ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D.

GABRIEL, and
ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

Full reference: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/dec1994/gr_l_114783_1994.html

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on
the following:
(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule
provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section
49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standard provided in this section

Issue:
WON the RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative"
proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district
for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with
the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself
on a right which pertains to itself.

Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

Bai Sandra Sema v Comelec July 16, 2008

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/july2008/177597.htm

Facts:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of
the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting
Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,
although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of
the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law
Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City).”
Issue:
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily –
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits –

 (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under
MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid
for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding
Cotabato City).

Held:
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the
power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Ratio:
The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay
– must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the
Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x.”
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be
created without a legislative district.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative
districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership
or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in
a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.
In view of certiorari and mandamus
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of
Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act
“which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”
In view of mootness
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the
14 May 2007 elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City”
mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it
involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the
constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome
of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for
representative of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included
in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to
proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court’s ruling in these petitions
affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for
the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.
In view of the Felwa case
As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a province
is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating
the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for
congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for “creating
congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.”
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created
legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and
(2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of
legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present
case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress
itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly.
 What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate
alone from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to
create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is
created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution
provides that “each province shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district
by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.
Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section
461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous
territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following scenarios
thus become distinct possibilities:
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative
powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act
(RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the
Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the
ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
 ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners
sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized
or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated
the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785.

RULING:

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and
in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject
to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law
pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative may “be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to determine proportional
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in
relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose
of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents
in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which
was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and
the Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the
Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be
remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House
of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
 ANTONIO TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL SR. (D)
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

FACTS:

 July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
 On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
 Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
 4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won
a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
 Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
 The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to
validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:
 No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the
purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
 When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized
by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
 Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
 Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
 HOMOBONO ADAZA v. FERNANDO PACANA JR (D)
135 SCRA 431 March 18, 1985

FACTS:

 Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental. He took his oath of
office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980.
 Elected vice-governor for said province was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise
qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would
expire on March 3, 1986.
 March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasang
Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won
by placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.
 July 19, 1984, petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa and since then he has
discharged the functions of said office.
 July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
 Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to
exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that
within the context of the parliamentary system.
 Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or
resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas
Pambansa elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in
the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the
office of governor.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.
 Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can
continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is
vacated.

HELD:
 No, a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP]
cannot exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.
 The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other
office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: Sec 10. “A member of the National Assembly [Batasan Pambansa]
shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime
minister or member of the cabinet . . .”
 The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only
exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or
expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.
 Yes, a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue
serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.
 The law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section
13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay
officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office."
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
 NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, (A)
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

FACTS:

 This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by
way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
 According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious
that, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee
thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
 Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
 This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from
the corresponding order of dismissal.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

HELD:
 No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.
 The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls
within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this
provision.
 Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
 The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint
herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress
presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or
as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
Astorga vs. Villegas G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application

filed in the House of Representatives, was passed on third
reading without amendments. But when the bill was
discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were
introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does
not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as
having been acted upon. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the
amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and not the
Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually
approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were
then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate
President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto
by way of approval. The bill became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled
copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the President was a
wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence,
the Senate President invalidated his signature on the bill.
Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B.
9266.
Issue: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should
be adhered to

Held: The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the

respect due to coequal and independent departments, which
requires the judicial department to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the right manner.

Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding

officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-
equal department of the government, is neutralized by the
fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the
bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that
the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had
signed had never been approved by the Senate. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the
journal should be consulted.

The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy

amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by
the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. The Court declares that
the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
a law.
Avelino v coenco

Facts:
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session
hall at the appointed time (10:00 A. M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said
petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A. M... he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the
resolution submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he
read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and... conferred with his
colleagues Senators Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco
that the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order... all the
Senators were present.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of
the session hall followed by Senators David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and
Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained
With Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent
had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution
declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designating the Honorable
Mariano
Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was
unanimously approved
Issues:
If it has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly
assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949
Was there a quorum in that session?
Ruling:
the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a
minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from
passing a resolution... that met with their unanimous endorsement.
Principles:
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum,
"the House" does not mean "all" the members.
Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House".
There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of
"the House", the latter requiring less number than the first
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional... majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD
No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated
to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands
of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Digest

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

Padilla, J.:

Facts:

1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government
corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.

2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners
and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what
they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez."

3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly
prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.

4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the
jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court granted it
and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention.

ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation

NO.

1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be

conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to
find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated
RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute
or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify
against one's self.

3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and
inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be
investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to
continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the legislative
committee and a judicial tribunal.

4. Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed
by the Constitution on governmental action ‘including the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to
remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes
of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the
petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be
violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July
15, 1936

DECISION
(En Banc)

LAUREL, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of
the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following
day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will
not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought
the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

 NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against
the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly
cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be
filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication
to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.