Panganiban v.

Borromeo, 58 PHIL 367

FACTS: Husband and wife Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala signed a contract before the notary public
of Elias Borromeo. The contract had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Atty.
Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document. He was quite knowledgeable about its contents
although he did not know it fully because of a difference in dialect. The contract is an agreement between
the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to
live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is valid

HELD: No. Although RPC allowed the offended party to give pardon to his or her offender spouse, this
doesn’t mean that the purpose of the legislature is to legalize adultery and concubinage. A notarized
contract that permits concubinage and adultery is not judicially recognizable. Although the consent of a
party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes, the acts are still contrary to customs, good morals and
against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.

A.C. No. 932 IN RE: SANTIAGO 70 PHIL 66

IN RE: ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO
A.C. No. 932
June 21, 1940
FACTS: Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for 9 years,
sought the legal advice of the respondent for a possible second marriage.

They prepared the document. Baniquit then asked, "Would there be no trouble?" The respondent points
to his diploma and said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid."

Hence, he contracted a second marriage.

Respondent realized that he had made a mistake for the timeline of the separation of husband and wife,
and for that reason, he immediately sent for the contracting parties to sign the deed of cancellation of the
document.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be suspended.

RULING: Yes. The advice of the respondent and the document prepared by him as a notary public is
contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. It constitutes malpractice
which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.

In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly
negligent in giving the complainant legal advice.

SELANOVA VS. MENDOZA

Adm. Matter 804-CJ
 May 19, 1975

FACTS:

On November 21, 1972, respondent judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared and ratified a
document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of complainant Saturnino Selanova
and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. The contract, signed by the spouses and two witnesses before the
culpable judge, divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses between them, and
licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity; and withdraw the complaint fro adultery or
concubinage which each had filed against the other.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extrajudicial agreement between spouses to dissolve their marriage

is valid.

HELD:

The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the provision under Art. 221
of the Civil Code, which state that the following shall be void and of no effect: (1) any contract for
personal separation between husband and wife; (2) every extrajudicial agreement, during
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of
property between husband and wife.

Even before the approval of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held that the
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void. An
agreement between husband and wife which permits the husband to take a concubine and for the
wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, is void. While adultery and concubinage
are private crimes, they still remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary
to law, morals and public orders, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.

The judge having become a lawyer in 1948, who was in good faith and with honest
intent to terminate the marital conflict, since he was not aware of Art. 221 of the Civil Code, was
merely reprimanded.

De Leon v CA
GR No. 80965
June 6, 1990
FREEDOM OF STIPULATION OF CONTRACTS

FACTS:
(1) On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were
united in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal. On August 28, 1971, a child named Susana L.
De Leon was born from this union.
(2) Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital
differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home.
(3) Sometime in March, 1973, Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained American citizenship.
(4) On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, a petition
for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed claims for support
and distribution of properties. It appears, however, that since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and did not
have any assets in the United States, Sylvia chose to hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the meantime,
concentrated her efforts to obtain some sort of property settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
(5) On March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, private
respondent Macaria De Leon,
(6) On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of P100,000 and US$35,000.00 or
P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the aforestated Letter-Agreement.
(7) On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint petition
for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership

Applicable Laws:

(1) Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
(1255a)

(2) Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.

(3) Article 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain
extent fix the property relations during the marriage. (n)

(4) Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the
spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared
absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, or in case of
abandonment by the husband, separation of property may also be ordered by the court, according to the provisions
of articles 167 and 178, No. 3.

In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been entered against the guilty or absent
spouse. (1433a) The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as we l as of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors
and other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of
this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)

(5) Article 221.The following shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

(6) Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
fraud is voidable. (1265a)

(7) Article 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is
the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the
contract. Mistake as to the identity or qualifications of one of the parties will vitiate consent only when such identity
or qualifications have been the principal cause of the contract.

A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction. (1266a)

(8) Article 1414. When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by
one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been caused to a third
person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest will thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the
contract to recover the money or property.

(9) Article 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity. (1288)

(10) Article 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed.

There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or
ascendants, to give his consent.

To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind.

A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if t he claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.
(1267a)

RTC: WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that the conjugal partnership of the Spouses is DISSOLVED

ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid

HELD: The letter-agreement is invalid.

The cause or consideration for the intervenor Macaria De Leon in having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the
termination of the marital relationship between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de Leon.
Intervenor's undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination of marital relationship is not only contrary to
law but contrary to Filipino morals and public Policy. As such, any agreement or obligations based on such unlawful
consideration and which is contrary to public policy should be deemed null and void.

... the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife;

Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the proper law to be applied. It
provides:
When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one of the
parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been caused to a third person. In such
case, the courts may, if the public interest wig thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to recover
the money or property.
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari
delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted to
Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she was before the
transaction was entered into.

OTHER NOTES:
(1) Applying the foregoing to the present case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to bring Jose Vicente
to court for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits and that Sylvia would pardon Jose Vicente for
possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject to the transfer of certain properties to her, is obviously not
the intimidation referred to by law.

In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be
given;
(2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful;
(3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which
all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and
(4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the
necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury.

Pugeda vs Trias G.R. No. L-16925 March 31, 1962

FACTS:
On January 5, 1916, plaintiff and the Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of
the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask
the latter to marry them, that accordingly to Ricafrente celebrated the
desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of them was
Santiago Salazar and another Amadeo Prudente, and after the usual
ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage
contract and after the witness had signed the some, he delivered one
copy to the contracting parties and another to the President of the
Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time the keeper of the
records of the civil register. It is also stated that after the marriage,
Pugeda and Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for 18 years.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a
phtostatic copy of the marriages in the municipality of Rosario Cavite in
the month of January 1916 which showed that no records of the alleged
marriage existed therein but the Justice of the Peace explained perhaps
the person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage
in the registry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Fabian Pugeda and Maria C.
Ferrer exist.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage existed, in view of the proofs presented which are the
testimony of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage and
the living together of the parties as husband and wife for 18 years. The
failure of the solemnizing officer to send a copy of the marriage
certificate as well when the person who kept the register forgot to make
an entry are not a fatal defects.

Case Summary

Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al. 576 US (2015)

1. Reference details

Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of the United States

Date of decision: 26 June 2015

Link to full case: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf

2. Facts of the case

The petitioners were two men whose same-sex partners had died and fourteen same-sex couples

who all brought cases in their respective District Courts challenging either the denial of their right
to marry or the right to have their marriage performed elsewhere recognised in their own state.

The cases were heard in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee, each of which defines marriage

as between a woman and a man. In each case, the relevant District Court found in favour of the

petitioner. Each of the respondents, who were state officials responsible for enforcing the

relevant laws, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consolidated the respondents’

appeals and reversed the decisions, finding in favour of the respondents. The petitioners then

sought certiorari in the Supreme Court.

The situation of three of the petitioners illustrates the nature of the cases. James Obergefell and

his partner of over twenty years, John Arthur travelled from Ohio to Maryland in order to marry.

John died three months later of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis but Ohio law prevented James being

listed on John’s death certificate as surviving spouse. Same-sex partners April DeBoer and Jayne

Rowse have three adopted children; however, Michigan permits only opposite-sex married

couples or single persons to adopt, with the result that each child is treated as having only one

parent, and if that partner passed away, the other would have no legal right to the children. Ijpe

DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York, where same-sex marriage was legal, before Ijpe

was deployed to Afghanistan. Upon his return, they settled in Tennessee where their marriage is

not recognised, with the result that their legal status in relation to each other changes as they

travel between states.

3. Law

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

(…) nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.

4. Legal Arguments

Each petitioner sought certiorari (review of the decision of the Court of Appeals). They each

argued that the actions of the relevant respondent violated the Fourteenth Amendment by either

denying them their right to marry, or by denying the recognition of their marriage legally

performed in another state. The petitioners argued that rather than intending to devalue
marriage, it was their respect for the institution of marriage which meant that they sought it for

themselves.

The respondents argued that the petitioners did not seek recognition of the right to marry, but

sought recognition of a new and non-existent “right to same-sex marriage”. They argued that

marriage was by nature between a man and a woman and recognition of same-sex marriage

would demean the institution of marriage. Further, the respondents warned that there had not

been sufficient democratic discourse to decide on an issue as important as the definition of

marriage. In addition, they argued that if same-sex couples are allowed to marry, fewer oppositesex
couples would marry because the connection between marriage and procreation would be

severed. This would further harm the institution of marriage.

5. Decision

The Court ruled by a majority of 5 to 4 in favour of the petitioners. The majority decision,

delivered by Justice Kennedy (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. joined), first

considered the issue arising from the cases from Michigan and Kentucky, of whether states are

required to register same-sex marriages.

Requirement to Register Same-Sex Marriages

The majority began by noting that the institution of marriage has evolved over time both legally

and socially and that the states were now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage, before

turning to consider the Due Process Clause (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law”). The liberties protected by this Clause extend to choices

that are central to a person’s dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices about personal

beliefs and identity. Injustice is not always recognised in our own times and when new insights

reveal a conflict between Constitutional provisions and legislation, the Court must consider a

claim to liberty. Applying these considerations, the Court has long recognised that the

Constitution protected the right to marry, including in Loving v Virginia 388 US 1, 12 (1967), in

which the Court invalidated bans on interracial marriage.

Although these previous cases concerned opposite-sex marriages, they established more farreaching
constitutional principles, including four essential principles relating to the right to

marry: the right to personal choice in relation to marriage as an inherent aspect of an individual’s
autonomy; the importance of the union of marriage to the two individuals which was “unlike any

other”; that marriage provides a safeguard for children and families; and that marriage was

central to social order, with states offering married couples rights, benefits and responsibilities.

Each of these principles applies equally to same-sex marriages and while limiting marriage may

have previously been seen as just and natural, it is now manifest that limiting marriage to

opposite-sex partners is inconsistent with the “central meaning of the right to marry”. Such

knowledge must lead to recognition that banning of same-sex marriage imposes “stigma and

injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”

The respondents’ argument that the petitioners did not seek to exercise their right to marry but

rather sought a new “right to same-sex marriage” was inconsistent with the Court’s previous

approach to fundamental rights, including marriage. Rights cannot be restricted only to those

who have exercised them in the past. Such a restriction would allow accepted practice to provide

its own continuing justification and prevent groups from invoking rights previously denied to

them. Rights do not come only from history, but from a better understanding of how liberty

should be defined in our own time. It would diminish the personhood of same-sex couples and

disparage their choices if they were denied the same rights to marry as opposite-sex couples

under the Constitution.

The right to same-sex marriage is also guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. In interpreting

this Clause, the Court has “recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal

unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and

unchallenged”. The marriage laws challenged by the petitioners are “in essence unequal”. They

denied same-sex couples all the benefits granted to opposite-sex couples and work as a “grave

and continuing harm”, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians.

The respondents warned that the recognition of the right to same-sex marriage has been the

subject of too little democratic discourse. While it is recognised in the Constitution that

democracy is the appropriate process for changes to be made, that process cannot impair

fundamental rights. The Constitution allows an individual to seek protection for a violation of

their rights, even if the public disagrees and the legislature does not wish to act. The issue is
whether the Constitution protects the right to same-sex marriage and not whether same-sex

marriage currently has or lacks popular support.

The respondents showed no foundation to conclude that recognising same-sex marriage would

harm the institution of marriage.

Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages in Other States

If the current state of affairs is left in place (being married in one place but not another), the result

would be instability and uncertainty. It follows from the decision that same-sex couples may

marry in all states, that there is no lawful basis on which a state can refuse to recognise a samesex
marriage lawfully performed in another state because of its same-sex character.

Dissenting Judgments

Chief Justice Roberts (Scalia and Thomas JJ joining) dissented from the majority on the basis that

the Constitution did not allow judges to decide the definition of marriage as it left that decision to

the legislature. There was no legal basis for the majority to reach its conclusion.

Justice Scalia (Thomas J joining) joined the opinion of the Chief Justice in full and wrote a further

dissent, stating that the majority had robbed the people of the freedom to govern themselves.

Justice Thomas (Scalia J joining), noted that due process is not a “font of substantive rights”; it

simply required that before the right to life, liberty or property is taken away, a person is granted

whatever process is due. The danger of substantive due process is evidenced by the majority

taking away the right of the people to decide this issue for themselves. Even if there were a right

to substantive due process, the petitioners would still not succeed; the liberty spoken of in the

Constitution refers to freedom from physical restraint. Further, even if the notion of liberty was

expanded, it would not encompass the right to marry; it would refer to a freedom from

governmental action, not a right to any entitlement granted by the government.

The final dissent was Justice Alito (Tomas and Scalia JJ joining), dissenting on the basis that the

Constitution left the question of what states should do about same-sex marriage to the people of

each state.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.
______________________________________________________________________
_

Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that
he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery.
From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely,
and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth
certificate.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law
which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before
a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause
or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained
no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were
all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that
all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of

Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her
name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from
female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where
afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that
she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued
by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both
male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same
was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be

changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of
himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversityof
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That
is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.
The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that
will follow.

Case: Eigenman vs. Guerra (1964) 5 C.A. Rep. 836

-Eduardo Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on 1957.
-Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action to annul hismarriage withGuerra on the ground that he wasbetween
ages 16-20 at that time and his mother didnot give her consent to the marriage.

ISSUE: Wether or not there was parental consent, the absence of which could render the marriage
void.

HELD: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmann’s
mother was present at the time of the celebration of marriage and did not object thereto, such that
consent can be gleaned from such act.
- Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a minor at the time of the marriage
celebration, having represented himself to be over 25 years of age

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v.

JUDGE HERNANDODOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.

Facts:

On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage

between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma D. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
in relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from
his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married
man separated from his wife , and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied
in the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming
the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph I of the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized
by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”;
and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct,

inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

Held:

In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect
or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
marriage.

In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.

Monica and Burgos, he was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and
the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in

these cases, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignoranceof the
law because of this he is suspended for a period of six months.

MERCEDITA MATA ARANES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.

OCCIANO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.

Facts:

On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita
Mata Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license
at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of
Orobia was not recognized, because the marriage was a null. She also cannot
claim the pension of her husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his
illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so
much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain

Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on
17 February 2000. He was assured that all the documents were complete, thus
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000,
he acceded to the request of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua
because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan. Before starting the ceremony he discovered that the
parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, thus he refused to
solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However,
due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After
the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the
license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply,
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the
same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge
vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid
despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and
negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28

August 2001 confessing that she filed the complaint out of rage, and she realizes
her own shortcomings. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage and that it was because of her prodding and
reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same.

From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage
License on 5 January
2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia
claimed it. Also, the Civil
Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur has no
records of the marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of
respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage
license. The LCR informed the judge that they cannot issue the same due to
the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

Issue:

Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his
jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages
is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to

the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage
of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to gross ignorance of the
law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which preceded the issuance
of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed

by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the
withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action

WHEREFORE,Judge Salvador M. Occiano, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a

STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil 1

FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez were man and wife and had one child, Domingo de Leon.
Eulogio de Leon died in 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor. Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez had a child named Melecio Madridejo. On July 8, 1920,
Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by
virtue of articulo mortis, by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, leaving Domingo de
Leon, her son in her first marriage, and Melecio Madridejo, her son in her second husband. The parish
priest failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.

ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid

HELD: Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of
their marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal requisite. Failure of the priest to send a copy of
the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not
appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

MARTINEZ V. TAN 12 PHIL. 237

Facts
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the
witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor
of the defendant Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence supporting
this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he and plaintiff appeared before the
justice of peace along with their witnesses (by Ballori and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the
defendant, plaintiff and Ballori appeared before the justice of peace and signed the document, the
testimony of Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff of court that
defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all present during the ceremony.

Issue

Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before
the justice of the peace
Held

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed.

The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually
agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document
signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath,
before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting
parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due
form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife,
unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the
woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her,
which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and
signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It
was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language,
and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this
particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this
occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

ABBAS vs. ABBAS G.R. No. 183896 January

30, 2013 Void ab initio Marriage, Marriage
License as a Formal Requisite of a Valid
Marriage
MAY 8, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, met Gloria, a Filipino, in Taiwan in 1991 and they got
married there in 1992.

Later, Gloria filed bigamy cases against him. As advised bt his counsel, he went to the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where their Marriage License was issued, to get certification
on whether or not there was a marriage license. There, he was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. It appeared that the
marriage license number appearing in their marriage contract was the number of another
marriage license issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

The RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued in favor of Gloria and Syed. Hence, their
marriage was declared void ab initio.

On appeal, the CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal.

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA
also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed
only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.

Syed’s MR was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for Syed and Gloria.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3) of the
Family Code, which read as follows:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony

xxxx
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on
the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. While Syed was able to secure a certification that there was no marriage license.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec.
29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
 HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, v.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001

Facts:

Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the
late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were
born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were “separated.”

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known
that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to
marry again; otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy. He then
prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed
merely to harass him.

The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found

guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question

in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

Ruling:

No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. Respondent Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting
as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long
period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not
serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the

minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was
shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause
of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action
for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for
at least five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article
34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceasedfather, Pepito G.
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period
should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union.
In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period
should be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitationcharacterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken.
Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.