CALUB V.

CA
G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000

FACTS: On January 18,1992 the Forest Protection and Law

Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles
loaded with illegally sourced lumber wherein Constancio Abuganda and
Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to present proper
documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized and
impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. Petitioner, Felipe Calub,
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed a
criminal complaint against Abuganda, for violation of Section 68 of PD
705 as amended by Executive Order 277, (Revised Forestry Code).

On January 31,1992 the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken

by Gabun and Abuganda from the custody of DENR,thus they filed a
criminal complaint of grave coercion but it was dismissed by the public
prosecutor.
On February 11,1992 one of the two vehicles was again
apprehended by the Philippine Army for illegally transporting forest
products.

Lower court ruled in favor of accused, and even granted recovery

of possession to them via replevin.

Upon petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals denied said

petition, stating that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to
the authority granted by Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O.
No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis.
According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department
Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the
confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the
conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is
subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added
the appellate court.

The DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one

such regulation, the appellate court said. Additionally, respondent CA
noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure outlined in
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable
to submit a report of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their
findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners’
failure to comply with the procedure laid down by DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the
admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been
issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin
suit. Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the
appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia
legis.

ISSUE: Are the said motor vehicles are in custodial legis pursuant to
Section 68 of PD 705?
HELD: Yes. Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being
transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or
right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved
vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the
Revised Forestry Code. Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe
the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of
1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of
the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the
vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and
Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded
vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the
motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time,
the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR
Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because
private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of
replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their
apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be
absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said
seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Hence, since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code
and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject
vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to
an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
LALICAN V. VERGARA
G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997

FACTS: On or about February 9,1991 the petitioners were

apprehended on the Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan Puerto Princesa
for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known as The Forestry Reform
Code of the Philippines. There were 1, 800 board feet of lumber loaded
in two (2) passenger jeeps in different sizes and dimension that were
confiscated. On August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
Petioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information filed
against them contenting that, Section 68 of PD 705 does not include
lumber because the wording of the law categorically specify timber to be
collected as to constitute the violation on the said law. He further
contends that, the law is vague because it does specify the authority or
legal documents required by existing forest law and regulation.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it
is not the courts to determine the wisdom of the law or to set the policy
as rest by the legislature. He further asserts that the word timber
should include lumber which is a product or derivative of a timber. The
position of the prosecution could result to the circumvention of the law,
for one could stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a lumber.
On September 24, 1991, the lower court construed the interpretation of
the law against the State thus the motion was granted.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the order
underscoring the fact that the accused presented Private Land Timber
Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that
while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product
actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the
product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement.
Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then
the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber
sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for
transportation from one point to another. The motion was approved
thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber
in order to constitute an offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines).
HELD: The Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The
primary reason why the law was enacted is to secure and maximize the
use of the natural resources; the non inclusion of lumber on the law
may give rise for the circumvention of law. Section 68 of the said law
punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations. Be that as it may, the legislative intent to
include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the
expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order
No. 277. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in
Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so
construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor
so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its
terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the
law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to
encompass lumbers which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence,
to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology.
PALLADA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000
FACTS: Sometime in the latter part of 1992, DENR received a reports
that illegally cut lumber were delivered in the warehouse of Valencia
Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia Bukidnon. DENR officers in
collaboration of PNP raided the company’s warehouse and found a large
stockpile of lumber in varying sizes cut by a chainsaw. As proof that the
company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two
receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon,
dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give
credit to the receipt considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit
to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber
were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed
sawmill operator.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together
with Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko,
as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias
Valdehueza, were charged with violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended. During the trial, the accused presented documents that
the lumber are legally obtained. This may include the certificate of
origin. However, the court found out that Pallada was guilty of the
violation of PD 705 and the rest of the accused were acquitted due to
insufficiency of evidence. The case was appealed to the CA and rendered
a decision affirming the decision of the lower court, thus this case was
elevated.

ISSUE: Whether separate certificates of origin is used for lumber and

timber.

HELD: Yes, there should be a separate Certificate of origin. The trial

court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber
Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company
should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. For indeed, as BFD
Circular No. 10-83 states in pertinent parts:
In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability
and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in
documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber
Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted
as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers . . . .
5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of
Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as
proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to
confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD
implementing guidelines.
The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they
are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial
court in giving no credence to the same. The presence of such glaring
irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly
executed by the DENR officials concerned.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DATOR
G.R. No. 136142. October 24, 2000
FACTS: Pastor Telen and his co accused Alfonso Dator and Benito
Genol were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code. The accused while transporting pieces of lumber bound to Maasin
Souther Leyte, were apprehended by the police officer and seized pieces
of lumber. As a result SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt covering the
fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1)
unit of Isuzu cargo truck. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the
cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property
Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred
custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. The
accused Telan alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track
of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte
which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay
Abgao of the same municipality. He further contends that he secured
verbal permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of the DENR.
The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation
of PD 705 sentencing the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, which is two (2) degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum,
the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs.
Thus, this case was elevated to the court.

ISSUE: Whether the penalty imposed to Telen, the accused, is correct

in violation of PD 705.

HELD: No, In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of
assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO
officials as soft, and therefore not premium quality lumber. It may be
noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere
janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for
commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It
does not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an
accused in any other pending criminal case involving violation of any of
the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended).
In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest
of justice, the basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant
should be the minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the
Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods for simple theft.

Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of

Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft
under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said
decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by
two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed on the
appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC. V. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO
G.R. No. 161798. October 20, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates

a multi-billion peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig
City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and
Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the
exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000
hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),

through its officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997,
February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 designating the petitioner as
DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and
conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the
CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) containing "Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of
Verification of Private Tree Plantation." The MOA provided, among
others, that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates
of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the
DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant
to these Memoranda, petitioner’s security personnel were deputized as
DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and
conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the forest
products removed and possessed by the offenders.

In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda,

petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel, had on numerous
occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation area.
These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept in
PICOP’s impounding area.

A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for
preliminary mandatory Injunction. They further asked for the
declaration of the memoranda null and void and sought to restrain the
DENR and those who are participants from enforcing the said
memoranda. The RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw
and abrogate the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated
February 16, 2001 and to refrain and desist from implementation.
Petitioner was also ordered to release the confiscated falcata logs and
vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of
the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative
and criminal proceedings were ongoing.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized
confiscated products by the virtue of MOA regarding the Procedural
Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation.

HELD: Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated

forest products and conveyances. Petitioner’s compound was used only
as a depository for the confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of the
Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the confiscated forest
products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted
that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be
determined in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the
Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. Hence,
petitioner’s interest in the confiscated forest products was merely
contingent and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that
private respondents’ intrusion was in violation of petitioner’s PTLA No.
47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave petitioner the
exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, and recognized
petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the concession
area. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting
proprietary interest pursuant to these license agreements.

It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the

confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting
proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which
need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the
trial court. Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of
the apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated
a depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such
depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and
conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or
criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. V. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT
AND REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990
FACTS: On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license
agreement with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an
exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited
species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of
54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of
Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.
However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a
memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya
and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of
petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to
presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.
Subsequently, petitioner’s timber license agreement was
cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand
Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in
support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that
it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of
its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter.
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly
covered by petitioner’s TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set
to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged
by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or
license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or
cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner

sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and
another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the
Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of
its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983
during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356
which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation
without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take
possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's
request was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating,
among others, its request that the timber license agreement issued to
private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however
denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of
the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the President,
acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the
Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification
of the Bureau orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the
granting of TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in
1983 and 1984, respectively.

HELD: No. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari
within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to
the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the
failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of
declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of
a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon
the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did
these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. In the
case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the
assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner,
throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the
opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally
operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and
inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of
certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a
more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in
favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of
cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so
where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company
are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public
policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide
latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural
resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of
utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause.
VIRGILIO BON V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged
for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended together with Rosalio
Bon. The said petitioner conspired and mutually heled one another in
cutting, gathering and manufacturing into lumber 4 narra trees, 1
cuyao-yao tree and 1 amugis tree with an approximate volume of 4,135
bd. Ft. Without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita
Mendoza and without having first obtained necessary permits.
Teresita Mendoza owns a parcel of agricultural land in sorsogon
and was administered by Virgilio Bon.She received an information that
the trees located in the said agricultural land were being cut, sawed and
stolen by her administrator and/or worker. She then sent her brother
Manuel Dangalan, to investigate. Manuel sought the assistance of
Brngy. Captian Labayane. During investigation they found 6 stump of
trees. Virgilio admitted that he ordered the said cutting of the trees into
lumber. The CA sustained the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan. Both
testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting of
trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza’s land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty as charged in violation

of Section 68 of PD 705?

HELD: We affirm the lower courts’ assessment of the credibility of the

prosecution witnesses.

Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended provides:

“SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the
case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
“The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.”
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1)
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and
(b) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal
documents.
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus
necessary for the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting,
gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind
of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court
may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Conviction may be based
on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is
necessary that the following elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, Virgilio, being the tenant in in actual
possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big trees and had a
better chance to cut and saw the lumber. Moreover, he admitted that he
orders the cutting of the said trees in the presence of witnesses and was
corroborated by Narvaez, who saw the lumber.
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged
cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was
proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary
evidence: photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of an
officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, and
the CENRO’s computation of the value of the timber generated from the
felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial evidence,
indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty
as charged.
CHU V. TAMIN
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003

FACTS: Complainant alleged that on 9 September 1999, Community

Environment and Natural Resources Officer Michael F. dela Cruz
(“CENRO dela Cruz”) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Region IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent
judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that complainant was in possession of
“forest products of dubious origin” in violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705 [1] (“PD 705”), as amended. On the same
day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 364 ordering the
seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber from complainant’s
fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. On the strength of
the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement agents,
seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove
specie) with an estimated value of P183,790.

Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that
respondent judge issued, under questionable procedure, search
warrants against him for violation of PD 705. Complainant recalled
that on 10 November 1998, respondent judge issued four search
warrants against him (Search Warrant Nos. 281 to 284), authorizing
the seizure from his compound of pagatpat lumber worth more than
P1.5 million. Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants
did not also contain any transcript of the required examination of
witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four warrants.
Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground that he
had in fact conducted such examination but the record of the
“deposition” was “misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence.”

In response to the directive of the Office of the Court

Administrator (“OCA”) of this Court to comment on the complaint,
respondent judge, in his Second Indorsement (“Indorsement”) dated 16
December 1999, denied complainant’s allegations. In his explanation,
dated 11 July 2001, respondent judge reiterated the claim he made in
his Indorsement of 16 December 1999 that he examined a certain
Reynaldo Cuaresma before issuing Search Warrant No. 364. He
explained that the records of the case contained a copy of the transcript
of the examination. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first
time, that the legal researcher in his office who prepared the duplicate
copy issued to complainant on 22 September 1999 failed, through “pure
inadvertence,” to recopy such transcript. Respondent judge attributed
such omission to the fact that at that time, the pages of the records
were not yet “physically paged.” He claimed that the pages were
numbered only upon preparation of the records for transmittal to
Branch 24 the following week. He further asserted that the copy of the
transcript in question was numbered page 5. Branch 24, however,
refused to accept the referral of the case. Thus, respondent judge
forwarded the records to the OCA with a request for their transmittal to
Branch 24. The OCA later returned the records to respondent judge as
their proper custodian.

ISSUE: Is the judge required to conduct searching questions and put it

in writing?

HELD: Yes. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable

searches and seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
which states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for whatever purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
OPOSA V. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993

FACTS: This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44

children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the
name of “their generation as well as those generations yet unborn.”
Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have
him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and
to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license
agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as
parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to
cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest
law of humankind-- the natural law—and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the
lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether children have the legal standing to file the case.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that
the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept
of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a healthy
environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment
for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal
standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the
law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the
police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.
PEOPLE V. CFI
G.R. No. L-46772. February 13, 1992
FACTS: The private respondents were charged with the crime of
qualified theft of logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines. The information provided that Godofredo
Arrozal and Luis Flores, together with 20 other John Does whose
identities are still unknown, the first-named accused being the
administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation, conspired and
entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in
the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente, and proceeded to
illegally cut, gather, and take, therefrom, without the consent of the
said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, 60
logs of different species.
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the
information on 2 grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form. Trial court thus dismissed the
information based on the respondent’s grounds.
ISSUE: Whether the information correctly and properly charged an
offense and whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes. The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1)
That the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other
forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut,
gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any
private individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing was without authority under a license agreement, lease,
license, or permit granted by the state. The failure of the information to
allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should
be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a
public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of
complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the
state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the
state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the
Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. Thus,
ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in
Section 60 of P.D. No. 705.
As to the second issue raised, the regular courts still has
jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD 705 covers 2 specific instances when a forest
officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines. The first authorizes a forest officer or
employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant, any
person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the
offenses described in the decree. The second covers a situation when an
offense described in the decree is not committed in the presence of the
forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention
by a report or a complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or
employee shall investigate the offender and file a complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation and file the necessary informations in court.
Unfortunately, the instant case do not fall under any of the situations
covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed
not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged
commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in
a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended
party to the fiscal. As such, the OSG was correct in insisting that P.D.
705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving
authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any
crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the
crime. In short, Sec. 80 does not grant exclusive authority to the forest
officers, but only special authority to reinforce the exercise of such by
those upon whom it is vested by general law.
PEOPLE V. QUE
G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996

FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilson Que appeals from his conviction for

violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, a member of
the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information
that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass
through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the
Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity
of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City and eventually saw the truck.
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Cacao, Wilson
Que, who was the owner of said truck, and an unnamed person. The
police then checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs,
but inserted therein where sewn lumber, as admitted by Que himself.
When required to show a permit, Que failed to do so and thus was
charged for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner violated Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O.

277 that amended Section 68, which penalizes the possession of timber
or other forest products without the proper legal documents, did not
indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession
legal, and considering that other laws and regulations did not exist at
the time of the enactment of said E.O.
HELD: Yes. Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest laws and
regulations” to refer to those laws and regulations which were already
in effect at the time of the enactment of E. O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory
construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should
be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of
possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative
Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Thus Que’s possession of
the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an
offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
Also, the court rejected Que’s argument that the law only
penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor
cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting
or removal of such forest products is legal. There are 2 distinct and
separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the
acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the
second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting,
gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not.
Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal
source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents as
malum prohibitum.
ROLDAN, JR. V. HON, MADRONA ET.AL.
G.R. NO. 152989. September 4, 2002
FACTS: On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land
Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and
poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the
various government agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued,
petitioner was allegedly informed by some employees from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he
could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was
still awaiting approval. Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the
cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway. He used the cut logs as
materials to build his chicken cages. About three weeks later,
representatives of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of
the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner’s place,
allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was
conducted there were 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board
feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of
P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether a person who cuts trees for his own use within his
property without the necessary permit from the DENR and without
transporting the same outside said property, be criminally charged for
violating PD 705.
(b) Whether the owner of a private property is administratively
liable under Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21
despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property
and used them for his own agricultural purposes.
HELD:
(a) Yes, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is
clear that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty
of qualified theft. As to the assertion that his penalty for cutting trees
in his own land should not be equated with that for qualified theft,
suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom of
the law. Whether or not the legislature was correct in imposing on
violators of PD 705 a penalty equal to that imposable on those guilty of
qualified theft is a question beyond the power of the Court to resolve. It
is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the
law regardless of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh - dura
lex sed lex.
 Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the “Revised
Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special
Private Land Timber Permit,” provides:
SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood
products covered by these regulations which are transported without
the prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore,
subject to confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed
in accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter.
(b) No, The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order
considers the mere act of transporting any wood product or timber
without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the
penalties provided for by law.
DENR V. MAYOR YAP
G.R. No. 167707. October 8, 2008 in consolidation with G.R. No. 173775

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc.

No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves
under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82
dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82

precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No.

1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-
claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for

declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on
PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to
judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and
Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-
claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised
Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.
The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court
affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought
reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial
court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection
purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other

landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.
They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested
rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the

two petitions.
SACAY V. SEC. OF DENR
G.R. No. 173775. October 08, 2008

FACTS: During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, PGMA issued

Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred
(400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and
trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes. This was on May 22, 2006.

Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners

in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that
the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions
of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions
of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.

The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The OSG argued that
Sacay et al do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the
island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section
3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the
island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated,
to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.

HELD: The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian
Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land
and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that
have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is

required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there
must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing
that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by
private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.

Also, private claimants also contend that their continued

possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Private claimants’ continued possession under Act
No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable.
It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial

confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do
they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to
prove the first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of
the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in
1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to
convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation
commenced on June 12, 1945.

Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in

Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They
have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a
vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation
No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private
claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor
do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases
based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law
and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a
judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay
even with their continued possession and considerable investment in
the island.
VILLARIN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175289. August 31, 2011

FACTS: In a Criminal Complaint filed before the Municipal Trial Court

in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto
(Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit
under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and
three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of
Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano
Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No.
705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The respondents were
guilty of gathering and possessing sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of
varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of
Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued
at P108,150.00, without any authority and supporting documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulation to the damage and
prejudice of the government.

ISSUE: Whether mere possession of timber without the legal

documents required under forest laws and regulations makes one
automatically liable even criminal intent in violation of Section 68,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended.

HELD: Yes, as a special law, the nature of the offense is malum

prohibitum and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of
the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and
Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and
storage without any license or permit issued by any competent
authority. Given these and considering that the offense is malum
prohibitum, petitioners’ contention that the possession of the illegally
cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is,
therefore, inconsequential.
REVALDO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170589. April 16, 2009

FACTS: Olympio Revaldo was charged with the offense of illegal

possession of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of
the Forestry Code, in an Information. Revaldo was found to be in
possession of 96.14 board ft. of the following species of flat lumber:
1. Six (6) pcs. 1x10x7 Molave;
2. One (1) pc. 2x6x6 Molave;
3. Two (2) pcs. 2x4x6 Molave;
4. Two (2) pcs. 1x10x6 Narra;
5. Two (2) pcs. 2x8x7 Bajong;
6. One (1) pc. 1x6x6 Bajong;
7. Four (4) pcs. 1x6x6 Magkalipay; and
8. Three (3) pcs. 1x6x5 Magkalipay;
with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal
document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from
proper government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

Revaldo testified that he is a carpenter specializing in furniture

making. He was in his house working on an ordered divider for a
customer in the morning of 18 June 1992 when policemen arrived and
inspected his lumber. Petitioner admitted to the policemen that he had
no permit to possess the lumber because those were only given to him
by his uncle Felixberto Bug-os (Bug-os), his aunt Gliceria Bolo (Bolo),
his mother-in-law Cecilia Tenio (Tenio). The seven pieces of
"magkalipay" lumber were left over from a divider he made for his
cousin Jose Epiz. He explained further that the lumber were intended
for the repair of his dilapidated house.

ISSUE: Is warrantless search and seizure valid in seizing forest

products cut, gathered or taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 of
the Forestry Code?

HELD: Yes, the Police Officers had the authority to arrest even without
a warrant. Sec. 80. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Actions. - A forest
officer or employee of the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in
his presence any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also
seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut,
gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the
offense. x x x
 Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary
documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court,
petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the
confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal
documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for
the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed
lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law.

The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not have the
required permit to possess the forest products cut is sanctioned by
Section 68 of the Forestry Code which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. – Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the
case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the

government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.

There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under

Section 68 of the Forestry Code, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.

As the Court held in People v. Que, in the first offense, one can
raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is
immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of
the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not
the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because the
Forestry Code is a special law which considers mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper documentation as
malum prohibitum.

The Court Affirmed the appealed Decision convicting Revaldo for

violation of section 68 of the Forestry code.