Flixborough Incident 08/30/2019

1974 FLIXBOROUGH, U.K., CYCLOHEXANE DISASTER

DATE 1-Jun-74

VESSEL 5 - 24 TONNE VERTICAL PRESSURE VESSEL REACTORS

FAILURE 20 INCH TEMPORARY CONNECTING PIPE FAILED

QUANTITY LOST 40 TONNES LOST

80 TONNES REMAINED IN VESSELS
120 TONNES TOTAL IN SYSTEM

FLOW DIRECTION UNKNOWN - INTO VERY CONGESTED AREA

FLOW MODE PROBABLE IMPINGEMENT - LOSS OF MOMENTUM
FLOW CONDITION 36% FLASHING FROM VESSEL AT 145°C AND 120 PSIG
NO LIQUID ENTRAINMENT ON FLASHING

OBSERVATIONS INITIAL CLOUD 120 METER DIAMETER, UNKNOWN HEIGHT

NO POOL FORMATION - NO RAINOUT
LOW WIND SPEED AT - 1 M/S & D STABILITY AS DEFAULTS

LOCATION RURAL AREA

NO NEARBY URBAN CENTER

CONSEQUENCES 28 KILLED
53 KNOWN WOUNDED REQUIRED MEDICAL TREATMENT
$425MM U.S. PROPERTY DAMAGE
1,800 HOUSES DAMAGED IN RURAL AREA

REASONS 20 INCH PIPE JACK-KNIFED AT PRESSURE SOMEWHAT ABOVE NORMAL

LARGE PIPE SPLIT ALLOWS CONTENTS TO FLASH TO ATMOSPHERE

LESSONS LEARNED MORE CONTROL REQUIRED OF CHEMICAL PLANTS

ALTHOUGH SITING WAS ADEQUATE, PLANT WAS TOO CONGESTED
POOR MORAL, ENG'G DEPT UNDER REORGANIZATION, OVERWORKED STAFF
AFTER WORKS ENG'R LEFT, ENGINEERING HAD NO QUALIFIED MECH ENGR
POOR LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF CONTROL ROOM
MINIMIZE HAZARDOUS INVENTORIES
MORE CONTROL OF CHANGES IN PLANT MODIFICATIONS
HAZARD REVIEW REQUIRED
ADHERE TO PRESSURE VESSEL REGULATIONS
USE STANDARD ENGINEERING PRACTICE ON PLANT MODIFICATIONS
BETTER INSTRUMENT CONTROL REQUIRED
REQUIRE EMERGENCY PLANNING

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:14

 Flixborough Incident 08/30/2019

SASTER

OVE NORMAL

VERWORKED STAFF
IFIED MECH ENGR

DIFICATIONS

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:14

Event Tree Outcomes 08/30/2019

Large LPG Immediate Wind To Delayed Congested Ignited Jet

Leakage Ignition Pop'd Area Ignition Area Points @ Tank
A B C D E F

Yes
0.1
Yes
0.9

0.9

No

Yes
0.1

Yes Yes
0.9 0.1

Yes 0.9
0.125
Large Leak No 0.9
1.00E-04
No
0.1

No
0.1
Yes
No 0.1

Yes
0.9 Yes
0.1

0.9
0.875
No 0.9
No
No
0.1

No

Event Large Leak Freq or Prob Source

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:14

Event Tree Outcomes 08/30/2019

A Large Leak Of Pressurized Flammable 1.00E-04 Fault Tree Analysis

B Immediate Ignition at Tank 0.9 Expert Opinion
C Wind Blowing Toward Populated Area 0.125 Wind Rose data
D Delayed Ignition Near Populated Area 0.9 Expert Opinion
E Congested Area w Vertical Confinement 0.1 Historical Data
F Jet Flame Strikes Pressurized Vessel 0.1 Layout & Piping Geometry

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:15

 Event Tree Outcomes 08/30/2019

Frequency
Per Year

BLEVE 9.00E-06

Local Thermal
Hazard 8.1E-05

VCE 1.1E-07

Flash Fir
& BLEVE 1.0E-07

Flash Fire 9.1E-07

Safe Dispersal 1.3E-07

VCE 7.9E-07

Flash Fir
& BLEVE 7.1E-07

Flash Fire 6.4E-06

Safe Dispersal 8.8E-07

Total = 1.00E-04

Source

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:15

 Event Tree Outcomes 08/30/2019

lt Tree Analysis
ert Opinion
d Rose data
ert Opinion
orical Data
out & Piping Geometry

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:15

Vessel Hazards and Consequence Analyses 08/30/2019

Vessel = Flixborough Reactor

Case Rapid Depressurization In Vapor Phase - No Liquid Ent

Chemical Stored C6H12 Goto List_Of_Chemicals For Some Phys Pro

Vessel Volume, cf = 8,500 5 Reactors
Liquid Storage Volume, cf = 6,378 % Full = 75.04%
Vessel Surface Area 2325 sf 216.00
Vessel Shell Thickness = 1.0000 inches 63,584
Wt Of Vessel = 85,000 lbs 38,555.75
Vessel Design Pressure, psig = 100 PSV Fire Flow Pressure =
Vessel Failure Pressure, psig = 120 20" Line Rupture at Opg Press
Liquid Temp at Failure Pressure = 200 °F 93
Molecular Weight 84
Quantity Material = 122.47 Tons 111.10
Liquid Density = 38.40 lb/cf 615.11
Ambient Temperature, Ta = 70 °F 294.44
Atmospheric Pressure, = 14.7 psia 101,353
Relative Humidity = 83.60% 83.60%
Flow Temperature, T = 283 deg F 412.78
Atmospheric Boiling Pt., Tb = 177 deg F 353.89
Avg Liq Cp Between Amb & Stg Temp 0.52 BTU/lb/F 2.1771
Latent Heat at Atm Boiling Point = 153.1 BTU/lb 356.11
Lower Flammable Limit 0.012
Upper Flammable Limit 0.08
Heat Of Combustion = 18,700 BTU/lb 43.50
Mols O2/Mols HC On Combustion = 9 = (n+m/4) in CnHm Hydrocarbon, eg in C2
Mass of Liq Flashing to Atm., Eq 4 88,184 lbs 40.00
Flammable Conc'n, C1, at LEL 0.00186 lb/cf 0.02976
Flammable Conc'n, C2, at UEL 0.01239 lb/cf 0.19841
Sig m, std dev'n of conc'n by Eq 25 96.15 feet 29.31
Cloud Radius, R1, at LEL by Eq 26 188.05 feet 57.32
Mass of Vapor in Flam Cloud, Eq 27 62,271.22 lbs 28,246.04

Trapazoidal Rule to Solve Integral in Eq 27

Radius at R1 = b 57.32 m.
Radius at 0 = a 0
Divide (a to b) into n = parts 13 Integral
h = (b - a) / n = dr = 4.4 m. Eqn 27
xo 0.0 yo 0.00
x1 4.4 y1 19.22
x2 8.8 y2 74.32
x3 13.2 y3 158.02
x4 17.6 y4 259.52
x5 22.0 y5 366.24
x6 26.5 y6 465.65
x7 30.9 y7 547.08
x8 35.3 y8 602.99
x9 39.7 y9 629.59
x10 44.1 y10 626.88
x11 48.5 y11 598.07

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:15

Vessel Hazards and Consequence Analyses 08/30/2019

x12 52.9 y12 548.63

Cloud Radius, R1, x13 57.32 y13 485.20

A = h/2(yo+2y1+2y2+....+yn) = Cu. m., m3, in Hemisphe

kgm in flam=(2p)(C2)(m
Basis: V.J. Clancey, 2nd Int. Symp. on Loss Prevention and Safety, Presented In Lihou Course
Promotion in the Process Industries, Heidelberg, 1877, p-323. Dechema, Frankfurt 1978

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:15

 Vessel Hazards and Consequence Analyses 08/30/2019

30-Aug-19
Phase - No Liquid Entrainment 12:54 PM

micals For Some Phys Prop Data

240.70 cu. m
111.10 Tonnes
m2
US Gal

121 psig
827.4 kPa
°C

tonnes
kgm/cu. meter
deg K
N/sq m 101.35

deg K
deg K
kJ/kgmK
kJ/kgm

Mj/Kgm
m Hydrocarbon, eg in C2H4 =(2+4/4) = 3
tonnes 36.00%
kgm/cu. m.
kgm/cu. m.
meters
meters
kgms 25.42%

yo 0
2y1 38.44
2y2 148.64
2y3 316.04
2y4 519.05
2y5 732.47
2y6 931.29
2y7 1,094.16
2y8 1,205.97
2y9 1,259.17
2y10 1,253.75
2y11 1,196.13

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:15

 Vessel Hazards and Consequence Analyses 08/30/2019

2y12 1,097.25
y13 485.20
Total yo - y13 = 10,277.57
Cu. m., m3, in Hemisphere = 22,657.40
kgm in flam=(2p)(C2)(m3.)= 28,246.04

R.A. Hawrelak 12:54:15

 10.00

Clanc
Guga
Flix P
Edge
P
S
O

i 1.00
n

p
s
i
g

0.10
100 1,000

Distance From Vessel, Feet

 Clancey
Gugan
Flix Pts.
Edge Of Cloud

10,000

t
 Fig 2.33: Serious Injury/Fatality Levels For Thermal Radiation (Mudan, 1984), CPQRA, p-161

100.0

T 10.0
i
m
e

S
e 1.0
c

0.1
1 10 100 1000

Incident Thermal Flux, kW/sq m

(Mudan, 1984), CPQRA, p-161

Near 100% Fatal

Mean 50% Fatal
2nd Deg Burns
1st Deg Burns
Pain Threshold
Mudan LC50 Pt.
Single Pt. Case
Eisenberg LC50

1000
Industrial Risk Insurers Damage Tables For VCEs 08/30/2019

Basis: Know Your Insurer's Expectations, Fire Protection Design, Hydrocarbons Processing, August 1977,
p-103, by Robert W. Nelson. Updated from Lihou's Table 4 - 8 Sep 96

Overpressure, psig
Equipment 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10 12 14 16 18 20 22

Control Rm, Stl Rf a c d n

Control Rm, Conc Rf a e p d n o

Cooling Tower b f o

Tank: API Cone Roof d k u

Instrument Cubicle a l,m t

Furnace Heater g i t

Reactor: Chemical a i p t

Filter h f v t

Regenerator j i,p t

Tank: Float'g Roof k u d

Reactor: Cracking j i t

Pipe Line Supports p s,o

Utilities: Gas Meter q

Utilities: Elec Transf h l t

Electric Motor h l v

Blower q t

Fractionation Tower r t

Press Vessel: Horiz p,i t

Utilities: Gas Regul i m,q

Extraction Column i v t

Steam Turbine i m s v

Heat Exchanger i t

Tank Sphere j i t

Press Vessel: Vert i t

Pump i v
Source: Stephens, M.M., Minimizing Damage To Refineries
U.S. Dept. of the Interior
Office of Oil and Gas, Feb., 1970.

Code

a Windows and guages break. l Power lines are severed.

b Louvers fail at 0.3 to 0.5 psig. m Controls are damaged.
c Switch gear is damaged from roof collapse. n Block wall fails
d Roof collapses o Frame collapses.
e Instruments are damaged p Frame deforms.
f Inner parts are damaged q Case is damaged.
g Brick Cracks r Frame cracks.
h Debris - Missle damage occurs. s Piping breaks.
i Unit moves and pipe breaks. t Unit overturns or is destroyed.
j Bracking fails u Unit uplifts (90% filled).
k Unit uplifts - (50% filled). v Unit moves on foundation.

R.A. Hawrelak PERCS Inc. 519-542-8280