Republic of the Philippines In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate
eath of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-
VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and
EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, MARIA VDA. DE
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARIO
MARTILLANO respondents.
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20 October
1989,1 reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial
Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 entitled Maria vda. de
Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses Ricardo M.
Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola,2 and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have been
preponderantly established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more
or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under
the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921
without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo
Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the
subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It
appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael
Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter
secured tax declarations for their respective shares.
whole property — OCT No. 255 — was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law
of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this
fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square
meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the
vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of
sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took
possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As reconstituted,
the new title is OCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended
for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and
heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein). Private respondent
Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the
children of Gavino Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, several
transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of the respective
adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-
A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10
January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and
Recovery of Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondent
Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was
ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his
possession.3
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to the
aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael
Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case
No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession
or, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein that after
"having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-14),
they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic) defendants
to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but
defendants refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;"
the last of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that they have
been deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoyment of the property since
September 1969 — which coincides with the date of the order in Civil Case No. 1267.4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert that
they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the
issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that
they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the land taxes thereon; and
that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches.5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional defendants the
spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and
Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testified that they mortgaged the subject land to
the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their failure to redeem the mortgage the same was
foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the questioned land
was redeemed by the original defendants' son in the person of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who
was knowledgeable/aware of the pendency of the above captioned case. The
corresponding redemption was effected through a deed of conveyance, . . . .6
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for indemnification for the
reasonable value of the property "in the event restitution of the property is no longer possible." 7
In its decision of 1 October 1986,8 the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject
property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment," and
accordingly decided thus:
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are hereby
ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the property in question which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are dismissed for
lack of proper substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that the heirs
of Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision
plan; (b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private respondents by
Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of the latter as indicated in the deed of sale
(Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of the former; and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants covered
the land in question — Lot No. 1-A-14 — and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
27257 was obtained by means of fraud, the claim of the defendants over the said property
is already barred. Action for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the discovery
thereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered the same in 1967 when
the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario Martillano was a party to that
partition. Let us grant further that the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257
to Rafael Reyes, Jr. created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants,
again, the claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer
(let us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to this case sometime in July, 1983, a
period of about sixteen (16) years had already elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is ten (10) years.
The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which it found to
have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time, the property was already
registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the
appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent Court of
Appeals formulated the issues before it as follows:
I
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the late Gavino
Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren after
discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that no actual partition was made in 1936
by the decedent's children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land sold by the
appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation.10
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible error when it
declared that the landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned only in 1967 by
the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedents'
(sic) children. The evidence on record bears out the existence of a subdivision plan (Exh.
6) which was not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In like manner, the lower
court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70
hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as evidenced by the said subdivision plan
(Exh. 6). With the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony
of appellants' witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under the law
is valid and binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his
properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done
orally, and the same would be valid if freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997,
March 1953). The reason for this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for
the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but rather a
confirmation by them of their ownership of the property. It must also be remembered that
when Gavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not yet covered
by a torrens title, as it was only in 1941 when said properties were brought into the
application of the torrens system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his
heirs have indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate
without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of land is
covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly
showed on its face that the 70 hectares of land belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was
subdivided and partitioned by his children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the said
property even without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case
of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein was described as
"na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone would confirm the contention of the
appellants that there was already an actual partition (at least an oral partition) of the
property of Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision Plan
(Exh. 6) is an (sic) evidence of such partition which appellees failed to controvert not to
mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the existence of said plan, in the
same manner that it concluded that the property was already surveyed and actually
subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).
From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no
moment considering that the property subject of the partition in the deed was already
partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots
supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were the same lots
inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers in 1936 while the land was not
yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land
inherited by him was two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14
described in the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same parcels of land
allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in representation of his father,
pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for which TCT No. 27257 was
issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it concluded that the
parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola
was not the same parcel of land under litigation. It must be pointed out that the identity of
the parcel of land which the appellees sought to recover from the appellants was never an
issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already conceded that the parcel
identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the same parcel of land identified as
Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this
admission, however, the lower court declared that "as described in the deed of sale (Exh.
5), the land's description does not tally with the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in
litigation." As correctly pointed out by the appellants however, the discrepancy in the
description was due to the fact that the description of the land sold in the Deed of Sale
was expressed in layman's language whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT
No. 27257 was done in technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael Reyes, Sr.
sold the property in dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the
only evidence of title to the land then available in so far as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was
concerned was Tax Declaration No. 4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257
was issued only in 1967. Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was
described by the vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766.
However, the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was exactly
the same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936.
Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that "if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr.
was the one now in litigation, he could have easily indicated Lot No. 1-A-14" is bereft of
merit under the foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough, the appellees never
denied the identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower court. What they were
denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola
which does not hold true because of the document denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh.
5).11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone acting in
their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot identified as
Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
costs.12
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 1 March 1990,13 petitioners filed the instant petition on 6 April 1990 after having
obtained an extension of time within which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners allege
that said court has decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable
jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D") executed
by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the
property subject of the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes."
In support thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the lot described
in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that ownership was confirmed by this Court in
G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court;
(b) private respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of estate
which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said registration is the operative act
that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land and also constituted constructive
notice to the whole world. The court cannot disregard the binding effect thereof Finally, the
pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in
question "militates against the indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens
title,"14 and allows reconveyance which is not tenable since the action therefor had already
prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition. But even
before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a
so-called Supplemental Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review On certiorari15 wherein
they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent Court are contrary to those
of the trial court and appear to be contradicted by the evidence on record thus calling for the
review by this Court;16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its
findings are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents' attack on
petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even if it is allowed, the same had
already prescribed and is now barred.
It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment. 17 We required
petitioners to reply thereto, which they complied with on 8 August 1990. 18 A rejoinder was filed by
private respondents on 29 August 1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda which they complied with.
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December
1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811
entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses
Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the
partition thereof among his children in 1936, and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement in Article 1358
of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a
public instrument is only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between
the parties themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The subsequent
execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not alter the oral partition
as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes corresponded to that previously
assigned to her father. Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de
Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the latter lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to ownership and possession
thereof.
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite this
resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and filed three days
thereafter, allege:
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable Court is not
deliberate nor with malice aforethought. The reason is that to date, we have not yet
received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of Court To Refer Case To The
Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the resolution that
will be issued therein will not be applicable to the case before this Honorable Court's
Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case before the Third
Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale executed by
Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes case before this Second Division, there was no sale
that was executed by the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the following:
(a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein, represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales,
who are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution of 20 August 1990.19 b) This motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October 1990. 20 c)
On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of
Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc And/Or Motion For
Reconsideration21 wherein they specifically admit that said case and the instant petition have
"identity and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of
"graphically" illustrating where such similarities lie.22 d) This motion was denied in the resolution of
28 November 1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys for petitioners.23 e) Entry of
judgment had already been made therein and a copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per
Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office dated 20
December 1990.
What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whether or
not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the
trial court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable because the
legal and factual conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The
Court of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holding that:
(a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no written
evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey and subdivision of the property
and the adjudication of specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the land sold
by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for
and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-
27257 was obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an action for
reconveyance, which should have been brought within four (4) years from the discovery thereof in
1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private respondent Rosario Martillano,
wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in
1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to
be in writing to be valid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule
74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice
to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into
an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an
essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and
why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it
does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification
of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving
the inheritance.
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court
in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for
some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino
Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.26 The estate of
the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may
validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion
disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.
Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista,27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his
share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to
purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be
awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his
share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was
eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-
petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot No.
1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is not, on his observation that the description of
the former does not tally with that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A,
he should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the property had already been
partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition to the contrary findings and conclusion
of the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had
this property declared for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the basis for
the description of the property in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee
— herein private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola — immediately took possession of the property.
This is the very same property which is the subject matter of this case and which petitioners seek
to recover from the private respondents. The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership
and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They
therefore admit and concede that the property claimed by private respondent, which was acquired
by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not
place private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly
maintained by private respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased mother, Marta
Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband,
Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of
Gavino.1âwphi1Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael
Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The
latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The
issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is
concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement
does not create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case,28 it is but a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to
Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the
subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in
favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never
had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-
interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his
father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private
respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As
categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or
about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them,
that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet,
despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property,
it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for
recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14
March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden on private
respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the
issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The instant petition then is without merit.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION (a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla
shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of
Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he
dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
vs. Belleza dies.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
FIFTH
DECISION
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation
PURISIMA, J.:
to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated December 23, 1993, in
CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in SIXTH
Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza. I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I
have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer,
lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED
The antecedent facts are as follows:
(100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,
SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately
devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100)
4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my
provisions: heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to
sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my
"FIRST sister."4

I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City: and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.

(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,
against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject
Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in
that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters
Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to
the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
 2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100)
piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria
Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint
as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in
case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall
likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private
respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-
Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in
the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the
Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer,
accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of
the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-
heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the
obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be
delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose
Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar
Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner
will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in
cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon,
taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the
total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment,
payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on
or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on
or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on
or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on
or before December of crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a
partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and
disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff.
While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply
because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does
not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in
the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate
proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and
semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100
piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation
under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of
sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation
since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of
seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-
compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from
the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must
institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an
administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her
right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together
with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this
Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion
of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil,
and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the
purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with
Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised
which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882
does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere
simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the
testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the
substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near
descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and
therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed
as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals
deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of
Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a
legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the
Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of
law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow
or widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory
heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without
need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the
moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to
the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of
the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not
applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation
to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir
or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. 13 The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is
in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." 16 Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article
863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore,
void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. 17 In the case under scrutiny, the
near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the
provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the
testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears
that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or
his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything
he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot
take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most
analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation
upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. 19 On the
other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition.21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix
intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that
the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the
said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property
shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that
such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as
modal and not conditional.22
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only
a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the
right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of
the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. 23 Such construction
as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100)
piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease,
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the
event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall
seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the
said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the
testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only
on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in
case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the
said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation
petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement
between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the
petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person
disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in
which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which
would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of
certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and
which he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of
Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and
bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal
properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis
unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D.
Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes
que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las
donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma
siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en
prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se
expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno
su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario,
pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed
annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th
reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan
de institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de
mi esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o
legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that
proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she
submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit
"C", the probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the
project of partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof
the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue
also of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the
project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio
de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage,
and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being
settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as
the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the
widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said
plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the
late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in
the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8
of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if
the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the
widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras
viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead
of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not
give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their
possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the
estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause
6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis
unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D.
Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes
que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las
donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma
siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the
widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the
words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated
Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of
Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the construction
of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is,
if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of
his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain
words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the
testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso
y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry
during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can
be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context
clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was
drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
(675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon,
26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The
same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918;
30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo
voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente
albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no
ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues
no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los
interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918)
.
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve cases
where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already
shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow
should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the
testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return,
unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third
parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor
Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties
described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting
and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari — docketed as
G.R. L-21938 — against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts
of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter
as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively — praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19
April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court
dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order
of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying
petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the
settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling
all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent
Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings,
petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from
proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this
Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344,
supra, and failing to declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed
in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in
failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof
of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24,
1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 —
praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by
the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record
on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said
court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We
issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for
certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's
contention that the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the
matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344)
alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during
the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for
his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two
days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be
published in accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another,
the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an
opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy
whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt
thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate
proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special
Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will
of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said
intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest
to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent.
A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first
to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and
dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of
said order having been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on
questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of
December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963,
be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the
meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by this Court, the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente
Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R.
No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions
of law which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by
the petitioner is hereby disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus
mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396
pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition
and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by
said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the
Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite,
Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child.
Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced
the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan
Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone
farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National
Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the
last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. It
appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963
denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and
Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the
Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y
Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost
from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte
knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros
Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b)
whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original
exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or intestate. While their
jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular
Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which
he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first
instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that
of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in
provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts
of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city where the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the
Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same
decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that
stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final
account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have
filed the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court —
particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled to commence the corresponding
separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he
should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special
Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts
would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the
Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente
Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros
Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been
requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona,
filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a
copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte,
he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special
proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased
person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to
petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will
for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said
petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and,
in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches.
It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed
by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the
initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice
of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition
for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a
motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on
April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus
motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings
had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator
with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more
specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered
that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter
was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the
Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that
inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory
acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If
the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the
proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special
Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an
independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his
doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case
No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila
Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to
submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased
testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his
acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13
Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs.
Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot
and academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the
Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said
court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's
motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has
been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than
that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to
circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the
writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the
supplemental petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the
City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was
an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he
left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote
out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator)
signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the
document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his
name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names
on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other.
The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which
Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override
any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit
"A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from
that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified
to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself
and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in
1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and
the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering
correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the
testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit
"A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even
by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by
the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41
Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand
margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the
signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three
pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed
by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court
declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the
six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with
section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator
at the left margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of
Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil
Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the
appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight
of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time
of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the
petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in
support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the
wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees
is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest
then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re
Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling
factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry
out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death
of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent
statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force
at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the
testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the
statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By
parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the
legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and
declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no
subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not
validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate.
With costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna
Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares
of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court,
on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide
for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested
on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. states said national law should govern.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that — determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated. Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants.
So ordered.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of
Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE
DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that
has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following
antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The
latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977,
after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed
a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued
an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order.
In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the
motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring
Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the
last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring
the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as
the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose
respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on
intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government.1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she
took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each
other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period
granted.2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding
entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of
execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order.
Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to
surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late
Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for
cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the
motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and
executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of
execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character.
The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the
estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February
1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed
orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly
designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals
upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to
maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties.3 Private respondents
opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the
lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that
has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of
Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a
superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of
review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the
whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the
trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became
final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either
in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the
capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into
question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed.5 Such
final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due
execution.6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated,7 particularly on three aspects:
 n whether the will submitted is indeed, the
decedent's last will and testament;
n compliance with the prescribed formalities
for the execution of wills;
n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
n and the due execution of the last will and
testament.9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound
and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not
acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a
forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly
prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even
after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically
valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the
testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof
cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and
executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that
character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court
finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had
the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party
does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early
as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium — the very object of
which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and
to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not
concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she
precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of
January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those
who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same
constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings.
Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to
forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue
had already been resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is clear from the executory order
that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of
intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set
aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who
are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require
delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no project of partition has been
filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife
of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the
same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said
that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it
has no option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-
examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that
testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass
the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no
longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of
the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo praesumitur
donare. 21 No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to
pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy
apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to
determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the
laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid
but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by
the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his
late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final
and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the
testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with
respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be
properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that
of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was
not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.