The Director of Forestry vs. Villareal GR No. L-32266 February 27, 1989 Cruz, J.

Facts: The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed the application for
registration of a parcel land classified as mangrove swamps in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz with an area
of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps, to the applicant Ruperto Villareal. He alleged that he and his
predecessors-in-interests had been in possession of the said parcel of land for more than forty years (40). Both
parties agreed in one point that the disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent argued that
mangrove swamp are agricultural land but the petitioner contended that it is a forestall land therefore not
disposable.The Court of the First Instance of Capiz however grants the application of the respondent. The
decision of the lower court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the Director of Forestry elevated
the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not, mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.
Held: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Furthermore, the legislative definition
embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines hence they are not alienable. The evidence
presented by the respondent in its claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of the land,
he only presented tax declaration. Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the
application for registration of title by the respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.

FACTS:
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. RupertoVillareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than
forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry
then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation.
Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.

ISSUE:
What is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are
commonly known? Part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution
or are they considered public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under private ownership.

RULING:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public
forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of
1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or
unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial
intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. As such,
they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership
until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application
for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED.

[G.R. No. 135527. October 19, 2000]

Spouses GEMINIANO and AMPARO DE OCAMPO and Spouses PEDRO and CRISANTA
SANTOS, petitioners, vs. FEDERICO ARLOS, MARY ARLOS, TEOFILO OJERIO and BELLA
OJERIO, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as such, occupation thereof
in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. A suit
for the reversion of such property to the State may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
The Facts

The undisputed facts are quoted by the CA from the RTC judgment, as follows:[5]

On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration, wherein
they seek judicial confirmation of their titles [to] three parcels of land, namely: (1) a parcel of land
covered by SGS 4140 [PLAN] with an area of 226,105 square meters; (2) a parcel of land identified as Lot
1, SGS 41241 [PLAN] with an area of 111,333 square meters; and (3) a parcel of land identified as Lot 2,
SGS 4141 [PLAN] with an area of 63,811 square meters, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and
having a total area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159 hectares.

Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo De Ocampo and spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos
opposed the application for registration, alleging that they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS
3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan, and their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the
government through sales patents.

The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that neither the applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application; and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron also
opposed the application for registration.

Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be exact, on 20 February 1981,
applicant Arlos and his spouse, Mary Alcantara Arlos, and applicant Ojerio and his spouse Bella V. Ojerio,
filed Civil Case No. 4739, seeking to cancel; (1) the free patent title of defendants-spouses Placido
Manalo and Rufina Enriquez, that is, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan, covering Lot, 1,
Plan F-(III-4) 508-D with an area of 155,772 square meters, and Lot 2, same plan, containing an area of
43,089 square meters, or a total area of 198,861 square meters or 19.8861 hectares; (2) the free patent
title of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT No. 297-Bataan, covering Lot, 1, F-
(III-4) 510-D with an area of 72,065 square meters or 7.2065 hectares; and (3) the sales patent title of
defendants-spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de Ocampo and defendants-spouses Pedro
Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan with an area of
225,011 square meters or 22.5011 hectares, and T-43298-Bataan with an area of 111,333 square meters
or 11.1333 hectares.

In the Order dated 31 July 1991 of the RTC, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Civil Case No. 4739 which was
then assigned to said Branch was ordered consolidated with the land registration cases assigned to
Branch 2.

Of relevance to this case on appeal is the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 26 April 1989 in G.R.
64753 involving Civil Case No. 3769 entitled Spouses de Ocampo et al. v. Manalo, et al. which annulled
the free patent titles of the spouses Manalo and declared as valid the sales patent title issued in favor of
the spouses De Ocampo and spouses Santos involving the same properties subject of this appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to comply with
the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual occupants and cultivators of
the land. It held that the testimonies of petitioners, which were incongruous with reality, bolstered the
finding that [they had] never occupied, cultivated or made improvements on the property. It explained:

On the basis of its own findings, the trial court, after evaluating the evidence presented, concluded that
[herein respondents] and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the subject lands in
1947 and continuously up to the present. In contrast, the checkered testimonies of [petitioners] reveal
that they have never been in possession of the lands. And because of the absence of the actual
occupancy on their part, the sales patents and titles issued in their favor are null and void citing therein
the ruling in Republic v. Mina (114 SCRA 946) that the alleged misrepresentation of the applicant that he
had been occupying and cultivating the land are sufficient grounds to nullify the patent and title under
Section 9 of the Public Land Laws.

On this particular note, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. x x x.[6]

Debunking petitioners reliance on Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[7] the CA ratiocinated as follows:

[Herein respondents] do not challenge the Decision of the High Court dated 26 April 1989 in GR No.
64753 which annulled the free patent titles of defendants-appellants Manalos and granted the issuance
of sales patent titles of [Petitioners] De Ocampos and Santoses.

What is being disputed is that the issuance of the sales patents of the subject property in favor of the
Santoses and the De Ocampos was allegedly tainted by fraud and misrepresentation on their part by
misrepresenting themselves to be actual occupants of the subject properties when in fact the subject
properties were being actually occupied by the [respondents] since 1947 way back when the land still
formed part of the military reservation and further on when it was declared to be public agricultural
land. x x x.[8]

Hence, this Petition.[9]

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:[10]

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in disregarding the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 64753 entitled, Placido Manalo, et al. vs. Spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo
de Ocampo, et al., wherein the validity and legality of petitioners TCT No. T-44205 and TCT No. T-43298
[pertaining to] the land in dispute were upheld.

II

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering the cancellation of petitioners
Sales Patent as well as TCT Nos. T-43298 and T-44205 considering that private respondents are not the
proper party to institute the action for annulment of petitioners titles [to] the lots.

III

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ruling that petitioners committed an act of
misrepresentation in their Application for Sales Patent.

IV

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents the amount of P50,000.00 representing attorneys fees.

In short, petitioners ask this Court to determine the propriety of (1) the registration of respondents title
under the Public Land Act and (2) the cancellation of petitioners Sales Patents and Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCTs).
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:Registration of Respondents Title

Respondents application for registration of title to the three parcels of land that were once part of the
public domain is governed by the Public Land Act,[11] the pertinent portion of which reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

xxxxxxxxx

Respondents claim that they purchased the subject lots in 1967 from Bernardo and
Arsenio Obdin,[12] who in turn had been in possession of the property since 1947. Hence, when the
former filed their application for registration in 1977, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been
occupying and cultivating, in the concept of owners, the said parcels of land for at least 30 years, as
required by the Public Land Act.

We are not convinced. First, a title may be judicially confirmed under Section 48 of the Public Land Act
only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain.[13] Unless such assets are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 1073[14] clarified
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by specifically declaring that the latter applied only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.[15]

In the present case, the disputed land which was formerly a part of a US military reservation that had
been turned over to the Philippine government in 1965, was declared disposable and alienable only in
1971. In Manalo v. IAC and de Ocampo,[16] a suit involving the same parcel of land and instituted by
herein petitioners against other claimants, the Court held:

As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned decision:

x x x. It is not correct to say that when the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, of which the land in
question forms part, was turned over to the Philippine government, the same automatically became a
disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over said reservation was transferred
to the Philippine government, but its nature as a military reservation remained unchanged. Said parcels
of land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19, 1971, per certification of the Bureau
of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map No 26-40). Its disposition only by sale was duly authorized
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274. If the land in question became immediately
disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine government in 1965, then why, it may be asked, was it
certified disposable only in 1971. This Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred to
continued to be a military reservation land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was
certified alienable in 1971. (Emphasis supplied.)

Second, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest could not have occupied the subject property
from 1947 until 1971 when the land was declared alienable and disposable, because it was a military
reservation at the time. Hence, it was not subject to occupation, entry or settlement. This is clear from
Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Act, which provide as follows:

SEC. 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the President may
designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in
accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the
public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic
power sites, irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public parks, public quarries,
public fishponds, working-men's village and other improvements for the public benefit.

SEC. 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-
alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again
declared under the provision of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, in Manalo, the Court debunked therein petitioners similar argument that they had been
occupying the property since 1944. It ruled in this wise:

The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in the case belong was
formerly a portion of the US Military Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which was turned over to the
Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals et
al., No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648). Under the situation, the Court seriously doubts whether
Placido Mapa and their predecessors-in-interest could have been in possession of the land since 1944 as
they claimed:

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30, 1976, 73
SCRA 146).

We reiterate that the land was declared alienable only in 1971; hence, respondents have not satisfied
the thirty-year requirement under the Public Land Act. Moreover, they could not have occupied the
property for thirty years, because it formed part of a military reservation. Clearly then, their application
for the registration of their titles was erroneously granted by the appellate and the trial courts.
Second Issue: Cancellation of Petitioners Titles

Petitioners claim that their titles can no longer be challenged, because it is a rule that the Torrens Title
issued on the basis of a free patent becomes indefeasible as one which was judicially secured upon
registration upon expiration of one year from date of issuance of patent.[17]

Petitioners further contend that the action for the cancellation of their Sales Patents and TCTs should
have been initiated by the solicitor general, not by herein respondents, pursuant to Section 101 of the
Public Land Act, which we quote:

SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts,
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

Respondents argue, however, that the present proceedings are not for reversion, but for
reconveyance. Hence, they have the personality to file the present suit.

We are not persuaded by respondents argument. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in
this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons
name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about.[18]

Reconveyance, however, is not available to respondents, because they have not shown a title better
than that of petitioners. As earlier shown, the former have not proven any title that may be judicially
confirmed.

Moreover, respondents invocation of Heirs of Nagano v. CA[19] must be rejected. In that case, the Court
noted that the allegations in the Complaint, which were deemed admitted for the purpose of resolving
the Motion to Dismiss, were an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of
the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section 48
(b) of CA No. 141 x x x. Hence, the Court ruled that respondents, not the OSG, were the proper parties to
file the suit.

In the present case, we reiterate that respondents failed to show entitlement to the land. They have not
established that they are the rightful owners of the property; or at least, that they, not petitioners, have
a better right thereto.

Respondents vigorously contend that the Sales Patents were fraudulently obtained by petitioners, who
have allegedly failed to prove the requisite actual occupation of the land in question. The former cite
several portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, showing that the latter have not actually
occupied or cultivated the property.

The Court, however, finds that a ruling on the veracity of these factual averments would be improper in
this Decision. If petitioners Sales Patents and TCTs were in fact fraudulently obtained, the suit to recover
the disputed property should be filed by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General. Since
petitioners titles originated from a grant by the government, their cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.[20] At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that respondents have no
personality to recover the property, because they have not shown that they are the rightful owners
thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Court are REVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for a possible review, in its
sound discretion, of the issuance of the Sales Patents and Certificates of Titles in the name of herein
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628 APEX MINING CO., INC., vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.,(SEM)

et. al

G.R. No. 152619-20 BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE vs. southeast mindanao

gold mining corp.

 G.R. No. 152870-71 THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON. VICTOR

O. RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO MARCELO (Member) and DIRECTOR

HORACIO RAMOS (Member) vs. southeast mindanao gold mining corporation

FACTS:

A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held that the assignment of

Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit. It also

ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a

mining right be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it

was not renewed before or after its expiration. It likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent

any question against its validity. In view of this, and

considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the “Mining Act of 1995,”

mining operations in mineral re

servations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of

ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said

proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive

Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to

private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and

provided that these private entities are qualified. Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the

Assailed Decision, praying that the

Court elucidate on the Decision’s pronouncement that “mining operations, are

now, therefore within the

full control of the State through the executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the

Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit. Balite echoes the

same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in the disputed area to
the exclusion of the private sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its

application for an exploration permit. CamiloBanad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and

prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them. In the Resolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the

instant cases.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to SEM was validly made

without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth in Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.

2. Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over the disputed area, which constitutes

a property right protected by the Constitution.

3. Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in this case is contrary to and

overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July 1991, 199 SCRA

278).

4. Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as mineral reservation outweighs

the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal

Gold Rush Area.

5. Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was belatedly raised.

HELD:
1. The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia. The

former was decided on facts and issues that were not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133,

the violation of the condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized and invalid

assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this assignment was effected without the approval of the

Secretary of DENR;

2. SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because it’s supposed right was extinguished by the

expiration of its exploration permit and by its violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133

by MMC to SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is a mere license

that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact, the same has been withdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No.

297, which places the disputed area under the full control of the State through the Executive Department;

3. The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463 applies to the assignment of EP

133 by MMC to SEM, since the exploration permit is an interest in a mining lease contract;

4. The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297 was raised belatedly, as SEM

questions the same for the first time in its Motion for Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be

entertained, the said proclamation is found to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing statutes;

5. The motion for reconsideration of CamiloBanad, et al. cannot be passed upon because they are not parties to

the instant casesii

6. The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to accept their applications for

exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is the Executive Department that has the prerogative to accept

such applications, if ever it decides to award the mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity;

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL v. JESSE CACHOPERO

 Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They had a
dispute over a piece of land which was a dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying to obtain
a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) alleging that he had been the owner of that land whereon he built a
house and other improvements. However, Celestial protests that she has preferential right
over the land because it is adjacent to and is the only outlet from her house. According to
the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute was a creek and is therefore outside the commerce
of man. The first MSA was denied by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) prompting
Cachopero to obtain another MSA which was granted by the DENR. Due to conflicting
interests of the parties, the land in dispute must be sold in a public auction.

Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the DENR with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachopero‘s petition for
certiorari as it is in the nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of the CA and
that the Cachopero has not exhausted all administrative remedies.

ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition

(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it is classified
as outside the commerce of man

HELD:

RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over original petitions
for certiorari, prohinition and mandamus.

Celestial has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e.
through a petition for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court) and a special civil action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).

Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to

issue the prerogative writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which
is a continuation of the original suit and not a commencement of a new action. In contrast,
to invoke a court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires the commencement
of a new and original action therefore, independent of the proceedings which gave rise to
the questioned decision or order. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the RTCs have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over original
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Section 21 of B.P. 129.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the instant case
falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies, which provides “that such is inapplicable if (1) it should appear that an
irreparable injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking
court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter as a
result of a patently illegal order or (2) where appeal would not prove to be speedy and
adequate remedy”.

This requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there

being instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted
to immediately, among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the
administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4)
when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small;
6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto
proceedings.

A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to

acquisitive prescription

As for Celestial‘s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of
the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of
her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she
purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art.
370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must
fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable
or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared
the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation
and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057 (January

17, 2005) Case Digest
Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands

Facts:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application
sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the land.

The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the government.

The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming,
wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father
to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.

Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.

Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration.

The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first
be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could
not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14
of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.

The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.

Issue:

Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject
land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership could even start.

Held:

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands
as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length
of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section 14(1) had been met by
Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land evidenced
by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the tax declarations
executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's bona fide claim of
ownership.

EIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC
of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified
that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the
fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed
to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23
February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of
Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon
as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the
Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership
of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail
themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that
is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the
public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
pr Land; alienable and disposable. While the subject lots were verified to be alienable or
disposable lands since March 15, 1982, there is no sufficient proof that open, continuous and
adverse possession over them by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest commenced on
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner’s applications cannot thus be granted.
While a property classified as alienable and disposable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of at least
30 years, public dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable but also with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use, public service or the
development of national wealth. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
While the subject lots were declared alienable or disposable on March 15, 1982, there is no
competent evidence that they are no longer intended for public use or for public service. The
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain does not change
its status as properties of the public dominion. Petitioner cannot thus acquire title to them by
prescription as yet. Joyce Y. Lim, represented by her attorney-in-fact Bernardo M. Nicolas/Joyce
Y. Lim, represented by her attorney-in-fact Bernardo M. Nicolas, G.R. No. 158630/G.R. No.
162047, September 4, 2009.
escription.
Land; alienable and disposable. While the subject lots were verified to be alienable or disposable lands
since March 15, 1982, there is no sufficient proof that open, continuous and adverse possession over
them by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner’s applications cannot thus be granted.dsa

While a property classified as alienable and disposable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of at least 30 years, public
dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable but also with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial
or no longer retained for public use, public service or the development of national wealth. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.

While the subject lots were declared alienable or disposable on March 15, 1982, there is no competent
evidence that they are no longer intended for public use or for public service. The classification of the
lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain does not change its status as properties of
the public dominion. Petitioner cannot thus acquire title to them by prescription as yet. Joyce Y. Lim,
represented by her attorney-in-fact Bernardo M. Nicolas/Joyce Y. Lim, represented by her attorney-in-
fact Bernardo M. Nicolas, G.R. No. 158630/G.R. No. 162047, September 4, 2009.

Land; registration. The Property Registration Decree involves original registration through ordinary
registration proceedings. Under Section 14 (1) of said law, the requisites for the filing of an application
for registration of title are: that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Joyce Y. Lim, represented by her attorney-in-
fact Bernardo M. Nicolas/Joyce Y. Lim, represented by her attorney-in-fact Bernardo M. Nicolas,G.R. No.
158630/G.R. No. 162047, September 4, 2009.