Argumentation (2019) 33:323–347

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-018-09475-7

Argument by Analogy in Ancient China

Yun Xie1 

Published online: 1 January 2019

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Abstract
Argument by analogy has long been regarded as the characteristic way of arguing in
ancient Chinese culture. Classic Chinese philosophers not only prefer to use anal-
ogy to argue for their own views, but also take efforts to theorize it in a system-
atic way. This paper aims to provide a careful study on the relevant ideas in ancient
China in order to reconstruct the ancient Chinese theory of argument by analogy,
and then to reveal some of its distinctive features through a comparison with the
Western counterpart account as developed by Aristotle. It is indicated that in ancient
China analogical argument was conceived primarily as a way of arguing based on
classification, with a unique mechanism of taking and giving according to kind.
On that basis, it is argued that although such a characterization captures the logical
structure of analogical argument in a similar way to Aristotle, the ancient Chinese
theory stresses the foundational role of a particular notion of kind, thus makes the
construction and application of analogical arguments become highly flexible and
context-sensitive. Moreover, it is also contended that in ancient China the ration-
ale of analogical arguments is explained from a general perspective of kind, relying
upon the universal knowledge pertaining to the forming of kinds. Then it is further
revealed that, unlike Aristotle who emphasizes the causal links between attributes in
the physical world, ancient Chinese thinkers justify analogical argument by appeal-
ing to some normative metaphysical and epistemological principles.

Keywords  Argument by analogy · Ancient China · Kind · Aristotle · The notion of

Li

* Yun Xie
xieyun6@mail.sysu.edu.cn
1
Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University,
Guangzhou 510275, People’s Republic of China

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1 Introduction: the Significance of Analogical Reasoning in Chinese

Context

It has long been a generally accepted claim that culture and language will affect
human cognition in many ways. There are plenty of evidence reported in rele-
vant literatures to support the view that people living in various social cultural
traditions will differ in their understanding of many things in the world, and in
particular, their modes of cognition or ways of thinking are also different (see
for example, Luria 1971; Lucy 1992; Levinson 1996; Nisbett et  al. 2001; Nis-
bett and Norenzayan 2002; Nisbett 2003; Kitayama and Cohen 2007; Rips and
Adler 2008, Section  11). Accordingly, different social and cultural background
could make varieties in argumentative practices between them, because argumen-
tation, as a social activity, not only reflects its participants’ sophisticated thinking
and communicating ability, but is also subject to the social–cultural institutions it
is embedded in. Presumably, this argumentative diversity is expected to be most
detectable when different cultural groups have no substantial connections yet,
especially, as in ancient times.
However, things become a little complicated when Chinese culture is con-
cerned, for there used to be a common view that Chinese people would always
prefer some non-confrontational and non-argumentative approaches in their
social lives, because of a longstanding tradition of stressing the notion of har-
mony in their cultural value systems and mainstream philosophies. In this con-
nection, some scholars have claimed that there is a lack of argumentative prac-
tice, and even a disinterest in logic, in ancient Chinese social–cultural tradition
(Oliver 1971; Becker 1986). But in last decades, this misunderstanding has been
gradually cleared up, due to a considerable amount of works in exploring the
communication practices and rhetoric theories in ancient China (see, for example,
Garrett 1993; Jensen 1992; Lu and Frank 1993; Lu 1998). Based on these works,
it is indicated that Chinese people in ancient times did have their own understand-
ing of argumentation, and that they had just conducted their arguing behaviors in
a considerably different way. Therefore, nowadays it is more tempting to believe
that an argumentative diversity does exist in ancient China, with a certain number
of characteristics that are explicable from a social cultural perspective.
In this context, many scholars, when trying to explore the argumentation prac-
tices in ancient China, have repeatedly reached the conclusion that the Chinese
argumentative diversity is indeed manifested by the prevailing uses of argument
by analogy, and its prominence in ancient Chinese thinking. For example, Gar-
rett has claimed in her overview of Asian rhetorical tradition that “arguments by
comparison (similes, examples, hypothetical examples, historical parallels, and
analogies)” are among “the types of arguments that predominate in Chinese dis-
course”, and are “the preferred modes of argumentation used by the classical Chi-
nese.” (Garrett 1991, pp. 299–301) Likewise, Reding has even gone much further
to maintain that “analogical reasoning, I suggest, is an original product of Chi-
nese intellectual history…In the first place, it seems that analogical reasoning is
extremely rare in early Greek philosophical literature.” (Reding 1986, pp. 41–42)

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Moreover, in recent literature on Chinese Logic, argument by analogy has also

been regarded as the most characteristic form of ancient Chinese argumentative
practice. On that basis, some Chinese scholars have strived to argue that Chinese
Logic is exactly a logic specialized in studying analogical arguments, therefore it
has its own legitimacy and differs substantially from its Western counterpart (i.e.,
the Aristotelian syllogism) (see Cui 2004b; Jin 2014).
Historically, the view that the ancient Chinese thinking is characterized by a pre-
dominance of analogical arguments could be traced back much earlier in 1950s to a
modern Chinese philosopher, Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973). In one of his compara-
tive studies on the relationship between logic and culture, Zhang has concluded by
saying that “the fundamentals of ancient western logic is syllogism…however, the
ancient Chinese did not think in syllogism, but in another different way which could
be called, if using the western logical terminology, ‘analogical reasoning’”(Zhang
1946, p. 59). As a result, Zhang’s claim has inspired many scholars to approach Chi-
nese Logic by exploring the studies of analogy in classic Chinese discourses and
texts. Among them, Qingtian Cui has made a significant contribution in 1990s to
fully develop this view. In general, Cui has tried to demonstrate that “analogical rea-
soning is the dominant type of reasoning that is prevailing in ancient China” (Cui
2004a). And more importantly, he has also attempted to justify such a view from a
cultural and linguistic perspective. According to Cui, for one thing, ancient Chinese
have always a practical orientation in their thinking to only concerns about issues
with practical meaning, focusing particularly on moral and political topics. In this
connection, analogical reasoning well accords with this thinking orientation because
the use of analogy requires an active attention to the substance, rather than to the
form, of reasoning. For another, “ancient Chinese language stresses particularly the
connection of meaning between linguistic elements. This language feature, to some
extent, facilitates the preference, as well as a habit, of correlative thinking in Chi-
nese people. Since correlative thinking is characteristic of a mode of thinking and
inferring in terms of similarity, therefore, it also results in the predominance of ana-
logical reasoning in Chinese mind” (Cui 2004b, pp. 113–116).
Given this special significance of analogical reasoning in China as indicated in
the above brief review, this paper aims to provide a careful study on the ancient
Chinese theory of argument by analogy, and then to reveal its distinctive features
from a comparative perspective. In Sect.  2, I first provide some illustration of the
practice of analogical arguments in ancient China, in order to show its importance
and popularity in ancient Chinese thinking. Then, in Sect. 3, I explore the relevant
ideas on analogical arguments that were developed in ancient China, with an aim to
reconstruct in a systematic way the ancient Chinese theory of argument by analogy.
On that basis, a comparison is made in Sect. 4 with its western counterpart theory
as developed by Aristotle, and then some remarks are offered regarding the pecu-
liarities in theorizing argument by analogy in ancient China. Finally I draw some
conclusions in Sect. 5.

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2 The Practice of Argument by Analogy in Ancient China

It is a matter of fact that arguments by analogy abound in classic Chinese texts, and
particularly in philosophers’ discussions about many important issues. Ancient Chi-
nese thinkers prefer to use analogical arguments in their disputations to defend their
own views and to refute their opponents. Among them the most famous examples
might be the following series of analogical arguments provided by Mencius, Gaozi
and Xunzi in their controversy over the human nature. In ancient Chinese philos-
ophy, the question of human nature being good or bad is a particularly important
issue. These three philosophers hold different views regarding the answer to this
question, and it is recorded that some of their arguments are indeed interrelated,
forming into an argumentative discourse that is proceeded almost exclusively via
analogy and counter-analogy.
Gaozi, for the first, believing that human nature is indifferent, i.e., neither good
nor bad, argued by an analogy that
Human nature is like the willow. Righteousness is like the cups. To make
morality out of human nature is like making cups out of the willow. (Mencius,
the chapter of Gaozi, in Jiao 1987, p. 732)1
It is easy to see that the willow is the wood materials with which we can make into
cups, but being able to be made into cups is surely not the nature of the willow.
Analogously, humans can have morality, but being able to have morality is not the
nature of human either, it is something that we have made it to become. It is clear
that here Gaozi is using an analogy to argue that human nature is not intrinsically
moral, i.e., good or bad. And in a similar vein, this view is contended more explic-
itly by his second analogical argument:
Human nature is like the flowing water. When you channel it to the east, it will
flow east, when you channel it to the west, it will flow west. So human nature
has no tendency of being good or bad, just as the water has no tendency of
flowing east or west. (ibid., p. 735)
However, this argument was refuted by a counter analogy advanced by Mencius,
who holds the view that humans are good in nature.
It is true that water shows no tendency of flowing east or west, but does it show
the same indifference to flowing upwards and downwards? Human nature has
a tendency to be good, just like the water has a tendency to flow downwards.
There is no man who is not good in nature, just as there is no water that does
not flow downwards. (ibid., p. 736)

1
  All quotations of ancient Chinese texts in this paper are translations. Following the reference conven-
tions in the field of ancient Chinese philosophy, I specify both the name of the classic work and the title
of the particular chapter where the original Chinese quotation is from. In addition, since classic Chinese
works normally have various versions or collections edited and interpreted by different scholars, I also
include the information about the particular book from which my quotations are taken.

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Many years later, another philosopher, Xunzi, has taken the wood analogy again
to argue for a very different thesis from either Gaozi’s or Mencius’. This time he
compared human nature to the crooked wood, which has to be forced straight, and
in that way he proposed a new analogy to argue that human nature is evil therefore
humans have to be cultivated.
Crooked wood inevitably requires steaming and straightening with the arrow-
straightener to straighten it…Human nature is bad [just as the crooked wood],
it inevitably requires instructions and standards to correct it. (Xunzi, Xing’e,
Wang 1988, p. 435)
In fact, in addition to its frequent uses in philosophical discussions, argument by
analogy has also played a prominent role in ancient Chinese thinkers’ own theory
constructions. For example, a fundamental method proposed by Confucius to seek
benevolence is to judge other people’s feelings by one’s own. It is advised that right
decision is always based on a comparison between similar situations, and in particu-
lar we should always put ourselves in the place of another, in order to better under-
stand the other by referring back to ourselves. Confucius has phrased this idea into
some famous Chinese mottos: “Always considering for the others by referring to
your own”, and “Don’t treat others the way you don’t want to be treated”. Likewise,
Mencius has also constructed a similar position by arguing that Saints, ordinary peo-
ple and all of us are of the same kind in the sense that we have something in com-
mon, therefore, we belong to the same class (human), and should spread our good
will onto the others. On that basis, Mencius proposed his ideal model of society in
which we should take care of the others’ parents and children, just like we should
take care of our own.

3 The Theory of Argument by Analogy: A Chinese Perspective

Actually, ancient Chinese philosophers not only deploy analogy frequently in their
argumentative practices, they have also carried out theoretical studies on that sub-
ject. Among them, it is widely recognized that the Mohists2 have made profound
investigations and provided the most important theorizing. So here in this paper I
will take their views as the major focus, but meanwhile some relevant ideas from
other philosophers, such as Mencius and Xunzi, will also be supplemented in the
discussion, in order to give a comprehensive overview of the ancient Chinese theory
on argument by analogy.

2
  The name of Mohists refers to Mozi and his followers, they are endorsers of Mohism, an ancient school
of Chinese philosophy that springs from the teachings of Mozi in the 5th century BCE.

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3.1 Lei (Kind): The Foundation of Analogical Argument

In ancient Chinese texts, when argument by analogy is reflected and theorized, it

is labeled as “Tui Lei”, a term consisting of two Chinese characters among which
the first one, “Tui”, means push or extend, and the second one, “Lei”, means kind or
sort. Hence, literally this term designates a process of extending a kind, and more
generally, it could also refer to a process of extending by kind, or inferring based
on kind. Accordingly, it is easy to see that argument by analogy in ancient China
is recognized in the first place as a form of arguing based on classification, and its
rationale rests on a proper extension of one kind. Here obviously the notion of kind
(Lei) constitutes the foundation of argument by analogy.
In fact, this emphasis on the significance of kind is not only characteristic for
analogical arguments, but is also a special feature in ancient Chinese epistemology.
In the system of ancient Chinese thinking, Lei functions as a crucial principle in cat-
egorizing things in the world, therefore, for almost all philosophers in ancient China,
it is regarded as a fundamental element in their epistemological theories. In gen-
eral, it is believed that any extensions of knowledge, as well as their justifications,
will need to bear on a right classification of distinct things into their own kinds,
and an adequate understanding of the differences and associations between different
kinds. In this connection, Mohists had explicitly contended that for any reasonable
discourse, including arguments by analogy, its legitimacy and effectiveness would
be relying upon the notion of Lei (kind) (Mozi, Daqu, Sun 2001, p. 413). According
to them, the justification of a claim will need to include three indispensable ele-
ments: Gu (Reason), Li (Principle) and Lei (Kind). More specifically, a claim should
be established on the basis of some reason(s), and this establishment, or the infer-
ence from the reason(s) to the claim, needs to comply with an underlying principle.
And more importantly, the legitimacy of both the reasons (Gu) and the underlying
principle (Li) will have to be based on the knowledge about the kind in question (Cui
2004a). Therefore, it is clear that among these three elements of justification, the
notion of Lei (kind) is recognized as more basic than the other two.
This fundamental notion of kind is further unpacked by ancient Chinese philoso-
phers in terms of commonality. According to Mohists, “if there is something in com-
mon, they are common in the kind…If there is nothing in common, they are not
in the same kind” (Mozi, Jingshuoshang, Sun 2001, p. 352), “it is just like that the
square things fit in the kind of square” (Mozi, Jingxia, Sun 2001, p. 328). No matter
the pieces of square woods or square rocks, their different qualities do not affect their
fittingness in the same kind of square. Another illustration would be that “a small
circle is a circle, a big circle is a circle, they are in the same kind because of having
the form of circle. Similarly, less than 1 m and less than a thousand miles are also of
the same kind, because they both are less in length” (Mozi, Daqu, Sun 2001, p. 408).
However, for many other ancient Chinese thinkers, this notion of commonality could
also be understood as similarity. As Mencius has contended, “things belong to the
same kind because of their similarity” (Mencius, Gaozi, Jiao 1987, p. 763).
Furthermore, for judging whether two things are belonging to the same kind,
the more specific criteria to be used is that they should have a common feature that
is also shared by all members belonging to their kind, while at the same time not

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shared by any member who is not belonging to their kind. Here is an example from
Mohists: we cannot classify horse and ox into different kinds based on the fact that
the ox has teeth and the horse has a tail, for these features are indeed shared by both
ox and horse. But we can classify horse and ox into different kinds based on the fact
that the ox has horn while the horse doesn’t, because the feature of having horn is
shared by all the ox, but not shared by any member of the horse. (Mozi, Jingshuoxia,
Sun 2001, pp. 385–386).

3.2 Taking and Giving According to Kind: The Mechanism of Argument

by Analogy

Given that the notion of Lei (kind) lays the foundation for arguing by analogy, then,
it is natural to see that its mechanism was conceived to be an inference based on
some operation on kind. This specific idea is formulated by Mohists as a principle
that is supposed to guide all rational thinking: Taking and Giving according to Lei
(Mozi, Xiaoqu, Sun 2001, p. 415). As far as argument is concerned, this principle
requires that we should always find our starting points or reasons based on kind,
and then infer to our claim or conclusion by the knowledge pertaining to that kind.
“Your argument for a claim is doomed to fail if you don’t know the right kind to
which that claim is belonging” (Mozi, Daqu, Sun 2001, p. 413).
In general, arguing by analogy, as is understood by ancient Chinese philosophers,
involves first (i) a classification of two objects into one kind based on their common-
ality or similarity, and then (ii) an inference from one object to the other through
an extension based on the knowledge about the kind they are belonging to, with an
effect of attributing them a same feature. More specifically, the mechanism of ana-
logical argument could be interpreted as follows: Given that one object is found to
resemble another in some way, we could correlate them together and thus identify a
kind, G. Then, since one object is known to have a feature X, thus we draw a conclu-
sion that the other object should also be attributed the same feature X, because they
are belonging to the same kind. More importantly, this inference is indeed an exten-
sion of our knowledge about the kind G, from one of its members that is known (i.e.,
one object having the feature X), to its another member that is unknown (i.e., the
other object also having the feature X). In particular, this extension, as well as the
inference involved, are in turn guaranteed by our knowledge about the kind, namely,
our knowing of that all the members in the same kind G are presumed to have the
same feature X, because that is the requirement of the principle that is underlying
our forming of such a kind.
Obviously, here the principle of “taking according to kind” is embodied in our
classifying two things into the same kind based on their commonality, which has
thereby laid the ground and provided us the starting point for the argument by anal-
ogy. And the principle of “giving according to kind” is illustrated in our attributing
the same feature to the other object in the conclusion, on the basis of the knowledge
pertaining to the kind. As a result, the structure of argument by analogy could be
reconstructed as the following scheme that consists of a two-step inference based on
kind:

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Y. Xie

[Taking according to kind]

A and B are of the same kind G (because of some commonality or similarity,

which is an indication of belonging to a same kind)
A is known to have a feature X,

[Giving according to kind]

Therefore,

B has the feature X (because members in that kind will have such a feature in
common, due to the underlying principle of that kind).

3.3 Li (Underlying Principle): the Rationale for Argument by Analogy

Moreover, it is important to note that ancient Chinese thinkers also have a keen
awareness of the issue of justifying analogical argument. In fact, they have taken
much efforts to explore the rationale behind the process of taking and giving accord-
ing to kind that is at work in arguing by analogy. As indicated above, the attribution
of a same feature to the other object (i.e., the inferential leap taken in analogical
argument) is recognized as admissible on the ground knowledge that all members in
their kind will have that feature in common. And for them such kind of knowledge is
further validated by some normative principle underlying the kind in question.
This idea of having a principle underlying a kind is captured by the notion of
Li, a term that is in need of some more clarification. As a Chinese philosophical
terminology, Li is quite significant in the context of Chinese intellectual tradition,
but with multiple and complicate meanings. In its original sense, it means the inher-
ent organic structure of things in the world (like, for example, the vein of a leaf).
For ancient Chinese thinkers, it is believed that everything will have its own dis-
tinct organic structure, and things can be generally recognized and understood only
through their basic structural principles. As a result, Li was first taken in Chinese
philosophy as a fundamental epistemic notion to conceptualize the basic structural
principles of things in the natural world. But gradually it has also become more
and more metaphysical, as an all-embracing system of principles and norms that
is underlying the reality of the external world, including the nature, the society and
even the whole universe. Furthermore, ancient Chinese philosophers also maintain
that the Li (principle) underlying each kind is normative and universal in nature. It
functions not only in the way of explaining why a kind is formed by its members
as such, but also in a way of determining the legitimacy of the membership within
such a kind. On the one hand, one can correlate things in the same kind only when
they are accord with a same Li, on the other hand, all members of a kind will have to
comply to the same underlying principle.
Then, regarding to the discussion on analogical arguments, it is easy to see why
Chinese philosophers have taken the notion of Li as a means to justify the inference
based on kind. As Xunzi has clarified, “things in the same kind will forever comply
to the same principle (Li), regardless of the length of time. It is by the help of these

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principles that we could avoid confusion when facing with the complicate world”
(Xunzi, Feixiang, Wang 1988, p. 82). In other words, the existence of a normative
principle underlying a kind constitutes the reason why we can argue by analogy. It
is such a principle that governs and authorizes the extension of knowledge about the
kind among its members, for all the members in the kind are presumed to fulfill the
requirement of that principle without exception. Therefore, it is by appealing to this
normative principle underlying a kind we are entitled to make inference in a way of
attributing a same feature from one member to another in the same kind.

3.4 Four Patterns of Argument by Analogy

When analogical arguments are put to use in various contexts in ancient China, there
are also some stereotype patterns emerged. These patterns have been widely and fre-
quently used, thus become relevantly conventional and highly effective in different
occasions. Accordingly, they are taken by ancient Chinese philosophers to be the
typical forms of argument by analogy, and have received much attention in their for-
mulations and specifications.
The first pattern is named Pi. It is originally defined as a method for knowing:
“make something unknown clear by referring it to another known” (Mozi, Xiaoqu,
Sun 2001, p. 416). Here is an illustrative example, suppose someone is outside the
room thus does not know what is inside, and he also sees the color outside is white,
then if he is told that the color inside the room is the same as the color outside, he
will then know it is also white inside the room. Basically, it is a process of knowing
something that is unknown (i.e., the color inside) through what is already known
(i.e., the color outside), based on the premise that they are in the same kind (i.e.,
being in the same color). However, this pattern has also been frequently deployed
in argumentation, in a way of arguing for a claim by referring to a similar claim that
has already been well understood and widely accepted. As a result, Pi is likewise
regarded explicitly as an effective argumentative pattern. For instance, when arguing
that all reasonable discourses will need to rely upon the notion of kind and comply
with its underlying principle, the Mohists have just used this pattern by referring to a
widely accepted common sense that “we need to follow the way in order to go some-
where. If a man does not know his way, he can’t make a step forward despite his
strong build” (Mozi, Daqu, Sun 2001, p. 413). Here the importance of following the
way is taken to be of the same kind with that of complying to the underlying princi-
ple, therefore, the well-known correctness of the former could then be attributed as a
same feature to the latter.
The second pattern is named Mou, which is clarified as arguing in a way that
“two claims should be judged the same if they are of the same form”(Mozi, Xiaoqu,
Sun 2001, p. 416). Here are two examples: “A white horse is a horse, therefore, rid-
ing a white horse is riding a horse…The person who named Huo is a human, there-
fore, loving the person who named Huo is loving a human.” (ibid., p. 417) This kind
of analogical argument is supposed to be acceptable on the ground that the state-
ments in its premise and conclusion are of the same kind, because of some formal
structural similarity between them. In particular, it is believed that adding the same

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Y. Xie

verb (i.e., ride) at the same time to both the subject (i.e., a white horse) and the
object (i.e., a horse) of a statement does not undermine its syntactic structure. And it
is in this way that the resulting new statement is in the same kind of the original one,
therefore could be attributed the same feature (i.e., being correct) that the original
statement has already had.
The third pattern is named Yuan, which is explained by Mohists in the form of
a rhetorical question: “if my opponent’s claim is right, then how could my claim
not be right?” (Mozi, Xiaoqu, Sun 2001, p. 416) More specifically, this pattern of
argument takes the claim of the opponent as a reason to argue for the conclusion,
which is supposed to be of the same kind of the opponent’s claim. For instance,
the Mohists had once used this pattern to defend their own position that “killing
a robber is not (committing a crime of) killing a person, even though a robber is a
person”, by offering as reason a similar claim that has been clearly held to be right
by his opponent: “having a lot of robbers is not having a lot of people, even though a
robber is a person” (ibid., p. 418).
The fourth pattern is named Tui. It is specified as a strategy in which a claim
that the opponent has not yet accepted is argued by “conjoining it to a claim the
opponent has already accepted, with the effect of forcing the opponent to accept it”
(Mozi, Xiaoqu, Sun 2001, p. 416). For example, a person named Gongmengzi, who
does not believe in ghosts and gods, once claimed that all gentlemen should learn
how to offer sacrifices to ghosts and gods. Then Mozi refuted him by the argument
that “learn how to offer sacrifices to ghosts and gods without believing in their exist-
ence, it is just like to learn how to host guests when there is no guests coming at all,
or is like to learn how to catch fish where there is no fish at all” (Mozi, Gongmeng,
Sun 2001, p. 457). Here because the claim to be argued are supposed to be of the
same kind of the claim the opponent has already accepted (i.e., To learn how to host
guests when there is no guests coming is obviously ridiculous), therefore it should
be attributed the same feature of being accepted (i.e., To learn how to offer sacrifices
to ghosts and gods without believing in their existence is also obviously ridiculous).
It is clear that all these patterns are basically simple forms of arguing by analogy,
for they all try to establish the conclusion by classifying two claims into the same
kind, and then to regard them as having the same desired feature. In this connec-
tion, it might look as though they are not that different in their respective formats.
However, it should be noted that their distinctions are based more on the differ-
ent contexts where an analogical argument is deployed in argumentative practices.
For example, the patterns of Yuan and Tui are quite alike in their forms since they
both try to justify a claim by conjoining it with another claim that the opponent
has already recognized. But they are purposely distinguished because the pattern
of Yuan is more often used in order to defend the correctness of the arguer’s own
position, while the pattern of Tui is more stressed as a strategy to persuade an audi-
ence who is clearly a skeptic of the acceptability of a claim. In other words, the
criteria used by ancient Chinese thinkers to distinguish those four patterns are not
theoretically motivated, but practically oriented. Hence the resulting distinction
between these stereotype patterns is supposed to be drawn in terms of the practical
uses of analogy in particular argumentative contexts, rather than in terms of some
structural differences or distinct mechanisms. Therefore, instead of being subtypes

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of analogical arguments, they are indeed more of different common applications of

argument by analogy in practice. Accordingly, such an ancient Chinese distinction
of four patterns might not be seen as comparable to a typology of analogical argu-
ments as developed in contemporary argumentation studies.

3.5 Faulty Analogy as Wrong Classification

Due to their frequent uses of analogical arguments, ancient Chinese thinkers have
also developed a clear awareness of the circumstances under which arguments by
analogy are wrongly deployed. And given that they have assumed a foundational
role for the notion of kind in analogical arguments, it is natural for them to think that
“distinguishing things into right kinds” is necessary as a precondition for any cor-
rect use of analogy. As Xunzi has put it, “when one makes no mistake in distinguish-
ing things into right kinds, one commits no error in her arguing by analogy.” (Xunzi,
Zhengming, Wang 1988, p. 423) In a similar manner, Mohists also make it clear that
“it is difficult to use argument by analogy, because different kinds will vary in their
scopes. It is hard to decide how large or how small the scope of a kind should be”
(Mozi, Jingxia, Sun 2001, p. 319). Accordingly, the use of analogical arguments will
be deemed incorrect when things of different kinds are classified into the same kind.
In this connection, ancient Chinese thinkers have explored the fallaciousness of
analogical arguments in two respects. For the first, seeming similarities could result
in faulty analogy. Mohists illustrate this point with some comparisons between
the night and wooden stick, the wisdom and grain. Specifically, we can say of one
night and a wooden stick both as being long or short, and we can also count some-
one’s wisdom and a stack of grains both as in big or small amount, but these are
only seeming similarities of being able to be measured by length and by quantity.
Hence it is not right for us to ask between one night and a wooden stick which one is
longer, nor is it reasonable to ask between someone’s wisdom and a stack of grains
which one is more in amount. Because, as Mohists have clarified, “things of differ-
ent kinds are not comparable” (Mozi, Jingxia, Sun 2001, p. 320), for members in dif-
ferent kinds would comply with quite different underlying principles.
For the second, the fallaciousness of analogical argument is generalized simply
as an error committed by wrongly classifying two different things into one kind.
And the arguer who has put forward such a faulty analogy will then be accused of
“being ignorant of the knowledge of (distinguishing) kinds”. Such an accusation is
actually quite severe in the ancient Chinese context, where it is widely believed that
a right classification of things into appropriate kinds (especially in the moral and
political domains) would have significant consequences in organizing and regulating
public and private human behaviors. Hence the mistakes in distinguishing kinds are
regarded as exactly the cause of chaos in personal life and in society.
Accordingly, for ancient Chinese thinkers, the powerful refusal of a given argu-
ment by analogy is always expressed by simply asserting that the objects being com-
pared in the argument are “of a different kind”. Thus, the strategy deployed in refut-
ing an analogical argument is normally to just deny the classification proposed, or
to establish a new distinction between the two objects involved. Here is an example:

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Y. Xie

Some rulers who delight in offensive warfare resort to sophistry in self-justifi-

cation and criticize Mozi, saying that “You claim that offensive warfare is an
unrighteous and unprofitable thing. But in ancient time King Yu launched an
expedition against the ruler of the Miao, King Tang attacked Jie, and King Wu
attacked Zhou, and yet all these three are regarded as sage kings. Why is this?”
Mozi said: “You have failed to examine the kind (Lei) to which my claim is
belonging to, hence failed to understand the reasons (Gu) behind it. What these
Kings did was not to ‘attack’, but to ‘punish (a criminal)’.”(Mozi, Feigong, Sun
2001, pp.145–146).
Here given that Mozi has endorsed the view that these three sage kings’ attacks
are righteous and profitable, those rulers attempted to argue by analogy that their
own offensive warfare is the same as the three sage kings’ attacks, therefore is also
as righteous and profitable as theirs. But as is shown in this example, Mozi accused
this analogical argument as being flawed simply on the ground that they had a
wrong classification as the basis for their analogy. In particular, Mozi has denied
those rulers’ classification by indicating that they just confused attacks to a criminal
with attacks to an innocent person, hence wrongly took them to be in the same kind.
In such a way he has directly refuted their analogical argument by undermining its
foundation, and thereby makes its conclusion groundless.

4 A Comparison with Aristotle’s Theory of Analogical Argument

As a matter of fact, the practicing and theorizing of analogical arguments has also
its origin in the western intellectual tradition, though it has never obtained a pre-
dominant status as it was in ancient China. Still, argument by analogy has long been
regarded as a common argument type, and it remains to be a topic throughout the
history of western logical studies. Moreover, there is also a rich literature on anal-
ogy in many other fields, such as that of philosophy and science (Achinstein 1964;
Hesse 1966; Bartha 2010), law (Becker 1973; Sunstein 1993; Sherwin 1999; Wein-
reb 2005), cognitive science (Gentner 1983; Holyoak and Thagard 1995; Gentner
et  al. 2001), and artificial intelligence (Helman 1988; Ashley 1990).3 In contem-
porary argumentation studies, argument by analogy has also received particular
attention since the 1980s, resulting in a variety of views, as well as some controver-
sies, regarding its typology (Govier 1987, 1989; Waller 2001; Guarini 2004; Kraus
2015), mechanism (Woods and Hudak 1989; Juthe 2005, 2009; Bermejo-Luque
2012; Macagno et al. 2017; Macagno 2017) and classification (Govier 1985; Brown
1989; Doury 2009; Garssen 2009; Juthe 2005, 2016).
In contrast, however, theoretical interest in analogical arguments has soon fade
away among ancient Chinese thinkers, following the decline of the Mohist philoso-
phy early in the Chinese history. It is from the Han Dynasty (202B.C.–220A.D.) that

3
  See Guarini et al. (2009) for a more comprehensive, multi-disciplinary collection of references on anal-
ogy.

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Argument by Analogy in Ancient China 335

Confucianism has become the dominant philosophy and ideology in Chinese cul-
ture, and since then almost all the logical studies on argument have been generally
discounted. Accordingly, there is sadly little advancement made by ancient Chinese
scholars that could contribute to developing a more elaborate theory of analogical
argument than that of Mohists. Therefore, if seen from this historical perspective,
it is only in its early stage that the Chinese studies of analogical argument could
be comparable to its counterpart in the Western intellectual tradition. Hence in this
section I would like to make such a comparison between the theory of argument by
analogy developed mainly by Mohists in ancient China and that developed by Aris-
totle in ancient Greece. By doing so, I hope to further explore the peculiarities of
this ancient Chinese theory from a comparative perspective.

4.1 Aristotle on Analogical Argument

Although Aristotle has explicitly used the term of ‘analogy’ in his works, it is
reported that he never discusses about analogical argument per se, or speaks of a
topos from analogy tout court (Hesse 1965, p. 332; Bartha 2010, p. 36; Rubinelli
2009, p. 75). Nevertheless, many scholars also believe that a systematic theory of
analogical argument can be reconstructed and credited to Aristotle, if we take an
overall consideration of his ideas regarding the classification of particulars into
species and genera, and of his discussions about topos from the example and from
likeness, scattered in all his works like Topics, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics,
Rhetoric, and Metaphysics (Hesse 1965; Lloyd 1966; Macagno and Walton 2009;
Kraus 2015).
According to Hesse, despite the fact that the classical Greek term for analogy
(analogia) is used mainly for mathematical proportion, like the ratios or relations
such as “B is to A as D is to C” (e.g. 3 is to 6, as 4 is to 8), Aristotle seems to hold a
dual nature of analogy, believing that there are two senses in which things are said
to be “analogous”: properties in common and similarity in the relation (Hesse 1965,
p. 330). These two kinds of analogical relations could be further unpacked in close
connection with Aristotle’s notion of likeness, which is divided into two types with
regard to the genera to which the two things compared are belonging:
Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things belonging to different
genera, the formula being: as one is to one thing, so is another to another (e.g.,
as knowledge stands to the object of knowledge, so is perception related to the
object of perception), or: as one is in one thing, so is another in another (e.g.,
as sight is in the eye, so is intellect in the soul, and as is a calm in the sea, so
is windlessness in the air). […] We should also look at things which belong to
the same genus, to see if any identical attribute belongs to them all, e.g. to a
man and a horse and a dog; for in so far as they have any identical attribute, in
so far they are alike. (Topics, 108a7–108a17)
Basically, when the likeness is between things belonging to different genera, the
comparison is between two relations, hence the analogy is in the sense of similarity
in the relation. When the likeness is between things belonging to the same genus,

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Y. Xie

the comparison is between (members of) two species, and then the analogy is in
the sense of commonality in property. By considering the nature of things being
compared as either concepts or states of affairs, Macagno et al. (2017) submit that
the Aristotelian notion of likeness could be further distinguished into four types,
each of which “can be considered as the grounds of distinct and similar types of
reasoning that the tradition has analyzed as distinct forms of analogical reason-
ing” (pp. 228–229). Among them, however, Aristotle seems to have mainly identi-
fied or emphasized two forms of analogical argument: the argument from example
(paradeigma) and the argument from likeness (homoiotes) (Bartha 2010, pp. 36–39;
Hesse 1965).
Aristotle takes argument from example to be enthymemes which “proceed from
one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deduc-
tively to a particular inference” (Rhetoric, 1402b15). An illustration would be the
following:
Let A be evil, B making war against neighbours, C Athenians against Thebans,
D Thebans against Phocians. If then we wish to prove that to fight with the
Thebans is an evil, we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil.
Conviction of this is obtained from similar cases, e.g. that the war against the
Phocians was an evil to the Thebans. Since then to fight against neighbours
is an evil, and to fight against the Thebans is to fight against neighbours, it is
clear that to fight against the Thebans is an evil. (Prior Analytics, 69a1)
At the first glance, argument from example is based on the likeness in the sense
of similarity in the relation, for particular cases are basically things belonging to
different genera. Here in this example “the war against Thebans is to Athenians, as
the war against Phocians is to Thebans”, they are alike because both are relation of
fighting a war with neighbour to a city-state, therefore, as the war against Phocians
is an evil to Thebans, so is the war against Thebans an evil to Athenians. However,
when the mechanism of this argument form is further explained, Aristotle makes it
more clear that argument from example draws its conclusion from a single particular
case, and “requires an additional (deductively valid) syllogism as its final step…thus
amounts to a single case induction followed by deductive inference.” (Prior Ana-
lytics, 69a15ff; Bartha 2010, p. 37) Hence, the claim that “Athenians fight against
Thebans is an evil” is argued via a universal proposition that “to fight against neigh-
bours is an evil”, which is in turn established by the particular similar case that “the
Thebans’ war against the Phocians was an evil”.
The other type of analogical argument discussed by Aristotle is called argument
from likeness. According to Bartha (2010, p. 38), this form of argument receives
considerable attention in Topics, and the most important passage pertaining to its
understanding is the following:
Try to secure admissions by means of likeness; for such admissions are
plausible, and the universal involved is less patent; e.g. that as knowledge
and ignorance of contraries is the same, so too perception of contraries
is the same; or vice versa, that since the perception is the same, so is the
knowledge also. This argument resembles induction, but is not the same

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Argument by Analogy in Ancient China 337

thing; for in induction it is the universal whose admission is secured from

the particulars, whereas in arguments from likeness, what is secured is not
the universal under which all the like cases fall. (Topics, 156b10-17)
In this passage, the first thing to note about argument from likeness is that
Aristotle takes it to be unclear whether there is a universal proposition involved
or secured, as an intermediate step as in the argument by example. This could be
interpreted firstly as an indication that Aristotle indeed regards argument from
likeness as being simply plausible, or just aiming to be practically persuasive
(Bartha 2010, p. 36). Nevertheless, it could also be taken as a clue to understand
the difference between the two forms of analogical arguments. Aristotle notes
that argument by example differs from induction because it arrives at a general
proposition while “does not draw its proof from all the particular cases” (Prior
Analytics, 69a15ff). However, as is indicated here, argument from likeness resem-
bles induction, but differs in the respect that “the universal under which all the
like cases fall” is less clear, and is not to be secured from particular cases. As
is illustrated by Aristotle, the knowledge and ignorance and perception of con-
traries are to be regarded alike, on that basis either of them could be admitted
to be characterized in a similar way with the other (i.e. being the same); but it
is not clear what kind of a universal proposition is involved here, which could
be safely established to guarantee such a similar characterization (For instance,
which kinds of likeness between knowledge and perception of contraries are to
be specified, that could sufficiently warrant their being characterized as the same?
And does this warrant have a secured generality?).
Another, perhaps more important, element in understanding argument from
likeness is the notion of likeness itself, which is defined by Aristotle in terms of
shared attributes: “Those things are called like which have the same attributes in
every respect, and those which have more attributes the same than different, and
those whose quality is one; and that which shares with another thing the greater
number or the more important of the attributes…in respect of which things are
capable of altering, is like that other thing.” (Metaphysics, 1018a15) Here it is
easy to see that argument from likeness is based on the likeness in the sense of
properties in common, for shared attributes are indeed identical properties. More-
over, for Aristotle, the discovery of shared attributes is exactly the way we should
take to define a genus (Posterior Analytics, 97b). In this connection, it is plausi-
ble for us to understand the argument from likeness as being relying more upon
the relationship between genus and species, taking the known shared attributes of
two things within the same genus to warrant inferring a further common attribute.
For example, since knowledge and perception are both epistemic status, then if
the knowledge is of contraries and is the same, so is the perception of contraries
the same. In fact, it is exactly due to this feature of passing from known simi-
larities to further possible similarity that contemporary scholars are apt to regard
Aristotle’s argument from likeness as much close to the modern understanding
of analogical arguments (Hesse 1965, p. 332; Bartha 2010, p. 38). And this con-
nection could also be traced back to Aristotle himself, if we have noticed that
his use of ‘analogy’ depends in the first place on his classification of particulars

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Y. Xie

into species, and this term is also introduced by him as a method for identifying
a genus that does not have a name yet (Hesse 1965, p. 329, 334; Macagno and
Walton 2009, p. 168).
The argument by likeness is further grounded on Aristotle’s account on the
genus-species relation: “Clearly, therefore, the species partake of the genera, but not
the genera of the species; for the species admits the account of the genus, whereas
the genus does not admit that of the species” (Topics, 121a10–14). Accordingly,
Aristotle formulates some rules of inference that could be adduced in argument from
likeness: “all the attributes that belong to the species belong to the genus as well;
e.g. if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposi-
tion; for disposition is the genus of knowledge…there is no necessity that all the
attributes that belong to the genus should belong also to the species; for animal is
winged and quadruped, but not so man” (Topics, 111a17-32; see also Macagno et al.
2017, pp. 230–235, for a more detailed discussion). In this regard, argument from
likeness does not hold in every cases, it works when the inferred attribute is “the
characteristics the generic concept has or may have intensionally, and not extension-
ally” (Macagno et al. 2017, p. 232).

4.2 Likeness and Similarity

According to Bartha (2010, pp. 36–40), Aristotle’s theory of analogy sets the stage
for all later Western theories of analogical arguments. In particular, it lays the foun-
dation for an important and influential commonsense account for the evaluation
of analogical arguments that has been widely endorsed by western scholars for a
long time (for example, Mill 1843/1930; Keynes 1921; Robinson 1930; Stebbing
1933; Copi 1961; Moore and Parker 1998; Woods et al. 2004). In such an account,
argument by analogy is commonly regarded as a form that can only establish its
conclusion as “more or less probable”, rather than “with logical necessity” (Copi
1986, p. 411). Hence its appraisal is subject to some non-formal, substantial criteria
such as “the number of aspects in which the things involved are said to be analo-
gous”, and “the number of points of difference between the instances mentioned in
the premises…and the instance with which the conclusion is concerned” (ibid., pp.
411–414). It is clear that this kind of evaluation is in agreement with the Aristotelian
ideas that likeness is embodied in shared attributes, thus similarity is reduced to a
conjunction of identical attributes or relations (Bartha 2010, p. 39). However, as is
indicated, although ancient Chinese thinkers had also connected their understanding
of analogy to the notion of likeness, they still preferred to assess analogical argu-
ments from the perspective of classification, rather than that of similarity or differ-
ence. For them, the fallaciousness of analogical argument is always a failure in “dis-
tinguishing things into right kinds”, instead of a deficiency of likeness.
However, this special attention to the notion of likeness or similarity indicates for
us the first clue to explore the difference between Aristotle’s theory of analogical
arguments and that developed in ancient China. We have seen that Aristotle takes
effort to expound the notion of likeness and distinguishes it into two types, as either
in property or in relation. Furthermore, as observed by many scholars (Lloyd 1966;

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Macagno and Walton 2009), Aristotle’s study of likenesses has indeed a fundamen-
tal importance in his logical theory. For example, Aristotle claims that the investiga-
tion of likeness is one of the means by which “we are to become well supplied with
deductions” (Topics, 105a21ff), and the examination of likeness is important “both
to inductive arguments and to hypothetical deductions, and also…to the rendering
of definitions”, for “it is not easy to do this [induction] if we do not know the points
of likeness. It is useful for hypothetical deductions because it is a reputable opinion
that among similars what is true of one is true also of the rest” (Topics, 108b). In
contrast, in ancient Chinese logical studies neither the notion of likeness nor that of
similarity has retained such a vital significance, thus both of them remain more or
less unexplored. It is interesting to note that, like Aristotle who defined a genus by
shared attributes, ancient Chinese thinkers also maintain that the task of distinguish-
ing kinds should rely upon a notion of commonality that is also interpreted in terms
of shared attributes (see Sect. 3.1). However, there seems to be no interest among
them to further examine or theorize it. For example, if we look at Mohists’ explana-
tion of commonality, there is actually a combination of examples that illustrate the
notion as either a particular identical attribute (e.g. ox are having the same feature of
having horn) or an abstract common relation (e.g. less than one metre and less than
a thousand miles are the same as being less in length). Nonetheless, such an obvious
difference attracts no attention to make any theoretical specification or distinction.
Accordingly, it is the notion of kind, instead of likeness or similarity, that plays the
pivotal role in the ancient Chinese theory of analogy. As is indicated, on the one hand,
the ancient Chinese term for analogy is made of the character of Lei (kind), with the lit-
eral meaning of extending a kind. Hence argument by analogy is recognized in the first
place as a form of arguing based on classification, being preconditioned with an iden-
tification of a particular kind. And the mechanism of analogical argument is also inter-
preted as a process of taking and giving according to the knowledge of the kind. On the
other hand, in ancient Chinese argumentative practices, the similarity based on which
two objects are classified into the same kind will remain simply assumed and always
implicit, with no specification when the analogy is put into use. As a result, in many
cases the use of argument by analogy is subject to a ready dependence on intuition.
Therefore, unlike the studies of analogical arguments in the western logical
tradition, there is no serious concern shown in ancient China to explore the typol-
ogy and degree of similarity between two analogous objects. To be more specific,
ancient Chinese thinkers merely take similarity as a means of making a working
classification. In principle, no matter how different two objects could be, a com-
monality between them will suffice for the purpose of analogy as long as it could
lead to recognizing a conceivable kind. For instance, consider the analogy between
human nature and flowing water offered by Gaozi to argue that human nature is not
intrinsically moral, the underlying common kind would be an understandable but
peculiar one: “things that can be ‘channeled’ (or developed) arbitrarily”.4 In fact,

4
  A possible reconstruction of this argument in line with the general model (as revealed in Sect.  3.2)
would be: Human nature and flowing water both belong to the same kind of “things that can be
‘channeled’(or developed) arbitrarily”, and it is clear that flowing water has no tendency (to go east or
west), therefore, human nature also has no tendency (of being good or bad).

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Y. Xie

this observation about the instrumental role of similarity in distinguishing kinds

in ancient China could also lead us to another clue for comparison, which I will
explore in next section.

4.3 The Notion of Kind

Clearly, if a commonality or similarity among objects could be easily taken by

ancient Chinese thinkers as an indicator for forming a kind, then their recognition of
a kind, as well as their classification system by kinds, would be more flexible when
compared with its western counterparts. Not surprisingly, it is indeed the case that
the Chinese notion of Lei (kind) is “not just a fixed natural kind”, but “a relevant
similarity group, a set of things that are similar in a relevant respect” (Harbsmeier
1998, p. 224), thereby cannot be treated as fully equal to the notion of category or
class in the western philosophical tradition. Specifically, “kinds or Lei in Chinese
logic separate things in a changing world according to different changeable associa-
tions, while ‘categories’ or ‘classes’ in Aristotelian logic arrange terms in a hierar-
chical class of genus and species, which is a pre-fixed order that provides the basis
for the study of deduction” (Yuan 2005, p. 183). In other words, for Aristotle “the
purpose of classification by genus and species is to exhibit and to explain the nature
of material substances” (Lloyd 1962, p. 86), but for ancient Chinese thinkers the
notion of Lei is only meant to offer some practical way to distinguish things in the
world and to locate them in their epistemic systems. In particular, as long as there is
a perspective, or as one can find a rationale (Li), of looking at two things in order to
conjoin them together in a relation, then these two things can be put into the same
kind, and an analogical argument is thereby made possible. However, when there is
a change in argumentative contexts, the perspective or the rationale used for distin-
guishing kinds before could also be adjustable. Therefore, “while Aristotle has ten
categories, Chinese logicians have countless kinds, which can come out in the prac-
tice along with the situations” (Yuan 2005, p. 190).
Meanwhile, given that there is also a lack of interest in examining the notion of
similarity, the ancient Chinese theory of analogical arguments turns out to be quite
charitable in recognizing remote things as analogous (see, for example, the anal-
ogy between human nature and wood material). In this connection, ancient Chinese
thinkers appear to be more free and less restricted in inventing analogies and in
legitimizing patterns of analogical argument (see, for example, the pattern of Mou
which argues in a quite peculiar way on the basis of syntactic similarity between
two claims). Accordingly, unlike Aristotle, they hardly show any interest in distin-
guishing analogy from example (or illustration, fable) and metaphor, and sometimes
they have even “moved freely from analogies to symbolisms and also from sym-
bolisms to analogies without finding the need to make a distinction between them”
(Liu 1974, p. 319). As a result, if seen from a contemporary point of view, we could
easily find that some ancient Chinese examples of analogical arguments cannot be
clearly distinguished from argument by metaphor or figurative analogy (Garssen
2009), and sometimes it would even be difficult for us to capture the exact common-
ality that is assumed to ground the analogy, and to identify the appropriate kind that

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Argument by Analogy in Ancient China 341

is functional in the argument (see again the example of the analogies among human
nature, following water and wood material).
Moreover, due to this particular notion of kind, the construction and application
of argument by analogy in ancient Chinese argumentative practices also become
highly context-sensitive and easily alterable. For instance, in Sect. 2, we have seen
that the same analogy between human nature and flowing water has been subtly
used by both Gaozi and Mencius to argue for exactly two opposite positions. And
Xunzi also borrows Gaozi’s analogy between human nature and wood material, but
to argue against the conclusion that was originally reached by Gaozi via that anal-
ogy. It is easy to see in these cases that, for ancient Chinese thinkers, the functioning
rationale for classifying two things into a possible kind is always changeable, being
subject to their practical considerations. In fact, there is also another, to some extent
more radical, example from the Mohists. As mentioned before, the Mohists once
made an analogical argument in the form of “A white horse is a horse, therefore, rid-
ing a white horse is riding a horse”, in which two statements are regarded as of the
same kind on the basis of some seemingly structural similarity. But later in another
occasion, we witness as well that exactly the same analogy is also disavowed by
Mohists themselves in their refuting of the argument “A robber is a person. There-
fore, killing a robber is killing a person” (Mozi, Xiaoqu, Sun 2001, p. 418). This
latter argument, though shares explicitly the structural similarity with the former
one, indeed argues for a claim that is precisely the opposite of Mohists’ own philo-
sophical position. It is for this reason that they have to disapprove of its adequacy.
However, this obvious inconsistency is usually explained, in their defense, in such
a way that “being a robber” is more than just being a person because of his com-
mitting a crime of robbing others, therefore, killing them should not be treated as
simply equivalent to killing a person. Here it is clear that a different perspective
has already been taken, and the rationale underlying the forming of the kind is also
modified, resulting in a new classification in which a robber can no longer be put in
the kind of “person”. As a result, the structural similarity on which the analogy was
based disappears in this new perspective, because now the structure of the statement
“a robber is a person” would not resemble that of the statement “a white horse is a
horse”, nor does it have the desired feature of “being correct” that is to be attributed
to the claim in conclusion.

4.4 The Logical Structure of Analogical Argument

To a great extent, the flexibility in distinguishing kinds is due to the practical orien-
tation that is prevailing in the Chinese intellectual tradition. Moreover, the lack of a
careful theoretical account for notions like similarity and classification well explains
why in ancient China the mechanism of analogical arguments is theorized in a very
general way as “taking and giving according to kind”. And it also makes it under-
standable that, unlike Aristotle who could discuss analogical arguments in regard
to different types and structures, ancient Chinese thinkers only specified different
patterns of analogy that are sensitive to practical contexts (see Sect. 3.4). But nev-
ertheless, such a relevantly undeveloped account has also captured the basic logical

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Y. Xie

structure of analogical argument in a way that is more or less similar to Aristotle’s

theory.
As is indicated, ancient Chinese thinkers understand analogical arguments basi-
cally as a form of arguing through extending the knowledge of a kind from a known
member to another unknown one. Particularly, a classification of two similar objects
into the same kind is used to lay the ground for analogy, and then a feature is attrib-
uted to the object in conclusion on the basis of the knowledge about that kind. In
this connection, the mechanism of “taking and giving according to kind” is indeed
unpacked into an inference with a more complicate structure: first, a particular kind
is identified based on some commonality between two objects, thus a generalization
is involved for forming such a kind; then, some universal knowledge pertaining to
that kind is appealed to, by means of which a common feature is authorized to be
given to a member in the kind. Here it is clear that for ancient Chinese thinkers there
is always an intervening generalization involved in an argument by analogy, which is
taken to be an indispensable prerequisite for the attribution of an identical common
feature.
The above particular view on the analogical inference structure in ancient
China, however, would also appear to be quite similar to its counterpart Aristote-
lian account. As discussed in Sect. 4.1, Aristotle talks respectively argument from
example and argument from likeness as two types of analogical argument. None-
theless, both forms are conceived more or less the same in their underlying logi-
cal structure: argument from likeness argues from the known shared attribute(s) in
two things to some further identical attribute between them via a genus to which
they both belong, while argument from example argues from one particular case to
another through a general proposition (Rhetoric, 1402b15), and both cases, as noted
by Aristotle, “are subordinate to the same term, but one of them is familiar” (Prior
Analytics, 69a15, italics added). Therefore, just as Macagno et al. have well argued,
the Aristotelian account for the general structure of analogical arguments could also
be interpreted as a twofold reasoning process consisting of first an abstraction of a
pragmatic or functional common genus (sometimes only a genus in metaphorical
sense) under which the two objects compared in analogy both fall, and then an attri-
bution of a same predicate from the Analogue to the genus, and then to the Target
(Macagno 2017; Macagno and Walton 2009; Macagno et  al. 2017; Macagno and
Zavatta 2014).5
In this connection, it is easy to see that the Chinese characterization of “taking
and giving according to kind” could also be interpreted as a transfer of an attribute
from one object to another by means of subsuming them into a higher genus. There-
fore, notwithstanding a conceptual difference between kind and genus, Aristotle and
ancient Chinese thinkers indeed understand the basic mechanism of analogical argu-
ments in the same manner. For them, arguing by analogy proceeds through a com-
parison between two objects, resulting in a kind of classification of them under the

5
  In a relevantly similar vein, Kraus also argues that it is a combination of an induction and a deduction
in which “a general statement is established by way of induction, and then from there a particular case
(the target claim) is again deduced” (Kraus 2015, p. 178).

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Argument by Analogy in Ancient China 343

same category represented by their similarity, and then arrives to the conclusion that
some further similarity exists. To some extent, given that analogical inference is so
common a form of human cognition across all times and cultures (Holyoak et  al.
2001), it is not surprising to find that a similar description is provided to portray its
basic cognitive processes. However, when the nature and rationale of such a form
of cognition is concerned, people from different cultural and philosophical back-
grounds would come up with dissimilar views.

4.5 The Justification of Analogical Argument

In fact, Aristotle does not examine the issue of justifying analogical arguments in
details. He once provides a basic principle pertaining to it: “for if it is as stated in
the case of some one like thing, it is so with the other like things as well, whereas if
it is not so in the case of some one of them, neither is it so in the case of the others”
(Topics, 14b29-32), but it seems to be too general a rule claiming that like things
being treated alike. Hence it is not very helpful to explain in particular the rationale
of analogical arguments, i.e., why it is reasonable to pass from known similarities
to a further similarity by means of identifying a genus common to a set of objects
being compared? Nevertheless, as Lloyd (1966) has observed, Aristotle typically
justifies analogical arguments by articulating a causal principle which governs the
two phenomena being compared. For instance, Aristotle explains the saltiness of the
sea by analogy with the saltiness of sweat, as a kind of residual earthy stuff exuded
in natural processes such as heating, and for this analogy he formulates a common
principle as “everything that grows and is naturally generated always leaves a resi-
due, like that of things burnt, consisting of this sort of earth” (Meteor., 358a15-20).
Accordingly, it is thought that “Aristotle believes that the important similarities
[in analogical arguments] are those that enter into such general causal principles”
(Bartha 2010, p. 39), thus his view regarding the justification of analogical argument
is in relation to the notion of causality (Hesse 1966; Lloyd 1966; Bartha 2010). In
other words, for Aristotle “good analogies drive from underlying common causes or
general laws” (Bartha 2010, p. 39), and the rationale of arguing by analogy lies in
the causal relationship between the similar attributes of objects in comparison. More
specifically, a transfer of an attribute from one object to another by means of anal-
ogy would be reasonable if the known similar attribute(s) has a causal or determin-
ing effect on that transferred attribute.
Unlike Aristotle who tends to emphasize the causal links among attributes of
things in the physical world, ancient Chinese thinkers have strived to justify ana-
logical arguments from a different perspective of kind, relying upon the universal
knowledge pertaining to the forming of kinds. As is indicated, the analogical infer-
ence is perceived by them as a proper extension of a kind, and in order to claim
its legitimacy, it is further contended that there is always some normative principle
underlying the identification of a kind, which will be conformed universally by all
the members of that kind, no matter known or unknown, in the past or the future.
And it is exactly due to this kind of universal principle that an argument by anal-
ogy becomes admissible, for a transfer of an attribute among members within a kind

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Y. Xie

then becomes a legitimate extension of our knowledge about that kind from one of
its known members to another unknown one (i.e. giving according to the kind).
Thus it can be seen that ancient Chinese thinkers prefer to explain the rationale
of analogical arguments in terms of universal epistemological principles, rather than
general causal laws of nature. However, this preference also reveals that they tend
to ground analogy on the basis of some cosmic uniformity, i.e., the presumption
that the universe is structured and ordered. And such a tendency is well manifested
in ancient Chinese thinkers’ use of the notion of Li as a means to justify the infer-
ence based on kind. As discussed in Sect.  3.3, the notion of Li is of fundamental
importance in ancient Chinese philosophical tradition: on the one hand, it represents
the structural model for the Chinese perception and comprehension of reality, and
on the other hand, it denotes to the general and basic rational structure underlying
the whole universe as understood from the traditional Chinese holistic world view.6
As observed by Rošker (2010), “the concept li indicates the notion of structure, a
structural pattern and the structural order of things” (p. 84), moreover, “a structure
ordered in accordance to cosmic rationality, which is also reflected in the human
mind as reason” (p. 92). When “taken as a whole, li represents a cosmic pattern,
defining lines of movement or the dynamicity of men and nature. These structural
lines are seen as relations which define both the sphere of ideas and that of phe-
nomena” (p. 84). Therefore, it is clear that the justificatory power of Li in regard to
analogical arguments indeed derives from its normative nature in both epistemology
and ontology within ancient Chinese philosophy.

5 Conclusion

Argument by analogy has long been appreciated as an argument type with special
significance in the Chinese context. Many scholars have recognized analogical argu-
ments as the characteristic way of arguing in ancient China, and then tried to under-
stand the Chinese argumentative diversity in terms of its prominence. In this paper,
the popularity of analogical arguments is illustrated in the argumentative practices
among ancient Chinese thinkers, and a reconstruction of their systematic theory on
that subject is provided. Argument by analogy in ancient China is theorized primar-
ily as a way of arguing based on classification, with a unique mechanism of taking
and giving according to kind. In particular, arguing by analogy is perceived to be a
proper extension of the knowledge pertaining to a kind, by attributing a same feature
from one of its member to another. Its rationale is then interpreted by appealing to
some normative principle underlying the forming of the kind. In addition, ancient

6
  It might occur to many readers that the Chinese notion of Li has a strong similarity with Aristotle’s
notion of substantial form, which could also be recognized as organizational principle of matter that
makes all things into various kinds of beings in the Aristotelian hylomorphic metaphysics. Although a
more detailed comparison of those two notion would definitely be of importance for the studies of com-
parative philosophy, here I choose not to explore it in this paper, because it seems to be unnecessary and
irrelevant to our discussions since Aristotle did not explain the reasonableness of analogy by means of
substantial form.

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Argument by Analogy in Ancient China 345

Chinese thinkers have identified four patterns of argument by analogy based on its
different applications in practical contexts, and they also explain the fallaciousness
of analogical arguments as an error of wrongly classifying two different things into
one kind.
When compared with its Western counterpart that is developed by Aristotle,
the ancient Chinese theory of argument by analogy is different in several respects.
For the first, the ancient Chinese conception of analogical arguments highlights
the foundational role for a particular notion of kind, which in turn makes the con-
struction and application of analogy become highly flexible and context-sensitive
in argumentative practices. For the second, due to a lack of theoretical examina-
tion on notions like similarity and classification, the mechanism of analogical argu-
ments is captured very generally as a form of arguing through extending the knowl-
edge of a kind among its members. But when this mechanism is further unpacked
into an inference structure, it turns out to be a similar account to that of Aristo-
tle: arguing by analogy involves a complex process in which a comparison of two
objects is made, and a transfer of an attribute from one object to another is allowed
by means of identifying a greater common category represented by their similarity.
For the third, in the ancient Chinese theory the rationale of analogical arguments is
explained from a general perspective of kind, relying upon the universal knowledge
pertaining to the forming of kinds. Unlike Aristotle who emphasizes the causal links
between attributes in the physical world, ancient Chinese thinkers prefer to justify
analogical argument by appealing to the metaphysical and epistemological princi-
ples that are thought to be normative in nature.

Acknowledgements  I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable criticisms, which are
very helpful for me to improve this paper. The work in this paper is supported by the National Social Sci-
ence Fund of China (18ZDA033), and the Guizhou Guoxue Project for Philosophy and Social Sciences
(17GZGX23).

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