Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013.
July 10, 2003 b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit:
Suffrage, Overseas Absentee Voting
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking
a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189
(The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and
material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used
and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a
taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because
it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which
requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding an
election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs.
Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court
held that a green card holder immigrant to the United States
is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in
the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a
promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to
vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be
allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on
the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in
effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement
to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of
suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of
the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for
by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003],
valid & constitutional?
RULING: Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d)
circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law
prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate
expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee
voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen
of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the
country.
The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of
R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee;”
1
“only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee;”
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to
wit: “The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section
25, to wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission” of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional
commission, such as COMELEC.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the
provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.
PEOPLE VS. CORRAL
FACTS: Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the
general elections held on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was
convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring
under a legal disqualification. The judgment of conviction was
based on section 2642, in connection with section 432. of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Said Section 432 reads as follows:
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting: (a)
Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of
imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon.
(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken
by him to the United States.
(c) Insane of feeble-minded persons.
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next
proceeding section who, after failing to make sworn
statement to the satisfaction of the board of inspectors at any
of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they are
incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to permanent
physical disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as
incapacitated, irrespective of whether such incapacity be real
or feigned.
And section 2642 provides:
Whoever at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing judgment to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor,
that he is not entitled so to do, ... shall be punished by and had not been granted a plenary pardon.
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter
year and by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor
voted in 1928 his offense had already prescribed, and he
more than one thousand pesos, and in all cases by
could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general
deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from
election held on June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly
public office for a period of not more than four years.
without merit. The disqualification for crime imposed under
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is entitled to exercise his section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code having once
right to vote. attached on the appellant and not having been subsequently
removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered it
HELD: It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final
illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of
judgment of this court promulgated on March 3, 1910, 1 to
1934.
suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence
was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by
been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that counsel for the appellant that the disqualification imposed on
at the general elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in the latter must be considered as having been removed at the
election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of Davao, expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an
Province of Davao. erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualification. It
regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a
correct view is that it is imposed, "for protection and not for
function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right
punishment,. The withholding of a privilege and not the
but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by
denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation and long
the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to
established administrative practice are against such a view.
exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the
evolution of the representative system of government, the
exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion
of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas,
the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has
come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are
excluded from the franchise. Among the the generally
excluded classes are minors idiots, paupers, and convicts.

The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of

suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime, is
beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions
upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The
presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of
felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is
unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The
exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere
disqualification, imposed for protection and not for
punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial
of a personal right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.)

Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the
appellant was not entitled to vote on June 5 1934, because of
section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code which
disqualified from voting any person who, since the 13th day of
August, 1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to offer
not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. As
above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final