Cinco v.
Canonoy negligence in the operation of the jeepney
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for
recovery of damages on account of a vehicular
accident involving his car and a jeepney driven
by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana
Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against
the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil case
counsel for the respondents moved for the
suspension of the civil action pending
determination of the criminal case invoking
Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The
City Court granted the motion and ordered the
suspension of the civil case. Petitioner elevated
the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil
action for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. The Court of
First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this
petition to review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be an independent
civil action for damages to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for
damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in
character which can be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action.Where the
plaintiff made essential averments in the
complaint that it was the driver's fault or
which caused the collision between his
automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff
sustained damages because of the collision; that
a direct causal connection exists between the
damage he suffered and the fault or negligence
of the defendant-driver and where the
defendant-operator in their answer, contended,
among others, that they observed due diligence
in the selection and supervision of their
employees, a defense peculiar to actions based
on quasi-delict , such action is principally
predicated on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the
New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature
and character. Liability being predicated on
quasi-delict , the civil case may proceed as a
separate and independent court action as
specifically provided for in Article 2177. Section
3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to
"other civil actions arising from cases not
included in Section 2 of the same rule" in which,
"once the criminal action has been commenced,
no civil action arising from the same offense can
be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended
in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered". The civil action referred to in Section
2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the criminal
action has been instituted is that arising from
the criminal offense and not the civil action
based on quasi delict.
The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article
2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also
damage to property. It makes no distinction
between "damage to persons" on the one hand
and "damage to property" on the other. The
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the
"harm" done and "reparation" for the harm
done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property
since "harm" is not limited to personal but also
to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict
in the law itself which includes damage to
property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code
which holds proprietors responsible for
damages caused by excessive smoke which may
be harmful "to person or property". Respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding
the decision of the city court suspending the
civil action based on quasi-delict until after the
criminal action is finally terminated.
Dulay v. CA
FACTS: On December 7, 1988, an altercation
between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which
Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at
the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow
of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, filed on
February 8, 1989 an action for damages against
Benigno Torzuela and herein private
respondents Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or
Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"),
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a valid
cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the
scope of his duties, and that since the alleged
act of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a
felony. — Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a
complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code,
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article
2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the private respondent argued that
petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability.
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that
their cause of action against the private
respondents is based on their liability under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
RTC: On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge
Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S
motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for
exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge
held that the complaint did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a
quasi-delict since it does not mention any
negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting
Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in
the performance of his duties. Respondent
judge ruled that mere allegations of the
concurring negligence of the defendants
(private respondents herein) without stating the
facts showing such negligence are mere
conclusions of law. Respondent judge also
declared that the complaint was one for
damages founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
as distinguished from those arising from,
quasi-delict.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed
decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not
limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts
that are intentional and voluntary. Thus,
petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting
Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to recover
damages under Article 2176 of the NCC is
limited to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence
HELD: An examination of the complaint in the
present case would show that the plaintiffs,
petitioners herein, are invoking their right to
recover damages against the private
respondents for their vicarious responsibility for
the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of
shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents,
there is no justification for limiting the scope of
Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence.
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article
2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional. As far back as the definitive
case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this
Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character; whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by
the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of
Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191
SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also
charged criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
[citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis
supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word
"intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate
obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since
intent cannot be coupled with negligence as
defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the absence of more substantial reasons, this
Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the
coverage of Article 2176.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of
negligence but also acts which are intentional
and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the
part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable
to private respondents.
Garcia v. Florido
Facts:
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C.
Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and
Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital,
hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8
G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by
respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip
from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the
purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of
government hospitals, hospital administrative
officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health
Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30
a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight
curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in
Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, said car collided with an oncoming
passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W
Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro
Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision,
petitioners sustained various physical injuries
which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.
Respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in
Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court
of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a
complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double
serious and less serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence". 20 days later, German C.
Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an
action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against
the private respondents, owners and drivers,
respectively, of the PU car and the passenger
bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for
preliminary attachment.
Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro
Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on three (3)
grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs
(petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the
complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment
but without the requisite verification, hence
defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57
of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the
defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co.,
Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had
operated said passenger bus with maximum
care and prudence.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal action bars the
petitioners from instituting a civil action for
damages.
Held:
In the case at bar, there is no question that
petitioners never intervened in the criminal
action instituted by the Chief of Police against
respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the
said criminal action been terminated either by
conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of
the present civil action for damages, petitioners
have in effect abandoned their right to press
recovery for damages in the criminal case, and
have opted instead to recover them in the
present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil
liability of private respondents to the former has
ceased to be involved in the criminal action.
Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case,
not only when he has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right to institute, but also
when he has actually instituted the civil action.
For by either of such actions his interest in the
criminal case has disappeared.
Andamo v. IAC
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Andamo are the owners of a
parcel of land in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite
which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.
Within the land of respondent corporation,
waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused
a young man to drown, damaged petitioners'
crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal
action against officers and directors of the
respondent corporation for destruction by
means of inundation. Subsequently, on February
22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case against
respondent corporation for damages before the
same court.
Respondent corporation filed motion to dismiss
or suspend the civil action until after judgment
in the criminal case. Trial court dismissed the
civil case and the Appellate Court affirmed such
decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing civil case
since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case is based on
quasi-delict that can proceed independently of
the criminal case.
HELD:
The civil action is one under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff. In
quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to
Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
Taylor v. Manila Electric Company
FACTS
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged
in the operation of a street railway and an
electric light system in the city of Manila. The
plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he
received the injuries complained of, 15 years of
age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and
having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics. On the 30th of September, 1905,
plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols,
about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to
the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting
one Murphy, an employee of the defendant,
who and promised to make them a cylinder for
a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr.
Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys,
impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and
perhaps by the unusual interest which both
seem to have taken in machinery, spent some
time in wandering about the company's
premises. After watching the operation of the
travelling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open
space in the neighborhood of the place where
the company dumped in the cinders and ashes
from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty
or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the
ground. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and
have in themselves a considerable explosive
power. They opened one of the caps with a knife,
and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and David held the
cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more
or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who
when the boys proposed putting a match to the
contents of the cap, became frightened and
started to run away, received a slight cut in the
neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded, and David was struck in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of
which injured his right eye to such an extent as
to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
who were called in to care for his wounds.
- The evidence does definitely and conclusively
disclose how the caps came to be on the
defendant's premises, nor how long they had
been there when the boys found them.
- No measures seems to have been adopted by
the defendant company to prohibit or prevent
visitors from entering and walking about its
premises unattended, when they felt disposed
so to do.
- The trial court's decision, awarding damages to
the plaintiff, upon the provisions of article 1089
of the Civil Code read together with articles
1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault
or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage
so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the
preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or
enterprise are equally liable for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed
or on account of their duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the
damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not
have been cared for with due diligence, and for
kindling of explosive substances which may not
have been placed in a safe and proper place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests
his appeal strictly upon his contention that the
facts proven at the trial do not established the
liability of the defendant company under the
provisions of these articles.
ISSUE
WON the defendant’s negligence is the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries

HELD
NO. The Court held that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the
injury received by the plaintiff. Under the Civil
Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine
in the United States, the plaintiff in an action
such as that under consideration, in order to
establish his right to a recovery, must establish
by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which
defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between
the negligence and the damage.
-These proposition are, of course, elementary,
and do not admit of discussion, the real
difficulty arising in the application of these
principles to the particular facts developed in
the case under consideration. It is clear that
the accident could not have happened and not
the fulminating caps been left exposed at the
point where they were found, or if their owner
had exercised due care in keeping them in an
appropriate place; but it is equally clear that
plaintiff would not have been injured had he not,
for his own pleasure and convenience, entered
upon the defendant's premises, and strolled
around thereon without the express permission
of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant
which he found on its premises, and had he not
thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps
and applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because
of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry
upon defendant company's premises, and the
intervention of his action between the negligent
act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
its premises and the accident which resulted in
his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident, which
should be deemed to be the direct result of
defendant's negligence in leaving the caps
exposed at the place where they were found by
the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause
of the accident which occasioned the injuries
sustained by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for
plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in
many of the courts of last resort in the United
States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and
"Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall.
(84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question
was whether a railroad company was liable for
in injury received by an infant while upon its
premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of
amusement, if such injury was, under
circumstances, attributable to the negligence of
the company), the principles on which these
cases turn are that "while a railroad company is
not bound to the same degree of care in regard
to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its
premises that it owes to passengers conveyed
by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such
strangers for injuries arising from its negligence
or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct
of an infant of tender years is not to be judged
by the same rule which governs that of adult.
While it is the general rule in regard to an adult
that to entitle him to recover damages for an
injury resulting from the fault or negligence of
another he must himself have been free from
fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant
of tender years. The care and caution required
of a child is according to his maturity and
capacity only, and this is to be determined in
each case by the circumstances of the case."
-The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company
vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and
sharply criticized in several courts. But the
doctrine of the case is controlling in our
jurisdiction.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice,
and necessity, and neither is contention that a
man has a right to do what will with his own
property or that children should be kept under
the care of their parents or guardians, so as to
prevent their entering on the premises of others
is of sufficient weight to put in doubt.
- But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff
upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have
relieved defendant from responsibility for
injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other
fault on his part, if such injury were attributable
to the negligence of the defendant, we are of
opinion that under all the circumstances of this
case the negligence of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the
defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the
detonating cap and putting match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant,
therefore is not civilly responsible for the
injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends, upon
the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo
cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the
intervention of his action between the negligent
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises and the explosion which
resulted in his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is
because we can not agree with this proposition,
although we accept the doctrine of the
Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have
thought proper to discuss and to consider that
doctrine at length in this decision.
- In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the
accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a
cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the
injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that, despite
his denials on the witness stand, he well knew
the explosive character of the cap with which he
was amusing himself.
Tayag v. Alcantara
Doctrine: Acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar
to prosecution in a civil action for damages
based on quasi-delict against the driver and the
operator.
Facts:
On Sept. 2, 1974, Pedro Tayag, Sr.
was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus
bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604
PUB ’74 and as a result of which he was
physically injured causing his instantaneous
death as well as destroying the bike he was
riding. The bus was being driven by defendant,
Romeo Villa y Cunanan, at the times of the
accident in a faster and greater speed than what
was reasonable and proper and in a grossly
negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent
manner.
The heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., petitioners, filed
with the Court of First Instance a complaint for
damages against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
and Romeo Villa y Cunanan, private respondents,
on Sept. 25, 1974. The private respondents
admitted some and denied the other allegations
in the complaints; thereafter, file a motion to
suspend trial on the ground of a pending
criminal case against the driver of the bus,
Romeo Villa y Cunanan. The respondent Judge
granted the motion and subsequently
suspended the hearing of the Civil Case.
The respondent judge acquitted the accused,
Romeo Villa, of the crime of homicide on the
ground of reasonable doubt in the criminal case
filed against him. The private respondents then
filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the
ground that petitioners have no cause of action
on the basis of the driver’s acquittal in the
related criminal case. The petitioners then
opposed the motion alleging that their cause of
action is based on a quasi-delict, not on a crime,
but the respondent Judge dismissed the
complaint and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners. Hence,
this petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside
the order of the respondent Judge was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent
Judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the civil case?
Held:
Yes, the respondent Judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
civil case. In this case, the allegations in the
complaint show that petitioners’ cause of action
was based upon a quasi-delict. The essential
averments for a quasi delictual action are
present, namely:
1) An act or omission constituting fault or
negligence on the part of private respondent:
2) Damage caused by the said act or
omission;
3) Direct causal relation between the
damage and the act or omission;
4) No pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties.
As stated in the case of Elcano vs. Hill, the civil
liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished by the acquittal of the accused in
the criminal action arising from the same act.
The petitioner’s cause of action is based on a
quasi-delict, therefore, the acquittal of the
driver, Romeo Villa, in the criminal case is not a
bar to the prosecution in the civil case for
damages based on a quasi-delict. The petition is
granted and the order of dismissal rendered by
the respondent Judge is set aside and the case is company’s trains.
remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. Issue
WON the defendant Manila Railroad Company is

Cangco v. Manila Rail liable to pay the plaintiff damages.

Jose Cangco, plaintiff, was in the employment of Held

the Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of Yes. The foundation of the legal liability of the

clerk. In coming daily by train to the company’s defendant is the contract of carriage, and that

office in the city of Manila where he worked, he the obligation to respond for the damage which

used a pass, supplied by the company, which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the

entitled him to ride upon the company’s train breach of Contract of Carriage.

free of charge. When the facts averred show a contractual

Upon the occasion in question, the plaintiff was undertaking by defendant for the benefit of the

returning home by rail from his daily labors, and plaintiff and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed

as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo or refused to perform the contract, it is not

the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings

class-car where he was riding and, making his whether the breach of the contract is due to

exit through the door. When the train had willful fault or negligence on the part of the

proceeded a little farther, the plaintiff stepped defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of

off, but one or both of his feet came in contact the contract and of its nonperformance is

with a sack of watermelons with the result that sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.

his feet slipped from under him and he fell The defendant company is liable for the damage

violently on the platform. thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence. And

on a dark night, and as the railroad station was in this case, Cangco was ignorant of the fact that

lighted dimly by a single light located some sacks of watermelons were there as there were

distance away, objects on the platform where no appropriate warnings and the place was

the accident occurred were difficult to discern, dimly lit. Furthermore, alighting from a moving

especially to a person emerging from a lighted train while it is slowing down is a common

car. practice and a lot of people are doing so every

On August 31, 1915, he filed an action to day without suffering injury. Cangco has the

recover damages from the defendant company, vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was

founding his action upon the negligence of the by no means so risky for him to get off while the

servants and employees of the defendant in train was yet moving as the same act would

placing the sacks of melons upon the platform have been in an aged or feeble person.

and in leaving them so placed as to be menace The conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to

to the security of passenger alighting from the alight while the train was yet slightly under way
was not characterized by imprudence and that argue that if it was valid then petitioner should
therefore he was not guilty of contributory not be made liable. The SC also passed upon the
negligence. justness of the damages awarded in particular
moral damages.

Fores v. Miranda Issue: whether or not the approval of the Public

Service Commission necessary for the sale of a

Facts: Defendant-petitioner Paz Fores brings this public service vehicle even without conveying

petition for review of the decision of the court therewith the authority to operate the same.

of appeals awarding to plaintiff-respondent

Ireneo Miranda the sums of P5000 by way of Whether or not the moral damages may be

actual damages and counsel fees, and P10,000 awarded in this case.

as moral damages. Story goes, respondent was a

passenger on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. Held: The court of appeals found that the

While the jeepney was descending Sta.Mesa alleged sale was merely dubious and fake, but

Bridge, at an excessive rate of speed, the driver still answered the query in the affirmative. A

lost control and hit the bridge wall. 5 passengers transfer contemplated by the law if made

including the respondent suffered injuries. without the requisite approval of the public

Respondent for emphasis suffered a fracture on service commission is not effective and binding

the upper right humerus to which he underwent in so far as the responsibility of the grantee

3 surgeries at the Orthopedic Hospital. The first under the franchise in relation to the public is

was to attach wire loops were wound around concerned. It does not contemplate the vehicle

the bones and screwed in place, the second, to itself, but rather the fact that the vehicle shall

insert a metal splint, and the third, to remove be used to engage in public service, as public

such splint. The driver was charged with serious service property.

physical injuries through reckless imprudence, No, moral damages are generally not

and was convicted thereof because he pleaded recoverable in damage actions predicated on a

guilty. The jeepney on the otherhand was breach of the contract of transportation, in view

registered under the name of Paz Fores. The of Articles 2219, 2220 and 2176 of the New Civil

vehicle even had the name plainted below its Code.

windshield. Petitioner contended that one day Article 2219: Moral damages may be recovered

before the accident, she allegedly sold the in the ff analogous cases: 1) A criminal offense

passenger jeep that was involved therein to a resulting in physical injuries; 2) quasi-delicts

certain Carmen Sackerman. The question causing physical injuries.

interposed by petitioner is whether or not the Article 2220, Will injury to property may be a

approval of the Public Service Commission legal ground for awarding moral damages if the

necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle court should find that under the circumstances

even without conveying therewith the authority such damages are justly due. The same rule

to operate the same. The petitioner seems to applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Article 2176 Whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called a quasi-delict, and
is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Hence with the above, we
realize that: 1) to recover moral damages from
breach of contract, there must be proof of bad
faith, fraud or deliberate injurious conduct; 2)
breach of contract however does not fall under
the term “analogous cases” in article 2219,
because of the definition of quasi-delict in
Article 2176 expressly excludes cases where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation bet.
the parties. In this case, there is a contract. To
recover moral damages though we resort to
Article 1764.
The exception to the rule
however is Article 1764, which makes the
common carrier expressly subject to the rule of
Article 2206 that entitles the spouse,
descendants, and ascendants of the deceased
passenger to demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of death of the deceased.
Hence, in summation – where the passenger
does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable, unless it is proved that the carrier
was guilty of malice or bad faith. In this case,
there is no showing of malice or bad faith. Even
the in cases of injury, the presumption against
the common carrier is just negligence and not
malicious. Since in this case, Miranda is still alive,
and no evidence proves maliciousness, the
award of moral damage must be dropped. The
actual and attorneys fees amounting to P2000 is
deemed fair.
Far East v. CA
Doctrine: In culpa contractual, moral damages
may be recovered where the defendant is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice
in the breach of the contract
Facts: Private respondent Luis Luna applied for,
and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by
petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company
("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request,
the bank also issued a supplemental card to
private respondent Clarita S. Luna. however,
Clarita lost her credit card and FEBTC was
informed. In order to replace the lost card,
Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of
this nature, the bank's internal security
procedures and policy would appear to be to
meanwhile so record the lost card, along with
the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled
Card" in its master file.
Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close
Filipino-American friend and another guest at
the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel
Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch,
Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the
attending waiter who promptly had it verified
through a telephone call to the bank's Credit
Card Department. Since the card was not
honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill
amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt
embarrassed by this incident. In a letter, private
respondent Luis, through counsel, demanded
from FEBTC the payment of damages. Festejo, a
vice-president of the bank expressed the bank's
apologies to Luis. In his letter that when a card
is reported to the office as lost, FAREASTCARD
undertakes the necessary action to avert its
unauthorized use (such as tagging the card as
hotlisted), however, FAREASTCARD failed to
inform you about its security policy.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private
respondents filed a complaint for damages
against FEBTC wherein the trial court rendered a
decision ordering FEBTC to pay private
respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b)
P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c)
P20,000.00 attorney's fees. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed
the decision of the trial court. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court
with this petition for review.
Issue: Whether Luis Luna is entitled to damages
Held: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages
may be recovered where the defendant is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice
in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property
may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not
simple, negligence. Concededly, the bank was
remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform
Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in
the findings of the trial court and the appellate
court, however, can sufficiently indicate any
deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause
harm to private respondents. Neither could
FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal
notice to Luis be considered so gross as to
amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad
faith implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative
idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or ill will. Also,
Article 21 states "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are
intended to serve as an example or as
correction for the public good in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. In criminal offenses, exemplary
damages are imposed when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In
quasi-delicts, such damages are granted if the
defendant is shown to have been so guilty of
gross negligence as to approximate malice. In
contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant is
found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art.
2232, Civil Code). Given the above premises and
the factual circumstances here obtaining, it
would also be just as arduous to sustain the
exemplary damages granted by the courts.
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps
inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to
private respondent Luis should entitle him to
recover a measure of damages sanctioned
under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing
thusly:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered
where the court deems such recovery to be just
and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no
issue of sound discretion on the part of the
appellate court in allowing the award thereof by
the trial court. The appealed decision is
MODIFIED by deleting the award of moral and
exemplary damages to private respondents; in
its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00
by way of nominal damages.
Air France v. Carrascoso
Facts
Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of
pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France, through
PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip
ticket. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in
first class but at Bangkok, the manager of Air
France forced him to vacate his seat, because a
"white man" had a "better right" to it. He
refused and even had a heated discussion with
the manager but after being pacified by fellow
passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat.
Air France asserts that the ticket does not
represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties, and that the issuance
of a first class ticket did not guarantee a first
class ride (depends upon the availability of
seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention.
Issue and Holding
WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class
seat he claims. YES
Ratio
On CA's decision
Air France charges that CA failed to make
complete findings of fact on all issues presented.
SC says that so long as CA's decision contains
the facts necessary to warrant its conclusions,
there is nothing wrong in withholding any
specific finding of facts with respect to the
evidence for the defense.
On the seat issue
If a first-class ticket holder is not entitled to a
corresponding seat, what security can a
passenger have? It's very easy to strike out the
stipulations in the ticket and say that there was
a contrary verbal agreement. There was no
explanation as to why he was allowed to take a
first class seat before coming to Bangkok if
indeed he had no seat or if someone had a
better right to it.
On contract to transport, QD, etc.
This is different in kind and degree from any
other contractual obligation because of the
relation which an air carrier sustains with the
public. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation as they have a right to be treated
by the employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy, consideration. What happened was a
violation of public duty by Air France--a case of
QD, so damages are proper. A case was cited
wherein it was said that although the relation of
passenger and carrier is contractual in origin
and nature, the act that breaks the K may be
also a tort.
On the issue of award of damages
Air France assails CA's award of moral damages,
claiming that since Carrascoso's action is based
on breach of contract, there must be an
averment of fraud or bad faith in order to avail
of said award. While there was no specific
mention of "bad faith," it may be drawn from
the facts and circumstances set forth. Deficiency
in the complaint, if any, was cured by evidence.
Allegations in the complaint on this issue:
There was a K to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering the Bangkok-Teheran leg
This K was breached when Air France failed to
furnish first class transpo at Bangkok
There was bad faith when the manager
compelled Carrascoso to leave his seat after he
was already seated and to transfer to the tourist
class, thereby making him suffer inconvenience,
embarrassment, humiliation, etc.
bad faith - state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of
self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes
See NCC 21. Upon the provisions of NCC 2219
(10), moral damages are recoverable. Exemplary
damages are well awarded also, since NCC gives
the court power to grant such in K and QK, with
the condition that the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
PSBA v. CA
Facts: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985
which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista
while on the second-floor premises of the
Philippine School of Business Administration
(PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to
file suit in the RTC of Manila, for damages
against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in
the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It
was established that his assailants were not
members of the school's academic community
but were elements from outside the school.
The Bautista Spouses (private respondents
herein) sought to adjudge PSBA officers liable
for the victim's untimely demise due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means and methods
before, during and after the attack on the
victim.
PSBA officers sought to have the suit dismissed,
alleging that since they are presumably sued
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides in part: “… teachers, or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.”, the complaint states no cause of
action against them, because they are beyond
the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The RTC overruled petitioners' contention and
denied their motion to dismiss. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s order.
Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming RTC’s
order
Ruling: While we agree with the CA that the
motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly
denied and the complaint should be tried on the
merits, we do not however agree with the
premises of the appellate court's ruling.
CA anchored its decision on the law of
quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code. It had been stressed that
the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational
institution sought to be held liable for the acts
of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist
in the present case for the assailants of Carlitos
were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school could be made liable.
This, however, does not exculpate petitioners
from liability.
Because the present case evinces a contractual
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista,
the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A
perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by
contract, whether express or implied. However,
this impression has not prevented this Court
from determining the existence of a tort even
when there obtains a contract.
What comes to mind is Article 21, which
provides that any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good custom or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. The
negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant
difficulties posed by the obligation of schools,
for conceptually a school, like a common carrier,
cannot be an insurer of its students against all
risks. It would not be equitable to expect of
schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass
upon their premises, for notwithstanding the
security measures installed, the same may still
fail against an individual or group determined to
carry out a nefarious deed inside school
premises and environs. Should this be the case,
the school may still avoid liability by proving
that the breach of its contractual obligation to
the students was not due to its negligence.
Hence the petition to dismiss is DENIED. The
court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby
ordered to continue proceedings consistent with
this ruling of the Court.
Calalas v. Sunga
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga , a
college freshman majoring in Physical Education
took a passenger jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente Calalas. Since the jeepney
was filled to capacity, Sunga was given an
extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of
the door at the rear end of the vehicle. When
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off, she
gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she
was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped
the left rear portion of the jeepney causing
Sunga to sustain several injuries. Sunga filed a
complaint for damages against Calalas for
violation of contract of carriage. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against
Salva, the owner of the truck. The lower court
rendered judgment against Salva and absolved
Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver
of the truck who was responsible for the
accident. The same court also held in Civil Case
No. 3490 that the truck owner and its driver are
jointly liable to Calalas for quasi-delict. The
Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
lower court on the ground that Sunga's cause
of action is based on contract of carriage and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
The third-party complaint against Salva and
Verena was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment in the case for
quasi-delict (Civil Case No. 3490) filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena constitutes res judicata
to the case at bar.
Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by
the truck was a caso fortuito.
Whether or not the award of moral damages in
the instant case is proper.
Held:
The principle of res judicata does not apply in
the instant case. The issues involved in Civil Case
No. 3490 and in the present case are not the
same. The former is based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana which has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor while the latter is
based on breach of contract or culpa contractual
which is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation. In
quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted by
proving the existence of the contract and the
fact that the obligor, in this case the common
carries, failed to transport his passenger safely
to his destination. The ruling in the civil case for
quasi-delict finding Salva and Verena liable for
damages to Calalas does not bind Sunga. The
doctrine of proximate cause applies only in
actions for quasi-delict and not in actions
involving breach of contract.
Petitioner's contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked
constitutes caso fortuito is untenable. The
requisites of caso fortuito are: (a) the cause of
the breach is independent of the debtor's will,;
(b) the event is unforseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event is such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the debtor did not take part in
causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of improperly
parking his jeepney. Further, upon the
happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose and petitioner failed to
prove that he observed extraordinary diligence
in the care of his passengers. As found by
appellate court, petitioner violated R.A. No.
4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. Hence, petitioner is liable on his contract
of carriage with Sunga.
As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated
on a breach of contract except where mishap
results in the death of a passenger or where the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. In the case
at bar, there was no basis for awarding moral
damages since there was no factual finding that
the petitioner acted in bad faith in the
performance of the contract of carriage.
Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m.,
Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology
Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew
her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier
as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a
duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding
permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was
stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her
firearm from her bag to deposit the same for
safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline
with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together
with his six minor children (respondents) filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and
assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved
their right to file a separate civil action in the
said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City
subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in
its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal
to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with
modification as to the penalty in a Decision
dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was
made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents
filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a
complaint for damages against Pajarillo for
negligently shooting Evangeline and against
Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard. Respondents
prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material
allegations in the complaint and alleged that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death
was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the
latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set
up a compulsory counterclaim for moral
damages and attorney's fees.
Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex
delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as
those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual
or obligations arising from law under Article 31
of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles
32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right
to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission or under both causes?
Held:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to
damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he
merely acted in self-defense. It gave no
credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that
Evangeline was seen roaming around the area
prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had
not made such report to the head office and the
police authorities. The RTC further ruled that
being the guard on duty, the situation
demanded that he should have exercised proper
prudence and necessary care by asking
Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter
instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo
had already been convicted of Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also
failed to proffer proof negating liability in the
instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of
Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with
Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded
that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in
the selection of its employees, particularly of
Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to
show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its
employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply
showed that it required its guards to attend
trainings and seminars which is not the
supervision contemplated under the law; that
supervision includes not only the issuance of
regulations and instructions designed for the
protection of persons and property, for the
guidance of their servants and employees, but
also the duty to see to it that such regulations
and instructions are faithfully complied with.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily
liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions
are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the
provisions on civil liability arising from felonies
under the Revised Penal Code; that since
Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a
final and executory judgment and is said to be
serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the
civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is
one solely dependent upon conviction, because
said liability arises from the offense charged and
no other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the
penal liability with a pronouncement that the
fact from which the civil action might proceed
does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising
from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a
good father of a family in the employment and
supervision of employees is inapplicable and
irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or
ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the liability of an employer
for the civil liability of their employees is only
subsidiary, not joint or solidary.