
Consultative Committee
delineates powers of federal
gov't, regions
In the Consultative Committee's draft federal constitution, there will be 18 regions to be led by a
regional governor elected by their regional legislative assembly
MANILA, Philippines – Days before submitting their draft constitution to President Rodrigo
Duterte, the Consultative Committee (Con-Com) finalized its proposed delineation of exclusive
powers of the federal government and the regions.
This distribution of powers is critical to the federal constitution as it shows clearly how powers
that used to be with the national government will now be the sole purview of the 18 proposed
federated regions.
The exclusive powers for the federal government and regional governments are listed below,
based on a presentation made by Con-Com spokesman Ding Generoso on Monday, July 2.
Exclusive powers of regional governments:
 Socioeconomic development planning
 Creation of sources of revenue
 Financial administration and management
 Tourism, investment, and trade
development
 Infrastructure, public utilities, and public
works
 Economic zones
 Land use and housing
 Justice system
 Local government units
 Business permits and licenses
 Municipal waters
 Indigenous peoples' rights and welfare
 Culture and language development
 Sports development
 Parks and recreation
Exclusive powers of federal government:
 Defense, security of land, sea, and air
territory

Foreign affairs
International trade

Customs and tariffs
 Citizenship, immigration, and
naturalization


National socioeconomic planning
Monetary policy and federal fiscal policy,
banks, currency
 Competition and competition regulation
bodies
 Inter-regional infrastructure and public
utilities, including telecommunications
and broadband networks
 Postal service
 Time regulation, standards of weights and
measures
 Promotion and protection of human rights
 Basic education
 Science and technology
 Regulation and licensing of professions
 Social security benefits
 Federal crimes and justice system
 Law and order
 Civil, family, property, and commercial
laws, except as may otherwise be
provided for in the Constitution
 Prosecution of graft and corruption cases
 Intellectual property
 Elections
Powers not listed above are considered "reserved" powers and will be given to the federal
government, said Generoso.
This proposed distribution of powers aims to give regional governments more control over their
economy and overall development, given the unique needs, resources, and culture of each
region.
"We want regions to look into their strengths and weaknesses, look at the resources they have
and plan their economic program," said Generoso.
18 regions
The Con-Com decided to retain, for the most part, today's regional configuration when it came
up with its number of proposed federated regions.
In total, there will be 18 federated regions to today's 17. The addition is the proposed
"Negrosanon federated region" composed of Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, and the
province of Siquijor. The Negros Island Region was dissolved by Duterte in August 2017, citing
lack of funds.
Of the 18, 16 are "symmetrical" regions, meaning they will all have the same types of powers
and structure.
But the Bangsamoro and Cordillera regions will be "asymmetrical" regions, or regions with more
powers and a different structure owing to their "ethnic or identity-based demands," said
Generoso.
He could not yet provide the list of federated regions.
The proposed federal system means that the national government will no longer directly
supervise all provinces, cities, and towns, as it does today.
Instead, the federal government will supervise the 18 regions, while the regional governments
will supervise the provinces and cities within their territory.
All regions will be led by a regional governor who will be elected from the regional legislative
assembly. This means the public will not directly elect their governor. They, however, will elect
their representative to the regional legislative assembly, the pool from which the governor will be
chosen.
The winning governor's running mate will automatically be the regional deputy governor. –
Rappler.com
PRRD’s federalism push in full-
swing in 2018
By Azer Parrocha December 26, 2018, 2:52 pm
MANILA -- As the first Philippines’ President from Mindanao, Rodrigo R. Duterte has made federalism
one of his major campaign promises during the 2016 elections. However, it was only in 2018 where
efforts to push for this new system of government went in full-swing.
On Jan. 23 this year, Duterte signed the appointment of members of the Consultative Committee
(ConCom) to review the 1987 Constitution with former Chief Justice Reynato Puno as chairman. Aside
from Puno, Justices, ex-legislators, lawyers, academics, among other experts comprise Duterte’s
ConCom.
This came after Duterte, on Dec. 7, 2016, signed Executive Order No. 10 creating the ConCom, which
was tasked to study, conduct consultations, and review provisions of the 1987 Constitution and draft a
proposed federal Constitution which is expected to distribute powers and resources among the
regions.
Duterte’s ConCom held its first session on Feb. 19 this year at the Philippine International Convention
Center (PICC) where Puno urged its members to ensure that the federal government will be
“possessed with the power to hold together the union in perpetuity and with the energy and the
endurance to convert to robust reality the dreams of our people, however long it takes.”
Four months after it convened, the 22-member ConCom approved unanimously, in an en banc session
on July 3 this year, the proposed federal charter which has 22 articles compared to the 1987
Constitution's 18 articles.
Among the ConCom’s federal charter’s provisions include a ban on political dynasties and political
turncoatism; a ban on monopolies and oligopolies that lessen competition; additional powers for the
Ombudsman and Commission on Audit among others; the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill
of Rights; and the establishment of a permanent and indissoluble nation.
Also, under the draft federal Constitution, there are 18 federated regions composed of 16 symmetrical
regions-- existing regions plus Negrosanon Federated Region and two asymmetrical regions --
Bangsamoro and Cordillera. Bangasamoro and Cordillera have different designs from other regions
because of their “identity-based demands.”
Puno said although there was no timeline for a plebiscite on the draft federal Constitution since it was
for Congress to decide, the best time to hold it would be in May 2019, noting that this would give more
people time to understand the proposed new Constitution.
Bayanihan Federalism
On July 9 this year, the ConCom turned over its draft “Bayanihan” (working together) federal
Constitution to the President in a ceremony held in Malacañang Palace. It also released the official
copy to the media and the public to allow them to freely “debate and deliberate” on every Article, every
Section, every sentence, and every word in the draft Constitution.
Hours after receiving the proposal, Duterte approved “in toto” (as a whole) the ConCom’s draft federal
Constitution and said he will endorse it to the Congress, except for the transitory provisions which he
wanted amended.
Earlier, Duterte said he was willing to lead the transition to federalism as long as it was within the end
of his term in 2022. However, he changed his mind and said he would rather “cut” his term as early as
2019 to be coterminous with the start of the transition period to erase suspicions about his desire to
stay in power beyond the end of his term in 2022. Duterte also said he wanted to “enable a younger
leader to take over.”
The ConCom initially wanted Duterte to lead the 10-member Transition Commission on Federalism
which will “formulate and adopt a transition plan for the orderly shift to the new system of government,
as provided for in the new Constitution.”
But the ConCom reviewed and revised the Transitory Provisions in accordance with the President’s
instructions. Eventually, ConCom's proposed federal charter barred Duterte from running for President
in the 2022 elections under the proposed federal Constitution.
After the ratification of the proposed federal Constitution, there must also be an election of a transition
President and Vice President in tandem as provided for in the same charter.
The ConCom presented its proposed federal charter to the House of Representatives and Senate on
July 11 and 17, respectively.
Also on July 17, the ConCom released its final and official draft of the proposed federal charter which
bars Duterte from running in the 2022 elections.
In his 3rd State of the Nation Address (SONA), Duterte thanked the ConCom for drafting a federal
constitution and submitting it to him last July 9, describing it as “a distinct honor and privilege.”
Duterte also reiterated that has no intention to stay beyond the end of his term in 2022 regardless of
what Constitution is in place.

Information drive and task force

On July 26, Malacañang said the government has around PHP90 million for its public information drive
to explain the benefits the country will get under the proposed federal system of government.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al.,
Of the amount, PHP50 million will come from the ConCom’s savings and additional PHP30 million will
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
also be set aside for the expert panel. DECISION
Meanwhile, PHP10 million will go to the Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO),
which will be tasked to produce information drive materials.

Prompted by his economic managers’ apprehensions on the proposed federal charter’s economic
aspects, Duterte also decided to allow the draft to be open for public feedback to help improve the
proposal.
Amid congressional deliberations on the country’s proposed PHP3.8 billion budget the federalism
information drive took what Communications Secretary Martin Andanar described as a “power nap.”
The Senate, in particular, insisted that it will not prioritize talks on Charter Change or federalism.
A Pulse Asia Survey conducted from Sept. 1 to 7, showed that only 3 percent of Filipinos wanted the
government to focus on federalism while more than half or 63 percent of Filipinos believed the
administration must first address inflation.
However, the federalism drive started to gain momentum after Duterte, under Memo Circular No. 52
signed by Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea by authority of the President on Oct. 31, created an
Inter-Agency Task Force on Federalism (IATF) to raise public awareness on the proposed new system
of government, amid survey results showing it is the least of Filipinos’ concerns.
Duterte’s IATF will take charge of “integrating, harmonizing, and coordinating ongoing efforts towards
federalism and constitutional reform.”
Among the inter-agency’s tasks are to develop strategies and implement such activities necessary and
proper to raise public awareness on federalism and constitutional reform and prepare an information
dissemination and public communication plan to ensure an effective, efficient, and uniform undertaking
of advocacy activities.
Interior Assistant Secretary Jonathan Malaya expressed confidence that awareness on federalism has
increased due to the holding of roadshows nationwide and the creation of the IATF.
He, however, acknowledged that even if more Filipinos became aware of federalism, there is no
guarantee that support will follow.
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act
that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA
No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections
and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM
regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections
of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

Earlier, Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo said there is still much time left for the Senate to II. THE ISSUES:
tackle charter change and federalism before the President steps down in 2022.
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
Panelo said the Palace is still confident that the Senate will support federalism after the proposed 2019
national budget is passed. (PNA) ARMM elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule

under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
 III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be
gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show
the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the 3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office
constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections,
should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the
interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2)
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when
those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in
the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend
their term through a holdover. xxx.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate
can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject
to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the
effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both
the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to
appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective
term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot
do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the
incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly,
then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an
act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way
it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,
we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply
where such contrary intent is evident.
 Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by
completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its
own, has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o
elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated
either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of
that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of
its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure
in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act
to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court
is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being
unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our
power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration
date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is
what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall
prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure –
RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as
the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant
to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on
clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution
requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and
representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment
of OICs constitutionally defective.
 After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were
to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character
of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM
officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No.
10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim
measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should
be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, GR No. 152774, 2004-
05-27
Facts:
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION." The program was established to
"facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of local government... units
(LGUs) in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the
National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government
Code."[1] The Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution Committee in
E.O. No. 48)... constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The
Local Government Code of 1991) has been tasked to formulate and issue the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective implementation.[2]
Further, to address the funding... shortfalls of functions and services devolved to
the LGUs and other funding requirements of the program, the "Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization Fund" was created.[3] For 1998, the DBM was
directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the
Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys
undertaken by the DILG.[4] The initial fund was to be sourced from the available
savings of the national government for CY 1998. [5] For 1999 and the
succeeding... years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program
was to be incorporated in the annual GAA.[6] The Oversight Committee has been
authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the
equitable allocation and distribution of... said fund to the LGUs.
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly
assailed are the Oversight Committee's Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-
005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029... and OCD-2002-001 issued
pursuant thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs
and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion
pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and
imposed conditions for the... release thereof, violate the Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the "just
share" of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286
of the Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin that the "just share" of the
LGUs shall be "automatically and... directly" released to them "without need of
further action" are, likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five- billion-
peso portion of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs
with the implementing rules and regulations, including the mechanisms and
guidelines prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that the LGUs'
share in the national taxes "shall be automatically released to them." The
petitioner maintains that the use of the word "shall" must be given a compulsory
meaning.
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the
Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the distribution and release
of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the
principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions
is the improper amendment to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of
1991 on the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs
Issues:
whether the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
(1) whether the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to file the present
suit; (2) whether the petition involves factual questions that... are properly
cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether the issue had been rendered
moot and academic.
Ruling:
The petitioner has locus standi... to maintain the present suit
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but... also
that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as
a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about
to be denied some right or... privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.
The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain
the present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to
protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.
The petition involves a significant... legal issue
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper
legal interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the
"transcendental importance" of the case, as it necessarily involves the application
of the constitutional principle on... local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The
nature of the present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court
of procedural rules in order to resolve the case forthwith.
The substantive issue needs to be resolved notwithstanding the supervening
events. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the
Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court
did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue
now before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
For the GAAs in the coming... years may contain provisos similar to those now
being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before
another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a categorical
ruling on the substantive issue now.
In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly... adopted as a policy that:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
President's power over the LGUs to one of general supervision.
Drilon v. Lim:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor... or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed... rules. He may
not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000... and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions violate the... constitutional precept on local autonomy
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the
LGUs shall have a "just share" in the national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be
determined by law; and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released to the
LGUs.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal
revenue.
As a rule, the term"SHALL" is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight
Committee's prior approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the LGSEF
allocated for various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999; P1.5 billion for
2000 and P2 billion for 2001), the
Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid down
guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs had to comply with before they could
avail of funds from this portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the
LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding... based on the criteria laid down
by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project proposals to the
DILG for appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the
DILG to be submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and
approval.
It was only upon approval thereof that the Oversight Committee would direct the
DBM to release the funds for the projects.
To the Court's mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of
the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or
"just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and
release to the vagaries of the... implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee
from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not... automatic, a
flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the "just share"
of the LGUs "shall be automatically released to them." The LGUs are, thus,
placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, et. al. vs. Judge Cader P. Indar, et. al.
December 21, 2009
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Digest by Clark Uytico
SUMMARY
This case stemmed from an election protest by incumbent Mayor Sampiano against his uncle Ogka.
Pending the resolution of the “double proclamation” election protest, COMELEC allowed Sampiano
to temporarily assume the duties of a Mayor “to prevent paralysis to the Public Service.” However,
Ogka wrote to PNB thru PNB’s chief legal counsel, Atty. Alvin C. Go, to suspend the release of the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. Atty. Go however
allowed the release of IRA. To prevent the release, Ogka filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibiton
and Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same day (October 11, 2004), Judge
issued ex parte a TRO which lasted for 11 days total. SC subjected the judge to disciplinary fine of
10,000 pesos for violating the Rules of Court. Ex-parte TROs can only last 72 hours, and a 20-day
TRO only after a summary hearing. The SC also stated that the automatic release of the IRA from the
national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release
thereof to particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining
to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a
preliminary injunction while such rights are still being determined.
FACTS
Administrative case against Judge Cader P. Indar of the RTC Branch 12 of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
by Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, charging him with
gross and wanton ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and serious acts
of impropriety.
Prior to that, Sampiano filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/TRO against his rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle Ogka, and
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur composed of Vadria Pungginagina
and Zenaida Mante. The Comelec issued an order allowing Sampiano to act, perform and discharge
the duties, functions and responsibilities as mayor "to prevent paralysis to public service" pending
determination and final resolution of the controversy involving the mayorship of the Municipality of
Balabagan.
Ogka however filed for an MR of the said COMELEC order and informed in writing PNB’s Chief Legal
Counsel, Atty. Alvin C. Go, not to release the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for Municipality of
Balabagan pending the resolution of double proclamation. Go however directed PNB to release the
IRA. Aggrieved, and to prevent the release, Ogka filed a Special Civil Action for Prohibiton and
Injunction with TRO and Preliminary Injunction. On the same day (October 11, 2004), Judge Indar
issued ex parte a TRO which lasted for 11 days total.
Sampiano’s arguments:
1. The October 11 order is in the nature of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. As such prior
notice and hearing are required. He added that a TRO has a limited life of 20 days while a writ of
preliminary injunction is effective only during the pendency of the case and only after posting the
required injunction bond. This is the ex-parte issuance of the October 11, 2004 order freezing the
IRA of the Municipality of Balabagan "unless ordered otherwise by the Court."
2. Said Order was issued in violation of Section 286 of the Local Government Code (LGC), which
provides for the automatic release of the share of the local government unit from the national
government. This is so as not to deprive the officials and employees of the Municipality of Balabagan
from receiving their hard earned salaries, but the Judge did not heed the said request.
3. Judge has no jurisdiction as the same belongs to COMELEC.
Judge Indar’s arguments:
1. The October 11, 2004 order DID NOT FREEZE the IRA but merely HELD or DEFERRED its release
to any person. Since said proclamation was neither annulled nor invalidated by the COMELEC
pending resolution of the petitioner Ogka's Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned 3
orders. Since petitioner Ogka was left with no alternative to protect his interest in the IRA and to
prevent irreparable injury, he filed the instant petition with the prayer for the issuance of TRO and
preliminary injunction.
2. The provision on the automatic release of IRA is not a shield or immunity to the authority of the
courts to interfere, interrupt or suspend its release when there is a legal question presented before
it in order to determine the rights of the parties concerned.
3. His court assumed jurisdiction as it is a petition for prohibition and injunction and not an
enforcement of election laws. While he considered the said petition as an improper remedy, hence,
the court should not have taken cognizance of the case, he had nevertheless acted on it since the
petition prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, both an
auxiliary remedy which concerns the "enforcement of legal right or a matter that partakes of a
question of law" and not the enforcement of election laws.
ISSUE
1. WON RTC has jurisdiction
2. WON the October 11 order freezing the release of the IRA is valid.
3. WON the said order partakes of a TRO.
4. WON the Order contravenes the automatic release of funds to LGUs
HELD
1. YES. RTC has jurisdtion.
2. YES. But Judge violated the Rules when the TRO extended to 11 days, when only a 72-hour TRO is
allowed ex-parte.
3. YES. It is obviously one of the prayers prayed for which is subsequently granted by the judge.
4. NO. This automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury does not prevent the proper
court from deferring or suspending the release.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the penalty of a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby
imposed on respondent Judge for the above-mentioned violation of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO
1. The petition prayed, among others, that Go should cease and desist from ordering PNB-Marawi
through its branch manager to release the IRA for the month of October 2004 and the succeeding
months to Sampiano and Macabato or their agents. The issue here involves the determination of
whether Ogka is entitled to the issuance of a TRO or an injunction and not the application or
enforcement of election law. Undeniably, RTC has jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129.
2. Judge issued the October 11, 2004 Order on the very same day it was filed, and without any
hearing and prior notice to herein complainants. Respondent was allowed by the Rules to issue ex
parte a TRO of limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a hearing to determine the propriety of
extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent conducted the hearing of the petition on October 14, 2004 or on the third day of the
issuance of a TRO ex parte. The October 11, 2004 Order was lifted in an Order dated October 27,
2004 issued by the latter. Hence, the TRO issued ex parte was effective for 11 days from October 11,
2004 until October 22, 2004 in violation of the Rules. Only a TRO issued after a summary hearing
can last for a period of 20 days. It is worthy to note that the said October 11, 2004 Order was
subsequently lifted by the succeeding judge on the ground that the requisites for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction were not present.

3. A cursory reading of the said Order reveals that it was in effect a TRO or preliminary injunction
order. The Order directed PNB's Go and Disomangcop to hold or defer the release of the IRA to
Sampiano and Macabato while the petition is pending resolution of the trial court and unless
ordered otherwise by the court. This Order was merely consistent with the relief prayed for in
respondent's petition for prohibition and injunction.

4. The automatic release of the IRA under Section 286 is a mandate to the national government
through the Department of Budget and Management to effect automatic release of the said funds
from the treasury directly to the local government unit, free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by
the national government. However, this automatic release of the IRA from the national treasury
does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending the release thereof to particular
local officials when there is a legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the
parties to receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary injunction
while such rights are still being determined. This should be considered an exercise of judicial
functions and judicial prerogatives in the most cautious manner taking into account the factual and
serious circumstances obtaining between petitioner Ogka and his Uncle Mayor Sampiano whose
family were already at war with each other.