1.

G.R. No. 111685. August 20, 2001

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., petitioner,

Vs
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, Presiding Judge of Branch 11, RTC-
Cebu and FRANCISCO TESORERO, respondents.

FACTS:
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. filed a complaint for damages against private respondent
Francisco Tesorero before the R T C, the complaint prayed for damages in the amount of
P11,000,000.00. In lieu of an answer, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss claiming that: (a) the
complaint did not state a cause of action; (b) the plaintiff’s claim has been extinguished or otherwise
rendered moot and academic; (c) there was non-joinder of indispensable parties; and (d) venue was
improperly laid. Of these four (4) grounds, the last mentioned is most material in this case at bar.

The trial court issued a Resolution dismissing petitioner’s complaint on the ground of improper
venue. The plaintiff being a private corporation undoubtedly Banilad, Cebu City is the plaintiff’s
principal place of business as alleged in the complaint and which for purposes of venue is considered as
its residence. However, in defendant’s motion to dismiss, it is alleged and submitted that the principal
office of plaintiff in Davao City, was borne out by the Contract of Lease and another Contract of Lease of
Generating Equipment executed by the plaintiff with the NAPOCOR.

The motion on the ground of improper venue is granted. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. Court of Appeals rendered the assailed judgment denying due course and
dismissing the petition. Petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue was proper.

HELD:
It is private respondent’s contention that the proper venue is Davao City, and not Cebu City
where petitioner filed. Private respondent argues that petitioner is estopped from claiming that its
residence is in Cebu City, in view of contradictory statements made by petitioner prior to the filing of the
action for damages. It cannot be disputed that petitioner’s principal office is in Cebu City, per its
amended articles of incorporation and by-laws.

Private respondent is not a party to any of the contracts presented. He is a complete stranger to
the covenants executed between petitioner and NAPOCOR, despite his protestations that he is privy
thereto, on the rather flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the electric
generating equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. We are likewise not persuaded
by his argument that the allegation or representation made by petitioner in either the complaints or
answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is in Davao City should estopp it from filing the
damage suit before the Cebu courts. Besides there is no showing that private respondent is a party in
those civil cases or that he relied on such representation by petitioner.
2.
G.R. No. 172242 August 14, 2007

PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD.,

Petitioner,
- versus -
DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION,
Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation under Singapore. Respondent is a corporation organized and existing
under Philippine laws, for selling & leasing laboratory instruments. Respondent entered into an
agreement with the Perkin–Elmer Instruments Asia PTE LTD appointed respondent as sole distributor of
its product under a Distribution Agreement. However the PEIA unilaterally terminated the distribution
agreement. The respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and damages. The Regional
Trial Court denied the respondents prayer. Petitioner appealed, but the Court Of Appeals affirms the
Regional Trial Court’s decision.

ISSUES:
Whether or not it is a proper venue for respondents civil case.

HELD:
It is proper venue for civil case base on Distribution Agreement it was stipulated that if dispute
arises it will be resolved either in Singapore or in the Philippines.
3.
Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel capalungan, petitioners,
vs. Court of Appeals, Felipe C. Rigonan and Concepcion R. Rigonan, respondents October 17,
2001
FACTS:
Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land including the house and warehouse on one
parcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion
Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives amounting to P850.00. The petitioners Eugenio Domingo,
Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest surviving relatives,
allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and intimidation, and
refused to vacate the same. The respondent filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against
petitioners. The petitioners stated that the sale was spurious and they are the legitimate owner of
the land being the nearest kin of Paulina. The respondents shown a carbon copy of the deed of
sale not bearing the signature of Paulina only allege thumb mark of the latter and the deed was
tainted with alterations, defects and irregularities. The trial court found the deed “fake” and
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. The appellate court, however, reversed the decision
and declared the respondents the owner of the properties. On appeal, the petitioners asserted
that there was abundant evidence at the time of the execution of the sale, the deceased was
already senile. She could have not consented to the sale by merely imprinting her thumbmark on
the deed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendor has the capacity to act on the alleged sale of her property.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the trial court. There is a serious doubt that the
seller consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. The time of the execution of
the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died an
octogenarian barely over a year when the deed was allegedly executed but before copies of the
deed were entered in the registry. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract
merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when such age
or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly,
intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The
unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the
deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina
played with her waste and urinated in bed.
4.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

v.
GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS
BANK, INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for civil forfeiture of assets with urgent
plea for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the bank deposits maintained by
Glasgow Credit and Collection Servicesin Citystate Savings Bank, Inc.. Acting on the plea for the issuance
of a TRO, the RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO, and the case was raffled for hearing. The summons
intended for Glasgow remained unserved, as it could no longer be found at its last address, and left no
forwarding address. Subsequently, the OSG received a copy of Glasgow’s Motion to Dismiss by Way of
Special Appearance, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not been
duly served upon it, among others. The Republic opposed such motion, contending that the action is
quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of improper venue as it
should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the complaint was correctly dismissed due to improper venue.
HELD :
The Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture. The
order dismissing the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account in CSBI has not yet
attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal. Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture applies to the Republic’s complaint. Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted that the Rule
of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the instant case." Section 3, Title II (Civil
Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides that a
petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional trial court of the judicial region where the
monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or
to a money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that where all or any portion of the
monetary instrument, property or proceeds is located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed
in the regional trial court in Manila or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary
instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner. Under Section 3, Title II of
the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC
of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or
relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the
account sought to be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region
(NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR.
Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republic’s complaint
for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account.
5.

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC.

v.
KLAUS SCHONFELD
FACTS:
Private respondent was hired as a Sector Manager of Pacicon Philippines, Inc., a subsidiary of Pacific
Consultants International in the Philippines, to consult in services for water and sanitation in the
Philippines. Pacific Consultants transmitted a Letter of Employment to respondent, who accepted the
same while making a few minor modifications. Contract states that in case of any question or dispute
arising between parties, the proper venue for such action would be the Court of Arbitration in London.
Respondent was issued an Alien Employment Permit by the Department of Labor and Employment,
which permit was applied for by PPI, and went on to serve for over a year. Upon notice of termination
from Pacific, respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal. Pacific argued that
the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case, as respondent was an alien, and that according to the
contract of employment, the London Court would be the proper venue, or the Court in Tokyo, Japan
where Pacific Consultants held office, or even in Canada, which was respondent’s home state. The Labor
Arbiter, as well as the NLRC gave due course to the petition to dismiss filed by Pacific Consultants and
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE :
Whether or not a clause in a contract can validly limit the venue of an action.
HELD:
In the instant case, no restrictive words like were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court
of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the
employment contract. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venueis that while they are considered
valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set
forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They
should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict
venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and
design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. Pacific Consultants
contend that Schonfeld should have filed his Complaint in his place of permanent residence, or where
Pacific Consultant holds its principal office, at the place where the contract of employment was signed,
in London as stated in their contract. By enumerating possible venues where Schonfeld could have filed
his complaint, however, Pacific Consultants itself admitted that the provision on venue in the
employment contract is indeed merely permissive.
6.

POLYTRADE CORPORATION
v.
VICTORIANO BLANCO
FACTS:
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection of money against Victoriano Blanco, in the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan of the place where the latter resided. Blanco filed a motion to dismiss the action on the
ground of improper venue since, he claims, according to the contract, suit may be lodged in the courts
of Manila. This Motion was denied by the CFI of Bulacan and rendered judgment against Victoriano.
ISSUE :
Whether or not venue was properly laid in Bulacan
HELD :
According to Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by courts of
first instance — and this is one — provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same Rule
which states that venue may be stipulated by written agreement — "By written agreement of the
parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another." No such
stipulation appears in the contracts covering the first two causes of action. The general rule set forth in
Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan,
the province of defendant's residence. The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements
covering the third and fourth causes of action. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The
parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in the
residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in
Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue
are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound
themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or exclusively in
Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely
agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right
to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non
praesumitur.
7.

JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, and RUFINO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74854 April 2, 1991

FACTS:
On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the
annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private respondent's refusal to have said deeds of sale set
aside upon petitioner's demand.

On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on private respondent as defendant therein, the RTC Executive
Judge issued an order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the matter of venue.
After said conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found, based on the
allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the
aforestated deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject parcel of riceland located in Estanza,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.

Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which in its decision of April 11,
1986, affirmed the order of dismissal of his complaint.

Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action belongs solely to the defendant and that the court or
its magistrate does not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that the venue was improperly laid,
as venue is waivable. In other words, petitioner asserts, without the defendant objecting that the venue was
improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the case motu proprio.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.

HELD:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at
this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now
RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to
dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is
deemed waived.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to
have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be
acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu
proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the Rules of
Court to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and
fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules
of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
dated April 11, 1986, is hereby nullified and set aside. The complaint filed by petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Branch LXXI is revived and reinstated. Respondent court is enjoined to proceed therein in
accordance with law. SO ORDERED.
8.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION

v.
ALBERT LIM
FACTS:
Petitioner corporation sold to Albert Lim grocery products in the totaling more than P800 thousand
pesos. After tendering partial payments, Lim refused to settle his obligation despite repeated demands
from Universal Robina. This prompted the latter to file with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a
complaint against Lim for a sum money. A month after the case was instituted, the RTC issued an Order
dismissing the complaint motu proprio on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. Universal
Robina accordingly filed an amended complaint alleging that the parties agreed that the proper venue
for any dispute relative to the transaction is Quezon City. The trial court granted the motion and
admitted the amended complaint. Summons was served on Lim thereafter, however, the latter failed to
file an answer within the prescribed period. The trial court, upon motion of Universal Robina, declared
Lim in default and allowed the former to present evidence ex parte. However, the trial court, still unsure
whether venue was properly laid, issued an Order directing Universal Robina to file memorandum of
authorities on whether it can file a complaint in Quezon City. Still undecided concerning the venue of
actions, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
ISSUE :
Whether or not improper venue is a proper ground for dismissal.
HELD :
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing
motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure
outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious
resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that
respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but
the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause. Rules of Court explicitly provide that improper
venue not impleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a court may not
dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not one of the grounds wherein
the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the basis of the pleadings. A trial court may not motu
proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue, thus: Dismissing the complaint on the
ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC),
may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a
motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held
and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly
challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
9. PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC.
v.
KLAUS SCHONFELD
FACTS:
Private respondent was hired as a Sector Manager of Pacicon Philippines, Inc., a subsidiary of Pacific
Consultants International in the Philippines, to consult in services for water and sanitation in the
Philippines. Pacific Consultants transmitted a Letter of Employment to respondent, who accepted the
same while making a few minor modifications. Contract states that in case of any question or dispute
arising between parties, the proper venue for such action would be the Court of Arbitration in London.
Respondent was issued an Alien Employment Permit by the Department of Labor and Employment,
which permit was applied for by PPI, and went on to serve for over a year. Upon notice of termination
from Pacific, respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal. Pacific argued that
the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case, as respondent was an alien, and that according to the
contract of employment, the London Court would be the proper venue, or the Court in Tokyo, Japan
where Pacific Consultants held office, or even in Canada, which was respondent’s home state. The Labor
Arbiter, as well as the NLRC gave due course to the petition to dismiss filed by Pacific Consultants and
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE :
Whether or not a clause in a contract can validly limit the venue of an action.
HELD
In the instant case, no restrictive words like were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court
of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the
employment contract. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venueis that while they are considered
valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set
forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They
should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict
venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and
design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. Pacific Consultants
contend that Schonfeld should have filed his Complaint in his place of permanent residence, or where
Pacific Consultant holds its principal office, at the place where the contract of employment was signed,
in London as stated in their contract. By enumerating possible venues where Schonfeld could have filed
his complaint, however, Pacific Consultants itself admitted that the provision on venue in the
employment contract is indeed merely permissive.
10.

CORAZON S. CRUZ under the name and style, VILLA CORAZON CONDO DORMITORY,
Petitioner,
vs.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184732 September 9, 2013

© Ceril Lyn Burro

FACTS:

Cruz filed before the RTC of Pasig a complaint for breach of contract, consignation and damages against
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). Cruz alleged that she executed a contract of lease with MIAA to
establish commercial arcade to sublease to other businesses yet the latter failed to inform her that part of the
leased premise is subject to an easement for public use. As a result, she was not able to obtain a building permit as
well as a certification of electrical inspection. Furthermore, some of Cruz’s stalls located along the easement area
was demolished by MMDA.

On MIAA’s part, it filed a motion to dismiss stating that there is a violation of the certification requirement
against forum shopping since there is another case filed in the RTC of Manila. It also added that there is improper
venue since Cruz indicated that she is a resident of Manila and not Pasig.

The RTC dismissed Cruz’s complaint on the ground that it constitutes forum shopping yet it sustain MIAA’s
argument on improper venue since Cruz alleged to be a resident of Manila; therefore, unless proven otherwise,
the complaint shall be taken on its face value.
On appeal, Cruz pointed out in her appellant’s brief that the RTC erred in holding that there was forum shopping,
that Cruz is not a real party-in-interest and that it did not deny MIAA’s motion to dismiss but she did not raised the
issue regarding improper venue. The MIAA, on the other hand, refuted the arguments and raised before the CA
the argument regarding improper venue. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC with modification stating that Cruz
did not commit forum shopping yet the case is dismissible on the ground of improper venue. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Cruz’s appeal on the basis of improper venue.

HELD:

The CA committed a reversible error in sustaining the dismissal of the Pasig case on the ground of improper venue
because the same was not an error raised by Cruz who was the appellant before it. The CA cannot take cognizance
of MIAA’s position that the venue was improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA’s participation was confined
to the refutation of the appellant’s assignment of errors. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.