
(Jing 2019).
The China Pakistan Economic Corridor has been well-defined from the very
beginning its goals and objectives that it is not limited to any domestic policies
between Pakistan and China but rather an international platform for the regional and
global connectivity. CPEC has a huge potential for regional integration if it is ana-
lyzed and studied by researchers particularly focusing on South Asian stability. Dr.

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Saleem Janjua holds a clear understanding that in various meetings between China
and South Asian head of states, China has shared new ideas and provided platforms
for talks, debates and discussed the key factors that can establish sustainable growth,
alleviate poverty, and improve trade and finance by paying attention to BRI with
special attention to CPEC (Janjua 2019).
First, CPEC functions as a new platform for regional integration complementary
to China’s Opening to the West.  As reforms deepen, China has a desire to bring
more benefits to its neighbours and contribute to common development through
its own development. China is actively planning six economic corridors, namely
China–Mongolia–Russia, China–Central Asia–West Asia, China–Indochina Penin-
sula, China–Pakistan, Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridors and
New Eurasian Land Bridge under the Belt and Road Initiative, most of which are
located in or pass through most of South Asian and Central Asian countries (Jiapei
2017). Among the new developments, Afghanistan and Iran expressed their inter-
est in becoming part of CPEC. Dr. Omar Zakhilwal, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to
Pakistan has stated that CPEC is equally important for Afghanistan, like Pakistan.
Moreover, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in a meeting with former Prime Min-
ister Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of the UNGA session has also given a sign to
become part of CPEC (Ahmed 2016).
Hasan Daud, Director of CPEC, says, “The corridor is beneficial for regional
countries including India and Central Asia. CPEC is highly beneficial for its trade
expansion to access the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. For
the transportation of their natural energy resources, CARs can be facilitated with
transit trade and pipeline routes by Pakistan; and their goods can be smoothly
exported to the Middle East and European states via Gwadar Port” (Daud 2019). In
addition, CPEC can become a source for Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
to export their natural resources to India and Pakistan. If there can be a consensus
between India and Pakistan with the idea of regional integration and connectivity, in
the long run, CPEC can be extended to India through subsidiary links from Punjab
and even Kashmir, thus turning the mutual security threat suspicion into a mutual
benefit. Moreover, CPEC has the potential to materialize a faster culmination of
Iran–Pak–India gas pipeline to fulfill the energy needs of India (Butt 2015).

6 Continuity or Change? CPEC Under PTI Government

The incumbent government of Imran Khan assumed office in August 2018. The
promising manifesto and 100 days plan of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) had played
a significant role in the victory as the leadership promised to reform the socio-eco-
nomic and political structure of the country. On various occasions, Imran Khan pro-
nounced that his government would adopt the Chinese development model to uplift
peoples from extreme poverty and to end massive corruption. Thus, the new govern-
ment has given an absolute assurance for continuity of CPEC and set up an internal
Pakistan–China Cooperation Unit.
Before elections, PTI raised its concerns over CPEC route, loan rates as well
as project transparency and urged the previous government to revise the bilateral

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agreements. Now media reports claim that Khan and his team is negotiating with
Chinese counterparts on previously undertaken projects in a friendly environment
which ensures the interests of both countries. Mr. Jalil argues that China and Paki-
stan have developed a strong bond of friendship which helps both states to renego-
tiate on various projects on the basis of mutual benefit (Jalil 2019). The Septem-
ber 2018 visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi seemed crucial as both
countries renewed their commitment not only to speed up work on existing projects
but also to include new projects (Munir 2018). During the visit, the Chinese For-
eign Minister invited Prime Minister Imran Khan to attend the first Chinese Interna-
tional Import Expo as a guest of honor. Therefore, in a reciprocal gesture, Mr. Khan
reached China in November and met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Keqiang,
Li Zhanshu Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
and Vice President of China Wang Qishan. The official visit facilitated the conclu-
sion of 15 agreements and reiterated commitment to make CPEC a success. The
bilateral meeting categorically rejected the negative propaganda through increasing
top-level engagement to improve cooperation in different sectors (Khan 2018).
The new government is determined to invite international investors by intro-
ducing business-friendly policies. Prime Minister Imran Khan addressed a global
investment conference during his visit to Saudi Arabia, where he highlighted the
investment opportunities in Pakistan based on mutual benefits and gains. In par-
ticular, he showcased the business opportunities in special economic zones under
the CPEC. As a result, the Saudi government announced to set up an oil refinery at
Gwadar development zone, which would push CPEC on new heights. Saudi inclu-
sion is making CPEC a project open for all, which is a crucial feature of this mega
development project (Siddiqui 2019). To sum up, here, it is worth mentioning that
Khan Government is devoted to speeding up development work on CPEC and not in
the mood to roll back the ambitious project.

7 Conclusion

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor envisioned to further enrich the economic

and trade relations between Pakistan and China through the development of multiple
connectivities, energy and telecommunication projects. The project has pure eco-
nomic nature, but strategic pundits contend that it carries a greater geopolitical and
geostrategic implications for regional and global actors. The execution has altered
the geopolitical dynamics of South Asia where new alliances are in the making.
India and the US have devised strategies to contain expanding Chinese influence
and to compete with the CPEC. The US frequently accusing Pakistan of harboring
terrorists on its soil, despite facilitation for the peace process in Afghanistan. Mean-
while, the Afghan government under intense external pressure refused to become
part of CPEC which is a serious blow to regional connectivity.
India is using various options to compete with the mega development project.
While the overt opposition comes in the form of Chabahar port development aim-
ing to connect India with Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. It is important to point
out that neither geostrategic position of Chabahar port nor fragile security situation

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in Afghanistan is compatible with Indian connectivity plans. Instead, the Gwadar

port and improved security environment in Pakistan have huge potential to welcome
regional and global investors. In the end, if India joins the mega development pro-
ject, it will open up new vistas for regional connectivity, economic prosperity and
elimination of decade’s long enmity between the regional rivals.

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Mehmood Hussain  Author is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Women University of Azad
Jammu and Kashmir, Bagh Pakistan. ORCID is 0000-0003-0515-8301. He can be contacted through
mhussain328@gmail.com.

Ahmed Bux Jamali  Author received Master Degree in International Relations from the School of Interna-
tional and Public Affairs (SIPA), Jilin University China.

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