CALUB V.

CA
G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000

FACTS: On January 18,1992 the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber wherein Constancio
Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper documents
and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its
load of lumber. Petitioner, Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer, then filed a criminal complaint against Abuganda, for violation of Section 68 of
PD 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, (Revised Forestry Code).
On January 31, 1992 the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabun and
Abuganda from the custody of DENR, thus they filed a criminal complaint of grave
coercion but it was dismissed by the public prosecutor.
On February 11, 1992 one of the two vehicles was again apprehended by the
Philippine Army for illegally transporting forest products.
Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even granted recovery of possession to
them via replevin.
Upon petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals denied said petition, stating that the
mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in
custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of
the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition
of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not
absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that
matter, added the appellate court.
The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the
appellate court said. Additionally, respondent CA noted that the petitioners failed to
observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990.
They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and
recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’ failure to comply with the
procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was
confirmed by the admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been
issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore, in
failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the subject vehicles could
not be considered in custodia legis.

ISSUE: Whether the motor vehicles in question are in custodial legis pursuant to Section
68 of PD 705?
HELD: Yes, upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported
without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said
timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under
Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code. Note further that petitioners’ failure to
observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was
justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor
give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the
seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded
vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was
apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners again were not able to
report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the
vehicle because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of
replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order
or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was
in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia
legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
LALICAN V. VERGARA
G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997

FACTS: On or about February 9, 1991 the petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio
Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan Puerto Princesa for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or
known as The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. There was 1, 800 board feet of
lumber loaded in two (2) passenger jeeps in different sizes and dimension that were
confiscated. On August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information filed against them
contenting that, Section 68 of PD 705 does not include lumber because the wording of the
law categorically specify timber to be collected as to constitute the violation on the said
law. He further contends that, the law is vague because it does specify the authority or legal
documents required by existing forest law and regulation.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not the courts
to determine the wisdom of the law or to set the policy as rest by the legislature. He further
asserts that the word timber should include lumber which is a product or derivative of a
timber. The position of the prosecution could result to the circumvention of the law, for
one could stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a lumber. On September 24,
1991, the lower court construed the interpretation of the law against the State thus the
motion was granted.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the order underscoring the fact
that the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10,
1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the
product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were
not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the
product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber
origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for
transportation from one point to another. The motion was approved thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber in order to constitute
an offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code
of the Philippines).
HELD: The Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The primary reason why
the law was enacted is to secure and maximize the use of the natural resources; the non
inclusion of lumber on the law may give rise for the circumvention of law. Section 68 of
the said law punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of
timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or
(b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations. Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include
possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting
the law which, under Executive Order No. 277. To exclude possession of "lumber" from
the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be
so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted
as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or
contravene the plain words of the law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad
enough to encompass lumbers which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to
mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology.
PALLADA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000
FACTS: Sometime in the latter part of 1992, DENR received a reports that illegally cut
lumber were delivered in the warehouse of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in
Valencia Bukidnon. DENR officers in collaboration of PNP raided the company’s
warehouse and found a large stockpile of lumber in varying sizes cut by a chainsaw. As
proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two
receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17,
1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipt considering that R. L.
Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces
of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill
operator.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as
assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden
Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended. During the trial, the accused presented documents that the
lumber are legally obtained. This may include the certificate of origin. However, the court
found out that Pallada was guilty of the violation of PD 705 and the rest of the accused
were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. The case was appealed to the CA and
rendered a decision affirming the decision of the lower court, thus this case was elevated.

ISSUE: Whether separate certificates of origin is used for lumber and timber.

HELD: Yes, there should be a separate Certificate of origin. The trial court acted correctly
in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the
lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. For
indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83 states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and responsibility for
shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the
attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which form[s] part of this circular is hereby
adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers.
Lumber transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) as
herein required shall be considered as proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be
subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD
implementing guidelines.
The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only
questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the
same. The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs
were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DATOR
G.R. No. 136142. October 24, 2000
FACTS: Pastor Telen and his co accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol were charged
with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Revised Forestry Code. The accused were
apprehended by the police officer while transporting pieces of lumber bound to Maasin
Souther Leyte and seized pieces of lumber. SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt covering
the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu
cargo truck. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to
SPO3 Lasala, PNP Property Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte who transferred
custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. The accused Telan alleged
that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San
Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in
Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. He further contends that he secured verbal
permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of the DENR.
The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD 705
sentencing the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than PRISION
MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the
costs. Thus, this case was elevated to the court.

ISSUE: Whether the penalty imposed to Telen, the accused is correct in violation of PD
705.

HELD: No, in the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and
Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not
premium quality lumber. It may be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the
appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for
commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear
that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending
criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code
(P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the
interest of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the
minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which
carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for simple theft.

Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,
as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by
two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods to prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC. V. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO
G.R. No. 161798. October 20, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) operates a multi-billion peso pulp and
paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued
Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-
manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land within the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its

officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April
6, 2001 designating the petitioner as DENR depository and custodian for apprehended
forest products and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the
CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement containing
"Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation." The
MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of applications for
Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR,
the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these Memoranda,
petitioner’s security personnel were deputized as DENR officers to apprehend and seize
the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the
forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.

In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP,

through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its
concession and tree plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances
were kept in PICOP’s impounding area.

A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for preliminary
mandatory Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null and
void and sought to restrain the DENR and those who are participants from enforcing the
said memoranda. The RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and abrogate
the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and to refrain and
desist from implementation. Petitioner was also ordered to release the
confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the
Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative and
criminal proceedings were ongoing.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated products by the
virtue of MOA regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of
Private Tree Plantation.

HELD: Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and
conveyances. Petitioner’s compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated logs
and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the
confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted
that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the cases
pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government Prosecution-
Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioner’s interest in the confiscated forest products was merely
contingent and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that private respondents’ intrusion was in
violation of petitioner’s PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave
petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, and recognized
petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the concession area. In filing this
petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these
license agreements.

It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest
products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its
licensing agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued
by the trial court. Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the
apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the
DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holds
the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the DENR while the
administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. V. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990
FACTS: On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose
Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber
except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of
54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from
October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.
On August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau),
Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in
Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner
and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a
memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena. Petitioner’s
timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President
Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support
thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable
action was taken on his letter. Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the
area formerly covered by petitioner’s TLA re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and
Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the
other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a
formal award or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies
of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

After the change of government in 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986
to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto
Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its
timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry
laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take
possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request was
denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the
timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The
MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of
the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through then
Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau
orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private
respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

HELD: No, The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable
period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of
laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may,
depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did
these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights.
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a
petition for certiorari with the court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in
1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not
deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at
the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There
is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of
petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic
rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion
of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case,
the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on
the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide
latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions
to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should
enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
VIRGILIO BON V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended together with Rosalio Bon. The said petitioner
conspired and mutually heled one another in cutting, gathering and manufacturing into
lumber 4 narra trees, 1 cuyao-yao tree and 1 amugis tree with an approximate volume of
4,135 bd. Ft. Without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita Mendoza and
without having first obtained necessary permits.
Teresita Mendoza owns a parcel of agricultural land in sorsogon and was
administered by Virgilio Bon.She received an information that the trees located in the said
agricultural land were being cut, sawed and stolen by her administrator and/or worker.
She then sent her brother Manuel Dangalan, to investigate. Manuel sought the assistance
of Barangay. Captain Labayane. During investigation they found 6 stump of trees. Virgilio
admitted that he ordered the said cutting of the trees into lumber. The CA sustained the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and
Manuel Dangalan. Both testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting
of trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza’s land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty as charged in violation of Section 68 of PD

705?

HELD: We affirm the lower courts’ assessment of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.

Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended provides:

“SEC.68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License.
— Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided,
That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
“The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.”
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned
without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal
documents.
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the
prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from
the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence,
however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and
findings of guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the
following elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, Virgilio, being the tenant in actual possession and control over the
land, fruit trees and big trees and had a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. Moreover,
he admitted that he orders the cutting of the said trees in the presence of witnesses and was
corroborated by Narvaez, who saw the lumber.
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and
manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following
pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of an
officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit
was secured for the cutting of the trees, and the CENRO’s computation of the value of the
timber generated from the felled trees. The facts shown together with the circumstantial
evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as
charged.
CHU V. TAMIN
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003

FACTS: On 9 September 1999, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer

Michael F. dela Cruz of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that
complainant was in possession of “forest products of dubious origin” in violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 [1] (“PD 705”), as amended. On the same day,
respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 364 ordering the seizure of several pieces of
mangrove lumber from complainant’s fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur.
On the strength of the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement agents,
seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an
estimated value of P183, 790.
Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge issued,
under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of PD 705.
Complainant recalled that on 10 November 1998, respondent judge issued four search
warrants against him (Search Warrant Nos. 281 to 284), authorizing the seizure from his
compound of pagatpat lumber worth more than P1.5 million. Complainant alleged that
the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required
examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four warrants.
Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact
conducted such examination but the record of the “deposition” was “misfiled in another
case folder through inadvertence.”
In response to the directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (“OCA”) of this
Court to comment on the complaint, respondent judge, in his Second Endorsement dated
16 December 1999, denied complainant’s allegations. In his explanation, dated 11 July
2001, respondent judge reiterated the claim he made in his Indorsement of 16 December
1999 that he examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing Search Warrant No.
364. He explained that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript of the
examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first time, that the legal
researcher in his office who prepared the duplicate copy issued to complainant on 22
September 1999 failed, through “pure inadvertence,” to recopy such transcript. Respondent
judge attributed such omission to the fact that at that time, the pages of the records were
not yet “physically paged.” He claimed that the pages were numbered only upon
preparation of the records for transmittal to Branch 24 the following week. He further
asserted that the copy of the transcript in question was numbered page 5. Branch 24,
however, refused to accept the referral of the case. Thus, respondent judge forwarded the
records to the OCA with a request for their transmittal to Branch 24. The OCA later
returned the records to respondent judge as their proper custodian.

ISSUE: Is the judge required to conduct searching questions and put it in writing?

HELD: Yes, The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and

seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
OPOSA V. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993

FACTS: This is a unique case brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming that
they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as those generations yet
unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license
agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and
approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to
stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed
in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether children have the legal standing to file the case.

HELD: Yes, The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the
legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”.
Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that
environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to
sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of
contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of
public welfare.
PEOPLE V. CFI
G.R. No. L-46772. February 13, 1992
FACTS: The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs,
defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The information provided that Godofredo
Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with 20 other John Does whose identities are still
unknown, the first-named accused being the administrator of the Infanta Logging
Corporation, conspired and entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte,
titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, and proceeded to illegally cut,
gather, and take, therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any
authority under a license agreement, 60 logs of different species.
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on 2
grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Trial court thus
dismissed the information based on the respondent’s grounds.
ISSUE: Whether the information correctly and properly charged an offense and whether
the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes, The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused
cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or
other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to
any private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was
without authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not
fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public
forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father,
Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or
lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the
Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. Thus, ownership is not an
essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705.
As to the second issue raised, the regular courts still has jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD
705 covers 2 specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the
violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest
officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any person who
has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the
decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not
committed in the presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought
to his attention by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or
employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the appropriate official
authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the necessary
informations in court. Unfortunately, the instant case does not fall under any of the
situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the
presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest
officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a
private offended party to the fiscal. As such, the OSG was correct in insisting that P.D. 705
did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to
conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary
information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission
of the crime. In short, Sec. 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest officers, but
only special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by those upon whom it is vested by
general law
PEOPLE V. QUE
G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996

FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for violation of
Section 68 of PD 705.
The facts shows that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of the Provincial
Task Force on Illegal Logging, received information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with
illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members
of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General
Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the truck. There were three persons on
board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson Que, who was the owner of said truck, and an
unnamed person. The police then checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut
slabs, but inserted therein where sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself. When required
to show a permit, Que failed to do so and thus was charged for violation of Sec. 68 of PD
705.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner violated Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 that
amended Section 68, which penalizes the possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents, did not indicate the particular documents necessary to
make the possession legal, and considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at
the time of the enactment of said E.O.
HELD: Yes, Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and regulations” to refer
to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of
E. O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile.
Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be
construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or
other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the
documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Thus Que’s
possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense
under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
Also, the court rejected Que’s argument that the law only penalizes possession of
illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the
cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are 2
distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial
whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products are legal or
not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the
crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O.
277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
legal documents as malum prohibitum.
ROLDAN, JR. V. HON, MADRONA ET.AL.
G.R. NO. 152989. September 4, 2002

FACTS: On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP)
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for
a proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the
various government agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was
allegedly informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his
application was still awaiting approval. Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the
cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway. He used the cut logs as materials to build
his chicken cages. About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner’s place, allegedly without a search warrant. An
inventory of the cut trees was conducted there were 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches
(8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of P235, 454.68 at
P27.00 per board foot.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether a person who cuts trees for his own use within his property without the
necessary permit from the DENR and without transporting the same outside said property,
be criminally charged for violating PD 705.
(b) Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under Section
14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport
the logs out of his property and used them for his own agricultural purposes.
HELD:
(a) Yes, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the
violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. As to the
assertion that his penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not be equated with that
for qualified theft, suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom of
the law. Whether or not the legislature was correct in imposing on violators of PD 705 a
penalty equal to that imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question beyond the
power of the Court to resolve. It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of the Court is
to apply the law regardless of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh - dura lex sed
lex.
Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the “Revised Guidelines in the
Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit,” provides:
SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products covered by
these regulations which are transported without the prescribed documents shall be
considered illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation in favor of the government and
shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter.
(b) No, The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the
mere act of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as
an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.
DENR V. MAYOR YAP
G.R. No. 167707. October 8, 2008 in consolidation with G.R. No. 173775

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist
zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation
No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The
OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG
maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public
Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,
declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and
disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay, and other landowners in Boracay

filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested
rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions.
SACAY V. SEC. OF DENR
G.R. No. 173775. October 08, 2008

FACTS: During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for
right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes. This was on May 22, 2006.

Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed
with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested
rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos
in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their
lots.

The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not
have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed
portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need
for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied
lands in Boracay Island.

HELD: The SC ruled against Yap et al. and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates
that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping

with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The records are
bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.

Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of
Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto
converted the island into private ownership. Private claimants’ continued possession
under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain
error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act
No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption
that the lands are alienable and disposable.

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands
under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) The classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.

Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been
in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply
for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to
decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of
title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.
VILLARIN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175289. August 31, 2011

FACTS: In a Criminal Complaint filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto Chief of the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada and three others namely,
Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo and
Cipriano Boyatac were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277. The respondents were guilty of gathering and possessing sixty-
three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total
volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at P108,
150.00, without any authority and supporting documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulation to the damage and prejudice of the government.

ISSUE: Whether mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under
forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable even criminal intent in violation
of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended.

HELD: Yes, as a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such,
criminal intent is not an essential element. There is no dispute that petitioners were in
constructive possession of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and
Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any
license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and considering that the
offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ contention that the possession of the illegally cut
timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore,
inconsequential.
REVALDO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170589. April 16, 2009

FACTS: Olympio Revaldo was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium
hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. Revaldo was found to be
in possession of 96.14 board ft. of the following species of flat lumber:
1. Six (6) pcs. 1x10x7 Molave;
2. One (1) pc. 2x6x6 Molave;
3. Two (2) pcs. 2x4x6 Molave;
4. Two (2) pcs. 1x10x6 Narra;
5. Two (2) pcs. 2x8x7 Bajong;
6. One (1) pc. 1x6x6 Bajong;
7. Four (4) pcs. 1x6x6 Magkalipay; and
8. Three (3) pcs. 1x6x5 Magkalipay;
With a total value of P1, 730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as
required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to
the damage and prejudice of the government.

Revaldo testified that he is a carpenter specializing in furniture making. He was in

his house working on an ordered divider for a customer in the morning of 18 June 1992
when policemen arrived and inspected his lumber. Petitioner admitted to the policemen
that he had no permit to possess the lumber because those were only given to him by his
uncle Felixberto Bug-os his aunt Gliceria Bolo his mother-in-law Cecilia Tenio . The seven
pieces of "magkalipay" lumber were left over from a divider he made for his cousin Jose
Epiz. He explained further that the lumber was intended for the repair of his dilapidated
house.

ISSUE: Is warrantless search and seizure valid in seizing forest products cut, gathered or
taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 of the Forestry Code?

HELD: Yes, the Police Officers had the authority to arrest even without a warrant.
Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. - A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest
even without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any
of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest
products cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.

Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when
the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the
possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have
any legal documents therefore and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair
of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is
the law.

The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not have the required permit to
possess the forest products cut is sanctioned by Section 68 of the Forestry Code which
provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. –
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case
of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting,
gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall,
in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as
the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of the
Forestry Code, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under existing forest laws and regulations.

As the Court held in People v. Que, in the first offense, one can raise as a defense the
legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing timber or other forest
products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source
is immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere possession
of timber or other forest products without the proper documentation as malum prohibitum.

The Court Affirmed the appealed Decision convicting Revaldo for violation of
section 68 of the Forestry code.
 COMPILATION OF CASES
IN NATURAL RESOURCES
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Submitted to: Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada

Submitted by: Joy Claire B. Mangagom
2D