1
G.R. No. 225730, February 28, 2018 and deliver as in fact she gave and delivered to the said
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. JULIA REGALADO ESTRADA, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
On appeal is the 20 August 2015 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06771, which
affirmed the 5 December 2013 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 10-278205-
07 and 10-278208, finding herein accused-appellant Julia
Regalado Estrada (Estrada) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and for three (3) counts
of Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
THE FACTS
Estrada was indicted for the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa under four (4) separate
Informations, the inculpatory averments of which read:
Criminal Case No. 10-278205:
That on or about and during the period comprised
between February 2009 and March 2009, inclusive, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud NOEL SEVILLENA,
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of
false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she
made to said NOEL SEVILLENA prior to and even
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to the effect
that she had the power and capacity to recruit and deploy the
latter as Master Baker in Dubai, and could facilitate the
processing of pertinent papers if given the necessary amount
to meet the requirements thereof, induced and succeeded in
inducing said NOEL SEVILLANA to give and deliver as in fact
he gave and delivered to the said accused the total amount of
PhP61,500.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as
in fact, she did obtain the total amount of PhP61,500.00, which
amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
misappropriated, and misapplied and converted the same to
her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of the said NOEL SEVILLENA in the aforesaid total amount of
PhP61 ,500.00, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 10-278206:
That on or about and during the month of March 2009,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JANICE
A. ANTONIO, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which she made to said JANICE A. ANTONIO
prior to and even simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, to the effect that she had the power and capacity to
recruit and deploy the latter as Service Crew in Dubai, and
could facilitate the processing of pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, induced
and succeeded in inducing said JANICE A. ANTONIO to give
accused the total amount of PhP25,000.00 on the strength of
said manifestations and representations, said accused well
knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely to obtain, as in fact, she did obtain the total
amount of PhP25,000.00, which amount once in her
possession, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, and
misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said JANICE
A. ANTONIO in the aforesaid total amount of PhP25,000.00,
Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 10-278207:
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised
between April 2009 and May 2009, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud ALBERT M.
CORTEZ, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which she made to said ALBERT M. CORTEZ prior to and
even simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, to the
effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and deploy
the latter as waiter in Dubai, and could facilitate the processing
of pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, induced and succeeded in inducing said
ALBERT M. CORTEZ to give and deliver as in fact he gave
and delivered to the said accused the total amount of
PhP37,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as
in fact, she did obtain the total amount of PhP37,000.00, which
amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
misappropriated, and misapplied and converted the same to
her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of the said ALBERT M. CORTEZ in the aforesaid total amount
of PhP37,000.00, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 10-278208 (Large Scale Illegal
Recruitment):
That on or about and during the period comprised
between February 2009 and May 2009, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to
have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job
placement abroad to ALBERT M. CORTEZ, NOEL
SEVILLENA and JANICE A. ANTONIO as Waiter, Master
Baker and Service Crew, respectively, in Dubai, without first
having secured the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment, and without valid
reason and without the fault of the said ALBERT M. CORTEZ,
NOEL SEVILLENA and JANICE A. ANTONIO failed to actually
deploy them and failed to reimburse expenses incurred by
them in connection with their documentation and processing
for purposes of their deployment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On 28 September 2010, Estrada, with the assistance
of counsel, was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges
against her.7 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
2
Evidence for the Prosecution
The three (3) private complainants, Noel Sevillena
(Sevillena), Albert Cortez (Cortez), and Janice A. Antonio
(Antonio), testified for the prosecution. Mildred Versoza, Labor
and Employment Officer at the Philippine Overseas and
Employment Administration (POEA), was also offered as a
witness for the prosecution, but her testimony was dispensed
with in view of the defense's admission of the genuineness and
due execution of the POEA Certification8 stating that Estrada
was not included in the list of employees submitted by ABCA
International Corporation (ABCA) for acknowledgment.9 Their
respective testimonies sought to establish that Estrada,
without the necessary license or authority from the POEA,
recruited them for overseas employment for a fee, as follows:
Private complainants separately met Estrada on
various dates from February to April 2009.10 Sevillena was
encouraged by his father to seek the help of Estrada as he
knew her to be recruiting for overseas work;11 Cortez met
Estrada through his aunt who also knew Estrada to be a
recruiter for overseas work;12 and Jacinto came to know
Estrada after she chanced upon a tarpaulin advertisement for
overseas work on which Estrada's number and address were
posted.13
During their respective meetings, Estrada
represented herself as having power and authority to deploy
persons abroad for overseas employment.14 Cortez recalled
that in their initial meeting, Estrada told him that she works for
Worldview International Corporation (Worldview), a private
recruitment agency for overseas employment. She later told
him, however, that she changed agency because Worldview's
license had expired.15
After their respective meetings, Estrada offered
private complainants various jobs in Dubai. In particular,
Sevillena was offered a job as a baker after he refused the
initial job offer in Saudi Arabia;16 Cortez was offered a job as a
waiter;17 and Antonio was offered a job as a cashier after she
refused the first job offer as a saleslady.18
The private complainants transacted only with Estrada
to whom they submitted all the documents necessary for their
overseas placement and to whom they paid processing,
placement, and other fees.19Specifically, Sevillena paid
P8,000.00 as processing fee and P17,000.00 as placement
fee;20 Cortez similarly paid P8,000.00 as processing fee and
P17,000.00 as placement fee;21 Antonio paid P10,000.00 as
processing fee and P15,000.00 as placement fee.22 In addition
to the fees they paid to Estrada, private complainants alleged
incurring other amounts relative to their overseas placement.
Cortez and Antonio paid the said fees personally to Estrada at
her house in Canlubang, Laguna;23 while Sevillena paid the
said fees personally to Estrada at his godmother's house in
Calamba City.24 Estrada did not issue a single receipt for the
said fees.25
Estrada also required the private complainants to
submit themselves to medical examination at the Holy Angel
Medical Clinic (HAMC) in Manila. Again, the private
complainants paid the fees for said medical examination
personally to Estrada: Sevillena and Cortez each paid
P4,000.00;26 while Antonio paid P3,500.00.27 As in the
processing and placement fees, no receipt was issued for the
medical examination fees.28
Estrada further required private complainants, with the
exception of Antonio, to undergo the Pre-Departure Orientation
Seminar (PDOS).29 However, even after undergoing PDOS,
payment of the fees required, and submission of the
documentary requirements, Estrada still failed to deploy them
abroad. Estrada repeatedly promised them that their plane
tickets were still being processed. Estrada, however, failed to
deliver on her promised deployment of the private
complainants; thus, they were prompted to file criminal cases
against Estrada.30
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented Estrada herself. The defense
also presented as witness Emilia G. Cosmo-an (Cosmo-an),
president of ABCA International Corporation (ABCA), another
recruitment agency for deployment abroad. In the course of
Cosmo-an's testimony, however, the defense moved to
declare her as a hostile witness, but the trial court did not act
on the said motion.31 Their respective testimonies are as
follows:
Estrada came to know the private complainants when
they separately went to her house and asked her help for them
to work abroad.32 Estrada insisted that she merely mentioned
ABCA and Worldview to the private complainants because she
knew their respective owners.33 She explained that prior to her
meeting with the private complainants, she worked as a
secretary at a military hospital in Riyadh; that the owner of
Worldview, Madam Juico, was her friend; that she also knew
the owner of ABCA because the owner's daughter was her
former co-worker at the Riyadh hospital; and that the
complainants went first to Worldview where they got her
number.34
Estrada denied that her mobile number was posted on
a tarpaulin advertisement for work abroad. She alleged that
what was posted on the tarpaulin is the number of Worldview,
and that the owner of Worldview merely gave Antonio her
number.35 She admitted that Antonio indeed went to her house
but averred that the latter merely asked if she knew the owner
of Worldview, to which she answered in the affirmative as
Worldview is the agency which handles her documents every
time she departs abroad for work. Antonio then left and went
to Worldview.36 Thereafter, Antonio's husband informed her
that Antonio and her friends had already submitted their
applications to ABCA.37
With respect to Sevillena and Cortez, Estrada averred
that the two went to her house, together with their aunt,38 to
ask if she could deploy workers abroad to which she answered
in the negative. While in her house, Sevillena and Cortez met
Antonio. The three went to ABCA together.39
Estrada learned later from Sevillena and Cortez's
aunt, as well as from the owner of ABCA, that the two had
already submitted their requirements to ABCA.40 She also
learned that despite completing all the requirements, the two
failed to depart because, according to Cortez, they did not sign
the contract because of the low salary offered.41 Subsequently,
Sevillena and Cortez went to her house to ask for the return of
the money they paid to ABCA. She insisted that she did not
receive any money from the private complainants and that she
did not recruit them for overseas work.42
On her part, Cosmo-an testified that she did not really
know Estrada having talked to her only once. She recalled that
she met Estrada at the parking lot of her office sometime in
March 2010. Estrada followed her and asked help for her
relatives who were looking for work abroad, to which she
responded that she may be able to help if there was a job
order.43 Estrada returned to ABCA's office later but they were
not able to talk.44
3
Cosmo-an also denied that her agency received
money from the private complainants and claimed that her
agency never required applicants to pay placement and other
fees.45 She insisted that Estrada was not and has never been
connected with ABCA in any capacity.46 In fact, after she heard
unpleasant rumors about Estrada, she placed a newspaper
ad/notice on 27 April 2010 that Estrada was not and had never
been connected with ABCA.47 Cosmo-an further denied
knowing any of the private complainants.48
The RTC Ruling
In its decision, the RTC found Estrada guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large
scale and three (3) counts of estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of
the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution was
able to establish Estrada's guilt by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It noted that the certification from the POEA confirmed
that Estrada had never been licensed or authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment. This fact, coupled with her
pretenses that she had the ability or influence to recruit private
complainants for work in Dubai clearly made her liable for the
crime of illegal recruitment.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered against Julia Regalado Estrada, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 10278208, for the
offense Illegal Recruitment in a large scale,
the Court finds accused Julia Regalado
Estrada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the said offense and she is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalties of Life Imprisonment
and Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 10278205, for the crime
of Estafa (Under Art. 315, 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code) the Court finds accused Julia
Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and
she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate imprisonment of Four (4) years
Two (2) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to Six (6)
years Eight (8) months and Twenty Five (25)
days of prision mayor minimum as
maximum.
Accused is also ordered to indemnify private
complainant Noel Sevillena the amount of
Twnety Nine Thousand Pesos (P29,000.00)
representing the accused's civil liability
therefor;
3. In Criminal Case No. 10278206, for the crime
of Estafa (Under Art. 315, 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code) the Court finds accused Julia
Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and
she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate imprisonment of Four (4) years
Two (2) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to Six (6)
years Eight (8) months and Twenty Five (25)
days of prision mayor minimum as maximum.
Accused is also ordered to indemnify private
complainant Janice A. Antonio the amount of
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)
representing the accused's civil liability
therefor;
4. In Criminal Case No. 10278207, for the crime
of Estafa (Under Art. 315, 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code) the Court finds accused Julia
Regalado Estrada GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and
she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate imprisonment of Four (4) years
Two (2) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional maximum as minimu to Six (6)
years Eight (8) months and Twenty Five (25)
days of prision mayor minimum as
maximum.
Accused is also ordered to indemnify private
complainant Albert M. Cortez the amount of Twenty-Nine
Thousand Pesos (P29,000.00) representing the accused's civil
liability therefor.
SO ORDERED.49
Aggrieved, Estrada filed a Notice of Appeal.50
The CA Ruling
In its appealed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision. The appellate court ruled that private complainants'
categorical and unequivocal avowal that Estrada promised and
assured them of work in Dubai, and their positive identification
of Estrada as the person who recruited and demanded
payment from them naturally prevails over her defense of
denial. As such, the trial court aptly ruled that the prosecution
evidence convincingly demonstrated the presence of the
elements of illegal recruitment in large scale.
The appellate court further opined that a person who
commits illegal recruitment may be charged with and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under R.A. No. 8042, in
relation to the Labor Code; and estafa under Article 315(2)(a)
of the RPC.
The fallo of the appealed CA decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated 5 December 2013 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 47 in Criminal Case Nos. 10-278205-07 and
10-278208, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.51
Hence, this appeal.
THE ISSUE
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED
IN FINDING ESTRADA GUILTY OF ILLEGAL
4
RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AND THREE (3)
COUNTS OFESTAFA DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO PROVE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
THESE CRIMES BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
THE COURT'S RULING
The appeal lacks merit.
Elements constituting illegal recruitment in large
scale sufficiently established
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority as
contemplated under Article 13(f) of the Labor Code, shall mean
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, procuring workers, and including referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not.
Further, to sustain a conviction for illegal recruitment
under R.A. No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, the
prosecution must establish two (2) elements: first, the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one
to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and second, the offender undertakes any of the activities within
the meaning of recruitment and placement defined in Article
13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042.52 Further, in
case the illegal recruitment was committed in large scale,
a third element must be established, that is, the offender
commits the illegal recruitment activities against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.53
The Court is convinced that the prosecution was able
to establish the essential elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
First, it is not disputed that Estrada is not licensed or
authorized to recruit workers for overseas placement. During
the trial, the defense admitted the POEA Certification which
stated that Estrada is not included among the list of employees
submitted by ABCA for POEA acknowledgment. Therefore,
Estrada is not authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. This fact was not denied by Estrada in her
defense anchored only on the allegation that she did not recruit
the private complainants but merely mentioned ABCA and
Worldview to them.
Second, the prosecution was able to establish that
Estrada unlawfully engaged in activities which refer to
recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code and Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042. Specifically, the
prosecution was able to sufficiently demonstrate that Estrada
promised and recruited private complainants for employment
abroad for a fee.
This is amply supported by the testimonies of the
private complainants who categorically testified that Estrada
promised them employment and placement in Dubai as baker,
waiter, and cashier. More particularly, the private complainants
positively identified Estrada as the person with whom they
transacted relative to their alleged deployment to Dubai; the
person who instructed them to complete the documents
necessary for their deployment and to undergo medical
examination; the person to whom they submitted these
documents; and the person to whom they directly paid the
processing, placement, medical examination, and other fees.
It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial
courts, including their assessment of the witnesses' credibility,
especially when the CA affirmed such findings, are entitled to
great weight and respect by this Court.54 Further, in the
absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were
motivated by improper motives, the trial court's assessment
with respect to their credibility shall not be interfered with by
this Court.55 Thus, between the positive identification and
categorical testimony by the private complainants and
Estrada's unsubstantiated and uncorroborated denial, the
Court finds the former more credible.
Finally, it is clear that Estrada committed illegal
recruitment activities against the three (3) private
complainants. Thus, the trial and appellate courts properly
convicted Estrada of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale.
Elements constituting Estafa sufficiently established
The Court also sustains Estrada's conviction for three (3)
counts of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.
A conviction for illegal recruitment whether simple or
committed in large scale would not preclude punishment
for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.56 This is because
no double jeopardy could attach from the prosecution and
conviction of the accused for both crimes considering that they
are penalized under different laws and involved elements
distinct from one another. Conviction under Article 315(2)(a)
requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third party,
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
These are elements completely different from those required
for illegal recruitment.57
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the
prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that
Estrada committed three (3) counts of estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the RPC, which states that estafa is committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or
by means of other similar deceits.
In this case, testimonial evidence established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that Estrada falsely represented
herself as possessing power to deploy persons for overseas
placement. By these pretenses, Estrada deceived the private
complainants into believing that she would provide them their
desired jobs in Dubai. This active representation of having the
capacity to deploy the private complainants abroad despite not
having the authority or license to do so from the POEA
constituted deceit - the first element of estafa. Moreover,
because of her assurances, the private complainants parted
with their money in order to pay Estrada the various fees which
they thought were necessary for their deployment abroad
resulting in damage to each of the private complainants - the
second element of estafa.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the elements
of estafa as charged have been established. Thus, the Court
5
affirms Estrada's conviction for three (3) counts of estafa under
Article 315(2)(a).
Penalties
Section 6(m) of R.A. No. 8042 considers illegal
recruitment in large scale as an offense involving economic
sabotage. In this regard, Section 7 of R.A. No. 8042 provides
that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall commit illegal recruitment involving economic
sabotage.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the trial court's
imposition of the penalties of life imprisonment and payment of
fine in the amount of P500,000.00 upon Estrada.
The Court, however, modifies the penalties imposed
by the trial court with respect to the three (3) counts of estafa in
view of the enactment of R.A. No. 10951 entitled An Act
Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on
which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the
Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815
Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as
Amendedand became effective on 17 September 2017. As its
title suggests, R.A. No. 10951 updated to the present monetary
values some felonies listed in the RPC which penalties are
dependent on the amount or value of damage involved,
thereby effectively reducing the penalties for certain crimes,
such as estafa.
Section 85 of R.A. No. 10951 modified Article 315 of
the RPC in this wise, to wit:
SEC. 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and
Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended as
follows:
"ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by: "1st. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million
four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000.00) but does not
exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos
(P4,400,000.00), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional Two
million pesos (P2,000,000.00); but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.
"2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is
over One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00)
but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos
(P2,400,000.00);
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period if such
amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) but does
not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos
(P1,200,000.00); and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such
amount does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00),
xxx"
In this case, the prosecution proved that Estrada's
fraud resulted in the damage to Sevillena, Antonio, and Cortez
in the respective amounts which did not exceed P40,000.00.
Thus, applying the penalties under Article 315 of the RPC, as
amended by Section 85 of R.A. No. 10951, Estrada should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period for each count of estafa.
The Court further modifies the sums awarded to
Cortez and Antonio. With respect to Cortez, he testified that
Estrada paid P5,000.00 as partial reimbursement for the
amounts he paid to her.58 This amount shall thus be deducted
from his total monetary award. As regards Antonio, it would
seem that the trial court failed to consider the P3,500.00 she
had paid to Estrada for her medical examination. The trial court
may have overlooked that Sevillena and Cortez had each paid
for their medical examination which amounts were not
deducted from the final monetary awards. Thus, the total
monetary awards to the private complainants shall be as
follows: P29,000.00 for Sevillena; P28,500.00 for Antonio; and
P24,000.00 for Cortez.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby DISMISSED. The 20 August 2015 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 06771, which
affirmed the 5 December 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 10-278205-
07 and 10-278208, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 10278208, the Court finds
accused-appellant Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment committed in large scale. She is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 10278205, the Court finds
accused-appellant Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and
sentences her to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor and to indemnify private complainant
Noel Sevillena the amount of Twenty-Nine Thousand
Pesos (P29,000.00);
3. In Criminal Case No. 10278206, the Court finds
accused-appellant Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and
sentences her to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor and to indemnify private complainant
Janice A. Antonio the amount of Twenty-Eight
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P28,500.00);
4. In Criminal Case No. 10278207, the Court finds
accused-appellant Julia Regalado Estrada GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and
sentences her to suffer the penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor and to indemnify private complainant
Albert M. Cortez the amount of Twenty-Four
Thousand Pesos (P24,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
6
G.R. No. 178774. December 8, 2010.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARLYN P.
BACOS, appellant.
Labor Law; Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment;
Together with Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), the law governing illegal
recruitment is the Labor Code.—Together with Republic Act
No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995), the law governing illegal recruitment is the Labor Code
which defines recruitment and placement as “any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not.” The same Code also defines and
punishes Illegal recruitment. Its Articles 38 and 39 state: Art.
38. Illegal Recruitment.—(a) Any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34
of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of this Code. x x x (b) Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof. x x x Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Art. 39. Penalties.—(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage
as defined herein[.]
Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Words and Phrases; By
its very definition, illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by the mere act of promising employment
without a license or authority and whether for profit or not;
The time when the misrepresentation was made, whether
prior or simultaneous to the delivery of the money of the
complainants, is only material in the crime of estafa under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and not in the crime of illegal recruitment.—The appellant’s
argument that she did not derive any consideration from the
transactions or that she made the assurances after
Dimayuga’s representations were made to the complainants
cannot serve to exonerate her from the crime. We emphasize
that the absence of a consideration or misrepresentations
employed by the appellant is not material in the prosecution for
illegal recruitment. By its very definition, illegal recruitment is
deemed committed by the mere act of promising employment
without a license or authority and whether for profit or
not. Moreover, we previously held that the time when the
misrepresentation was made, whether prior or simultaneous to
the delivery of the money of the complainants, is only material
in the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and not in the crime of illegal
recruitment.
BRION, J.:
For review is the decision,1 dated April 18, 2007, of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01713 which affirmed
the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 79,
Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-96-65212 finding Marlyn
P. Bacos (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment in large scale. The RTC sentenced her to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00.
This is not the first time we have passed upon this case as we
previously disposed of the appellant’s appeal in our
Resolutions dated April 14, 2010 and August 23, 2010. We are
once more passing upon this case as we committed an
oversight in our previous Resolutions; one of the justices of the
Court who then participated and voted for the denial of the
present appeal was also a member of the Division that handled
the case at the CA. Hence, the need to resubmit this case for
another consideration and decision, with a new Member
replacing the Justice who should not have participated in
resolving this case before this Court.
The Facts
Together with her common law husband Efren Dimayuga, the
appellant was charged of illegal recruitment in large scale
before the RTC, based on the complaints filed by ten (10)
individuals. The appellant and Dimayuga pleaded not guilty,
and a joint trial ensued. Dimayuga died during the pendency of
the trial, leaving the appellant to face the charges.
Of the ten (10) complainants, only three (3) testified, namely:
Cynthia Deza, Elizabeth Paculan and Ramelo Gualvez
(complainants). The complainants claimed that within the
period of December 1993 to September 1994, they met
Dimayuga and the appellant at their house. Dimayuga
represented that he was a recruiter who could send them to
work in Japan. The appellant likewise assured the
complainants that they (she and Dimayuga) could send them
abroad. Believing that Dimayuga was a legitimate recruiter, the
complainants parted with their money to be used as placement
and processing fees. The money was given by the
complainants either to Dimayuga while in the presence of the
appellant, or handed to the appellant who gave it to Dimayuga.
Dimayuga issued receipts for the money received.
The complainants were not deployed within the period
promised by Dimayuga. The complainants also discovered that
Dimayuga and the appellant moved to another house.
Believing that they had been duped, the complainants and the
other applicants filed complaints for illegal recruitment against
Dimayuga and the appellant before the authorities.
The prosecution presented documentary evidence consisting
of two (2) Certifications (dated December 1, 1999 and January
19, 2000) from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration stating that Efren Dimayuga, Marlyn P. Bacos
and Marlyn Reyes y Bacos are not authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment.
In her defense, the appellant testified that she had no
participation in the transactions between her husband and the
complainants. She denied having received any money from the
complainants, and likewise denied signing any receipt for
payments made. The appellant claimed that she only served
the complainants snacks whenever they came to where she
and Dimayuga then resided.
The defense presented Pulina Luching who testified that
Dimayuga and the appellant were both known to her, having
lived with them for a time. The witness denied having any
knowledge of the nature of Dimayuga’s business.
7
The RTC Ruling
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the
complainants, which it found to be straightforward and
consistent. The RTC observed that the appellant did not refute
the allegation that Dimayuga was engaged in the recruitment
and placement business. The RTC ruled that sufficient
evidence existed establishing that the two accused conspired
in engaging in illegal recruitment activities. The RTC found that
the appellant gave indispensable assistance to Dimayuga in
perpetrating the fraud by receiving the amounts of money for
placement fees and assuring the complainants that Dimayuga
can deploy them for employment abroad. Under the
circumstances, the RTC ruled that the appellant’s denial
deserved little credence in light of the positive testimony
coming from credible prosecution witnesses.
The CA Ruling
The CA upheld the factual findings of the RTC on appeal. The
CA ruled that all the elements of illegal recruitment, as defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code in relation to Article 34
of the same Code, were sufficiently proven by the prosecution
evidence. The CA held that the appellant is liable as principal,
considering that she actively participated in the recruitment
process by giving the victims the assurance that Dimayuga
could deploy them for employment abroad. The CA declared
that the appellant’s acts fall within the legal definition by
enumeration of what constitutes "recruitment."
The Issues
The appellant assigns the following errors for the Court’s
consideration:
(1) In finding the appellant as principal in the crime
charged absent any direct and clear evidence of her
active participation in the illegal recruitment; and
(2) In the alternative, the appellant is only liable as an
accomplice under the circumstances.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the appeal and affirm the appellant’s conviction, with
modification on the award of damages.
Together with Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), the law governing illegal
recruitment is the Labor Code which defines recruitment and
placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not."3 The
same Code also defines and punishes Illegal recruitment. Its
Articles 38 and 39 state:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. –
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to
be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of this Code. x x x
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate
or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized
in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as
a group.
Art. 39. Penalties. -
(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein[.]
Applying these legal provisions to the facts, no doubt exists in
our mind that the appellant committed illegal recruitment
activities together with Dimayuga. The prosecution evidence
clearly showed that despite the lack of license or authority to
engage in recruitment, the appellant admitted that she gave
the complainants "assurances" that she and Dimayuga could
deploy them for employment in Japan. The complainants, in
this regard, were categorical in saying that they relied not only
on the representations of Dimayuga but also on the
assurances of the appellant that they would be deployed for
work in Japan.
We arrive at this conclusion after additionally considering the
following established acts of the appellant: (a) her acceptance
of the placement fee given by the complainants; (b) the fact
that she communicated to the complainants the date of their
departure; and (c) her information on how the balance of the
placement fee should be paid. These acts indubitably show
that she was engaged in illegal recruitment activities together
with Dimayuga. Thus, the appellant’s liability under the
circumstances cannot be considered as that of a mere
accomplice, but rather as a principal directly and actively
engaged in illegal recruitment activities.
Lastly, the appellant’s argument that she did not derive any
consideration from the transactions or that she made the
assurances after Dimayuga’s representations were made to
the complainants cannot serve to exonerate her from the
crime. We emphasize that the absence of a consideration or
misrepresentations employed by the appellant is not material
in the prosecution for illegal recruitment. By its very definition,
illegal recruitment is deemed committed by the mere act of
promising employment without a license or authority and
whether for profit or not. Moreover, we previously held that the
time when the misrepresentation was made, whether prior or
simultaneous to the delivery of the money of the complainants,
is only material in the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not in the crime of
illegal recruitment.41avvphi1
8

For all these reasons, we affirm the CA’s finding that the
appellant committed illegal recruitment in large scale.

The Penalty

The illegal recruitment having been committed against three

victims is illegal recruitment in large scale, as provided under
the aforequoted Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. We,
thus, likewise affirm the CA’s ruling imposing the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of ₱100,000.00, pursuant to the first
paragraph of Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Committed in large scale, the illegal recruitment is deemed to
constitute economic sabotage.

We find as well that the CA decision should be modified by

adding an award of legal interest with respect to the
complainants’ civil indemnity. The amounts of civil indemnity
represent the amount of placement fees that the complainants
paid to Dimayuga and the appellant. The legal interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum shall be imposed, reckoned
from the filing of the information until the finality of the
judgment, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.5

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) RECALL the Resolutions dated April 14, 2010 and

August 23, 2010.

(2) DENY the appeal for failure to sufficiently show

that a reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in the assailed decision; and

(3) AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01713
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 79, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No.
Q-96-65212, finding Marlyn P. Bacos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Appellant is ordered to indemnify the complainants the
following amounts:

(a) Cynthia Deza - ₱20,000;

(b) Elizabeth Paculan - ₱10,000; and

(c) Ramelo Gualvez - ₱5,000

representing the amounts paid by the complainants as

placement fees, plus 12% legal interest per annum that shall
be reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality
of the judgment.

SO ORDERED.
9
G.R. No. 187160. August 9, 2017.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERLINDA
A. SISON @ “MARGARITA S. AGUILAR,” appellant.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment; Illegal
recruitment is “committed by persons who, without
authority from the government, give the impression that
they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.”—Simply put, illegal recruitment is
“committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to
send workers abroad for employment purposes.” Illegal
recruitment may be undertaken by either non-license or license
holders. Non-license holders are liable by the simple act of
engaging in recruitment and placement activities, while license
holders may also be held liable for committing the acts
prohibited under Section 6 of RA 8042.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held in
several cases that an accused who represents to others
that he or she could send workers abroad for employment,
even without the authority or license to do so, commits
illegal recruitment.—Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for overseas
employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; or
(2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under Section
6 of RA 8042. In this case, Sison herself admits that she has
no license or authority to undertake recruitment and placement
activities. The Court has held in several cases that an accused
who represents to others that he or she could send workers
abroad for employment, even without the authority or license
to do so, commits illegal recruitment. It is the absence of the
necessary license or authority to recruit and deploy workers
that renders the recruitment activity unlawful. To prove illegal
recruitment, it must be shown that “the accused gave the
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or
ability to deploy the complainants abroad in a manner that they
were convinced to part with their money for that end.”
Same; Illegal Recruitment Committed by a
Syndicate; Elements of.—Illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate, as in the present case, has the following elements:
(a) the offender does not have the valid license or authority
required by law to engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the “recruitment
and placement” activities defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code, or engages in any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under now Section 6 of RA 8042; and (c) the
illegal recruitment is “carried out by a group of three or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme.” In the third element, it “is not essential that there be
actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every
act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective.”
Same; Since it was proven that the three (3) accused
were acting in concert and conspired with one another,
their illegal recruitment activity is considered done by a
syndicate, making the offense illegal recruitment
involving economic sabotage.—Since it was proven that the
three accused were acting in concert and conspired with one
another, their illegal recruitment activity is considered done by
a syndicate, making the offense illegal recruitment involving
economic sabotage. Section 7 of RA 8042 sets out the penalty
for illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage: SEC.
7. PENALTIES.—(a) Any person found guilty of illegal
recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve
(12) years and a fine not less than two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00). (b) The penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined
herein. Provided, however, that the maximum penalty shall be
imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen
(18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority.
Same; Denials; The courts do not look favorably at
denial as a defense since [d]enial, same as an alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law.—The RTC rejected Sison’s claim that she was also a
victim of illegal recruitment. The courts do not look favorably at
denial as a defense since “[d]enial, same as an alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is
considered with suspicion and always received with caution,
not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also
because it is easily fabricated and concocted.” Denial “does
not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact.” Sison’s
defense of denial is merely an attempt to avoid liability. The
Court agrees with the RTC’s assessment that Sison’s claim
that she is also a victim of illegal recruitment has no credence.
Same; Illegal Recruitment; Estafa; It is settled that a
person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for
illegal recruitment under Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 and
estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).—We affirm Sison’s conviction for estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same
acts, may be convicted separately for illegal recruitment under
RA 8042 and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.
In People v. Gallemit, 724 SCRA 359 (2014), the Court
explained: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who
commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
and estafaunder par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malumin se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.
Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar
conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely,
conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the
crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
10
Before the Court is an appeal by Erlinda A. Sison (Sison) from
the 6 November 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals irtcA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02833. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 8
May 2007 Joint Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 (RTC) finding Sison guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of (1) violation of Section 6, in
relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), or
illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, and (2) estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Sometime in November or December 1999, Darvy3 M.
Castuera (Castuera) was introduced to Sison by her husband,
a certain Col. Alex Sison (Col. Sison), a police officer assigned
at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Castuera's aunt, Edna
Magalona, was then teaching police officers at Camp Crame
and Col. Sison was one of her students. Col. Sison happened
to mention that his wife can facilitate papers for workers in
Australia. Castuera and Magalona then proceeded to Col.
Sison's home in Las Piñas. There, they met Sison and she
briefed Castuera on the requirements for working as a fruit
picker in Australia.4
During that meeting, Sison introduced Castuera to another
man who related that he was able to go to Australia with
Sison's help. She also showed Castuera pictures of other
people she had supposedly helped to get employment in
Australia. Sison further narrated that a couple she had helped
had given her their car as payment. Because of Sison's
representations, Castuera believed in her promise that she
could send him to Australia.5
Sison asked Castuera for ₱180,000 for processing his papers.
After some negotiations, Sison agreed to lower the fee to
₱160,000. Castuera was to pay half before he leaves the
Philippines and the other half will be taken from his salary in
Australia.6
On 16 June 2000, Castuera met Sison at McDonald's in SM
Megamall to give the ₱80,000 down payment. Sison issued a
signed document as proof of payment. Castuera's
companions, his aunt Edna Magalona and cousin Mark
Magalona, also signed the document as witnesses. Sison
promised Castuera that she would personally process his visa
application.7
Sison, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for
Castuera. She told him that it was difficult to get an Australian
visa in the Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia to get one.
She also said that Castuera's Australian visa was already in
Malaysia and his personal appearance was required there.8
On 28 June 2008, Sison and Castuera left Manila for
Zamboanga City by plane and from there, rode a boat to
Sandakan, Malaysia. Sison told Castuera that he only needed
to stay in Malaysia for a week then he would proceed to
Australia.9
Twice, they nearly overstayed in Malaysia. Each time, Sison
and Castuera would leave for Brunei, stay there for three days,
and then go back to Malaysia. The second time they returned
to Malaysia, they met several of Sison's other recruits - other
Filipinos who have come in through Thailandas well as Sison'
s co-accused, Rea Dedales (Dedales) and Leonardo Bacomo
(Bacomo). Castuera was told that the group would be
proceeding to Indonesia to process their Australian visas there.
The group then left for Indonesia.However, the day after
arriving in Indonesia, Sison went back to the Philippines,
leaving Castuera and the other recruits with Dedales and
Bacomo.10
Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in
Indonesia was denied.11 Dedales said it was harder to get an
Australian visa from Indonesia and told Castuera to apply for a
U.S. visa instead. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the
processing of his U.S. visa, which he paid.12 However, when
his U.S. visa came, Castuera saw that it was in an Indonesian
passport bearing an Indonesian name. Because of this,
Castuera decided to just return to the Philippines. He asked for
his US$1,000 back but Dedales would not return it. His
Philippine passport was also not returned immediately causing
him to overstay in Indonesia. He found out then that the
extension papers that Dedales and Bacomo procured for him
were fake.13
Castuera sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in
Indonesia and was able to return to the Philippines using his
own funds.14
Upon returning to the Philippines, Castuera filed a complaint
against Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo at the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The agency
verified that Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo did not have any
license or permit to hire and recruit for overseas employment.15
During the trial, Sison denied that she recruited Castuera for
employment. She maintained she was also a victim of illegal
recruitment by Dedales.16 She claimed that it was Dedales,
then working for a travel agency, who was processing her visa
and ticket to Australia. She further claimed that she accepted
the down payment money from Castuera because Dedales
was already in Malaysia at that time. When she and Castuera
arrived in Malaysia, she gave the money to Dedales. Like
Castuera, she found out when they arrived in Malaysia that her
Australian visa application had been denied. She also said that
Dedales asked her for an additional US$ l,000, which she
gave.
However, upon learning that it was difficult to get an Australian
visa, Sison opted to go back to the Philippines. When Dedales
and Bacomo informed her that Castuera had been issued a
U.S. visa, Sison supposedly told them to apply the US$1,000
she paid to Castuera's payment.
The RTC's Joint Decision
In its 8 May 2007 Joint Decision, the RTC found Sison guilty of
illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage and estafa:
11
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused ERLINDA SISON
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and
hereby sentences her, thus:
1) In Criminal Case No. MCOl-4035-H for Violation of
Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of R.A. 8042 (Illegal
Recruitment-Economic Sabotage) to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment pursuant to Section 6 (m)
of R.A. 8042 in relation to Section 7 (b) thereof and to
pay a fine of One Million Pesos (Php1,000,000.00) as
the illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage;
2) In Criminal Case No. MCOl-4036 for Estafa under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
to suffer the penalty of four years, two (2) months of
prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of
prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the victim, Darby
Castuera, the sum of Php160,000.00 as actual damages.
In so far as accused Rea Dedales and Leonardo Bacomo are
concerned, who have been fugitives from justice and are not
yet arraigned, let bench warrants issue against them.
Accordingly, the cases against them are ordered archived until
such time that they shall have been arrested and arraigned.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC stated it was clear that Sison convinced Castuera to
apply for employment as fruit picker in Australia and induced
him to pay the fees needed for overseas employment.18
The RTC also held that Castuera was indeed "a victim of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate"19 since it was
committed by a group of three persons acting "in conspiracy"
with one another.20
According to the RTC, the conduct of Sison and her co-
accused showed that they acted "in concert towards the
accomplishment of a common felonious purpose which was to
recruit [Castuera] for overseas employment even though they
had no license to do so."21
As to the estafa charge, the RTC held that Sison and her co-
accused were also guilty of the same. The RTC pointed out
that the element of deceit was evident in the "false pretenses
by which accused deluded [Castuera] into believing that they
ha[ve] the power and qualifications to send people abroad for
employment" and which induced him to pay them Pll0,000 and
us$1,000.22
The RTC also rejected Sison's claim that she was also a victim
like Castuera. The RTC stated that if that were true, then Sison
should have filed a case against the illegal recruiter, but she
did not. It also held that Castuera's positive and categorical
testimony prevailed over Sison's mere denials.23
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Sison appealed the joint decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals.
She maintained that she was also a victim of her co-accused
Dedales24 and that there was "no material and concrete proof
that indeed [she] offered or promised for a fee employment
abroad to two (2) or more persons."25According to Sison,
Castuera merely sought her out to "enable him to transact with
accused Dedales"26 who would facilitate his application for an
Australian visa. She claimed that there was no proof beyond
reasonable doubt that her transaction with Castuera was for
recruitment or deployment to Australia.27
Sison did not dispute her lack of license or authority to conduct
recruitment activities. However, she maintained that the
transaction she facilitated between Castuera and Dedales was
"only for the former to secure a visa, not a working visa."
Further, she argued that the procurement of a visa did not
qualify as a "recruitment activity."28
Sison also contested the ruling that she was guilty of estafa,
claiming that she "did not fraudulently or falsely [represent]
herself to possess the power, capacity or authority to recruit
and deploy [Castuera] for overseas employment."29
In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's
joint decision:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The decision of the court a quodated May 8, 2007 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.30
The Court of Appeals held that all the elements of illegal
recruitment were sufficiently proven in the case.
First, Sison herself did not dispute that she is not licensed or
authorized to engage in recruitment or placement activities.
This fact was unknown to Castuera at the time of their
transaction.31
Second, the Court of Appeals held that even if Sison did not
directly recruit Castuera, her actions led him to believe that she
was engaged in the recruitment business.32 Castuera was able
to prove that it was Sison who promised him a job as fruit picker
in Australia and even accompanied him to Malaysia, Brunei,
and Indonesia in the guise of processing his visa application.
However, the Court of Appeals noted that this process was
actually part of "defrauding [Castuera] and inveigling him with
false or fraudulent promises of employment in a foreign land."33
Further, the Court of Appeals found that Sison made
representations about her purported power and authority to
recruit for employment in Australia and, in the process,
collected various. amounts of money from Castuera as
placement and processing fees.34 The Court of Appeals stated
that it was "enough that these recruiters give the impression
that they have the ability to enlist workers for job placement
abroad in order to induce the latter to tender payment of
fees."35
12
The Court of Appeals further held that the illegal recruitment
activities of Sison and her co-accused constituted economic
sabotage. It underscored that "active participation of each
[accused] in the various phases of the recruitment scam
formed part of a series of machinations" which lured Castuera
to part with his hard earned money in exchange for guaranteed
employment in Australia.36 The Court of Appeals noted that
Castuera would not have gone along with traveling to
Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia and complying with Sison's
further demands without the repeated assurances of the
latter.37
The Court of Appeals also affirmed Sison's conviction for
estafa. It held that the two elements of estafa were proven in
the case. The Court of Appeals found that Sison's
misrepresentations facilitated the commission of the crime.
Sison deliberately misrepresented that she had the power,
capacity, or means to send Castuera to Australia. The Court of
Appeals concluded that Sison defrauded Castuera through
deceit.38
Sison appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to this Court via
a Notice of Appeal dated 25 November 2008.39
The Issue
The lone issue in this case is whether the guilt of Sison was
established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed, with modification as to the penalty
imposed in the estafa case.
Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate - Economic Sabotage
Under Article 13(b) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, also known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines,recruitment and placement refers to "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring,
or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contact services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement."
Illegal recruitment, on the other hand, is defined in Article 38:
Article 38. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT. - (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Department of
Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may
initiate complaints under this Article.
xxxx
RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, approved on 7 June 1995, further strengthened the
protection extended to those seeking overseas employment.
Section 6, in particular, extended the activities covered under
the term illegal recruitment:
II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers
and includes referring, contact services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not,
when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines. Provided, that such non-license or non-holder,
who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following
acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any
amount greater than the specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, or to make a worker pay any
amount greater than that actually received by him as
a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information
or document in relation to recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or
document or commit any act of misrepresentation for
the purpose of securing a license or authority under
the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already
employed to quit his employment in order to offer him
another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a
worker from oppressive terms and conditions of
employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or
entity not to employ any worker who has not applied
for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of
workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or
to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly
authorized representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of
employment, placement vacancies, remittances of
foreign exchange earnings, separations from jobs,
departures and such other matters or information as
13
may be required by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker,
employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor and Employment from the time
of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and
including the period of the expiration of the same
without the approval of the Department of Labor and
Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement
agency to become an officer or member of the Board
of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be
engaged directly on indirectly in the management of a
travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from
applicant workers before departure for monetary or
financial considerations other than those authorized
under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and
regulations;
(1) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as
determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the
workers in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases
where the deployment does not actually take place
without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when
committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered as offense involving economic
sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction
of their business shall be liable. (Emphasis supplied)
Simply put, illegal recruitment is "committed by persons who,
without authority from the government, give the impression that
they have the power to send workers abroad for employment
purposes."40
Illegal recruitment may be undertaken by either non-license or
license holders. Non-license holders are liable by the simple
act of engaging in recruitment and placement activities, while
license holders may also be held liable for committing the acts
prohibited under Section 6 of RA 8042.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
commits illegal recruitment for overseas employment in two
ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; or (2) by
undertaking any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA
8042.41
In this case, Sison herself admits that she has no license or
authority to undertake recruitment and placement activities'.
The Court has held in several cases that an accused who
represents to others that he or she could send workers abroad
for employment, even without the authority or license to do so,
commits illegal recruitment.42
It is the absence of the necessary license or authority to recruit
and deploy workers that renders the recruitment activity
unlawful. To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that
"the accused gave the complainants the distinct impression
that she had the power or ability to deploy the complainants
abroad in a manner that they were convinced to part with their
money for that end."43
On the other hand, illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate, as in the present case, has the following elements:
(a) the offender does not have the valid license or authority
required by law to engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the "recruitment
and placement" activities defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code, or engages in any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under now Section 6 of RA 8042; and (c) the
illegal recruitment is "carried out by a group of three or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme."44 In the third element, it "is not essential that there be
actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every
act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective."45
The acts of Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo show a common
purpose and and each undertook a part to reach their
objective. Their concerted action is evident in that either Sison
or Dedales was receiving payments from the recruits; that
Dedales signed the acknowledgment receipt from Sison; and
that the three accompanied their recruits together in seeking
out their visas in Malaysia and Indonesia. Further, the
impression given to Castuera and other recruits was that the
three were indeed working together.
Since it was proven that the three accused were acting in
concert and conspired with one another, their illegal
recruitment activity is considered done by a syndicate, making
the offense illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage.
Section 7 of RA 8042 sets out the penalty for illegal recruitment
involving economic sabotage:
SEC. 7. PENALTIES -
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less
14
than two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more
than five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more
than one million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if
illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein.
Provided, however, that the maximum penalty shall be
imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen
(18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC rejected Sison's claim that she was also a victim of
illegal recruitment. The courts do not look favorably at denial
as a defense since "[d]enial, same as an alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is
considered with suspicion and always received with caution,
not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also
because it is easily fabricated and concocted." 46 Denial "does
not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact."47
Sison's defense of denial is merely an atte.mpt to avoid liability.
The Court agrees with the RTC's assessment that Sison's
claim that she is also a victim of illegal recruitment has no
credence.
It is hard to believe that Castuera would deal with Sison in the
manner that he had if he believed that she was also a mere
recruit like himself. For one thing, there is no proof of Sison' s
transactions with Dedales, except for a handwritten
acknowledgment receipt,48 which is only backed up by her own
testimony.
Also, if she were a victim, she would have taken action against
Dedales and Bacomo herself. Her husband was a member of
the Philippine National Police. It would have been easy to seek
help in apprehending the illegal recruiters. Sison also failed to
explain why she took no action to recover the ₱100,000 she
allegedly paid for her Australian visa, as well as the money to
travel and stay in Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. >>
Lastly, why would she have allowed, as she claims, the
US$1,000 she allegedly paid to be applied to the U.S. visa
application of Castuera, someone she says she hardly knows,
instead of trying to recover the same, considering that Dedales
failed to procure the visa for which she ·paid? All these cast
doubt on her claim of being only a victim of Dedales.
At the very least, Sison gave the impression that she had some
sort of authority, whether or not Dedales is indeed the principal,
which is enough to amount to illegal recruitment. In any case,
the acknowledgment
receipts49 only serve to strengthen the case of conspiracy
among Sison and her coaccused.
Estafa
We affirm Sison's conviction for estafa under Article 315(2)(a)
of the RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may
be convicted separately for illegal recruitment under RA 8042
and estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of the RPC. In People v.
Daud, the Court explained:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a)
of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa
is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor
Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other
laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one's
acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
and vice versa.50 (Citations omitted)
The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 3 l
5(2)(a) of the RPC are:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and
was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that,
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.51
All these elements are present in this case.
First, Sison misrepresented her qualifications and authority to
send Castuera to work in Australia. She actively made
Castuera believe that she had the ability to do so - she showed
pictures of her "recruits," had one of them give a testimonial,
and told him stories to convince him of such ability. It did not
matter that "they had no agreement"52 that their transaction
was for recruitment or deployment. All her acts were calculated
to convince Castuera that Sison was qualified to send him
abroad for employment. It is enough that she "gave the
impression that [she] had the power to send workers abroad
for employment purposes."53
Second, Sison's false representation was made prior to or
simultaneous to the commission of the fraud. Sison used these
false representations to convince Castuera that he would be
able to go to Australia and be a fruit picker, just like her other
recruits. These representations were clearly mere devices to
convince Castuera, whom she only met at that time, that she
was a legitimate recruiter.
Third, Castuera relied on Sison's representations. He believed
that she could send him to Australia because of the pictures
and testimonials she showed him. He also relied on the fact
that his aunt knew Sison's husband, a police officer, adding to
her trustworthiness. Sison banked on that trust to convince
15
Castuera to part with his money and be "recruited" into
overseas employment. Castuera believed that Sison had the
same ability to send him to Australia. He did not even ask for
her authority or check for himself with the POEA, relying
instead on her word. This tells us that he was fully convinced
based on Sison's representations.
Fourth, Sison' s misrepresentation resulted in damage to
Castuera. He paid the ₱80,000 down payment that Sison
required of him as processing fee, but the purpose for which it
was paid never materialized. Likewise, said amount was never
reimbursed to Castuera despite his demands for its return.
Penalty
The penalty for illegal recruitment is correct based on Section
7 of RA 8042. Since the illegal recruitment was committed by
a non-licensee or non- holder of authority, the RTC may
rightfully mete out the maximum penalty. Thus, the penalty
imposed by the RTC stands.
The penalty for estafa, however, needs to be modified. Article
315 of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be tenned prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in
determining the penalty for estafa. Under this law, the
maximum term is "that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under [the RPC]"
and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the [RPC] for the offense."54
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, "the minimum term
is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prision
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months). On the other hand, the maximum
term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum in its
maximum period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every
₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00, provided that the total
penalty shall not exceed 20 years."55
In People v. Tolentino, the Court further explained:
The range of penalty under Article 315 is composed of only two
periods. To compute the maximum period of the indeterminate
sentence, the total number of years included in the two periods
should be divided into three equal portions, with each portion
forming a period. Following this computation, the minimum,
medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty are:
1. Minimum Period - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5
years, 5 months and 10 days;
2. Medium Period - 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to
6 years, 8 months and 20 days;
3. Maximum Period - 6 years, 8 months and 21 days
to 8 years.
Any incremental penalty, i.e. one year for every P10,000 in
excess of ₱22,000, shall be added to anywhere from 6 years,
8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the court's discretion,
provided the total penalty does not exceed 20 years.56
To arrive at the correct penalty, the Court must determine the
actual amount defrauded from the victim.
Actual damages must be proven, not presumed.57 It should be
"actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable."58
Based on the evidence and testimony of Castuera, he only paid
₱80,000 as down payment because, under their agreement,
the balance of the placement fee was to be deducted from his
salary when he starts working in Australia. Thus, there is no
basis for the ₱160,000. awarded by the RTC.
Based on the foregoing, the minimum penalty should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day of prision correccionalin its
minimum period to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional in its medium period. Thus, the R TC was correct
in imposing the minimum penalty of 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional.
However, the maximum period should be computed as the
maximum period that could be properly imposed under the
RPC, plus the incremental penalty resulting from each
additional ₱10,000 in excess of ₱22,000 that was defrauded
from the victim.
In this case, the amount is ₱80,000, which means that there
must be five more years of imprisonment added to the
maximum period imposed by the RPC.1âwphi1 Thus, the
maximum period should be 13 years of reclusion temporal.
Lastly, Sison is ordered to pay legal interest of 6% per
annum on the amount adjudicated, to be reckoned from the
finality of this Decision until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02833
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No.
MCOl-4036 for Estafa under A1iicle 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, appellant Erlinda A. Sison is sentenced to suffer
16

the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Sison is also ORDERED to pay Darvy
M. Castuera the amount of ₱80,000 as actual damages, with
legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of
this Decision until the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
17
G.R. No. 214500. June 28, 2017.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MICHELLE DELA CRUZ,** accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment; Words and
Phrases; The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and
penalized under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995.—The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and
penalized under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, as follows: SEC. 6. Definition.—For purposes of this Act,
illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not,
when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, x x x:
x x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
Same; Same; Elements of.—In order to hold a person
liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must
concur: (1) the offender undertakes any of the activities within
the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b)
of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section
6 of Republic Act No. 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case
of illegal recruitment in large scale, as in this case, a third
element is required: that the offender commits any of the acts
of recruitment and placement against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Trial courts are
in a better position to decide the question of credibility,
having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed firsthand their demeanor and manner of
testifying under grueling examination.—This Court has
consistently conformed to the rule that findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight. Factual
findings of the trial court and its observation as to the
testimonies of the witnesses are accorded great respect, if not
conclusive effect, most especially when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, as in this case. The reason for this is that trial
courts are in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed firsthand their demeanor and manner of testifying
under grueling examination. In the absence of palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the
trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be
disturbed on appeal.
Criminal Law; Denials; Denial, same as an alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law.—Appellant’s defense that she merely referred private
complainants to a certain “Madam Rosa” fails to convince as
the same was unsupported by any evidence. Between the
categorical statements of the private complainants and the
bare denial of appellant, the former must perforce prevail. An
affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony
especially when the former comes from the mouth of a credible
witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is considered with
suspicion and always received with caution, not only because
it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily
fabricated and concocted.
Same; Illegal Recruitment; Estafa; It is well-
established in jurisprudence that a person may be
charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and
estafa.—Furthermore, we agree with the court a quo that the
same pieces of evidence which establish appellant’s liability for
illegal recruitment in large scale likewise confirm her culpability
for estafa. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person
may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment
and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In
the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction. In the second, such intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds
another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar
deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of fraud.
Same; Estafa by Means of Deceit; Elements of.—The
elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following: (a)
that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and
was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that,
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
Same; Same; Illegal Recruitment; In the instant case,
the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded
private complainants by leading them to believe that she
has the capacity to send them to South Korea for work as
domestic helpers, even as she does not have a license or
authority for the purpose.—In the instant case, the
prosecution has established that appellant defrauded private
complainants by leading them to believe that she has the
capacity to send them to South Korea for work as domestic
helpers, even as she does not have a license or authority for
the purpose. Such misrepresentation came before private
complainants delivered various amounts for purportedly travel
expenses and visa assistance to appellant. Clearly, private
complainants would not have parted with their money were it
not for such enticement by appellant. As a consequence of
appellant’s false pretenses, the private complainants suffered
damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the money they paid were never recovered.
All these representations were actually false and fraudulent
and thus, the appellant must be made liable under par. 2(a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Even if appellant was acquitted
in these two (2) estafa cases, it must be clarified that she
18
can still be convicted of illegal recruitment.—As to
appellant’s acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 05-414 and 05-415,
due to the trial court’s finding that there is “insufficient”
evidence to show that payment has been made to appellant,
this Court can no longer review and pass judgment in view of
the appellant’s right against double jeopardy. Nevertheless,
even if appellant was acquitted in these two estafa cases, it
must be clarified that she can still be convicted of illegal
recruitment. This is because while in estafa, damage is
essential, the same is not an essential element in the crime of
illegal recruitment. It is the lack of the necessary license or
authority, not the fact of payment that renders the recruitment
activity of appellant unlawful. As long as the prosecution is able
to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the
accused-appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment, a
conviction for the offense can very well be justified.
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 2,
2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
04935. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 21, 2010
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal
Cases Nos. 05-412 to 415, which convicted appellant Michelle
Dela Cruz of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.
Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale
and three (3) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code. The Informations against appellant
read:
Criminal Case No. 05-412 for Illegal Recruitment (Large
Scale):
That in or about and sometime from September 21, 2004 to
February 18, 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused not being authorized by the POEA of the Department
of Labor and Employment to recruit workers for overseas
employment, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promise and recruit the following complainants, to
wit:
ARMELY AGUILAR UY, SHERYL AGUILAR REFORMADO &
ADONA LUNA QUINES LA VARO
for an overseas job placement abroad and in consideration of
said promise, said complainants paid and delivered the total
amount of Php300,000.00 as processing fees of their papers,
but despite said promise, accused failed to deploy
complainants and despite demand to reimburse/return the
amount which complainants paid as processing fees, accused
did then and there refuse and fail to reimburse/return to said
complainants the aforesaid amount, thus in large scale
amounting to economic sabotage, in violation of the aforecited
law.
Contrary to law."3
Criminal Case No. 05-413 for Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a)
of the RPC._
That in or about and sometime from September 21, 2004 to
February 18, 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud complainant ARMEL Y AGUILAR UY in the following
manner, to wit: The said accused by means of false
manifestation and fraudulent representation prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud which she
made to the complainant to the effect that she have a power
and capacity to recruit workers for the employment of
complainant as Domestic Helper in Korea and could facilitate
the necessary papers to meet the requirements and by means
of other deceit of similar import induced and succeeded in
inducing complainant to give and deliver in the total amount of
Phpl00,000.00, the accused knowing fully well that the same
was false and fraudulent and was made only to obtain, as in
fact the accused obtained the amount of Php100,000.00,
which the accused applied and used for her own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant ARMEL Y AGUILAR UY.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 05-414 for Esta[a under Art. 315. par. 2(a)
of the RPC.
That in or about and sometime from September 21, 2004 to
February 18, 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud complainant ADONA LUNA QUINES LAV ARO in the
following manner, to wit: The said accused by means of false
manifestation and fraudulent representation prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud which she
made to the complainant to the effect that she have a power
and capacity to recruit workers for the employment of
complainant as Domestic Helper in Korea and could facilitate
the necessary papers to meet the requirements and by means
of other deceit of similar import induced and succeeded in
inducing complainant to give and deliver in the total amount of
Phpl00,000.00, the accused knowing fully well that the same
was false and fraudulent and was made only to obtain, as in
fact the accused obtained the amount of Phpl00,000.00, which
the accused applied and used for her own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant
ADONA LUNA QUINES LAV ARO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Criminal Case No. 05-415 for Estafa under Art. 315. par. 2(a)
of the RPC.
That in or about and sometime from September 21, 2004 to
February 18, 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud complainant SHERYL AGUILAR REFORMADO in the
following manner, to wit: The said accused by means of false
manifestation and fraudulent representation prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud which she
made to the complainant to the effect that she have a power
and capacity to recruit workers for the employment of
19
complainant as Domestic Helper in Korea and could facilitate
the necessary papers to meet the requirements and by means
of other deceit of similar import induced and succeeded in
inducing complainant to give and deliver in the total amount of
Php 100, 000. 00, the accused knowing fully well that the same
was false and fraudulent and was made only to obtain, as in
fact the accused obtained the amount of Php 100,000.00,
which the accused applied and used for her own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant SHERYL AGUILAR REFORMADO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The prosecution presented the three (3) private complainants
as witnesses to prove the crime of Illegal Recruitment on Large
Scale, namely: Armely Aguilar-Uy (Aguilar-Uy), Sheryl
Reformado (Reformado ), Adona Lavaro (Lavaro), and
Rosalina Rosales (Rosales) from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
Testimony of first private complainant Armely Aguilar-Uy:
Private respondent Aguilar-Uy testified that she and appellant
were introduced to each other by a certain Maggie Dela Cruz.
Aguilar-Uy claimed that appellant recruited her to work in South
Korea as domestic helper. She was told that she will receive
₱50,000.00 for eight hours of work and an overtime pay
totalling to ₱80,000.00 per month.7Appellant informed her that
she has twelve (12) visas with her and still needed two more
persons to go to South Korea. 8 Appellant required her to
submit the requirements that will be sent to South Korea for
authentication.
Aguilar-Uy testified that appellant asked for ₱l00,000.00 from
them as payment for expenses needed to go to South Korea.
Aguilar-Uy added that considering that she is also paying for
her niece, Sheryl Reformado, who also wants to work abroad,
she gave appellant the total amount of ₱200,000.00.
Thereafter, Aguilar-Uy waited for their visas until January
2005, but none were given to them. Aguilar-Uy called up and
texted appellant several times to no avail. Upon realizing that
they will no longer be able to get their visas, she told appellant
to return their passports instead but again appellant did not
reply. Finally, when they eventually met on February 18, 2005,
appellant asked her anew for additional payment of $72 to
renew their visas. Aguilar-Uy narrated that appellant gave
them a stub 9 which purported to be coming from the Embassy
of the Republic of South Korea. However, when they presented
the same to the Korean Embassy, they were told that all their
documents were fake. Aguilar-Uy then lodged a complaint
against the appellant before the Presidential Task Force Anti-
Illegal Recruitment Agency. Appellant promised them that she
would pay them back but failed to do so. Aguilar-Uy identified
the appellant in open court. 10
Testimony of second private complainant Sheryl
Reformado:
For her part, private complainant, Shery 1 Reformado
(Reformado) essentially corroborated the testimonies of her
aunt, Aguilar-Uy. She testified that she came to know appellant
through their neighbor Gemma Dimatera and her sister Maggie
Dela Cruz, who were also applying for work with appellant.11
Reformado narrated that on September 20, 2004, Gemma
Dimatera and Maggie Dela Cruz went to her place at Blk. 22,
Lot 13, Makiling St., Mountainview Subdivision, Muzon, San
Jose del Monte City, Bulacan and informed her that appellant
needed two more applicants to go to South Korea as overseas
workers. 12 As agreed upon per phone conversation with
appellant, they met in front of the Korean Embassy located in
Makati. Appellant immediately asked for ₱40,000.00 from them
since the working visa she had with her will expire. 13 She
corroborated the claim of AguilarUy that on different dates,
they gave appellant the total amount of ₱200,000.00. 14 They
waited for the processing of their passport and visa from
November 2004 up to February 2005 but none were given to
them as promised. Appellant gave them many alibis. They later
on asked for police assistance and went to the Korean
Embassy so they could get their passports, but the Consul
scolded her since the papers they submitted were all
fake. 15 Reformado also identified appellant in open court. 16
Testimonv of third private complainant Adona Lavaro:
Third private complainant, Adona Lavaro, testified that she was
introduced to appellant by a certain Mary Anne Legaspi. She
narrated that it was appellant who called her up and told her
that her employer, Mr. Simeon Right, was looking for a
domestic helper. Lavaro testified that appellant told her that
she will be the one to facilitate the processing of her documents
and assured her that she would be able to work in South
Korea. 17
On different occasions, Lavaro testified that appellant asked
her for money to be able to work in South Korea. She claimed
to have given appellant the amounts of (1) ₱40,000.00 as
terminal fee, (2) ₱40,000.00 as processing fee; (3) $72 for the
visa, (4) traveler's checks in the amount of US$200, and (5)
₱2,050.00 as terminal fee. Lavaro testified that she gave said
amounts of money to appellant because she trusted her and
she really wanted to leave for abroad but nothing happened.
Lavaro waited for appellant's instruction or call but when
appellant finally called her, it was only to ask her anew for
money. At this time, she already started to doubt appellant.
She later learned that appellant has also been asking money
from other people who also wants to work abroad. Lavaro also
identified appellant in open court.18
In the course of the trial, the prosecution formally offered the
following evidence to prove the payments made by private
complainants to appellant, 19 to wit:
Date
Amount Payment Details
Given
Received by Accused
₱ 40,000.0020 09/21/04
Michelle Dela Cruz
Listed as payment with
₱ 20,000.0021 09/27/04
alleged signature of Accused
20

Appellant denied that she promised private

Michelle Dela Cruz in a green complainants any deployment abroad, specifically in South
notebook22 Korea. She claimed that she just told them to secure the
needed documents. Appellant averred that she introduced the
Listed as payment with complainants to her agent named "Rosa," who assisted her in
alleged signature of Accused
₱ 20,000.00 23
10/04/04 going to Korea. She also admitted that she assisted the
Michelle Dela Cruz in a green complainants in securing the original copies of ITR,
notebook employment certificate and bank certificate to get a tourist visa.
However, after introducing the complainants to "Rosa",
Listed as payment with appellant claimed to be unaware anymore as to what
alleged ' signature of Accused happened next because she went to the province as she was
₱ 30,000.00 24
10/09/04
Michelle Dela Cruz in a green pregnant that time. 34
notebook
When confronted with an acknowledgement receipt marked as
Listed as payment with
Exh. "A", appellant declared that said document represents the
alleged signature of Accused
₱ 4,000.0025 10/13/04 payment in securing the ITR and the bank certification. She
Michelle Dela Cruz in a green
averred that the amount of ₱40,000.00 was personally
notebook
delivered to her and thereafter she gave the amount to Alma
Palomares.35 She said she did not know what Alma did with
Listed as payment with
the money. She further added that private complainants filed a
alleged signature of Accused
₱ 2,800 26
10/12/04 case against her just because she was the one who talked to
Michelle Dela Cruz in a green
them and they could not contact Aldrin, who was still in South
notebook
Korea at that time.
Listed as payment with
₱ 8,000 or alleged signature of Accused On cross-examination, appellant testified that she facilitated for
10/04/04 a fee the procurement of private complainants' papers like ITR,
$14427 Michelle Dela Cruz in a green
notebook bank certificate and certificate of employment. She confirmed
having received the amount of ₱40,000.00 for the facilitation of
Deposited in the Metrobank said documents. She claimed that Madam Rosa, Alma
₱ l0,000.0028 10/15/04 Palomares and private complainants were the ones
account of Norlita Hinagpis
communicating with each other. 36
Deposited in the Equitable
₱ 10,000.0029 10/15/04 PCI Bank account of Mario Appellant likewise admitted that the documents which she
Castillo produced for private complainants were all fake. She recalled
that her first entry to South Korea was illegal because she also
Deposited in the Metrobank used fake ITR, bank certificate and certificate of employment.
₱ 4,000.0030 11/12/04 Appellant, however, averred that she merely referred private
account of Norlita Hinagpis
complainants to the person who faked all her papers but she
Deposited in the Metrobank has no hand in the preparation of the fake documents. 37
₱ 2,000.0031 01/05/05
account of Norlita Hinagpis
On October 21, 2010, the RTC found the accused-appellant
₱ 150,800.00 TOTAL guilty of the cime of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads in this wise:

Meanwhile, prosecution witness, Rosalina Rosales testified
that as per Certification32 issued by Noriel Devanadera,
Director IV, Licensing and Regulation Office, POEA, appellant
Dela Cruz is not authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment during the year 2005 up to the present. Rosales
was the one who prepared the Certification signed by Director
Devanadera.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 05-412, this Court finds
the accused Michelle Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Article 3 8 (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended, in relation to Article 13 (b) and 34 of the same Code
(Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale) and hereby sentences her
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of
₱500,000.00.

For the defense, appellant testified that prior to her arrest, she
has worked in South Korea as an OFW for five years and three
months. She alleged that private complainants, namely,
Armely Aguilar, Adona Lavaro and Sheryl Aguilar were
introduced to her by a certain Alma Palomares, the sister of
her compadre Aldrin who was also an OFW in South
Korea.33 Thereafter, private complainants asked her the
necessary requirements for them to be able to work in South
Korea.
Accused is further ordered to pay complainant Armely Aguilar-
Uy the amount of ₱40,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages.
In Criminal Case No. 05-413, this Court finds the accused
Michell Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences her to a prison term ranging from
two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of
21
prision correccional as minimum up to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 05-414 and 05-415, accused Michelle
Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED." 38
The RTC was unconvinced by the defense of alibi and denial
interposed by appellant. The trial court relied on the testimony
of Rosalina Rosales of the Licensing Division of the POEA who
confirmed that appellant is not licensed to recruit workers for
overseas employment. It likewise accorded greater weight to
the testimonies of private complainants who positively
identified appellant as the person who recruited them for
employment in South Korea and received the placement fees.
The court a quo also found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa for misrepresenting herself as having the power
and capacity to recruit and place private complainants as
domestic helpers in South Korea.
Such misrepresentation, the trial court stressed, induced
private complainants to part with their money.
Unperturbed, appellant appealed the trial court's decision
before the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 2013, in its disputed Decision, 39 the Court of
Appeals denied the appellant's appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal, raising the same issues brought before the
appellate court, to wit:
I any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAIL URE TO PROVE HER GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
WHETHER THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S VERSION
AND INSTEAD REL YING HEAVILY ON THE
PROSECUTION'S VERSION.
Appellant avers that she cannot be held criminally liable for
illegal recruitment because she merely assisted private
complainants in processing their travel documents without any
promise of employment. She asserts that the prosecution
failed to establish whether she actually undertook any
recruitment activity or any prohibited practice enumerated
under Art. 13 (b) or Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
The appeal lacks merit.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and penalized under
Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,40 as
follows:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not,
when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13 (f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, x xx:
xxxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
Thus, in order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the
following elements must concur: (1) the offender undertakes
any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" under Article l 3(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042) and (2) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers. In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, as in
this case, a third element is required: that the offender commits
more persons, individually or as a group.
In the instant case, appellant committed the acts enumerated
in Section 6 of R.A. 8042. As testified to by Aguilar-Uy,
Reformado and Lavaro, appellant gave them an impression
that she is capable of sending them to South Korea as
domestic helpers. The testimonial evidence presented by the
prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise
of overseas employment, appellant received monies from
private complainants. Such acts were accurately described in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to wit:
Direct-examination o(Armelv Aguilar-Uy:
A. I was informed by this Michelle de/a Cruz that site has
twelve (12) visas with her and site still needs two more persons
to go to Korea and during that time on September 20 she even
called me and asked information regarding myself so that our
papers will be sent to Korea for authentication.
Q. You mentioned that you were called by Michelle dela Cruz.
In what manner were you called?
A. Through [cellphone].
22
Q. What did the two of you talk about?
A. She asked me to give my name and age, the name of my
niece Sheryl because according to her she needs to
authenticate the papers.
Q. And would you kindly tell this Honorable Court what is the
purpose of the authentication of the papers and the documents
which you just mentioned?
A. For us to be able to go to Korea.
Q. And after you were told through telephone call made by the
accused asking for your names and documents for proper
authentication with the Korean Embassy, what did you do next,
Madame Witness?
A. After that [cellphone] call from her that evening she told me
to prepare the money and bring it so that we can meet each
other the next day.
Q. Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the money for?
A. That money is for the expenses needed to be paid for us to
go to Korea.
Q. And that would be how much, Madame Witness?
A. ₱ 100,000.00
Q. And were you able to give that said amount of ₱100,000.00?
A. We were not able to give the full amount at once. We gave
the said amount on various dates and different places.
Q. And would you kindly tell this Honorable Court in what
manner and under what circumstances were you able to give
the amount of ₱l00,000.00 to the said accused?
A. Other payments by giving the money personally to her and
the others we deposited the money in the bank.41
xxxx
Q. When was the last payment which you made?
A. December 5, 2004, additional payment for our tickets.
Q. After the last payment which you made, which you claimed
you made a total payment of ₱200,000.00, would you kindly
tell this Honorable Court what happened after you made the
last payment?
A. She made several schedules for our departure and she even
told us to bring our things. I gave a condition to her that we will
not bring our things unless she will show to us our visa.
Q. And what is the reaction of the said accused when you told
her unless she can be able to produce the visa?
A. Site agreed and told us that site is going to show us the visa.
Q. And was she able to show you your visa as promised?
A. No, sir.42
xxxx
Q. Going back to your previous testimony that the said visa is
for going to Korea and you were being recruited to work as
what?
A. Domestic Helper.
Q. And how much did said accused tell you on how much you
are going to receive as your salary?
A. ₱50,000.00 for eight (8) hours plus overtime pay so we
could earn ₱80,000.00 per month.43
Cross-examination of Sheryl Reformado:
Q. And it was this Alvin Palomares who knows Michelle dela
Cruz and was the one who indorsed Michelle to Maggie dela
Cruz?
A. I am not familiar with the story, what I am aware of was that
she told us that Maggie Dela Cruz, that this Michelle Dela Cruz
came from Korea and she is looking for workers to work there.
xxxx
Q. And she told you that money will be required for the
facilitation for the processing of these papers, so that you will
be able to get the tourist visa for Korea?
A. Site told us site needs tlte money to get the document and
so we can travel and work abroad in Korea.
Q. But this document was a requirement for the procurement
of the tourist visa, is that right? A. Yes ma'am. She told us that
she is into direct hiring.44
xxxx
Re-direct examination of Sheryl Reformado:
Q. And when these documents were given to you, what were
these documents for, according to the accused?
A. According to her, those documents are needed for us to
work abroad.
xxxx
23
Re-cross examination of Sheryl Reformado:
Q. You for yourself to determine whether it is genuine or fake?
A. Yes ma'am. We were able to examine. We examined those
documents, we were always asking her if we will not encounter
any problem as to those documents, she told us none, because
the consul in the Philippines and the consul in Korea knows
about the document and site told us that those were just
formality, so that we can work abroad. 45
Direct-examination of Adona Lavaro:
Q. What, if any, did you talk about?
A. On August 4, Michelle called up informing me that her
employer needs domestic helper and from that time on she
used to call me several times.
Q. And after being told or being informed that there is that need
for domestic helpers in Korea, what was your reaction, if any?
A. I made some thinking and because of several calls from her,
I decided to accept the offer. 46
xxxx
Q. And you said a while ago, '"napapayag ka. "' What do you
mean by napapayag ka?
A. I was encouraged to accept the job she was offering
because of her good words and promises. She told me that the
work will be from Monday to Friday and the salary would be
₱40,000.00 plus and I can have a part time job. And because
of that I asked her about the fees and the other requirements.
And she told me that I have to give a partial payment.
According to her, I can give ₱40,000.00.47
Cross-examination of Adona Lavaro:
Q. You never insisted from her for you to get your ... you never
insisted that you be deployed to Korea?
A. No. more because she was always asking for money and
gives us several promises that we will be able to work for
Korea. 48
This Court has consistently conformed to the rule that findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great
weight. Factual findings of the trial court and its observation as
to the testimonies of the witnesses are accorded great respect,
if not conclusive effect, most especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, as in this case. The reason for this is that
trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of
credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed first-hand their demeanor and manner of testifying
under grueling examination. In the absence of palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the
trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be
disturbed on appeal.49
Moreover, private complainants' testimonies were consistent
and substantially corroborate each other on material points,
such as the amount of the fees they gave to appellant, the
country of destination and the nature of work. It was also
established that appellant gave private complainants the
impression that she had the ability to send them to South Korea
for work in such a manner that the latter were convinced to part
with their money in order to be employed. Without any
evidence to show that private complainants were propelled by
any ill motive to testify falsely against appellant, we shall
accord their testimonies full faith and credit. 50
Meanwhile, appellant's defense that she merely referred
private complainants to a certain "Madam Rosa" fails to
convince as the same was unsupported by any evidence.
Between the categorical statements of the private
complainants and the bare denial of appellant, the former must
perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony especially when the former comes from the
mouth of a credible witness. Denial, same as an alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. It is
considered with suspicion and always received with caution,
not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because it is easily fabricated and concocted.51
Furthermore, we agree with the court a quo that the same
pieces of evidence which establish appellant's liability for illegal
recruitment in large scale likewise confirm her culpability for
estafa.
It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be
charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa.
The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction.
In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed
by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name,
or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud. 52
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on
the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and
was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that,
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 53
In the instant case, the prosecution has established that
appellant defrauded private complainants by leading them to
believe that she has the capacity to send them to South Korea
for work as domestic helpers, even as she does not have a
license or authority for the purpose. Such misrepresentation
came before private complainants delivered various amounts
for purportedly travel expenses and visa assistance to
24
appellant. Clearly, private complainants would not have parted
with their money were it not for such enticement by appellant.
As a consequence of appellant's false pretenses, the private
complainants suffered damages as the promised employment
abroad never materialized and the money they paid were
never recovered. All these representations were actually false
and fraudulent and thus, the appellant must be made liable
under par. 2 (a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, as to appellant's acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 05-
414 and 05-415, due to the trial court's finding that there is
"insufficient" evidence to show that payment has been made to
appellant, this Court can no longer review and pass judgment
in view of the appellant's right against double jeopardy.
Nevertheless, even if appellant was acquitted in these two
estafa cases, it must be clarified that she can still be convicted
of illegal recruitment. This is because while in estafa, damage
is essential, the same is not an essential element in the crime
of illegal recruitment. It is the lack of the necessary license or
authority, not the fact of payment that renders the recruitment
activity of appellant unlawful. 54 As long as the prosecution is
able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the
accused-appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment, a
conviction for the offense can very well be justified.55
PENALTY
The crime of illegal recruitment is penalized under Sections 6
and 7 of RA 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, to wit:
SEC. 7. Penalties. –
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not
less than Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor
more than Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than
One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be
imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen
(18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority.
As the crime was committed in large scale, it is an offense
involving economic sabotage and is punishable by life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱500,000.00 nor more
than ₱l,000,000.00. The trial court, thus, aptly imposed the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the RPC,
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, if
the amount of the fraud is over ₱12,000.00 but does not
exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional ₱l0,000.00, provided that the total
penalty shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
Since the amount defrauded exceeded ₱22,000.00, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period which is six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8)
years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC, or anywhere within prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods or six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Thus, in this case, the minimum term to be imposed should be
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
The maximum term, on the other hand, shall be that which
could be properly imposed under the rules of the RPC, which
in this case shall be six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days to eight (8) years. The incremental penalty shall
be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty,
which is anywhere between six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years.
While there were several evidence fonnally offered during trial,
only Exhibit "A,"56 representing the receipt amounting to
₱40,000.00 received by appellant from complainant Aguilar-
Uy, can be given probative value. And considering the amount
defrauded is ₱40,000.00 which is ₱l8,000.00 more than
₱22,000.00, one (1) year shall be added to six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days making the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence to seven (7) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days.
Finally, following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court, likewise,
imposes interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on
each of the amounts awarded from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July
2, 2013 in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 04935
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 05-412, the Court finds
appellant Michelle Dela Cruz GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
committed in large scale. She is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and ordered to
pay a fine of ₱500,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 05-413, the Court finds
appellant Michelle Dela Cruz GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and sentences
her to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum.
3. Appellant Michelle Dela Cruz is likewise ordered to
indemnify private complainant Armely Aguilar Uy in
25

the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) as

actual damages, with legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this decision, until
the said amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
26
G.R. No. 199497. August 24, 2016.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DELIA CAMANNONG, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale; Essential elements of illegal recruitment in
large scale.—The essential elements of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused engaged in
acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities
listed under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) that she had not
complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a
license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that
she committed the unlawful acts against three or more
persons.
Same; Testimonial Evidence; It is settled that factual
findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and
respect by the Court, particularly when the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed such findings.—It is settled that the
factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of
the witnesses’ credibility, are entitled to great weight and
respect by the Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such
findings. This is because the trial court is in the best position to
determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses
by observing their demeanor at the time they testify.
Same; Denial; Frame-up; Denial and frame-up are
usually regarded by the courts as inherently weak by
virtue of their being essentially self-serving and easy to
contrive.—Denial and frame-up were negative by nature, and,
as such, did not prevail over the affirmative assertions of fact
by the Prosecution’s witnesses. Indeed, such defenses are
usually regarded by the courts as inherently weak by virtue of
their being essentially self-serving and easy to contrive.
Same; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty, for only moral certainty is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.—The State fully discharged its burden of
proof by establishing the concurrence of the aforestated
elements of the crime charged with moral certainty.
Consequently, the proof of guilt of the accused was beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty, for only moral certainty is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind.
Actual Damages; Actual Damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
also be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, for
the courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture
or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.—It is true that actual damages, to be recoverable,
must not only be capable of proof, but must also be proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty, for the courts cannot simply
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages. The courts have thus
generally required competent proof of the actual amount of
loss, and for this reason have denied claims of actual damages
not supported by receipts.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; The
non-issuance of receipts by illegal recruiters is essential
to the scheme to defraud the victims.—One of the constant
lessons from our experience as judges is that the non-issuance
of receipts by the illegal recruiters was also essential to the
scheme to defraud the victims. By all means, then, should the
lack of receipts not hinder the courts from vindicating the
victims of the fraud.
BERSAMIN, J.:
On appeal is the judgment promulgated on April 14, 2011 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03529, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale penalized under
Article 38(b), in relation to Article 39(a), of the Labor Code but
increased the fine from ₱100,000.00 to ₱500,000.00. She had
been found guilty under the decision rendered on August 19,
2008 in Criminal Case No. V-1013 by the Regional Trial
Coun.(RTC), Branch 50, in Villasis, Pangasinan.2
Antecedents
The information for illegal recruitment in large scale, to which
the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That sometime on the 3rd week of July, 2000 at Mangampang,
Pogo, Bautista, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and. feloniously
recruit JOEL G. SALVA, MARVIN ALBANO, REYNALDO
SALVA, JR., ROLLY CALIXTRO and ROGER CABAEL for
employment abroad, without first securing the requisite license
or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
Contrary to Art. 38, par. (a) in relation to Art. 39, par. (B), Labor
Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 442), as amended by PD No.
2018.3
At the trial, the Prosecution presented the complainants as
witnesses, namely: Joel Salva, Marvin Albano, Rolly Calixtro,
and Reynaldo Salva, Jr. Also presented as a witness for the
Prosecution was Remedios Mercado, Labor and Employment
Officer III of the District Office in Dagupan City of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).4 On the other
hand, the accused-appellant testified for the Defense along
with Rogelio Maniquez.5
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:
x x x [T]he prosecution endeavored to prove that on the 3rd
week of July 2000, DELIA met with MARVIN, ROLL Y,
REYNALDO, JR. and Joseph Cabael [JOSEPH] and
introduced herself as a recruiter of workers for deployment to
Israel as apple pickers. She told them that she needed their
birth certificates and P500.00 for authentication, ₱1,500.00 for
their medical examination and ₱6,500.00 to cover their
processing fee and passports including the amount necessary
to open a bank account for them. On the 2nd week of the
following month, private complainants again met with DELIA
and each of them handed her the amount of ₱6,500.00 in
Alcala, Pangasinan. Because of their trust on and assurances
of DELIA, they parted with their money without asking for
receipts. According to them, DELIA promised that they would
be able to leave for Israel sometime in the 3rd week of
27
September 2000 but none of them was able to leave as
promised. On February 2001, private complainants together
with JOSEPH, SONNY, Betty Cabael and Susan Cabael went
to DELIA's house to demand the return of their money and
papers but she asked for time to withdraw the amount and
retrieve the papers from their office. When DELIA defaulted
again on her promise, they returned to her house but DELIA
told them that the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) will sue them if they insist on backing-out. Thus, they
agreed among themselves to seek assistance from and file a
complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation [NBI] of
Dagupan.
On further questioning, JOEL recalled that DELIA was
introduced to him and to MARVIN, REYNALDO, JR., ROLLY,
JOSEPH and ROGER by a certain SONNY BRILLO [SONNY].
He claimed that he signed a contract for a monthly salary of
₱35,000.00 upon his deployment to Java, Israel. However, he
was not furnished a copy of this contract. MARVIN, on the
other hand, maintained that he had spoken with DELIA
numerous times before he parted with his ₱6,500.00 upon the
supposition that the same will be used for the procurement of
his passport and payment of other processing fees. According
to him, he gave a total of
₱7,000.00 to DELIA since he gave an additional ₱500.00 in the
house of Susan Cabael. Meanwhile, ROLL Y testified on cross-
examination that it was SONNY who introduced him to DELIA
when the.latter went to their barangay in Bautista, Pangasinan
to convince people to work abroad.
When questioned by the trial judge, he asserted that aside from
the ₱6,500.00, he gave DELIA an additional 1!500.00 for
"authentication purposes" while at SONNY's bakery. Lastly,
REYNALDO, JR. 0 maintained during his cross-examination
that he gave the money to DELIA and not to SONNY. On
further questioning, the witness averred that "Pastor Sonny"
and DELIA were then at the canteen of JOEL and that when
he and his companions went there, they learned that DELIA
and "Pastor Sonny" were recruiting workers for jobs abroad.
To prove DELIA's lack of authority to recruit workers for
employment abroad, Remedios Mercado, Labor Employment
Officer III of the Department of Labor and Employment [DOLE]
of Dagupan City District, testified that DELIA had no certificate
or license to recruit nor was she issued any special recruitment
authority by the POEA.
For her part, DELIA, a sales supervisor of Rhine Marketing
Corporation, denied knowing private complainants prior to her
apprehension or that she recruited. them for overseas
.eµiployment. She insisted that it was SONNY, cousin of her
friend Celedonia Cabael, who sends workers to Israel and that
he approached her to inquire whether she knew some persons
who were seeking employment abroad. According to her, NBI
agent Rolly Lomboy [LOMBOY] went to her house and
demanded 1!5,000.00 from her. When she did not accede,
LOMBOY left and called her to go to the van parked along the
road. When she got there, she saw five (5) unknown men
seated inside the van and that she later learned that they were
the applicants of SONNY. LOMBOY then took her moqile
number and soon called her to meet him at Bayambang
market. She sought the assistance of NBI agents who
eventually apprehended LOMBOY in an entrapment operation
at Cindy's Camiling. On crossexamination, she asserted that
while detained at the Urdaneta District Jail, two persons, whom
she later learned to be some of the private complainants,
approached her to sign an affidavit to withdraw her complaint
against LOMBOY.6
After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on August 19, 2008
pronouncing the accused-appellant guilty as charged, and
disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Delia Camannong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, penalized under
Art. 38 par. (b), in relation to Art. 39 par. (a), of the Labor Code,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of l~fe
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00
The accused is likewise ordered to pay the private
complainants actual damages of P6,500.00 each with legal
interest from the time of the filing of the Information until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.7
The accused-appellant appealed to the CA, which
promulgated the assailed judgment on April 14, 2011 affirming
the conviction with modification of the fine, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is
hereby DENIED and the assailed judgment of conviction is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount
of the fine imposed is INCREASED to Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00).
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
The issue is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the illegal recruitment
in large scale and properly imposed the penalty provided by
law.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale are: (1) that the accused engaged in acts of
recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article
13(b ) 9 of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities listed
under Article 34 10 of the Labor Code; (2) that she had not
complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a
license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; 11 and (3)
28
that she committed the unlawful acts against three or more
persons. 12
In the assailed judgment, the CA affirmed the findings of facts
of the RTC, observing that:
First. DELIA made misrepresentations pertaining to her
capacity to send workers abroad for employment, for which
reason JOEL, MARVIN, REYNALDO, JR. and ROLLY, parted
with their money believing that the same will be utilized to
process their papers. Second. As testified to by an employee
of the DOLE, one Remedios Mercado, DELIA had no authority
to conduct any recruitment activity for overseas employment in
the province of Pangasinan, including the cities of Dagupan,
San Carlos and Urdaneta. Third. DELIA recruited for overseas
employment, JOEL, MARVIN, REYNALDO, JR., and ROLLY.
Verily, DELIA is culpable for the crime of large scale illegal
recruitment, having promised overseas employment to JOEL,
MARVIN, REYNALDO, JR. and ROLL Y as apple pickers in
Israel. Her actions in requiring them to undergo medical
examinations, opening bank accounts, procurement of
passports and such other documents necessary for travel
abroad, showed her alleged capacity to recruit private
complainants for foreign employment when in truth she had no
authority to do so. It must also be stressed that the failure of
private complainants to show the covering receipts to prove
payment to DELIA will not hinder her conviction for the crimes
committed since the absence of receipts to evidence payment
to the recruiter would not warrant an acquittal of the accused,
and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that LOMBOY was never
mentioned during the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence either during the direct or cross-examination of its
witnesses. When JOEL and MARVIN testified, only the name
of Atty. Reynaldo Pangan was mentioned as the person before
whom their respective affidavits were executed while the
others did not mention any other names specifically that of
LOMBOY. Curiously, not one of the private complainants were
asked regarding their alleged connection to LOMBOY with
respect to this case when they were cross-examined by the
defense counsel. Truth be told, the extortion charge against
LOMBOY is merely being utilized by DELIA to lend some
credence to her defense of frame-up. To Our mind however,
the complaint filed against DELIA cannot be taken as a mere
act of retaliation on the part of JOEL, MARVIN, ROLL Y and
REYNALDO, JR. since it is apparent that the extortion case
against LOMBOY came only after private complainants
charged her with illegal recruitment. Verily, the lack of any
connection between LOMBOY and private complainants is a
tell-tale sign that the concept of frame-up was but an eleventh-
hour defense of DELIA.
For another, LOMBOY's actuations must be taken as a distinct
event from which the extortion which DELIA claims, was
rooted. Without any strong evidence to connect private
complainants to LOMBOY's alleged act of extortion, this Court
cannot simply brush aside the evidence presented for the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale during the trial on the
sole ground that the arresting officer was involved in extortion.
This is especially true since each private complainant narrated
with particularity the details of their recruitment with respect to
what was promised by and the amounts paid to DELIA thereby
placing beyond doubt that the latter was indeed engaged in
recruiting them for overseas work without any lawful authority
to do so.
Trite to state, when the credibility of the witness is in issue, the
trial court's assessment is accorded great weight unless it is
shown that it has overlooked a certain fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly
considered, would alter the results of the case. Here, We find
no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court since
the totality of the evidence supports DELIA's conviction for the
crime charged. 13
We affirm the findings by the CA. It is settled that the factual
findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the
witnesses' credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect
by the Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such findings.
This is because the trial court is in the best position to
determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses
by observing their demeanor at the time they testify. The
absence of any showing by the accused that the trial court had
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, could alter the result of the case, or that the
assessment by the trial court had been arbitrary, now impels
the Court to give due deference to the trial court's
determination of the credibility of the witnesses and other
evidence. 14
In her defense, the accused-appellant tendered denial and
frame up. 15 Such defenses contrasted with the positive and
firm assertions of the complainants pointing to her as the
person who had induced them to part with their money in
exchange for their being employed abroad. Denial and frame
up were negative by nature, and, as such, did not prevail over
the affirmative assertions of fact by the Prosecution's
witnesses. Indeed, such defenses are usually regarded by the
courts as inherently weak by virtue of their being essentially
self-serving and easy to contrive. Their being the usual
recourse of persons like the accused-appellant who are haled
in court to answer for criminal charges of illegal recruitment
further diminishes their worthiness and credit.
Both the courts below unanimously found that the accused-
appellant had misrepresented to the complainants her capacity
to send workers abroad for employment.1âwphi1 Believing her
misrepresentation, they parted with their money for her to
process their deployment papers. It was established that she
did not have the necessary license or authority to engage in
recruitment in the Province of Pangasinan, including the Cities
of Dagupan, San Carlos and Urdaneta, a fact duly attested to
by a competent employee of the Department of Labor and
Employment. In this connection, the Prosecution did not even
need to establish that she had not been issued any license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers. Under the law, even a licensee or holder of the
authority to engage in recruitment who failed to reimburse the
amounts received as placement or related fees upon her
failure to deploy the victim could be criminally liable for the
crime. It was observed in People v. Ocden: 16
29

x x x Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular Moreover, the negation of the right to recover on that rigid basis
acts which would constitute illegal recmitment whether would mock the Rules of Court, which has enshrined
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee., non- testimonial evidence as one of the means sanctioned by it of
holder, licensee or holder of authority. Among such acts, under ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a
Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the [f]ailure to matter of fact. Confining the proof of actual damages to
reimburse expenses incurred. by the worker in connection with documentary evidence would definitely trench on the
his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, institutional wisdom of the Court in erecting the triumvirate of
in cases where the deployment does not actually take place evidence admissible in court.
without the workers fault.
Notwithstanding their failure to get receipts from the
Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed accusedappellant, therefore, the RTC rightly fixed actual
by any person, even by a licensed recruiter, a certification on damages of ₱6,500.00 for each of the complainants, and the
whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is CA justifiably agreed with the RTC.
inconsequential. x x x.
Finally, imposing on the actual damages legal interest
The State fully discharged its burden of proof by establishing reckoned from the filing of the information was in accord with
the concurrence of the aforestated elements of the crime jurisprudence.20 The rate of legal interest is 12% per
charged with moral certainty. Consequently, the proof of guilt annum from the filing of the information until June 30, 2013,
of the accused was beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment of the
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, actual damages.
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty, for
only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 17 on April 14, 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03529 subject to the MODIFICATION that accused-
The judgment of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ordered the appellant Delia Camannong is ordered to pay to each of the
accused-appellant to pay the complainants actual damages of complainants, namely: Joel G. Salva, Marvin Albano,
₱6,500.00 each with legal interest from the filing of the Reynaldo Salva, Jr., Rolly Calixtro, and Roger Cabael, the
information until fully paid. amount of ₱6,500.00 as actual damages, plus interest thereon
of 12% per annum from the filing of the information until June
We uphold the payment of actual damages in that amount and 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid,
legal interest. It is true that actual damages, to be recoverable, and the costs of suit.
must not only be capable of proof, but must also be proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty, for the courts cannot simply SO ORDERED.
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages. The courts have thus
generally required competent proof of the actual amount of
loss, and for this reason have denied claims of actual damages
not supported by receipts. 18 Such policy has eliminated the
fabrication of claims for actual damages, or deterred judges
from indulging in speculation, conjecture or guesswork. Yet, in
this case, despite the complainants uniformly testifying that
they had parted with their money without asking for
receipts, 19 there seemed to be no dispute about each of them
having actually paid to the accused-appellant that amount for
their processing and passport fees and other expenses
including the amount necessary to open their bank accounts.
To still deny them their right to recover actual damages only
because they had no receipts to show for their payments would
be a travesty of justice. For, if we are now affirming her
conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale for collecting the
sums of money from them, it would really be beyond
understanding to reverse the assessment of actual damages
by the trial judge just to serve the general policy of limiting proof
of actual damages to receipts.

One of the constant lessons from our experience as judges is

that the non-issuance of receipts by the illegal recruiters was
also essential to the scheme to defraud the victims. By all
means, then, should the lack of receipts not hinder the courts
from vindicating the victims of the fraud.
30
G.R. No. 199211. June 4, 2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
JERIC FERNANDEZ y JAURIGUE, appellant.
Criminal Law; Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale; The law imposes a higher penalty when the
illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large
scale as they are considered an offense involving
economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed
in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.—Article 38 of the Labor
Code defines illegal recruitment as “any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34
of (the Labor Code), to be undertaken by nonlicensees or
nonholders of authority.” The term “recruitment and placement”
refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not,
provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. The law
imposes a higher penalty when the illegal recruitment is
committed by a syndicate or in large scale as they are
considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of.—For illegal
recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to
prove three essential elements, namely: (1) the accused
undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3)
the accused committed such illegal activity against three or
more persons individually or as a group.
Same; Same; Same; There is illegal recruitment
when one who does not possess the necessary authority
or license gives the impression of having the ability to
send a worker abroad. Corollarily, where the offense is
committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to
illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher
penalty under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.—There is
illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the
necessary authority or license gives the impression of having
the ability to send a worker abroad. Corollarily, where the
offense is committed against three or more persons, as in this
case, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which
provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the Labor
Code.
Same; Same; Same; Estafa; Conviction under the
Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude
punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the crime
of estafa.—We point out that conviction under the Labor Code
for illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the
Revised Penal Code for the crime of estafa. We are convinced
that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, which provides that estafa is committed by any
person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or by
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business; by imaginary transactions
or similar forms of deceit executed prior to or simultaneous with
the fraud. The appellant’s act of falsely pretending to possess
power and qualifications to deploy the complainants to
Hongkong, even if he did not have the authority or license for
the purpose, undoubtedly constitutes estafa under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of deceit
and damage are clearly present; the appellant’s false
pretenses were the very cause that induced the complainants
to part with their money.
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal, filed by appellant Jeric Fernandez,
assailing the April 6, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03313.1
The RTC Ruling
In its February 11, 2008 decision,2 the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 211, Mandaluyong City, convicted the appellant
of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and five ( 5)
counts of estafa committed against complainants Airene Etac,
Jowel A. Baja, Joemar Aquino, Luis M. Bernardo and Anthony
M. Canlas. The RTC gave full faith and credence to the
testimonies of the complainants that the appellant promised
them employment abroad. The trial court ruled that the
appellant represented to the complainants that he had the
power and ability to send them in Hongkong, and that by virtue
of this representation and fraud, the complainants were
convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It
also disregarded the appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi.
For the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal
Case No. MC03-6278, the RTC sentenced the appellant to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a
₱100,000.00 fine. For the crime of estafa, the RTC sentenced
the appellant to suffer the following indeterminate penalties: (a)
four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9)
years of prision mayor, as maximum in Criminal Case No.
MC03-6279; (b) four (4) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum in
Criminal Case No. MC03-6280; (c) four (4) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor,
as maximum in Criminal Case No. MC03-6281; (d) four (4)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum in Criminal Case No. MC03-6282
; and (e) four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum in Criminal Case
No. MC03-6283.
The RTC also ordered the appellant to indemnify Etac the sum
of ₱35,000.00; Baja the sum of ₱29,550.00; Aquino the sum of
₱45,800.00; Bernardo the sum of ₱30,500.00; and Canlas the
sum of ₱29,550.00.
31
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA upheld the factual findings of the RTC. It
agreed with the trial court that all the elements of illegal
recruitment, as defined under Article 13(b), in relation to Article
34 of the of the Labor Code, were sufficiently established by
the prosecution’s evidence. The CA held that the appellant’s
acts of promising the complainants that they would be
deployed for work abroad after they paid him their placement
fees, and his misrepresentations concerning his purported
power and authority despite the lack of license, are constitutive
of illegal recruitment in large scale.
The CA also declared that appellant’s assurances that he
could deploy the complainants for employment in Hongkong
constitutes estafa.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal and affirm the appellant’s convictions. We
however, modify the penalties imposed in the five counts of
estafa.
Illegal Recruitment In Large Scale
Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any
recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non holders of authority." The
term "recruitment and placement" refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not, provided that any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement. The law imposes a higher penalty
when the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in
large scale as they are considered an offense involving
economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.3
For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution
has to prove three essential elements, namely: (1) the accused
undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the
accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3)
the accused committed such illegal activity against three or
more persons individually or as a group. In the present case,
the appellant promised the five complainants that there were
jobs available for them in Hongkong; and that through his help,
they could be deployed for work within a month or two. He
exacted money from them for the plane ticket, hotel
accommodation, processing of visa and placement fees.
Notably, the prosecution presented a Certification dated
January 10, 2003 issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Licensing
Branch, showing that the appellant had no authority or license
to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
These acts, to our mind, constitute illegal recruitment. There is
illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the
necessary authority or license gives the impression of having
the ability to send a worker abroad. Corollarily, where the
offense is committed against three or more persons, as in this
case, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which
provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the Labor
Code.
Estafa
We point out that conviction under the Labor Code for illegal
recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised
Penal Code for the crime of estafa.4 We are convinced that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which provides that estafa is committed by any
person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or by
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business; by imaginary transactions
or similar forms of deceit executed prior to or simultaneous with
the fraud.5
The appellant’s act of falsely pretending to possess power and
qualifications to deploy the complainants to Hongkong, even if
he did not have the authority or license for the purpose,
undoubtedly constitutes estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of deceit and damage are
clearly present; the appellant’s false pretenses were the very
cause that induced the complainants to part with their money.
Penalties
The CA correctly imposed the penalty for illegal recruitment in
large scale.
As regards the penalties imposed in the crime of estafa, Article
315 of the RPC provides that an accused found guilty of estafa
shall be sentenced to the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prision
correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months). On the other hand, the maximum
term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum in its
maximum period, adding 1 year of imprisonment for every
₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00, provided that the total
penalty shall not exceed 20 years.
Applying these principles to the present case, the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum is not prision mayor
minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC.1âwphi1 To
32

compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be
divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion
shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with
Article65 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum
period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at
the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, jurisprudence tells us
that the amount defrauded should be subtracted by
₱22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by ₱10,000.00.
Any fraction of a year shall be discarded. Accordingly, the
imposable penalty should be as follows:
In Criminal Case No. MC03-6279, where the amount
defrauded was ₱45,800.00, the appellant should be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years, 8
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
amount defrauded exceeds ₱22,000.00 by ₱23,800.00, 2
years shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty.
In Criminal Case No. MC03-6280, where the amount
defrauded was ₱29,550.00, the appellant should be sentenced
SO ORDERED.
to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum.
minimum, to 8 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision
mayor, as maximum.
(2) In Criminal Case No. MC03-6280, the appellant is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of
prision mayor, as maximum.
(3) In Criminal Case No. MC03-6281, the appellant is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of
prision mayor, as maximum.
(4) In Criminal Case No. MC03-6282, the appellant is
sentenced to suffer the in detenninate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of
prision mayor, as maximum.
(5) In Criminal Case No. MC03-6283, the appellant is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months and 21 days or
prision mayor, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. MC03-6281, where the amount

defrauded was ₱29,550.00, the appellant should be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. MC03-6282, where the amount

defrauded was ₱30,500.00, the appellant should be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years, 8
months and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. MC03-6283, where the amount

defrauded was ₱35,000.00, the appellant should be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8
months and 21 days or prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
amount defrauded exceeds ₱22,000.00 by ₱13,000.00, 1 year
shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals dated April 6, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 03313 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. MC03-6279, the appellant is

sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (
4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
33
G.R. No. 182232. October 6, 2008.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NENITA B. HU, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment; Elements; Words
and Phrases; Recruitment and placement is “any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals,
contact services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement”; The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale when the foregoing two elements concur, with
the addition of a third element—the recruiter committed
the same against three or more persons, individually or as
group; A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment
must be based on a finding in each case of illegal
recruitment of three or more persons whether individually
or as a group.—Illegal recruitment is committed when two
elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license
or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he
undertakes any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and
placement” defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.
Recruitment and placement is “any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers; and includes referrals, contact services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.” The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale when the foregoing two elements concur, with the
addition of a third element—the recruiter committed the same
against three or more persons, individually or as group. A
conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on
a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more
persons whether individually or as a group. While it is true that
the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the
trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient
evidence proving that the offense was committed against three
or more persons.
Same; Same; In offenses in which the number of
victims is essential, failure of the prosecution to prove by
convincing evidence that the offense is committed against
the minimum number of persons required by law is fatal
to its cause of action.—While there were six private
complainants in this case, four of whom were presented during
the trial, the prosecution, nonetheless, failed to establish that
Hu engaged in illegal recruitment acts against at least three of
these complainants. In offenses in which the number of victims
is essential, such as in the present petition, failure of the
prosecution to prove by convincing evidence that the offense
is committed against the minimum number of persons required
by law is fatal to its cause of action. Underscoring the
significance of the number of victims was the disquisition of
Justice Florenz Regalado in People v. Ortiz-Miyake, 279
SCRA 180 (1997): It is evident that in illegal recruitment
cases, the number of persons victimized is
determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed
against a lone victim, the accused may be convicted of
simple illegal recruitment which is punishable with a lower
penalty under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code.Corollarily,
where the offense is committed against three or more persons,
it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides
a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the same Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Same; Failure of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt does not
absolve her of her civil obligation to return the money she
collected from private complaints.—Failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of Hu beyond reasonable doubt
does not absolve her of her civil obligation to return the money
she collected from private complaints Panguelo, Abril and
Orillano, plus legal interest in accordance with our ruling
in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 75 (2000).
There, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish a case to
warrant a conviction, but clearly proved a just debt owed to the
private complainant. Thus, the accused was ordered to pay the
face value of the check with 12% legal interest per annum,
reckoned from the filing of the information until the finality of
the judgment. It is well settled that acquittal based on
reasonable doubt does not preclude an award for civil
damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, civil
liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is based on lack
of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance
of evidence is required in civil cases. There appears to be no
sound reason to require that a separate action be still filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have
already been established in the criminal proceedings. In the
present case, the prosecution explicitly proved that private
complainants parted with substantial amounts of money upon
the prodding and enticement of Hu on the false pretense that
she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad.
In the end, private complainants were not able to leave for work
abroad or get their money back.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The act of referral,
which means the act of passing along or forwarding an
applicant after an initial interview to a selected employer,
placement or bureau, is included in recruitment.—Garcia
testified that she applied for employment in Taiwan for the
position of Electronic Operator thru Brighturn in April 2002. Due
to the alleged suspension of Brighturn’s license, Hu referred
her to a neighboring agency (Best One), but Hu continued
collecting placement fees from her. The act of referral, which
means the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant after
an initial interview to a selected employer, placement or
bureau, is included in recruitment. Undoubtedly, the act of Hu
in referring Garcia to another recruitment agency squarely fell
within the purview of recruitment that was undertaken by Hu
after her authority to recruit and place workers already expired
on 17 December 2001.
Same; Same; Receipts; The absence of receipts in
the case of illegal recruitment does not warrant the
acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the
prosecution’s case.—Failure of Garcia to present proof of
payment is irrelevant. The absence of receipts in the case of
illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the
appellant and is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. As long as
the prosecution is able to establish through credible and
testimonial evidence, as in the case at bar, that the appellant
had engaged in illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense
can be very well justified.
34
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused-
appellant Nenita B. Hu (Hu) seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 9 October 2007 in
CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02243, affirming with modification the
Decision2 dated 4 January 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 03-356.
The RTC in its Decision found Hu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, as
defined and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No.
8042,3 and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment, to pay the fine of P500,000.00, and to
indemnify private complainants Paul Abril (Abril), Joel
Panguelo (Panguelo) and Evangeline Garcia (Garcia) in the
amounts of P44,000.00, P50,000 and P50,000, respectively.
The decretal part of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision
reads:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions,
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 03-856, finding
appellant Nenita B. Hu, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION.
As modified, the award of actual damages in the
amount of P50,000 in favor of Evangeline Garcia,
is DELETED.4
The antecedent facts are as follows:
An Information5 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
was filed against Hu and Ethel V. Genoves (Genoves) which
reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses Ethel V.
Genoves a.k.a. Merry Ann Genoves and Nenita B. Hu,
of the crime of Violation of Section 6 penalized under
Section 7(b) of RA 80426 (Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale) committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October 2001, in the
City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and both of
them helping and aiding one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit,
promise employment/job placement abroad for an
overseas employment and collect fees from the
following persons to wit:
NOEL P. JOEY F.
DELAYUN SILAO
JOEL U. PAUL C.
PANGUELO ABRIL
EVANGELINE ERIC V.
E. GARCIA ORILLANO
thus in large scale amounting to economic sabotage
without any license or authorized by the POEA of the
Department of Labor and Employment to recruit
workers for an overseas employment.
Upon arraignment, Hu assisted by counsel entered a plea of
not guilty while Genoves remained at large.7Subsequently, trial
on the merits ensued. While the Information for illegal
recruitment named several persons as having been promised
jobs by Hu and Genoves, only four of them - Panguelo, Garcia,
Abril and Orillano -- testified.
Hu was the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc.
(Brighturn), a land-based recruitment agency duly licensed by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to
engage in the business of recruitment and placement of
workers abroad, with principal address at No. 1916 San
Marcelino St., Malate, Manila. Brighturn was authorized by the
POEA to recruit, process and deploy land-based workers for
the period 18 December 1999 to 17 December 2001.8
Genoves worked as a consultant and marketing officer of
Brighturn. Aside from her stint at Brighturn, Genoves was also
connected with Riverland Consultancy Service (Riverland),
another recruitment agency located at Room No. 210, LPL
Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
Private complainants Orillano, Panguelo, Abril and Garcia
sought employment at Brighturn for the positions of factory
worker and electronic operator in Taiwan.9 Notwithstanding
private complainants' compliance with all of the pre-
employment requirements, including the payment of
placement fees, they were not able to leave the country to work
abroad.
Sometime in June 2001, Panguelo was informed by a friend
that Brighturn was hiring factory workers for Taiwan. When
Panguelo went to Brighturn, he was promised employment
abroad by Hu for P50,000.00. Upon Hu's instruction, Panguelo
paid in full the placement fee in the amount of P50,000.00 to
Genoves. The payment was evidenced by an Official Receipt
dated 16 October 2001 bearing Genoves' signature. Panguelo
waited for three years to be deployed to Taiwan. His waiting
was all for naught. Thus, Panguelo decided to abort his
application and demanded from Hu the return of the amount
he paid for the placement fee, but Hu could no longer return
the money.10
Also sometime in September 2001, Abril went to Brighturn to
apply as a factory worker in Taiwan. At Brighturn, Abril was
entertained by Hu who oriented him on the necessary
requirements for application which included a valid passport,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Clearance and ID
pictures. After complying with the documentary requirements,
Abril was required by Hu to pay the placement fee to Genoves
in the amount of P44,000.00. As shown in Official Receipts
dated 9 October 2001 and 26 October 2000, which were
signed by Genoves, Abril paid the whole amount
of P44,000.00 as placement fee. Abril was assured by Hu that
he would be deployed to Taiwan by December 2001 which was
subsequently reset to April 2002. Despite several
postponements, Abril was not able to leave the country.11
35
For his part, Orillano came to know of Brighturn thru Genoves.
Orillano was interviewed at Brighturn by a Taiwanese principal
in October 2001. After the interview, Hu informed Orillano to
submit a medical certificate, NBI clearance and passport; and
to pay the requisite placement fee in the amount
of P50,000.00. Believing that Hu could send him abroad,
Orillano faithfully complied with these requirements including
the placement fee, the payment of which was made to
Genoves at Brighturn's office. Despite such payment, however,
Orillano was not able to leave the country.12
Garcia suffered the same fate as her co-applicants. In April
2002, Garcia applied as Electronic Operator at Brighturn
wherein she was entertained by Hu who informed her that
Brighturn's license was suspended. Garcia was then referred
by Hu to Best One International (Best One), another
recruitment agency likewise located in Malate, Manila. While
Garcia was told by Hu that the processing of her documents
would be done at Best One, the placement fee, however,
should be paid at Brighturn. Accordingly, the amount
of P60,000.00 was paid by Garcia to Hu and Genoves as
placement fee upon Hu's instruction. Almost predictably, the
promise of an employment abroad never came to pass.13
When Hu was not able to refund the amounts paid as
placement fees upon demand, private complainants went to
NBI to file a complaint for illegal recruitment against Hu and
Genoves.
For her defense, Hu claimed that she was the President of
Brighturn, a duly authorized land-based recruitment agency.
Brighturn had foreign principals in Taiwan who were looking for
skilled individuals willing to work in a foreign country. Hu
alleged that Brighturn had an established recruitment
procedure wherein applicants were only required to pay the
corresponding placement fees after the POEA had already
approved their employment contracts. According to Hu,
announcements were posted all over Brighturn's premises
warning job applicants to pay placement fees only to the
cashier. After the expiration of its license issued by the POEA
on 18 December 1999, Brighturn failed to pursue its application
for renewal due its inability to post the required cash bond.
Brighturn was thus constrained to refer all pending applications
to Best One. 14
Hu admitted knowing the private complainants because these
individuals went to her office demanding the return of their
placement fees by showing their official receipts. Hu averred
that when she examined such receipts, she found that private
complainants paid their placement fees to Riverland and not to
Brighturn as shown in the heading of the said receipts which
bore the name and address of Riverland and its proprietress,
Genoves. Hu denied knowing Genoves.15
On 4 January 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision16 finding
Hu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Nenita Hu
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale under Section 6 and 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042, and, accordingly, sentences
the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment,
pay the fine of P500,000.00 and to indemnify private
complainants Paul Abril in the amount of P44,000.00,
Joel Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00 and
Evangeline Garcia in the amount of P50,000.00.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision17 dated 9 October 2007,
confirmed the presence of all the elements of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and thereby affirmed the conviction
of Hu with the modification that the amount of actual damages
awarded to Garcia in the amount of P50,000.00 be deleted.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED
IN FINDING HU GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE
SCALE.
Hu was charged with and convicted by the trial court of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, which conviction
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
found that Hu made enticing, albeit empty promises, which
moved private complainants to part with their money and pay
the placement fee.
For its part, the Solicitor General joined the lower courts in
finding that Hu was indeed guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale. According to the Solicitor General, all the elements of
illegal recruitment in large scale had been established beyond
reasonable doubt.18
We cannot sustain the conviction for illegal recruitment in large
scale.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur,
namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes
any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.19Recruitment
and placement is "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes
referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."20
The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when
the foregoing two elements concur, with the addition of a third
element - the recruiter committed the same against three or
more persons, individually or as group.21
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based
on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more
persons whether individually or as a group. While it is true that
the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the
trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient
36
evidence proving that the offense was committed against three
or more persons.22
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic
tenet that the prosecution has the burden of proof in
establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with which
he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non qui negat;
i.e., "he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove." The
conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his
defense, but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.23
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that illegal recruitment was committed
against three or more persons. What we have uncovered upon
careful scrutiny of the records was the fact that illegal
recruitment was committed against only one person; that is,
against Garcia alone. Illegal recruitment cannot
successfully attach to the allegations of Panguelo, Abril
and Orillano, since they testified that they accomplished
their pre-employment requirements through Brighturn
from June 2001 up to October of the same year,24 a period
wherein Brighturn's license to engage in recruitment and
placement was still in full force and effect. 25
While there were six private complainants in this case, four of
whom were presented during the trial, the prosecution,
nonetheless, failed to establish that Hu engaged in illegal
recruitment acts against at least three of these complainants.
In offenses in which the number of victims is essential, such as
in the present petition, failure of the prosecution to prove by
convincing evidence that the offense is committed against the
minimum number of persons required by law is fatal to its
cause of action. Underscoring the significance of the number
of victims was the disquisition of Justice Florenz Regalado
in People v. Ortiz-Miyake26:
It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the
number of persons victimized is
determinative. Where illegal recruitment is
committed against a lone victim, the accused may
be convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is
punishable with a lower penalty under Article
39(c)27 of the Labor Code.Corollarily, where the
offense is committed against three or more persons, it
is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which
provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a)28 of the
same Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Regrettably, we cannot affirm the conviction of Hu for the
offense of illegal recruitment in large scale. While we strongly
condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters and
syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain
employment abroad, nevertheless, we find the pieces of
evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of Hu beyond
reasonable doubt. It is unfortunate that the prosecution
evidence did not pass the test of reasonable doubt, since the
testimonies of its witnesses unveil a contradicting inference --
that the recruitment of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano was
undertaken by Hu with the required authority from the POEA.
Failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Hu beyond
reasonable doubt does not absolve her of her civil obligation to
return the money she collected from private complaints
Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, plus legal interest in accordance
with our ruling in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals.29 There, the
prosecution failed to sufficiently establish a case to warrant a
conviction, but clearly proved a just debt owed to the private
complainant. Thus, the accused was ordered to pay the face
value of the check with 12% legal interest per annum, reckoned
from the filing of the information until the finality of the
judgment. It is well settled that acquittal based on reasonable
doubt does not preclude an award for civil damages. The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, civil liability is
not extinguished where the acquittal is based on lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases. There appears to be no
sound reason to require that a separate action be still filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have
already been established in the criminal proceedings.30 In the
present case, the prosecution explicitly proved that private
complainants parted with substantial amounts of money upon
the prodding and enticement of Hu on the false pretense that
she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad.
In the end, private complainants were not able to leave for work
abroad or get their money back.
Neither does her acquittal herein exempt Hu from subsequent
criminal prosecution for estafa31 provided that deceit, which is
an essential element of estafa, be proven by the
prosecution.32 Apparently, Hu deluded private complainants
into believing that she had the capacity to send them abroad
for employment. Through this hoax, she was able to convince
private complainants to surrender their money to her in the vain
hope, as it turned out, of securing employment abroad.
This leaves us a case of simple illegal recruitment committed
against Garcia.
Garcia testified that she applied for employment in Taiwan for
the position of Electronic Operator thru Brighturn in April 2002.
Due to the alleged suspension of Brighturn's license, Hu
referred her to a neighboring agency (Best One), but Hu
continued collecting placement fees from her.
The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or
forwarding an applicant after an initial interview to a selected
employer, placement or bureau, is included in
recruitment.33 Undoubtedly, the act of Hu in referring Garcia to
another recruitment agency squarely fell within the purview of
recruitment that was undertaken by Hu after her authority to
recruit and place workers already expired on 17 December
2001.
Failure of Garcia to present proof of payment is irrelevant. The
absence of receipts in the case of illegal recruitment does not
warrant the acquittal of the appellant and is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. As long as the prosecution is able to
establish through credible and testimonial evidence, as in the
case at bar, that the appellant had engaged in illegal
recruitment, a conviction for the offense can be very well
justified.34
37
Irrefragably, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of Hu of the charge of illegal recruitment against
Garcia when the former referred the latter to another agency
without the license or authority to do so. The trial court gave
full credence to the testimony of Garcia, which unmistakably
demonstrated how Hu successfully enticed her to part with a
considerable amount of money in exchange for an employment
abroad which was never realized. This finding was adopted by
the appellate court, considering that that the trial court was in
the best position to ascertain credibility issues, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during trial.
Aptly, the bare denials of Hu have no probative value when
ranged against the affirmative declarations of Garcia, even if
the latter failed to present receipts for the payments she had
made. In People v. Villas,35 this Court affirmed the conviction
of the appellant for illegal recruitment even if private complaints
were not able to present any receipt that they paid appellant
anything, thus:
Neither is there merit in the contention of the defense
that appellant should be exonerated for failure of the
prosecution to present any receipt proving that private
complainants paid her anything. The defense argues
that a receipt is the best evidence to prove delivery of
money and the absence thereof shows that no
payment was made.
This argument is not novel. The Court has previously
ruled that the absence of receipts evidencing payment
does not defeat a criminal prosecution for illegal
recruitment. In People vs. Pabalan [262 SCRA 574,
30 September 1996], this Court ruled:
"x x x the absence of receipts in a criminal
case for illegal recruitment does not warrant
the acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to
the case of the prosecution. As long as the
witnesses had positively shown through their
respective testimonies that the accused is the
one involved in the prohibited recruitment, he
may be convicted of the offense despite the
want of receipts.
"The Statute of Frauds and the rules of
evidence do not require the presentation of
receipts in order to prove the existence of
recruitment agreement and the procurement
of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The
amounts may consequently be proved by the
testimony of witnesses."
The private complainants have convincingly testified
that the accused enticed them to apply and, in actual
fact, received payments from them. And to these
testimonies, the trial court accorded credence. On the
other hand, appellant has not shown any reason to
justify a modification or reversal of the trial court's
finding.
Our ruling in People v. Villas36 that the absence of receipts in
illegal recruitment case does not warrant the acquittal of the
accused has been reiterated in several cases.37 We are not
unaware of the proliferation of these scheming illegal recruiters
who cunningly rob Filipino workers, desperate to work abroad,
of their money in exchange of empty promises. This Court
cannot be drawn to the ingenious ploy of these illegal recruiters
in withholding receipts from their victims in their vain attempt
to evade liability.
In fine, the Court will have to discard the conviction for illegal
recruitment in large scale meted out by the RTC, since only
one applicant abroad was recruited by Hu without license and
authority from the POEA. Accordingly, Hu should be held
responsible for simple illegal recruitment only. Hu's
unsuccessful indictment for illegal recruitment in large scale,
however, does not discharge her from her civil obligation to
return the placement fees paid by private complainants.
Under Section 7(a) of Republic Act No. 8042,38 simple illegal
recruitment is punishable by imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve years and
a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if
the offense is punishable by a special law, as in this case, the
court shall impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by the said law and the minimum of which shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Accordingly, a penalty of eight (8) to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment should be meted out to Hu. In addition, a fine in
the amount of P500,000.00; and indemnity to private
complainants -- Abril in the amount of P44,000.00, Panguelo
in the amount of P50,000.00, Garcia in the amount
of P60,000.00 and Orillano in the amount of P50,000.00, with
12% legal interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the
information until the finality of the judgment - is imposed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 9
October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No.
02243 affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant Nenita
B. Hu for the offense of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
sentencing her to life imprisonment is hereby VACATED. A
new Decision is hereby entered convicting the accused-
appellant of the offense of Simple Illegal Recruitment
committed against private complainant Evangeline Garcia.
She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years to twelve (12) years of imprisonment. She is ordered
to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to indemnify
private complainant Evangeline Garcia in the amount
of P60,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, reckoned from
the filing of the information until the finality of the judgment.
Accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu is likewise ordered to
indemnify private complainants Paul Abril in the amount
of P44,000.00, Joel Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00,
and Eric Orillano in the amount of P50,000.00, with 12%
interest per annum, as reckoned above.
38

SO ORDERED.
39
G.R. Nos. 115719-26. October 5, 1999.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
IRENE YABUT @ IRENE CORTEZ @ FLORENCE
MADRID1 (At-large), FERNANDO CORTEZ y VEGA,
accused-appellant.
Labor Law; Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment;
Estafa; In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who
commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.—In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a
person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.
Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar
conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely,
conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the
crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that appellant did
not issue the receipts for amounts received from
complainants has no bearing on his culpability for the
complainants have shown through their respective
testimonies and affidavits that appellant was involved in
the prohibited recruitment.—The acts of appellant consisting
of his promises, offers and assurances of employment to
complainants fall squarely within the ambit of recruitment and
placement as defined above. The fact that he did not issue the
receipts for amounts received from complainants has no
bearing on his culpability for the complainants have shown
through their respective testimonies and affidavits that
appellant was involved in the prohibited recruitment. It is
immaterial that appellant ingeniously stated to one of the
complainants that he (appellant) was a member of the PNP
and a government employee, hence could not sign the
receipts.
Same; Same; Same; If the illegal recruitment is
committed by a syndicate or in large scale, the Labor Code
considers it an offense involving economic sabotage.—If
the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large
scale, the Labor Code considers it an offense involving
economic sabotage and imposes a stiffer penalty therefor in
accordance with Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of illegal recruitment
in large scale.—The elements of illegal recruitment in large
scale are: “(1) the accused undertakes any recruitment activity
defined under Art. 13, par. (b), or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he does not
have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers; and, (3) he commits the same
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.”
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; It is against
human nature and experience for strangers to conspire and
accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify
their hurt feelings.—There is no showing that any of the
complainants had ill-motive to testify falsely against appellant.
And it is generally observed that it is against human nature and
experience for strangers to conspire and accuse another
stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt
feelings. Moreover, we have no reason to discount the trial
court’s appreciation of the complainants’ truthfulness, honesty
and candor. For such appreciation deserves the highest
respect, since the trial court is best-equipped to make the
assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, and its factual findings
are generally not disturbed on appeal. Thus, after a careful
review of the records, we see no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated February 16, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, convicting
appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, imposing upon him the penalty of
life imprisonment, and ordering him to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 and to indemnify private complainants in the
following amounts —
a. Fely M. Casanova in the amount of P151,581.00;
b. Arnel M. Diana in the amount of P50,000.00;
c. Reynaldo P. Claudio in the amount of P58,454.00;
d. German Aquino in the amount of P40,000.00;
e. Manolito Latoja in the amount of P45,000.00;
f. Alejandro P. Ruiz in the amount of P50,000.00;
g. Antonio S. Bernardo in the amount of P60,000.00;
and,
h. Henry Ilar in the amount of P25,000.00; all with legal
rate of interest reckoned from the filing of the
Information until fully paid.
Appellant is a former policeman while the co-accused, Irene
Yabut, is his common-law wife. Both were charged with estafa
and illegal recruitment in large scale, but only appellant stood
trial as Yabut has eluded arrest and remains at-large.
The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General,
which we find to be duly supported by the records, are as
follows: 2
On August 13, 1992, prosecution witness and
private complainant Mr. Henry Ilar met for the
first time the herein appellant, who was at that
time a policeman, and his live-in partner and
co-accused Irene Yabut, at Rm. 103 P.M.
Apartelle, N. Domingo Street, San Juan,
Metro Manila (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-7).
Ilar handed over to the appellant and co-
accused Irene Yabut the initial down payment
of P10,000.00 for the processing of papers
and visa for Japan where he was to work as
40
a roomboy in a hotel (Ibid., p. 3-4, Exh. "A"
Pros.). Appellant assured Ilar not to worry
since he would be able to leave for Japan
otherwise his money would be refunded
(TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7). Additional amounts
were given by Ilar to co-accused Irene Yabut
thru her employee Butch Barrios, namely:
P6,000.00, and P4,000.00 for the purpose of
processing his papers (TSN, June 9, 1993,
pp. 4-5; Exhs. "B" and "C" pros.). On
September 26, 1993, Ilar handed over
additional P5,000.00 to the appellant the
amount to be used allegedly for the expenses
to be incurred for Ilar's training (TSN, June 9,
1993, p. 5; Exh. "D" pros.). Finally, Ilar was
made to sign a one (1) year contract but he
was not furnished a copy of the same (TSN,
June 9, 1993, p. 4). Ilar was scheduled to
leave for Japan on October 8, 1993 but this
date was postponed allegedly due to
problems (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 5). The
second scheduled date for departure was
again cancelled allegedly due to the
necessity of applicants undergoing medical
examination (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 6). After
undergoing the medical examination, Ilar was
again scheduled to depart on December 12,
1992 (Ibid). Prior to the scheduled departure,
Ilar checked on Irene Yabut but she was no
longer in her apartelle (Ibid) although he
found the appellant who re-assured Ilar that
he would be able to leave for Japan (TSN,
June 9, 1993, p. 7). Sensing fraudulent
practice on the part of the appellant and his
co-accused, Ilar verified from the POEA
whether the appellant and his co-accused
were authorized or licensed to engage in
recruitment and placement activities. A
certification was issued by the POEA stating
that the appellant and co-accused Irene
Yabut were neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment
(TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 6; Exh. "E" pros). As
expected, the last scheduled departure of Ilar
on December 12, 1993 (sic) (1992) did not
push through.1âwphi1.nêt
In the case of private complainant Mr.
Reynaldo P. Claudio, on July 28, 1992, he
went to Room 103 P.M. Apartelle, San Juan,
Metro Manila, to apply for a job as hotel
worker in Japan. Appellant and co-accused
Irene Yabut, introducing themselves as
husband and wife, told him that he could work
in Japan provided he paid the fees (TSN,
June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 26). Convinced by
their assurances, (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 19)
Claudio gave them an initial payment of
P15,000.00 (TSN, June 15, 1993 pp. 9-10;
Exhibits "A" and "G" pros.). Claudio was
required to undergo training (June 15, 1993,
p. 10-11, Exhs. "B" and "H" pros.). On August
18, 1992, Claudio paid P30,000.00 to co-
accused Irene Yabut (June 15, 1993, p. 11;
Exhs. "C" and "I" pros). On August 21, 1992,
Claudio paid another P25,000.00 to the co-
accused Irene Yabut (TSN, June 15, 1993,
pp. 12, 22; Exhs. "J" and "D" pros.). The
amounts he paid all in all totalled P70,000.00
which would allegedly be used for the
processing of the visa, plane ticket expenses,
medical tests and seminar costs for Claudio
and his two (2) brothers (TSN, June 15, 1993,
pp. 11, 13). Claudio was made to sign a
recruitment contract but he was not furnished
a copy of the same by the appellant and his
co-accused (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 13).
Yabut tried to convince Claudio not to appear
at the preliminary investigation hearing
scheduled the next day at the Department of
Justice by refunding to him the amount of the
plane ticket already paid for by Claudio. This
proved futile as Claudio appeared at the
hearing nonetheless (TSN, June 15, 1993,
pp. 14-16). Claudio was scheduled to depart
five (5) times but not one of those scheduled
departures for Japan materialized for
purportedly the following reasons: that there
was no escort or that the contract had to be
changed or that it was necessary for him to
undergo a medical examination (TSN, June
15, 1993, pp. 18-19). Persistent follow-ups
made by Claudio with the appellant and
Yabut at their apartelle went for naught as
Claudio was repeatedly told to wait as they
were allegedly doing something about the
delay (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 20).
In the case of Mr. Arnel Diana, on July 20,
1992, he along with his brother-in-law, met
the appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut
at their room in P.M. Apartelle, No. 26 N.
Domingo Street, San Juan Metro Manila
(TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 30). Diana and his
companion were assured by the appellant
that they could leave for abroad (Ibid). The
appellant and his co-accused asked Diana to
pay the fee of P50,000.00 for the travel
documents and POEA papers (TSN, June
15, 1993, p. 31). Diana was made to sign an
employment contract (Ibid; Exhs. "A" to "A-4"
and "P" to "P-4") which convinced him to part
with his money (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 40-
42). The amount was paid on installments.
Diana made the first payment on July 20,
1992 for P15,000.00 (TSN, June 15, 1993,
pp. 33; Exhs. "B" and "Q" pros), handed over
to the appellant and Irene Yabut (TSN, June
15, 1993, pp. 40-41). The second installment
on July 24, 1992 for P25,000.00 (Ibid, Exhs.
"C" and "R" pros) and the third installment
was given on July 27, 1992 for P10,000.00
(TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 34; Exhs. "D" and "S"
pros). Diana was first scheduled to leave on
August 8, 1992 but his departure did not push
through (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 35).
41
Disappointed, Diana asked the appellant and
his co-accused Irene Yabut for an
explanation. Appellant cited lack of escort as
the reason for his non-departure (Ibid).
The second scheduled date of departure was
also cancelled for alleged unavailability of the
Japanese who was to hire him (Ibid). Diana
was scheduled five (5) times to depart but
each time the departure went for naught,
while appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut
kept on assuring him that they were going to
do something about it (TSN, June 15, 1993,
p. 36). Exasperated, Diana demanded for the
return of his money from appellant (TSN,
June 15, 1993, pp. 37-38). Despite the
promises of the appellant, the money he paid
was never refunded. Thereafter, Diana found
out from another complainant Henry Ilar, that
the appellant and his co-accused were not
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment (TSN, June 15, 1993,
p. 38).
In the case of private complainant Antonio S.
Bernardo, he entered into an employment
contract with appellant's co-accused Irene
Yabut (TSN, August 18, 1993, pp. 2-3).
Bernardo was told by the appellant that he did
not affix his signature on the employment
contract because of his government
employment i.e., a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), but appellant on
several occasions promised Bernardo that he
would be able to leave for abroad (TSN,
August 18, 1993, p. 3).
Still another complainant, Fely Casanova
testified that she first met appellant and his
co-accused Irene Yabut who introduced
themselves as Mr. and Mrs. Madrid on June
8, 1992 (TSN, August 18, 1993, p. 5).
Casanova always saw the appellant at the
P.M. Apartelle on Domingo Street, San Juan,
Metro Manila whenever she made follow-ups
on her papers (Ibid). Casanova also saw the
appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut at
the Town and Country on December 18, and
22, 1992 when the two were already in hiding.
They were talking to other applicants whom
they promised to send abroad (TSN, August
19, 1993, p. 6). On those two occasions,
appellant and his co-accused assured her
about a job placement abroad or the return of
her money (Ibid).
Realizing that their overseas jobs would never materialize,
complainants hauled appellant and his co-accused to the
Department of Justice, which conducted a preliminary
investigation on the complaints. Both were subsequently
charged with (1) Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in Criminal
Case No. 98224, and (2) eight (8) counts of Estafa in Criminal
Case Nos. 98997-99004. The Information for Illegal
Recruitment reads: 3
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice and Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission hereby accuses Irene
Yabut and Fernando Cortez for (sic) Illegal
Recruitment as defined and penalized under
Articles 38 and 39 of Presidential Decree No.
422 as Amended, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, committed as
follows:
That during the period from June to
September, 1992 or thereabouts, in San
Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused mutually confederating and
conspiring with each other did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract;
enlist and recruit for a fee, eight (8) persons
for employment abroad without first obtaining
the required license and/or authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, for Makati, Metro Manila, March 31,
1993
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all
charge. 4 Accused Irene Yabut already fled and was not
arraigned.
During joint trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses
three (3) of the complainants, namely: (1) Henry L. Ilar; (2)
Reynaldo P. Claudio; and (3) Arnel M. Diana. The testimonies
of the other five (5) complainants were dispensed with upon
the agreement of the prosecution and the defense that
affidavits would be offered as their testimonies. The
corresponding receipts issued by accused Yabut for amounts
received from complainants were marked as evidence for the
prosecution. 5
For the defense, appellant testified on his behalf. He admitted
that accused Irene Yabut was his live-in partner with whom he
has a child, but he washed his hands of any participation in her
business activities. He further insisted that Yabut was not
engaged in recruitment of workers for overseas employment
but only in the processing of visas. He also denied any
knowledge of the special power of attorney executed in his
favor by Yabut for the refund of the PAL tickets of several
recruits. Moreover, he claimed that he was not present at any
given time when large sum of money were received by Yabut
and that he never gave any assurances to complainants
regarding their departure to Japan. 6
The prosecution then presented complainants Antonio S.
Bernardo, Fely M. Casanova, and Henry L. Ilar as rebuttal
42
witnesses to refute appellants denials and protestations of
innocence regarding accused Yabut's recruitment activities.
On February 16, 1994, the trial court rendered a
decision 7 acquitting of eight (8) counts of estafa but convicting
him of illegal recruitment in large scale. The dispositive portion
of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, accused Fernando Cortez is
hereby Acquitted under Criminal Case Nos.
98997-99004 of the crime of Estafa under Art.
315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, on
grounds of reasonable doubt.
Upon the other hand, the prosecution having
established beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of accused Fernando Cortez under
Criminal No. 98224 of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment (in large scale) penalized under
Art. 38(a) in relation to Art. 39(b) of P.D. 442,
this Court hereby imposes upon accused
Fernando Cortez as follows:
1. To suffer life imprisonment and pay a fine
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00);
2. To indemnify private complainants —
a) Fely M. Casanova in the amount of
P151,581.00;
b) Arnel M. Diana in the amount of
P50,000.00;
c) Reynaldo P. Claudio in the amount of
P58,454.00;
d) German Aquino in the amount of
P40,000.00;
e) Manolito Latoja in the amount of
P45,000.00;
f) Alejandro F. Ruiz in the amount of
P50,000.00;
g) Antonio S. Bernardo in the amount of
P60,000.00; and
h) Henry Ilar in the amount of P25,000.00; all
with legal rate of interest reckoned from the
filing of the Information until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant contends that the trial
court 8 —
. . . ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING THE
TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND AS A RESULT
IT ALSO ERRED IN CONVICTING
FERNANDO CORTEZ OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT WHILE AT THE SAME
TIME IT ACQUITTED HIM OF THE CRIME
OF ESTAFA BASED ON THE SAME
EVIDENCE.
Appellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the insufficiency of
evidence, documentary and testimonial, to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. If at all, appellant argues, the sole
person guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale should be
Yabut since she was the only one who signed the receipts for
the amounts received from the complainants. He contends that
the mere fact that he is "romantically linked" with Yabut does
not mean he acted in conspiracy with her.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in praying for the
affirmance in toto of the trial court decision, insists that
appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, as shown
by the following acts: 9
. . . (1) He received deposits of money to
defray travelling expenses (TSN, June 9,
1993, pp. 3-5; June 15, 1993, pp. 9-12, 22,
40-41; July 15, 1993, p. 34); (2) He informed
the complainants that the money turned over
would be used for the processing of papers
and visas for Japan (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp.
3-5; June 15, 1993, pp. 11, 13, 31); (3) He
gave assurance to the complainants that they
would be able to leave for Japan otherwise
their money would be refunded (TSN, June 9,
1993, p. 7; June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 20, 26, 30,
36; August 18, 1993, p. 3; August 19, 1993,
p. 6); (4) He stayed at the apartelle office and
manned the office by entertaining job seekers
even after his co-accused Irene Yabut had
gone into hiding (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-7;
June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 20, 30; August 18,
1993, p. 5)
The crux of the issue is whether appellant could be convicted
of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his acquittal of the
crime of estafa. If so, did the prosecution prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of illegal recruitment in large
scale insofar as appellant is concerned?
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a)
of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 10 The offense of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa
is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
crucial for conviction. 11 Conviction for offenses under the
Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by
other laws. 12 Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a)
of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction
for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that
43
one's acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result
in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
and vice versa.
Art. 13, par. (b) of the Labor Code enumerates the acts which
constitute recruitment and placement as follows —
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refer to any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not: Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
The acts of appellant consisting of his promises, offers and
assurances of employment to complainants fall squarely within
the ambit of recruitment and placement as defined above. The
fact that he did not issue the receipts for amounts received
from complainants has no bearing on his culpability for the
complainants have shown through their respective testimonies
and affidavits that appellant was involved in the prohibited
recruitment. 13 It is immaterial that appellant ingeniously stated
to one of the complainants that he (appellant) was a member
of the PNP and a government employee, hence could not sign
the receipts. 14
Art. 38 of the Labor Code renders illegal all recruitment
activities without the necessary license or authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Art. 38 of the
Labor Code provides —
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any
recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or
non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this
Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment
(now Department of Labor and Employment)
or any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.1âwphi1.nêt
(b) Illegal Recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic
sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group. . . .
Thus, if the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or
in large scale, the Labor Code considers it an offense involving
economic sabotage and imposes a stiffer penalty therefor in
accordance with Article 39 of the Labor Code.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are: "(1) the
accused undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Art.
13, par. (b), or any prohibited practice enumerated under Art.
34 of the Labor Code; (2) he does not have a license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers; and, (3) he commits the same against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group. 15
Indisputably, all three (3) elements exist in the case at
bar. First, the complaining witnesses have satisfactorily
established that appellant had actively promised them
employment, gave assurance of their placement overseas, and
with his co-accused received certain sums as fees
therefor. Second, the Licensing Division of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration issued a Certification
dated March 1, 1993 that JAWOH GENERAL
MERCHANDISING 16 represented by Irene Yabut and
Fernando Cortez are neither licensed nor authorized by the
POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. 17 In fact,
the defense even entered into a stipulation during trial that
appellant is not authorized by the POEA to recruit overseas
workers. 18 Third, appellant and co-accused undertook
recruitment of not less than eight (8) workers — complainants
herein, who were recruited individually on different occasions.
For purposes of illegal recruitment, however, the law makes no
distinction whether the workers were recruited as a group or
individually.
There is no showing that any of the complainants had ill-motive
to testify falsely against appellant. And it is generally observed
that it is against human nature and experience for strangers to
conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime
just to mollify their hurt feelings. 19 Moreover, we have no
reason to discount the trial court's appreciation of the
complainants' truthfulness, honesty and candor. For such
appreciation deserves the highest respect, since the trial court
is best-equipped to make the assessment of the witnesses'
credibility, and its factual findings are generally not disturbed
on appeal. 20 Thus, after a careful review of the records, we
see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.
As to the amounts to be refunded to complainants, we find the
trial court's computations in accord with the evidence, except
with respect to complainant Fely M. Casanova. Upon
recomputation, the amount to be refunded for the failed
promise of employment of her daughter and sister-in-law
should be P150,781.00 instead of P151,581.00. 21
Lastly, it would not be amiss to stress that in these difficult
times, many of our countrymen venture abroad and work even
in hazardous places to ensure for themselves and their families
a life worthy of human dignity. They labor overseas to provide
proper education for their children and secure a decent future
for them. Illegal recruiters prey on hapless workers, charge
44

exorbitant fees that siphon their meager savings, then cruelly

dash their dreams with false promises of lucrative jobs
overseas. For this reason, illegal recruiters have no place in
society. Illegal recruitment activities must be stamped out by
the full force of the law.

WHEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court finding appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega guilty of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale beyond reasonable doubt and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 and to indemnify complainants in the amounts
stated therein, EXCEPT that only P150,781.00 instead of
P151,581.00 should be paid to complainant Fely M. Casanova,
with interest at the legal rate from the time of filing the
information until fully paid. Costs against
appellant.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
45
G.R. No. 229712, February 28, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
DELIA C. MOLINA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated January 14, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05977,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 137, finding accused-appellant Delia C.
Molina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
On December 21, 2007, accused-appellant Delia C. Molina
and Juliet Pacon were charged with the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale in an Information2 that reads:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses DELIA C. MOLINA and
JULIET PACON of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale, defined and penalized under Section[s] 6 and 7 of
Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995), committed as follows:
That in or about and sometime in the months of April 2006 to
September 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit for a fee, promise
employment/job placement abroad to five (5) persons, hence,
committed in large scale, and received payments from
complainants, to wit:
MARIA C. LUYA - P 75,000.00
GILBERT B. UBIÑA - 130,000.00
WILFREDO I. LOGO - 100,000.00
BENJAMIN B. DELOS SANTOS - 75,000.00
MAYLEN S. BOLDA - 70,000.00
in connection with the documentation and processing of their
papers for purposes of their deployment, but said accused
failed or refused to deploy herein complainants abroad without
the fault of the latter and to reimburse the above-enumerated
amounts to said complainants, to the damage and prejudice of
the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The case proceeded only against accused-appellant Delia C.
Molina, as co-accused Juliet Pacon was at-large. When
arraigned on April 7, 2009, accused Delia C. Molina pleaded
not guilty.4 After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses the five private
complainants and Eraida Dumigpi, Senior Labor and
Deployment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). On the other hand, the defense
presented accused-appellant Delia C. Molina as its lone
witness.
Prosecution witness Wilfredo I. Logo, from Baliwag, Bulacan,
testified that in May 2006, he was referred by a certain Lita to
Juliet Pacon of Southern Cotabato Landbase Management
Corporation, a recruitment agency, to apply for a job in Korea
as a factory worker. At the agency, he met Juliet Pacon who
discussed with him the work in Korea, the placement fee and
the salary of Nine Hundred Won, or about P45,000.00. He was
told to pay half of the placement fee, and once there is a job
order, he was told to pay the remaining balance. For this job
application, he paid the agency through Pacon, in cash and on
installment basis, the total sum of P100,000.00 on the following
dates: (1) May 22, 2006 - P3,000.00; (2) May 23, 2006 -
P7,000.00; (3) August 29, 2006 - P60,000.00; and (4)
September 14, 2006 - P30,000.00, all covered by cash
vouchers.5 The payments were all received by Juliet Pacon as
shown by her signature on the cash vouchers. Years passed,
and despite compliance with all the requirements of the
agency, the promised deployment did not materialize. Logo
entertained doubt as to his deployment abroad. He went back
and forth to the agency, but Pacon already went into hiding and
could not be located. He then went to the POEA and
discovered that the agency had no job order for Korea. He got
confirmation that accused Molina was the President of the
agency as reflected in the POEA Certification6dated July 13,
2011. Thereafter, he filed a complaint against Molina and
executed in support thereof' his affidavit.7
Logo positively identified accused Molina as the owner of the
agency. He came to know accused Molina not only because
Pacon introduced her as the owner of the agency, but also
because he frequently saw Molina in her office in the agency
everytime he went there and paid his placement fee between
the months of April to September 2006.8 He was able to talk to
accused Molina who assured him of his deployment abroad.9
The second witness, Gilbert Ubiña, a resident of Cubao,
Quezon City, testified that in June 2006, his Auntie Lita
accompanied him to the agency located in Makati City to apply
for a job abroad. At the agency, he talked to Juliet Pacon who
discussed with him the requirements of the job order for a
factory worker in South Korea such as visa, passport, medical
certificate, training and the payment of P130,000.00 as
placement fee. He paid the placement fee in two installments:
(1) P10,000.00 on June 9, 2009; and (2) P120,000.00 on July
13, 2006, both evidenced by cash vouchers.10 The payments
were received by Pacon in behalf of the agency as evidenced
by her signature on the cash vouchers of the agency. He was
assured by both accused Molina and Pacon of a monthly salary
of P45,000.00, but the promised job was not attained. Upon
inquiry from the POEA, he found out that there was no job
order for the agency. He also learned that accused Molina was
the owner of the agency.
46
In open court, Ubiña positively identified accused
Molina,11 who advised him and other applicants to complete all
their requirements for their immediate deployment to Korea
where allegedly there were many jobs waiting for them.
The third witness, Benjamin Delos Santos, a resident of San
Juan City, testified that in February 2006, he went to the
agency, Southern Cotabato Landbase Management
Corporation, located in Palanan, Makati City, and applied as a
factory worker in South Korea. At the agency, he talked to
Juliet Pacon who told him that he would earn US$900.00 per
month, and that he could leave immediately upon submission
of the requirements such as NBI clearance, resume, pictures
and a placement fee of P75,000.00. He paid the placement fee
in two installments: (1) P10,000.00 on April 26, 2006; and (2)
P65,000.00 on May 8, 2006.12 Although he complied with all
the requirements, the agency failed to deploy him. Thus, he
went to the POEA where he found out that accused Molina,
whom he identified in open court,13 did not have any job orders,
and that Pacon was not licensed to get workers for deployment
abroad. Despite his demand for the return of his money, he
only received promises, but his money was never
returned.14Then he filed a complaint and executed his
affidavit.15
The fourth witness, Maylen Bolda, a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila, testified that she gave P70,000.00 to Juliet
Pacon in connection with her application for employment in
South Korea. She paid in two installments: (1) P10,000.00 on
April 12, 2006; and (2) P60,000.00 on April 26, 2006.16 Like her
co-applicants, the payments were evidenced by vouchers
signed by Pacon. Upon receipt of the money, Pacon told her
to complete all the requirements, which she did through the
submission of the payment, medical result, NBI clearance and
pictures. Pacon assured her that she would be able to depart
for Korea as soon as she completes the requirements. She
was also able to talk to accused Molina, who was introduced
by Pacon to her as the owner of the agency. As the promised
employment did not materialize, she demanded for the return
of the money she paid, but only her passport was given back
to her. She positively identified accused Molina in open court.
Molina acknowledged that she was the owner of the agency
and she assured Bolda of her employment abroad.
The fifth witness, Maria Luya, from Lemery, Batangas, testified
that in April 2006, she came to know both accused Pacon and
Molina when she applied with the agency for a job in South
Korea, upon referral of her older sister who was in Korea. At
the agency, she met Pacon who was assigned as her recruiter.
She also saw accused Molina, who Pacon said was the
President of the company and that she does not talk with
applicants as there are recruiters for them. Pacon told her that
there were job orders already, so she had to pay and complete
the requirements because in a few months, she could leave for
South Korea as a factory worker. She submitted the required
documents such as NBI clearance, resume, photocopies of
passport, birth certificate, medical certificate, and identification
pictures. She paid to Pacon the processing fee of P75,000.00
in two installments: (1) P10,000.00 on April 17, 2006 and (2)
P65,000.00 on May 2, 2006.17 Despite submission of all the
requirements of the agency, the promised deployment did not
materialize, so she went back and forth to the agency many
times to demand for the return of her money, but to no avail.
Based on the Certification18 dated July 20, 2007 issued by the
POEA, she found out that while the agency was registered, it
did not have any job order, and that the agency was in the
name of accused Molina who told her and her co-applicants to
just wait as there were job orders already and that in a few
months, they would be able to go abroad and that their papers
were already being processed.
The last prosecution witness, Eraida Dumigpi, Senior Labor
Deployment Officer of the Licensing Branch of the POEA,
identified the two certifications19 dated July 13, 2011 and
September 8, 2011 as having been issued by her office. She
likewise confirmed and affirmed the contents of both
certificates, which stated that the Southern Cotabato Landbase
Management Corporation, represented by Ms. Delia C. Molina,
President, was a private recruitment agency whose license
expired on March 31, 2007 and was cancelled on May 30,
2008.
The defense presented as its lone witness the accused, Delia
C. Molina. Molina admitted that she was the former President
of the Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Corporation,
which was a duly licensed recruitment agency established on
March 31, 2006 as evidenced by the provisional
license20 issued by the POEA. The agency was not able to do
its business for failure to submit the requirements of the POEA,
i.e., to submit new job orders. She traveled abroad to look for
such job orders. She departed from the Philippines on May 21,
200621 as stamped on her passport.22 She went to Egypt23 and
on June 25, 2006, she went to Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia24 where she was able to obtain a new job order. The
suspension order against the agency was lifted on July 31,
2006, and the agency started its operation on August 6, 2006
(but no documents were marked and offered to this effect).
During the time that she was out of the country, from May 21,
2006 to June 29, 2006, her former secretary Angelita Palabay
took charge of the agency. She stated that co-accused Juliet
Pacon had no relation to her or to the agency in any capacity
as Pacon was a total stranger to her and had no authority to
act for the agency. It was only in the hearing of this case that
she learned of the name Juliet Pacon. Moreover, she has not
met personally all the private complainants in this case.
On cross-examination, accused Molina admitted that there
were about 100 cases of illegal recruitment filed against her in
different courts and that she was convicted of illegal
recruitment in the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148 and Branch
150 where the complainants were illegally recruited for South
Korea. She denied the recruitment of private complainants and
the payments made by them in this case, more so, the cash
vouchers showing such payments.
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision25 dated January 16, 2013, the trial court found
accused Molina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
The trial court held:
xxx [T]he crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is generally
committed when the following elements concur, to wit: (1) the
47
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable one to engage lawfully in recruitment and placement of
workers; (2) he or she undertakes any of the activities within
the meaning of recruitment and placement as defined
thereunder in relation to Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines; and (3) that the accused commits the acts against
three or more persons, individually or as a group. In addition
thereto, and more apt to the case at bar, even if one is a
licensee or holder of authority, he or she will still be deemed
liable for illegal recruitment in large scale if he or she commits
any of the defined acts under Section 6 of R.A. 8042.
After going over the pieces of testimonial and documentary
evidence of the prosecution, vis-a-vis the defense of general
denial by the accused, this court finds that all the requisite
elements necessary to sustain a judgment of conviction for the
defense of illegal recruitment in large scale were established
during the trial. The attendance of the first element - that is,
absence of a valid license or authority to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers - is supported
by the POEA certifications and further bolstered and
strengthened by the testimony at the witness [stand] of Eraida
Dumigpi, Senior Labor Deployment Officer from the Licensing
Branch of the POEA. The second element pertaining to the
performance of activities within the meaning of recruitment and
placement as defined under Section 6 of R.A. 8042 is
substantiated by the testimonies of private complainants Luya,
Ubiña, Logo, Delos Santos and Bolda. The third element is
evident from the number of complainants, in the instant case
herein five (5) complainants, against whom the accused
committed illegal recruitment.26
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the prosecution
having established the guilt of accused Delia C. Molina beyond
reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the
accused as principal of large scale illegal recruitment and she
is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), plus cost of suit.
Accused Delia C. Molina is further ordered to pay the following
complainants the amounts opposite their names as actual or
compensatory damages, to wit:
1. Maria C. Luya - P 75,000.00
2. Gilbert B. Ubiña - P130,000.00
3. Wilfredo L. Logo - P100,000.00
4. Benjamin B. Delos Santos - P 75,000.00
5. Maylen S. Bolda - P 70,000.00
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the date of filing this criminal case, February 7,2008, until the
amount shall have been fully paid.
The case against co-accused Juliet Pacon is ordered
ARCHIVED, with standing alias warrant of arrest dated
September 6, 2012.
SO ORDERED.27
The accused-appellant appealed the Decision of the RTC to
the Court of Appeals, raising this assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.
Before the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant professed
her innocence, arguing that while she was the President of
Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Services, a duly
licensed recruitment agency, she never recruited or promised
private complainants any work in South Korea. She had no
contractual obligations or duty to deploy them for employment
abroad. It was accused Juliet Pacon who recruited and
promised employment in South Korea to private complainants.
In fact, it was Pacon who received private complainants'
payments. Thus, considering that she never demanded or
received any amount from private complainants as placement
fee or other incidental expenses in relation to their purported
deployment, she had no contractual obligation to reimburse
any amount of money to them due to accused Pacon's failure
to deploy them abroad. Accused-appellant asserted that there
was no direct evidence that she gave private complainants the
impression that she had the power or ability to send them
abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with
their money in order to be employed. In fact, she had no
participation in the transactions between the private
complainants and accused Pacon. Hence, the charge of illegal
recruitment against her has no leg to stand on.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 14, 2016, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision,28 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision is
AFFIRMED en toto.29
The Court of Appeals did not give credence to accused-
appellant's allegation that she neither knew Juliet Pacon nor
authorized Pacon to act in behalf of the agency, because the
transactions happened in her office. Moreover, private
complainants identified accused-appellant as the President of
the agency. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's
findings that the elements of the crime charged are present in
this case. It found no reversible error on the part of the trial
court in finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment
in large scale.
Thereafter, the case was certified and the entire records
thereof were elevated to this Court for review.
In lieu of filing their respective Supplemental Briefs, the parties
manifested to the Court that they were adopting their
48
respective Appellee's Brief and Appellant's Brief filed with the
Court of Appeals for the instant appeal.
The issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the Decision of the Court of Appeals with
modification.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, known as the "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," defines illegal recruitment
in Section 6 thereof, thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. — For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not,
when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13 (f) of Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee
or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged. It shall likewise include the following
acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) x x x
x x x x (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the
worker in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where
the deployment does not actually take place without the
worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction
of their business shall be liable.30
In this case, the provisional license31 granted by the POEA to
the recruitment agency Southern Cotabato Landbase
Management Corporation, of which accused-appellant was the
President, was valid from March 31, 2006 to March 31, 2007.
On May 31, 2006, Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, Administrator
of the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office, issued an
Order32 stating that the license of Southern Cotabato
Landbase Management Corporation "is hereby suspended
effective immediately for non-compliance with its undertaking
to submit requirements within 30 days from the date of
issuance of its license as a landbased agency, pursuant to
Section 16, Rule IV, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and
Regulations." Accused-appellant testified that she travelled
abroad, particularly to Egypt and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to
look for job orders, and these trips were reflected on her
passport. She stated that she obtained a new job order in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; hence, the suspension order against
the agency was lifted on July 31, 2006 (but no documentary
evidence was submitted to support her allegation) and that the
agency started operating again on August 6, 2006. Based on
a Certification33 dated September 8, 2011 issued by the POEA,
the license of Southern Cotabato Landbase Management
Corporation expired on March 31, 2007 and the license was
cancelled on May 30, 2008.
The testimonies of private respondents and the records show
that: (1) private complainants Wilfredo Logo, Maylen Bolda and
Maria Luya applied at the recruitment agency for employment
in South Korea and paid for their respective
placement/processing fee when the agency's provisional
license was already issued; (2) Benjamin Delos Santos applied
before the issuance of the provisional license but paid the
placement fee when the provisional license was already
issued, and (3) Gilbert Ubiña's application and payments were
made after the agency's license was suspended and before it
was alleged lifted on July 31, 2000, but before the agency's
license expired on March 31, 2007. Hence, it appears that the
recruitment agency, which accused-appellant headed, was a
licensee or holder of authority when the recruitment of private
complainants was made as the agency's license expired on
March 31, 2007. Nevertheless, accused-appellant is still liable
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, which provides:
x x x [Illegal recruitment] shall likewise include the following
acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does
not actually take place without the worker's fault.34
As the trial court stated:
Although it might be argued by the accused that her
license/authority as a private recruitment agency expired only
in March 2007, and cancelled only in May 2008, and as such
during the period of time material to the instant criminal
indictment she would seem to be possessed of the requisite
license and authority to recruit, still, accused Molina cannot
escape liability for the offense charged because of her failure
to reimburse to private complainants the expenses they
incurred in connection with the documentation and processing
for purposes of deployment when her agency, and of which
she is the President, failed to actually deploy them without the
private complainants' fault. The existence of a valid license at
the commencement of the recruitment process will not justify
an acquittal, for the provision and mandate of the special law
violated is clear, categorical and specific on this point.35
49
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that accused-
appellant cannot escape from liability for large scale illegal
recruitment on the ground that she did not recruit private
complainants and participate in their transactions with Juliet
Pacon to whom complainants made their payments, as the
recruitment was made in the recruitment agency of which
accused-appellant is the President. Moreover, private
complainants Logo, Ubiña, Bolda and Luya testified that they
saw accused-appellant at the agency and she was introduced
to them by Pacon as the owner of the agency, and she even
assured them that they would be deployed for employment
soon. Private respondent Delos Santos also testified that he
saw accused-appellant at the agency and Pacon told him that
she was the boss and owner of the agency. Further, the cash
vouchers,36 evidencing the payments made by private
complainants to Pacon, contained the name of the recruitment
agency or its office address in Makati City, showing that it was
received by Pacon in behalf of the agency whose President
was accused-appellant. As stated by the trial court:
To the mind and appreciation of this Court, it is of no moment
that in the cash vouchers evidencing payments of the
placement fee by all five (5) private complainants, the name of
accused Molina did not appear and all were paid to and
accepted not by her, but by her alleged agent, co-accused
Juliet Pacon who remains at large to date. Scrutiny of these
vouchers, however, would show that all payments were in the
name of Southern Cotabato Landbase Management Services,
the private recruitment agency owned, managed and presided
by accused Molina. As held in the case of People v. Crispin
Billaber y Matbanua, "[T]he absence of receipts to evidence
payment to the recruiter would not warrant an acquittal, a
receipt not being fatal to the prosecution's cause." The clear,
categorical and straightforward testimonies of the private
complainants pertaining to the assurances given by accused
Molina herself about the existence of job orders in South
Korea, the certainty of deployment for work abroad upon
completion of all the requirements - which includes the
payment of the placement fees - and her subsequent failure to
deploy them and return the money paid by the private
complainants have only been met and controverted by a
general denial by the accused. Such negative assertion,
definitely pales in comparison to the affirmative testimonies of
the private complainants.37
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which affirm those
of the trial court, are binding on the Court. The Court may
revise such findings only when the accused-appellant
convincingly demonstrates that such findings were erroneous,
or biased, or unfounded, or incomplete, or unreliable, or
conflicted with the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals,38 which has not been demonstrated by the accused-
appellant in this case.
Under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042, illegal
recruitment "is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group,"
and "[i]llegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage." Thus, the offense charged in the Information is
illegal recruitment in large scale because it was committed
against the five private complainants.
Moreover, Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A. No. 8042 provides
that in case of juridical persons, the officers having control,
management or direction of their business shall be liable.
Accused-appellant, as President of the recruitment agency, is
therefore liable for illegal recruitment in large scale for failure
to reimburse the expenses incurred by private complainants in
connection with their documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment to South Korea, which did not actually
take place without their fault under Section 6, paragraph (m) of
R.A. No. 8042.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8042 provides for the penalties for illegal
recruitment as follows:
SEC. 7. Penalties. —
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not
less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor
more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed
if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be
imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen
(18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority.39
Since illegal recruitment in large scale is an offense involving
economic sabotage under Section 6, paragraph (m) of R.A.
No. 8042, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision
of the trial court imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 under Section 7
(b) of R.A. No. 8042. Although R.A. No. 10022, which took
effect on May 7, 2010, amended the fine under Section 7 (b)
of R.A. No. 8042 and increased it to "not less than Two million
pesos (P2,000,000.00) nor more than Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) x x x if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage," the said amendment does not apply in
this case because the offense was committed in 2006, before
the amendment took effect in May 2010.
The Court of Appeals also correctly affirmed the ruling of the
trial court ordering accused-appellant to reimburse to each of
the private complainants the amount she respectively received
from each of them, but the imposition of interest on the actual
damages awarded should be modified as computed from the
date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is DISMISSED. The Court AFFIRMS withMODIFICATION the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 14, 2016 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05977, sustaining the Decision of the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 137, finding accused-appellant
Delia C. Molina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale and imposing on her the
50

penalty of life imprisonment and ordering her to pay a fine of

Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), plus cost of
suit, and to pay actual damages to private complainants as
follows:

1. Maria C. Luya - P 75,000.00

2. Gilbert B. Ubiña - P130,000.00

3. Wilfredo I. Logo - P100,000.00

4. Benjamin B. Delos Santos - P 75,000.00

5. Maylen S. Bolda - P 70,000.00

with interest on the actual damages awarded at the legal rate

of six percent (6%) per annum with the modification that the
said interest imposed on the actual damages shall be
computed from the date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.
51
G.R. No. 196784. January 13, 2016.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MA. FE TORRES SOLINA a.k.a. MA. FE BAYLON
GALLO, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale;
Elements of.—All the elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are present, namely: (1) the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (2)
the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning
of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042); and
(3) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group. More importantly, all the
said elements have been established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Same; Denials; Greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than the accused’s denial and explanation
concerning the commission of the crime.—Accused-
appellant’s defense of denial cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution. As
is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than the accused’s denial and explanation
concerning the commission of the crime. Based on the factual
findings of the RTC, the combined and corroborative
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution show that it
was appellant herself who informed them of the existence of
the job vacancies in Japan and of the requirements needed for
the processing of their applications. It was properly established
that it was accused-appellant who accompanied the private
complainants to undergo training and seminar conducted by a
person who represented himself as connected with the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA). Evidence was also presented that the private
complainants, relying completely on accused-appellant’s
representations, entrusted their money to her. Finally, since
there were six (6) victims, the RTC therefore did not commit
any error in convicting accused-appellant of the charge of
illegal recruitment in large scale.
Same; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Estafa; It is
settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act (RA)
No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—This
Court is also in agreement with the ruling of the CA that
accused-appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of estafa under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under R.A. 8042, in relation to
the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person. As aptly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA,
accused-appellant defrauded the private complainants into
believing that she had the authority and capability to send them
for overseas employment in Japan and because of such
assurances, private complainants each parted with
P20,000.00 in exchange for said promise of future work
abroad. Still, accused-appellant’s promise never materialized,
thus, private complainants suffered damages to the extent of
the sum of money that they had delivered to accused-
appellant.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The
determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this
case, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great
respect, if not conclusive effect.—Settled is the rule that the
findings and conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect because the trial courts
have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses
as they testify. The determination by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court,
as in this case, is accorded full weight and credit as well as
great respect, if not conclusive effect.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale;
Economic Sabotage; Penalties; The penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.—The CA
erred in not increasing the amount of fine imposed by the RTC.
In modifying the penalty to life imprisonment, the CA cited
Section 7(b) of R.A. 8042 because the present case involves
economic sabotage, however, the same provision reads, [t]he
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Hence, the fine
imposed should have been not less than five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) and not two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as ruled by the RTC and the CA.
PERALTA, J.:
Accused-appellant Ma. Fe Torres Solina a.lea. Ma. Fe Baylon
Gallo appeals her case to this Court after the Court of
Appeals (CA) in its Decision1 dated March 11, 20 I 0 affirmed
with modification her conviction beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale under Republic
Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (R.A. 8042) imposing the
penalty of life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine in the
amount of I!200,000.00 with subsidiary liability in case of
insolvency and six (6) counts of Estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), imposing the indeterminate
penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20)
days prision correccional, as minimum, to five (5) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor, as
maximum, for each count and ordered to return to each
complainant the amount of P20,000.00 as actual damages,
handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 147,
in Makati City.
Accused-appellant was arraigned and tried under an
Information dated June 16, 2006 charging her of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale under R.A. 8042, thus:
That in or about and sometime during the period from
September, 2005 up to February 2006, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
52
Court, the above-named accused, representing herself to have
capacity to contract, enlist, transport and refer workers for
employment abroad, did then and there, without any license or
authority, recruit for overseas employment and for a fee, the
following complainants, to wit:
MONICA B. HIMAN
ERWIN B. DELA VEGA
GLADYSZ. REMORENTO
JOEY P. BACOLOD
MARLON B. DELA CRUZ
AUGUSTO A. CEZAR GARCES
LEYNARD B. TUTANES
thus in a large scale amounting to economic sabotage but said
accused failed to deploy said complainants and likewise failed
to return the money incurred by them and the documents
submitted despite demands, to the latter's damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Accused-appellant was also charged and tried under seven (7)
separate informations for estafa under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of
the RPC, to wit:
1) That in or about and sometime during the month of
September 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction or this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, defraud complainant MONICA HIMAN y
BASAMOT in the following manners, to wit: the said accused
by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations made prior and simultaneously with the
commission of fraud, to the effect that she have the capacity to
deploy complainant for overseas employment and could
facilitate the necessary papers, in connection therewith if given
the necessary amount and by means of other deceit of similar
import, induced and succeeded in inducing complainant to give
and deliver and, in fact, the complainant gave and delivered to
said accused the total amount of Php20,000.00 on the strength
of said manifestation and representation which turned out to
be false, to the damage and prejudice or said complainant in
the aforementioned amount of P20,000.00
CONTRARYTOLAW.3
2) That in or about and sometime during the month of October,
2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, defraud
complainant JOEY BACOLOD y PORTILLES in the following
manners, to wit: the said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations made prior and
simultaneously with the commission of fraud, to the effect that
she have the capacity to deploy complainant for overseas
employment and could facilitate the necessary papers, in
connection therewith if given the necessary amount and by
means of other deceit of similar import, induced and
succeeded in inducing complainant to give and deliver and, in
fact, the complainant gave and delivered to said accused the
total amount of Php20,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestation and representation which turned out to be false,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
3) That in or about and sometime during the month of October,
2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, defraud
complainant MARLON DELA CRUZ y BOLESA in the following
manners, to wit: the said accused by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations made prior and
simultaneously with the commission of fraud, to the effect that
she have the capacity to deploy complainant for overseas
employment and could facilitate the necessary papers, in
connection therewith if given the necessary amount and by
means of other deceit of similar import, induced and
succeeded in inducing complainant to give and deliver and, in
fact, the complainant gave and delivered to said accused the
total amount of Php20,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestation and representation which turned out to be false,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
4) That in or about and sometime during the month of
November, 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, defraud complainant ERWIN DELA VEGA y
BRIONES in the following manners, to wit: the said accused by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
made prior and simultaneously with the commission of fraud,
to the effect that she have the capacity to deploy complainant
for overseas employment and could facilitate the necessary
papers, in connection therewith if given the necessary amount
and by means of other deceit of similar import, induced and
succeeded in inducing complainant to give and deliver and, in
fact, the complainant gave and delivered to said accused the
total amount of Php20,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestation and representation which turned out to be false,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
5) That in or about and sometime during the month of
November, 2005, in the City or Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction or this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, defraud complainant GLADYS REMORENTO y
ZAMORA in the following manners, to wit: the said accused by
53
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
made prior and simultaneously with the commission of fraud,
to the effect that she have the capacity to deploy complainant
for overseas employment and could facilitate the necessary
papers, in connection therewith if given the necessary amount
and by means of other deceit of similar import, induced and
succeeded in inducing complainant to give and deliver and, in
fact, the complainant gave and delivered to said accused the
total amount of Php20,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestation and representation which turned out to be false,
to the damage and prejudice or said complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
6) That in or about and sometime during the month of
February, 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenarned
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, defraud complainant AUGUSTO CEZAR GARCES
y ALIMAGNO in the following manners, to wit: the said accused
by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations made prior and simultaneously with the
commission of fraud, to the effect that she have the capacity to
deploy complainant for overseas employment and could
facilitate the necessary papers, in connection therewith if given
the necessary amount and by means of other deceit of similar
import, induced and succeeded in inducing complainant to give
and deliver and, in fact, the complainant gave and delivered to
said accused the total amount of Php20,000.00 on the strength
of said manifestation and representation which turned out to
be false, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in
the aforementioned amount of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8 elevating the cases to the CA. On March 11, 2010, the CA
7) That in or about and sometime during the month of
February, 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, defraud complainant LEYNARD TUTANES y
BADTOLA in the following manners, to wit: the said accused
by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations made prior and simultaneously with the
commission of fraud, to the effect that she have the capacity to
deploy complainant for overseas employment and could
facilitate the necessary papers, in connection therewith if given
the necessary amount and by means of other deceit of similar
import, induced and succeeded in inducing complainant to give
and deliver and, in fact, the complainant gave and delivered to
said accused the total amount of Php20,000.00 on the strength
of said manifestation and representation which turned out to
be false, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in
the aforementioned amount of P20,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" and after trial on the
merits, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged except for one charge
of estafa which was provisionally dismissed by the RTC, upon
motion of accused-appellant, without prejudice to
reinstatement considering that the subpoena sent to
complainant Monica B. Himan had not been duly served upon
her person. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in
these cases as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 06-1275, finding herein accused Ma. Fe
Torres Solina a.k.a. Ma. Fe Baylon Gallo, Guilty Beyond
Reasonable Doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years as
maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P200,000.00 with
subsidiary liability in case of insolvency;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 06-1277 to 06-1282, finding the said
accused Ma. Fe Torres Solina a.lea. Ma. Fe Baylon Gallo,
Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt of six (6) counts of Estafa
under Art. 315, par. 2 (a), Revised Penal Code, and sentencing
her to suffer for each count, the indeterminate penalty of one
(1) year, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days prision
correccional as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months, and
eleven (11) days of prision mayor as maximum; to return to
each private complainant, namely, Joey P. Bacolod, Marlon B.
dela Cruz, Erwin B. Dela Vega, Gladys Z. Remorento, Augusto
Cezar A. Garces, and Leynard B. Tutanes, the amount of
P20,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Makati City, October 30, 2007.10
Thereafter, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal,11 thus
affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is
hereby DENIED. However, the assailed Decision dated 30
October 2007 is MODIFIED in that the appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT as
penalty for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and is
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P200,000.00 with
subsidiary liability in case of insolvency. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the case is now before this Court after accused-
appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on March 24, 2010.12
Accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) both adopted their respective briefs filed before the
CA.13
In her BrieC accused-appellant assigned the following errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE.
54
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUIU'Y DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HER GUJU'
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Accused-appellant maintains her denial that she was engaged
in the business of recruiting possible workers for jobs abroad.
She insists that like all the private complainants, she was also
an applicant for a job as an overseas worker and that she
merely accompanied them to a recruitment agency. She
alleges that private complainant Dela Vega and Dela Cruz
conspired together, used her name, and represented
themselves to the other applicants as being authorized to
collect documents and fees and that she only met the other
private complainants in the trainings/seminars she attended.
Anent the acknowledgment receipt signed by her and
presented by the prosecution as evidence, accused-appellant
argues that it does not prove that the money received by her
was the consideration for private complainant Garces'
placement abroad.
As to the charges of estafa, accused-appellant claims that the
prosecution failed to prove that she employed deceit to entice
private complainants to part with their money because she did
not represent or pass herself off as a licensed recruiter.
After a careful review of the records, this Court finds no reason
to reverse the decision of the CA.
All the elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
are present, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the offender
undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b)14of the Labor
Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042); and
(3) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group. More importantly, all the
said elements have been established beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, as ruled by the CA:
First off, the first element is admittedly present. Appellant had
no license to recruit or engage in placement activities and she
herself had admitted to her lack of authority to do so. The
Certification elated 7 April 2006 issued by the POEA also
undeniably establishes this fact.
In like manner, the second and third elements also obtain in
this case. On separate occasions and under different
premises, appellant met with and herself recruited the private
complainants, six (6) in number, giving them the impression
that she had the capability to facilitate applications for
employment as factory workers in Japan. All these
complainants testified that appellant had promised them
employment for a lee amounting to P20,000.00. Their
testimonies corroborate each other on material points, such as
the amount exacted by appellant as placement fee, the country
of destination, the training that they had to undergo to qualify
for employment and the submission of documentary
requirements needed for the same. The private complainants
were positive and categorical in testifying that they personally
met the appellant and that she asked for, among others, the
payment of placement fees in consideration for the promised
employment in Japan.15
Accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the
positive testimonies of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution.1avvphi1 As is well-settled in this jurisdiction,
greater weight is given to the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses than the accused's
denial and explanation concerning the commission of the
crime.16Based on the factual findings of the RTC, the combined
and corroborative testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution show that it was appellant herself who informed
them of the existence of the job vacancies in Japan and of the
requirements needed for the processing of their applications. It
was properly established that it was accused-appellant who
accompanied the private complainants to undergo training and
seminar conducted by a person who represented himself as
connected with the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA). Evidence was also
presented that the private complainants, relying completely on
accused-appellant's representations, entrusted their money to
her. Finally, since there were six (6) victims, the RTC therefore
did not commit any error in convicting accused-appellant of the
charge of illegal recruitment in large scale.
This Court is also in agreement with the ruling of the CA that
accused-appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of estafa under
Article 315, par. 2 (a) or the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under R.A. 8042, in relation to
the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.17 The elements of estqfa are: (a) that the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.18 As aptly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA,
accused-appellant defrauded the private complainants into
believing that she had the authority and capability to send them
for overseas employment in Japan and because of such
assurances, private complainants each parted with
P20,000.00 in exchange for said promise of future work
abroad. Still, accused--appellant's promise never materialized,
thus, private complainants suffered damages to the extent of
the sum of money that they had delivered to accused-
appellant.
To reiterate, settled is the rule that the findings and conclusion
or the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect because the trial courts have the advantage of
observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.19 The
determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses,
when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case, is
accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not
conclusive effect.20
Anent the CA's modification as to the penalty imposed, this
Court finds no reason for its correction. The trial court imposed
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, for the crime of
55

illegal recruitment in large scale, whereas the proper penalty

should have been life imprisonment, as provided under Section
7 (b) of R.A. 8042. As ruled by the CA:

Be that as it may, this Court finds reversible error on the part

of the trial court respecting the penalty imposed on the
appellant for the crime or large scale illegal recruitment. Under
the last paragraph of Section 6 or R.A. 8042, illegal recruitment
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if
committed in large scale, viz., committed against three or more
persons individually or as a group. In the present case, six (6)
private complainants testified against appellant's acts of illegal
recruitment, thereby rendering her acts tantamount to
economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. 8042, the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed if
illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.

Nevertheless, the CA erred in not increasing the amount of fine

imposed by the RTC. In modifying the penalty to life
imprisonment, the CA cited Section 7 (b) of R.A. 8042 because
the present case involves economic sabotage, however, the
same provision reads, [t]he penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage. Hence, the fine imposed
should have been not less than five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos
(Pl,000,000.00) and not two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as ruled by the RTC and the CA.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Court of

Appeals Decision dated March 11, 20l0 is AFFIRMEDwith
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Ma. Fe Torres
Solina a.k.a. Ma Fe Baylon Gallo is ORDERED to PAY a fine
in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos
with subsidiary liability in case of insolvency, instead of the
,P200,000.00 adjudged earlier by the RTC and the CA for the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Anent the six (6)
counts of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a), Revised
Penal Code, accused-appellant is ORDERED to RETURN to
each private complainant the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), plus the legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid, as
actual damages.

SO ORDERED.
56
G.R. No. 198664. November 23, 2016.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs.OWEN MARCELO CAGALINGAN and
BEATRIZ B. CAGALINGAN, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale;
Labor Law; Illegal recruitment is a crime committed by a
person who, not having the valid license or authority
required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers, undertakes any of
the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and
placement” mentioned in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code,
or any of the prohibited practices enumerated in Section 6
of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 (Migrant Workers’ Act),
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group.—Illegal recruitment is a crime committed by a person
who, not having the valid license or authority required by law
to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement
of workers, undertakes any of the activities within the meaning
of “recruitment and placement” mentioned in Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers’ Act),
against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
Courts; Factual Findings; The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals (CA) are accepted because the Court is
not a trier of facts. Such findings, which affirmed those of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as the trial court, are now
even binding on us.—The factual findings of the CA are
accepted because the Court is not a trier of facts. Such
findings, which affirmed those of the RTC as the trial court, are
now even binding on us. This is because the RTC had the
unique advantage to observe the witnesses’ demeanor while
testifying, and the personal opportunity to test the accuracy
and reliability of their recollections of past events, both of which
are very decisive in a litigation like this criminal prosecution for
the serious crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale
where the parties have disagreed on the material facts.
Denial; The courts have generally viewed denial in
criminal cases with considerable caution, if not outright
rejection. This dismissive judicial attitude comes from the
recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable
by virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too
convenient for the guilty to make.—In contrast, the accused-
appellants offered only denial. Such defense was futile
because denial, essentially a negation of a fact, did not prevail
over the affirmative assertions of the fact. The courts — trial as
well as appellate — have generally viewed denial in criminal
cases with considerable caution, if not outright rejection. This
dismissive judicial attitude comes from the recognition that
denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being
an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make.
Same; The denial carried no weight in law and had
no greater evidentiary value than the testimonies of
credible witnesses of the Prosecution who testified on
affirmative matters.—Denial, to be worthy of consideration at
all, should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Hence, the appeal of the accused should also fail because it
relied solely on negative and self-serving negations. Verily, the
denial carried no weight in law and had no greater evidentiary
value than the testimonies of credible witnesses of the
Prosecution who testified on affirmative matters.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale;
Republic Act (RA) No. 10022 introduced an amendment to
the Migrant Workers’ Act to raise the imposable fine to not
less than P2,000,000.00 nor more than P5,000,000.00.—
Under Section 7(b) of the Migrant Workers’ Act, the penalty for
illegal recruitment in large scale is life imprisonment and fine
of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00.
Although Republic Act No. 10022, approved on March 8, 2010,
has since introduced an amendment to the Migrant Workers’
Act to raise the imposable fine to not less than P2,000,000.00
nor more than P5,000,000.00, the amendment does not apply
herein because the illegal recruitment subject of this case was
committed in October and November, 2002, or long before the
amendment took effect.
Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The
minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count of
estafa is fixed within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), which is prisión correccional in its minimum period
to prisión correccional in its medium period (i.e., six [6]
months and one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2]
months).—The minimum of the indeterminate sentence for
each count of estafa is fixed within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is prisión correccional in its minimum
period to prisión correccional in its medium period (i.e., six
months and one day to four years and two months).
Same; Same; As to the maximum term for each count
of estafa under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty is first
determined, and the incremental penalty of one (1) year of
imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00 is then added, provided that the total penalty
shall not exceed twenty (20) years.—As to the maximum
term for each count of estafa under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty
is first determined, and the incremental penalty of one year of
imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 is
then added, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20
years. To compute the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty, the time included in prisióncorreccional maximum
to prisión mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal
portions, with each portion forming a period.
Interest Rates; The accused-appellants shall pay
interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the respective
amounts due to each of the complainants, reckoned from
the finality of this decision until the amounts are fully
paid.—Finally, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the
accused-appellants shall pay interest of 6% per annum on the
respective amounts due to each of the complainants, reckoned
from the finality of this decision until the amounts are fully paid.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Illegal recruitment is a crime committed by a person who, not
having the valid license or authority required by law to enable
him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers, undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" mentioned in Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers’ Act),
against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
The Case
57
The accused-appellants assail the decision promulgated on
March 18, 2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
their convictions for illegal recruitment in large scale and three
counts of estafa handed down on November 25, 2004 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro
City.2
Antecedents
The factual and procedural antecedents, as summarized by
the CA, are as follows:
Accused-appellants Owen Marcelo Cagalingan (Owen) and
Beatriz B. Cagalingan (Beatriz) (accused spouses) were
charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale before the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City in a complaint
initiated by private complainants Reynalyn B. Cagalingan
(Reynalyn), Roselle Q. Cagalingan (Roselle), Laarni E.
Sanchez (Laarni), Norma R. Cagalingan (Norma); and Arcele
J. Bacorro (Arcele). Accused-appellants were likewise indicted
for three (3) counts of estafa in the same court by private
complainants Reynalyn, Roselle, and Arcele, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 2003-124, 2003-125, and 2003-238,
respectively.
The information in Criminal Case No. 2003-173, which
charged the accused with illegal recruitment in large scale
reads, as follows:
"That on or about and during the period from the
months of October up to November, 2002, in the City of
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist, hire and
transport Filipino workers for employment in Macau, China,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to the
following persons:
1. Reynalyn B. Cagalingan
2. Roselle Q. Cagalingan
3. Laarni E. Sanchez
4. Norma R. Cagalingan; and
5. Arcele J. Bacorro
Without first having secured or obtained the required license or
authority from the government agency.
Contrary to and in Violation of Section 6, in relation to Section
7(b) of RA 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995."
That in Criminal Case No. 2003-124 for the crime of estafa, the
information reads:
"That on or about November 23, 2002 in the City of Cagayan
de Oro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Reynalyn
Cagalingan in the following manner, to wit: the said accused,
by means of false manifestation and fraudulent
representations which they made to said Reynalyn Cagalingan
to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ her abroad as a worker in Macao, China and could
facilitate the pertinent papers, if given the necessary amount,
to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said
Reynalyn Cagalingan to give and deliver, as in fact the latter
gave and deliver (sic), to said accused the amount of Php
40,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as
in fact they did obtain the amount of Php 40,000.00 which
amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, they
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriated, misapplied
and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said Reynalyn Cagalingan in the
aforesaid amount of Php 40,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code"
That in Criminal Case No. 2003-125 for the crime of estafa, the
information reads:
"That on or about November 22, 2002 in the City of Cagayan
de Oro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Code, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Roselle Cagalingan in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent
representations which they made to said Roselle Cagalingan
to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and
employ her abroad as a worker in Macau, China and could
facilitate the pertinent papers, if given the necessary amount,
to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said
Roselle Cagalingan to give and deliver, as in fact the latter
gave and deliver (sic), to said accused the amount of Php
40,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation and fraudulent
representations, said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as
in fact they did obtain the amount of Php 40,000.00 which
amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, they
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriated, misapplied
and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said Roselle Cagalingan in the
aforesaid amount of Php. 40,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY to Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code."
And that in Criminal Case No. 2003-238 for estafa, the
information reads:
"That on October 28, 2002, in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
58
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Arcele J. Bacorro in the
following manner, to wit: accused by means of false pretenses
and fraudulent representations, which they made to said
Arcele J. Bacorro representing that they had the power and
capacity to recruit and employ her to work at Macau, China and
by means of their similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing the said Arcele J. Bacorro to give and deliver, as in
fact the latter did give and deliver (sic), to said accused the
amount of Php 40,000.00 as placement fee well-knowing that
their representations were false and fraudulent and made
solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of Php
40,000.00 which amount once in their possession, accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to their own personal, use, gain and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party
Arcele J. Bacorro in the aforesaid sum of ₱40,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code."
Warrants of arrest against accused spouses were issued on
various dates and accused spouses were arrested on May 26,
2003 in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Nevertheless, due to budgetary
constraints, accused spouses were brought to the court a
quo only on June 4, 2004.
Thereafter, upon arraignment both accused assisted by
counsel pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. Joint trial
ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented as witnesses the following: private
complainants Arcele, Reynalyn, Laarni, and Roselle; Leonardo
G. Rodrigo (Leonardo), Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-Regional
Extension Unit-10, Cagayan de Oro City; and Marichu
Damasing (Marichu), Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 1, MTCC-
Cagayan de Oro City. The evidence presented by the
prosecution established the following facts.
On different dates and occasions, private complainants were
recruited by Accused Spouses to work in Macau, China for a
fee. Accused spouses Owen and Beatriz were from Vigan,
Ilocos Sur but Owen grew up and finished his high school
education in Cagayan de Oro City. Owen is the first cousin of
the husbands of private complainants Reynalyn and Roselle
and the nephew of the husband of private complainant Norma.
Private complainant Arcele testified that she met accused
spouses on October 28, 2002 at around 12 o’clock noon, at the
house of private complainant Norma. The latter introduced
accused spouses to her and she was told by accused Owen
that her wife, accused Beatriz, was asked by her employer, a
certain Lu Ting Hoi Simon, of Macau, China to hire office
workers who are computer literate to work at Mandarin Oriental
Hotel. Beatriz confirmed this information and added that she
was even given a leave of absence by her employer just to
come home in order to hire workers. It was Owen who
explained to her about the job and the requirements like:
passport, bio-data, Diploma in lieu of Transcript of Records,
and Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) for roundtrip tickets
and documentation fees as Beatriz could not speak Visayan.
On November 6, 2002, Arcele paid Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(₱15,000.00) to accused Owen and subsequently, another
₱5,000.00 after she mortgaged her house in order to raise the
required amount. She was issued a receipt for the ₱20,000.00
and was told that the balance of ₱20,000.00 was needed for
the documentation fee. She was likewise told that her
departure for Manila would be on November 22, 2002 and on
November 23, 2002 for Macau, China. Nonetheless, as she
was not able to pay the ₱20,000.00 before the scheduled date,
her departure was postponed. Hence, on November 23, 2002,
she paid in full the balance of ₱20,000.00 without receipt as
she trusted accused spouses. The departure was rescheduled
on November 29, 2002 for Manila at 3 o’clock in the afternoon
and on November 30, 2002 for Macau, China. They further
agreed that Accused Spouses would fetch her at her house at
12 o’clock noon on November 29, 2002. Unfortunately, on the
said date and time, accused spouses failed to appear. Hence,
she decided to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City airport and
look for accused spouses but the latter were not around.
Instead, she met the other recruits at the airport and they all
realized that they were victims of illegal recruitment. She and
the other private complainants went home aggrieved and
humiliated.
Private complainant Reynalyn likewise recounted that accused
Owen was the first cousin of her husband and accused
spouses were introduced to her by her parents-in-law on
October 4, 2002 as the latter stayed at the house of her
parents-in-law located adjacent to her house .. Accused Owen
offered to help her find work in Macau, China as accused
Beatriz was allegedly asked by her employer to find Filipino
workers who could replace the Taiwanese and Protuguese
workers in Mandarin Oriental Hotel at Macau, China. As
Reynalyn was not a college graduate, she was told that she
could be assigned at the laundry section with a salary rate
equivalentto Eighteen Thousand Pesos (₱18,000.00) per
month. She was told to secure her passport, to fill-up the bio-
data with Chinese character and to pay ₱40,000.00 for plane
tickets and other documents. She paid accused spouses the
said amount and a receipt was issued to her. However, on the
scheduled date of departure to Manila on November 29, 2002,
she waited for accused spouses at the airport but to her
disappointment, the latter failed to show up.
Another prosecution witness, private complainant Laarni, also
testified that it was private complainant Roselle who informed
her that accused spouses were recruiting workers for Macau,
China. On October 21, 2002, she met Roselle together with
accused spouses and the latter asked her if she was willing to
work in Macau. She was asked about her educational
background and upon knowing that she is an AB Journalism
graduate, and took up computer informatics, Beatriz assured
her that she could work in Macau. She was offered as office
secretary for a two (2) years contract with a salary of
₱l8,000.00 a month. She was then given a bio-data with
Chinese characters with a corresponding English translation to
fill up and was required to submit her transcript of records,
diploma, certificate of employment and a photocopy of her
passport. She was also required to pay ₱40,000.00 for the
processing fee, plane ticket and documentation. Thereafter,
accused spouses made follow-ups at the office of her father at
Branch 1, MTCC-Cagayan de Oro City.
59
On November 20, 2002, she met accused spouses again at
the office of her father and she told accused spouses that she
might not proceed with her application as she was able to raise
only ₱11,500.00 and the said amount was even borrowed from
a lending institution. Accused Spouses nonetheless accepted
the said amount and told her that the balance of the payment
would be deducted from her salary in Macau, China.
Thereafter, Accused Spouses issued a receipt and she was
told that her departure for Manila would be on November 29,
2002 and they would just meet at Cagayan de Oro airport at 1
o'clock in the afternoon. However, on the said date, she did not
find accused spouses at the airport and upon inquiry from the
airline counter she was informed that their names were not on
the plane manifest.
The testimony of Laarni as to the receipt of ₱11,500.00 was
collaborated by prosecution witness Marichu Damasing. She
testified that the said amount was received by Beatriz and the
latter even counted the money at her table. The receipt was
prepared by Laarni's father and was signed by Beatriz and
witnessed by her. She further testified that upon receipt of the
said amount, accused spouses left the office.
Corollarily, private complainant Roselle narrated that she met
accused spouses on October 4, 2002 at the house of her
mother-in-law. Accused spouses told her that they would be
hiring workers for Macau, China and considering that at that
time she was jobless, she told them of her interest to apply for
work. She was then offered the position of an office clerk for
two (2) years with a monthly salary of ₱22,000.00 and was
asked to submit the required documents and to pay
₱40,000.00 as placement fee. Albeit it was the first time she
met them, yet, she trusted them considering that Owen was
the first cousin of his husband and they were staying at the
same house. On November 20, 2002, she initially paid
₱20,000.00 and on November 26, 2002, the balance of
₱20,000.00. A receipt was issued to her and she was told that
her depaiiure to Manila would be on November 29, 2002. Upon
the request of accused spouses, a "despidida" party was held
on November 28, 2002 at the house of private complainant
Reynalyn located just beside the house of her mother-in-law.
She further narrated that on November 29, 2002, accused
spouses left the house of her mother-in-law at about 8 o'clock
in the morning and told her that they would go to Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City to attend another "despidida" party and
they would just meet at the airport. Accordingly, at about 12
o'clock noon, she and other private complainants were already
at the Cagayan de Oro City airport but accused spouses were
not around. They stayed at the airport until 5 o'clock in the
afternoon but still accused spouses did not show up. Together
with the other private complainants, they proceeded to
Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro City at the house of Arcele and
stayed there until 12 o'clock midnight as she was ashamed of
her neighbours (sic). When she finally got home, she and her
family checked the bag of accused spouses which was left at
the house of her mother-in-law and to their surprise, the bag
contained pillows only. Hence, she reported the incident and
upon verification with the POEA she learned that Accused
Spouses were not licensed recruiters.
The prosecution likewise presented Leonardo, the officer-in-
charge of the PO EA-Regional Extension Unit-10. At the trial,
he issued certifications upon requests of private complainants
Reynalyn, Roselle, Arcele and Norma certifying that upon
verification of their computer database, accused spouses were
neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers and/or
applicants for employment abroad.
On the other hand, the accused spouses denied the charges
against them and argued that they neither recruited nor
promised private complainants any work in Macau and
explained that it was very difficult to find work in Macau, China
unless they have relatives or siblings working there who could
find work for them and who could recommend them to their
employers. Albeit they admitted to be in Cagayan de Oro City
sometime in August and September 2002, yet, they denied
being in Cagayan de Oro City sometime in October and
November 2002 as alleged by private complainants. They
admitted that they met private complainants on different
occasions while they were in Cagayan de Oro City as some of
them were relatives of accused Owen but they asserted that
they neither offered any work nor required private
complainants to submit any documents and pay any amount
for possible work in Macau. In fact, it was private complainants
who requested them to find work for them in Macau but they
turned down their requests as it was very difficult to find work
in said place. They likewise denied having received any money
from private complainants because they were not in Cagayan
de Oro City when the alleged payments were made and as
indicated in the receipts and they further testified that some of
the private complainants were hard up and were incapable of
producing the said amount. They could not think of any reason
why private complainants accused them and filed charges
against them except that they turned down their requests for
job placements in Macau, China.3
Judgment of the RTC
On November 25, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting the accused-appellants,4 disposing:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the court finds
accused OWEN MARCELO CAGALINGAN and BEATRIZ B.
CAGALINGAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 6 of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as
"Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995"
(Criminal Case No. 2003-173). Accordingly, they are hereby
sentenced and are SO ORDERED to suffer the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and for each accused to pay a fine
of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00).
Both accused are jointly and severally directed and SO
ORDERED to pay to Mrs. Arcele J. Bacorro the sum of Forty
Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), with legal interest to start from
the date of the promulgation of this judgement until fully
satisfied, as refund for the plane ticket and documentation
fee; SO ORDERED to pay Mrs. Reynalyn Cagalingan the sum
of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), with legal interest to
start from the date of promulgation until fully satisfied as refund
for the plane ticket and affidavit of support; SO ORDERED to
pay Mrs. Roselle Q. Cagalingan the sum of Forty Thousand
Pesos (₱40,000.00), with legal interest to start from the date of
60
the promulgation until fully satisfied, as refund for the plane
ticket and affidavit of support; SO ORDERED to pay Miss
Laarni E. Sanchez the sum of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (₱11,500.00), with legal interest to start from the
promulgation until fully satisfied, as refund for the processing
fee.
The Court likewise finds OWEN MARCELO CAGALINGAN
and BEATRIZ B. CAGALINGAN GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt (in Criminal Case No. 2003-124) of violating paragraph
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, for swindling
Reynalyn Cagalingan the sum of ₱40,000.00 with the
promised (sic) to employ her in Macao, (sic) China.
Accordingly, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence law,
both accused are hereby sentenced and SO ORDERED to
suffer the imprisonment of Four (4) Years Nine Months and
Eleven (11) days of Prision Correccional, as the Minimum, to
Nine (9) years of Prision Mayor, as the maximu, including its
accessory penalty.
The Court likewise finds OWN MARCELO CAGALINGAN and
BEATRIZ B. CAGALINGAN GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt (in Criminal Case No. 2003-125) of violating paragraph
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, for swindling
Roselle Cagalingan the sum of ₱40,000.00 with the promised
(sic) to employ her in Macao (sic), China. Accordingly, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, both accused are
hereby sentenced and SO ORDERED to suffer the
imprisonment of Four (4) Years Nine (9) Months and Eleven
(11) days of PRision Correccional, as the Minimum, to Nine (9)
years of Prision Mayor, as the Maximum, including its
accessory penalty.
The Court likewise finds OWEN MARCELO CAGALINGAN
and BEATRIZ B. CAGALINGAN GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt (in Criminal Case No. 2003-238) of violating paragraph
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, for swindling
Arcele J. Bacorro the sum of ₱40,000.00 with the promised to
employ her in Macao (sic), China. Accordingly, after applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, both accused are hereby
sentenced and SO ORDERED to suffer the imprisonment
of Four (4) Years Nine (9) Months and Eleven (11) days of
Prision Correccional, as the Minimum, to Nine (9) years of
Prision Mayor, as the Maximum, including its accessory
penalty.
The Court declines to award damages in estafa cases since
they were provided already in the case of Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
On March 18, 2011, the CA affirmed the convictions of the
accused-appellants by the RTC,6 viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
The accused-appellants assign the sole error that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION'S FAIL URE TO ESTABLISH BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED.8
The accused-appellants insist that the complainants well knew
that they were not connected to any recruitment agency, or that
they were not recruiters themselves; that they did not represent
themselves to the latter as having the capability to deploy
workers overseas;9 that they did not commit any act of
fraudulent misrepresentations essential in the estafa for which
they were convicted; and that they simply assisted in
processing the papers of the latter to help them realize their
desire to work abroad.10
Did the CA correctly affirm the convictions of the accused-
appellants for illegal recruitment in large scale and for three
counts of estafa?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
We find no reason to disturb the factual findings and legal
conclusions by the CA affirming the factual findings of the RTC,
to wit:
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale,
three elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the
offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the same Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
xxxx
In the case at bench, all three (3) elements were established
during trial. First, it was proved by private complaints that
accused spouses were not licensed or authorized to engage in
recruitment activities. This fact was substantiated by POEA's
Certifications and as testified to by the Officer-in-Charge of the
POEA who issued the same. Second, private complainants
testified and proved that indeed accused spouses undertook
acts constituting recruitment and placement as defined under
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. They testified that they were
induced, offered and promised by accused spouses
employment in Macau, China for two (2) years for a fee. They
were made to believe that accused spouses were authorized
61
to hire them and capable of sending them to Macau for work
with higher pays. They paid accused spouses for
documentation and processing fees, yet, they were unable to
go abroad. These testimonies, as well as the documentary
evidence they submitted consisting of the receipts issued to
them by accused spouses, all proved that the latter were
engaged in recruitment and placement activities. And third,
there are five (5) complainants against whom accused
spouses are alleged to have recruited.
Moreover, the defense proffered by accused spouses
consisted merely of alibi and denial.1âwphi1 It is however
noteworthy to state that denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak
defense and it is not at all persuasive. Accused spouses did
not deny being in Cagayan de Oro City, albeit they asserted to
have arrived months earlier than the alleged date, and they
likewise did not deny having met private complainants on
different occasions as some of the private complainants were
even relatives of accused Owen.
xxxx
Parenthetically, there is no question that accused spouses are
likewise liable for estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. We are convinced that the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt Accused Spouses' guilt for
three (3) counts of Estafa.
xxxx
There are three ways of committing estafa under Article 315
(a) of the Revised Penal Code: (1) by using a fictitious
name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of
other similar deceits. Under this class of estafa, the element of
deceit is indispensable. Likewise, it is essential that the false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very
cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part
with the thing of value.
In the present case, private complainants were led to believe
by accused spouses that they possessed the power and
qualifications to provide them with work in Macau when in fact
they were neither licensed nor authorized to do so. Accused
spouses made it appear to private complainants that Beatriz
was requested by her employer to hire workers for Macau,
when in fact she was not. They even recruited their own
relatives in the guise of helping them get better jobs with higher
pays abroad for them to improve their standard of living.
Likewise, private complainants were deceived by accused
spouses by pretending that the latter could arrange their
employment in Macau, China. With these misrepresentations,
false assurances and deceit, they suffered damages and they
were forced to part with their hard-earned money, as one of
them even testified to have mortgaged her house and another,
to have borrowed money from a lending institution just to raise
the alleged processing fees.11
The factual findings of the CA are accepted because the Court
is not a trier of facts. Such findings, which affirmed those of the
RTC as the trial court, are now even binding on us. This is
because the RTC had the unique advantage to observe the
witnesses' demeanor while testifying, and the personal
opportunity to test the accuracy and reliability of their
recollections of past events, both of which are very decisive in
a litigation like this criminal prosecution for the serious crime of
illegal recruitment committed in large scale where the parties
have disagreed on the material facts.12 The Court may revise
such findings in its rare and extraordinary role of a trier of facts
only when the appellants convincingly demonstrate that such
findings were either erroneous, or biased, or unfounded, or
incomplete, or unreliable, or conflicted with the findings of fact
of the CA.13 Alas, that demonstration was not made herein.
The records show that the Prosecution presented the
complainants themselves to establish that the accused-
appellants had made the complainants believe that they could
deploy them abroad for a fee despite their having had no
license or authority to do so from the proper government
agency; receipts; and the certification from the POEA on the
lack of the license to recruit having been issued in favor of the
accused-appellants.
In contrast, the accused-appellants offered only denial. Such
defense was futile because denial, essentially a negation of a
fact, did not prevail over the affirmative assertions of the fact.
The courts - trial as well as appellate - have generally viewed
denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not
outright rejection. This dismissive judicial attitude comes from
the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by
virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for
the guilty to make. Denial, to be worthy of consideration at all,
should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Hence, the appeal of the accused should also fail because it
relied solely on negative and self-serving negations. Verily, the
denial carried no weight in law and had no greater evidentiary
value than the testimonies of credible witnesses of the
Prosecution who testified on affirmative matters.14
We next ascertain if the CA properly affirmed the imposition of
the penalties for illegal recruitment in large scale and the three
counts of estafa.
Under Section 7(b)15 of the Migrant Workers' Act, the penalty
for illegal recruitment in large scale is life imprisonment and
fine of not less than ₱500,000.00 nor more than
₱1,000,000.00. Although Republic Act No. 10022,16 approved
on March 8, 2010, has since introduced an amendment to
the Migrant Workers' Act to raise the imposable fine to not less
than ₱2,000,000.00 nor more than ₱5,000,000.00, the
amendment does not apply herein because the illegal
recruitment subject of this case was committed in October and
November, 2002, or long before the amendment took effect.
Accordingly, we hold that the RTC and CA correctly imposed
life imprisonment and fine of ₱1,000,000.00.17
For the three counts of estafa, the relevant legal provision is
Article 315, first paragraph, of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be
punished by:
62

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12.000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos;
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
on March 18, 2011 IN ALL RESPECTS subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 2003-173, the accused-
appellants shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and fine of ₱1,000,000.00 each;
2. In each of Criminal Case No. 2003-124, Criminal
Case No. 2003-125, and Criminal Case No. 2003-238,
the accused-appellants shall suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four years of prision correcional, as
minimum, to seven years, eight months, and 21 days
of prision mayor;

The minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count 3. The accused-appellants shall indemnify
of estafa is fixed within the range of the penalty next lower to complainants Arcele J. Bacorro, Reynalyn
that prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Cagalingan, Roselle Q. Cagalingan, and Laarni E.
Code,18 which is prision correccional in its minimum period Sanchez in the respective amounts of ₱40,000.00,
to prision correccional in its medium period (i.e., six months ₱40,000.00, ₱40,000.00, and ₱11,500.00 plus
and one day to four years and two months). The RTC imposed interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
the minimum of four years, nine months, and eleven days decision until the amounts are fully paid; and
of prision correccional, thereby exceeding the legal range for
the minimum of the indeterminate sentence. Accordingly, the
4. The accused-appellants shall pay the costs of suit.
minimum of the indeterminate sentence is reduced to four
years of prision correccional considering the absence of any
modifying circumstances. SO ORDERED.

As to the maximum term for each count of estafa under

the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty is first determined, and the incremental
penalty of one year of imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 in
excess of ₱22,000.00 is then added, provided that the total
penalty shall not exceed 20 years. To compute the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty, the time included in prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be
divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a
period.19 Based on the computation, the maximum period
for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is
from six years, eight months, and 21 days to eight years. The
incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to
anywhere from six years, eight months, and 21 days to eight
years, at the discretion of the court. In computing the
incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted
by ₱22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by
₱10,000.00. Any fraction of a year is disregarded.20

For the maximum term of the three counts of estafa, the RTC
imposed nine years. We note that the RTC ordered the gravest
imposable penalty within the range (eight years of prision
mayor plus the one-year incremental penalty). However,
because neither the RTC nor the CA found the attendance of
any modifying circumstance,21 we reduce the maximum to six
years, eight months, and 21 days of prision mayor and add the
incremental penalty of one year, or a total of seven years, eight
months, and 21 days.

Finally, in line with prevailing jurisprudence,22 the accused-

appellants shall pay interest of 6% per annum on the
respective amounts due to each of the complainants, reckoned
from the finality of this decision until the amounts are fully paid.
63
G.R. No. 173792. August 31, 2011.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ROSARIO “ROSE” OCHOA, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment; Labor Law;
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 broadens the concept
of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provides
stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute
economic sabotage.—Ochoa was charged with violation of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said provision broadens
the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
provides stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute
economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and
illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
Same; Same; It is well-settled that to prove illegal
recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that she had the
power or ability to send complainants abroad for work
such that the latter were convinced to part with their
money in order to be employed.—It is well-settled that to
prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or
ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter
were convinced to part with their money in order to be
employed. All eight private complainants herein consistently
declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment
overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit their
bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private
complainants did. Private complainants also gave various
amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees
as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa issued to Gubat, Cesar,
and Agustin. Despite private complainants’ compliance with all
the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave
for work abroad. Private complainants pleaded that Ochoa
return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.
Same; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Section 6
of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for
certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m)
thereof, among which acts is the “[f]ailure to reimburse
expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment, in cases where the deployment does not
actually take place without the worker’s fault.”—More
importantly, Ochoa could still be convicted of illegal recruitment
even if we disregard the POEA certification, for regardless of
whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder of authority,
she could still have committed illegal recruitment. Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any
person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment
for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof.
Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No.
8042, is the “[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the
worker in connection with his documentation and processing
for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment
does not actually take place without the worker’s fault.” Ochoa
committed illegal recruitment as described in the said provision
by receiving placement and medical fees from private
complainants, evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and
failing to reimburse the private complainants the amounts they
had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and
Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own.
Same; Same; Witnesses; As is well-settled in this
jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than the accused’s denial and explanation
concerning the commission of the crime.—There is no
reason for us to disturb the weight and credence accorded by
the RTC to the evidence of the prosecution, over that of the
defense. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is
given to the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than the accused’s denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime. Likewise,
factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment
of the witnesses’ credibility, are entitled to great weight and
respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the Court of
Appeals affirmed such findings. After all, the trial court is in the
best position to determine the value and weight of the
testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any showing that the
trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or
that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to
the trial court’s determination according credibility to the
prosecution evidence. Moreover, in the absence of any
evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by
improper motives, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.
Same; Same; Economic Sabotage; Illegal
recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is,
committed against three or more persons individually or
as a group.—Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large
scale, that is, committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group. Here, there are eight private
complainants who convincingly testified on Ochoa’s acts of
illegal recruitment. In view of the overwhelming evidence
presented by the prosecution, we uphold the verdict of the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty
of illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage.
Same; Same; Estafa; Double Jeopardy; It is settled
that a person may be charged and convicted separately of
illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation
to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.—We affirm as well the
conviction of Ochoa for estafacommitted against three private
complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and
98-77303. The very same evidence proving Ochoa’s criminal
liability for illegal recruitment also established her criminal
liability for estafa. It is settled that a person may be charged
and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic
Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We
explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut, 316 SCRA 237
(1999), that: In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who
commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
and estafaunder par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where
the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.
Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar
64
conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely,
conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the
crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
Same; Estafa; Elements.—The elements of estafa are:
(a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party or third person. Both elements are present in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. Ochoa’s deceit
was evident in her false representation to private complainants
Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin that she possessed the authority
and capability to send said private complainants to
Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to two
weeks from completion of the requirements, among which
were the payment of placement fees and submission of a
medical examination report. Ochoa promised that there were
already existing job vacancies overseas for private
complainants, even quoting the corresponding salaries. Ochoa
carried on the deceit by receiving application documents from
the private complainants, accompanying them to the clinic for
medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of
certain recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had
actually no connection at all. Clearly deceived by Ochoa’s
words and actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and
Aquino were persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to
pay for their placement and medical fees. Sadly, private
complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were never able to
leave for work abroad, nor recover their money.
Same; Same; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence
Law; To compute the minimum, medium, and maximum
periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the
amount of fraud exceeds P12,000.00, the time included in
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum
shall be divided into three equal portions, with each
portion forming a period.—The maximum term under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the Revised Penal Code. To compute the minimum,
medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty
for estafa when the amount of fraud exceeds P12,000.00, the
time included in prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum shall be divided into three equal portions, with
each portion forming a period.Following this computation, the
minimum period for prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum is from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5
years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is from 5
years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20
days; and the maximum period is from 6 years, 8 months, and
21 days to 8 years. Any incremental penalty (i.e., 1 year for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.) shall thus be added
to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years,
at the discretion of the court, provided that the total penalty
does not exceed 20 years.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated
March 2, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 00888, which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-
77300 to 98-77303. The RTC found accused-appellant
Rosario "Rose" Ochoa (Ochoa) guilty of illegal recruitment in
large scale, as defined and penalized under Article II, Section
6 in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995," in Criminal Case No. 98-77300; and of the crime of
estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301,
98-77302, and 98-77303.
The Information filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 98-77300, charged Ochoa with illegal recruitment in
large scale, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the period covering the months of February
1997 up to April 1998 or immediately before or subsequent
thereto in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Robert Gubat,
Junior Agustin, Cesar Aquino, Richard Luciano, Fernando
Rivera, Mariano R. Mislang, Helen B. Palogo, Joebert
Decolongon, Corazon S. Austria, Cristopher A. Bermejo,
Letecia D. Londonio, Alma Borromeo, Francisco Pascual,
Raymundo A. Bermejo and Rosemarie A. Bermejo for a
consideration ranging from ₱2,000.00 to ₱32,000.00 or a total
amount of ₱124,000.00 as placement fee which the
complainants paid to herein accused without the accused
having secured the necessary license from the Department of
Labor and Employment.3 (Emphases supplied.)
Three other Informations were filed before the RTC and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-
77303, this time charging Ochoa with three counts of estafa,
committed separately upon three private complainants Robert
Gubat (Gubat), Cesar Aquino (Cesar), and Junior Agustin
(Agustin), respectively. The Information in Criminal Case No.
98-77301 accuses Ochoa of the following acts constituting
estafa:
That on or about March 3, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
name accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit and promise employment in Taiwan to one
ROBERT GUBAT for a consideration of ₱18,800.00 as
placement fee, knowing that she has no power, capacity or
lawful authority whatsoever and with no intention to fulfill her
said promise, but merely as pretext, scheme or excuse to get
and exact money from said complainant, as she did in fact
collect and received the amount of ₱18,800.00 from said
Robert Gubat, to his damage and prejudice.4 (Emphases
supplied.)
The two other Informations for estafa were similarly worded as
the aforequoted Information, except as to the name of the
private complainants and the amount purportedly collected by
Ochoa from them, particularly:
65
Docket No. Private Amount
Complainant Collected
Criminal Case Cesar Aquino ₱19.000.00
No. 98-773025
Criminal Case Junior Agustin ₱32,000.00
No. 98-773036
As prayed for by the State Prosecutor, all four criminal cases
against Ochoa before the RTC were consolidated. When
arraigned, Ochoa pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial of
the four criminal cases ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Cory Aquino (Cory)
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) and
private complainants Gubat, Agustin, Francisco Pascual
(Pascual), Rosemarie Bermejo (Rosemarie), Cesar,
Christopher Bermejo (Christopher), Joebert Decolongon
(Decolongon), and Fernando Rivera (Rivera).
According to private complainants, they were recruited by
Ochoa from January to March 1998 for various jobs in either
Taiwan or Saudi Arabia, under the following circumstances:
1. In the second week of February 1998, Ochoa was
introduced to Robert Gubat, a licensed electrical
engineer and a resident of Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas,
through a certain Nila, Gubat’s neighbor, who had a
pending application for work abroad with Ochoa.
Ochoa talked to Gubat on the telephone, and during
their conversation, Ochoa told Gubat that one of her
applicants was already leaving for Taiwan. Per
Ochoa’s instruction, Gubat met with Francisco
Pascual, who accompanied him to Ochoa’s house in
San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, and
personally introduced Gubat to Ochoa. Gubat
submitted his résumé to Ochoa, which Ochoa would
bring to Axil International Agency where Ochoa was
working as a recruiter. Right after browsing through
Gubat’s résumé, Ochoa informed Gubat that as an
engineer, Gubat was qualified to work as a factory
supervisor and could leave for Taiwan in two weeks or
in March 1998. Ochoa also told Gubat that the total
application expenses would amount to ₱100,000.00,
and the downpayment was ₱50,000.00. Gubat was
able to actually pay Ochoa ₱18,800.00 as reservation
fee at the agency; processing fee for Gubat’s papers
at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA),
Malacañang, and Embassy of Taiwan; and medical
examination fee. Ochoa, however, only issued to
Gubat three receipts, dated March 3, March 31, and
April 6, all in the year 1998, in the amount of
₱5,000.00 each or a total of ₱15,000.00. Gubat
started to worry when he was not able to leave for
abroad as Ochoa promised and when she failed to
show up at their arranged meetings. When Gubat was
finally able to talk to Ochoa, Ochoa again promised
him that he would be leaving for abroad soon. Despite
Ochoa’s renewed promise, Gubat was still not able to
leave the country. Gubat then demanded that Ochoa
return his documents and money. When Ochoa failed
to comply with his demand, Gubat filed a report
against Ochoa at Barangay (Brgy.) San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City. On May 21, 1998, he met
the other private complainants7 who had similar
complaints against Ochoa. When nothing came out of
the confrontation with Ochoa at Brgy. San Bartolome,
Gubat and the other private complainants filed a joint
complaint against Ochoa before the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI).8
2. The paths of Junior Agustin and Ochoa crossed on
February 2, 1998. Agustin, a farmer, was staying at
the home of Pascual, his cousin, at No. 4 Gulod,
Novaliches, Quezon City. When Ochoa arrived at
Pascual’s home, Pascual introduced Ochoa to
Agustin as a recruiter for overseas workers in Taiwan.
Interested in working abroad, Agustin submitted his
bio-data to Ochoa at the latter’s residence at Phase 1,
Lot 3, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Ochoa promised Agustin that he would be fielded as
a factory worker in Taiwan for three years, earning a
monthly salary of ₱18,000.00. Ochoa then informed
Agustin that the total placement fee for Taiwan is
₱80,000.00. Agustin initially paid Ochoa the sum of
₱28,000.00 as processing fee. Ochoa then promised
that Agustin could leave for Taiwan in two months.
However, the two months passed, but there was still
no overseas employment for Agustin. Agustin was
compelled to file a complaint against Ochoa at Brgy.
San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. Agustin met
the other private complainants during the barangay
hearing on May 21, 1998. Ochoa was also present at
said hearing. Given the unsuccessful barangay
hearing, Agustin and the other private complainants
lodged a complaint against Ochoa before the NBI.9
3. Francisco Pascual, presently jobless and a resident
of Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City, learned from a
neighbor of one Mrs. Bermejo that her son was being
helped by Ochoa, a recruiter, to find a job abroad.
Pascual went to Mrs. Bermejo’s house in January
1998, and met Ochoa for the first time. Ochoa invited
Pascual to apply for a job abroad, saying that the latter
could leave within two weeks. During Pascual’s visit
at Ochoa’s house at Blk. 1, Lot 1, San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City, Ochoa promised Pascual
employment as a driver salesman in Saudi Arabia,
with a monthly salary of ₱18,000.00. Ochoa told
Pascual that the placement fee would be ₱7,000.00
and that Pascual should already have his medical
examination so that the position in Saudi Arabia could
be reserved for him. Since his visa had not yet arrived,
Pascual did not pay any placement fee to Ochoa.
Pascual did undergo medical examination at St. Peter
Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila, for which he paid
₱2,600.00 to Ochoa. Pascual though did not receive
the results of his medical examination because
according to Ochoa, the same was withheld by the
clinic. Despite Ochoa’s promises, Pascual was not
able to leave for Saudi Arabia. At that time, Pascual
was still employed as a Field Coordinator with
Selecta, but because of his frequent absences, spent
66
following-up on his application for work abroad, he
was fired. Pascual filed a complaint against Ochoa at
Brgy. San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. As
nothing happened during the confrontation with
Ochoa at the barangay hearing on May 21, 1998,
Pascual and the other private complainants filed a
complaint before the NBI.10
4. Rosemarie Bermejo came to know of Ochoa
through Rivera, a friend of Rosemarie’s mother.
Rosemarie first met Ochoa at the latter’s home in
Quezon City sometime in January 1998. Rosemarie
was promised by Ochoa employment for three years
in Saudi Arabia as clerk/typist, earning US$400.00.
Rosemarie was also instructed by Ochoa to have a
medical examination and secure a passport and NBI
clearance. Rosemarie and her brothers, who also
applied for jobs abroad, were accompanied by Ochoa
to the St. Peter Medical Clinic in Malate, Manila for
their medical examination on February 27, 1998.
Rosemarie and her brother each handed over to
Ochoa ₱2,600.00 for their medical examinations, and
it was Ochoa who gave the payment to the clinic.
Rosemarie and her brothers then spent ₱55.00 each
to secure NBI clearances for travel abroad. In
addition, Rosemarie gave Ochoa ₱5,500.00 on April
17, 1998; and although not secured by a receipt, said
payment was witnessed by Rosemarie’s mother and
Imelda Panuga, the landlord of Rosemarie’s mother,
who lent Rosemarie the ₱5,500.00. During their initial
meeting in January 1998, Ochoa said that Rosemarie
could already leave for abroad in two weeks. Since
Rosemarie was not able to complete the
requirements, her departure for Saudi Arabia was
moved to April 19, 1998. On April 19, 1998, Ochoa
requested Rosemarie to go to the office of Al Arab
Agency located at Jalandoni Building, Ermita, Manila,
to which Ochoa was purportedly connected.
Rosemarie waited at the Al Arab Agency until noon,
but no one came to pick her up. Later, at the same
day, Ochoa invited Rosemarie to her house for the
birthday celebration of her father. There, Ochoa
explained that Rosemarie was unable to leave for
Saudi Arabia because the Al Arab Agency has yet to
secure Rosemarie’s Overseas Employment
Certificate (OEC). Ochoa advised Rosemarie to stay
at the rented apartment of Rosemarie’s mother
because it was close to Ochoa’s house and would be
more convenient as Rosemarie could leave for abroad
any day soon. When none of Ochoa’s promises came
to fruition, Rosemarie, together with the other private
complainants, first sought redress from Brgy. San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, and then from
the NBI.11
5. It was Pascual who introduced Cesar Aquino, a
resident of Cubao, to Ochoa at the latter’s residence
in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City,
sometime in February 1998. When Cesar directly
asked Ochoa if she was a recruiter, the latter
answered in the affirmative. Cesar applied to work as
a factory worker in Taiwan. Ochoa told Cesar that as
a factory worker, he could earn at least ₱15,000.00 a
month. On March 13, 1998, Cesar handed over
₱17,000.00 to Ochoa to cover his processing fee and
medical examination. On the same day, Cesar had his
medical examination at St. Peter Medical Clinic.
Ochoa then promised that Cesar could leave two
weeks thereafter. When two weeks had passed and
he was not able to leave for Taiwan, Cesar demanded
that Ochoa return his money. Ochoa failed to comply
with Cesar’s demand, and Cesar instituted a
complaint against Ochoa at Brgy. San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City. At the hearing attended by
Ochoa, Cesar, and the other private complainants
before the Barangay Lupon, Ochoa signed a
Kasunduan, agreeing to return the money to private
complainants. Again, Ochoa failed to fulfill her
promise to return the money paid by Cesar, thus, the
latter, together with the other complainants, filed a
complaint with the NBI.12
6. Christopher Bermejo met Ochoa at the house of his
mother in Novaliches, Quezon City in January 1998.
Also present at the house were Fernando Bermejo,
Christopher’s brother, and Richard Luciano. Ochoa
promised that after a week, Christopher would already
be deployed to Saudi Arabia as an accountant,
earning 250-350 Saudi Riyals. As a result,
Christopher immediately resigned from his job at the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Christopher’s mother paid Ochoa ₱5,000.00 as
processing fee for Christopher’s application. A week
passed and Ochoa failed to send Christopher to Saudi
Arabia for work. When Rosemarie and Raymundo
Bermejo (Raymundo), Christopher’s sister and
brother, respectively, also failed to leave for work
abroad as promised by Ochoa, Christopher,
Rosemarie, and their mother went to see Ochoa at an
office at the Jalandoni Building, Ermita, Manila. Ochoa
explained that Christopher and his siblings could not
leave yet because there are other documents that still
need to be accomplished. Ochoa said that she would
just notify Christopher and his siblings of their
scheduled departure. When they still did not receive
any notification from Ochoa, Rosemarie, Raymundo,
and their mother returned to the office at the Jalandoni
Building and found out that their placement fees were
not given to said office. Christopher joined the other
private complainants in filing a complaint against
Ochoa before the NBI.13
7. Joebert Decolongon is a resident of Sta. Maxima,
Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City, and works as a bus
conductor.lawphi1 Decolongon was introduced to
Ochoa by Rivera, Decolongon’s friend, at Rivera’s
house on Villareal Street, Gulod, Novaliches. Ochoa
informed Decolongon that there was a vacancy for the
position of janitor in Saudi Arabia, with a monthly
salary of 800 Saudi Riyals. Decolongon submitted his
application, birth certificate, and passport to Ochoa.
Ochoa also went to Decolongon’s house and collected
from Decolongon’s wife the initial amount of
₱2,000.00 as placement fee. The rest of
Decolongon’s placement fees would be paid by one-
month salary deduction. Trusting Ochoa, neither
67
Decolongon nor his wife demanded a receipt. When
Ochoa failed to deploy Decolongon for employment
abroad, Decolongon too filed a complaint against
Ochoa before Brgy. San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City. Without a successful resolution at the
barangay level, Decolongon joined the private
complainants in filing a complaint against Ochoa
before the NBI.14
8. Sometime in January 1998, Ochoa was
accompanied by a certain Amy to Fernando Rivera’s
residence at 27 Villareal Street, Novaliches, Quezon
City. Ochoa first talked to Rivera’s mother who had
previously worked abroad. Ochoa then also offered
work to Rivera, either as tea boy or janitor in the army
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Rivera chose to work as a tea
boy, with a salary of 800 to 1,000 Saudi Riyals. Ochoa
said that Rivera would be deployed in the first week of
February 1998. Ochoa required Rivera to submit NBI
clearance, passport, and pictures, but Rivera
submitted only his NBI clearance. In January 1998,
Rivera paid Ochoa ₱2,000.00 as she would be the
one to secure Rivera’s passport. In March 1998,
Rivera handed over his ring and necklace, worth of
₱10,000.00, to Ochoa to cover his processing and
medical examination fees. Rivera did not require a
receipt from Ochoa because he trusted Ochoa, who
was his mother’s friend. When Rivera failed to leave
in February 1998, Ochoa explained that Rivera’s
departure was postponed until March 1998 due to
Ramadan. After the period of Ramadan, Rivera was
still not able to leave for Saudi Arabia. Rivera then filed
a complaint against Ochoa before Brgy. San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. Ochoa
promised to return to Rivera his jewelries and
₱2,000.00, but Ochoa did not appear at the barangay
hearing set on April 30, 1998. Thus, Rivera and the
other private complainants proceeded to file a
complaint against Ochoa before the NBI.15
Cory C. Aquino of the POEA authenticated the Certification
dated June 3, 1998, issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo (Mateo),
Director, Licensing Branch of the POEA, that Ochoa, in her
personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized by the
POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Cory
identified Director Mateo’s signature on the Certification, being
familiar with the same. The Certification was issued after a
check of the POEA records pursuant to a request for
certification from the NBI. Cory, however, admitted that she did
not participate in the preparation of the Certification, as the
NBI’s request for certification was through a counter
transaction, and another person was in charge of verification
of counter transactions.16
Ochoa testified on her own behalf.
Ochoa stated under oath that she was employed by AXIL
International Services and Consultant (AXIL) as recruiter on
December 20, 1997. AXIL had a temporary license to recruit
Filipino workers for overseas employment. Ochoa worked at
AXIL from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and was paid on a
commission basis. She admitted recruiting private
complainants and receiving from them the following amounts
as placement and medical fees:
Private Amounts Collected
Complainant
Robert Gubat ₱18,000.00 for placement and medical
fees17
Junior Agustin ₱22,000.00 for placement and medical
fees18
Francisco Pascual ₱ 2,000.00 for medical fee19
Rosemarie ₱ 2,600.00 for medical fee20
Bermejo
Cesar Aquino ₱ 19,000.00 for placement and
medical fees21
Christopher ₱ 2,600.00 for medical fee22
Bermejo
Joebert ₱ 6,000.00 for medical fee23
Decolongon
Fernando Rivera ₱ 2,000.00 for medical fee24
Ochoa claimed though that she remitted private complainants’
money to a person named Mercy, the manager of AXIL, but
AXIL failed to issue receipts because the private complainants
did not pay in full.25
On April 17, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 98-77300) and
three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-
77302, 98-77303). The dispositive portion of said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-77300, the Court finds the
accused, ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE, defined and
penalized in Section 6 in relation to Section 7 (b) of
Republic Act No. 8042, and sentences her to life
imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos.
2. In Criminal Case No. 98-77301, the Court finds the
accused, ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA,
defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a)
of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional
as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and
to indemnify complainant Robert Gubat in the amount
of Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred (₱18,800.00)
Pesos.
68
3. In Criminal Case No. 98-77302, the Court finds the
accused, ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA,
defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a)
of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional
as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum, and
to indemnify the complainant Cesar Aquino in the
amount of Seventeen Thousand (₱17,000.00) Pesos.
4. In Criminal Case No. 98-77303, the Court finds the
accused, ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA,
defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a)
of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional
as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum,
and to indemnify complainant Junior Agustin in the
amount of Twenty-Eight Thousand (₱28,000.00)
Pesos.26
Ochoa filed a Notice of Appeal27 in which she stated her
intention to appeal the RTC judgment of conviction and prayed
that the records of her case be forwarded to the Court of
Appeals. Ochoa’s appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No.
24147 before the Court of Appeals.
In a Resolution28 dated August 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals
granted Ochoa’s First Motion for Extension of Time to file her
brief.
Ochoa filed her Appellant’s Brief on September 4, 200029 while
the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed its Appellee’s Brief on March 1, 2001.30
The Special Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision31 dated June 17, 2002 affirming the
appealed RTC decision dated April 17, 2000. Ochoa filed a
Motion for Reconsideration,32 which the People opposed for
being bereft of merit.33
In its Resolution34 dated August 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals
declared that it had no jurisdiction over Ochoa’s appeal,
ratiocinating thus:
We affirmed this judgment on 17 June 2002. While neither the
accused-appellant nor the Office of the Solicitor General
representing the people ever raised the issue of jurisdiction,
our second look at the suit proved worthwhile because we
came to realize that we mistakenly assumed jurisdiction over
this case where it does not obtain.
It was error to consider accused-appellant’s appeal from a trial
court judgment imposing life imprisonment in Criminal Case
No. Q-98-77300 for illegal recruitment in a large scale.
Consequently, the judgment we rendered dated 17 June 2002
is null and void. No less than Article VIII, §5(2)(d) of the
Constitution proscribes us from taking jurisdiction—
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or
certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of the lower court in:
xxxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher…
§17(1) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 reiterates –
SECTION 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules
of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in—
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty
imposed is life imprisonment; and those involving offenses
which, although not so punished, arose out of the same
occurrences or which may have been committed by the
accused on the same occasion as that giving rise to the more
serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are
charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories, or whether
they have been tried jointly or separately; x x x.
§3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
likewise declares –
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. –
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is
imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment is impose[d], shall be by filing a
notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this
section.
Even if only in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300 was the penalty
of life imprisonment meted out, we still cannot consider the
appeal of the verdict in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 to 98-
77303 for as the Supreme Court clearly clarified—
An appeal of a single decision cannot be split between two
courts. The splitting of appeals is not conclusive to the orderly
administration of justice and invites possible conflict of
dispositions between the reviewing courts. Specifically, the
Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review an appeal of a
69
judgment imposing an indeterminate sentence, if the same
ruling also imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and
death for crimes arising out of the same facts. In other words,
the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed below is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death, even if the same decision
orders, in addition, a lesser penalty or penalties for crimes
arising out of the same occurrence or facts.
It will be seen that Robert Gubat, private complainant in
Criminal Case No. Q-98-77301, Cesar Aquino, private
complainant in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77302 and Junior
Agustin, private complainant in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77303
were also the private complainant in the illegal recruitment in a
large scale suit, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300.
As gleaned from the charges, the estafa cases were intimately
related to or arose from the facts and occurrences of the
alleged illegal recruitment. Clearly, we have no recourse but to
refuse cognizance over the estafa cases as well.35
Despite its lack of jurisdiction over Ochoa’s appeal, the Court
of Appeals did not dismiss the same and merely ordered its
transfer to us:
While the Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 directs the
dismissal of appeals filed before the wrong court, the Supreme
Court has in practice allowed the transfer of records from this
Court to the highest court. In which case, we shall subscribe to
this practice in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our decision is declared
NULL and VOID. We order the TRANSFER of the records of
Criminal Cases Nos. 98-77300 to 98-77303 to the Supreme
Court for proper action.36
37
In the Resolution dated September 17, 2003, we accepted
Ochoa’s appeal and informed both Ochoa and the OSG to file
their respective additional briefs. Ochoa’s appeal was then
docketed as G.R. No. 159252.
On August 17, 2004, Ochoa’s counsel filed an explanation
stating that he had nothing more to add since he had already
written and filed all necessary pleadings, complete with all the
necessary research and arguments.38
In the meantime, People v. Mateo39 was promulgated on July
7, 2004, where we held that an appeal from the decisions of
the RTC, sentencing the accused to life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua, should be made to the Court of Appeals.
Thus, in our Resolution40 dated March 11, 2005, the Court
ordered the transfer of the records of G.R. No. 159252 to the
Court of Appeals for a decision on the merit. We likewise
directed the Court of Appeals to raffle the said case to any of
its regular divisions.
When Ochoa’s appeal was before the Court of Appeals a
second time, it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888.
The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 2, 2006,
affirmed with modification the RTC Decision dated April 17,
2000. The appellate court essentially affirmed the findings of
fact and law of the RTC, but reduced the award of damages in
Criminal Case No. 98-77301 and increased the prison
sentence in Criminal Case No. 98-77303. The decretal portion
of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No.
98-77300 finding appellant Rosario Ochoa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under
Sec. 6 (l) and (m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No.
8042 and sentencing her to life imprisonment and a
fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) is
AFFIRMED.
II. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77301,
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa is MODIFIED. Appellant is, hereby, ordered to
indemnify Robert Gubat in the amount of P15,000.00
only as and by way of actual damages.
III. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77302,
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa is AFFIRMED.
IV. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77303,
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa is MODIFIED. Appellant is, hereby, sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS OF prision mayor as
maximum.41
Ochoa’s appeal is anchored on the following assignment of
errors:
The lower court erred:
a. In admitting Exhibit "A" – the POEA Certification –
when it was already excluded during the bail hearing
b. In shifting the burden of the accused to prove that
there was no illegal recruitment
c. In finding that there was estafa
d. By not limiting liability of the accused to civil liability
only42
We find no reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals
decision.
Illegal recruitment in large scale
Ochoa was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 8042. Said provision broadens the concept of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code43 and provides stiffer
penalties, especially for those that constitute economic
sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate.
70
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment
as follows:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment
shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does
not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be
shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that she had the power or ability to send
complainants abroad for work such that the latter were
convinced to part with their money in order to be
employed.44 All eight private complainants herein consistently
declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment
overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit their
bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private
complainants did. Private complainants also gave various
amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees
as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa issued to
Gubat,45 Cesar,46 and Agustin.47 Despite private complainants’
compliance with all the requirements Ochoa specified, they
were not able to leave for work abroad. Private complainants
pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but
Ochoa failed to do so.
Ochoa contends that Exhibit "A," the POEA certification –
which states that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment – was already rejected by the RTC during the
hearings on bail for being hearsay, and should not have been
admitted by the RTC after the trial on the merits of the criminal
cases. Inadmissible evidence during bail hearings do not
become admissible evidence after formal offer. Without the
POEA certification, the prosecution had no proof that Ochoa is
unlicensed to recruit and, thus, she should be acquitted.
Ochoa’s contention is without merit.
We refer to the following ruling in Fullero v. People,48 wherein
we rejected a similar argument raised by petitioner therein
against a certification issued by an officer of the Professional
Regulation Commission:
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the
prosecution's documentary evidence, consisting of Exhibits
"A," "C," "F," "G," "H," "I," "J," "K," "L," "M," "N," "O," "P," "Q"
and "R" and their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence
based on the following reasons:
(1) Exhibit "A," which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17
January 1998, confirming that petitioner's name does not
appear in the registry books of licensed civil engineers, was
not properly identified during the trial. The proper person to
identify the certification should have been the signatory therein
which was PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a
person who actually witnessed the execution of the
certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was not present
when the certification was executed, had identified the
certification during the trial. Thus, the contents of the
certification are mere hearsay; x x x.
xxxx
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states
that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are
derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not
testify as to what he merely learned from others either because
he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the
truth of what he has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the
hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official
records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In
other words, official entries are admissible in evidence
regardless of whether the officer or person who made them
was presented and testified in court, since these entries are
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and
trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience
and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness
to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
This will also unduly hamper public business. The
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty by a public officer.
Exhibit "A," or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January
1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila.
Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify
during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification
is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because
petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its
truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence.49
71
In the case at bar, the POEA certification was signed by Dir.
Mateo of the POEA Licensing Branch. Although Dir. Mateo
himself did not testify before the RTC, the prosecution still
presented Cory, Dir. Mateo’s subordinate at the POEA
Licensing Branch, to verify Dir. Mateo’s signature.
Also worth re-stating is the justification provided by the Court
of Appeals for the admissibility of the POEA certification, viz:
The certificate is admissible. It is true that the trial court, during
the bail hearings, rejected the certification for being hearsay
because at that stage of the proceedings, nobody testified yet
on the document. However, as the trial progressed, an officer
of the POEA, specifically in its licensing branch, had testified
on the document. It does not follow, then, as appellant would
want this court to assume, that evidence rejected during bail
hearings could not be admissible during the formal offer of
evidence.
This court admits that Ms. Cory Aquino was not the signatory
of the document. Nevertheless, she could testify on the
veracity of the document because she is one of the officers of
the licensing branch of the POEA. Being so, she could testify
whether a certain person holds a license or not. It bears
stressing that Ms. Aquino is familiar with the signature of Mr.
Mateo because the latter is her superior. Moreover, as testified
to by Ms. Aquino, that as a policy in her office, before a
certification is made, the office checks first whether the name
of the person requested to be verified is a reported personnel
of any licensed agency by checking their index and computer
files.
As found in the office’s records, appellant, in her personal
capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers
for overseas employment. It bears stressing, too, that this is
not a case where a certification is rendered inadmissible
because the one who prepared it was not presented during the
trial. To reiterate, an officer of the licensing branch of the
POEA, in the person of Ms. Aquino, testified on the document.
Hence, its execution could be properly determined and the
veracity of the statements stated therein could be
ascertained.50
More importantly, Ochoa could still be convicted of illegal
recruitment even if we disregard the POEA certification, for
regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder
of authority, she could still have committed illegal recruitment.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any
person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder
of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain
acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among
such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the
"[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does
not actually take place without the worker’s fault." Ochoa
committed illegal recruitment as described in the said provision
by receiving placement and medical fees from private
complainants, evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and
failing to reimburse the private complainants the amounts they
had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and
Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own.
Ochoa further argues in her defense that she should not be
found personally and criminally liable for illegal recruitment
because she was a mere employee of AXIL and that she had
turned over the money she received from private complainants
to AXIL.
We are not convinced. Ochoa’s claim was not supported by
any corroborating evidence. The POEA verification dated
September 23, 1998, also signed by Dir. Mateo, and presented
by Ochoa during trial, pertains only to the status of AXIL as a
placement agency with a "limited temporary authority" which
had already expired. Said verification did not show whether or
not Ochoa was employed by AXIL. Strangely, for an alleged
employee of AXIL, Ochoa was not able to present the most
basic evidence of employment, such as appointment papers,
identification card (ID), and/or payslips. The receipts presented
by some of the private complainants were issued and signed
by Ochoa herself, and did not contain any indication that
Ochoa issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also,
Ochoa was not able to present any proof that private
complainants’ money were actually turned over to or received
by AXIL.
There is no reason for us to disturb the weight and credence
accorded by the RTC to the evidence of the prosecution, over
that of the defense. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater
weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by
the prosecution witnesses than the accused’s denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the
crime.51 Likewise, factual findings of the trial courts, including
their assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, are entitled to
great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly
when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. After all, the
trial court is in the best position to determine the value and
weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any
showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result
of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the
Court to defer to the trial court’s determination according
credibility to the prosecution evidence.52Moreover, in the
absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were
motivated by improper motives, the trial court’s assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by
this Court.53
Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that
is, committed against three or more persons individually or as
a group. Here, there are eight private complainants who
convincingly testified on Ochoa’s acts of illegal recruitment.
In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the
prosecution, we uphold the verdict of the RTC, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment
constituting economic sabotage.
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than ₱500,000.00
nor more than ₱1,000.000.00 shall be imposed when the illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Thus:
72
Sec. 7. Penalties. –
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve
(12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Since the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱1,000,000.00 imposed on Ochoa by the RTC, and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are in accord with the law, we similarly
sustain the same.
Estafa
We affirm as well the conviction of Ochoa for estafa committed
against three private complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 98-
77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. The very same evidence
proving Ochoa’s criminal liability for illegal recruitment also
established her criminal liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042,
in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in
People v. Cortez and Yabut54 that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a)
of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is
malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial
for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws.
Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of
the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s
acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and
vice versa.55
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines
estafa as:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b)
that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person.56Both elements
are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and
98-77303. Ochoa’s deceit was evident in her false
representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and
Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability to send
said private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for
employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of
the requirements, among which were the payment of
placement fees and submission of a medical examination
report. Ochoa promised that there were already existing job
vacancies overseas for private complainants, even quoting the
corresponding salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by
receiving application documents from the private
complainants, accompanying them to the clinic for medical
examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain
recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had actually
no connection at all. Clearly deceived by Ochoa’s words and
actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were
persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to pay for their
placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants
Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were never able to leave for work
abroad, nor recover their money.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation.
According to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
It was established by evidence that in Criminal Case No. 98-
77301, Gubat was defrauded by Ochoa in the amount of
₱15,000.00; in Criminal Case No. 77-98302, Cesar paid
Ochoa the sum of ₱17,000.00; and in Criminal Case No. 77-
98303, Agustin handed over to Ochoa a total of ₱28,000.00.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, when the amount of the fraud is over
73
₱12,000.00 but not exceeding ₱22,000.00, is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years). If the amount of fraud
exceeds ₱22,000.00, the aforementioned penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional ₱10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not
exceed 20 years.1avvphi1
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere within
prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).57 Consequently, the
minimum terms in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302
were correctly fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals at 2 years, 11 months, and 11 days of prision
correccional. While the minimum term in Criminal Case No. 98-
77303 was increased by the Court of Appeals to 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, it is still within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by Section 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law
shall be that which, in view of attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code. To compute the minimum, medium, and maximum
periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the amount
of fraud exceeds ₱12,000.00, the time included in prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be
divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a
period. Following this computation, the minimum period for
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is
from 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and
10 days; the medium period is from 5 years, 5 months, and 11
days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days; and the maximum
period is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. Any
incremental penalty (i.e., 1 year for every ₱10,000.00 in excess
of ₱22,000.) shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court,
provided that the total penalty does not exceed 20 years.58
In Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302, the amounts
of fraud were more than ₱12,00.00 but not exceeding
₱22,000.00, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the maximum term shall be taken
from the medium period of the penalty prescribed (i.e., 5 years,
5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days).
Thus, the maximum terms of 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days
actually imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 are
proper.
As for determining the maximum term in Criminal Case No. 98-
77303, we take into consideration that the amount of fraud was
₱28,000.00. Since the amount of fraud exceeded ₱22,000.00,
the maximum term shall be taken from the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21
days to 8 years; but since the amount of fraud exceeded
₱22,000.00 by only ₱6,000.00 (less than ₱10,000.00), no
incremental penalty shall be imposed. Considering that the
maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of Appeals in
Criminal Case No. 98-77303 is within the maximum period of
the proscribed penalty, we see no reason for disturbing the
same.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the present appeal for lack of merit
and AFFIRM the Decision dated March 2, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888, affirming with
modification the Decision dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case Nos.
98-77300 to 98-77303, to read as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-77300, accused-appellant
Rosario "Rose" Ochoa is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale,
constituting economic sabotage, as defined and
penalized in Section 6(l) and (m), in relation to Section
7(b), of Republic Act No. 8042, and is sentenced to
life imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos
(₱1,000.000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 98-77301, accused-appellant
Rosario "Rose" Ochoa is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined
and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional,
as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and
to indemnify private complainant Robert Gubat in the
amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) as
actual damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 98-77302, accused-appellant
Rosario "Rose" Ochoa is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined
and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11)
months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional,
as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and
to indemnify private complainant Cesar Aquino in the
amount of Seventeen Thousand Pesos (₱17,000.00);
and
4. In Criminal Case No. 98-77303, accused-appellant
Rosario "Rose" Ochoa is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined
and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
indemnify private complainant Junior Agustin in the
amount of Twenty-Eight Thousand Pesos
(₱28,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
74
G.R. No. 179931 October 26, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.
NIDA ADESER y RICO, Appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated June 28, 2007, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01902, affirming
the Decision2 dated May 2, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 118 in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-
2700 and 03-2701. The RTC convicted appellant of the crimes
of syndicated illegal recruitment constituting economic
sabotage and estafa.
On November 12, 2003, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay filed before the RTC two
Informations3 against appellant Nida Adeser y Rico, Lourdes
Chang, and the spouses Roberto and Mel Tiongson. The
Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 03-2700
That on or about and sometime in the month of May,
2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, by means of false representation and
fraudulent allegation to the effect that they could secure
employment abroad for complainant JOSEPHINE R. PALO,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit for
a fee aforesaid person without the corresponding license from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a
syndicated illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage.
Contrary to law.4
Criminal Case No. 03-2701
That on or about and sometime in the month of May,
2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, defrauded private complainant
JOSEPHINE R. PALO, in the following manner to wit: that said
accused, by means of false representations and fraudulent
allegations that they could facilitate private complainant’s
working and travel papers, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously ask, demand and receive from the
said complainant the amount of ₱80,000.00 as placement fee
for the latter’s supposed deployment to Australia as "Apple
Picker/Office Worker"; and said private complainant carried
away by said misrepresentations, in fact gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of ₱80,000.00, which amount
accused in turn misapplied, misappropriated and converted to
their own personal use and benefit, failing, however, to deploy
private complainant to Australia, and despite repeated
demands accused failed and refused to do so, or account for
the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of the said
private complainant in the aforesaid amount of ₱80,000.00.
Contrary to law.5
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty6 to
both charges while her co-accused remained at large. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.
Private complainant Josephine R. Palo and her sister
Teresa Caraig testified that sometime in November 2002, the
spouses Roberto and Mel Tiongson, agents of Naples Travel
and Tours, introduced Palo to appellant, owner and general
manager of Naples, to discuss employment opportunities in
Australia. During their meeting held at the Naples office in
Villaruel Tower, Villaruel Street, Pasay City, appellant and the
spouses Tiongson informed Palo that for a placement fee of
₱80,000, she can work as an apple picker in Australia with a
monthly salary of $1,400.
Thus, on November 8, 2002, Palo and Caraig went to
the Naples office and gave Roberto Tiongson and Lourdes
Chang, operations manager of Naples, ₱15,000 as first
installment for the placement fee. Palo was issued a
voucher7 signed by Roberto and Chang stating therein that the
₱15,000 was for Palo’s visa application.
On November 11, 2002, Palo and Caraig returned to
the Naples office and paid ₱58,500. She was again issued a
voucher8 signed by Roberto and Chang stating therein that the
amount paid was for Palo’s visa application. Palo insisted that
the voucher should indicate that her payments were for
"placement fees" but they were able to convince her that it is
not necessary because they know her.
After making her payments, she was required to
submit her resume and pictures and was promised that she
would be employed within three months.
More than three months passed, however, but Palo
was not deployed to Australia. Neither did she get her
Australian visa.
In May 2003, she learned from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that Naples had closed down. NBI likewise
informed her that Naples had no license to operate and deploy
workers abroad. Upon advice of the NBI, Palo filed a
complaint9 against appellant, the spouses Tiongson and
Chang.
Appellant on the other hand denied the charges
against her. She admitted that she was the owner and general
manager of Naples which was a travel agency that offered visa
assistance, ticketing, documentation, airport transfer and
courier services, but denied having engaged in recruitment.
She claimed that she cannot remember meeting Palo in her
office and asserted that she met her for the first time only at
the fiscal’s office when Palo was already claiming for a refund.
She testified that Roberto, to whom Palo claims to have given
her payment, was neither her employee nor her agent but was
only her driver’s brother. Based on her records, Roberto
endorsed to her office ₱30,000 from Palo for tourist visa
assistance. Appellant also admitted that she and Roberto
offered to settle the ₱30,000 but not the amount claimed by
Palo per vouchers issued to her.
On May 2, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision
finding appellant guilty of both charges. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered NIDA
ADESER is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment constituting
Economic Sabotage in Criminal Case No. 03-2700
and Estafa in Criminal Case No. 03-2701. Accordingly, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
1. In Criminal Case No. 3-2700 – LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a FINE of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00), and
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2701 – Indeterminate
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 13 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify Josephine R. Palo the
sum of Eighty Thousand Pesos (₱80,000.00) with
legal interest from the time of the filing of the
information.
75
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.10
Appellant appealed her conviction but the same was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 28,
2007. The appellate court did not give credence to appellant’s
denials and found that the prosecution evidence fully supports
the finding that appellant and her co-accused engaged in
recruitment and placement as defined under the Labor Code
despite having no authority to do so. It likewise held that the
same evidence proving the commission of the crime of illegal
recruitment also established that appellant and her co-accused
acted in unity in defrauding Palo and in misrepresenting to her
that upon payment of the placement fee, they could obtain
employment abroad for her. The appellant’s act of deception
and the resultant damage suffered by Palo render appellant
guilty of estafa.
In this appeal, appellant raises the following lone assignment
of error:
THE [APPELLATE] COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.11
Essentially, the issue is whether appellant’s guilt for
the crimes of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that she was able to prove that she
was not part of the group that defrauded Palo. She points out
that as can be gleaned from the facts established and even
from Palo’s testimony, she was not involved in the evil scheme
orchestrated by Roberto and Chang as her signature did not
even appear on the vouchers issued to Palo.
Appellant likewise contends that the elements of the
crime of illegal recruitment were not established with moral
certainty. Naples was never into recruitment as it was only
engaged in the business of assisting clients procure passports
and visas. She argues that it should be Roberto and Chang
who should be convicted as she had no hand in recruiting Palo.
Appellant’s arguments are bereft of merit.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two
elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or
authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the
offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined in Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor
Code. Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to
"any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the simplest
terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without
authority from the government, give the impression that they
have the power to send workers abroad for employment
purposes.12 The law imposes a higher penalty when the crime
is committed by a syndicate as it is considered as an offense
involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of
Article 38 of the Labor Code.13
Undoubtedly, what transpired in the instant case is
illegal recruitment by a syndicate. As categorically testified by
Palo and Caraig, appellant, together with her co-accused,
made representations to Palo that they could send her to
Australia to work as an apple picker. There is no denying that
they gave Palo the distinct impression that they had the power
or ability to send her abroad for work such that the latter was
convinced to part with a huge amount of money as placement
fee in order to be employed. And this act was committed by
appellant and her co-accused even if they did not have the
required license to do so. Appellant herself admitted that
Naples, the travel agency which she owned and managed,
only offered visa assistance, ticketing, documentation, airport
transfer and courier services. Clearly, neither she nor her
agents had a license to recruit Palo to work abroad. It is the
lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the
recruitment unlawful or criminal.14
Thus, as against the positive and categorical
testimonies of Palo and Caraig, appellant’s denials cannot
prevail.15Moreover, there is no reason to overturn the trial and
appellate courts’ findings on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses as there is no showing that any of them had ill
motives against appellant or her co-accused and especially
since it appears they were motivated solely by the desire to
bring appellant and her co-accused to justice for the crimes
they have committed.16
Neither can this Court sustain appellant’s contention
that her participation in the recruitment is negated by the fact
that her signature does not even appear on the vouchers
issued to Palo. Even if Palo did not present receipts signed by
appellant, this would not rule out the fact that appellant did
receive the money. This Court has consistently ruled that
absence of receipts as to the amounts delivered to a recruiter
does not mean that the recruiter did not accept or receive such
payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of
evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order to
prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the
procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. Such proof
may come from the credible testimonies of witnesses 17 as in
the case at bar.
We likewise uphold appellant’s conviction for estafa.
A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may also be
convicted of estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of the Revised
Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are
present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds
another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied
on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the
accused and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.18
Such is the case before us. Palo parted with her
money upon the prodding and enticement of appellant and her
co-accused on the false pretense that they had the capacity to
deploy her for employment in Australia. Unfortunately,
however, Palo was not able to work abroad nor get her
Australian visa. Worse, she did not get her money back.
76

As to the penalties, Section 7 of Republic Act No. complainant Josephine R. Palo is reduced to Seventy-Three
804219 or the Migrant Workers’ Act of 1995 provides the Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱73,500) with legal interest of
penalties for illegal recruitment: 12% per annum from the time of filing of the information until
fully paid.
SEC. 7. Penalties.—
No pronouncement as to costs.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six
SO ORDERED.
(6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve
(12) years and a fine not less than Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not

less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
(Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx
As appellant was found guilty of syndicated illegal
recruitment constituting economic sabotage, she was aptly
meted out the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.
With respect to the estafa case, Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall

defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be;

xxxx

Considering that the total amount paid by Palo is

₱73,500 or ₱51,500 in excess of the ₱22,000 limit, an
additional sentence of five years should be imposed based on
the above-quoted provision. Thus, appellant was correctly
meted the maximum penalty of 13 years of reclusion temporal.

As to the amount to be indemnified to Palo, contrary

to the findings of the trial and appellate courts, Palo’s testimony
and the vouchers she presented establish that the total amount
she paid is only ₱73,50020 and not the ₱80,000 quoted as
placement fee. Thus, she should only be indemnified the said
amount, plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the time of
filing of the information.21

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated June 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01902 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The amount to be indemnified to private
77
G.R. No. 197303. June 4, 2014.*
APQ SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., LTD. and APQ CREW
MANAGEMENT USA, INC., petitioners, vs. ANGELITO L.
CASEÑAS, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Supreme
Court; The Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts and,
thus, its jurisdiction is limited only to reviewing errors of
law.—At the outset, it is to be emphasized that the Court is not
a trier of facts and, thus, its jurisdiction is limited only to
reviewing errors of law. The rule, however, admits of certain
exceptions, one of which is where the findings of fact of the
lower tribunals and the appellate court are contradictory. Such
is the case here. Thus, the Court is constrained to review and
resolve the factual issue in order to settle the controversy.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract; While the seafarer and his employer are
governed by their mutual agreement, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Rules and
Regulations require that the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) be integrated in every seafarer’s
contract.—Employment contracts of seafarers on board
foreign ocean-going vessels are not ordinary contracts. They
are regulated and an imprimatur by the State is necessary.
While the seafarer and his employer are governed by their
mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and Regulations require
that the POEA-SEC be integrated in every seafarer’s contract.
In this case, there is no dispute that Caseñas’ employment
contract was duly approved by the POEA and that it
incorporated the provisions of the POEA-SEC.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Theory of Imputed
Knowledge; Agency; The theory of imputed knowledge
ascribed the knowledge of the agent to the principal, not
the other way around.—In Sunace International
Management Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 480 SCRA 146 (2006),
the Court ruled that the theory of imputed knowledge ascribed
the knowledge of the agent to the principal, not the other way
around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer could
not, therefore, be imputed to its agent. As there was no
substantial proof that Sunace knew of, and consented to be
bound under, the 2-year employment contract extension, it
could not be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its owner
were not held solidarily liable for any of the complainant’s
claims arising from the 2-year employment extension.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Termination of Employment;
In a nutshell, there are three (3) requirements necessary
for the complete termination of the employment contract:
1] termination due to expiration or other reasons/causes;
2] signing off from the vessel; and 3] arrival at the point of
hire.—It is to be observed that both provisions require the
seafarer to arrive at the point of hire as it signifies the
completion of the employment contract, and not merely its
expiration. Similarly, a seafarer’s employment contract is
terminated even before the contract expires as soon as
he arrives at the point of hire and signs off for medical reasons,
due to shipwreck, voluntary resignation or for other just causes.
In a nutshell, there are three (3) requirements necessary for
the complete termination of the employment
contract: 1] termination due to expiration or other
reasons/causes; 2] signing off from the vessel; and 3] arrival at
the point of hire. In this case, there was no clear showing that
Caseñas signed off from the vessel upon the expiration of his
employment contract, which was in February or April 2005. He
did not arrive either in Manila, his point of hire, because he was
still on board the vessel MV Haitien Pride on the supposed date
of expiration of his contract. It was only on August 14, 2006
that he signed off from MV Haitien Pride and arrived in Manila
on August 30, 2006. In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v.
NLRC, 261 SCRA 757 (1996), the Court held that the
obligations and liabilities of the local agency and its foreign
principal do not end upon the expiration of the contracted
period as they were duty bound to repatriate the seaman to
the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract of
employment.
Maritime Law; Seaworthiness; While seaworthiness
is commonly equated with the physical aspect and
condition of the vessel for voyage as its ability to
withstand the rigors of the sea, it must not be forgotten
that a vessel should be armed with the necessary
documents required by the maritime rules and
regulations, both local and international.—Caseñas
claimed that his transfer was due to the fact that MV
Perseverance could not leave port because of incomplete
documents for its operation. This was not disputed. To the
mind of the Court, having incomplete documents for the
vessel’s operation renders it unseaworthy. While
seaworthiness is commonly equated with the physical aspect
and condition of the vessel for voyage as its ability to withstand
the rigors of the sea, it must not be forgotten that a vessel
should be armed with the necessary documents required by
the maritime rules and regulations, both local and international.
It has been written that vessel seaworthiness further extends
to cover the documents required to ensure that the vessel can
enter and leave ports without problems. Accordingly, Caseñas’
contract should have been terminated and he should have
been repatriated to the Philippines because a seafarer cannot
be forced to sail with an unseaworthy vessel, pursuant to
Section 24 of the POEA-SEC. There was, however, no
showing that his contract was terminated by reason of such
transfer. It is necessary to reiterate that MV Haitien Pride
appears to be manned by, and accredited with, the same
principal/agency. His joining the said vessel could only mean
that it was for the purpose of completing his contract as the
transfer was made well within the period of his employment
contract on board MV Perseverance.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits;
Temporary Total Disability; For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman
is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until
he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either
partially or totally.—In Magsaysay Maritime Corporation vs.
NLRC, 699 SCRA 197 (2013), citing Vergara vs. Hammonia
Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court
reiterated that the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must
report to the company-designated physician within three (3)
days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration
of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the
seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable
to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he
is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either
partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-
SEC and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial
period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because
78
the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the
temporary total disability period may be extended up to a
maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a partial or total disability already
exists. The seaman may, of course, also be declared fit to work
at any time such declaration is justified by his medical
condition.
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeks to review, reverse and set aside the January
24, 2011 Decision1 and the June 1, 2011 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA). in CA-GR. SP No. 112997, which
annulled and set aside the October 14, 2009 Decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRCJ in NLRC LAC
No. 04-000220-09, where respondent Angelito L. Caseñas
(Caseñas) was seeking disability and other benefits against
petitioner APQ Shipmanagement Co., Ltd. (APQ) and
petitioner-principal APQ Crew Management USA, Inc. (Crew
Management).3
It appears from the records that in June 2004, Casenas was
hired by APQ, acting for and in behalf of its principal, Crew
Management, as Chief Mate for vessel MV Perseverance for a
period of eight (8) months starting from June 16, 2004 to
February 16, 2005,with a basic monthly salary of US$840.00,
for forty-eight (48) hours a week, with US$329.00 as overtime
pay.
In his Position Paper,4 Casenas further alleged that on June
16, 2004, he left Manila to join his assigned vessel in Miami,
Florida, USA, though the vessel could not leave the Florida port
because of its incomplete documents for operation; that
consequently, he was transferred to another vessel, MV
HAITIEN PRIDE, which was in Haiti, although again because
of incomplete documents, the vessel could not leave the port
and remained at Cap Haitien; that together with the rest of the
vessel's officers and crew, he was left to fend for himself; that
they were not provided food and water and had to fish for their
own food and were not paid their salaries; that he suffered
extreme stress and anxiety because of the uncertainty of the
situation; that his employment contract was extended by APQ
from the original eight (8) months to twenty-six (26) months;
that the vessel eventually left for Bahamas; that he felt he
became weaker and got tired easily; that despite his unpaid
wages and weakened condition, he performed his duties as
Chief Mate diligently; that in August 2006, he began to suffer
shortness of breath, headache and chest pains; that he was
then brought to the Grand Bahamas Health Services and was
diagnosed with hypertension and was given medicines; that he
was then repatriated due to his condition and he arrived in the
Philippines on August 30, 2006; that within three (3) days
thereafter, he reported to APQ for post-employment medical
examination where the company-designated physician later
diagnosed him with Ischemic Heart Disease; that a certain Dr.
Ariel G. Domingo likewise examined him, confirming and
certifying that he was suffering from Essential Hypertension
and Ischemic Heart Disease; that he was declared "unfit for
sea service"; that as a result, he was not able to work for more
than 120 days from his repatriation; that another medical
examination was conducted by Dr. Lina R. Cero, showing that
he was suffering from Essential Hypertension with
Cariomegally Ischemic Heart Disease and Indirect Inguinal
Hernia Right; that he was then advised to take his maintenance
medications for life; that APQ refused to provide him further
medical attention, thus, he incurred medical expenses in the
amount of 6,390.00 by November 2006; that he demanded
payment of permanent total disability benefits, sickness
allowance and medical expenses to which he was entitled
under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC), but APQ refused to pay; that he, together with other
crew members, sent a series of letters and e-mails to the
representatives of the shipowners regarding their unpaid
wages, but despite efforts, APQ still refused to pay their
salaries; that demands for payment were also made to the
president of APQ, but the same were refused; and that
ultimately, he was compelled to seek redress and filed a
complaint for permanent total disability benefits,
reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance, non-
payment of salaries representing the extended portion of the
employment contract, damages, and attorney's fees.
APQ, on the other hand, alleged in its Position Paper5 that
upon expiration of the contract, Caseñas refused to return to
the Philippines until he finally did on August 30, 2006;6 that
thereafter, Caseñas demanded payment of his wages,
overtime and vacation pay for the alleged extended portion of
the contract; that it could not be held liable for claims pertaining
to the extended portion of the contract for it did not consent to
it; that, in fact, as early as January 2005, it had been making
arrangements, through American Airlines/American Eagle, for
Caseñas’ repatriation at the end of his contract in February
2005; that Caseñas was fully paid of his wages and other
benefits for the duration of his 8-month contract; and that
Caseñas suffered illness after the expiration of the contract,
hence, it could not be made liable to pay him any benefits for
his injury/illness.7
Caseñas, however, disputed the position of APQ, claiming that
his contract of employment was duly extended.8 He denied that
APQ had been making arrangements for his repatriation as
early as January 2005. To prove that his contract was
extended, he submitted the following documents:
1. Deck Logbook, dated 14 August 2006;
2. Report of Mr. Steve Mastroropolous, dated 16 May
2006;
3. Letter, dated 24 April 2006 of Mr. Alex P. Quillope,
President of the respondent APQ to OWWA, admitting
that there was no food and water for the crew of MV
"HAITIEN PRIDE."9
APQ countered that the abovementioned documents did not
prove mutual consent of the parties as provided in Caseñas’
employment contract. His contract expired on August 1, 2005
and, thus, he had no legal basis to claim any salary after the
said period.10 Caseñas became ill in August 2006 or more than
one (1) year after the expiration of his employment contract.11
Labor Arbiter Decision
79
On November 20, 2008, the Labor Arbiter (LA)rendered the
Decision12 dismissing Caseñas' complaint. He was of the view
that the employment contract was not extended pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the contract. Caseñas failed to prove
mutual consent of the parties to the extension of the contract.
He rendered services on MV Haitien Pride from August 1, 2005
to April 30, 2006, after the expiration of his contract with APQ
on board the vessel MV Perseverance on February 15, 2005.
The LA pointed out that the illness/disease suffered by
Caseñas was sustained while serving on board MVCap Haitien
Pride, which was outside the period of his contractual
employment. Thus, Caseñas' claims could not be awarded.
NLRC Resolution
On June 22, 2009, the NLRC resolved the appeal by reversing
and setting aside the LA decision. Based on the records, it
found that the employment contract was extended. The illness,
Essential Hypertension, suffered by Caseñas was a
compensable disease under Section 32-A, No. 20 of the
POEA-SEC. Hence, NLRC ruled that Caseñas was entitled to
his claims because the illness was sustained within the
duration of his employment contract.
On October 14, 2009, the NLRC, acting on the motion for
reconsideration filed by APQ, reconsidered and set aside the
June 22, 2009 NLRC Resolution. It explained that the
documentary evidence presented only proved the extension of
contract but not the consent given to it by APQ. Caseñas failed
to present the new contract duly signed by APQ or Crew
Management, or any proof that they consented to the
extension. The NLRC explained that Caseñas directly dealt
with the shipowner to the exclusion of APQ and Crew
Management, hence, his recourse was against the shipowner.
Thus, APQ could not be held liable for the unpaid salaries, as
well as the permanent disability benefits, because these were
claims that accrued after the expiration of the employment
contract.
Caseñas moved for a reconsideration, but the NLRC denied
his motion in its Resolution, dated November 27, 2009.
CA Decision
Caseñas filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA, assailing the October 14, 2009 decision and the November
27, 2009 resolution of the NLRC. On January 24, 2011, the CA
granted the petition and nullified and set aside the questioned
NLRC decision and resolution.
The CA reinstated the earlier June 22, 2009 NLRC Resolution.
In so ruling, the CA cited the case of Place well International
Services Corporation v. Camote,13 where it was written:
xxx a subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas
contract worker with the foreign employer is void, simply
because it is against our existing laws, morals and public
policy. The subsequent agreement cannot supersede the
terms of the standard employment contract approved by the
POEA. Assuming arguendo that petitioner entered into an
agreement with the foreign principal for an extension of his
contract of employment, sans approval by the POEA, the
contract that governs petitioner's employment is still the POEA-
SEC until his repatriation. As far as Philippine law is
concerned, petitioner's contract of employment with
respondents was concluded only at the time of his repatriation
on August 30, 2006.
Further, the CA explained that a declaration from the company
designated physician as to the fitness or unfitness of a seafarer
to continue his sea-duties is sanctioned by Section 20(B)(3) of
the POEA-SEC. There being no declaration made by the
company-designated physician within the 120-day period as to
the fitness of Caseñas, the CA opined that he was undoubtedly
entitled to disability benefits.
APQ filed a motion for reconsideration, while Caseñas filed his
Comment/Opposition. On June 1, 2011, the CA denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
GROUNDS
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION OF THE NLRC DATED 14 OCTOBER 2009
AND 27 NOVEMBER 2009, AND REINSTATING THE NLRC’S
RESOLUTION DATED 22 JUNE 2009, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT WAS NEVER EXTENDED BY THE
COMPANY NOR BY THE PRINCIPAL
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CLAIM FOR
DISABILITY BENEFITS, SICKNESS ALLOWANCE
AND UNPAID WAGES ALL ACCRUED AFTER THE
EXPIRATION OF THE CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT14
The pivotal issue for resolution is whether or not the
employment contract of Caseñas was extended with the
consent of APQ/Crew Management.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
At the outset, it is to be emphasized that the Court is not a trier
of facts and, thus, its jurisdiction is limited only to reviewing
errors of law. The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions,
one of which is where the findings of fact of the lower tribunals
and the appellate court are contradictory. Such is the case
here. Thus, the Court is constrained to review and resolve the
factual issue in order to settle the controversy.
Employment contracts of seafarers on board foreign ocean-
going vessels are not ordinary contracts. They are regulated
and an imprimatur by the State is necessary. While the
seafarer and his employer are governed by their mutual
agreement, the POEA Rules and Regulations require that the
POEA-SEC be integrated in every seafarer’s contract.15 In this
80
case, there is no dispute that Caseñas’ employment contract
was duly approved by the POEA and that it incorporated the
provisions of the POEA-SEC.
As earlier stated, the controversy started when Caseñas
claimed sickness and disability benefits as well as unpaid
wages from the petitioners upon his return to the Philippines.
The petitioners, on the other hand, refused to pay, arguing that
Caseñas’ sickness was contracted after his employment
contract expired.
Regarding the issue of extension and its corresponding
consequences, two cases were cited by the parties in their
pleadings. The first was Sunace International Management
Services, Inc. v. NLRC16 (Sunace)and the second was
Placewell International Services Corporation v.
Camote17 (Placewell).
In Sunace, the Court ruled that the theory of imputed
knowledge ascribed the knowledge of the agent to the
principal, not the other way around. The knowledge of the
principal-foreign employer could not, therefore, be imputed to
its agent. As there was no substantial proof that Sunace knew
of, and consented to be bound under, the 2-year employment
contract extension, it could not be said to be privy thereto. As
such, it and its owner were not held solidarily liable for any of
the complainant’s claims arising from the 2-year employment
extension.18
In Placewell, the Court concluded that the original POEA-
approved employment contract subsisted and, thus, the
solidary liability of the agent with the principal continued. It
ruled that:
R.A. No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration
to the prejudice of the worker, of employment contracts already
approved and verified by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) from the time of actual signing thereof by
the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of
the same without the approval of the DOLE. Thus, we held in
Chavez v. Bonto-Perez,19 that the subsequently executed side
agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign
employer which reduced her salary below the amount
approved by the POEA is void because it is against our existing
laws, morals and public policy. The said side agreement
cannot supersede her standard employment contract
approved by the POEA.
xxx
Moreover, we find that there was no proper dismissal of
respondent by SAAD; the "termination" of respondent was
clearly a ploy to pressure him to agree to a lower wage rate for
continued employment. Thus, the original POEA-approved
employment contract of respondent subsists despite the so-
called new agreement with SAAD. Consequently, the solidary
liability of petitioner with SAAD for respondent’s money claims
continues in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042.20
APQ’s primary argument revolves around the fact of expiration
of Caseñas’ employment contract, which it claims was not
extended as it was without its consent. While the contract
stated that any extension must be made by mutual consent of
the parties, it, however, incorporated Department Order
(DO)No. 4 and Memorandum Circular No. 09, both series of
2000, which provided for the Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean Going Vessels. Sections 2 and 18 thereof provide:
SECTION 2. COMMENCEMENT/ DURATION OF
CONTRACT
A. The Employment contract between the employer
and the seafarer shall commence upon actual
departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in
the point of hire and with a POEA approved contract.
It shall be effective until the seafarer’s date of arrival
at the point of hire upon termination of his employment
pursuant to Section 18 of this Contract.
B. The period of employment shall be for a period
mutually agreed upon by the seafarer and the
employer but not to exceed 12 months. Any extension
of the contract shall be subject to the mutual consent
of both parties.
xxx
SECTION 18. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
A. The employment of the seafarer shall cease when
the seafarer completes his period of contractual
service aboard the vessel, signs off from the vessel
and arrives at the point of hire.
B. The employment of the seafareris also terminated
when the seafarer arrives at the point of hire for any
of the following reasons:
1. When the seafarer signs off and is
disembarked for medical reasons pursuant to
Section 20 (B)[5] of this Contract.
xxx
[Emphases supplied]
It is to be observed that both provisions require the seafarer to
arrive at the point of hire as it signifies the completion of the
employment contract, and not merely its expiration. Similarly,
a seafarer’s employment contract is terminated even before
the contract expires as soon as he arrives at the point of hire
and signs off for medical reasons, due to shipwreck, voluntary
resignation or for other just causes. In a nutshell, there are
three (3) requirements necessary for the complete termination
of the employment contract: 1]termination due to expiration or
other reasons/causes; 2]signing off from the vessel; and
3]arrival at the point of hire. In this case, there was no clear
showing that Caseñas signed off from the vessel upon the
expiration of his employment contract, which was in February
or April 2005. He did not arrive either in Manila, his point of
81
hire, because he was still on board the vessel MV Haitien Pride
on the supposed date of expiration of his contract. It was only
on August 14, 2006 that he signed off21 from MV Haitien Pride
and arrived in Manila on August 30, 2006.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,22 the Court
held that the obligations and liabilities of the local agency and
its foreign principal do not end upon the expiration of the
contracted period as they were duty bound to repatriate the
seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract
of employment.23
APQ avers that Caseñas transferred from MV Perseverance to
MV Haitien Pride, which was not the ship specifically
mentioned in his contract. Section 15 of the POEA-SEC guides
the Court on this. It reads:
Section 15. Transfer Clause– The seafarer agrees to be
transferred at any port to any vessel owned or operated,
manned or managed by the same employer, provided it is
accredited to the same manning agent and provided further
that the position of the seafarer and the rate of his wages and
terms of services are in no way inferior and the total period of
employment shall not exceed that originally agreed upon.
Any form of transfer shall be documented and made available
when necessary.
APQ did not argue that MV Haitien Pride was not operated or
managed by Crew Management. It did not claim either that said
vessel was not accredited by it. The logical conclusion,
therefore, is that MV Haitien Pride was operated/managed by
Crew Management and accredited by APQ.
Thus, Caseñas’ transfer should have been documented and
made part of its records for future purposes, but no
documentation has been shown.
Even assuming arguendo that MV Haitien Pride was not
related in any way with either Crew Management or APQ, it is
with more reason that the transfer should have been properly
documented pursuant to the above provision because it
necessitated the termination of his employment contract and
his repatriation to the Philippines, pursuant to Section 26(A) of
the POEA-SEC. The said provision specifically provides that:
Section 26. Change of Principal.
A. When there is change of principal of the vessel
necessitating the termination of employment of the
seafarer before the date indicated in the Contract, the
seafarer shall be entitled to earned wages,
repatriation at employer’s expense and one month
basic pay as termination pay.
B. If by mutual agreement, the seafarer continues his
service on board the same vessel, such service shall
be treated as a new contract. The seafarer shall be
entitled to earned wages only.
C. In case arrangement has been made for the
seafarer to join another vessel to complete his
contract, the seafarer shall be entitled to basic wage
until the date joining the other vessel.
Meanwhile, Caseñas claimed that his transfer was due to the
fact that MV Perseverance could not leave port because of
incomplete documents for its operation. This was not disputed.
To the mind of the Court, having incomplete documents for the
vessel’s operation renders it unseaworthy. While
seaworthiness is commonly equated with the physical aspect
and condition of the vessel for voyage as its ability to withstand
the rigors of the sea, it must not be forgotten that a vessel
should be armed with the necessary documents required by
the maritime rules and regulations, both local and international.
It has been written that vessel seaworthiness further extends
to cover the documents required to ensure that the vessel can
enter and leave ports without problems.24
Accordingly, Caseñas’ contract should have been terminated
and he should have been repatriated to the Philippines
because a seafarer cannot be forced to sail with an
unseaworthy vessel, pursuant to Section 24 of the POEA-
SEC.25 There was, however, no showing that his contract was
terminated by reason of such transfer. It is necessary to
reiterate that MV Haitien Pride appears to be manned by, and
accredited with, the same principal/ agency. His joining the
said vessel could only mean that it was for the purpose of
completing his contract as the transfer was made well within
the period of his employment contract on board MV
Perseverance.
APQ further claims that that there was an agreement between
Caseñas and the shipowner, but there was no concrete proof
adduced to show that indeed a new agreement for the
extension of the contract was ever made. Granting that a new
agreement for the extension was made, the acts of APQ and
Crew Management proved that there was implied consent to
the extension.
APQ attempts to impress upon the Court that Caseñas’
contract already expired and that he had a new employer
during the alleged extension of the contract by relying on the
December 16, 2005 Letter of the POEA. APQ alleged in its
Memorandum26 that:
In a letter dated 16 December 2005 letter, the POEA confirmed
that the Contract expired on April 2005 but he was not allowed
repatriation by the owner of the Vessel, his new employer [See
Annex "6" of Comment attached as Annex "z" of this Petition.]
A perusal of the said letter, however, discloses that nowhere
was it stated that Caseñas was allowed repatriation by the
owner of the vessel, his new employer. What was clearly stated
therein was that Caseñas was not allowed repatriation by his
employer for some reason. Insofar as Philippine law is
concerned, the employer referred to in the said letter remains
to be the foreign principal/manning agency as stated in the
POEA-approved employment contract.
Finally, there was no showing as to why Caseñas was not
repatriated to the Philippines upon the expiration of his
contract. It was expressly provided therein that the contract
82
was for eight (8) months, plus or minus two (2) months, that is,
until February 2005 or at most, April 2005.
On its claim of lack of consent, APQ insists that as proof of its
intention not to extend Caseñas’ contract, it already arranged
his plane ticket as early as January & February 2005, in
anticipation of the expiration of the contract, attaching the e-
mail copy of the American Airlines E-ticket &
Itinerary.
Again, a scrutiny of the records reveals otherwise. The e-mail
and eticket consistently relied upon by the petitioners clearly
showed that the eticket was issued on January 18, 2006, which
flight was scheduled on January 23 (Monday) bound for Miami
and January 25 (Wednesday) bound for Manila. There were
two (2) other e-tickets arranged for Caseñas which showed a
flight schedule on February 8 (Wednesday) and February 15
(Wednesday), both bound for Manila from Miami. These e-
mails and etickets were sent by Crew Management to APQ
viafax. Crew Management also executed the letter,27 dated
February 24, 2006, addressed to DOLEOWWA in response to
the report of the wife of Caseñas to DOLE regarding his
repatriation. Crew Management stated in said letter, copy
furnished APQ, that it had already issued an air ticket to
Caseñas, but he failed to claim it. The same letter assured the
DOLE-OWWA of its arranging the payment of wages and
repatriation of the crew members on-board MV Haitien Pride,
as well as its arranging another plane ticket for Caseñas, if
necessary. Thus, these communications reveal that APQ had
actual knowledge that Caseñas continued working on board
the said vessel after February/April 2005. Despite such
knowledge, APQ neither posed any objection to the extension
of the contract nor make any effort to protect itself from any
responsibility that might arise from the extension, if it did not
indeed intend to extend the employment contract. Tokeep on
notifying a person/party who was not anymore privy to any
contract at all makes no sense. Also, APQ sent OWWA
another letter,28 dated April 24, 2006, giving information on the
status of MV Haitien Pride. The same letter confirmed that APQ
and Crew Management had constant communication with
each other regarding the said vessel and its crew. Alex P.
Quillope, APQ’s President, even stated in the same letter that:
Soon as I receive any information from them, I will at once
inform your good office as I have then already prepared my
travel again to Miami, Florida once MV Haitien Pride be on her
sailing to Miami.29
APQ cannot now feign ignorance of any extension of the
contract and claim that it did not consent to it.1âwphi1 As it had
knowledge of the extended contract, APQ is solidarily liable
with Crew Management for Caseñas’ claims. Caseñas is,
therefore, entitled to the unpaid wages during the extended
portion of his contract.
As to his claim for medical and other benefits, there is no
dispute that the symptoms of Caseñas’ illness began to
manifest during the term of his employment contract. The fact
that the manifestations of the illness only came about in August
2006 will not bar a conclusion that he contracted the ailment
while the contract was subsisting. The overall state and
condition that he was exposed to over time was the very cause
of his illness. Thus, the CA was correct in reinstating the NLRC
resolution awarding sickness allowance as well as disability
benefits in favor of Caseñas. Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000
POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going
Vessels provides:
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR
ILLNESS
xxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the
seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company-
designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed
one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post
employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return except
when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed
as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of
the right to claim the above benefits. If a doctor appointed by
the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may
be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both
parties.
xxx
In Magsaysay Maritime Corporation vs. NLRC,30 citing Vergara
vs. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,31the Court reiterated
that the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to
the company-designated physician within three (3) days from
arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on
temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He
receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared
fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his
condition is defined under the POEA-SEC and by applicable
Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and
no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires
further medical attention, then the temporary total disability
period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject
to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a
partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may, of
course, also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justi1ied by his medical condition.32
In this case, Casenas immediately reported to APQ for the
required post-employment medical examination upon his
return to the Philippines. He was referred to the company-
designated physician, who diagnosed him to be suffering from
lschemic Heart Disease, which was a manifestation of organ
damage.33 Caseñas likewise consulted two (2) other
physicians who certified him to be suffering from Essential
83

Hypertension aside from Ischemic Heart Disease.34From the

time of Caseñas' diagnosis by the company-designated
physician, he was under the state of temporary total disability,
which lasted for at least 120 days as provided by law. Such
period could be extended up to 240 days, if further medical
attention was required.

There was, however, no showing of any justification to extend

said period. As the law requires, within 120 days from the time
he was diagnosed of his illness, the company-designated
physician must make a declaration as to the fitness or unfitness
of Caseñas As correctly observed by the CA, however, the 120
day period lapsed without such a declaration being
made.35 Caseñas is now deemed to be in a state of permanent
total disability and, thus, clearly entitled to the total disability
benefits provided by law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
84
G.R. No. 161757. January 25, 2006.*
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, Second Division; HON. ERNESTO S.
DINOPOL, in his capacity as Labor Arbiter, NLRC; NCR,
Arbitration Branch, Quezon City and DIVINA A.
MONTEHERMOZO, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Finding of the Court of
Appeals solely on the basis of the above-quoted telefax
message, that Sunace continually communicated with the
foreign “principal” and therefore was aware of and had
consented to the execution of the extension of the
contract is misplaced.—The finding of the Court of Appeals
solely on the basis of the above-quoted telefax message, that
Sunace continually communicated with the foreign “principal”
(sic) and therefore was aware of and had consented to the
execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The
message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to
the new contract executed after the expiration on February 1,
1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese
broker communicated regarding Divina’s allegedly withheld
savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the
extension of the contract.
Same; Same; The theory of imputed knowledge
ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the
principal, employer Xiong, not the other way around.—The
theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the
agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer Xiong, not the other
way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer
cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services
(Sunace), a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, deployed to Taiwan Divina A.
Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-
month contract effective February 1, 1997.1 The deployment
was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund
Wang, President of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998,
Divina continued working for her Taiwanese employer, Hang
Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the
Philippines on February 4, 2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a
complaint2 before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese
broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she
was jailed for three months and that she was underpaid.
The following day or on February 15, 2000, Labor Arbitration
Associate Regina T. Gavin issued Summons3 to the Manager
of Sunace, furnishing it with a copy of Divina’s complaint and
directing it to appear for mandatory conference on February
28, 2000.
The scheduled mandatory conference was reset. It appears to
have been concluded, however.
On April 6, 2000, Divina filed her Position Paper4 claiming that
under her original one-year contract and the 2-year extended
contract which was with the knowledge and consent of
Sunace, the following amounts representing income tax and
savings were deducted:
Year Deduction for Income Tax Deduction for Savings
1997 NT10,450.00 NT23,100.00
1998 NT9,500.00 NT36,000.00
1999 NT13,300.00 NT36,000.00;5
and while the amounts deducted in 1997 were refunded to her,
those deducted in 1998 and 1999 were not. On even date,
Sunace, by its Proprietor/General Manager Maria Luisa Olarte,
filed its Verified Answer and Position Paper,6claiming as
follows, quoted verbatim:
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED FOR THE REFUND OF
HER 24 MONTHS SAVINGS
3. Complainant could not anymore claim nor entitled for the
refund of her 24 months savings as she already took back her
saving already last year and the employer did not deduct any
money from her salary, in accordance with a Fascimile
Message from the respondent SUNACE’s employer, Jet
Crown International Co. Ltd., a xerographic copy of which is
herewith attached as ANNEX "2" hereof;
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REFUND OF HER 14
MONTHS TAX AND PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
4. There is no basis for the grant of tax refund to the
complainant as the she finished her one year contract and
hence, was not illegally dismissed by her employer. She could
only lay claim over the tax refund or much more be awarded of
damages such as attorney’s fees as said reliefs are available
only when the dismissal of a migrant worker is without just valid
or lawful cause as defined by law or contract.
The rationales behind the award of tax refund and payment of
attorney’s fees is not to enrich the complainant but to
compensate him for actual injury suffered. Complainant did not
suffer injury, hence, does not deserve to be compensated for
whatever kind of damages.
Hence, the complainant has NO cause of action against
respondent SUNACE for monetary claims, considering that
she has been totally paid of all the monetary benefits due her
under her Employment Contract to her full satisfaction.
6. Furthermore, the tax deducted from her salary is in
compliance with the Taiwanese law, which respondent
SUNACE has no control and complainant has to obey and this
Honorable Office has no authority/jurisdiction to intervene
because the power to tax is a sovereign power which the
Taiwanese Government is supreme in its own territory. The
sovereign power of taxation of a state is recognized under
international law and among sovereign states.
85
7. That respondent SUNACE respectfully reserves the right to
file supplemental Verified Answer and/or Position Paper to
substantiate its prayer for the dismissal of the above case
against the herein respondent. AND BY WAY OF -
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Reacting to Divina’s Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25,
2000 an ". . . answer to complainant’s position paper"7alleging
that Divina’s 2-year extension of her contract was without its
knowledge and consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to
any claim arising therefrom, and Divina in fact executed a
Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of Responsibility and an
Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document was annexed
to said ". . . answer to complainant’s position paper."
To Sunace’s ". . . answer to complainant’s position paper,"
Divina filed a 2-page reply,8 without, however, refuting
Sunace’s disclaimer of knowledge of the extension of her
contract and without saying anything about the Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim and Affidavit of Desistance.
The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace’s claim that the extension
of Divina’s contract for two more years was without its
knowledge and consent in this wise:
We reject Sunace’s submission that it should not be held
responsible for the amount withheld because her contract was
extended for 2 more years without its knowledge and consent
because as Annex "B"9 shows, Sunace and Edmund Wang
have not stopped communicating with each other and yet the
matter of the contract’s extension and Sunace’s alleged non-
consent thereto has not been categorically established.
What Sunace should have done was to write to POEA about
the extension and its objection thereto, copy furnished the
complainant herself, her foreign employer, Hang Rui Xiong and
the Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang.
And because it did not, it is presumed to have consented to the
extension and should be liable for anything that resulted
thereform (sic).10 (Underscoring supplied)
The Labor Arbiter rejected too Sunace’s argument that it is not
liable on account of Divina’s execution of a Waiver and
Quitclaim and an Affidavit of Desistance. Observed the Labor
Arbiter:
Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or
any part of the dispute, the same shall be reduced to writing
and signed by the parties and their respective counsel (sic), if
any, before the Labor Arbiter.
The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after
being satisfied that it was voluntarily entered into by the parties
and after having explained to them the terms and
consequences thereof.
A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the
presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending
shall be approved by him, if after confronting the parties,
particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they
understand the terms and conditions of the settlement and that
it was entered into freely voluntarily (sic) by them and the
agreement is not contrary to law, morals, and public policy.
And because no consideration is indicated in the documents,
we strike them down as contrary to law, morals, and public
policy.11
He accordingly decided in favor of Divina, by decision of
October 9, 2000,12 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES and its owner
ADELAIDA PERGE, both in their personal capacities and as
agent of Hang Rui Xiong/Edmund Wang to jointly and severally
pay complainant DIVINA A. MONTEHERMOZO the sum of
NT91,950.00 in its peso equivalent at the date of payment, as
refund for the amounts which she is hereby adjudged entitled
to as earlier discussed plus 10% thereof as attorney’s fees
since compelled to litigate, complainant had to engage the
services of counsel.
SO ORDERED.13 (Underescoring supplied)
On appeal of Sunace, the NLRC, by Resolution of April 30,
2002,14 affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Via petition for certiorari,15 Sunace elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals which dismissed it outright by Resolution of
November 12, 2002,16 the full text of which reads:
The petition for certiorari faces outright dismissal.
The petition failed to allege facts constitutive of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the public respondent amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
finding that petitioner Sunace International Management
Services impliedly consented to the extension of the contract
of private respondent Divina A. Montehermozo. It is undisputed
that petitioner was continually communicating with private
respondent’s foreign employer (sic). As agent of the foreign
principal, "petitioner cannot profess ignorance of such
extension as obviously, the act of the principal extending
complainant (sic) employment contract necessarily bound
it." Grave abuse of discretion is not present in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED.17
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis on words in capital letters in the original; emphasis
on words in small letters and underscoring supplied)
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution of January 14, 2004,18Sunace
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
86
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC’s
finding that Sunace knew of and impliedly consented to the
extension of Divina’s 2-year contract. It went on to state that "It
is undisputed that [Sunace] was continually communicating
with [Divina’s] foreign employer." It thus concluded that "[a]s
agent of the foreign principal, ‘petitioner cannot profess
ignorance of such extension as obviously, the act of the
principal extending complainant (sic) employment contract
necessarily bound it.’"
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged
continuous communication was with the
Taiwanese brokerWang, not with the foreign employer Xiong.
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the Taiwanese
broker to Sunace, the only basis of a finding of continuous
communication, reads verbatim:
xxxx
Regarding to Divina, she did not say anything about her
saving in police station. As we contact with her employer, she
took back her saving already last years. And they did not
deduct any money from her salary. Or she will call back her
employer to check it again. If her employer said yes! we will
get it back for her.
Thank you and best regards.
(Sgd.)
Edmund Wang
President19
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the
above-quoted telefax message, that Sunace continually
communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore
was aware of and had consented to the execution of the
extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not
provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract
executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the
original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Divina’s allegedly
withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace
ratified the extension of the contract. As Sunace points out in
its Reply20 filed before the Court of Appeals,
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an
information given to the petitioner that the private respondent
had t[aken] already her savings from her foreign employer and
that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing
about the extension or the petitioner’s consent thereto.21
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February
21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten
Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on
February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a
mandatory conference following Divina’s filing of the complaint
on February 14, 2000.
Respecting the Court of Appeals following dictum:
As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess
ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its
principal extending [Divina’s] employment contract necessarily
bound it,22
it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of
imputed knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of
the agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer Xiong, not the
other way around.23 The knowledge of the principal-foreign
employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and
consented to be bound under the 2-year employment contract
extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and
its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divina’s
claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the
New Civil Code provides,
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns,
and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature,
or by stipulation or by provision of law.24
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an
implied revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign
principal when, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina
and entered into a new and separate employment contract in
Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code reading
The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the
business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third
persons.
thus applies.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the
validity of the Waiver and Affidavit of Desistance which Divina
executed in favor of Sunace is rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
respondent Divina A. Montehermozo against petitioner
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
87
G.R. No. 205727. January 18, 2017.*
RUTCHER T. DAGASDAS, petitioner, vs. GRAND
PLACEMENT AND GENERAL SERVICES CORPORATION,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for
Review on Certiorari; As a rule, only questions of law may
be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, this rule allows certain exceptions, including a
situation where the findings of fact of the courts or
tribunals below are conflicting.—As a rule, only questions of
law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. However, this rule allows certain exceptions, including
a situation where the findings of fact of the courts or tribunals
below are conflicting. In this case, the CA and the NLRC
arrived at divergent factual findings anent Dagasdas’
termination. As such, the Court deems it necessary to
reexamine these findings and determine whether the CA has
sufficient basis to annul the NLRC Decision, and set aside its
finding that Dagasdas was illegally dismissed from work.
Labor Law; Management Prerogative; It is well-
settled that employers have the prerogative to impose
standards on the work quantity and quality of their
employees and provide measures to ensure compliance
therewith.—It is well-settled that employers have the
prerogative to impose standards on the work quantity and
quality of their employees and provide measures to ensure
compliance therewith. Noncompliance with work standards
may thus be a valid cause for dismissing an employee.
Nonetheless, to ensure that employers will not abuse their
prerogatives, the same is tempered by security of tenure
whereby the employees are guaranteed substantive and
procedural due process before they are dismissed from work.
Same; Security of Tenure; Lex Loci Contractus;
Since the employment contracts of Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) are perfected in the Philippines, and
following the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the
place where the contract is made), these contracts
are governed by our laws, primarily the Labor Code of the
Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR); Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad, he or
she is entitled to security of tenure, among other
constitutional rights.—Security of tenure remains even if
employees, particularly the Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs), work in a different jurisdiction. Since the employment
contracts of OFWs are perfected in the Philippines, and
following the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the
place where the contract is made), these contracts are
governed by our laws, primarily the Labor Code of the
Philippines and its implementing rules and regulations. At the
same time, our laws generally apply even to employment
contracts of OFWs as our Constitution explicitly provides that
the State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or
overseas. Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad, he or
she is entitled to security of tenure, among other constitutional
rights.
Same; Probationary Employees; As regards a
probationary employee, his or her dismissal may be
allowed only if there is just cause or such reason to
conclude that the employee fails to qualify as regular
employee pursuant to reasonable standards made known
to the employee at the time of engagement.—Even
assuming that Dagasdas was still a probationary employee
when he was terminated, his dismissal must still be with a valid
cause. As regards a probationary employee, his or her
dismissal may be allowed only if there is just cause or such
reason to conclude that the employee fails to qualify as regular
employee pursuant to reasonable standards made known to
the employee at the time of engagement. Here, ITM failed to
prove that it informed Dagasdas of any predetermined
standards from which his work will be gauged. In the contract
he signed while still in the Philippines, Dagasdas was
employed as Network Technician; on the other hand, his new
contract indicated that he was employed as Superintendent.
However, no job description — or such duties and
responsibilities attached to either position — was adduced in
evidence. It thus means that the job for which Dagasdas was
hired was not definite from the beginning. Indeed, Dagasdas
was not sufficiently informed of the work standards for which
his performance will be measured. Even his position based on
the job title given him was not fully explained by his employer.
Simply put, ITM failed to show that it set and communicated
work standards for Dagasdas to follow, and on which his
efficiency (or the lack thereof) may be determined.
Same; Employment Contracts; Overseas Filipino
Workers; Unless the employment contract of an Overseas
Filipino Worker (OFW) is processed through the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), the same
does not bind the concerned OFW because if the contract
is not reviewed by the POEA, certainly the State has no
means of determining the suitability of foreign laws to our
overseas workers.—The new contract was not shown to have
been processed through the POEA. Under our Labor Code,
employers hiring OFWs may only do so through entities
authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment. Unless the employment contract of an OFW is
processed through the POEA, the same does not bind the
concerned OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the
POEA, certainly the State has no means of determining the
suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers.
Same; Termination of Employment; Overseas
Filipino Workers; The employer must inform the employee
of the cause or causes for his or her termination, and
thereafter, the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Aside
from the notice requirement, the employee must be
accorded the opportunity to be heard.—A valid dismissal
requires substantive and procedural due process. As regards
the latter, the employer must give the concerned employee at
least two notices before his or her termination. Specifically, the
employer must inform the employee of the cause or causes for
his or her termination, and thereafter, the employer’s decision
to dismiss him. Aside from the notice requirement, the
employee must be accorded the opportunity to be heard. Here,
no prior notice of purported infraction, and such opportunity to
explain on any accusation against him was given to Dagasdas.
He was simply given a notice of termination. In fact, it appears
that ITM intended not to comply with the twin notice
requirement. As above quoted, under the new contract, ITM
reserved in its favor the right to terminate the contract without
serving any notice to Dagasdas in specified cases, which
included such situation where the employer decides to dismiss
the employee within the probationary period. Without doubt,
ITM violated the due process requirement in dismissing an
employee.
Same; Quitclaims; Generally, the employee’s waiver
or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee from
demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled, and
from filing an illegal dismissal case.—Generally, the
88
employee’s waiver or quitclaim cannot prevent the employee
from demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled, and
from filing an illegal dismissal case. This is because waiver or
quitclaim is looked upon with disfavor, and is frowned upon for
being contrary to public policy. Unless it can be established
that the person executing the waiver voluntarily did so, with full
understanding of its contents, and with reasonable and
credible consideration, the same is not a valid and binding
undertaking. Moreover, the burden to prove that the waiver or
quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the employer.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
September 26, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 115396, which annulled and set aside the
March 29, 20102 and June 2, 20103 Resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC OFW-L-
02-000071-10, and concomitantly reinstated the November 27,
2009 Decision4 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissing the
Complaint for lack of merit.
5 the ITM Office.19 Later, 11M gave him a termination
Also challenged is the January 28, 2013 Resolution denying
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rutcher T. Dagasdas
(Dagasdas ).
Factual Antecedents
Grand Placement and General Services Corp. (GPGS) is a
licensed
recruitment or placement agency in the Philippines while Saudi
Aramco (Aramco) is its counterpart in Saudi Arabia. On the
other hand, Industrial & Management Technology Methods Co.
Ltd. (ITM) is the principal of GPGS, a company existing in
Saudi Arabia. 6
In November 2007, GPGS, for and on behalf of ITM, employed
Dagasdas as Network Technician. He was to be deployed in
Saudi Arabia under a one-year contract7 with a monthly salary
of Saudi Riyal (SR) 5,112.00. Before leaving the Philippines,
Dagasdas underwent skill training8 and pre-departure
orientation as Network Technician.9Nonetheless, his Job
Offer10 indicated that he was accepted by Aramco and ITM for
the position of "Supt."
Dagasdas contended that although his position under his
contract was as a Network Technician, he actually applied for
and was engaged as a Civil Engineer considering that his
transcript of records, 11 diploma 12 as well as his curriculum
vitae 13 showed that he had a degree in Civil Engineering, and
his work experiences were all related to this field. Purportedly9
the position of Network Technician was only for the purpose of
securing a visa for Saudi Arabia because ITM could not
support visa application for Civil Engineers. 14
On February 8, 2008, Dagasdas arrived in Saudi
Arabia.15 Thereafter, he signed with ITM a new employment
contract16 which stipulated that the latter contracted him as
Superintendent or in any capacity within the scope of his
abilities with salary of SR5,112.00 and allowance of
SR2,045.00 per month. Under this contract, Dagasdas shall be
placed under a three-month probationary period; and, this new
contract shall cancel all contracts prior to its date from any
source.
On February 11, 2008, Dagasdas reported at ITM's worksite in
Khurais, Saudi Arabia. 17 There, he was allegedly given tasks
suited for a Mechanical Engineer, which were foreign to the job
he applied for and to his work experience. Seeing that he would
not be able to perform well in his work, Dagasdas raised his
conce1n to his Supervisor in the Mechanical Engineering
Department. Consequently, he was transferred to the Civil
Engineering Department, was temporarily given a position as
Civil Construction Engineer, and was issued anidentification
card good for one month. Dagasdas averred that on March 9,
2008, he was directed to exit the worksite but Rashid H.
Siddiqui (Siddiqui), the Site Coordinator Manager, advised him
to remain in the premises, and promised to secure him the
position he applied for. However, before Dagasdas' case was
investigated, Siddiqui had severed his employment with ITM. 18
In April 2008, Dagasdas returned to Al-Khobar and stayed at
notice20 indicating that his last day of work was on April 30,
2008, and he was dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his
contract, which provided that ITM reserved the right to
terminate any employee within the three-month probationary
period without need of any notice to the employee.21
Before his repatriation, Dagasdas signed a Statement of
Quitclaim22 with Final Settlement23 stating that ITM paid him all
the salaries and benefits for his services from February 11,
2008 to April 30, 2008 in the total amow1t of SR7,156.80, and
ITM was relieved from all financial obligations due to
Dagasdas.
On June 24, 2008, Dagasdas returned to the
Philippines.24 Thereafter, he filed an illegal dismissal case
against GPGS, ITM, and Aramco.
Dagasdas accused GPGS, ITM, and Aramco of
misrepresentation, which resulted in the mismatch in the work
assigned to him. He contended that such claim was supported
by exchanges of electronic mail (e-mail) establishing that
GPGS, ITM, and Aramco were aware of the job 1nismatch that
had befallen him. 25 He also argued that although he was
engaged as a project employee, he was still entitled to security
of tenure for the duration of his contract. He maintained that
GPGS, ITM, and Aramco merely invented "imaginary cause/s"
to terminate him. Thus, he claimed that he was dismissed
without cause and due process of law.26
GPGS, ITM, and Aramco countered that Dagasdas was legally
dismissed. They explained that Dagasdas was aware that he
was employed as Network Technician but he could not perform
his work in accordance with the standards of his employer.
They added that Dagasdas was informed of his poor
performance, and he conformed to his termination as
evidenced by his quitclaim. 27 They also stressed that
Dagasdas was only a probationary employee since he worked
for ITM for less than three months.28
89
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On November 27, 2009, the LA dismissed the case for lack of
merit. The LA pointed out that when Dagasdas signed his new
employment contract in Saudi Arabia, he accepted its
stipulations, including the fact that he had to undergo
probationary status. She declared that this new contract was
more advantageous for Dagasdas as his position was
upgraded to that of a Superintendent, and he was likewise
given an allowance ofSR2,045.00 aside from his salary of
SR5,112.00 per month. According to the LA, for being more
favorable, this new contract was not prohibited by law. She
also decreed that Dagasdas fell short of the expected work
performance; as such, his employer dismissed him as part of
its management prerogative.
Consequently, Dagasdas appealed to the NLRC.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
On March 29, 2010, the NLRC issued a Resolution finding
Dagasdas' dismissal illegal. The decretal portion of the NLRC
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED, and the respondent[s] are hereby ordered to pay
the complainant the salaries corresponding to the unexpired
p01tion of his contract amounting to SR46,008 (SR5112 x 9
months, or from May 1, 2008 to January 31, 2009), plus ten
percent (10%) thereof as attorney's foes. The respondents are
jointly and severally liable for the judgment awards, which are
payable in Philippine currency converted on the basis of the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment.
SO ORDERED.29
The NLRC stated that Dagasdas, who was a Civil Engineering
graduate, was "recruited on paper" by GPGS as Network
Technician but the real understanding between the parties was
to hire him as Superintendent. It held that GPGS erroneously
recruited Dagasdas, and failed to inform him that he was hired
as a "Mechanical Superintendent" meant for a Mechanical
Engineer. It declared that while ITM has the prerogative to
continue the employment of individuals only if they were
qualified, Dagasdas' dismissal amounted to illegal termination
since the mismatch between his qualifications and the job
given him was no fault of his.
The NLRC added that Dagasdas should not be made to suffer
the consequences of the miscommunication between GPGS
and ITM considering that the government obligates
employment agencies recruiting Filipinos for overseas work to
"select only medically and technically qualified recruits."30
On June 2, 2010, the NLRC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of its Resolution dated March 29, 2010.
Undeterred, GPGS filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
ruling that Dagasdas was illegally dismissed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On September 26, 2012, the CA set aside the NLRC
Resolutions and reinstated the LA Decision dismissing the
case for lack of merit.
The CA could not accede to the conclusion that the real
agreement between the parties was to employ Dagasdas as
Superintendent. It stressed that Dagasdas left the Philippines
pursuant to his employment contract indicating that he was to
work as a Network Technician; when he arrived in Saudi Arabia
and signed a new contract for the position of a Superintendent,
the agreement was with no participation of GPGS, and said
new contract was only between Dagasdas and ITM. It
emphasized that after commencing work as Superintendent,
Dagasdas realized that he could not perform his tasks, and
"[s]eemingly, it was [Dagasdas] himself who voluntarily
withdrew from his assigned work for lack of competence." 31 It
faulted the NLRC for falling to consider that Dagasdas backed
out as Superintendent on the excuse that the same required
the skills of a Mechanical Engineer.
In holding that Dagasdas' dismissal was legal, the CA gave
credence to Dagasdas' Statement of Quitclaim and Final
Settlement. It ruled that for having voluntarily accepted money
from his employer, Dagasdas accepted his termination and
released his employer from future financial obligations arising
from his past employment with it.
On January 28, 2013, the CA denied Dagasdas' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, Dagasdas filed this Petition raising these grounds:
[1] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITIED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN TT Rt.
VERSED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATION’S COMMISSION.32
[2] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PATENTLY ERRED WITH ITS FINDINGS THAT THE
CONTRACT SIGNED BY DAGASDAS IN
ALKHOBAR IS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
LATTER AND THAT IT WAS [H]IS PERSONAL ACT
OR DECISION [TO SIGN] THE SAME.33
[3] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
GRAVELY ERRED IN FAULTING THE NLRC FOR
ITS FAILURE TO INVALIDATE OR DISCUSS THE
FINAL SETTLEMENT AND STATEMENT OF
QUITCLAIM SIGNED BY [DAGASDAS].34
Dagasdas reiterates that he was only recruited "on paper" as
a Network Technician but the real agreement between him and
his employer was to engage him as Superintendent in t'1e field
of Civil Engineering, he being a Civil Engineering graduate with
vast experience in said field. He stresses that he was
terminated because of a "discipline mismatch" as his employer
actually needed a Mechanical (Engineer) Superintendent, not
a Civil Engineer.
90
In addition, Dagasdas insists that he did not voluntarily back
out from his work. If not for the discipline mismatch, he could
have performed his job as was expected of him. He also denies
that the new employment contract he signed while in Saudi
Arabia was more advant1geous to him since the basic salary
and allowance stipulated therein are just the same with that in
his Job Offer. He argues that the new contract was even
disadvantageous because it was inserted therein that he still
had to undergo probationary status for three months.
Finally, Dagasdas contends that the new contract he signed
while in Saudi Arabia was void because it was not approved by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
He also claims that CA should have closely examined his
quitclaim because he only signed it to afford his plane ticket for
his repatriation.
On the other hand, G PGS maintains that Dagasdas was fully
aware that he applied for and was accepted as Network
Technician. It also stresses that it was Dagasdas himself who
decided to accept from ITM a new job offer when he arrived in
Saudi Arabia. It further declares that Dagasdas' quitclaim is
valid as there is no showing that he was compelled to sign it.
Issue
Was Dagasdas validly dismissed from work?
Our Ruling
The Petition is with merit.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, this rule allows
certain exceptions, including a situation where the findings of
fact of the courts or tribunals below are conflicting. 35 In this
case, the CA and the NLRC arrived at divergent factual
findings anent Dagasdas' termination. As such, the Court
deems it necessary to re-examine these findings and
detemline whether the CA has sufficient basis to annul the
NLRC Decision, and set aside its finding that Dagasdas was
illegally dismissed from work.
Moreover, it is well-settled that employers have the prerogative
to impose standards on the work quantity and quality of their
employees and provide measures to ensure compliance
therewith. Non-compliance with work standards may thus be a
valid cause for dismissing an employee. Nonetheless, to
ensure that employers will not abuse their prerogatives, the
same is tempered by security of tenure whereby the
employees are guaranteed substantive and procedural due
process before they are dismissed from work. 36
Security of tenure remains even if employees, particularly the
overseas Filipino workers (OFW), work in a different
jurisdiction. Since the employment contracts of OFWs are
perfected in the Philippines, and following the principle of lex
loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
made), these contracts are governed by our laws, prin1arily the
Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules and
regulations.37 At the same time, our laws generally apply even
to employment contracts of OFWs as our Constitution explicitly
provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor,
whether local or overseas.38 Thus, even if a Filipino is
employed abroad, he or she is entitled to security of tenure,
among other constitutional rights.39
In this case, prior to his deployment and while still in the
Philippines, Dagasdas was made to sign a POEA-approved
contract with GPGS, on behalf of ITM; and, upon arrival in
Saudi Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment contract.
Nonetheless, this new contract, which was used as basis for
dismissing Dagasdas, is void.
First, Dagasdas' new contract is in clear violation of his right to
security of tenure.
Under the Labor Code of the Philippines the following are the
just causes for dismissing an employee:
ARTICLE 297. [282] Termination by Employer. - An employer
may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.40
However, per the notice of termination given to Dagasdas, ITM
terminated him for violating clause 17.4.3 of his new
contract, viz.:
17.4 The Company reserves the right to terminate this
agreement without serving any notice to the Consultant in the
following cases:
xxxx
17.4.3 If the Consultant is terminated by company or its client
within the probation period of 3 months.41
Based on the foregoing, there is no clear justification for the
dismissal of Dagasdas other than the exercise of ITM's right to
terminate him within the probationary period. While our Civil
Code recognizes that parties may stipulate in their contracts
such terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
these terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or policy.42 The above-cited clause
is contrary to law because as discussed, our Constitution
guarantees that employees, local or overseas, are entitled to
security of tenure. To allow employers to reserve a right to
91
terminate employees without cause is violative of this
guarantee of security of tenure.
Moreover, even assuming that Dagasdas was still a
probationary employee when he was terminated, his dismissal
must still be with a valid cause. As regards a probationary
employee, his or her dismissal may be allowed only if there is
just cause or such reason to conclude that the employee fails
to qualify as regular employee pursuant to reasonable
standards made known to the employee at the time of
engagement.43
Here, ITM failed to prove that it informed Dagasdas of any
predetermined
standards from which his work will be gauged.44 In the contract
he signed while still in the Philippines, Dagsadas was
employed as Network Technician; on the other hand, his new
contract indicated that he was employed as Superintendent.
However, no job description - or such duties and
responsibilities attached to either position - was adduced in
evidence. It thus means that the job for which Dagasdas was
hired was not definite from the beginning.
Indeed, Dagasdas was not sufficiently informed of the work
standards for which his performance will be measured. Even
his position based on the job title given him was not fully
explained by his employer. Simply put, ITM failed to show that
it set and communicated work standards for Dagasdas to
follow, and on which his efficiency (or the lack thereof) may be
determined.
Second, the new contract was not shown to have been
processed through the POEA. Under our Labor Code,
employers hiring OFWs may only do so through entities
authorized by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment.45 Unless the employment contract of an OFW is
processed through the POEA, the same does not bind the
concerned OFW because if the contract is not reviewed by the
POEA, certainly the State has no means of determining the
suitability of foreign laws to our overseas workers. 46
This new contract also breached Dagasdas' original contract
as it was entered into even before the expiration of the original
contract approved by the POEA. Therefore, it cannot
supersede the original contract; its terms and conditions,
including reserving in favor of the employer the right to
terminate an employee without notice during the probationary
period, are void.47
Third, under this new contract, Dagasdas was not afforded
procedural due process when he was dismissed from work.
As cited above, a valid dismissal requires substantive and
procedural due process. As regards the latter, the employer
must give the concerned employee at least two notices before
his or her tem1ination. Specifically, the employer must inform
the employee of the cause or causes for his or her termination,
and thereafter, the employer's decision to dismiss him. Aside
from the notice requirement, the employee must be accorded
the opportunity to be heard.48
Here, no prior notice of purported infraction, and such
opportunity to explain on any accusation against him was given
to Dagasdas.1âwphi1 He was simply given a notice of
termination. In fact, it appears that ITM intended not to comply
with the twin notice requirement. As above-quoted, under the
new contract, ITM reserved in its favor the right to terminate
the contract without serving any notice to Dagasdas in
specified cases, which included such situation where the
employer decides to dismiss the employee within the
probationary period. Without doubt, ITM violated the due
process requirement in dismissing an employee.
Lastly, while it is shown that Dagasdas executed a waiver in
favor of his employer, the same does not preclude him from
filing this suit.
Generally, the employee's waiver or quitclaim cannot prevent
the employee from demanding benefits to which he or she is
entitled, and from filing an illegal dismissal case. This is
because waiver or quitclaim is looked upon with disfavor, and
is frowned upon for being contrary to public policy. Unless it
can be established that the person executing the waiver
voluntarily did so, with full understanding of its contents, and
with reasonable and credible consideration, the same is not a
valid and binding undertaking. Moreover, the burden to prove
that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the
employer.49
In this case, however, neither did GPGS nor its principal, ITM,
successfully discharged its burden. GPGS and/or ITM failed to
show that Dagasdas indeed voluntarily waived his claims
against the employer.
Indeed, even if Dagasdas signed a quitclaim, it does not
necessarily follow that he freely and voluntarily agreed to waive
all his claims against his employer.1âwphi1 Besides, there was
no reasonable consideration stipulated in said quitclaim
considering that it only determined the actual payment due to
Dagasdas from February 11, 2008 to April 30, 2008. Verily, this
quitclaim, under the semblance of a final settlement, cannot
absolve GPGS nor ITM from liability arising from the
employment contract of Dagasdas.50
All told, the dismissal of Dagasdas was without any valid cause
and due process of law. Hence, the NLRC properly ruled that
Dagasdas was illegally dismissed. Evidently, it was an error on
the part of the CA to hold that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when the NLRC ruled for Dagasdas.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 26, 2012 and Resolution dated January 28, 2013
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115396
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the March 29,
2010 and June 2, 2010 Resolutions of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC LAC OFW-L-02-000071-10
are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.