HARM PRINCIPLE children were Jehovah's Witnesses; they believed that such a gesture of respect for the

flag was forbidden by Biblical commands.

-only legitimate basis for limiting an individual’s liberty of action is self-protection of the
community to which the individual belongs Note: Scholars have noted that while the Court spelled their name "Gobitis," the proper
spelling is actually "Gobitas."
- the state has no power to prevent an individual from doing whatever he wants to do on
the basis that it is done for the individual’s own good
Question

Whitney vs California
Did the mandatory flag salute infringe upon liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments?
Facts of the case
Conclusion
Charlotte Anita Whitney, a member of the Communist Labor Party of California, was
prosecuted under that state's Criminal Syndicalism Act. The Act prohibited advocating,
No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court declined to make itself "the school board for the
teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime, including "terrorism as a means of
country" and upheld the mandatory flag salute. The Court held that the state's interest in
accomplishing a change in industrial ownership. . .or effecting any political change."
"national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values" and that
national unity was "the basis of national security." The flag, the Court found, was an
Question
important symbol of national unity and could be a part of legislative initiatives designed
"to promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to
Did the Criminal Syndicalism Act violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments? the institutions of their country."

Conclusion West Virgina vs Barnette

In a unanimous decision, the Court sustained Whitney's conviction and held that the Act Facts of the case
did not violate the Constitution. The Court found that the Act violated neither the Due
Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause, and that freedom of speech guaranteed
The West Virginia Board of Education required that the flag salute be part of the program
by the First Amendment was not an absolute right. The Court argued "that a State. . .may
of activities in all public schools. All teachers and pupils were required to honor the Flag;
punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances. . .tending to. . .endanger the
refusal to salute was treated as "insubordination" and was punishable by expulsion and
foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means" and
charges of delinquency.
was not open to question. The decision is most notable for the concurring opinion written
by Justice Brandeis, in which he argued that only clear, present, and imminent threats of
Question
"serious evils" could justify suppression of speech.

Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment?
Minersville School District vs Gobitis
Conclusion
Facts of the case

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis
Lillian and William Gobitas were expelled from the public schools of Minersville,
and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. The
Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitas
Court found that such a salute was a form of utterance and was a means of
communicating ideas. "Compulsory unification of opinion," the Court held, was doomed to
failure and was antithetical to First Amendment values. Writing for the majority, Justice
Jackson argued that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."
Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION
106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959
FACTS:
1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their
schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the
conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for
the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of
Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.
2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary
and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.
3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine,
not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the
complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly
devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any
religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony
must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a
follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding
for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or
ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.
2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot
mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws,
rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute
on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or
refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted.
Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they
chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public
education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more.
According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to
comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend
public schools.
3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of
the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national
unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by
authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that
compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school
discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in
public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony,
petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were
attending.
Ebralinag, et al vs. Div. Supt. of Schools of Cebu G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness, and enrolled in various public and private schools,
which refused to sing the Phil. National Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic
pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS and
her Assistant issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989, directing District
Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions to
remove from service, after due process, teachers and school employees, and to deprive
the students and pupils from the benefit of public education, if they do not participate in
daily flag ceremony and doesn’t obey flag salute rule.
Members of the Jehovah’s Witness sect find such memorandum to be contrary to their
religious belief and choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate persuasions
made by the Cebu officials to let them obey the directives, still they opted to follow their
conviction to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the district supervisor of Daan
Bantayan District of Cebu, dated July 24, 1990, ordering the ‘dropping from the list’ in
the school register of all Jehovah’s Witness teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6
who opted to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute Law, however, given a
chance to be re-accepted if they change their mind.
Some Jehovah’s Witness members appealed to the Secretary of Education but the latter
did not answer to their letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed special civil actions for Mandamus,
Certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior
notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free
public education and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship. Petitioners
prayed for the voiding of the order of expulsion or ‘dropping from the rolls’ issued by
the District Supervisor; prohibiting and enjoining respondent from barring them from
classes; and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order
their(Petitioners) re-admission I their respective schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective
classes until further orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions defending
the expulsion orders issued by the respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in ‘external acts’ or behavior that would offend their countrymen
who believe in expressing their love of country through observance of the flag ceremony.
They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the
right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not
engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools
violates right receive free education.
Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovah’s Witness from the schools where they are
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to
receive free education, for it is the duty of the state to ‘protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education, and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art
XIV). Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag Ceremony does not give them a
right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention during flag
ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the
peace, or pose ‘a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any legitimate public interest that the state has a right and duty to
prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when
every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the
Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier, perhaps if petitioners had lived
through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the
Phil. Flag.
The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are hereby
annulled and set aside.
GREATEST AMOUNT OF GOOD FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER
Buck vs Bell
Facts of the case
Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution.
Her condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law
allowed for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the
patient and the welfare of society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a
hearing was required to determine whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do.
Question
Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process
of the law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made
clear that Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the
process of the substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing
had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit
Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so
requested by the patient. Only after "months of observation" could the operation take
place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation.
Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like
Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . .
Three generations of imbeciles are enough."
Skinner vs Oklahoma
Facts of the case
Oklahoma's Criminal Sterilization Act allowed the state to sterilize a person who had been
convicted three or more times of crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral
turpitude."
Question
Did the Act violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Conclusion
A unanimous Court held that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Since some crimes such as embezzlement, punishable as felonies
in Oklahoma, were excluded from the Act's jurisdiction, Justice Douglas reasoned that the
law had laid "an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality
of offense." Moreover, Douglas viewed procreation as one of the fundamental rights
requiring the judiciary's strict scrutiny.
Korematsu vs US
Facts. President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) issued an
executive order authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or
all persons may be excluded. Thereupon, a military commander ordered all persons of Japanese
descent, whether or not they were United States citizens, to leave their homes on the West
Coast and to report to assembly Centers.The Petitioner, a United States citizen of unchallenged
loyalty, but of Japanese descent, was convicted under a federal law making it an offense to fail
to comply with such military orders.
Issue.
Was it within the power of Congress and the Executive to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry
from the West Coast at the time that they were excluded?
Held. Yes. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was justified.
Justice Hugo Black stated that although the exclusion order imposed hardships upon a
large number of American citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under conditions of
warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect them must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.
Dissent.
Justice Frank Murphy (J. Murphy) argued that the exclusion at issue here goes over the
brink of constitutional power and falls into the abyss of racism. Although we must extend
great deference to the judgments of the military, it is essential that there be definite limits
to military discretion. Moreover, the military order is not reasonably related to the
dangers it seeks to prevent.
Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) stated he would not distort the United States
Constitution (Constitution) to approve everything the military may deem expedient
Vinuya vs Executive Secretary
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and
the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape
by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to
assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing
to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against
them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former
comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is
well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular
and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be
inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with
Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn
the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign
policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such
an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our
consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the
interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies
are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation,
and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Law in Action: Spirit of the Law

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a - Laws to be workable and acceptable to the people for whom they are framed, should suit
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to the people’s temperament, culture, ways of life and even the climate ,soil, environment
persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of and order of things in the land
one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the Lochner vs New York
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Facts of the case
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a
that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting week or 10 hours a day.
consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in
international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a Question
view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army Conclusion
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty
to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that
attained the status of jus cogens.
the statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth
Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court viewed the
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as
statute as a labor law; the state had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty by
a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a determining the hours of labor.
whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards
the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the
Mapp vs Ohio
field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States.
In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
Facts. Three Cleveland police officers arrived at the petitioner residence pursuant to
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
information that a bombing suspect was hiding out there and that paraphernalia regarding the
bombing was hidden there. The officers knocked and asked to enter, but the petitioner refused
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
to admit them without a search warrant after speaking with her attorney. The officers left and
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
returned approximately three hours later with what purported to be a search warrant. When
the petitioner failed to answer the door, the officers forcibly entered the residence. The
petitioner attorney arrived and was not permitted to see the petitioner or to enter theJustice William Douglas filed a concurring opinion. He believed this to be an appropriate case in
residence. The petitioner demanded to see the search warrant and when presented, shewhich to put an end to the asymmetry which Wolf imported into the law.
grabbed it and placed it in her shirt. Police struggled with the petitioner and eventually
recovered the warrant. The petitioner was then placed under arrest for being belligerent and
taken to her bedroom on the second floor of the residence. The officers then conducted aDiscussion.
widespread search of the residence wherein obscene materials were found in a trunk in the
basement. The petitioner was ultimately convicted of possessing these materials.
This case explicitly overrules Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The federal exclusionary rule
Issue. now applies to the States through application of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Whether evidence discovered during a search and seizure conducted in violation of the FourthAll illegally obtained evidence under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution must now be
Amendment of the Constitution shall be admissible in a State court? excluded.

Held. Justice Tom Clark filed the majority opinion. No, the exclusionary rule applies to
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure clause in all State
prosecutions. Since the Fourth Amendment right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
sanction of exclusion is also enforceable against them. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter illegally obtaining evidence and to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the
only effective manner. Otherwise, a State, by admitting illegally obtained evidence, disobeys the
Constitution that it has sworn to uphold. A federal prosecutor may make no use of illegally
obtained evidence, but a State prosecutor across the street may, although he supposedly is
operating under the enforceable prohibitions of the same Amendment. If the criminal is to go
free, then it must be the law that sets him free. Our government is the potent, omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law.

Dissent. Justice John Harlan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter and
Justice Charles Whittaker . A recent study shows that one half of the States still adhere to the
common-law non-exclusionary rule. The main concern is not the desirability of the rule, but
whether the States should be forced to follow it. This Court should continue to forbear from
fettering the States with an adamant rule which may embarrass them in coping with their own
peculiar problems in criminal law enforcement.
Concurrence.
Justice Hugo Black filed a concurring opinion. When the Fourth Amendment ban against
unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment ban
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies, but
actually requires the exclusionary rule.