MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in
,et al. GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700 March 8,2016
FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections,
Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9,
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24,
2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in
Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore
Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his
father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually
demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US
to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good
to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she
had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She
registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of
the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy
the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she
cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she
was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be
proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling
and held a vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for
Presidency.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a
natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement.
HELD: YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino
Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only
natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as
being shown in her physical features which are typical of
1
Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that
residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99%
chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said
probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under
Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural
born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935
Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either
to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the
natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being
found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year
residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS
MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled
with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to
US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe
presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and
intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship
under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was
granted by the SC.
MAQUILING VS. COMELEC
FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he
lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July
2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May
2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner,
attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as "USA-American."
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was
2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, 40 he was not
candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. qualified to run for a local elective position.

COMELEC FIRST DIVISION: In the matter of the issue of In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen
citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen. Therefore petition April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport
for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of after renouncing his American citizenship.
candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel
This Court has previously ruled that: Qualifications for public
C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
ANNULLED.
office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
COMELEC EN BANC: COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for challenged. x x x. The citizenship requirement for elective
Reconsideration, on the following premises: First: By public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just
renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation
never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, opens the citizenship issue to attack.
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First
Citizen again.
Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation.
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to
ARNADO VS. COMELEC
run for public office.
FACTS: Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who
HELD: We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of
lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen
using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
of the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
preparation for his plans to run for public office in the
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
No. 92255 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even
by using his US passport.
date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado
foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position. On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however,
citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take
filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC
the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of
citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry
foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the
to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid
other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Affidavit of Renunciation.
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010
candidate for public office. elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest
number of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
proclaimed the winning candidate.
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
2

On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a
Resolution holding that Arnado's continued use of his US
passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office
for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The
Comelec First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation
and held that the rule on succession should be followed.
Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan
Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened
in the case. He argued that the Comelec First Division erred in
applying the rule on succession.
On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a
Resolution reversing the ruling of the Comelec First Division. It
held that Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to
revert his status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En
Banc found merit in Arnado's explanation that he continued to
use his US passport because he did not yet know that he had
been issued a Philippine passport at the time of the relevant
foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after
receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his
subsequent trips.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner Arnado is qualified to run
Held: No. The Petition is devoid of merit. COMELEC’s decision is
affirmed.
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person
with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any
elective local position. The phrase "dual citizenship" in said
Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance.''
RA 9225 allowed natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to
enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in
the Philippines provided that they:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws; and,
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
In this case, Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite
because, as held inMaquiling v. Commission on Elections, his
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit.
3
Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012
for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to
comply with said second requirement. The Comelec also noted
that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013,
affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same
would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.
It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification
to run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a
candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En
Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of
discretion had it departed therefrom.
The use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or
recantation of the oath of renunciation. Arnado's use of his US
passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting
in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the
2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC
for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his
qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and
applicable to this case.
CABALLERO VS. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan
Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.4 were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan,
Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Private respondent filed a Petition5 to deny due course
to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy
alleging that the latter made a false representation when
he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian
citizen and a nonresident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner,
through counsel, manifested that he was not properly
served with a copy of the petition and the petition was
served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy
of the petition during the conference. Petitioner did not
file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting
private respondent's substantial allegations in his
petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on
October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul
General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary
Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with
Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225.6 He claimed that he did not
lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite
becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan
temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his
family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his
vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally
in Canada.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution finding that petitioner made a material
misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a
resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one
year prior to the election.
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the
election returns showed that petitioner won over private
respondent.8 Private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-
parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.9 On May 14, 2013,
petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes. On May
16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
the COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution
issued by the COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC. On
May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul
Proclamation.10 On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc
issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ABANDONED HIS
PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN SEVERAL
FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS
PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN
CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP,
TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON
13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
ON RESIDENCY.
HELD: We are not persuaded. RA No. 9225, which is known as
the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire
4
or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the
law.21 The law does not provide for residency requirement for
the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor
does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino.22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence.23 This is only logical and consistent with the general
intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-
born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the
Philippines becomes material.
Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who
retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, provides, among others, for the
qualifications of an elective local official. Section 39 thereof
states: SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able
to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the
candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to
be elected at least one year immediately preceding the
election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of
petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately
preceeding the day of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but
rather to "domicile" or legal residence,25 that is, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi)."26 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person
at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of
new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised
in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later
worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla
v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country
may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian
citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of
choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during
his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as
waiver of such abandonment.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain
his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that
after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012,
he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile
of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as
such.
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents. [G.R. No. 123755.
June 28, 1996]
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995,
petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with
the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not
yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate
of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the
petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained
unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections
held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc
5
affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of
the election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued
showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the
position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for
his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to
the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane
directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee
as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of
Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for
his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at
2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen
of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D.
725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such,
when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x
x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x
x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor— not Lee — should
occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee,
"not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and
that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".
Issues: 1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for
lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to
run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon –
NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election,
valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? -NO!
Held:
1.) It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No.
87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R.
No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992
elections. That he was disqualified for such elections
is final and can no longer be changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire,
or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res
judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as
the occasion demands."
2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We
uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact
remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign
will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second placer, just
that, a second placer."
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have
seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he
obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections,
he—not Lee —should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's
proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.
==================================================
========
CONCLUSION OF THE COURT
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local
Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at
the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
the term of office to which he has been elected. We further
hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
6
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue
thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and
effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative
nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his
political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as
his unique situation of having been forced to give up his
citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a
regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive
effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U.
S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital
requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term
of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed
instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as
a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of
said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship
requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification
to run for and hold public office. And once again, we
emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the
Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide
petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably
construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest
effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt,
political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the
popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have
held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (citations omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible
protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular
will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance
of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for
it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be
filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect
and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find

fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant
retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him
still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the
time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it
could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that
he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his
consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from
running for any elective local position." But the real essence
of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork
legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the
ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court
struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical
and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to
evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent
with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in
Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At
this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his
loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first
opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his
people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly
voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to
this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy
and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite
several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and
in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming
intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native
Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such
loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose
cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of
lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most
powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-
mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his
struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves
every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied
in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo
himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly
deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.