Case Digests

Constitutional Law 1
Case Digests
Submitted by:
Al- Emir Yusoph J. Balt
Submitted to:
Atty. Gonzalo Malig-on, Jr.
1. Santiago vs. Guingona G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
Facts:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the
position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President.
Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of
the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan
comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.”
However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen
Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
Issues:
o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority
leader
o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure
Ruling:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a
total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes
of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,”
much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind
other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall
ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states
that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than
one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller
number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or
totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where
there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out
by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec
as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present
Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right
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to select the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is
that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing
who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.”
xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing
the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence
of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to
direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the
opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given
a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may
intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and
waiver by the body adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem.
And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this
prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the
Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp;
rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach
of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the
Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of
the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement Sec.10, paragraph 2, Article XII
of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS
and MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2)
when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for
his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of
“state action.” Without doubt, therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State, it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements
of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy
provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the
awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that if for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional
mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding
its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life
and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To
ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Facts:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong
Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in Section 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
Issues:
1. Whether Section 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming Section 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement Section 10, paragraph 2, Article
XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation,
over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
Ruling:
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, Section 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not
need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may
be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the
tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument
is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the
State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-
executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When
our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
3. Francisco et al. vs House Speaker et al. GR No. 160261 November 10, 2003
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred
to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
“sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The
following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.”
Issues:
i. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
ii. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
iii. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Rulings:
i. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
ii. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by
the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
iii. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
4. Infotech Foundation et al. vs COMELEC GR No. 159139 January 13, 2004
Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide
demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March
1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections.
It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I — Voter
Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III —
Electronic Transmission.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum
of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the
release of an additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation
of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to
Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to
glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the
noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been
discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.
Issue:
Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;
Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;
Whether the petitioner has standing; and
Whether the petition is premature.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec Resolution No.
6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and
void is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further
ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project.
Comelec awarded this billion-peso undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing
mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. It also accepted the proferred computer hardware and
software even if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to
safeguard the integrity of elections:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory eligibility requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the issuance by the BAC of
its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April 21, 2003 31
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were violations of the
mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec's own Request for Proposal on the
automated election system IHaECA
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the bidders to pass the
technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the automated counting
machines
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument, the Court deems it
sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that impinge on the issue of grave abuse of
discretion:
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder
B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the award, and their effect on the
present controversy
In view of the bidding process
Unfortunately, the Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or criteria
the condition, performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given
the passing mark.
The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM hardware
but also the development of three (3) types of software, which are intended for use in the following:
1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
3. Election Day Use."
In short, Comelec claims that it evaluated the bids and made the decision to award the Contract to the "winning"
bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs running a "base" software. That software was therefore
nothing but a sample or "demo" software, which would not be the actual one that would be used on election day.
What then was the point of conducting the bidding, when the software that was the subject of the Contract was
still to be created and could conceivably undergo innumerable changes before being considered as being in final
form?
In view of awarding of contract
The public bidding system designed by Comelec under its RFP (Request for Proposal for the Automation of the
2004 Election) mandated the use of a two-envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first envelope (Eligibility
Envelope) was meant to establish its eligibility to bid and its qualifications and capacity to perform the contract if
its bid was accepted, while the second envelope would be the Bid Envelope itself.
The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal documents such as articles of incorporation, business registrations,
licenses and permits, mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so forth; technical documents containing documentary
evidence to establish the track record of the bidder and its technical and production capabilities to perform the
contract; and financial documents, including audited financial statements for the last three years, to establish the
bidder's financial capacity.
However, there is no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of
agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported consortium.So, it necessarily follows
that, during the bidding process, Comelec had no basis at all for determining that the alleged consortium really
existed and was eligible and qualified; and that the arrangements among the members were satisfactory and
sufficient to ensure delivery on the Contract and to protect the government's interest.
In view of standing
On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens
— respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly,
Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on
the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of
the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further
argue that the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts;
therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of
public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."
In view of prematurity
The letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28 serves to eliminate the prematurity
issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the Contract. The letter was
signed by/for, inter alia, two of herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines,
represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance
with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely to the procedure
outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.
Paat v. Court of Appeals enumerates the instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may
be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."
5. Javellana vs Exec. Secretary G.R. No. 36142 March 31, 1973
Facts:
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No.
4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines.
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Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970,
pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10,
1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing
the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The
next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to
the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential
Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential
Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the
conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and
the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and
“there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no
freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents
thereof.”
On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.
1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20
was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further
notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972,
temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution.”
Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to
refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under
which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to
the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to
Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal
postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of
Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these
cases.
“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.   L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying
that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in
said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January
16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948
riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying:
“… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the
Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its
head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo
de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such
task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-
called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the
period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this
Supplemental Urgent Motion.”
On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-
35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the
motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned,
at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the
President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which
had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the
Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the
public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed
said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed
this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated.
Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru
his Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon
ground that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies;
without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people
of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence
null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and objective.
Issues:
Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.
Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
Rulings:
It is a justiciable and a non-political question.
To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution
has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of
ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force
at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935
Constitution) shall show.
The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.
The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings
held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed
in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no
means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of
the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with
the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the
Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by
the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when
necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point
is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and
without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No.
73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of
the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the
1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to
insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s
Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution
No majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have
already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by
the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution
under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American
decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that
such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining
what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with
the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the
point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”
The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with
Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not
constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This
is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the
people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their
compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have
admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said
Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions,
is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to
a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures
approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive
department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due
course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance
with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or
majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the
Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a
plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the
provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect.
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force
by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando
and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of
the Court, voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the
result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
6. Magallona vs Ermita 655 SCRA 476
Facts:
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the
law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law
decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular
arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to
the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage)
and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a
“regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Issue:
Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory.
The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine
territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of
sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA
9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was
440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone,
the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act
is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in
North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the
bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that.
However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent
passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised
in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not
diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they
generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago
(which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which
would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of
the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based
rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
7. Grace Poe vs COMELEC GR No. 221697, GR No. 221698-700 March 8, 2016
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968,
found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized
as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010,
before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirement. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others,
that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or
either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want
of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency.
Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding
on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election
contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President,
only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution
is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections.
Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of
the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as
a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos.
The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it
is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to
accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on
the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings
to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the
general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it
adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new
domicile.
Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application
under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay in the
country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is
without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with
her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines
over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations
in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and
residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide
upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by
law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false
representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.
Carpio Dissent (Highlights): “Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens”
Brion Dissent (Highlights): “COMELEC’s Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the Determination of a
Candidate’s Eligibility”
8. Tecson vs COMELEC GR No. 161434 March 3, 2004
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9
January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F.
Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January
2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed
his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include
GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction
to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office of the President of the Philippines.
Held:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of
birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four
modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus
soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become
the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some
of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time
of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record
in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during
the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.
9. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commission on Immigration 41 SCRA 29
Facts:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she
stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hong Kong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the
Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13
March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that
said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order
her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.
At the hearing, which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could
not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor,
with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a
result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau
Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Held:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of
the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it every time she has to
perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the
case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Every time the citizenship of
a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
10. Valles vs COMELEC 337 SCRA 543
Facts:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino
and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May
1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground
that she is an Australian.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
Held:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served
as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the
country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also
known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force
at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen
of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia
is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at
most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
11. Co vs HRET 199 SCRA 692
Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. Petitions are dismissed. The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in
the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which
he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived
the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life
and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the
Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and
that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization
was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the
local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila
in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment
opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a
natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be
aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that
date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier
laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children
born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father
had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require
him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since
1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who
had been a citizen since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the
oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his
death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask
the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest
12. Balgamelo Cabiling et al. vs Commissioner GR No. 183133
Facts:
The petitioners herein were born of a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother. They were all
raised, have resided and lived their whole lives in this country. During their age of minority, they secured from the
Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the age of
twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens,
petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
Issue:
Whether late registration of the acquired Filipino citizenship in the Civil Registry encumbers persons to become
naturalized citizens of the Philippines.
Held:
No. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the
registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. The SC ruled that under the
facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed
to complete the statutory requirements for such election.The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half
a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration
of the election of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
13. Republic vs Dela Rosa GR No. 104654 June 1994
Facts:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the
RTC Manila.
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of
the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks,
the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992, citing
his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved
to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to
R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify
the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.
Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office
and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
14. Frivaldo vs COMELEC 257 SCRA 731
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League
of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
Held:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications,
a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted
to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD
725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
15. Tabasa vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his father became a naturalized
citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested
and detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that
his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with the RA No. 8171, and that
because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the BID.
Issue:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and therefore, is not an
undocumented alien subject to deportation.
Held:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only person entitled to repatriation
under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-
born Filipino, including his minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied in his case because he
is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to children
who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.
16. Mercado vs Manzano 307 SCRA 630
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground
that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered
himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines.
Held:
The Court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative
of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that
he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
17. Jacot vs Dal and COMELEC GR No. 179848 November 27, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Jacot assails COMELEC Resolution affirming his disqualification from running for the position of Vice-
Mayor for failure to comply the citizenship requirement. Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
who became a naturalized U.S citizen. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under R.A No. 9225.
Six months after, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy. Respondent Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification
before the COMELEC against petitioner arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required
under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws. When the local and national elections were held, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for
the position of Vice Mayor. Thereafter, COMELEC finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has validly comply the citizenship requirement as required by law for persons seeking
public office.
Held:
No. R.A 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign
country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship. It specifically provides that public office in the Philippines should meet the Constitutional
requirements and existing laws. At the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Filipinos
reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 should not only take their oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to
run for elective posts in the Philippines. A candidate in Philippine elections must only have one citizenship, that is,
Philippine citizenship. This the petitioner fails to do.
A candidate who failed to comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and received the highest
number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, the citizenship
requirement. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be
strictly applied. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. The appeal was DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution was AFFIRMED and petitioner was
DISQUALIFIED.
18. AASJS Member Calilang vs Datumanong GR No. 160869 May 11, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanong from implementing R. A. 9225
entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent,
Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." which was signed
into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Petitioner argued that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as
it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states that “dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
Petitioner contends that RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 thereof, together,
allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-
born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign
citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to
regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The
OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former
Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant
taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical
affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.
Issues:
1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional
2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance
Held:
1. No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out
of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep.
Act No. 9225.
2. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were
not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would
set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the
judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
19. Co Kim Cham vs Tan Keh September 17 1945 75 Phil 113
Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the
time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during
the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect
of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling
law granting such authority.
Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto
government.
Issues:
Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations
and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments
and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.
Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts and
proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.
Discussions:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid.
The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be
considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444):
“The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one
of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution
or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated
and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the
world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . ..
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during
military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . .. He, nevertheless,
has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new
ones.”
General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but this
cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been
continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become re-established and conceived
of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle
of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said
courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As
Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal
of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . .. Such political
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon
removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre
and content.”
Rulings:
The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also
legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.
The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also
to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact
that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power
of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice
into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is
enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of
War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force
and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From
a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will
for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice
such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue
local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in
order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent
occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.
20. Lawyer’s League for Better Phils. vs Aquino GR No. 73748, 73972 May 22, 1986
Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of
power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made the
judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
Held:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding that petitioners did
not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government
but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the present government.
21. GP vs Monte de Piedad GR No. 9959 December 13, 1916
Facts:
A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000
were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00
was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the
Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent
bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.
On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit
against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or
their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent
in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the competence of
the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended
beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs.
Issues:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank for the
reimbursement of the money of the intended beneficiaries?
Discussions:
In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people
has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been
entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money
intended for the people.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in representation of
the legitimate claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all
charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other
person is entrusted with it.
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in
a royal person or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the
interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of
charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign
authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change
of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be
called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being
exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.
22. Soriano vs Laguardia GR No. 164785 April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,
made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-
complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and
within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s
utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee,
the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot
be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a
prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewer’s
rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast
media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content,
of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.
23. Tanada vs Angara GR No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to
nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the “Filipino
First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction
of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused
by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is an
assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that
would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO
Agreement.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements
and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by
petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and
12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power
by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court
in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled by
Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
“economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO itself has some built-in
advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in
the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions
are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence,
poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push
their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary
to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic
Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to
Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption
of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after deliberation and voting,
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the
land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
Held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As
explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from
a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown
by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with
due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its
signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of
what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of
President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was
concurring in.
24. The Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel GR No. 183591 October 14, 2008
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose
and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The
Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec.
7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including
public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding
itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
Held:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units
or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged
violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite
locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to
have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern
(Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 Art III) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise
of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order.
In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status
of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative”
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,
much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely
an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down
in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity
to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the
spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary
to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation
and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an
autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation
need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee
to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom
constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao
to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest
or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.
Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not
grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD
is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
Conclusion:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It
illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.
25. Peralta vs Director of Prison 75 Phil 285
Facts:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and
penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus
is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No.
7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.
Issue:
Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional.
Held:
Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a
governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the
courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which
convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
26. Laurel vs Misa 77 Phil 856
Facts:
The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving
the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was
suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since
his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
as defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that there was a change of
sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Issue:
Whether the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen to the government becomes suspended during enemy
occupation.
Held:
No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate
government.
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of a sovereignty with the control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights,
duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during military occupation.
DISSENTING OPINION:
During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were suspended. This is full
harmony with the generally accepted principles of the international law adopted by our Constitution [ Art. II, Sec.
3] as part of law of the nation.
The inhabitants of the occupied territory should necessarily be bound to the sole authority of the invading power
whose interest and requirements are naturally in conflict with those of displaced government, if it is legitimate for
the military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants such obedience as may be necessary for the
security of his forces, for the maintenance of the law and order, and for the proper administration of the country.
30. Republic of the Phils. vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
Facts:
A decision was rendered in favor P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation against the Republic. Where later, the respondent Judge Villasor, issued an order directing the sheriff
to execute the said decision. An alias writ of execution was issued. The sheriff served notices of garnishment with
severals banks, especially on the “monies due the AFP” in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount
mentioned in the said writ.
However, funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated for the payment of
pensions, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for the maintenance and operations of the AFP.
So, petitioner contends that the judge, acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of the Alias writ of execution, thus must be null and void.
Issue:
Whether the Alias Writ of Execution is null and void?
Ruling:
Yes. "The State may not be sued without its consent."
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental
postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.
"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."
Public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously
granted and the state liability adjudged.
In Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego, “"The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law."
In Director of Commerce and Industry vs Concepcion, “money in the hands of public officers, although it may be
due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment…One
reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature.”
“Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer
of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion
thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy
forbids it."
31. Wenceslao Vinzons Tan vs. The Director of Forestry G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983
Facts:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the US Government to the
Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL)
subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000
hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon) promulgated on
December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary
timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released
by the Director of Forestry.
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked.
On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tan’s OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to
Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources denied the motion.
Issues:
I. Whether or not petitioner’s timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)
Ruling:
Petitioner’s timber license was signed and released without authority and is therefore void ab initio. In the first
place, in the general memorandum dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public
forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the
petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. (The license was released to
the petitioner on January 6, 1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue license
was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release
the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date
of the release or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke
his timber license. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper
exercise of police power.
II
Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President has the
power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that
appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.
32. Republic vs Pablo Feliciano and IAC G.R. No. 70853 148 SCRA 424 March 12, 1987
Facts:
The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the Philippines to dismiss
the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent.
Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private
property of Feliciano and the rest of the property, Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial
court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of
ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of
presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was
submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to allow them to present their
evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion for execution with the Appellate Court
but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land. No.
Discussions:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has
consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in
strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to
be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the
legislative body.
Ruling:
No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the
Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land,
bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for
the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific
party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the
private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself
fails to allege the existence of such consent.
33. PNB vs Judge Pabalan G.R. No. L-33112 83 SCRA 595 June 15, 1978
Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon Judge
Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA).
Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint against Judge Pabalan for grave
abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and
therefore may not be garnished, attached or levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non-
suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued.
2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited with the petitioner
bank is valid.
Discussions:
The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In this case, Consent to be sued was given
impliedly when the State enters into a commercial contract. When the State enters into a contract, the State is
deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary
individual. Hence, Funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
Rulings:
1. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government
has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped
down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can
be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment. Funds of public
corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of execution be imposed
immediately.
34. Department of Agriculture vs NLRC G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993
Facts:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by
Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday
pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the
payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce
and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied
on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The
petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims,
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the
NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit
by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issues:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.
Discussions:
Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied. However, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on
Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the State’s immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation
expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the
Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money
claims against the Government must be strictly observed.
Rulings:
No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.”
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when
it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.
35.Dale Sanders, and A.S. Moreau, Jr. vs. Judge Veridiano G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent
residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in
the special services department of the NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of
the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time
status.
However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter
contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi
and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c)
"even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public
places where others not involved in the case could hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages
alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was
an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their
acts were official in nature.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
Ruling:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its
personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being
sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within
the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for
their acts.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal
capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate
him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his
authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the
person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such
award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government
as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle
of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a
contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate
from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
36. Mobil Philippines Inc. vs Customs Arrastre Service G.R. No. L-23139 18 SCRA 1120 December 17,
1966
Facts:
This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs
to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. The
shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then
handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee
three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered
case plus other damages.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants
cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau
of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such,
can be sued by private individuals.
Issues:
Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs can invoke state immunity.
Discussions:
The Bureau of Custom, is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a separate juridical personality of its
own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and
penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. As stated in the law,
agencies of the government is not suable if it is performing governmental functions and if it an unincorporated
government entity without a separate juridical personality.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of money and damages
involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, because it is a
necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. The Court ruled that the
fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in
its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there
is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Supreme Court
ruled that the plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under
the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the
Government may be filed.
37. National Airports Corp. vs Teodoro
G.R. No. L-5122 91 Phil 203 April 30, 1952
Facts:
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the provisions
of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take
its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.
Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for
landing and parking for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and
payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport.
The owner commenced an action in the court against the Philippine Airlines, Inc.
The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation,
which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third
party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of
the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers
of said airport and, further, that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands.”
The Solicitor General, after answering the third-party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation “has
lost its juridical personality,” and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and
not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued
Issues:
Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration should be regarded as engaged in private functions and
therefore subject to suit.
Discussions:
Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. The power to sue and be
sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf,
the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for
and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and
assumed all the liabilities of the latter. The rule is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernment
capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in
matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political
character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The Latter is true, although the state may own stock or property
of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through a corporation the state divests itself so far of
its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private
entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a
necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime
objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public. It is engaged in an enterprise
which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be
undertaken by private concerns.
In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple justice to the parties who dealt with the
National Airports Corporation on the faith of equality in the enforcement of their mutual commitments, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration may not, and should not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign
state.
38. PNB vs CIR and Manansala
G.R. No. L-32667 81 SCRA 214 January 31, 1978
Facts:
A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He was the
counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order
assailed is challenged on two grounds:
• That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of
execution was contrary to law and
• That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In thus denying the motion to quash,
petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines
amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is denied for the lack of merit. PNB
is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the ‘notice of Garnishment’ dated May 6, 1970.”
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of
discretion.
Discussions:
According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government Agencies:
“An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate judicial personality. If the agency
is incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.”
From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him: “It is, we think, a
sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as
concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it
associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted.
Rulings:
No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The premise that the funds could be
spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
was a government-owned entity It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment.
As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations”, a government owned and
controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It may sue
and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.
Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render
the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.
39. Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge Firme 195 SCRA 692
Facts:
A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due
to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a
complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint
against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the
defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality
and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Baniña.
Issues:
1. Are municipal corporations suable?
2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions?
Held:
1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject
to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions
and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting
such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized
by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river
to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck
was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any liability.
40. E. Merritt vs Government of the Philippines 34 Phil. 311
Facts:
Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General
Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act
2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages,
if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the
driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
Issues:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its
liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
Held:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and
which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a
special agent; thus the Government is not liable. (Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-
11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311)
NOTE:
■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)
■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by
its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of
its agents. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)
■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly
made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands)
41. USA vs Guinto 182 SCRA 644
Facts:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at
bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Among those who submitted their bids
were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made
a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and the
individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to
allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending
litigation.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that
the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability, but trial court denied the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the
performance of their official duties.
Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles of international
law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these
principles in its relations with other states.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and
divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Rulings:
The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial
enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their
facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the
grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.
Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States.
They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found
liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity of the record in
the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before
the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof
if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below
for further proceedings.
42. Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon GR No. 54705 June 26, 2003
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave
its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that
petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance
Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered
by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years.
When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he allegedly found
respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance
Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against
the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
Issues:
Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.
Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their
private capacities.
Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there
can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign
States, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in
parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A
contrary attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations”.
The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The increasing need of sovereign
States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental
functions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the
government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the commercial activities of a
state.)
Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The
mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of
whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute
that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private
entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was
entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to
have waived its immunity from suit.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity
from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except in the case of:
a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds
it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee
as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State
outside his official functions.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly
applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside
official functions, which is not the case herein.
43. USA vs Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the
invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it
to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an
acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by
William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that
the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance
was filed by him against the US.
Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke
state immunity.
Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its
consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states.
However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities
of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends
only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the
United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters
into business contracts.
44. Froilan vs Pan Oriental Shipping GR No. L-6060 September 30, 1950
Facts:
Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging
that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to
pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel
mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-payment
of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale
cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping
Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under
his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for
the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have
the rightful possession thereof. The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue
thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the
vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property,
Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of
P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession
thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to
intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon
may be foreclosed.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.
Discussions:
When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of the mantle of
sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to
judicial action and processes.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in
intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel.
The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The
state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level
of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and
other defenses he might have against the state.
45. Amigable vs Cuenca 43 SCRA 360
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title
(1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the
portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the
court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner
of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action
was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of
action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be
sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
Issue:
Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.
Held:
In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of
the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance
of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to
recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the
government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.
46. Basco vs PAGCOR GR No. 91649 May 14, 1991
Facts:
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by Presidential Decree 1067-
A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on
land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in
1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated through
PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized
by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate
all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR. They claim
that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection clause and b) it violates the local
autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other
vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila to waive its right to
impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts
PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.
Issues:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
Held:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not
clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse
racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 for
one, unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does
not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things
to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they
were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy
on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was
clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter
of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere
creatures of Congress” which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general
legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned
by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local governments.
47. Tolentino et al. vs COMELEC GR No. 148334 January 21, 2004
Facts:
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on
February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to
be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were
due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which
ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected
Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term
of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition,
praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005
without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election
as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates
of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section
73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA
6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the
senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate
elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica
sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any
restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned
Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim
that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the
issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Ratio:
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix
the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is
considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election
is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of
special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there
was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special
Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our
election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if
necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said
resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by
former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed
to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.”
Puno, dissent:
The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. In this case of first impression, however, the distance
between existing jurisprudence and the resolution of the issue presented to the Court cannot be negotiated through
a straight and direct line of reasoning. Rather, it is necessary to journey through a meandering path and unearth the
root principles of democracy, republicanism, elections, suffrage, and freedom of information and discourse in an
open society. As a first step in this indispensable journey, we should traverse the democratic and republican
landscape to appreciate the importance of informed judgment in elections.
To capture the spirit of People Power and to make it a principle upon which Philippine society may be founded, the
Constitutional Commission enunciated as a first principle in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies under
Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that the Philippines is not only a republican but also a democratic
state.
In a republic undergirded by a social contract, the threshold consent of equal people to form a government that will
rule them is renewed in every election where people exercise their fundamental right to vote to the end that their
chosen representatives will protect their natural rights to life, liberty and property. It is this sacred contract which
makes legitimate the governments exercise of its powers and the chosen representatives’ performance of their duties
and functions. The electoral exercise should be nothing less than a pure moment of informed judgment where the
electorate speaks its mind on the issues of the day and choose the men and women of the hour who are seeking their
mandate.
The importance of information and discourse cannot be overemphasized in a democratic and republican setting.
Our constitutional provisions and cases highlighting the people’s right to information and the duty of the State to
provide information unmistakably recognize the indispensable need of properly informing the citizenry so they can
genuinely participate in and contribute to a functioning democracy. As elections lie at the foundation of
representative democracy, there should be no quarrel over the proposition that electoral information should also be
disseminated to the electorate as a predicate to an informed judgment.
With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to the ponencias position for it leaves the purity of elections and the
ascertainment of the will of the electorate to chance, conjecture and speculation. Considering that elections lie at
the heart of the democratic process because it is through the act of voting that consent to government is secured, I
choose to take a position that would ensure, to the greatest extent possible, an electorate that is informed, a vote that
is not devalued by ignorance and an election where the consent of the governed is clear and unequivocal.
48. Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
Facts:
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during
the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of
accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
Issue:
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
Yes, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the
United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of
aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first
and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts
these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
184. Ople vs Torres G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
Facts:
Administrative Order (AO) No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996. The AO requires a computerized system
to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by establishing a decentralized Identification Reference
System among the key basic services and social security providers and a linkage among concerned agencies through
a common Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) using the
Biometrics Technology.
Blas F. Ople, a distinguished member of the Senate who is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising
the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308:
1)Is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate
2)Impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy
Respondents have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January
19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of
the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that
representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system. All
signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308.
Issue:
1. Whether or not A.O. no. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy
2. Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
3. Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise of the Executive power.
Held:
1. Yes, A.O. no. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy. The petition is granted and Administrative Order
No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void
for being unconstitutional.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a
"common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics
Technology" and "computer application designs." Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint
to identify an individual. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics
and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering
the banquet of options available to the implementers of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy
of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 also does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for
identification purposes. The indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store
and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness
of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
• The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. In the case at bar,
the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to
surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that
A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
2. Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. Ople’s concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress
is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of
executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
3. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
In holding the A.O. no. 308 as an invalid exercise of the Presidents Executive power, the Court provided the
following:
1. As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does indeed infringe upon the legislature’s exclusive function as it
laid down a system whereby compliance therewith is a condition to transact with the government.
2. A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the Constitutional right to Privacy as it allows the government to pool
various data regarding an individual without any clear concise direction as to the manner to keeping, safeguards
against improper use, and any definite answer as to what type of information may or may not be used.
• But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
3. A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any justifiable reason to allow the would be infringement. To streamline
government transactions and to remove red taping was not sufficiently shown to be valid reasons to counter act the
strict protection of the individual’s right to privacy.
49. Philip Morris Inc vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993
Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to seek the reversal and setting aside of the
following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon
magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ
of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from manufacturing and selling
“MARK” cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners’ respective symbols “MARK VII”,
‘MARK TEN”, and “MARK”, also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation.
All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction, They Invoked
provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property. As corporate nationals
of member-countries of the Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or
for unfair competition, without need of obtaining registration or a license to do business in the Philippines, and
without necessity of actually doing business in the Philippines.
Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement and damages against Fortune Tobacco before
the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) for manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the trademark “Mark” which
is identical and confusingly similar to Philip Morris trademarks. The said act was dismissed. Hence, this petition at
bar.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs’ right of property to such trademark or trade name.
Discussions:
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual
use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided
by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine
of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to
national legislative enactments
Ruling:
No. There is no proof that any of petitioner’s products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the
trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere in the
Philippines.
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-
requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.
50. Secretary of Justice vs Lantion
G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice
received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the
U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition
were attached along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then
requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to
assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time,
the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069
Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases
making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request,
as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez.
Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.
Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local
state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Ruling:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
51. Government of the USA vs Purganan
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest
of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez.
A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued
but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Ruling:
No. The court agrees with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision
on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws.
His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
52. Ichong vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled
“An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional
stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance,
Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing
its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
• It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law.
• The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
• The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which,
being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does
not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.”
53. Ramon Gonzales vs Rufino Hechanova
9 SCRA 230
Facts:
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National
Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino
Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters.
Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive
agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic
Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
Held:
Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former
may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power.
He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event
of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to
the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without
completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice
it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC
may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”.
In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
54. Tañada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of
the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They
argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and
to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they
contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino
First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
Issue:
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic
globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
Ruling:
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the President’s
ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization
and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence
in the WTO Agreement.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
that is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the
entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy
in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on
external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means
avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources
and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be
struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages
industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against
a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can
compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown
capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered
under a policy of laissez faire.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic
materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and
legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally
fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby
justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such
exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with
petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is
not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would
constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a
valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the
nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our
people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of
membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
55. Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 251 SCRA 569
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah’s
Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute
the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant issued
Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and
Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees,
and to deprive the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in daily flag
ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and choose
not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives,
still they opted to follow their conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor
of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in the school register
of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted to follow their belief which is
against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to their
letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and prohibition,
alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right
to free public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners prayed for the voiding
of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining
respondent from barring them from classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit
and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending the expulsion orders
issued by the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in ‘external
acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools violates right receive free
education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right
as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect
and promote the right of all citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art
XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such
patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health
or any legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of
religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier,
perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting
the Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby annulled and set aside.
56. Aglipay vs Ruiz 64 Phil. 201
Facts:
The Director of Post announced that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration
of City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church pursuant
to Act No. 4052 for the purpose of appropriating funds for the making of new postage stamps. Aglipay requested
Atty. Vicente Sotto to denounce the matter to the President. It was alleged that Ruiz is in direct violation of the
Constitution by issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
That such act was violative of Art. VI, Sec. 23 (3) of the Philippines, to wit:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit,
or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state.
Issue:
Is the production and selling of the International Eucharistic Congress commemorative stamps violation of the
separation of Church and State and Art. VI, Sec. 23 (3)?
Ruling:
No, we are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete
separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in
the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of
our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that
there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new
designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.”
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose. What it gives is the discretionary powers to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the government.
57. Imbong vs Ochoa GR No. 294819 April 8, 2014
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual
case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it
is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail
the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes
which one’s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not
be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though
it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality
does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it
and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The
Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in
the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue
that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b)
the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature
from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this
intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law
prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life
and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by
using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the
term “primarily”, must be struck down.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate
under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices
and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives
are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion.
To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if
the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV
of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations
to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot
infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid
as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are
not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide
Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection
to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing
the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of
the petitioners.
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should
be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to
the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the
RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is
valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect
to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice
of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in
the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights
to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court
has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which
the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative
need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed.
Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications, and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions
of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their
right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to
health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the
full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a)
of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
58. Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil. 726
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and
from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to
11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations
to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall
into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members
of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus
populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force
in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
59. Oposa vs Factoran 224 SCRA 792
Facts:
The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests
of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to:
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable
of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit
of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
violates the requirements of due process.
Ruling:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the
requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the
complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual
controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as future generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.
The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.
The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the
national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein.
All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as defendants
the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
60. Valmonte vs Belmonte 170 SCRA 256
Facts:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information
and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner
Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering
ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of
public interest."
Issue:
WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given
by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
political parties.
Held:
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents
subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not
settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system
of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose
to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged
to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here
I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract,
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing
proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered
into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although
citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
61. Gonzales vs Office of the President GR No. 196231 September 4, 2012 679 SCRA 614
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of
the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the
power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Facts:
G.R. No. 196231:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed
before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others.
Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While
said, cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned
over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.
Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material
allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment
of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution
recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure
of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice.
However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and
his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez
for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked
a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated
in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight Hong Kong Chinese
nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the
blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC).
It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive
sessions.
The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation
of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine
(9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.
The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate
resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos
F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and
several unknown persons with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against
the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought
the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with
jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap
on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public
offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA.
At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution
No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the
Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
Held:
Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative  disciplinary power over a Deputy  Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive.
Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions
in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President
to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
respectively.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same
Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the
power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers'
real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities.
By granting express statutory  power to the President to remove  a Deputy Ombudsman and a  Special
Prosecutor, Congress  merely filled an obvious gap in  the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is
also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there
is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman,
or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the
law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself,
under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to  Remove a Deputy Ombudsman  and a Special Prosecutor is  Implied from his
Power to  Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor,
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional
authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the
general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's
own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to
grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law
enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power  to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman  does not Diminish the  Independence of
the Office of the  Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended
to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What
the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means
nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be  removed from office where the  questioned acts, falling short of  constitutional
standards, do not  constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a
manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking
cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional
mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the
case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was
pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements;
that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending
for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering
the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that
could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of
any corrupt intention or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as
the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman,
there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vested  with statutory authority to proceed  administratively against
petitioner  Barreras-Sulit to determine the  existence of any of the grounds for  her removal from office as
provided  for under the Constitution and the  Ombudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman
is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No.
196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-
Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public
trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
62. Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission GR No. 47065, June 26, 1940
Facts:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco).
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province
of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service
Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses, Brockway trucks. on the ground that they were
needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the
Eight Hour Labor Law. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on
their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it
was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by
the respondent Public Service Commission in the decision complained of in the present proceedings, reads as
follows:
With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate in the Philippines
without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of
public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the
operation of said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner.
The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding
paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality
thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the
certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce
the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the
Commission.
In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age of the model, or
other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken into consideration.
The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually force and to those which
may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time schedules of public services and to authorization
to renew and increase equipment and properties.
Issues:
Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:
- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers
Held:
The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper
delegation of legislative power, so called “Subordinate Legislation”.
It is a valid delegation because of the growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws.
All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry
out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and
suitable manner.
The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights and is a mere
license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice
and hearing, “to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances
so warranted.
The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.
In addition, the Court ruled that, “the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When private
property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.
63. Macias vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-18684 32 SCRA 1 September 14, 1961
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental and Bulacan and
the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to
implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged that their respective
provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040
is unconstitutional and void because:
1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the HOR at least 3
calendar days prior to passage.
2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population.
3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.
Issues:
Whether or not the apportionment of representative districts under Republic Act 3040 is in accordance with the
constitution.
Discussions:
The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the House of Representatives “shall be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the member of their respective
inhabitants.” A law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts than those with
bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the
Constitution. Inequality of apportionment law is “arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of
equality.” as held in Houghton County v. Blacker.
Rulings:
No. The Court concluded that the statute be declared invalid. Republic Act 3040 clearly violates the said
constitutional provision in several ways namely:
• It gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only.
• It gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only
• Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both, five members having
been assigned to it.
• Samar (with 871,857) was allotted four members while Davao with 903,224 got three only.
• Bulacan with 557,691 got two only, while Albay with less inhabitants (515,691) got three.
• Misamis Oriental with 387,839 was given one member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904)
got two. These were not the only instances of unequal apportionment.
• Mountain Province has 3 whereas Isabela, Laguna and Cagayan with more inhabitants have 2 each. And
then, Capiz, La Union and Ilocos Norte got 2 each, whereas Sulu that has more inhabitants got 1 only. And Leyte
with 967,323 inhabitants got 4 only, whereas Iloilo with less inhabitants (966,145) was given 5.
64. Mariano Jr. vs COMELEC GR No. 118577 March 07, 1995
Facts:
Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.
Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special
law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3
years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Issue:
Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional
Held:
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise
fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing
a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be
made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress
will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive
the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art.
VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section
provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since
it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
65. Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC 342 SCRA 244
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents,
who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less
than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is
mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.
Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The
Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system
of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties
participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR
determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats for
concerned party
Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is
consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system,
the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and
which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according
to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.
Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members
of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing
its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional
seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to
compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation.
66. BANAT vs COMELEC GR No. 179271 April 21, 2009
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
Facts:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation
of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come
from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total
votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats
– this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at
least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates
a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists
in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of
this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
Issues:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
Held:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall
be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not
more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and
50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of
the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate.
As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or
the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists
which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified.
Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme
Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants
in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed
seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the
availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even
if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the
number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat,
and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional
seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of
seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38
remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first,
the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at
least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3
seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes
cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means
it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got
20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied
seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be
prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or
from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was
not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political
parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained
that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country
shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
67. Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections 694 SCRA 477
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Facts:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-
list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
Held: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for
new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are
as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined
political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,”
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating
in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral
wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to
work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who
“lack well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were
drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic
and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent
of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system
should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery –
unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other
cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of
Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do
not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.
68. Sema vs COMELEC GR No. 177597 July 16, 2008
Facts:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not
part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two
legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of
Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato
City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for
the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also
while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1stdistrict). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes
therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was
winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan),
that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in
effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created,
the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
Held:
RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply
with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must
be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate
to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary
legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within
their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once
created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district,
there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so
Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan
without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
69. Bagabuyo vs COMELEC Gr No. 176970 December 08, 2008
Facts:
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative
districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the
Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was
contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
Held:
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is
a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government
unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a single
legislative district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro
now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means
better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
70. Marcos vs COMELEC September 18, 1995
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not
meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months
to “since childhood.” The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it
was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended
as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a
resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school
days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her
proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election.
Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec
already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives.
Issues:
Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the
May 9, 1995 elections.
Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?
Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?
Held:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary
residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following
reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have
two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s
domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The
term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.
What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and
wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President
in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm
in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the
Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881
even after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory
that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.
3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members
of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being
a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question.
71. Aquino vs COMELEC GR No. 120265 September 18, 1995
Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati stating that he has been
residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed, he filed another certificate of candidacy stating
that he has been residing in Makati for more than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed
petition for Aquino’s disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon filed for
suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Held:
Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to qualify he must prove that he has
established not just residence but domicile of choice. Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home” where he eventually intends to return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution
speaks of residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted upon.
72. Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board GR No. 157870 November 3, 2008
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)
Facts:
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section
36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by
requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug
free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
Held:
No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.
In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield
obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot
require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without
such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
73. Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the
immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents
Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed
his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he
did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under
the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives,
as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the
Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives
and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7,
Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He
asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant
to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground
not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another
office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another
office or employment.
Issues:
1. Is section 67, article IX, of BP. blg. 881 operative under the present constitution?
2. Could the respondent speaker and/or the respondent secretary, 'by administrative act', exclude the petitioner from
the rolls of the house of representatives, thereby preventing him from exercising his functions as congressman, and
depriving him of his rights and privileges as such?
Held:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of
abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this
…chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI
(1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal,
the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office
of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that
such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and
thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to
their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people
with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another
office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the
filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode
of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of
Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not
by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of
the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from
prescribing other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To
justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was
their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX,
B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his
certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the
clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of
the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and
benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose
and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
Note:
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner
seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be
extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office
(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than
the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio
Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
27. Bondoc vs Pineda 201 SCRA 792
Facts:
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda
was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista
Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by
the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed
to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He
confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to Camasura’s
expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed
that a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative
will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s
chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal
is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being
complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal,
a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest
involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET
after the tribunal has already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already
become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election.
Camasura should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is
not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security
of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP).
And 1 coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
74. Flores vs Drilon 223 SCRA 568
Facts:
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard
Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
Issues:
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an
excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec.
8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have
received pursuant to his appointment.
Held:
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or
by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the
Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the
Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment
in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the
cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really
has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President
with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other,
can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during
his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an
elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO
of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and
his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in
accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.
75. Liban vs Gordon GR No. 175352 July 15, 2009, January 18, 2011
Facts:
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed
with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in
the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased
to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator
. . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6,
1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically
forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC Chairman
is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-
owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of
Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar
as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that
“[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of
the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise
moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part
of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some
provisions of the PNRC Charter.
Issue:
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
Ruling:
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the
second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota
of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in
the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the
Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule
that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should
have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court
could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of
the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years
of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971,
December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No.
1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the
effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the
PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but
also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international community.
There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character
of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947
under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The
PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even
in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of
the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under
the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the
Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the
Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in
discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be
classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence,
nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an
auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a
subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as
Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the
PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be
organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian
field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to
recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by
the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is
widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not
only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have
adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter
that were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion
of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
76. Avelino vs Cuenco 83 Phil. 17
Facts:
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the
next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand
by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He
however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his
piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled
Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due
to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino
just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator
Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68)
that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the
President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo
warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
Held:
No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its
own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain
in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at
any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the
Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and
that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve
senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had
the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there
two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal.
There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority
of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all
the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the House”
and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of
all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at
least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco
would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to
bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no
constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators;
one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the
majority which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being
only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent
events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority’s pronouncement on
the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in
that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would
result in Cuenco’s election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,
has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group,
but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this
reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and
that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.
Therefore, Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the members of the National
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of
1939, so as to read “a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on
actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge
their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which
make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is
empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment
was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all
the members” as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which
required “concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member” was amended
by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction
of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and
therefore 12 constituted a majority.
78. Osmena vs Pendatun 109 Phil. 863
Facts:
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said
speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59
was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his
allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the
resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun
filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the
power to discipline its members.
Issue:
Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
Held:
No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before
the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member
therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.
79. Santiago vs Sandiganbayan GR No.126055 April 19, 2001
Facts:
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to
be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified.
Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty
since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the
Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.
Held:
Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel
a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring
member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but
a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a
senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding,
and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before
trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence
of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the
court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that
he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that
the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal procedure.
80. Paredes vs Sandiganbayan GR No. 118364 August 10, 1995
Facts:
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Ceferino
Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and
Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment
and of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been
issued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge
handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the
prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but
he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political
realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with
Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite
his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of
each House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’
by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”
81. Mabanag vs Lopez Vito 78 Phil 1
Facts:
Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections
as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The three senators were
suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account
of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit
in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not
been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives,
but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As
a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional
resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines
to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the
necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of
the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the
enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of
Printing are made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the
Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue:
Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution.
Held:
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not within the province
of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers,
a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining
what matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively
binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal
which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended
to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of
the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent of any intervention
by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard
public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.
Arroyo vs de Venecia GR No. 127255 August 14, 1997
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same
time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo
were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion,
the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress
in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
82. Casco vs Gimenez 7 SCRA 347
Facts:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily
in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both
being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported
urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro
Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde,
as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the
synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of
Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed
upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive
use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea
and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction
“and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea”
and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea
formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
Issue:
Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.
Held:
No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and
“formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent
the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The
enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon
the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
83. US vs Pons 34 Phil 729
Facts:
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila
from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso
subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25
barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs
officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium.
Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and
fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence
arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that
his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the
Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and
void.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law
on February 28, 1914.
Held:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals
in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals
which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28,
1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed
upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
84. Astorga vs Villegas 56 SCRA 714
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of
the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under
authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of
the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied
recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila)
because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading
in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces
and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before
the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made
significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower
house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA
4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for
approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no
amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to
this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that
they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does
not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
Issue: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
Held: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires
it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the
journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore
did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their
signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law.
To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would
be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
85. Morales vs Subido 27 SCRA 131
Facts:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess
a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank
of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time,
given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of
Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet
the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified
other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein
for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight
years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …” can
be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved
version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and
has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has
served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the
rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill
emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or
has served as chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of
certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill
division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly
into the matter.
Held:
No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section
10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go
behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government
demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official
acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth
trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To
be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each
house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on
the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence
the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered
on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
87. Abbas vs Electoral Tribunal 166 SCRA 651
Facts:
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN
coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The
SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed
for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all
of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair
play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed
disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the
concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where more
than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit
the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the
resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
Issue:
Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.
Held:
The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which,
in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the
Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative
component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no
Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution
of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as
such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
88. Pimentel vs HRET GR No. 141489 November 29, 2002
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System
Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list
groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14
party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente
C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA),
NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay
(ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other
party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various
political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives
to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of
House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections
the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of
filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the
House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then
Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R.
Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to
cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to
direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred
the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al.
filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman
and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives
should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al.
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution
of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February
2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar,
Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The
Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the
strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member
of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-
NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the
Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators
and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who
among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These
constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute,
being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine
of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated
duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left
alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if
party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of
any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of
members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred
the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available
facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process.
The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the
predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA.
As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot
resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of
Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the
HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
89. Codilla vs de Venecia GR No. 150605 December 10, 2002
Facts:
Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for
disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he
used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and
sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them
to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained
in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was
found guilty and ordered disqualified.
Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and
subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and
also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation.
Issues:
Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative
Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative
Ruling:
First. The validity of the respondent’s proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably
filed by the petitioner.
xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending
his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the
validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as
it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus,
be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.
xxx
(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the
COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The
issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot
assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a
candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving
members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding
the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to
review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.
xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for
having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It
is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the
elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to
office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of
absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto
proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus
“when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.” For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of
the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer
or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge
of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the
part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division
initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set
aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the
COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become
final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled
by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that
its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos
and confusion.
90. Guingona vs Gonzales GR No. 106971 October 20, 1992
Facts:
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD
senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives
in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total
No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC,
1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,
nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN
should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino
who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC
and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that
the compromise is against proportional representation.
Issue:
Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.
Held:
It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the
rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article
VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or
1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership
into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one
other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation
of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based
on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation
to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2
parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve
such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since
one party may have affiliations with the other party.
91. Coseteng vs Mitra 187 SCRA 377
Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to
Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal
– a request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on,
added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due
to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered
as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson
and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate
of proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be
nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the
support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction
of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that
petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because revision
in House representation in CA was based on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79%
of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and
KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority
choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House
membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and
they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their
parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred the
Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.
92. Daza vs Singson 180 SCRA 496
Facts:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to
only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing
the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new
set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson
as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the
Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO
that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that
the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.
Issue:
Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
Ruling:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
93. Manalo vs Sistoza 312 SCRA 239
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law created the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner as to how officers of the Philippine National
Police are to be appointed. It was provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors
and Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments before said officers can take their office.
In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al as Directors and Chief Superintendents within
the PNP. Said appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo
questioned the validity of the appointments made. He insists that without the confirmation by the Commission,
Sistoza et al are acting without jurisdiction, their appointment being contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6975.
He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out the provisions of the said law. Manalo also insists
that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, and hence, it must be carried out by the
courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid.
Held:
No. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true that prior to this case, as with all other laws, R.A. 6975 enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws enacted by Congress must be respected by courts and as much
as possible, courts must avoid delving into the constitutionality of a law.
However, it is also the duty of the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by
Congress is not repugnant to the Constitution.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed
by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group are the only ones whose appointments are required by the Constitution to be affirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. All others need not be confirmed. Officers of the PNP are not included therein.
There is also no merit to the contention that PNP officers are akin to officers of the armed forces.
Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. 6975 are void for amending the provisions set forth in the Constitution.
Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
alienated by the fundamental law. When it does, the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.
94. People vs Jalosjos GR No. 132875
February 31, 2001
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of
a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges
and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI
of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for
the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.
Aguinaldo vs Santos 212 SCRA 763
Facts:
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d’état was
crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why
he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed
by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo
denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he
was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal
from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining
order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued that: (1)
that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government official under Section 60, Chapter
IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power
to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the
alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a
mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor
of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed
from office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not
yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the
elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Issues:
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case moot
and academic
2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.
Held:
1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending
moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes
among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation
of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during
the failed coup.
2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and
a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of
the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices and the power of general supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of
the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it
cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987
Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for
the manner of removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court
had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution,
until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to
remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.
3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence.
96. Pobre vs Santiago AC No. 7399 August 25, 2009
Facts:
After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not considered for the position of Chief Justice by the Judicial and
Bar Council, she delivered a speech on the Senate floor and was quoted as saying:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am
no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. . .
In a sworn letter complaint dated December 22, 2006, a certain Antero J. Pobre asked the Supreme Court to
undertake disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary action against Senator Santiago on the ground that her
statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny making the statements. However, she explained
that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress. The purpose of her speech, according to
her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.
Held:
The Supreme Court agreed with Senator Santiago. In Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C.
No. 7399, August 25, 2009, it ruled:
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.” Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun,
said: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means
of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity,
parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the
public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a
judge’s speculation as to the motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and
oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the
assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary
action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under
the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.
While the Supreme Court dimissed the complaint, it felt that such should not be the last word on the matter. It
added:
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in
her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed
the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to spit on
the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a
“Supreme Court of idiots”. . .
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The
factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of
remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely
tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty
to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability
thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable
them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress
against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress
and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator
from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public
institution.” But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called
her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the
Rules dictates under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.”
97. Jimenez vs Cabangbang 17 SCRA 876
Facts:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said
letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists
and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The
“planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not
be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in
newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed
because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
Issue: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.
Held: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or
debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen
in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls
of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or
not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session
when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious
that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a
member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
98. Adaza vs Pacana Jr. 135 SCRA 431
Facts:
Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He
took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana,
Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of
office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May
14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won
by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa
on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his
oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of
governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this
petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that
within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official
can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
Issue:
Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously.
Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by
virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
Held:
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad.
He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office.
Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because
he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by
petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election
of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors,
members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered
on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision,
considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code.
99. Puyat vs de Guzman 113 SCRA 31
Facts:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted
– hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior
to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased
ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner
Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez
entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an
assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared,
Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect
granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
Issue:
Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating
the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
Held:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing.
He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but
because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of
interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself
involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.
100. Villegas vs Legaspi GR No. 53869 March 25, 1982
Facts:
This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of Congress may appear
before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.
Case 1
In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino
Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi
as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas “no member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction”. The presiding judge
however overruled Villegas’ challenged and proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate
jurisdiction.
Case 2
In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas, a
corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation. Reyes questions the
appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on the same ground invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez
is also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue:
Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang Pambansa may
appear as counsels before the said CFIs.
Held:
No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFI’s acting in their original jurisdiction.
CFI’s have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of origin) or appellate
courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as
courts of general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the said CFIs from any lower courts. Thus,
the CFIs in the case at bar are “courts without appellate jurisdiction”.
101. League of Cities vs COMELEC
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before
the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the
Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million
annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No.
9009. Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. “The
Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.” “The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly
followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the “just share” of local government
units (LGUs) in national taxes.” (League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18,
2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood
Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress’ deliberations
and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum
income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any
retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only
affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment
accorded the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To
impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed
unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the
LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities
of the Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final
and executory and was recorded in the SC’s Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP),
et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts
(RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. “Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc
Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying
reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main
decision where there is no prior decision,” the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November
18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that “no
city…shall be created…except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code.” It stressed
that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code, the
assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities
under sec. 450 of the LGC. “The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided
an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution….Congress exceeded and abused its law-making
power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution,” the Court held.
The Court further held that “limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the
exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.” (GR No. 176951, League of
Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No.
178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling
Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first
resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011Ruling
Yes. It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities
covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also
complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA
No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence,
this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the
creation of cities.
“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency
of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA
9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent
to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of
Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities
Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However,
the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed
to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and
fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills
were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses
ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by
necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the
exemption clauses.”
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009
was arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the
criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every
amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of
the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.”
102. People vs Vera G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for
new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal
to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent
of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.
The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial
boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if
Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection
of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation
of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
Discussions:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard
by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to
it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in
the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise
arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the
benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality, leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards
to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal
protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to
each member of the class.
Rulings:
1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of
Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.
Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province
may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse
or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter.
This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same
benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case
no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province
by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.
103. US vs Ang Tang Ho
G.R. No. 17122 43 Phil 1 February 27, 1922
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing
the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes
the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products.
Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price
of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged
in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of power
to the Governor General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is
vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to
the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice
and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete
in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to
the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a
law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment
of any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the
Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for
enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and
under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality,
also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced,
how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define
what was “any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify
or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime
was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation.
The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is
charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that
fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
104. Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA and Kathleen Saco
Facts:
Private respondent was awarded the sum of P192k by the POEA for the death of her husband. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principle ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband
was not an overseas worker.
The husband was a chief officer of MV Eastern Polaris owned by Petitioner, he was killed in an accident in Tokyo.
The wife sued for damages under EO 797 and Memorandum Circular No.2 of POEA.
Petitioner contends that the complaint was cognizable by SSS and against the State Insurance Fund because
Vitaliano Saco should be considered as a domestic worker in contrast to a overseas worker, subject to appeal in the
ECC.
Issue:
Whether there is undue delegation of power in Memo Cir. 2 of POEA?
Held:
First, Saco should be considered as an overseas worker, because of the tacit recognition of his employment at the
time of his death. First, the submission of shipping articles to the POEA, second is the payment of contributions to
the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers.
The award to the defendant was based on Memo circular no.2
SC HELD that the authority to issue said regulation is clearly provided by Section 4a of EO 797,
The governing board (POEA) as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the administration (POEA).
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to admin.
Bodies.
With the this power, admin bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details
which the congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation
of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the department of labor
on the new labor code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memo Circular No.2 is one such administrative regulation.
The power of the POEA in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the
delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the POEA, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to “fair and equitable employment
practices.”
The petition is dismissed.
105. Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
Facts:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general
from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities.
Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed
by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed” except by Act of Congress.
Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President.
Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further
maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.
Issue:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
Held:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power
to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would,
in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace
the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may
require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.”
Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation
of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
106. Divinagracia vs. Consolidated Broadcasting System G.R. No. 162272
Facts:
Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) are
radio networks both involved in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the
grantees of legislative franchises. Following the enactment of these franchise laws, NTC issued Provisional
Authorities allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various
locations throughout the nation.
Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia, alleging that he was a stockholder of respondent companies, filed two
complaints with the NTC alleging that despite the provisions of the law mandating the public offering of at least
30% of the common stocks of Respondents, both entities had failed to make such offering.
Petitioner prayed for the cancellation of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of Respondents. The NTC dismissed
both complaints, positing that although it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel a Provisional Authority or CPC
for violations or infractions of the terms and conditions, it refrained from exercising the same.
Issue:
Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and CPCs of entities which Congress has
issued franchises to operate
Ruling:
No. We earlier replicated the various functions of the NTC, as established by E.O. No. 546. One can readily notice
that even as the NTC is vested with the power to issue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with
the power to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise empowered to prevent broadcast stations with duly issued franchises
and CPCs from operating radio or television stations.
Petitioner relies on the power granted to the Public Service Commission to revoke CPCs or CPCNs under Section
16(m) of the Public Service Act. That argument has been irrefragably refuted by Section 14 of the Public Service
Act, and by jurisprudence, most especially RCPI v. NTC. As earlier noted, at no time did radio companies fall under
the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission as they were expressly excluded from its mandate under Section
14. In addition, the Court ruled in RCPI that since radio companies, including broadcast stations and telegraphic
agencies, were never under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission except as to rate-fixing, that
Commission’s authority to impose fines did not carry over to the NTC even while the other regulatory agencies that
emanated from the Commission did retain the previous authority their predecessor had exercised. No provision in
the Public Service Act thus can be relied upon by the petitioner to claim that the NTC has the authority to cancel
CPCs or licenses.
107. Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7
of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
People’s Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and
present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched
without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official
of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for publication. The law
enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless
search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the
exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
Issues:
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
Ruling:
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s warrantless
arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers
could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now”
and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David
was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting
to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT
valid
[T]he searches [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be
issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates
that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the
daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may
be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Issue:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional
Held:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
"the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives". To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo's exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws", she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain
laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and
the like. She can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
28. Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts:
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935,
Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath
of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed
before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC
adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest.
Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
Ruling:
The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and
among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism
devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and
is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is
the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments
of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.
108. Tatad vs Department of Energy 281 SCRA 353
Facts:
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways
to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One
such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that “any person or entity
may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease
or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his
own requirement,” subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of
the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported
refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential
unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil
industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3%
is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
Held:
The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It
violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be
denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that.
Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the
lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities.
The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry
of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building
refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven
field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in
refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by
burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex,
competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the “new players” insofar as it
placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain
conditions already being observed by the latter.
109. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs Garcia Jr. 239 SCRA 386
Facts:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates
within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators Association
of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed by the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and
Perla Bautista as they were exorbitant and unreasonable.
Issue:
Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates based on the order of
the LTFRB
Held:
The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates of public services
and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing
complexity of modern life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range is
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari
protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further delegation of power would constitute a negation of
the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing
the provincial bus operators to change their fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public
at the mercy of transport operators.
110. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Executive Secretary September 01, 2005
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections
4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These
questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been
satisfied, to wit:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the
rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further
argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President
has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the
recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be
brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2)
of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of
the Constitution.
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
Discussions:
Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution
to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to propose
amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution
to originate in the House. the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at
large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to
bear on the enactment of such laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether
the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was
left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.”
Rulings:
R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill
when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and
franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on
the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications
for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection,
the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
111. ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima GR. 166715 August 14, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines
the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the
law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic
and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight
committee.
Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree
with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law
should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they
have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the
collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which
the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane
and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and
the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the
Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created
for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA,
BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
112. Lawyers Movement Against Monopoly and Poverty GR No.164987 April 24, 2012
Facts:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206
or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a
mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the
above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual
senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive
function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-
legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered
nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on
mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.
Issues:
1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether
or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
Held:
I. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and
this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the
Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in
the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The
ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
II. The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of
validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there
must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x
x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it.”
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there
were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request
for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
PORK BARREL:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be
funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent
with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power given to the President
to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive
and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the
actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the
budgetary process remain intact.
113. Belgica vs Executive Secretary GR No. 208566 November 19, 2013
Facts:
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly
known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The
allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure
projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical
assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request
for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork
barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around
since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been
around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated
by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit
and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
Held:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following
principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive
may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law,
was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a
clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the
older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence
of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by
the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF
money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which
he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA
is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system,
how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval
of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development
Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the
PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a
congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance
where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if
that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and
not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as
amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures
shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a
General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
114. Araullo vs Executive Secretary GR No. 209287 July 1, 2014 and February 3, 2015
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then
came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to
realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So
what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP
program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth
was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request
of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive.
It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon
Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other
concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among
their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation
provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
Held:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to
refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads
of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however,
such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in
the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent
insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these
projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition
of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings”
as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied
with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the
year and then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law,
such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed
funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative
Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
115. Demetria vs Alba 148 SCRA 208
Facts:
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then
Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform
Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section
provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
Held:
No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution.
It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for
the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise
goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be
allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another
here.
116. Guingona vs Carague
Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing
Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations
of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of
the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher
than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates
to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”
Issue:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for
education.
Held:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the
highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as
to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that
can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
117. PCGG vs COCOFED GR No. 147063 December 14, 2001
Facts:
Immediately after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Orders 1, 5 2 6
and 14. On the explicit premise that vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created by Executive Order 1 to assist the President in the recovery
of the ill-gotten wealth thus accumulated whether located in the Philippines or abroad. Executive Order 2 stated that
the ill-gotten assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks,
buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal
properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world. Executive Order 14, on the other hand,
empowered the PCGG, with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies,
inter alia, to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under EOs 1 and 2. Pursuant to these laws, the PCGG
issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional takeovers of allegedly ill-gotten
companies, assets and properties, real or personal.
Among the properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) registered in the names of the alleged “one million coconut farmers,” the so-called Coconut Industry
Investment Fund companies (CIIF companies) and Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. In connection with the sequestration of
the said UCPB shares, the PCGG, on 31 July 1987, instituted an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages (Case 0033) in the Sandiganbayan. On 15 November 1990, upon Motion of COCOFED,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares on the ground that
COCOFED and the so-called CIIF companies had not been impleaded by the PCGG as parties-defendants in its 31
July 1987 Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The Sandiganbayan ruled
that the Writ of Sequestration issued by the Commission was automatically lifted for PCGG’s failure to commence
the corresponding judicial action within the six-month period ending on 2 August 1987 provided under Section 26,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The anti-graft court noted that though these entities were listed in an annex
appended to the Complaint, they had not been named as parties-respondents. The Sandiganbayan Resolution was
challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for Certiorari (GR 96073) in the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of
Cojuangco, the anti-graft court ordered the holding of elections for the Board of Directors of UCPB. However, the
PCGG applied for and was granted by this Court a Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the election.
Subsequently, the Court lifted the Restraining Order and ordered the UCPB to proceed with the election of its board
of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the sequestered shares to be voted by their registered owners. The victory of
the registered shareholders was fleeting because the Court, acting on the solicitor general’s Motion for
Clarification/Manifestation, issued a Resolution on 16 February 1993, declaring that “the right of COCOFED, et.
al. to vote stock in their names at the meetings of the UCPB cannot be conceded at this time. That right still has to
be established by them before the Sandiganbayan. Until that is done, they cannot be deemed legitimate owners of
UCPB stock and cannot be accorded the right to vote them.” On 23 January 1995, the Court rendered its final
Decision in GR 96073, nullifying and setting aside the 15 November 1990 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which
lifted the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares.
A month thereafter, the PCGG — pursuant to an Order of the Sandiganbayan — subdivided Case 0033 into eight
Complaints (Cases 0033-A to 0033-H). Six years later, on 13 February 2001, the Board of Directors of UCPB
received from the ACCRA Law Office a letter written on behalf of the COCOFED and the alleged nameless one
million coconut farmers, demanding the holding of a stockholders’ meeting for the purpose of, among others,
electing the board of directors. In response, the board approved a Resolution calling for a stockholders’ meeting on
6 March 2001 at 3 p.m. On 23 February 2001, “COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.” filed the “Class Action
Omnibus Motion” in Sandiganbayan Civil Cases 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F, asking the Sandiganbayan to enjoin
the PCGG from voting the UCPB shares of stock registered in the respective names of the more than one million
coconut farmers; and to enjoin the PCGG from voting the SMC shares registered in the names of the 14 CIIF holding
companies including those registered in the name of the PCGG. On 28 February 2001, the Sandiganbayan, after
hearing the parties on oral argument, issued the Order, authorizing COCOFED, et. al. and Ballares, et. al. as well
as Cojuangco, as are all other registered stockholders of the United Coconut Planters Bank, until further orders from
the Court, to exercise their rights to vote their shares of stock and themselves to be voted upon in the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) at the scheduled Stockholders’ Meeting on 6 March 2001 or on any subsequent continuation
or resetting thereof, and to perform such acts as will normally follow in the exercise of these rights as registered
stockholders. The Republic of the Philippines represented by the PCGG filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the PCGG can vote the sequestered UCPB shares.
Held: The registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. This
principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator
cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion. On the other hand, it is authorized to vote these sequestered
shares registered in the names of private persons and acquired with allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if it is able to satisfy
the two-tiered test devised by the Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo and PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr. Two clear “public
character” exceptions under which the government is granted the authority to vote the shares exist (1) Where
government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their own names, and
(2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private hands. The
exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must yield to truth; that public property
registered in the names of non-owners is affected with trust relations; and that the prima facie beneficial owner
should be given the privilege of enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie fact of ownership. In short, when
sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have been acquired with
ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private
individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased with
public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public
character exceptions in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the
shares. Herein, the money used to purchase the sequestered UCPB shares came from the Coconut Consumer
Stabilization Fund (CCSF), otherwise known as the coconut levy funds. The sequestered UCPB shares are
confirmed to have been acquired with coco levies, not with alleged ill-gotten wealth. As the coconut levy funds are
not only affected with public interest, but are in fact prima facie public funds, the Court believes that the government
should be allowed to vote the questioned shares, because they belong to it as the prima facie beneficial and true
owner. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in grossly contradicting and effectively reversing
existing jurisprudence, and in depriving the government of its right to vote the sequestered UCPB shares which are
prima facie public in character.
118. Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works 110 Phil 331
Facts:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal,
assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for
the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator
Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that
Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully
enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand,
perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
Issue:
Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
Held:
No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the
property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law
was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that
the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for
public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
119. Cruz vs Paras 123 SCRA 569
Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that
the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of
the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or
City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places
of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to
regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools,
pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its
territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit
... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to
prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact
wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional
question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases.
Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
Held:
No. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise
of an assumed power to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the
statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.
There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all
"the great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave
defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of
doom certainly commends itself.
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.
They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in
futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for
licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would
be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued
existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their
establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of
their business.
4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.
120. Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board GR No. 75697 June 18, 1987
Facts:
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse
effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired
from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD
imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject
matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed
the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
Issue:
Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.
Held:
No.1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction
and control of the [VRB].”
121. Tobias vs Abalos GR No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
Facts:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the
law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the constitution. First,
it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the
division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate
Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond
that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
minimum population requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement?
Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first contention of one subject
one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject
from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the
"one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives, the provision of the
section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore,
the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their
separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act
enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration
by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
122. Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance 235 SCRA 630
Facts:
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB
11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the
1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known
as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text
and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just
becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco
even signed the said Senate Bill.)
Issue:
Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
Held:
No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far
as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted.
The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
123. Bolinao Electronics Corp. vs Valencia 11 SCRA 486
Facts:
Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in
the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even
after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their
continuing operation had caused damages to his department.
Issue:
Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.
Held:
The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN
to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine
Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the
Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no
appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department
they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the
then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a
condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.
Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same
produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
124. Gonzales vs Macaraig 191 SCRA 452
Facts:
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills
is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section
55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power
does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
Issue:
Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has
the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
Held:
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted
in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which
can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that
even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and
Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions”
that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
125. PHILCONSA vs Enriquez GR No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution
Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can
only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is
already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of
congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et
al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH,
and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Issue:
Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
Held:
In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional.
In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The
president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already
taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however
did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly
veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the
vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect
repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions which
authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed.
The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program.
Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One
Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds
if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question
is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and
30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items
in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are
“appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate
of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed
the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval
of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate”
provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article
VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation benefits. The President
declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall
be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the
veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal
of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section
8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore,
confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-
established principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the
President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the
CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB
by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that
additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are
mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements
may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts know more
about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for that matter. Hence,
with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
126. Tanada vs Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
Facts:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
Held:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be
the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word
“shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published
have no force and effect.
127. PVB Employees vs Judge Vega GR No. 105364 June 2001
Facts:
In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila, Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB Employees Union filed claim for
accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, R.A. 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) was signed into law by then Pres. Corazon Aquino
and was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. This law sought the rehabilitation of the PVB
which means that Congress mandated that the PVB be not dissolved.
However, the liquidation judge, Judge Benjamin Vega, did not immediately stop the liquidation proceeding. In fact
he went on with it.
When questioned, Vega argued that R.A. 7169 did not immediately take effect and that it only took effect 15 days
after publication in the Official Gazette or on March 10, 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Benjamin Vega is correct.
Held:
No. R.A. 7169 provides in its effectivity clause that:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
As a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”. Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to
make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by
President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became
legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on
March 10, 1992.
128. Senate vs Ermita GR No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Facts:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced.
This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged
overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and
military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the
department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief
of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were
sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took
effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of
the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials
who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers
as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to
except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For
defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties
of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.
Issue:
Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
Held:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry
is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently
true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance
of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also,
in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically
to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can
be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the
question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries
in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through
the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement
then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid
on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head
to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or
by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
129. Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon GR No. L-89914 November 20, 1991
Facts:
It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly
enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law
Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business
enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various
government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the
speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the
committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his
right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his
allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry
regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and
testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and
blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and
that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et
al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the
SBRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
Held:
No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted
by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated
the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group.
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is
not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo
Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
130. Standard Charter vs Senate GR No. 167173 December 27, 2007
Facts:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged
speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a
similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of
legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative
inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested
solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
Ruling:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the privileged
speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in
selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law.
Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of
Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than
proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures
to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in
its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the
recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to
the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
131. Negros Oriental II Electric Coop. vs SP 155 SCRA 421
Facts:
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with
pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO
II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to
have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and they
alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform
to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the Charter
of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such
power. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters
within its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
Held:
No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative
bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of
a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be
deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena
power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist
as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative
agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue
compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to
claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to
issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The
contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of
the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
132. Arnault vs Nazareno 87 Phil. 29
Facts:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee
created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a
representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged
the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
Issue:
Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of
legislation.
Held:
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may
be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to
violate the witness’ right to due process of law.
133. Gudani vs Senga GR No. 170165 August 15, 2006
Facts:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing
of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the
military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga
issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee
without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has
been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of
War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before
the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
Issue:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief,
and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same
time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders
have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive
officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the
considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on
specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress
does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right
to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military
officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the
legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
134. Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation, GR No. 180643, March
25, 2008
Facts:
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of
China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a
statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of
the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him
with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what
they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege “. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend
the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri
is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
Held:
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed
in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
QUALIFICATIONS, Election, Term, Oath
Note: Executive power is vested in the President (alone)- cabinet members are alter-ego of the President but they
are not the Chief Executive, serve at the pleasure of the President
135. Macalintal vs PET
Facts:
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal from a decision dismissing his
petition and declaring the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as constitutional.
Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged unconstitutional creation of the PET that Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET. Thus, PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling on the constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC).
Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office
which cannot be created by the President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus,
petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme
Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
Issue:
Whether the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is constitutional.
Held:
The decision of the Court still stands on its constitutionality
We reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as
supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present
Constitution.
The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before is
not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific wording required by
petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect. Thus:
Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the
Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance
with the process outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired
by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit
grant of independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of
the PET.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task,
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot
overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our
abundant experience, is not unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court
sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not
specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise
thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon
the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's
exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial
power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a
thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not
separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that
"[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity."
The decision therein held that the PTC "finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution." A
plain reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of Article VII
on the Executive Branch, reveals that the two are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the Executive
and the Judicial Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution of the PET
was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the Constitutional Commission during the drafting
of the present Constitution.
The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Issue:
Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of paragraph 7,
Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as members of the presidential electoral tribunal is
unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
First Issue:
Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional and
election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the
overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections is that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent
Electoral Tribunal.
Verba legisdictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. However,
where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent
of its framers orratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and
the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution. Last,ut magis valeat quam pereat the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions
peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman
and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the
Tribunals functions as a special electoral court. the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department,i.e., the Supreme Court.
Second Issue:
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission,
Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out
that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution
did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present
Constitution.
136. Soliven vs Makasiar
Facts:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the then
president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that
Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention
on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow
herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,
considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself
thus she may be liable for contempt.
Issue:
Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
Held:
No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in
a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
137. Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001
Facts:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other
forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000,
Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during
which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out
and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May
14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
“conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed
for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
Issues:
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
Ruling:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. exercise of people
power of freedom of speech and freedom of assemblyto petition the government for redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial
review
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President
as President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation
of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when
President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—
President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan
Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did
not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon
as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring
to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January
20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto
T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio
and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress
by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been
laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption.
By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered
by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice
system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the
publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said
that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would
really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less
with prosecution.
137. Almonte vs Vasquez
G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995
Facts:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB
for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings
from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous
activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim
privilege of an agency of the Government.
Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide documents
relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
Ruling:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military,
diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and
of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff
cannot enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and
information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on
other considerations.
138. Senate of the Philippines vs Ermita
Facts:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced.
This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged
overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and
military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the
department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief
of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were
sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took
effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of
the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials
who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers
as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to
except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For
defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her
approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court
martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties
of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.
Issue:
Held:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry
is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently
true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance
of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also,
in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically
to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can
be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the
question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries
in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through
the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement
then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid
on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head
to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or
by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
139. Doroma vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings
and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted
bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and air-conditioning equipment
to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or
NMYC).
An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary
investigation was conducted.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan”
to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution
and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon
orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the “Tanodbayan”.
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal,
a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and
there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a
family corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or
participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no
preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him.
The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because
both old and new information involve the same subject matter.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the same subject
matter.
3. Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation.
Held:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court.
Ratio:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that
he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13
of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least
an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any
business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a
"prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"
provided by the Constitution.
Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be
considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and
the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of
dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to
the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand
Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance
the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.
140. Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec.
Facts:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring
that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The
Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary
of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
Issue:
Held:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment
in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the
debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere
personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries
or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government
and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
141.Public Interest Center vs Elma
June 30, 2006, Chico-Nazario
Facts:
Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on, he was appointed as CPLC (Jan 1999 during his term), but
waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Supervening events: There’s actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma was replaced by Sabio as PCGG.
Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending resolution of the case, he was appointed SOLGEN.
Arguments: Public Interest Center
CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent appointments
CPLC and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices
Arguments: Elma
As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions don’t cover other public officials given the
rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
His appointment falls under the exceptions in Art IX-B, Sec7
The 2 positions are not incompatible
NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the case is capable of repetition,
and to serve as a guide to the bench.
Issue:
whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against multiple offices
imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
Yes. The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v.
Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with
the other.
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x Where one office is not
subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not
that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other. The
force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two
places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in
the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the
other. x x x The offices must subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere,
one with the other, before they are incompatible at common law. x x x
***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties
of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as
well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department.
Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.
*note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review Decision on investigation
involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential appointees with the rank of Secretary conducted by the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC))
Issue:
whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision regarding multiple offices, Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
NO if based on position. YES, if based on primary functions test.
the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman
nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may
have the same rank as the latter positions.
CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal negation of the privilege
of holding multiple offices or employment.
The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to the rule against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to
become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials’ office.
…The Court further qualified that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the
official’s primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in an ex-officio capacity, which
“denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office.”[18] Thus, it will not suffice that no additional compensation shall be
received by virtue of the second appointment, it is mandatory that the second post is required by the primary
functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
*Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the position of PCGG
Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent Elma since
neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this
Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be
appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because neither office was occupied by
him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do not require an appointment to the other
post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and
elective officials, due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman
and the CPLC.
142.Marcos vs Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
Facts:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three-year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the
Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and
to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling:
Yes, According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the
same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section
19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing
power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive.
In its decision, dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President
Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting
ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed
to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding
one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration,
p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the
inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the
rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the
Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to
return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return
of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
4. Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration
is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked
by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or
substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts
at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of
merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein,
to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view
that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario
under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses
has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of
erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the
basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos,
not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to
all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to
comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers
of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power.
That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized
under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three
(3) separate branches.
Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the
specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the
sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article
III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal
articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution...
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal
executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the
constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis
was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language
of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for
power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves
exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority
is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159
(1978).]
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is
tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers
of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides:
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable
to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of
the land,
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of
the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to
an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific
power of legislation.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to
protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with
this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
The SC sustain the power of the president to create the Commission but, invalidated the executive ordernevertheless
on the ground of violation of equal protection.
143. Biraogo vs PTC
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
Facts:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can
do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding
body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section
31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include
the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.” (c)
E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987. (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past
and present, who may be indictable. Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
argued that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] E.O.
No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress. 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede
the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and
its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction. 4] The Truth Commission does not violate
the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause.
Ruling:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. Legislators have a legal standing
to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate.
Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining,
any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi is “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.” Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer. The person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of
the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There
is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety
in the funding.
PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause
for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. 4. Court finds difficulty
in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
144. Pichay vs. Office of The Deputy Executive Secretary
Facts:
ODES no power to try and decide cases’ E.O. No. 13 empowering it is unconstitutional FACTS On November 15,
2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).On April 6, 2011, respondent
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct
against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato
Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the
purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of
stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under
oath. In compliance, therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a
case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero
Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial function through
and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.
Held:
NO. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292. In the case
of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue
of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and
efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner
he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division
specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing
"delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292. The President's power to
reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his
power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize
the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from
one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices
outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring
functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or gencies, and vice versa. The distinction
between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the
other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of
the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under
E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners
who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of the
President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is
an office within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President
Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is
allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292 What actions does reorganization include? The Reorganization Did not
Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office. The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation
of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were
simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The
reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA could
take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. Reorganization takes place when
there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control,
authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory
body not vested with quasi-judicial powers. while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-
ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of
reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers,
functions and duties xxx, of PAGC." Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report
and recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the
President, not having the power to settlecontroversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission: Fact-finding
is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi- judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the
Ombudsman. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's
primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier
filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency.
Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989. While the Ombudsman's function goes into the
determination of the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the
investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations
and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA
can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal, contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent
Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the
actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed.
Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODESLA had unjustifiably sided against him in the
conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the
performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration. Every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner has failed to discharge
the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing
authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
145.DENR VS DENR Employees
G.R. No. 149724
Facts:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec.
Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal
City. The memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
Ruling:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the
DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the
President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
146. Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa
Facts:
Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The
information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter.
Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter
Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further
proceeding. In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the
executive and by virtue o the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control, direction,
and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the investigation
of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection
therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.
Issue:
Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor.
Held:
No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered him to investigate
Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all localgovernments over which he has been granted only the power of
general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control
and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct
of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his
jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative
Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and
supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a
local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10,
Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Congress has
expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who
is authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and
he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.” Sec 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the
administration of municipalities. In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to
Mondano’s office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or
concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is,
the governor must suspend a mayor not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power
granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.
147.Jose Villena vs Secretary of the Interior
Facts:
Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended
the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended
Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction
is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if
the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to
the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing
trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as
amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he
has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the
latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec
79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.
Held:
Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under
investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration
of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude“. The fact, however, that the
power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does
not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar
power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend
the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code)
to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a
municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And
the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official
(sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The
power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an
impartial investigation.
148. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Jose Paño
Facts:
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone
which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc.
(LMC) of which he is a co-owner. Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The
Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was
elevated to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the
earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the
decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not
contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
Issue:
Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.
Held:
Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the president
may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate powers which
are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the
resident is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office
of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained
recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. The act of the Executive
Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by
the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.
149. Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct
and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon
based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension.
Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted
that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local
officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given
by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local
officials.
Held:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which
supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one
from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”
But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over
local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid
power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
150. Dadole vs. COA December 3, 2002
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaue City enacted an ordinance that granted additional monthly allowance of
1500 for judges assigned in their locality. However, DBM issued LBC 55 imposing 1000 as the maximum limit for
such allowances. The City Auditor subsequently disallowed the allowances for the judges and asked them to
reimburse the amount in excess of 1000. The Judges filed an MR but was denied by COA. SC reversed and ruled
that DBM exceeded its supervisory power in imposing a limit not existing on the LGC provision it claimed to
interpret. The budget circular is void for not being published.
Doctrine:
Administrative circulars cannot go beyond the law they seek to implement. A limit cannot be imposed through an
administrative circular when the law it is seeking to implement does not provide for such (own words)
The DBM has 90 days from the receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance of cities to review the same.
Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. After such
period, the legality of the provisions in the said ordinance can no longer be questioned.
Facts:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through
the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City
increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the DBM issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that the
additional allowances granted by LGUs to national government officials and employees assigned in their locality
in the form of honorarium at rates shall not exceed P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities.
The said circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity without need of publication:
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners,
namely, Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Cañete, Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges
Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC
55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000
each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September,
1994.
The petitioner judges filed with the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. This was treated as
a motion for reconsideration and indorsed to the COA Regional Office which in turn referred the motion to the head
office with a recommendation that the same be denied. COA denied this MR ruling that the appropriation ordinance
of LGUs is subject to the organizational, budgetary and compensation policies of budgetary authorities like the
DBM who has the authority to (a) Provide guidelines on the classification of local government positions and on the
specific rates of pay therefore; and (b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all allowances and additional
forms of compensation to local government employees (Sec 1, AO 42). Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole,
for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration but was again denied. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
Arguments of Judge Dadole, et al: LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating
a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein. It
is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. Also, said circular
is void for lack of publication. The yearly appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is
allowed by Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi], of the LGC.
Solicitor General filed a manifestation supporting the position of the petitioner judges. The Solicitor General argues
that (1) DBM only enjoys the power to review and determine whether the disbursements of funds were made in
accordance with the ordinance passed by a local government unit while (2) the COA has no more than auditorial
visitation powers over local government units pursuant to Section 348 of RA 7160 which provides for the power to
inspect at any time the financial accounts of local government units. Moreover, the Solicitor General opines that
“the DBM and the respondent are only authorized under RA 7160 to promulgate a Budget Operations Manual for
local government units, to improve and systematize methods, techniques and procedures employed in budget
preparation, authorization, execution and accountability” pursuant to Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor General
points out that LBC 55 was not exercised under any of the aforementioned provisions.
Arguments of COA: The constitutional and statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges
stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President,
through the DBM, to check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government units.
The disbursement of additional allowances and other benefits to judges subject to the condition that the finances of
the city government should allow the same. Thus, DBM is merely enforcing the condition of the law when it sets a
uniform maximum amount for the additional allowances that a city government can release to judges stationed
therein. Also, publication is not required for LBC 55 inasmuch as it is merely an interpretative regulation applicable
to the personnel of an LGU. Assuming arguendo that LBC 55 is void, the provisions of the yearly approved
ordinance granting additional allowances to judges are still prohibited by the appropriation laws passed by Congress
every year because Mandaue City gets the funds for the said additional allowances of judges from the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) and the General Appropriations Acts of 1994 and 1995 do not mention the disbursement
of additional allowances to judges as one of the allowable uses of the IRA. Hence, the provisions of said ordinance
granting additional allowances, taken from the IRA, to herein petitioner judges are void for being contrary to law.
Issue and Ruling:
(1) Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for not
having been published? YES, IT IS Void.
(2) Whether or not the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances for
judges contravenes any law and should therefore be struck down as null and void? No.
Ratio:
1. LBC 55 is null and void.
Although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains
subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. The supervisory power
of the President has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The Chief Executive wielded no more
authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided
by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the
scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. (Taule v. Santos)
Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. On the other hand,
supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules,
nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work
done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the
act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. (Drilon v. Lim)
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet
and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President,
at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate
from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the
same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the
law.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds
that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore
by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local
affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation
of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly
serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges “when the finances of the
city government allow.” The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional
allowances granted to judges. Thus, the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances
higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a
city government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and expenditures of P35 million can afford
to grant additional allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can
afford it. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the
criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over
local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In
other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. (Tañada vs.
Tuvera). At the very least, before an administrative circular reducing income of government officials and employees
should be effective, the concerned officials and employees should be apprised and alerted by the publication of
subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines – to the end that
they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on
the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.
(De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit). Subsequent publication will not cure the defect because the publication is
required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules
and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. (Philippine International Trading
Corporation vs. Commission on Audit)
2. The yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances for judges is
VALID.
Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the
judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city government
and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated
revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no data or figures were
presented to show that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because
Mandaue City’s locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, did not mean that the
additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the city’s own revenues.
Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue City’s appropriation
ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of the LGC. Thus, within 90 days
from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise,
such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the
instant case, the DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue
City and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the said
ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Commission on
Audit are hereby set aside.
151. GPI vs Springer 50 Phil 259
Facts:
This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against
three directors of the National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the
committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of
section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The voting power of all
such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created
it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of
the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely
lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head
of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and
the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others
as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against
Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.
Issue:
Whether or not EO no. 37 is invalid.
Rulings:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill
the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and
controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the
Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers.
The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint
persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill
offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
152. Sarmiento III v Mison
GR No. 79974 December 17, 1987
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Facts:
(1) Petitioners contend that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by
reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand,
maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
(2) There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can appoint Mison without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments
Held:
Petition dismissed. President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of
the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
In sum:
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior
offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law.
Ratio:
(1) By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated
in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
(2) It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those
within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a
matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers
whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other
hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
(3) In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to
exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments
to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use
in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress
may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the president) may be authorized by law to appoint is
already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
153. Bautista Vs. Salonga
Facts:
August 27, 1987: President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as permanent Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
December 22, 1988: Bautista took her oath of office to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as
such.
January 9, 1989: The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for
her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under
CoA's review.
Bautista filed a petition with the Supreme Court.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because of Bautista's refusal
to surrender her post.
Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR
should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as well.
Issues:
WON the President's appointment is considered constitutional.
WON or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
WON or not President should extend her appointment on January 14, 1989.
Held:
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
The Court held that it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the Constitution, that she appoint
Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the President is
authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several government officials. The position of Chairman
of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the
appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even without the review or
participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on
the day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath.
Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by
Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is constitutionally
guaranteed that they must have a term of office.
To hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and
her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7)
year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due process properly
safeguarded.
It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the rule of law, after petitioner Bautista had elevated her case
to this Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated an Acting Chairman for the Commission on Human Rights
(pending decision in this case) instead of appointing another permanent Chairman. The latter course would have
added only more legal difficulties to an already difficult situation.
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office. The
temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from
dismissing or terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.
Petition granted.
154. Rufino vs. Endriga
Facts:
Petitioners in GR No. 139565, led by Baltazar N. Endriga (the Endriga group), were appointed members of the
board of trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1995, with the
qualification that their appointments would extend only until December 31, 1998. On December 22, 1998, then
President Joseph Estrada advised petitioners that they were being replaced by seven new appointees to the CCP
board, led by Armita B. Rufino (the Rufino group). Having been dislodged from the CCP, Endriga filed quo
warranto proceedings questioning the President’s authority to appoint new members in the CCP board.
It was alleged that under Section 6(b)[1] of Presidential Decree No. 15, vacancies in the board “shall be filled by
election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x.
” The Endriga group claimed that it was only when the board was entirely vacant that the President of the Philippines
may fill the vacancies, in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. The members of the group believed
that since only one seat was vacant, President Estrada could not appoint a new board. They averred that presidential
appointment was unjustified, since the CCP board still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to
fill any vacancy in the board by election.
On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the quo warranto Petition. It declared the Endriga group
lawfully entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from the CCP board. The CA held that Section 6(b) of
Presidential Decree (PD) 15 had clearly vested in the remaining members of the board the power to elect new
trustees. It ruled that the President could exercise the power to appoint only when the board was entirely vacant.
In its appeal before this Court, the Rufino group asserted that Section 6(b) of PD 15, which authorized the CCP
trustees to elect their fellow trustees, should be declared unconstitutional. The provision was allegedly repugnant to
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, which allowed the appointment only of “officers lower in rank” than
the appointing power.
Issues:
The lone issue was whether Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was unconstitutional in the light of Section 16 of Article
VII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
At the outset, the Court recognized the occurrence of a supervening event that could have rendered the case moot –
the resignation of the Rufino group and the appointment of new CCP trustees by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. The Court, however, deemed it best to pass upon the merits of the case, in order to prevent a repeat of this
regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked by internecine politics. Moreover,
the Court brushed aside procedural barriers, in view of the paramount importance of the constitutional issues
involved.
By a vote of 10-3,[2] the Court held that Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was irreconcilable with Section 16 of Article
VII of the Constitution.
The clear and categorical language of Section 6 (b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP board shall be filled
by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. It is only when the board becomes entirely vacant that the vacancies
shall be filled by the President of the Philippines, acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP.
Thus, Section 6 (b) empowers the remaining trustees of the board to fill the vacancies by electing their fellow
trustees. Simply put, this provision authorizes the appointing officer to appoint an officer who will be equal in rank
to the former.
In its Decision, the Court held that the power of appointment granted in Section 6 (b) of PD 15 transgressed Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
It explained that the power to appoint – vested by Section 16 in the President; or the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions or boards – was restricted only to officers lower in rank. This constitutional provision clearly excluded
a situation in which the appointing officers appointed an officer who would be equal to them in
rank.
This latter situation, however, was present in the CCP, whose trustees were appointing new co-trustees who would
be equal in rank to the former. Thus, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional, insofar as it
violated the constitutional mandate that the head of the board may be authorized to appoint lower-ranking officers
only.
Further, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution authorized Congress to vest specifically in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards – and in no other person – the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers. The word “heads” referred to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards, not to their members, for
several reasons.
First, the 1935, the 1973, and the 1987 Constitutions made a clear distinction whenever the power to appoint lower-
ranked officers was granted to the members of or the head of a collegial body. When conferring the power of
appointment to the members of that collegial body, our past and present Constitutions used the phrases “in the
courts,”[4] “courts,”[5] “the Supreme Court,”[6] “members of the Cabinet,” 4and
“the Constitutional Commissions.”[7]
Thus, if the intention was to grant to members of a commission or board the power to appoint lower-ranked officials,
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution should have used the phrase “in the commissions or boards.” But in
sharp contrast, this provision vested the power “in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.”
Second, the deliberations[8] of the present Constitution revealed that the framers had intended the phrase “in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards” to be an enumeration of offices whose heads may be
vested by law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Thus, in the enumeration, what applied to the first
office applied also to the succeeding offices mentioned.
Third, all commissions or boards had chief executives who were their heads. Since the Constitution spoke of “heads”
of office, and all commissions or boards had chief executives or heads, that word could have referred only to the
chief executives or heads of the commissions or boards.
Given that the word “heads” referred to the commission or board chairpersons, not members, the Court ruled that
the head of the CCP was the chairperson of the CCP board of trustees. This conclusion was further supported by
the fact that Section 8 of PD 15[9] and Section 3 of the Revised Rules and Regulations[10] of the CCP recognized
that its board chairperson – as the head of the CCP – had the power to appoint, remove, and discipline all officers,
staff and personnel of the CCP.
Pursuant to Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, the chairperson of the CCP board, as the head of the CCP,
was the only officer who could be vested by law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
Section 6 (b) of PD 15 could not validly grant this power of appointment to the members of the CCP board, as they
were not the head of the CCP.
Moreover, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional, because it ran afoul of the President’s
power of control under Section 17 of Article VII of the Constitution.[11] It was noted that the CCP was an agency
that fell under the Executive Branch.
Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency “not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department” fell “under the Office of the President.”[12] Since the CCP did not fall under the Legislative
or the Judicial Branch of government and was not an independent constitutional or quasi-judicial body or local
government unit, then the CCP necessarily fell under the Executive Branch and should be subject to the President’s
control.
However, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15, by authorizing the trustees of the CCP board to fill its vacancies, insulated
the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President. This authority made the CCP a self-
perpetuating
entity, virtually outside the control of the Chief Executive. Such public office or board could not legally exist under
the present Constitution.
The legislature could not have validly enacted a law that would put a government office in the Executive Branch
outside the control of the President.
While the charter of the CCP vested it with autonomy of policy and operation, this charter did not free it from the
President’s control. As part of the Executive Branch, the CCP could not be cut off from that control in the guise of
insulating the latter from presidential influence.
The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Tinga:
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Tinga opined that the majority Decision had expanded the principle of executive
control in a manner that would empower the President to make all appointments of officers and officials in the
Executive Branch.
This expansion of executive control allegedly resulted in the diminution of the congressional power embodied in
the “Appointments” clause, which was thus rendered inutile.
In the opinion of Justice Tinga, the Appointments clause allowed Congress to grant the power of appointment to
the CCP board of trustees, which was the head of the CCP and thus superior to the individual trustees. Contrary to
the majority opinion, he believed that the appointment of fellow trustees by the board would not constitute the
latter’s appointment of an officer of equal rank. For this reason, the board of trustees as a body was superior in rank
to any of its individual members.
Justice Tinga cited GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications,[13] [13] which recognized that collective or collegiate
bodies outweighed or outranked any individual member, even if the latter was the presiding officer of the body.
Thus, Section 6 (b) of PD 15, which authorized the board of trustees to elect its own members, was in accord with
the mandate of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, according to which the heads of agencies may be
authorized by Congress to appoint officers of lower rank.
The Dissent also pointed out that the statutory four-year term of respondents had not yet expired when President
Estrada advised them of their replacements. By ruling against them, the majority allegedly sanctioned the
President’s removal of officials whose terms had been fixed by law. Allegedly, this arbitrary removal could not be
justified by the “executive control” clause; otherwise, the President, in the guise of executive control, would be free
to violate the laws passed by Congress. And this result was clearly not intended by the said clause, according to
which the President
“shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”[14]
The notion that executive control authorized the removal of the members of the CCP board at the pleasure of the
President contravened not only the CCP charter, but the Constitution itself, not to mention our Civil Service laws
that guaranteed security of tenure.[15]
The Court, in fact, explained in Ang-Angco v. Castillo[16] [16] that the power of executive control did not extend
to the power to remove an officer who was in the Executive Department. That earlier ruling had stated that “the
power [of executive control] applie[d] to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the
actor or agent himself of the act.”[17]
Hence, before the expiration of their terms, officials whose terms had been fixed by law could not be removed from
office without cause, even by the President.
The fixity of their terms destroyed the power of removal at pleasure. Since there was no showing that respondents
had validly been removed for legal cause, their removal was consequently unconstitutional.
Further, the Dissenting Opinion discerned in the majority Decision a clash between the President’s executive
control and the prerogative of Congress to dictate through legislation the eligibility requirements and the nature and
length of public officers’ terms of office.
The majority was criticized for inferring that the Legislative Branch had no power to legislate any form of control
on executive action. Allegedly impaired was the right of the legislature to impart public offices it had created with
safeguards that would ensure their independence from executive interference, should Congress deem that their
independence served a necessary public purpose. In effect, said Justice Tinga, the Decision allowed the President
to ignore or countermand statutory limitations contained in the charters of GOCCs like the CCP.
155. Aytona vs Castillo
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 Facts:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect
Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all,
350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal
appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto)
against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new
President, should be considered void.
Issue:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.
Ruling:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration was
no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the
incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of
his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had
ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in
important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration
of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance
of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration
of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the
steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other
conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
156. Jorge vs Mayor
G.R. No. L-21776 February 28, 1964
Facts:
Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career official in the Bureau of Lands. He started working there as a Junior Computer in the
course of 38 years service, from February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960, and attained the position of Acting Director,
through regular and successive promotions, in accordance with civil service rules. On June 17, 1961, he was
designated Acting Director of the same Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos
Garcia ad interim Director. He qualified by taking the oath of office on the December 23, 1961. His appointment
was on December 26, 1961, transmitted to the Commission on Appointments, and on May 14, 1962, petitioner's ad
interim appointment as Director of Lands was confirmed by the Commission.
On November 14, 1962 he received a letter from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources of the Macapagal administration, informing him that pursuant to a letter from the Assistant Executive
Secretary Bernal, served on Jorge on November 13, his appointment was among those revoked by Administrative
Order No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal; that the position of Director of Lands was considered vacant; and
that Jorge was designated Acting Director of Lands, effective November 13, 1962. Upon learning that Mayor, an
outsider, had been designate by the President to be Acting Director of Lands Jorge protested (in a letter of November
16, 1962) to the Secretary of Agriculture informing the latter that he would stand on his rights, and issued office
circulars claiming to be the legally appointed Director of Lands. Finally, on September 2, 1963, he instituted the
present proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as a valid revocation of Jorge's ad
interim appointment.
Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that Nicanor G. Jorge is declared to be the duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified Director of
Lands.
Petitioner Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record that it was
made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a matter of contemporary
history, of which SC may take judicial cognizance, that the session ended late in the night of December 13, 1961,
and, therefore, after regular office hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed
that the appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular course of business.
The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and
the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and
thereafter, the office never became vacant.
In common with the Gillera appointment sustained by the SC, Jorge's appointment is featured by a recognition of
his tenure by the Macapagal administration itself, since he was allowed to hold and discharge undisturbed his duties
as de jure Director of Lands for nearly eleven months and it was only in mid-November of 1962 that the attempt
was actually made to demote him and appoint a rank outsider in his place in the person of respondent Mayor.
If anyone is entitled to the protection of the civil service provisions of the Constitution, particularly those against
removals without lawful cause, it must be the officers who, like Jorge, entered the Civil Service in their youth, bent
on making a career out of it, gave it the best years of their lives and grew gray therein in the hope and expectation
that they would eventually attain the upper reaches and levels of the official hierarchy, not through political
patronage, but through loyalty, merit, and faithful and unremitting toil.
157.Guevara vs. Inocentes, G. R. NO. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, MARCH 15, 1966
Facts:
The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former
Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive
issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the
former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22,
1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the
incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto
seeking to be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec.
10 (4) of the 1935 Constitution. which states that:
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which commenced on
January 17, 1966, the respondent contended that the petitioner’s ad interim appointment as well as other made under
similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated
that (1) the specific provision in the Constitution which states that: “until the next adjournment of Congress” means
adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine
die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative merely ‘suspended’ its session and to be
resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous
session without interruption since January 17.
Issues:
1. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention regarding “the next adjournment of Congress specifically provides
for regular session only.
2. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention that Congress is still in continuous session?
Held:
1. No. The phrase “until the next adjournment of Congress” does not make any reference to specific session of
Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that ‘when the
law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. It is safe to
conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word “adjournment” had in mind either regular or special
and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended.
2. No. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of the
Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its
Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the petitioner’s ad interim appointment must
have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of the Senate.
158. Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
Facts:
On February 1999, petitioner Maria Angelina Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by
then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was
appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad
interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring
petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID
and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7
dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that “transfer and detail of employees are prohibited
during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated
November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an
administrative and criminal complaint Department 17 against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning
the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners
of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
Issues:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments
issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
We find petitioner’s argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.”
159. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) And President Gloria M. Arroyo
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Facts:
Seven days After 2010 Presidential Election, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno had his compulsory Retirement by May
17, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. May the incumbent
President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. But under Section 4 (1), Article
III judicial Department of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled
within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, “from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy." This provision sin in contrast with the provision mentioned above.
The question now arises whether the incumbent president has the right to appoint the next chief Justice upon the
retirement of Chief Justice Puno. The JBC has unanimously agreed in their meeting on January 18, 2011, to start
the process of the filling the Vacant position of the Retired Chief Justice. Judicial Bar Council has published the
said announcement in the Daily inquirer and Philippine Star news papers on January 20, 2010. Despite of the issues
JBC has decided to proceed to the next step of the process by announcing the names of the following Associate
Justices: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice
Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval and inviting the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010, to the Following Candidates.
The announcement was printed at Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star on February 13, 2010.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme Court or to the Judiciary.
Ruling:
No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
or to other appointments to the Judiciary the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments
made in the Executive Department. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the
submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC.
Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before
the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For
the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive
the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named
in the list of the JBC before making the appointment. The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the
start of the President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose
names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the
petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every
vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay
in performing that duty. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.
159. Conrado L. De Rama vs. The Court of Appeals (Ninth Division, The Civil Service Commission), G.R. NO.
131136. February 28, 2001
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter
dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen
(14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees
were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section
15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen
employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already
been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence
that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.
Issue:
whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
Ruling:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment
and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V,
Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that
“an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall
remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following grounds: (a) Non-
compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through
the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management
and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
160. Llamas vs. Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos and Mariano Un Ocampo III, October 15, 1991 G.R. No.
99031
Facts:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found
guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than
30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office
without completing the 90-day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases. They say that the
qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the
grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case, allegedly
because the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases.
Issue:
WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
Held:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if
the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide
for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency
in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the
government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt. On
the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a
decision.
161. Torres vs Gonzales, G.R. NO. 76872 July 23, 1987
Facts:
Sometime before 1979, petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two
counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two
(22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on 2 November 2000.
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition
that petitioner would “not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated,
he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.” Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the “Board”) resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. The evidence before the Board showed that on 22
March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
19672 and Q-20756, which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
(Quezon City). The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this
conviction was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had before it a letter
report dated 14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”), addressed to the Board, on the
petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the
petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling,
grave threats, grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief,
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with police
functions). Some of these charges were identified in the NBI report as having been dismissed. The NBI report did
not purport to be a status report on each of the charges there listed and identified.
On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the Philippines informing her of the
Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner.
On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.
On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued “by authority of the President” an Order of Arrest
and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve
the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Issue:
whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance
of his original sentence
Held:
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted
by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal
Code defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions
thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
162. Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs Fernandez G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949
Facts:
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war. The case was
proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No.
8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However,
Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two
accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain
Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to them.
Issue:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
Held:
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may
be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does “nor work the restoration of the rights to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and
it “in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence” (art
36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Effects of pardon (absolute pardon remits penal consequences of the crime, but not erases the crime itself)
163.Monsanto vs. Factoran
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government
in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said
motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time,
the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same
was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to back pay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her
former position.
Issues:
1. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
2. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?
Held:
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but
it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal
Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of
creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
Effects of violation of terms of pardon (maybe rearrested by order of the president; purely executive prerogative
under sec. 64 of the Administrative code)
164.Macaga-an vs People July 29, 1987
Facts:
In a decision on July 15, 1981 the 22 petitioners were charged and convicted in 33 cases for estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents) The total amount of government funds (treasury warrants)
involved over P2.7 M
Petitioners moved to close their cases on ground that they had been given amnesty by former President Marcos on
January 28 1986. The Sandiganbayan required them to submit originals or authenticated copies of their amnesty
paper, which they were unable to produce. Petition was denied.
According to the petitioner they were given conditional amnesty on Feb. 2, 1985, through the 3rd and 11th amnesty
commission of Lanao del Sur and Marawi city subject to the approval or final action of the President pursuant to
PD 1082.
The amnesty commission recommended the approval of their amnesty or grant of executive clemency.
January 22, 1986, former governor made written representations with Marcos concerning the applications during
the political rally. Marcos wrote the following on the upper write hand corner of Dimaporo’s letter: “Approved “and
signed the same with a partly illegible date.
Petitioners also state that the original copies were lost or destroyed at Malacanang during the bloodless military
revolution and could not be located.
Issue:
Won the PD 1082 applies to the petitioners
Held:
No. It does not apply to them because their acts are nor offenses of rebellion.
The offenders of which amnesty may be granted under the provisions pf PD 1082 are acts which were done in
furtherance of resistance to the republic bay members and supporters of the MILF and the Bangsamoro Army and
other anti-government group with similar motives and aims.
Petitioners fall under persons expressly disqualified from amnesty stated on sec 2(a) of PD 1182, which repealed
PD 1082. Petitions also filed beyond the time limit provided.
The supposed approval of the former president on 1985, in clear and conflict with the restrictions in the very decree
he promulgated, cannot be given any legal effect. Marcos did not amend his own decree and he must be held to the
terms and conditions that he himself had promulgated in the exercise of legislative power.
165. IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment
of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together
the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more
benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement
is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute
a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets
for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
2. calling out power, declaration of state of rebellion
166. Lacson vs Perez
G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001
Facts:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in NCR. She also issued
General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" followed. Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the Court. The
case at bar is for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance
of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of
rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact
and in law. On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila.
Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the
proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of
Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion."
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
Held:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant.
The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners'
contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the
extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not
without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and Mandamus is improper at
this time. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void
ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders
in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set
aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations ex
abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that
the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains
speculative up to this very day. Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in their
behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial warrant forall acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang as distinguished in the Marcos
time.
29. Bengzon III vs HRET GR No. 142840 May 7, 2001

Facts:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,
however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An
Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4),
a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in
the armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or
Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who
was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.
Issue:
WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Held:
Petition was dismissed.
Yes. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in,
the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided
in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before
he lost his Philippine citizenship.
167. Buscayno vs Military Commission,
G.R. NO. 58284, 19 November 1981
Facts:
Petitioners Bernabe Buscayno Jose Ma. Sison And Juliet Sison, were charged with subversion by the Military
Commission in different charge sheets on different dates for acts committed prior to the effectivity of Presidential
Decree No. 885 on May 11, 1976 amending Republic Act No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. The three petitioners
were all charged with rebellion in an amended charge sheet but only the subversion and murder cases against
Buscayno were decided by the Military Commission with the penalty of death by firing squad although the decision
is still subject to review.
Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado Guerrero, alleged subversives
classified as "PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional Armed Group personalities," were wanted by the
authorities since 1971.
Buscayno and Sison were included in the so-called "National Target List" of active participants in the conspiracy
to seize political and state power and to take over the government by force whose arrest was ordered under General
Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972. The list was prepared by Colonel Hamilton B. Dimaya. (p. 95, Rollo of L-
47185)
On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant omnibus, catchall petition for habeas corpus,
prohibition and mandamus couched in repetitious, involuted and obfuscatory verbiage.
They prayed that the decision of Military Commission No. 2 dated May 4, 1981, convicting Buscayno of subversion
and murder and sentencing him to death by firing squad, be declared void because he was denied his constitutional
right to present evidence and that he be released from detention.
They also prayed that the charges of rebellion and subversion be dismissed for being in contravention of the rule on
double jeopardy, that Military Commissions Nos. 1, 6 and 25 be enjoined from proceeding with the trial of the
petitioners and that the petitioners be released. They also prayed that they be granted bail.
The petitioners also asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, enjoining the three Commissions from
trying the petitioners, enjoining Military Commission No. 1 from continuing with the perpetuation of testimonies
and from requiring the petitioners to attend the perpetuation proceedings and enjoining the Review Board-AFP from
reviewing the decision in the subversion and murder cases.
Petitioner contends that criminal liability for subversion was extinguished when Presidential Decree No. 885 (which
took effect on May 11, 1976, 72 OG 3826) repealed Republic Act No. 1700.
Issue:
Whether or not, criminal liability for subversion be extinguished for acts committed prior to the effectivity of
Presidential Decree No. 885 amending Republic Act No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law.
Ruling:
Petition dismissed. The acts committed before the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 885 shall be prosecuted
and punished under Republic Act No. 1700.
Revised Anti-Subversion Law (P.D. No. 885), in repealing or superseding Republic Act No. 1700, expressly
provides in its Section 7 that "acts committed in violation'' of the former law before the effectivity of said decree
"shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the provisions of the former Act" and that nothing in said
decree "shall prevent prosecution of cases pending for violation of" Republic Act No. 1700. That saving or transitory
clause is re-enacted in Section 14(i) of the National Security Code.
Notes:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, ALSO KNOWN AS THE ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT, is a law that outlaws
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and similar organizations, penalizing mere membership of these
organizations. It declares that the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in
fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines not only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control. Under the Anti-Subversion Act, the term Communist
Party of the Philippines means and includes the organizations now known as the Communist Party of the Philippines
and its military arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, formerly known as HUKBALAHAPS, and any
successors of such organizations.
168. Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,
G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
Facts:
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned
down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on
November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On
December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened
in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before
Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Issues:
Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the
issues moot and academic?
Ruling:
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]
Yes, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered
the issues moot and academic
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in
entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The
issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue
of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or
invalidate the same. xxx.
xxx xxx
[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense, jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress
can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does
not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
xxx xxx
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has
nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over
the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree
affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no
petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is
that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province.
In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed
government presence.
xxx xxx xxx.
In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching
the matter, it having become moot and academic.
169. Ampatuan, et al. v. Secretary Ronaldo Puno G.R. No. 190259: June 7, 2011
Facts:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters,
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the AFP and the PNP "to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence" in the named places.
Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also issued AO 273 "transferring" supervision of the ARMM
from the Office of the President to the DILG. But, due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the
President issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A) amending the former, by "delegating" instead of
"transferring" supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.
Claiming that the President's issuances encroached on the ARMM's autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition
under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to take over
ARMMs operations and seize the regional government's powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy
under Republic Act 9054 (also known as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the
DILG Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control over the ARMM since
the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.
Petitioners alleged that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise
of the Presidents emergency powers. Hence, petitioners prayed the nullity of Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273
and 273-A and respondents, DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.
In its comment for the respondents, the (OSG) insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive
the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. She issued the proclamation pursuant
to her "calling out" power as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.10 She must use her
judgment based on intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to call out the armed forces
to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever these reared their ugly heads.
On the other hand, the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her supervisory powers over the
ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. These orders did not authorize a take over of the
ARMM. They did not give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials. The delegation was
necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings. Further, the assailed proclamation and administrative
orders did not provide for the exercise of emergency powers.
Issues:
[1] Whether the aforementioned issuances are constitutional
[2] Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
Held:
The AO Nos 273 and 273-A are constitutional.
The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And
she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
The President's call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in
her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides -
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. x x x
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President's exercise of the "calling out" power had no factual basis. They
simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the
takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and
the main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military
and police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional
offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.
In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too
grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress
reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take
preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the
armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
170. Nicolas V. Romulo
*This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo
Facts:
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the
said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime
against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a
treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the
other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not
ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
Issue:
Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
Held:
The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty.
As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its
obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress
that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately
implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the
Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance
has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form
of implementation of its provisions.
171. Bayan v. Zamora
G. R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on
January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3)
votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21,
Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities”
may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held
for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such
treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
Held:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities
should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of
votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in section 25, Article
XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
172. Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary
Facts:
This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court to require the
Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court for the
Senate’s concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a
function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners
submit that the Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary
international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification
unless they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners to
file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On the
substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit the
Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
Issue:
Whether or not the executive department has a ministerial duty to transmit the Rome Statute (or any treaty) to the
Senate for concurrence.
Ruling:
The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the the President, being the head of state, is regarded as
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As
the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides
a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments
of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although
this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized
representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the
other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft
of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations.
The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even “collapse” in case the
parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is
primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of
the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the
treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several
negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty
more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests.
It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government
other than that which negotiated them.
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also
signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification
is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its
signature.
Petitioners’ arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with ratification. It should
be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-
making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument
and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state’s authorized representative in
the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a
treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within
the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This
Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
173. Vinuya v. Romulo
Facts:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines
and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these
were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Issue:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
Ruling:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that “the conduct
of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the
political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority
to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the
authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is
not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries,
and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability
in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length
of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of
both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient,
and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means
and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person
on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in
international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their
cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the
position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have
not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty
of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation
or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn
between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
174. Go Tek vs. Deportation Board
Facts:
On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint against Go Tek, a chinaman,
praying that the board recommend his immediate deportation to the President because he was an undesirable alien
on the basis of these allegations:
Go Tek was a sector commander and intelligence and record officer of a guerilla unit of the “Emergency Intelligence
Section, Army of the United States;”
And he was in possession of fake dollar checks in violation of Art. 168 of the RPC.
Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss.
The complaint was premature as he had a pending case in the city fiscal’s office for violation of Art. 168.
The board had no jurisdiction over the case because the board may only deport aliens on the grounds expressly
specified by law citing an obiter in Qua Chee Gan.
The Board denied the motion ruling that a conviction is not required before the State may deport an undesirable
alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the
President.
Go Tek filed an action for prohibition with the CFI.
The CFI granted the petition by upholding the obiter in the Qua Chee Gan case. It held that Sec. 37(3) of the
Immigration Law requires conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude and, thus, the complaint was premature
since mere possession of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law.
The Board appealed the decision to the SC.
Issues/ Held:
Can the Deportation Board entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not specified in section
37 of the Immigration Law? Yes.
Is prior conviction of the offense imputed to Go Tek necessary to allow the board to continue its investigation? No.
Rationale:
Under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due
investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of
Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation,
as charged against the alien, under Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law.
When deportation is effected by the President in the exercise of his powers, it need not be under any ground specified
in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law; such a requirement is relevant only when the deportation is effect by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Sec. 69 of the RAC and E.O. No. 398, creating the Deportation Board, do not specify the grounds for deportation
There is no legal nor constitutional provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is
to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable
as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state.
The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens
as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with Sec. 69 of the RAC.
After all, the inherent right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is rental to public
welfare is absolute and unqualified.
As the President is granted full discretion as regards deportation, it is fundamental that an executive order for
deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case.
175.Pastor Endencia vs Saturnino David
Facts:
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice
Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt from taxation – this is also
in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is
separate from the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may
not be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their
benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto vs Meer was rendered
ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
Held:
No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the power to interpret laws.
Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the
functions of the courts when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution
of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of their salary. This is a clear
example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office,” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the
law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as
used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a
judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction
of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts
in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
176. Nitafan VS CIR
G.R. No. 78780 July 23 1987
Facts:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme
Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the
Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Issue:
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
Held:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although
such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert
to the original concept of non-diminution´ of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens
whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also
of Cabinet members and all other employees.
177. De la Llana v Alba
GR No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
Facts:
(1) Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the
Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed
completed
Issue:
Whether or not BP 129 entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes" is constitutional
Held:
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg 129 not having been shown, this petition is
dismissed. No costs.
Ratio:
(1) Petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as tax payers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated.
(2) Confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no
choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to
be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. (3) There
is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing and
urgent."
(4) Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. Stress was laid
by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment of more efficiency in
the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a
necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill,
together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the
court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future."
(5) Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate
body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. This conclusion flows from the fundamental proposition that
the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions.
Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(6) The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts of
the national capital region, and other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in cities, as well as in
municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to doubt the fact that existing inferior
courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the
appropriate response to the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences
of opinion as to the appropriate remedy.
(7) It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may
be necessary to carryout national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is understandable
then why in Fortun v . Labang it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of
the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and
the legislative branches."
(8) To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with the security
of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant
who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise
(9) To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and
in the process to abolish existing ones.
(10) Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority
to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. The language of the
statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows: "Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial
Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such
receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in
Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1597." The existence of a standard is thus clear.
(11) The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. The work of justices
was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization. That is more in
the nature of scholarly studies.
178. Santiago vs Bautista
G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970
Facts:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought
the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers
who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper,
and even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They
also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal,
nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function
Issue:
WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.
Ruling:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing
of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and
determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the
legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of
parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined:
•as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
•authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or
the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
•The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
•The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance
of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to
the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine
179.Daza vs Singson
G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989
Facts:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to
only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing
the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new
set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson
as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the
Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO
that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that
the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.
Issue:
Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
Ruling:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
180. Garcia vs Board of Investments
G.R. No. 92024 November 9 1990
Facts:
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration with the
Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It
originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an amended
application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of
the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original and amended application documents. The BoI
denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to the release of the
documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these
documents absent consent to disclose. The BoI subsequently approved the amended application without holding a
second hearing or publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes of the investor, national
interest notwithstanding.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcia’s Constitutional right to have access to information on matters of public
concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had an
“interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital because it will
affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe” The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended
application was in fact a second application that required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be
held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that “all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the
consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the orders of a court of
competent jurisdiction”. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application, amended
application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, “the Constitution does not open every door
to any and all information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny”. Thus
it excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial information of the applicant BPC, and
matters affecting national security” from its order. The Court did not provide a test for what information is excluded
from the Constitutional privilege to access public information, nor did it specify the kinds of information that BPC
could withhold under its ruling.
181. Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education
95 Phil. 806
Facts:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private
schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of
Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary
of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the
Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any
law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that
such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court
2. Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
Held:
1. Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if,
and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference,
a hypothetical threat is insufficient. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. Mere
apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does
not constitute a justiciable controversy.
2. No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury
from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for
state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to
wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part
of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.
182. Tan vs. Macapagal
G.R. Nos. L-34161 29 February 1972
Facts:
The petitioner filed a five-page complaint on October 6,1971 to assail the validity of the Laurel Leido Resolution,
questioning the competence of the Constitutional Convention, on the grounds that “it is without power to consider,
discuss, and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution and it is merely empowered to propose
improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plans laid down by it”
The plea was dismissed on Oct. 8, 1971 for lack of merit. On month end, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, and an examination of the case in the light of Separation of Powers now ensues:
Issue:
Whether the complainant has the requisite standing to seek a declaration of nullity.
Held:
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantive
interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The Senator
has usually been considered as a possessor of the requisite personality. The petitioner cannot qualify in this category.
However, there are instances when the taxpayers can seek action following the principle that public funds
administered for the purposes of unconstitutional acts equate to misapplication of said funds. The Court has the
discretion to entertain a taxpayer’s suit, as it has in the case of Gonzales.
Moreover, it is only when a statute has been enacted that the courts can adjudicate on the validity. Filing of the suit
has to be after the enactment of the statute. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments
being left to discharge its duties. It may only render judgment on the validity of that has been done but only after it
is properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on
by it, there is no room for the interposition f judicial oversight. It is not within the jurisdiction of the courts to declare
the validity or nullity and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is dismissed. No costs.
183. Dumlao, Igot, Salapantan, Jr. vs. COMELEC 22 January 1980
Points of contention
Dumlao questions the constitutionality of BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 1 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
and due process clauses
Dumlao also alleges that such provision is directed against him and that the classification is based on purely arbitrary
grounds (class legislation)
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired
As for Igot and Salapantan, they assail the validity of BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State […] shall not be qualified to be a candidate for
any of the offices covered by this Act […] provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before
a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Resolution
The procedural aspect
Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities so it is traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution
Misjoinder of parties and actions (interest of Dumlao alien to that of Igot and Salapantan; they contest different
provisions; nature of joining suit different)
Out of the four requisites for the exercise of judicial review (SALE – standing, actual case, lis mota, earliest
opportunity), only the requisite of raising the issue at the earliest opportunity was complied with
Actual case and controversy
• Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of provision as there is no petition has been filed
seeking his disqualification
• In effect, his petition is one seeking an advisory opinion
• His case is within COMELEC’s primary jurisdiction (sole judge of contests relating to qualifications…)
Proper party
• It was only during the hearing (not in their petition) that Igot is said to be a Councilor candidate
• Neither Igot nor Salapantan has been convicted / charged with acts of disloyalty, and they have not been
disqualified from being candidates (generated grievance only)
As regards the petition being a taxpayer’s suit
Statutory provisions do not directly involve public fund disbursement
The two did not allege that their tax money is being misappropriated
Neither do they seek to restraint COMELEC from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid law
Institution of taxpayer’s suit is no assurance of judicial review
Unavoidability of constitutional question
This case is not an appropriate case for either of the petitioners because there is no cause of action; hence, the
necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent
The substantive viewpoint
THEY HAVE RESOLVED TO RULE ON TWO OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS THOUGH
• Paramount public interest involved
• Proximity of the elections (case decided 22 Jan; elections on 30 Jan)
Regarding Dumlao’s contentions
Dumlao’s contention that the provision is against him personally is BELIED by the fact that several petitions for
the disqualification of other candidates have been filed with the COMELEC
Equal protection is subject to rational classification
• Employees 65 y/o (they are subject to compulsory retirement) have been classified differently from the
younger ones (for purposes of public service)
• Reason to disqualify from same office: retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable
from the same gov’t work but by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume same post
• Purpose of the law: to allow emergence of younger blood in local gov’t
Absent is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision
It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for candidates provided they are reasonable
Regarding Igot and Salapantan’s contentions
Accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; accusation ≠ guilt
Challenged provision (BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2) contravenes constitutional presumption of innocence because candidate
is disqualified on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him
He is placed in the same category as a person ALREADY CONVICTED of a crime
Although the filing of charges is just prima facie evidence (can be rebutted by contrary proof), there is “clear and
present danger” considering that elections was just 8 days away (no more time to offer proof to overcome prima
facie evidence)
It is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body (like COMELEC)
Legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination
Disposition
BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 1 VALID à This is the provision challenged by Dumlao
Portion of BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2 declared NULL AND VOID for being violative of presumption of innocence à This
is the provision challenged by Igot and Salapantan
“…the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact"
Opinions
Concurring: Barredo
Sec. 9(1), Art. XII-C [Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination] is more expensive than the equal protection clause
Concurring: Aquino
BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2 is VALID, being similar to certain presumptions in RPC 217, 315 as amended by RA 4885
Concurring: Abad Santos
A judgment of conviction (as provided in BP 52, Sec. 4, par. 2) should be one which is final and appealable
Concurring: Fernando
Provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause
Dissenting: Teehankee
Dissents insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of BP 52, Sec. 4 (special disqualification
Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated (a retired officer running for another position is allowed to run)
Mentioned purpose (infusing new blood in local gov’t) is not rational nor reasonable
Disqualification / non-disqualification and consequent classification as old / new blood cannot hinge on such an
irrelevant question of WON they have received retirement benefits
Disqualification violative of equal protection clause as well as Sec. 9(1), Art. XII-C (see Barredo’s concurring
opinion)
185. Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC
05 May 1994 G.R. No. 113375
Facts:
The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in
operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator
Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship
requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling
35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos
strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project
pushed through.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and
2. Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
Ruling:
1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The
legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court
brushes aside the procedural barrier.
2. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries
“in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic
or foreign.” The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration,
association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By
the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned,
nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.
186. Kilosbayan VS. Morato
G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993
Facts:
1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of
a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO
from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint venture.
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories
on January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
• Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual rental
computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
• Rent is computed bi-weekly.
• Term is 8 years.
• PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
• Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
• It is the same as the old contract of lease.
• It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
• It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and it is not
most advantageous to the government.
4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
• ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
• ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
• Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
• Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
• Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
• Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.
2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.
Rulings:
1. In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
• STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure
from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
• LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is
not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense
be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties are the same but the cases are not.
• RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly
passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same
parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with,
but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to
make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
• Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner’s
standing.
• Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real parties of interest’.
• Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either
principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment
which would positively result to them from the contract.
• Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public
contracts may be made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
2. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
• It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of the system
is completely in its hands.
• Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined to review.
• Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is discussed
in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
• In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this would allow
PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the claim is speculative. In any case,
in the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in making contracts, the government has acted in good faith.
The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power.
• It was held in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which
would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for the holding of sweepstakes
activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing in any activities that would compete in their
own activities.
• It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own activities. The
Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of technology would
involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association with the PGMC.
• O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for privately-owned buildings or
spaces for government use or of government owned buildings or spaces for private use.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED
with finality.
187. Joya vs Presidential Commission on Good Governance GR No 96541 24 August 1993
Facts:
Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order
seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on January 11, 1991 by Christie’s of New
York of the following:
o 82 Old Masters Paintings
o 18th and 19th century silverware contained in 71 cartons
The items were seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of manila and place in custody of the Central
Bank and alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies
August 9, 1990 – Mateo Caparas, the Chairman of PCGG wrote then President Aquino requesting her for authority
to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Phil and Christie, Manson and Woods
International Inc (Christie’s of New York) concerning the sale
August 14, 1990 – Pres Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. authorized PCGG to
sign the agreement
August 15, 1990 – PCGG signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie’s of New York
October 26, 1990 – COA submitted to Pres Aquino the audit findings and observations on the Consignment
Agreement to the effect that:
The authority of PCGG Chairman Caparas was of doubtful legality
Contract was highly disadvantageous to the government
PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the US
Assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance hence their disposal was prohibited by
law
November 15, 1990 – PCGG, through its new Chairman David Castro, wrote Pres Aquino defending the
Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo; Director of National Museum
Gabriel Casal issued a certification that the items subject on the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the
classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
Ruling:
No. Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The paintings legally belong to the foundation or the members of thereof
and the silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was toppled and the said objects
were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the government without complying with constitutional
and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these were already acquired, any defect in the
acquisition must be raised by the true owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said
objects that have become publicly owned.
Ratio and Reasoning:
The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question
Legal Standing – personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged
Interest – material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or mere incidental interest; must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party
There are certain instances when the Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen
brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfilment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the
disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens and taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country’s artistic wealth, they have legal personality
However, the paintings were donated by private persons to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation and
the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign
countries. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration should not be understood to mean that
the ownership of these items has automatically passed on to the govt. Petitioners failed to establish that they are
the legal owners of the artworks or that the pieces have become publicly owned and thus they do not possess any
clear legal right to question their alleged unauthorized disposition
The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only if there is an actual case or controversy
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction
sale, which is long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic
188. Chavez v PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.
Facts:
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD
No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring
to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque
issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Parañaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board
of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V.
Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands
and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus
void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the
Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section
28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional
and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue:
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going negotiations BEFORE a final
agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government
Held:
1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot
operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA
on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI
have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA
is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating
lands of the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but
one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila
Bay to a single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned corporation performing
public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible
transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas
as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed
area to raise financing for the reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA
failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public
disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by
PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with
its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they
'immediately affect the social, economic and moral wellbeing of the people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights — to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources — matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution,
thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the
right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the
people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for
the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating
to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means
the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers
at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public
records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public
service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of
the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to
public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use
the property. Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property
not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public
dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The
legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use
or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter,
and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for
non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public
agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting
his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under
the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the
public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural
resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested
with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands
subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere
transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No.
1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO
No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however,
expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied)
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter
free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government
is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:...
"In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed
by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original
JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares,
almost double the area publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the
public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of
the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of
a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction
a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can
"acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which
is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
189. Gonzales vs. Narvasa
G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26,
1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the
constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by
way of a law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43
Held:
No. The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that
he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all,
it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the
President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the
Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he
claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi
so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that
public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that
there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue
of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is
“appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that
case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to
make such a representation.
190. Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law
is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with
the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental
rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR
SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY
NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE
BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER
THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
Issue:
R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
I. It violates the due process clause for its vagueness
II. It violates the constitutional right of the accused to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him
III. It violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence by lowering the quantum of
evidence necessary for proving the component elements of plunder
IV. It is beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to delimit the reasonable doubt standard and to abolish
the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes by converting these to mala prohibita, in violation of the due process
concept of criminal responsibility.
Held:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by
RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in
a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear,
or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a
well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and
"series:"
Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into
such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have
taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under
Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said
common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the
aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used
by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in
this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys
a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a
statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the
immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime
of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as
in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability
lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There
is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
In view of mens rea
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof
of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion — . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are
mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form
of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are
the effect and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government official, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are
mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the
same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and
becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
In view of presumption of innocence
At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is
a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be
expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given
situations. The application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which
will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally mandated function
of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative
enactments.
A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish
the purpose for which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its
enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation which affects not
just private parties or personal interests but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a
crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped permanently."
In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been subject
to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a
co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a Senator would not
in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of
law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is
estopped from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result
in injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.
What is RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States federal law that provides for extended
criminal penalties and a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO
was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted
October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968.
While its intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were actively engaged in organized crime,
its application has been more widespread.
In view of facial challenge
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.'
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.
In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J.
In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to the Constitution before this Court may
declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law
prohibits, the statute allows to be done. 40 To justify the nullification of the law, there must be a clear, unequivocal
breach of the Constitution; not a doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law which are easily
clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from
establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the Constitution, the
constitutional challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to the presumption of
innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of
constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof.
Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of
plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of over or criminal acts indicative of unlawful
scheme or conspiracy."
All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived to be the reality with respect to the
crime of plunder — that "the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth and entirety, be discovered, by reason
of the 'stealth and secrecy' in which it is committed and the involvement of 'so many persons here and abroad and
[the fact that it] touches so many states and territorial units."'
"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless
the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in favor of
constitutionality . . . To doubt is to sustain.'
In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal statute should not be so vague and
uncertain that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.
There are three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that
individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale
was articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could
not reasonably understand to be proscribed.
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty
the standards to which an individual must conform his conduct, it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable
standards to guide prospective conduct. And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty
is higher. The penalty imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to
death. Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher
than that of other laws.
It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a "facial challenge" to the Plunder Law, and that
"facial" or "on its face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several
problematical portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you have a 'series' of
criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings
of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.
To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to
constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and sentence
the accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise punishable under the Revised
Penal Code and other laws which are bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently
mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be established together
with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does
not require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes
a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life
and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against
political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.
In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the desire to do justice is tarnished by
anger and vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections accorded an accused may be taken away.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law
which deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other procedures leading to conviction may be fair and
proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus, an accused may not be
sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial construction
takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due process requires that a criminal
statute should not be vague and uncertain. More explicitly — That the terms of a penal statute. . . must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process.
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. 9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is vague or
overbroad, in violation of the due process clause, where its language does not convey sufficiently definite warning
to the average person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the criminal
acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed. Equally disagreeable is the provision of the
Plunder Law which does away with the requirement that each and every component of the criminal act of plunder
be proved and instead limits itself to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy,
and does away with the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are concerned. In other words, R.A.
No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to
constitute the crime of plunder, because the law requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the specifications of details in an
information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot rise higher than the statute
upon which it is based. Not even the construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can
supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information should
be drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an information should also be present in the law upon
which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the information will come from the
prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of Congress.
In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded on
the Constitution which even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by
the Constitution are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no matter how
socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the enumerated "criminal acts" under
Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and
repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove
beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. The State
may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With more reason, it should not be allowed to
go around the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a "means" of committing the
crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be convinced of the existence of a "combination
or series." As to which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the Justices need not be in full agreement.
Surely, this would cover-up a wide disagreement among them about just what the accused actually did or did not
do. Stated differently, even if the Justices are not unified in their determination on what criminal acts were actually
committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the law, still, they could convict him of plunder.
The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated under Section 1(d)
thereof." 33 But it can very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times. And the Office of the
Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends differently. It defines the
term series as a "repetition" or pertaining to "two or more."
A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already punished with lesser
penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be cured by judicial construction.
In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this Court
is not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the law. I vote to grant the petition, not
because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond today and I see that this law can pose a serious threat to the
life, liberty and property of anyone who may come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this Court,
my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good conscience,
fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.
191.Umali vs. Guingona, 305 SCRA 533 (1999)
Facts:
The case is a case filed for the dismissal of the petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Injunction brought by petitioner
against the respondents. It was on October 27, 1993 when Osmundo Umali was appointed as Regional Director of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos. The late President received a memorandum alleging
against the petitioner in violation of internal revenue laws during the incumbency as Regional Director. On October
6, 1994, President Ramos issued an Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing the petitioner from service with
forfeiture of retirement and all benefits provided by law. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the Office
of the President denied the motion for reconsideration. December 1, 1994, a petition is brought to the regional Trial
Court of Makati pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction of Administrative Order No. 152.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right to security of tenure
(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of administrative order no. 152
(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of
its constitutionality belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision
(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the charges against petitioner, there is still
basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order no. 152
Ruling:
(a) Whether or not administrative order no. 152 violated the petitioner's right to security of tenure
NO. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. The petitioner
claimed that as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal revenue he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure
however it is anemic of evidentiary support. But it was fatal that he wasn't able to provide sufficient evidence on
this matter.
(b) Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of administrative order no. 152
NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues to be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to
due processes before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect
to his alleged violations of internal revenue laws and regulations and he attended the hearings before the
investigatory body.
(c) Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of
its constitutionality belated in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision
The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the
proceedings below
(d) Whether or not in the light of the ombudsman resolution dismissing the charges against petitioner, there is still
basis for petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in administrative order no. 152
The administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. Administrative
Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges
before the ombudsman.
Note: The petition is dismissible because the issues raised by the petitioner does not constitute any valid legal basis
for overturning the findings and conclusions by the Court of Appeals. However, considering antecedent facts and
circumstances, the Court has decided to consider the dismissal and because the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Finally, the Solicitor General has no more basis to
enact Administrative Order No. 152.
Dispositive:
Wherefore, in light of the foregoing effective and substantive supervening events, and in the exercise of its equity
powers, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition Accordingly Administrative order no 152 is considered LIFTED
and petitioner can be allowed to retire with full benefits No pronouncement as to costs.
192. Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is
one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former
during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is
outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located
in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the
Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law
situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity
to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or
the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which
law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to
the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the
State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of
lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is
misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the
existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary
merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the
constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned
by Filipinos is inapplicable.
Notes:
lis mota
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not
likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the
resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a statute or governmental act.[110] If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made
without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.[111] Garcia v. Executive Secretary
explains why:
Lis Mota — the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review — means that the
Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed
of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to
show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This
requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative. [112] (Italics in the original.)
193. Hacienda Luisita vs PARC
Case Digest GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural
lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a
6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac.
Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO),
which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed
an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now
DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to
surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal
was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the
SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in distributing land
ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a
spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement
(SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary
Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was
subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and
the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms
and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they haven’t actually received those benefits in full, that HLI
violated the terms, and that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the
Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended
to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through
compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those
lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC
was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the
corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer.
For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept
of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
Administrative Law
Issue 1: W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan or SDP
Constitutional Law
Issue 2: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at the earliest possible
opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least
within a reasonable time thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC, the lis mota of the
petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of
HLI. With regards to the original positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota
is the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved
without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657.
Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the executive or legislative
departments have not been met in this case.
Statutory Construction
Issue 3: W/N Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the Constitution’s concept of agrarian reform
The SC, through a resolution dated Nov 21 2011 of the motion for reconsideration filed by HLI, affirmed the
revocation of HLI’s SDP and the placing of Hacienda Luisita under the compulsory land distribution scheme of the
CARP law. It was also held that the date of taking was Nov 21 1989, when the PARC, by Resolution 89-12-2,
approved the SDP of HLI.
Issue:
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
Held:
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the
suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to
decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is
on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of
the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not
only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they
were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the
case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of
acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the
Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
194. Agbayani vs PNB [G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971]
Facts:
Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage.
On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging
that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity.
PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10,
1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending
the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which
the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such contention persuasive
and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
Issue:
W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law before the same were
declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of Unconstitutionality of a law)
Held:
Yes. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official.” 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is
an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of the judicial recognition that
moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has
made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period
that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan
matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time
consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the
effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated,
covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the
foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.
196. People vs Mateo
G.R. No. 147678-87 July 7 2004
Facts:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to
indemnify the complainant for actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General assailed the
factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
Issue:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the
constitution on automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death.
Ruling:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on
the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987
Constitution –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
“x x x x x x x x x
“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.”
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not
necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity
on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would appear
to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the
ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical
dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to
face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to
review factual issues.
197. Villavert vs. Desierto
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence. (Sec. 30, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
An administrative charge for grave misconduct was filed against Villavert, Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO
Cebu Branch. The Graft Investigation Officer recommended the dismissal of the case. However, Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas issued a Memorandum finding Villavert guilty of the charge. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770.
Issue:
May decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases be appealed to the Supreme Court?
Held:
No. In Fabian vs. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30,
Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice
and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.
198. Yao vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
George Yao’s legal dilemma commenced when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company (PEMCO)
noticed the proliferation locally of General Electric (GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA,
Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC 50 pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design.
Assessing that these products were counterfeit% PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was
issued by the MeTC Branch 49 Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing starters, were thereafter seized from
the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City. The indictment charged YAO and Roxas of having mutually and in
conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the General Electric(GE) logo design and containers, making
them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters6 and inducing the public to believe them as such. Both accused
pleaded not guilty. The MeTC acquitted Roxas but convicted YAO. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared
that the prosecution failed topro4e that he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized.
YAO filled a motion for reconsideration, which the MeTC denied. He then appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City (RTC). Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered a one page decision which affirmed in toto the MeTC
decision. YAO filed a motion for reconsideration and assailed the decision as4iolati4e of section 2 Rule 20 of the
Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid of merit and reiterated that the findings
of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and
cogent reasons. YAO appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals granted
YAO an extension of twenty days to file the appellant’s Brief. However, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
resolution declaring that the decision of RTC has long become final and executory and ordering the records of the
case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment.
YAO filed an urgent Motion to set Aside Entry of judgment contending that the resolution did not specifically
dismiss the appeal but the Court of Appeals denied the urgent Motion to set aside the Entry of judgment for lack of
merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Yao was denied due process
Ruling:
Yes, he was. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of YAO transgressed section 14 Article 8 of the
Constitution, which states SEC 140. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
The Court finds that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the
constitutional injunction. The RTC decision achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple
summation of facts which could easily be done. The Court cannot consider or affirm said RTC decision as a
memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity. It merely affirmed in toto the
MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly
meet the issues for resolution otherwise, the appeal would be pointless. Faithful adherence to the requirements of
Section 14 Article 8 of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is
likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to litigation should be informed of
how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe
that the decision should be reversed. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and his right to appeal
is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the prerogative, but instead afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his case, freed from the constraints of technicalities. A party litigant is to be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on mere technicalities. The Court withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable
failure to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in court and reminding
also all magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14 Article 8 of the Constitution.
199. Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez vs CA
Facts:
Sometime in February 1981, private respondents Godofredo Dela Paz and his sister Manuela Dela Paz entered into
an oral contract with petitioner Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant Parish Priest of Cabanatuan City for the sale of
a certain lot located at Villa Fe Subdivision.
At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered under the name of Claudia Dela Paz, private respondents’ mother
although the latter had already sold it to private respondent Manuela Dela Paz by virtue if a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Private respondent subsequently registered the lot under her name and was issued a Transfer Certificate Title.
When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents Dela Paz were accompanied by their mother
since petitioner dealt with the Dela Pazes as a family and not individually.
He was assured by them that the lot belonged to Manuela.
It was agreed that petitioner will pay 3000 downpayment and the balance would be payable in installments.
Petitioner started the construction of a house on the lot with the written consent if the then registered owner, Claudia.
Construction on the house was completed and since them, petitioner and his family have maintained their residence
there.
On January 1983, petitioner completed payment of the lot for which private respondents Dela Paz executed two
documents.
The first document was a promise that the Deed of Sale shall be delivered to petitioner on February 25, 1983 and
the second document was a certification that Freddie Dela Paz has agreed to sign the affidavit of sale of lot sold to
petitioner.
However, private respondents Dela Paz never delivered the Deed of Sale as they promised to petitioner.
In the meantime, in a Deed of Absolute Sale with right to repurchase, private respondents Dela Paz sold three lots
with right to repurchase the same within one year to private respondents spouses Veneracion. One of the lots sold
was the lot previously sold to petitioner.
Spouses Veneracion never took actual possession of any of these lots during the period of redemption, but all the
titles to the lots were given to him.
Before the expiration of the one year period, private respondet Godofredo Dela Paz informed private respondent
Reynaldo Veneracion that he was selling the three lots to another person.
Indeed, Veneracion received a call from Mr. Tecson verifying if he had the titles ti the properties as the Dela Pazes
were offering to sell the two lots. The offer included the lot purchased by petitioner.
Private respondent Veneracion offered to purchase the same two lots from Dela Paz and so a Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed over these lots.
Sometime in January 1984, Reynaldo Veneracion asked a certain Renato Reyes, petitioner’s neighbor, who the
owner of the building erected on the subject lot was.
Reyes told him that it was Feliza Martines, petitioner’s mother, who was in possession of the property.
Veneracion told Godofredo about the matter and was assured by the latter that he would talk to Feliza.
Based on that assurance, private respondents Veneracion registered the lots with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold to the spouses Veneracion after
receiving a letter from private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion, claiming ownership of the land and demanding
that they vacate the property and remove their improvements thereon.
Petitioner, in turn, demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale from private respondents Dela Paz
and informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was the owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same
from private respondents Dela Paz.
The matter was then referred to the Katarungang Pambarangay for conciliation but the parties failed to reach an
agreement.
As a consequence, private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion brought an action for ejectment in the MTC against
petitioner and his mother.
On the other hand, petitioner caused a notice of lis pendens to be recorded in the TCT.
The TC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
The TC’s decision where objected by the private respondents Veneracion and these cases were forwarded to the
RTC.
RTC rendered a decision finding private respondents Veneracion as the true owner of the lot in dispute by virtue of
their prior registration with the Register of Deeds.
Meanwhile, while the ejectment case was pending before the MTC, petitioner Martinez filed a complaint for
annulment of sale with damages against the Veneracions and Dela Pazez with the RTC.
RTC rendered a decision finding private respondents Veneracion owners of the land in dispute.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review for the ejectment case before the CA.
As to the case for annulment of sale and damages, the petitioner likewise appealed the TC’s decision before the CA.
CA rendered a decision in favor of respondents.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith of the lot in dispute as to make them the
absolute owners thereof.
Held:
The CA based its ruling that private respondents are the owner of the disputed lot on their reliance on private
respondent Godofredo Dela Paz’s assurance that he would take care of the matter concerning petitioner’s occupancy
of the disputed lot as constituting good faith.
This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Article 1544 of the CC which provides two
requirements – acquisition in good faith and recording in good faith. The presence of good faith shall be ascertained
from the circusmtances surrounding the purchase of the land and the SC ruled in three ways.
First, with regard to the first sale to private respondents Veneracion, Reynaldo Veneracion testified that before the
execution of the sale with right to repurchase, he inspected the lot and it was vacant. However, this is belied by the
testimony of Engr. Minor who was the building inspector and when he conducted an ocular inspection of the lot in
dispute, he found that the building was 100% completed. Thus, private respondents already knew that there was a
construction being made on the property they purchased.
Second, the parties entered into an equitable mortgage and not contract of sale. The requisites were all present:
a. Private respondents Veneracion never took actual possession of the three lots;
b. Private respondents Dela Paz remained possession of the third lot which was co-owned by them and where they
resided;
c. During the first sale and second sale, Veneracion never made any effort to take possession of the properties; and
d. When the period of redemption expired and when they were informed that the Dela Pazes are offering the lots
for sale, they never objected and instead, offered to purchase the two lots.
Third, the appellate court’s reliance on Articles 1357 and 1358 of the Civil Code to determine private respondents
Veneraction’s lack of knowledge of petitioner’s ownership of the disputed lot is erroneous.
a. Art. 1357 and Art. 1358, in relation to Art. 1403(2) of the Civil Code, requires that the sale of real property must
be in writing for it to be enforceable.
b. It need not be notarized.
c. If the sale has not been put in writing, either of the contracting parties can compel the other to observe such
requirement.
d. This is what petitioner did when he repeatedly demanded that a Deed of Absolute Sale be executed in his favor
by private respondents De la Paz.
e. There is nothing in the above provisions which require that a contract of sale of realty must be executed in a
public document.
f. In any event, it has been shown that private respondents Veneracion had knowledge of facts which would put
them on inquiry as to the nature of petitioner’s occupancy of the disputed lot.
Finally, the SC reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and:
a. Declared the deed of sale executed by private respondents Godofredo and Veneracion null and void;
b. Ordered private respondents Godofredo and Manuela to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner
Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez;
c. Ordered private respondents Dela Pazes to reimburse spouses Veneracion the amount the latter may have paid;
d. Ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the TCT in favor of the Veneracion spouses and issue a new one in the
name of petitioner and
e. Ordered private respondents to pay petitioner jointly and severally the sum as attorney’s fees and to pay the cosrs
of the suit.
200. Maceda vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 102781
Facts:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of
service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew
that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts
Held:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under
Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service,
the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
211. Manila Public School Teachers Association vs Secretary of Education GR No. 95445 August 6, 1991
Facts:
September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day. There is no question that some 800
teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition in
G.R. No. 95590, 4 they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the morning whence they proceeded to the National
Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly.
Issue:
Do public teachers have the right to strike?
Ruling:
No, the manila public school teachers’ association has no right to strike during class hours.
The dissenting opinions, however, would anchor their defense of the public-school teachers on their
right to petition the government for redress of grievances.
201. Noblejas vs Teehankee
23 SCRA 405 April 29, 1968
Facts:
Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration. By the
terms of section 2 of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments
and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."
On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain in writing why
no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision,
consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the
original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges,
emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated
in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should
be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No.
296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the
President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of
the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary
of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer
respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial
functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act
and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative
or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except
when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the
separation of powers.
Issue:
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance.
Held:
it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact
a member of the Judiciary.
petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be
investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would
necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature
had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the
President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General the
rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature,
through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials
the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal
procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in
plain and unequivocal language.
if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges
of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed
only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would
violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of
supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.
Decision: Writs denied, petition dismissed
202.Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each
having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to
allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued
that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses,
the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that
the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism,
as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance
of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a
representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.
Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this case?
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of
7 sitting members unconstitutional?
3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?
Held:
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally,
a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an
official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court
and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country
may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the
Court. Then it goes to its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second
part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed
of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative
may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members
of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s
voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory,
defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect that
the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is
the best means to break a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize
that it was so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a
unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of
Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to
legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot
be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the
JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute.
Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.
It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied
to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put
in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless
valid.
203. Jardeleza vs Sereno
GR 213181 August 19, 2014
Facts:
Following Justice Abad’s compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application or recommendations for the
position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of
candidates. However, he was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself –
CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called “unanimity rule” against him. Generally,
the rule is that an applicant is included in the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of
all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an applicant’s
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on June
30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and direct the JBC to, among others,
give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings,
and to disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed a confidential information
which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a
sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing.
He also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist.
Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees
who made it to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the “unanimity
rule”..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in
the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding
him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Political Law
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that an applicant’s access to the
rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class
of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s
qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to
recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence
to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious
assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its
assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies
with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to
the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of
procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the “unanimity
rule” as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses
to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received
before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case
Yes. Jardeleza’s allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC.
Under Sec 8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under the supervision of the SC. It follows that
such supervisory authority covers the overseeing of whether the JBC complies with its own rules or not.
Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC
No. The JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance
of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer
where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter
in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is available against the JBC (which is
not exercising quasi-judicial functions)
Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial review vested to the SC by the 1987
Constitution, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.
204. Fortich vs Corona 398 SCRA 685
Doctrine: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a resolution which substantially modifies
a decision after it has attained finality is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and
executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said agency has lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.
The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final and executory.
Facts:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a “win-win” Resolution which reopened case O.P.
Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long
declared the said Decision final & executory after the DAR’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having
been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OP’s act, it being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the “win-win” Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void
since “it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling,” hence, the “March 29, 1996 decision…could not as yet become final
and executory as to be beyond modification”. They further explained that the DAR’s failure to file their Motion for
Reconsideration on time was “excusable”.
Issue:
Was the OP’s modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers and prerogatives?
1. Whether the DAR’s late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation of rules.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.
Held:
1.No. Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates that ‘decisions/resolutions/orders
of the Office of the President shall…become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy therof xxx’
unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
The respondent’s explanation that the DAR’s office procedure ‘made it impossible…to file its Motion for
Reconsideration on time’ since the said decision had to be referred to its different departments cannot be considered
a valid justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary
period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an
administrative body.
2.No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be disturbed or substantially modified. Res
judicata has set in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. The Constitution guarantees that “all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.”
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly & speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the relaxation of rules was
‘never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.’
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances.
3.No. It is a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that
the same was rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere
technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before a case or controversy
can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules & settled
jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the
petitioners, and all others who should be benefited by the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., “just as a
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.”
205. Santiago vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Facts:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term limits of elective
officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s initiative the
signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective
government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and
Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be
submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will
be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal
of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative
but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This
deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law. c.COMELEC has no power
to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only Congress is authorized by the
Constitution to pass the implementing law.d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.e. Congress nor any government agency
has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
Issue:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution but, as worded, it does not
adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for amendments to
Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not
relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended,
in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. The argument that the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative
and Referendum because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope
of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution which only legislative
bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff
powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large;
[4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of
the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void.
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under
Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an
order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist
Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of
the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance
with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested
upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the required signatures,
the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative
only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot
be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning
undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of
6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.
206. Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
Facts:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No.
6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve
per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%)
of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications
in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution;
Held:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready
and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there
is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself
because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures.
The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed
as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will
not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
207. Ramon Gonzales vs COMELEC
Facts:
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the
proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the
same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon
Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission
of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather
than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up with their proposals
to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense
that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
Held:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers
are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository
of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is
not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act.
Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether
or not such act of the constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held that
there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a
special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so
under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a special date so as
to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should be able to compare the original
proposition with the amended proposition.
208. Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections
Facts:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise
by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No.
1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued
PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission
on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and
effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot
take cognizance of it.
Issue:
Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
Held:
Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in
cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function
normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition
(Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars.
1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal
of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation
are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence
of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in
form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to
present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.
209. Luego vs CSC 143 SCRA 327
Facts:
Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment
was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest
filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position
and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment
is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s
appointment.
Issue:
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.
Held:
No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not
for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to
“…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove
those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer,
its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC
Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified,
which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
210. Baluyot vs Holganza GR No. 136374 February 9, 2000
Facts:
During a spot audit conducted on March 21, 1977 by a team of auditors from the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) headquarters, a cash shortage of P154,350.13 was discovered in the funds of its Bohol chapter. The chapter
administrator, petitioner Francisca S. Baluyot, was held accountable for the shortage. Thereafter, on January 8,
1998, private respondent Paul E. Holganza, in his capacity as a member of the board of directors of the Bohol
chapter, filed an affidavit-complaint1 before the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner of malversation
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. However, upon recommendation by respondent Anna Marie P.
Militante, Graft Investigation Officer I, an administrative docket for dishonesty was also opened against petitioner.
On February 6, 1998, public respondent issued an Order3 requiring petitioner to file her counter-affidavit to the
charges of malversation and dishonesty within ten days from notice, with a warning that her failure to comply would
be construed as a waiver on her part to refute the charges, and that the case would be resolved based on the evidence
on record. On March 14, 1998, petitioner filed her counter-affidavit,4 raising principally the defense that public
respondent had no jurisdiction over the controversy. She argued that the Ombudsman had authority only over
government-owned or controlled corporations, which the PNRC was not.
On August 21, 1998, public respondent issued the first assailed Order5 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. It
further scheduled a clarificatory hearing on the criminal aspect of the complaint and a preliminary conference on
its administrative aspect on September 2, 1998. Petitioner received the order on August 26, 1998 and she filed a
motion for reconsideration6 the next day.
On October 28, 1998, public respondent issued the second assailed Order7 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this recourse.
We dismiss the petition.
Held:
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy since the
PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary organization. The following circumstances, she insists, are indicative of the
private character of the organization:
(1) the PNRC does not receive any budgetary support from the government, and that all money given to it by the
latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the organization;
(2) funds for the payment of personnel's salaries and other emoluments come from yearly fund campaigns, private
contributions and rentals from its properties; and
(3) it is not audited by the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner states that the PNRC falls under the International Federation of Red Cross, a Switzerland-based
organization, and that the power to discipline employees accused of misconduct, malfeasance, or immorality
belongs to the PNRC Secretary General by virtue of Section "G", Article IX of its by-laws.8 She threatens that "to
classify the PNRC as a government-owned or controlled corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would
lose its neutrality, independence and impartiality . . . .9
Practically the same issue was addressed in Camporedondo v. National Labor Relations Commission, et.
al.,10where an almost identical set of facts obtained. Petitioner therein was the administrator of the Surigao del
Norte chapter of the PNRC. An audit conducted by a field auditor revealed a shortage in the chapter funds in the
sum of P109,000.00. When required to restitute the amount of P135,927.78, petitioner therein instead applied for
early retirement, which was denied by the Secretary General of the PNRC. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against PNRC before the National Labor Relations Commission. In
turn, PNRC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, averring that PNRC was a
government corporation whose employees are embraced by civil service regulation. The labor arbiter dismissed the
complaint, and the Commission sustained his order. The petitioner assailed the dismissal of his complaint via a
petition for certiorari, contending that the PNRC is a private organization and not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. In dismissing the petition, we ruled thus:
Resolving the issue set out in the opening paragraph of this opinion, we rule that the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) is a government owned and controlled corporation, with an original charter under Republic Act No. 95, as
amended. The test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the
Government Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to a private corporation" simply
because its charter was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties,
taxes, fees and other charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for
its disaster relief work and other services and in its benefits and fund raising drives, and be allotted one lottery draw
a year by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster relief operation in addition to its
existing lottery draws for blood program.
Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter, pursuant to Section 13, of Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", to wit:
Sec. 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in ever case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.11
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
212. SSS vs CA GR No. 85279 July 28, 1989
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work;
that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment
of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees
and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the
right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service
are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with
an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO
v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's
memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
213. Bitonio Jr. vs COA GR No. 147392 March 12, 2004
Facts:
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations
in the Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he
was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to Mr.
Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet
members, their deputies and assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of compensation therefore,
and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997, implementing Senate Committee Reports No.
509.
In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court modified its earlier ruling in
the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their
Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other
appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.
He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil Liberties Union case became
final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively
presumed to have been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties
Union case.
COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board
of Directors’ meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Held:
The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.
The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting as representative of the
Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.
The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office
or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of
Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the Constitution. No law can
render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have
realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such
defect. The option of designating representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted.
Likewise, the paragraph as to payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also deleted,
considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.
214. Cayetano vs Monsod 201 SCRA 210
Facts:
Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as chairman of the COMELEC. Cayetano
questioned the appointment for Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years.
The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman,
shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent worked in his
father’s law office for a short while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the World Bank Group for about 2
years, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans, and coordinating
legal, economic and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief
Executive Officer or Consultant of various companies.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming Monsod’s
appointment.
Held:
1. Yes. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court…In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before
judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a
lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.
A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law.”
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty. Monsod’s past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
2. No. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the president is
mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so vested
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence,
there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the CA.
215. Javier vs COMELEC 144 SCRA 194
Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984
in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes
perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique
to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June
7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without
prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made
by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be
resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was
a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute
requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down.
The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.
Issue:
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
Held:
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently
demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be
sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the
rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized
after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings
are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent
law.
216. Aruelo Jr. vs CA 227 SCRA 311
Facts:
(1) Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the office of the Vice- Mayor of
the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a margin of four votes, such that
on May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas,
Bulacan.
(2) On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition docketed as SPC No.
92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes
in the tally sheets and the election returns.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion by declaring that Gatchalian’s answer with counter-
protest and counterclaim was timely filed
Held:
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
Ratio:
An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and above
the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people. For this
reason, it is a well-established principle that laws governing election protests must be
liberally construed to the end that the popular will, ex pressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely
technical reasons, be defeated (Unda v. Commission on Elections, 190 SCRA 827[1990]; De Leon v. Guadiz , J r.,
104 SCRA591 [1981]; Macasundig v. Macalangan, 13 SCRA 577[1965]; Corocoro v. Bascara,9 SCRA 519 [1963]).
217. NPC vs COMELEC 144 SCRA 194
Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating
space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and
the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their
right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued
by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only
publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period
of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that
Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or
political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio
and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information
concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and
opinion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech,
freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may
be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., "during the election period." In
our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given
constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media
operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article
IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b)
does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-
worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so
long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly
paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in
responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid
political advertisements of particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly
repressive or unreasonable.
218. Flores vs COMELEC 184 SCRA 484
Facts:
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for kagawad
on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in
accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who
placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum
sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as
stray from the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge
agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have
been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another
candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second
place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review the
decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the
municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable”. In his petition
for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioner’s appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?
Held:
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-
C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”.
Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests
are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the
decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and
not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal
or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.
219. Garces vs CA 259 SCRA 99
Facts:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to
replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post
as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the
Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election
Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover
for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga
del Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion
continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and
damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent
Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic
by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme
Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary
to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A. RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the
proper remedy, and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving
the conduct of elections. CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
Held:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was
the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy.
The “case” or “matter” referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC,
i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the COMELEC that
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC’s
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving “elective regional, provincial and city officials.”
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is
an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an
elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before
the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over “all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.”
220. Office of the Ombudsman vs Madriaga GR No. 164316 September 27, 2006
Facts:
The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman charging Gertrudes
Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same
school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
They were subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six
(6) months imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman
to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over public
officials.
Held: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary power to
direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to ―recommend‖
the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith.
The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute" an officer or employee — akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without
just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee
is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation
by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that
the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the
Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer,
which in this case would be the head of the BID. The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in
conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce
compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The
implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
221. Cruz vs Sec. of DENR 347 SCRA 728
Facts:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain
provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
Held:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs
over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private
lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral
domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
222. Lee Hong Kok vs David 48 SCRA 372
Facts:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of
sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a
Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
Issue:
Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant
Held:
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said
officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land
involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the
cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the
law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the
defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:
The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty
comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under dominium. The use of this term
is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide
for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by
the Constitution.
223. Republic vs Republic Estate Corp. GR No.103882 November 25, 1998
Facts:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake
and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands
bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands
within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of
Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives
a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with
modifications.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.
II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.
Held:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term
“foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line
usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by
a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much
less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have
provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the
term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and
the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore
ultra vires and null and void.
224. Chavez vs PEA-AMARI GR No. 133250 July 9, 2002
Facts:
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD
No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve,
acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety-four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque
issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road,
Parañaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board
of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V.
Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to
AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands
and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus
void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating
a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the
Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition
for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section
28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue:
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of
courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a
final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands,
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the
government
Held:
1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot
operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended
JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation
of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged
areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned corporation performing
public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the
possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under
the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the
reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the
entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court
can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for
mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands.
The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA
failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public
disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal
or constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by
PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with
its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information
on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public
domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they
'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights —
to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources — matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right
to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that
the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction."
Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the
people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for
the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents
and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity
of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to
conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some
public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the
defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to
public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use
the property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property
not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public
dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The
legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use
or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter,
and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for
non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public
agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as
many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by
putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands,
is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily
fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural
lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All
other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public
domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested
with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands
subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the
reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise,
the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD
No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while
EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however,
expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied)
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of
the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter
free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the
government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price
as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250
hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original
JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on
December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares,
almost double the area publicly auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of
the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of
the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of
a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction
a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can
"acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue.
Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which
is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
225. Chavez vs PEA-AMARI, Resolution, November 11, 2003
Facts:
In July 2002, Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation lost a case (PEA-Amari Scandal) before the Supreme
Court involving certain reclaimed lands. Upon receipt of the adverse decision, Amari filed a Motion for Inhibition
asking the ponente of said case, Justice Antonio Carpio, to inhibit from the case on the ground that before Justice
Carpio was appointed to the Supreme Court, he wrote a column in the Manila Times newspaper where he questioned
the legality of the agreement between the Public Estates Authority and Amari regarding the said reclaimed property
(PEA-Amari deal). Amari insists that Justice Carpio already prejudged the issue as his bias and prejudice were
already apparent. Amari also prays for a re-deliberation after Justice Carpio inhibits.
Issue:
Whether or not Justice Carpio should inhibit from the case by reason of the said Manila Times column.
Held:
No. In the first place, the decision was already promulgated when Amari filed its motion requesting Justice Carpio
to inhibit. The rule is that a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after a member of the Court had already given
an opinion on the merits of the case. Reason: a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court
(only to) raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been rendered.
Second, judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just because they have written legal
articles on the law involved in the case.
Third, looking at Justice Carpio’s Manila Times article, his article questioned the legality of the PEA Amari deal
on the basis of the lack of public bidding. In this particular case before the Supreme Court, the issue of the absence
of public bidding was not raised by any of the parties involved hence, Justice Carpio’s write up had nothing to do
with the very merits of the case.
226. NADECO vs PVB 192 SCRA 257
Facts:
The particular enactment in question is Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix
Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company. The law outlined the
procedure for filling claims against the Agrix Companies and created a claims committee to process these claims.
Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is section 4(1) thereof providing that “all mortgages and
other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished.” Earlier,
the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate
mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over three parcels of land situated in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the
mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that
the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos. A claim for the payment of its loan credit was filed by
PNB against herein petitioner, however the latter alleged and invoked that the same was extinguished by PD 1717.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix is entitled for payment without prejudice to PD 1717.
Held:
Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the protection of Bill of rights
so do interests on loans, as well s penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private
property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to another without just compensation and any
known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between Agrix and the private respondent
without justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle will
apply only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible
to change by the legislature in the interest of greater number.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the
traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and
of the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process
of law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in
violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor controlled by the
government, should have been created only by general and not special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes
with purely private agreements without any demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise an
impairment of the obligation of the contract.
227. Albano vs Reyes 175 SCRA 264
Facts:
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) board directed the PPA management to prepare for the public bidding of the
development, management and operation of the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) at the Port of
Manila. A Bidding Committee was formed by the DOTC for the public bidding. After evaluation of several bids,
the Bidding Committee recommended the award of the contract to respondent International Container Terminal
Services, Inc. (ICTSI). Accordingly, Rainerio Reyes, then DOTC secretary, declared the ICTSI consortium as the
winning bidder.
On May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the same with directives that PPA shall still have the
responsibility for planning, detailed engineering, construction, expansion, rehabilitation and capital dredging of the
port, as well as the determination of how the revenues of the port system shall be allocated for future works; and
the contractor shall not collect taxes and duties except that in the case of wharfage or tonnage dues.
Petitioner Albano, as taxpayer and Congressman, assailed the legality of the award and claimed that since the MICT
is a public utility, it needs a legislative franchise before it can legally operate as a public utility.
Issue:
Whether a franchise is needed for the operation of the MICT?
Held:
No. While the PPA has been tasked under E.O. No. 30 with the management and operation of the MICT and to
undertake the provision of cargo handling and port related services thereat, the law provides that such shall be “in
accordance with P.D. 857 and other applicable laws and regulations”. P.D. 857 expressly empowers the PPA to
provide services within Port Districts “whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise”.
Even if the MICT is considered a public utility, its operation would not necessarily need a franchise from the
legislature because the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize
the operation of public utilities. Reading E.O. 30 and P.D. 857 together, it is clear that the lawmaker has empowered
the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and management of the MICP or to authorize its operation and
management by another by contract or other means, at its option.
228. Salazar v. Achacoso (1990)
Doctrine:
The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Facts:
1. Rosalie Tesoro charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar for illegal recruitment before the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
2. Rosalie claims that upon arriving from Japan, Hortencia took her PECC Card on the premise that Hortencia
would find her another booking in Japan. 9 months passed and there is still no booking. Rosalie transferred to
another agency but Hortencia would not give her the PECC Card.
3. The POEA ordered Hortencia to appear before the POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit. That same day,
public respondent, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued a CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER against
Hortencia, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency.
4. Subsequently, a POEA group, assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen, proceeded to the
residence of the Hortencia to implement the Closure and Seizure Order. There it was found that petitioner was
operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
5. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw
about twenty more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. Because of this event, Hortencia filed a letter with the POEA requesting that the personal properties seized
at her residence be immediately returned.
Petitioner’s basis:
• She has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order violated "due
process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.
• POEA’s actions violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people
"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose."
Issues:
W/N the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) may validly issue warrants
of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code NO
Held:
Article 38 of the Labor Code. Illegal recruitment.
xxx
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the
arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his
activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers.
The Secretary shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties
and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishments and entities
found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so.
• We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of
the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
• For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants
of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.
• The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the
power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the
sole domain of the courts.
DISPOSITION: Petition is granted.
229. Republic vs PLDT 26 SCRA 620
Facts:
Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of
Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so
that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent
contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.
Issue:
Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for
expropriation.
Held:
Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company
to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems,
through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.
230. Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of
the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the
election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner
before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not
submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of
respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.
Issue:
Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
Ruling:
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest
filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution
of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the
earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit
the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

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Constitutional Law 1

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

2. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

xxx xxx xxx

ii. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

4. Infotech Foundation et al. vs COMELEC GR No. 159139 January 13, 2004

Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;

Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;

Whether the petitioner has standing; and

Whether the petition is premature.

A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder

1. Evaluation of Technical Bids

2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures

3. Election Day Use."

In view of awarding of contract

"(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(5) when there is irreparable injury,

(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,

(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,

5. Javellana vs Exec. Secretary G.R. No. 36142 March 31, 1973

The Ratification Case

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

6. Magallona vs Ermita 655 SCRA 476

Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

Anent their particular contentions:

7. Grace Poe vs COMELEC GR No. 221697, GR No. 221698-700 March 8, 2016

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Carpio Dissent (Highlights): “Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens”

8. Tecson vs COMELEC GR No. 161434 March 3, 2004

9. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commission on Immigration 41 SCRA 29

10. Valles vs COMELEC 337 SCRA 543

Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

11. Co vs HRET 199 SCRA 692

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

12. Balgamelo Cabiling et al. vs Commissioner GR No. 183133

WHEREFORE, the Decision Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

13. Republic vs Dela Rosa GR No. 104654 June 1994

February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.

Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

14. Frivaldo vs COMELEC 257 SCRA 731

Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

15. Tabasa vs Court of Appeals

16. Mercado vs Manzano 307 SCRA 630

Thus, the present petition.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional

19. Co Kim Cham vs Tan Keh September 17 1945 75 Phil 113

Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

21. GP vs Monte de Piedad GR No. 9959 December 13, 1916

22. Soriano vs Laguardia GR No. 164785 April 29, 2009

23. Tanada vs Angara GR No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,