TOPIC : VI.

LAWS
Classifications
General, Specific/Special or Local

TITLE : Garcia vs Pascual, et al., 3 SCRA 655, G.R. No. L-16950,

December 22, 1961

FACTS : This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija declaring the appointment of petitioner-appellee, Simeon T. Garcia as clerk of court of the
justice of the peace court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija valid, and, ordering the respondents to
approve the vouchers previously returned by the treasurer with the information that they be first
approved by the municipal mayor who refused to approve them for reason that Rep. Act No.
1551 has repealed Section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act
because section 1 of Rep. Act No. 1551 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid by
the general funds of the municipality shall be appointed by the mayor upon recommendation of
the chief of office, so that, as the clerk of court of the justice of the peace is paid out of the
general funds of the municipality the power to appoint the said clerk should be lodged in the
mayor as with all other subordinate officials of the municipality.
ISSUE : Whether or not a specific provision or Section 75 of the Judiciary Act (RA 296)
has been repealed by a general law or Rep. Act No. 1551.
HELD : No. Pursuant to the separation of powers among the three departments of the
government, what Rep. Act No. 1551 intended to be made subject to appointment by the
municipal mayor are subordinate officials in the municipality, like employees in the executive
branch and employees in the municipal council or board. The court further stated that when the
provisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of a
previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such
general law does not operate to modify or repeal the special law, either wholly or in part, unless
such modification or repeal is provided for in express words, or arises by necessary implication
( Black on Interpretation of Laws).

Decision affirmed with costs against the appellants.

TOPIC : VI. LAWS

Classifications
General, Specific/Special or Local

TITLE : Butuan Sawmill vs City of Butuan, 16 SCRA 755, G.R. No. L-

21516 , April 29, 1966

FACTS : This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Agusan
declaring Ordinance Nos. 7, 11, 131, and 148 as unconstitutional and ultra vires and annulling
Ordinance No. 104 as unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive.
The City of Butuan claims that the franchise of Butuan Sawmill is subject
to 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the business of electric light , heat and power
system as empowered and authorized by the city’s Charter (RA 523 approved on June 15,
1950) and the Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264 approved on June 19,1959). Considering that
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise by virtue of RA 399 approved on June
18, 1949 for an electric light, heat and power system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan,
subject to the terms and conditions under Act 3636, as amended by Commonwealth Act 132
and the Constitution; it, on the other hand, disputes the constitutionality of the taxing ordinances
and maintains that the said ordinances are ultra vires and void.
 ISSUE : Whether or not the City of Butuan has the authority to impose the 2% tax on the
gross sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat and power system.
HELD : No. The inclusion of the franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the
City of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the city’s taxing
power under its charter nor an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise since
the charter did not expressly or specifically provide any such power. The Local Autonomy Act did
not authorize the City of Butuan to tax the franchised business citing Sec.2, par.(j) of said act that
withholds the imposition of taxes on persons paying franchise tax like Butuan Sawmill, Inc.
because the internal revenue code already imposes a franchise tax. The court further noted that
“where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general – the terms of the general
broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special……. the special is to be considered
as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of
a particular case.”

Decision affirmed. Costs against appellant City of Butuan.

TOPIC : VI. LAWS

Classifications
General, Specific/Special or Local

TITLE : City of Manila vs Teotico, 22 SCRA 267 G.R. No. L-23052,

January 29, 1968

FACTS : This is an appeal filed by the City of Manila from a decision of the Court of
Appeals. On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico, who was about to board
a jeepney, fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
He suffered injuries: head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglass and causing broken
pieces to pierce his left eyelid, contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, right leg and
upper lip, abrasion on the right infra-patella region, and allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus
injections administered to him in the hospital. As a consequence, he filed before the Court of
First Instance of Manila a complaint / claim for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor,
city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer, and chief of police. In defense, the City of Manila
presented evidence to prove that they immediately act on reports of loss catchbasin cover and
diligently perform their duty to install, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila. The
Court of First Instance of Manila sustained the defendants’ theory and dismissed complaint
without costs. Plaintiff Teotico filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA affirmed
except in so far as the City of Manila to pay P6,750.00 for damages. Hence,this appeal.
ISSUE : Whether or not Republic Act 409 should prevail over Article 2189 of the Civil
Code considering that it is a special law intended for the City of Manila
HELD : Not intended as a basis of the present action. Section 2 of RA 409 establishes
a general rule regulating liability of the City of Manila for the damages or injury to persons or
property arising from negligence in general while Article 2189 of the Civil Code includes a
particular prescription due to defective streets in particular. Thus, Article 2189 is decisive
thereon considering that the present action is based on the alleged defective condition of the
street.

Decision affirmed with costs against the City of Manila.

TOPIC : VII. AIDS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

A. Title
 TITLE : Ebarle vs Sucaldito, 156 SCRA 803 G.R. No. L-33628,
December 29, 1987

FACTS : This is a petition filed by Ebarle, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971. He also sought injunctive relief
in two separate petitions to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Cases filed in Pagadian City
and Fiscal’s office as well for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019) and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code as commenced by
he Anti-Graft League of the Philippines. On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, Supreme
Court issued temporary restraining order (TRO) that respondents to desist from further
proceedings. Anti-Graft League moved to have it lifted and the case itself dismissed. Petitioner
submits that the prosecutions in question are politically motivated as he being a candidate for
reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and citing provisions of EO 264 Outlining the
Procedure by which Complainants Charging Government Officials and Employees with
Commission of Irregularities Should Be Guided.
ISSUE : Whether or not Executive Order No. 264 has exclusive application to
administrative and not criminal complaints.
HELD : The title of the Order speaks of “COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES”.
There is no mention of criminal offenses or of the word “crimes”.Had the Order intended to
make it applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific term. It is not the
business of the SC to resolve complaints as it is not in a position to decide on the case.
Disposition of the case belongs to another agency.

Petitions are dismissed. The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against the petitioners.

TOPIC : VII. AIDS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

A. Title

TITLE : City of Baguio vs Marcos, 27 SCRA 342 G.R. No. L-

33628, February 28, 1969

FACTS : This is a petition to oppose reopening of cadastral proceedings under RA

931, An Act o Authorize the Filing in the Proper Court, Under Certain Conditions, of Certain
Claims of Title to Parcels of Land That Have Been Declared Public Land, By Virtue of Judicial
Decisions Rendered Within the Forty Years Next Preceding The Approval of This Act. On July
25, 1961, Belong Lutes, respondent, petitioned the cadastral court to reopen Civil Reservation
Case No. 1 as to the parcel of land he claims on the ff: grounds ( 1 ) He and his predecessors
have been in actual, open, adverse , peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the
land since Spanish times or before July 26, 1894 and paying taxes then and; (2) his
predecessors were illiterate Igorots without knowledge on cadastral proceedings, thus, not able
to file their claim to the land in question within the statutory period. On December 18, 1961,
private petitioners Joaquin and Buchholz, who are tree farm lessees, registered opposition to
the reopening. On May 5, 1962, City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening. Cadastral court
denied private petitioners’ right to intervene in the case because of a final declaratory relief
judgment dated March 9, 1962 which declared such tree farm lessees were null and void.
Private petitioners then filed for reconsideration and averred that said declaratory relief
judgment did not bind them for they were not parties to that action.
 ISSUE : Whether or not private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening
proceedings.
HELD : When engaged in the task of construing, an obscure expression in the law or
where exact or literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent,the title
may be resorted to in the determination of legislative intent or congressional will. The title of the
law serves as an index of or clue or guide to legislative intention.

Petition for certiorari granted; the cadastral court’s orders dated August 5, 1963, November 5,
1963, and September 17,1964 are hereby declared null and void and the cadastral court is
hereby directed to admit petitioners’ oppositions and proceed accordingly. No costs.

TOPIC : VII. AIDS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

A. Title

TITLE : Central Capiz vs Ramirez, 40 Phil 883 G.R. No. L-16197,

March 12, 1920

FACTS : This is an original action brought in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain
an interpretation and application of the intent, purpose and scope of Act No. 2874 of the
Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it affects agricultural lands,
privately owned.
The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July 1, 1919, Ramirez contracted
with the Central Capiz to supply to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her
plantation, which said contract, by agreement, was to be converted later into a right in rem and
recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and to be binding upon all
future owners of the same. However, Act No 2874 became effective in the execution of said
contract and its conversion into a right in rem upon the respondent's property. The respondent,
while admitting said contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant thereto,
bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the
petitioner is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the
United States.

It is conceded by the parties that the land involved is private agricultural land, that is, land which
is held and owned by the respondent, for which she holds a Torrens title.

ISSUE : Whether or not Act No. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned.

HELD : In construing the act, the California Sate Constitution provides,

“Every Act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; but, if any subject
shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as
to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in its title." The court, after citing this constitutional
provision, said ”… that the purpose of the act was the creation of a primary election law and
"other purposes. Under the cloak of "other purposes," all and every conceivable kind of
legislation could hide and thrive in the body of the act, and thus the constitutional provision be
set at naught… when these words "for other purposes" are found in the title of an act of the state
legislature they accomplish nothing, and in reading the title our eyes are closed to them…. These
matters of legislation, not being embraced within the purview of the title, are void and fall to the
ground.”

Having demonstrated that said Act No 2874 does not apply to lands of the respondent, and there
being no objection to the form of the remedy prayed for, the same is hereby granted, without any
finding as to costs.

TOPIC : XII. AMENDMENTS, REPEALS AND PARTIAL

INVALIDITY OF STATUTES
C. Invalidities
3. Distinguished

TITLE : Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters vs Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377

G.R. No. L-24022, March 3, 1965

FACTS : This is

ISSUE : Whether or not

SEE BOOK of Alcantara
HELD :

Petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved.
Costs against petitioners.

TOPIC : XI. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

C. Weight of Administrative Construction

TITLE : PAFLU vs Bureau of Labor RElations, 72 SCRA 396 G.R.

No. L-43760, August 21, 1976

FACTS : This is

ISSUE : Whether or not

SEE BOOK of Alcantara
HELD :

The Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (PAFLU).

TOPIC : XI. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

C. Weight of Administrative Construction

TITLE : Phil Sugar Central vs Collector of Customs, 51 Phil 131 G.R.

No. L-27761, December 6, 1927
FACTS : This is

ISSUE : Whether or notthe Government of the Philippine Islands can legally collect the
duty of $1 per gross ton of 1,000 kilos as a charge for wharfage on goods, wares and
merchandise exported through a port of entry of the Philippine Islands or shipped therefrom to
the United States, where it appears that the Government does not own the wharf and that the
sugar in question was loaded from a wharf which was the sole property of a private person.

SEE BOOK of Alcantara

HELD : In view of its history, its long continuous construction, and what has been done
and accomplished by and under it, clearly the Government is entitled to have and receive the money in
question even though the sugar is shipped from a private wharf.

Judgement of the lower court reversed, with costs.

TOPIC : XI. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

B. Executive Construction
1. Rule-Making Power

TITLE : San Miguel vs Inciong, 103 SCRA 139 G.R. No. L-

49774, February 24, 1981

FACTS : This is a complaint filed on January 3, 1977 by Cagayan Coca-Cola Free

Workers Union against San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan Coca-Cola Plant) for the alleged
failure or refusal of the latter to include in the computation of 13th- month pay such items as
sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special holidays,
including pay for regular holidays and night differentials.

ISSUE : Whether or not in the computation of the 13th-month pay under Presidential
Decree 851, payments for sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest
days and special holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials should be
considered.

HELD : Citing certain provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines specifically Art. 87 on
overtime work performed beyond 8 hours a day is paid as additional compensation equivalent to
a regular wage plus 25% hereof and Art 93 on work performed on any special holiday as an
additional compensation of at least 30% of the regular wage of the employee, clearly, additional
compensation is categorically excluded from the definition of basic salary under the
Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851.

Therefore, additional compensation shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th-
month pay.
The Orders of the Deputy Labor Minister dated June 7, 1978 and December 19, 1978 are hereby
set aside and a new one entered as above indicated. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this Court on February 14, 1979 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
.
TOPIC : XI. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
C. Executive Construction
2. Rule-Making Power

TITLE : Molina vs Rafferty, 38 Phil 167 G.R. No. L-11988,

April4,1918

FACTS : Plaintiff Molina contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an
"agricultural product" within the meaning of that term as used in paragraph (c) of section 41 of
Act No. 2339 (now section 1460 of the Administrative Code of 1917), in forced when the
disputed tax was levied, and that he is therefore exempt from the percentage tax on merchants'
sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339, as amended: “(c) Agricultural products when
sold by the producer or owner of the land where grown, whether in their original state or not.
(Act No. 2339, sec. 41.)”

ISSUE fish in general constitute an agricultural products, and therefore

: Whether or not
exempt from the percentage tax on merchants' sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339, as
amended.

HELD : The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature
should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found it should be made to
govern, . . . what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the
circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be
redressed; . . . . And where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, is entitled to
great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not
lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive. (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p.
450.). Therefore, fish produced in ponds are agricultural products and thus, exempted from
taxation when sold by the producer or he owner of the land. Administrative conclusion of tax law
should be followed unless clearly erroneous.

Judgment affirmed.

TOPIC : XI. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

D. Executive Construction
3. Rule-Making Power

TITLE : MAdrigal vs Rafferty, 38 Phil 414 G.R. No. L-

12287 August7,1918
FACTS :Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno legally contracted marriage prior to
January 1, 1914 under the provisions of law concerning conjugal partnerships (sociedad de
gananciales). On February 25, 1915, Vicente Madrigal filed sworn declaration on the prescribed
form with the Collector of Internal Revenue, showing, as his total net income for the year 1914,
the sum of P296,302.73. Subsequently Madrigal submitted the claim that the said P296,302.73
did not represent his income for the year 1914, but was in fact the income of the conjugal
partnership existing between himself and his wife Susana Paterno, and that in computing and
assessing the additional income tax provided by the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913, the
income declared by Vicente Madrigal should be divided into two equal parts, one-half to be
considered the income of Vicente Madrigal and the other half of Susana Paterno. The general
question had in the meantime been submitted to the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands
who in an opinion dated March 17, 1915, held with the petitioner Madrigal. The revenue officers
forwarded the correspondence with the opinion of the Attorney-General to Washington for a
decision by the United States Treasury Department. The United States Commissioner of Internal
Revenue reversed the opinion of the Attorney-General, and thus decided against the claim of
Madrigal.

ISSUE : Whether or not the additional income tax should be divided into two equal parts
because of the conjugal partnership existing between Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno.

HELD : “The counter contentions of appellees are that the taxes imposed by the Income
Tax Law are taxes upon income tax and not upon capital and property; that the fact that Madrigal
was a married man, and his marriage contracted under the provisions governing the conjugal
partnership, has no bearing on income considered as income, and that the distinction must be
drawn between the ordinary form of commercial partnership and the conjugal partnership of
spouses resulting from the relation of marriage.”

The income of husband and wife should be taken as a whole for the purpose of the normal tax
regardless as to whether from separate estates or not.

Jjudgment affirmed ,costs against appellants

TOPIC : XI. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

E. Executive Construction
1.Rule-Making Power

TITLE : PLDT vs Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 G.R. No. L-

3222, January 21, 1952

FACTS : PLDT filed complaint against CIR for collecting P 3, 977.22 representing
franchise tax. The CFI of Manila absolved CIR from said complaint. The petitioner filed case
before the Supreme Court arguing that PLDT should not be obliged to pay franchise tax on
uncollected fees due from regular customers because such earnings were not representative of
gross receipts as what CIR construed it to be. PLDT further contended that CIR’s prolonged
practice of non-collection of franchise tax on items of the same nature as those questioned in the
case was an administrative construction of great weight.
ISSUE : Whether or not the principle of executive construction is properly applied for in
the instant case.

HELD : No. Said principle is not absolute and may be overcome by strong reasons to the
contrary. If through a misapprehension of law, an officer has erroneously executed it for a long time, the
error may be rectified when the true construction is ascertained. The CIR’s construction is in accordance
with the Constitution because a person may have earned his salary but may not have collected the
same. Thus, the uncollected “ gross receipts” which should be construed as meaning the same thing as
“gross earnings” should be subject to franchise tax.

Judgment affirmed with modifications.

TOPIC : IX. GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

D. Judical Legislation

TITLE : Floresca vs Philex Mining, GR No. L-30642, April 30, 1985

FACTS : This is a petition to review the Order dated December 16, 1968 of the former
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for damages
for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex. Said employees died
while working underground at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967 burying them in the tunnels of the
mine. Petitioners allege that Philex negligently and deliberately failed to take the required safety
measures for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. On August 3,
1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex.

ISSUE : Whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen’s compensation
claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code.

HELD : “It is stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by
the work-related nature without any fault on part of the employers.. Justice Holmes pronounced that
“judges do and must legislate but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to
molecular motions”. However, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expounding on the scope of the provisions protecting human rights. Both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of
any legislative enactment or executive act.

The trial court’s order of dismissal is reversed and set aside and the case is remanded to it for further
proceedings. Should a greater amount of damages be decreed in favor of petitioners, the payments
already made to them pursuant to the workmen’s compensation act shall be deducted . No costs.

TOPIC : XI. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

C.Weight of Administrative Construction
 TITLE : Phil Global Communication vs Relova, 145 SCRA 587 GR No. L-
60548, November 10, 1986

FACTS : This is a petition for review on certiorari where the Philippine Global
Communications Inc. seeks to set aside decision dated April 27, 1982 declaring petitioner without
authority to establish, maintain and operate, apart from its single principal station in Makati, any
other branch or station within the Phils.
On May 10, 1976 petitioner filed application with the Board of Communications an
application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu City for the purpose of rendering
international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside Phils.This was opposed
by the private respondents. On March 24, 1977, BOC issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-13
designating Metropolitan Manila area as the sole gateway, point of entrance into and exit from) for
communications in the Phils. And defining what constitutes domestic record operations.I was on
Jan. 16, 1979 that BOC granted petitioner provisional authority to establish a station in Cebu City
subject to condition that as soon as domestic carriers shall have upgraded their facilities,
applicant shall ceases its operation and interface with domestic carriers. On May 24, 1979, BOC
granted petitioner the final authority to establish a branch/station in Cebu City subject to prior
approval, anywhere in the PHils. Private respondents filed petition for declaratory judgment on the
proper construction of petitioner’s franchise, RA 4617. Petitioners sought dismissal of petition .
Motion was denied. Petitioner assailed the order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Court held
that the suit for declaratory relief fell within the competence of the Judiciary and did not require
prior action by the administrative agency concerned under the concept of primary
jurisdiction. Parties then agreed to submit the case for decision on the bases of their
respective pleadings and memoranda . Court rendered judgment on April 27, 1982 declaring
petitioner without authority to establish, maintain and operate any other branch or station within
the Philippines.

ISSUE : (1) Whether or notpetitioner is authorized under its legislative franchise, RA

4617, to establish stations or substations in places or points outside Metropolitan Manila.

HELD : It is stressed that the principle of contemporaneous construction of a statute by the

executive officers of the government, BOC in his case, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great
respect. Therefore, the Bureau of Communications made final the provisional authority granted to
applicant or Phil Global Communications, Inc. to establish branch stations in ay point within the country
for the purpose of receiving and transmitting messages to countries outside the Philippines where it is
authorized to render international communications services in accordance with its legislative franchise,
RA 4617 and Memorandum Circular No. 77-13.

The decision appealed from is reversed.

TOPIC : VIII. SOME WELL-KNOWN LATIN MAXIMS

H. In Pari Materia

TITLE : Phil Global Communication vs Relova, 145 SCRA 587 GR No. L-

60548, November 10, 1986

FACTS : This is a petition for review on certiorari where the Philippine Global
Communications Inc. seeks to set aside decision dated April 27, 1982 declaring petitioner without
authority to establish, maintain and operate, apart from its single principal station in Makati, any
other branch or station within the Phils.
On May 10, 1976 petitioner filed application with the Board of Communications an
application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu City for the purpose of rendering
international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside Phils.This was opposed
by the private respondents. On March 24, 1977, BOC issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-13
designating Metropolitan Manila area as the sole gateway, point of entrance into and exit from) for
communications in the Phils. And defining what constitutes domestic record operations.I was on
Jan. 16, 1979 that BOC granted petitioner provisional authority to establish a station in Cebu City
subject to condition that as soon as domestic carriers shall have upgraded their facilities,
applicant shall ceases its operation and interface with domestic carriers. On May 24, 1979, BOC
granted petitioner the final authority to establish a branch/station in Cebu City subject to prior
approval, anywhere in the PHils. Private respondents filed petition for declaratory judgment on the
proper construction of petitioner’s franchise, RA 4617. Petitioners sought dismissal of petition .
Motion was denied. Petitioner assailed the order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Court held
that the suit for declaratory relief fell within the competence of the Judiciary and did not require
prior action by the administrative agency concerned under the concept of primary
jurisdiction. Parties then agreed to submit the case for decision on the bases of their
respective pleadings and memoranda . Court rendered judgment on April 27, 1982 declaring
petitioner without authority to establish, maintain and operate any other branch or station within
the Philippines.

ISSUE :Whether or not the establishment of such stations or substations constitutes

domestic service within the terms of petitioner’s legislative franchise.

HELD : It is stressed that RA 4630 and 4617 are in pari material, meaning, these two acts relate
to the same thing or have the same purpose or object. When statutes are in pari material, they should be
construed together. Therefore, as to the issue and the legislative franchise, the answer is no. The
establishment of such stations constitutes international service having Metropolitan Manila as the sole
gateway of all messages received and transmitted in the course of a carrier’s international record carrier
operation.

The decision appealed from is reversed and judgment rendered declaring petitioner with authority to
establish, maintain and operate in accordance with its legislative franchise and Memorandum Circular No.
08-8-83.

TOPIC : VIII. SOME WELL-KNOWN LATIN MAXIMS

H. In Pari Materia

TITLE : Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs Baluyot, 83 SCRA

38 GR No. L-27350, May 11, 1978

FACTS : This is an appeal from the Decision of the Decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila rendering two consolidated cases filed by (1) Wil Wilhemsen, Inc. and (2) Compania
General de Tabacos de Filipinas, both to pay Baluyot storage fees and other incidental charges for
the storage of their vans . They argued that per Memorandum Order No. 130-63, the operator of
Derham Bonded Warehouse (Baluyot) is not anymore entitled to collect storage fees and other
incidental expenses for the storage of empty cargo vans for failure to comply with certain
requirements, that is, to send written notices to the owners/agents of cargo vans.

ISSUE : Whether or not the Customs Administrative Order No. 22-64 is the applicable
regulation in the instant case and therefore, require the plaintiffs-appellants to pay storage fees
and other incidental charges for the storage of empty vans.
HELD : Yes. It is stressed that two customs regulations, Memorandum Order No. 130-63 and
Customs Administrative Order No. 22-64, under consideration are in pari materia. In statutory
construction, it is a principle that when there are two statutes of equal theoretical application to a
particular case, the one specially designed for said case must prevail over the other. It is the
Administrative Order No.22-64 that is more applicable in the instant case. Memorandum Order NO. 130-
63, on the other hand, prescribes reasonable rates for storage and handling services . The mentioning of
written notices is used only for the purpose of leveling out warehousing fees chargeable by the
warehouseman, thus, giving the consignee opportunity to reduce storage expenses.

Judgment appealed from is affirmed.

TOPIC : X. SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR

DIFFERENT LAWS
F.Naturalization Laws

TITLE : Lee Cho vs Republic, 106 Phil 775

G.R. No. L-12408 Decemberl 29, 1959

FACTS: This is a petition for naturalization filed by Lee Cho before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. On August 30, 1956, the Court rendered Decision finding petitioner qualified
to be a Filipino citizen. However, on October 2, 1957, the government filed motion for new trial
on the ground that a newly discovered evidence which if presented, the Court may render an
adverse decision. However, after re-hearing, the Court rendered decision reaffirming previous
decision where the government interposed the present appeal.
Petitioner was born in Amoy, China of Chinese parents. He came to the
Philippines in February 1921 and continuously residing in Cebu since then. He was issued the
corresponding alien certificate of residence and registration. He speaks and writes English and
the Cebu dialect. He married Sy Siok Bin with whom he had 13 children, all born in Cebu City.
All these children were issued alien certificates except for William who is not of school age,
Lourdes who married a naturalized Filipino citizen and Angelita who rendered only grade five.
ISSUE : Whether or not petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of
Naturalization Law to become a Filipino citizen.

HELD : Yes. Despite claims that petitioner has resided continuously in the
Philippines for thirty years or more and has given primary and secondary education to all his
children in private schools recognized by the Government, petitioner Lee Cho failed to give
such education to his daughters Lourdes Lee who got married but continued secondary
education in a Chinese school and Angelita Lee who reached fifth grade only without
explanation why no secondary education was afforded to her where the teaching of the
subjects Philippine Civics, Philippine History and Philippine Government is taught embracing
Philippine citizenship. As such, petitioner should have not tolerated such deviation from the
educational requirement of the law.
Decision reversed. Costs against he petitioner.

TOPIC : X. SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR

DIFFERENT LAWS
F.Naturalization Laws
 TITLE : Velasco vs Republic, 108 Phil 234
G.R. No. L-14214 May 25, 1960

FACTS: This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of
Manila which, after trial, was denied for failure of petitioner to meet the requirements of the law.
Petitioner has appealed.

Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco and Miguela
Tiu who became naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that he continuously resided in the
Philippines; that he has finished his elementary, high school and collegiate studies in the
Philippines; that he is presently employed at the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a
monthly salary of P150.00; that he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog; that he is
a Catholic by faith; and has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; that
he does not own any real property but has cash savings amounting to P3,500.00 at the Republic
Savings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern University, P2,000.00
shares of stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines, and P1,000.00 in cash; that he has mingled
socially with the Filipinos; that he has shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of
the Filipinos; and that he desires to become a Filipino citizen because he considered the
Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as his countrymen.

ISSUE : Whether or not the petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen.

HELD qualifications as to moral character were attested by

: No. It was found out that his
Santiago Mariano, a sergeant of the Manila Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a
housekeeper, who admitted that she is the prospective mother-in-law of petitioner and such
testimony is biased. The limited character witnesses indicates that petitioner has a limited circle
of Filipino friends. His present income is only P150.00 a month which is neither lucrative nor
substantial to meet the requirements of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one must a
lucrative income or occupation.
Decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

TOPIC : X. SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR

DIFFERENT LAWS
D.Insurance

TITLE : Ty vs First National Surety and Assurance Corp., 1

SCRA 1324 G.R. No. L-16138, April 29, 1961

FACTS: This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing
the actions filed by Diosdado Ty to 8 local insurance companies which insured him for personal accident
policies. Diosdado Ty is employed as an operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton Factory in
Grace Park, Caloocan, Rizal at a monthly salary of P185.00. He insured himself in 18 local insurance
companies. Plaintiff’s beneficiary was his employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the insurance
premiums. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out destroying totally the Broadway Cotton Factory.
From the incident, Ty was injured on the left hand by a heavy object.He was given first-aid at the Manila
Central University. He proceeded then to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries,
fractures in his left hand. He underwent medical treatment from December 26, 1953 to February 8, 1954.
Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim to recover indemnity under
paragraph II of the policy. Plaintiff’s claim was rejected for reason that there being no severance of
amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by the policy.

ISSUE : Whether or not Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity for total or partial

disability.

HELD : No. The court cannot go beyond the express and clear conditions of the insurance
policies which define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist.
Considering that there is no amputation in the present case, he decision appealed from is affirmed with
costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

TOPIC : X. SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR

DIFFERENT LAWS
D.Insurance

TITLE : De La Cruz vs Capital Insurance & Surety Co., 17

SCRA 559 G.R. No. L-21574, June 30, 1966

FACTS: This is an appeal by the Capital Insurance & Surety Company, Inc., from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (in Civ Case No. U-265), ordering it to
indemnify therein plaintiff Simon de la Cruz for the death of the latter's son, to pay the burial
expenses, and attorney's fees.
Eduardo de la Cruz was employed in the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. in Baguio. He was a holder of
an accident insurance policy (No. ITO-BFE-170) underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety
Co., Inc., for the period beginning November 13, 1956 to November 12, 1957. On January 1,
1957, Eduardo dela Cruz participated in the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. sponsored- boxing contest
for general entertainment in connection with the celebration of the New Year. In the course of
his bout with another person, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the
back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. He was
brought to the Baguio General Hospital the following day. The cause of death was reported as
hemorrhage, intracranial, left.

ISSUE : Whether or not death caused by the participation in a boxing contest entitles
the petitioner to indemnity under the insurance policy.

HELD : Yes.Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the
insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces
the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of policies insuring against death or injury
from accident.Therefore, decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against appellant.

TOPIC : X. SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR

DIFFERENT LAWS
C.Labor Laws
 TITLE : Villavert vs ECC, 110 SCRA 233 G.R. No. L-
48605, December 14, 1981

FACTS: This is a petition to review decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission

affirming decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits on
the ground that acute hemmorhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease, thus, petitioner failed to
show the causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino Villavert and the nature of his
employment. He was employed at the Philippine Constabulary as code verifier. However, due to shortage
of qualified civilian personnel to handle certain task, he was assigned various tasks that would require him
to render overtime services especially in the preparation of the checks for the salary of the Philippine
Constabulary and the National Integrated Police personnel throughout the country.

ISSUE : Whether or not Marcelino Villavert thru mother Domna Villavert is entitled to
death benefits?

HELD : Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, “All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of the labor”. Judgment rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance System
to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (Php6,000.00).

TOPIC : X. SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR

DIFFERENT LAWS
C.Labor Laws

TITLE : Bustamante vs NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 G.R. No.

11165 March 15, 1996

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the NLRC Resolution of May 3, 1993
setting aside earlier resolution dated March 8, 1993 and deleting the award of backwages in favor of
petitioners.Osmalik Bustamante and three others were employed as laborers and harvesters while
Lamaran was employed as a laborer and sprayer in respondent company’s plantation. They all signed
contracts of employment for a period of six months from January 2, 1960 to July 2, 1990 but started
working sometime in September 1989. Before the contracts expire in July 2,1990, their employments
were terminated on June 25, 1990 on the ground of poor performance on account of age, not one of them
was allegedly below forty years old.

ISSUE : Whether or not petitioners are entitled to backwages after a finding by the
NLRC that they had become regular employees .

HELD : Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, “All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of the labor”. Judgment rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance System
to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (Php6,000.00).
 TOPIC : X. SPECIFIC RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR
DIFFERENT LAWS
C.Labor Laws

TITLE : Manahan vs ECC, 104 SCRA 198 G.R. No. L-

44899 April 22, 1981

FACTS: This is a petition

to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission in ECC Case No. 0070 (Nazario Manahan, Jr., deceased), entitled "Maria Manahan,
Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System, (Las Piñas Municipal High School).
GSIS denied the claim for death benefit. The claimant, petitioner herein, Maria E. Manahan, is
the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric Fever" while employed as classroom
teacher in Las Piñas Municipal High School, Las Piñas Rizal, on May 8, 1975. In a letter dated
June 19, 1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr.,
typhoid fever, is not an occupational disease. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the deceased, Nazario Manahan, Jr., was in perfect health when admitted to the
service and such ailment was attributable to his employment.

ISSUE : Whether or not the petitioner thru his mother is entitled to death benefits

HELD : Yes. It isnot improbable that the deceased might have contracted the illness
during those rare moments that he was away from his family. I was a medically accepted
principle that enteric fever is caused by salmonella organisms which are acquired by ingestion of
contaminated food or drinks. Contamination of food or water may come from the excretion of
animals such as rodents flies, or human beings who are sick or who are carriers, or infection in
meat of animals as food. Meat, milk and eggs are the foods most frequently involved in the
transmission of this type of species, since the organism may multiply even before ingestion. ..."
These findings of the respondent Commission lead to the conclusion that the risk of contracting
the fatal illness was increased by the decedent's working condition.
Decision of ECC is set aside and the GSIS is ordered (1) To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as death compensation benefit; (2)To pay the petitioner the
amount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) as attorney's fees; (3)To reimburse the petitioner
expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased Nazario
Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts; and (4)To pay administrative fees.

TOPIC : VIII. SOME WELL-KNOWN LATIN MAXIMS

F.Ejusdem Generis

TITLE : Gotiaoco vs Union Ins. Society of Camilon, 40 PHIL

40 G.R. No. 13983 September 1, 1919

FACTS: This is a
 ISSUE : Whether or not the
HELD : Yes.

TOPIC : V. SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION

C.Other Issuances which have the binding force and effect of laws

TITLE : Conte vs COA, 264 SCRA 19 G.R. No. 116422

November 4, 1996

FACTS: This is a petition filed by AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-

PALMA seeking reconsideration of COA’s ruling of July 10, 1989 disallowing claims for
financial assistance under Res. 56. Petitioners argue that the financial assistance under
Res. 56 is not a retirement plan prohibited by RA 4968, and that Res. 56 provides
benefits different from and “aside from” what a retiring SSS employee would be entitled
to under RA 660. They said it is a form of social amelioration and economic upliftment
for the welfare of retiring employees. However, the court ruled that Res. 56 constitutes
a supplementary retirement plan, and thus does not conform with RA 4968.

ISSUE SSS Resolution No. 56 is within the ambit of

: Whether or not the
and thus proscribed by Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968
HELD Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the
: Yes.
creation of any insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS to prevent the undue
and inequitous proliferation of such plans. Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law
and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. In statutory construction, between a
statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.[i] “A rule or regulation must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such
rule or regulation to be valid”. Petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of
public respondent is AFFIRMED, and SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby declared
ILLEGAL, VOID AND OF NO EFFECT. The SSS is urged to assist petitioners and
facilitate their applications under RA 1616, and to advance to them, unless barred by
existing regulations, the corresponding amounts representing the difference between
the two benefits programs. No costs.
[i ]

TOPIC : V. SUBJECTS OF CONSTRUCTION

D.Ordinances

TITLE : Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta, 93 SCRA

462 G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979

FACTS: This is an appeal filed by defendants whereby Ordinance No. 3, s. 1964 was declared
null and void by the Court of First Instance of Lingayen, Pangasinan, in its decision dated June 29, 1966.
On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusta B. Primacias plaintiff appellee, was driving his car within the
jurisdiction of Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop for violating
Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a truck." Primicias
surrendered his license and a temporary operator's permit was issued to him. Thereafter, a criminal
complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of said ordinance.
Plaintiff Primicias filed for an annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for restraining the Municipality of Urdaneta to enforce said ordinance and from further
proceeding in the criminal case. The Court of First Instance declared the ordinance null and void and
had been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. Appellants contend that the Ordinance is valid when the Land Transportation and 'Traffic Code,
became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned ordinance was approved by
Urdaneta's Municipal Council. The explicit repeal of the aforesaid Act is embodied in Section 63, Republic
Act No. 4136. Appellants further argued that a general rule that a later law prevails over an earlier law.
ISSUE : Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, enacted on March
13,1964 by the Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid.
HELD : No.. An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that is "must not
contravene . . . the statute," for it is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in
status and subordinate to the laws of the state." Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict
between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance "must give way. The appealed decision is hereby
affirmed.

TOPIC : III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

F. Power to Construe
3. Limitations

TITLE : Vera vs Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (GR No. L-24750, 16

May 1980)

FACTS : Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the

Commission on elections submitted, last May, to the President and the Congress of the
Philippines, its report on the national elections held the preceding month, and, among
other things, stated that, by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in
the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region
did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.In the course of the
session on May 25, 1946, a resolution known as Pendatun was approved referring to
the report and ordering petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero,
who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the highest
number of votes, proclaimed by the Commission on Elections, shall defer the
administration of oath/ sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber pending the
hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections. Petitioner sought “
to desist and to abstain from carrying out" the so-called Pendatun Resolution.
ISSUE : power to issue the writ
Whether or not the court has the
of preliminary injunction sought by petitioners against the carrying out of the so-
called Pendatun Resolution.

HELD : court lacks jurisdiction to issue the writ of

No. This
preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners. Political rights are the rights
sought to be exercised or protected by petitioners. The questions raised are
 political questions, and it is well settled that the equitable remedy of injunction
is not available for such a purpose. The principle is that a court will not entertain
a suit calling for a judgment upon a political question.
Case dismissed. No costs.

TOPIC : III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

F. Power to Construe
3. Limitations

TITLE : Palanca vs City of Manila, 41 Phil 125 (GR No. L-

15819, 27 October 1920)
FACTS : This is an appeal from an amended decision of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila requiring the defendant City of Manila to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of P2,400 with legal interest thereon from the respective dates on which the
several payments composing the amount were made, without costs.
ISSUE : Whether or not theplaintiff, by taking out and paying for his
license as a distiller, is entitled to sell the products of his distillery in a store separate
and distinct therefrom without the necessity of taking out and paying for an additional
license as a wholesale liquor dealer.
HELD : Yes. “Statues
which are plain and specific should be applied
without attempted construction and interpretation.” (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico
[1913], 24 Phil., 504; Philippine Railway Co. vs. Nolting [1916], 34 Phil., 401; U.S. vs.
Fisher [1804], 3 Cranch, 358.). Manila Liquor License Act No. 59, as amended by Act
No. 95. Section 16 and 17 thereof, the latter as superseded by Act No. 95, provides
license to be granted to distillers not only authorizes the licensee "to conduct the
business of a distiller of alcoholic liquors" but also "to sell, give away or otherwise
dispose of the products of such distillery, in quantities of one gallon or more". No
provision of the Act limits the place of sale or disposition of the products of the licensed
distiller to the distillery proper.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
TOPIC : III. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
F. Power to Construe
3. Limitations – Void for Vagueness

TITLE : People vs NAzario, 165 SCRA 186 (GR No. L- 44143,

31 August 1988)
FACTS : This is an
ISSUE : Whether or not the
HELD : Yes. Appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.