G.R. No.
158995 ISSUES: WON the spouses Vallejeras cause of action is founded
September 26, 2006
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-
President and General Manager, vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City,
and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA
FACTS:
 Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino
Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned
by LG FOODS CORP and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer.
- Charles died as a result of the accident.
 Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was
filed against the driver MTCC entitled People of the Philippines v.
Vincent Norman Yeneza.
- Unfortunately, before the trial, the accused driver
committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and
remorse.
- MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the
criminal case.
 RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for
damages against the LG Foods Corp and President and GM as
employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees.
PETITIONER’S ANSWER:
 In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the petitioners as
defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old
son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees, including the
deceased driver.
 They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
LG FOODS ARGUMENT:
 Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the
LG Foods filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the
complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an
employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC, as
such there must first be a judgment of conviction against their
driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable.
 Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal
action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was
not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the
plaintiffs.
 They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a
reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the
criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby
deemed instituted with the criminal action. which was already
dismissed.
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for
pre-trial.
- MR having been denied by the same court in its subsequent
order the petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic complaint
for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
CA: denied the petition and upheld the trial court.
 Ruling that the complaint by the spouses does not purport to be
based on subsidiary liability since the basic elements of such
liability, such as conviction and insolvency of the accused
employee, were not even alleged in said complaint.
 It then said that the complaint purports to exact responsibility for
fault or negligence under Art. 2176 of CC, which is entirely
separate and distinct from civil liability arising from
negligence under the Art. 103 of RPC.
 Liability under Art. 2180 of CC is direct and immediate, and not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or showing of insolvency.
on Article 103 of the RPC as maintained by the petitioners, or derived
from Article 2180 of the Civil Code
RULING:
 The case is a negligence suit brought under Art. 2176 NCC to
recover damages primarily from LG Foods as
employers responsible for their negligent driver
pursuant to Art. 2180, CC.
 The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages
caused by his employees.
1) Nothing in the allegations in the complaint suggests that the LG
Foodsare being made to account for their subsidiary liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
- Plus, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for
the subsidiary liability of an employer under said provision.
2) While not explicitly stated that the suit was for damages based on
quasi-delict, it alleged gross fault and negligence on the part of the
driver and the failure of LG Foods, as employers, to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
- It was further alleged that LG Foods is civilly liable for
the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of their employees,
which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the
vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old
son
Actions; Damages;
 Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines
cause of action as the “act or omission by which a party violates
the right of another.”
 Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come
from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.
 Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e.,
1) civil liability ex delicto; and
2) independent civil liabilities, such as those
a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as
felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from
law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or
b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either
of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against
the offender.
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence;
Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-
delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil
Code.—
 If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may
hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee,
subject to the employer’s defense of exercise of the diligence of a
good father of the family.
 On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of
prior conviction of its employee.
 Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising
from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to
the provision of
3) Article 2177 and
4) of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human
Relation, and of Title 18 of this Book, regulating damages.
 Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the
plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility
of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-
delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his
cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint, and not with
the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s
cause of action or lack of it based on the defendant’s perception
 that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is
direct or immediate—it is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency
of such employee.—
 Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the
couple’s minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
petitioners’ driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly
liable for the negligence of their driver for failing “to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which
diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident.”
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on
Article 103 of RPC, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver
had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is
insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as
employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based
on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
 Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the
driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the
termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses'
recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct
and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with
Compulsory Counter-Claim, repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that "they
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their]
employees." The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed
the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action
as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
 All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought
under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily
from the petitioners as employers responsible for their
negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
- Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged
in any business or industry.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil
action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is
of no moment where the criminal case was dismissed without any
pronouncement having been made therein—in reality, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place.—
 Citing Maniago v. CA, petitioner would argue that Civil Case No.
99-10845 should have been dismissed for failure of the respondent
spouses to make a reservation to institute a separate civil action for
damages when the criminal case against the driver was filed. The
argument is specious.
 To start with, the petitioners’ reliance on Maniago is obviously
misplaced.
 There, the civil case was filed while the criminal case against the
employee was still pending.
5) Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was
prematurely terminated due to his death.
 Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent
spouses because no remedy can be obtained by them against the
petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against their
driver during the pendency thereof.
 And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a
condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for
the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Vicarious Liability; Negligence; When by
evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong’s employment were
proved, the presumption of negligence on respondents’ part attached,
as the registered owner of the van and as Bicomong’s employer.—In the
present case, it has been established that on the day of the collision —
or on February 25, 2003 — URC was the registered owner of the URC
van, although it appears that it was designated for use by NURC, as it
was officially assigned to the latter’s Logistics Manager, Florante Soro-
Soro (Soro-Soro); that Bicomong was the Operations Manager of NURC
and assigned to the First Cavite Industrial Estate; that there was no work
as the day was declared a national holiday; that Bicomong was on his
way home to his family in Quezon province; that the URC van was not
assigned to Bicomong as well, but solely for Soro-Soro’s official use; that
the company ser-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
126
126
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Greenstar Express, Inc. vs. Universal Robina Corporation
vice vehicle officially assigned to Bicomong was a Toyota Corolla, which
he left at the Cavite plant and instead, he used the URC van; and that
other than the Cavite plant, there is no other NURC plant in the provinces
of Quezon, Laguna or Bicol. Applying the above pronouncement in the
Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, 783 SCRA 368
(2016), it must be said that when by evidence the ownership of the van
and Bicomong’s employment were proved, the presumption of
negligence on respondents’ part attached, as the registered owner of the
van and as Bicomong’s employer. The burden of proof then shifted to
respondents to show that no liability under Article 2180 arose. This may
be done by proof of any of the following: 1. That they had no employment
relationship with Bicomong; or 2. That Bicomong acted outside the
scope of his assigned tasks; or 3. That they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bicomong.
Same; Same; Common Carriers; Diligence Required of Common
Carriers; When the van began to swerve toward his bus, he did not
reduce speed nor swerve his bus to avoid collision. Instead, he
maintained his current speed and course, and for this reason, the
inevitable took place. An experienced driver who is presented with the
same facts would have adopted an attitude consistent with a desire to
preserve life and property; for common carriers, the diligence demanded
is of the highest degree.—Despite having seen Bicomong drive the URC
van in a precarious manner while the same was still a good 250 meters
away from his bus, Sayson did not take the necessary precautions, as
by reducing speed and adopting a defensive stance to avert any
untoward incident that may occur from Bicomong’s manner of driving.
This is precisely his testimony during trial. When the van began to
swerve toward his bus, he did not reduce speed nor swerve his bus to
avoid collision. Instead, he maintained his current speed and course,
and for this reason, the inevitable took place. An experienced driver who
is presented with the same facts would have adopted an attitude
consistent with a desire to preserve life and property; for common
carriers, the diligence demanded is of the highest degree.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The collision was certainly foreseen and
avoidable but Sayson took no measures to avoid it.—Sayson took no
defensive maneuver whatsoever in spite of the fact that he saw
Bicomong drive his van in a precarious manner, as far as 250 meters
away — or at a point in time and space where Sayson had all the op-
127
VOL. 806, OCTOBER 17, 2016
127
Greenstar Express, Inc. vs. Universal Robina Corporation
portunity to prepare and avert a possible collision. The collision was
certainly foreseen and avoidable but Sayson took no measures to avoid
it. Rather than exhibit concern for the welfare of his passengers and the
driver of the oncoming vehicle, who might have fallen asleep or suddenly
fallen ill at the wheel, Sayson coldly and uncaringly stood his ground,
closed his eyes, and left everything to fate, without due regard for the
consequences. Such a suicidal mindset cannot be tolerated, for the
grave danger it poses to the public and passengers availing of
petitioners’ services. To add insult to injury, Sayson hastily fled the
scene of the collision instead of rendering assistance to the victims —
thus exhibiting a selfish, cold-blooded attitude and utter lack of concern
motivated by the self-centered desire to escape liability, inconvenience,
and possible detention by the authorities, rather than secure the well-
being of the victims of his own negligent act.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Words and
Phrases; The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising
therefrom.—The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising
therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence
of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Greenstar
Express, Inc. vs. Universal Robina Corporation, 806 SCRA 125, G.R.
No. 205090 October 17, 2016