G.R. No.
167571 November 25, 2008 stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in
CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent
motion for reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8
January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner
three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili
and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail. 3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson
appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in
the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had
lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he
himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had
issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. 7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim
wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate. 8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against
Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice
(DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July
1997,10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately
altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her
resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case,
the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993.
The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from
1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against
Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed. 13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself
and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same,
stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate
informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an
information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3)
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that
Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and
punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of
offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court
ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before
the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the
DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification
and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a
mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said
motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration
of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised
therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on
technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance
with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P.
Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in
accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition
for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In
addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with
the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a
number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither
jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are
alleged are true and correct–the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served, 32 as in the instant case. In the
case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently
complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure
to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain
reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, 33 a certified true
copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in
declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what
is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that
the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of
Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly
beyond his control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for
more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine,
hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of
the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot
uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4
December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v.
Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People
v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a
judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense. 46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender,48and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special
laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In
the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court
ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the
investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character:
executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. 54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24
August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed
his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the
assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer
setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties,
especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the
Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution
of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under
 2
B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of Id. at 28-29. The resolutions were penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with Associate
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner. Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring.
3
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 Id. at 30-31; Complaint-Affidavit.
4
March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is Id.
5
also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and
petitioner. for Other Purposes.
6
No costs. Rollo, pp. 35-40.
7
SO ORDERED. Id. at 45-52; Affidavit of Adverse Claim, Affidavit of Withdrawal of Adverse Claim, Complaint-Affidavit.
8
DANTE O. TINGA Id. at 45-46.
9
Associate Justice Id. at 53-55.
10
Id. at 56-57.
11
Id. at 58-62.
12
WE CONCUR: Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin.
13
Rollo, pp. 59-60.
14
Id. at 60; Nevertheless, it appears that a reinvestigation of the case was conducted for the purpose of
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
referring the questioned signatures of Tongson. However, petitioner was unable to present the
Associate Justice
corresponding documents, particularly the original copies thereof, that could be referred to the NBI to rebut
Chairperson
Tongson's defense of forgery.
15
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Id.
16
Associate Justice Associate Justice Id. at 63-65.
17
CA rollo, pp. 59-69.
18
ARTURO D. BRION G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 277.
19
Associate Justice Rollo, pp. 66-76.
20
Docketed as I.S. No. 95-12212.
21
ATTESTATION Per letter of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City dated 10 July 2003,
informing petitioner of the filing of the information charging him "for violation of B.P.Blg. 22 ((3) counts),
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
and requiring him to pay filing fees. Id. at 77.
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. 22
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Id. at 78-83.
23
Associate Justice Rollo, p. 79.
24
Chairperson Supra note 18.
25
CA rollo, pp. 2-16.
26
Rollo, p. 28.
27
CERTIFICATION CA rollo, pp. 79-86.
28
Id. at 29.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby 29
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to Id. at 106-126.
30
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. Id. at 130-140.
31
REYNATO S. PUNO Id. at 19.Citing Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 20 February 2001, 352 SCRA 334,
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Suerte Cigar and Cigaret Factory, 4 July 2002, 384 SCRA
Chief Justice
117.
32
Sps. Hontiveros v. RTC, Br. 25, Iloilo City, 368 Phil. 653, 666 (1999).
33
Footnotes CA rollo, p. 2. The third paragraph of the petition reads:
1
Rollo, pp. 11-27.
 This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner seeks the In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,... City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against
annulment of the Resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dated 9 August 2004, which was rendered Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
in excess of jurisdiction of with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
34
CA rollo, pp. 17-21. Petitioner thus complied with the requirement that the petition "shall be accompanied On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint
by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling against Tongson
subject thereof." (Rule 46, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines)
35 ACP Sampaga held that... the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,[12] which
Supra note 18.
36 provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
338 Phil. 1061 (1997).
37
Rollo, p. 22. Issues:
38
Id. at 23.
39
Act No. 3326, Sec. 2. that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326.
40
People v. Joson, 46 Phil. 509 (1924).
41
See Concurring Opinion, Tinga, J.; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Ruling:
Corporation, et al.,G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008.
42
The petition is meritorious.
9 Phil. 509 (1908).
43
46 Phil. 380 (1924). There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
44
9 Phil. 509, 511 (1908). Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to
45
52 Phil 712 (1929). offenses under special laws which do not... provide their own prescriptive periods.
46
Id. at 715.
47
19 Phil. 494 (1967). We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the
48
Id. at 500. penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act
49
338 Phil. 1061 (1997). No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes... in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same
50 be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof.
G.R. No. 168662, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 303.
51
Supra note 39.
52
Presidential Decree No. 178. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the
53
Concurring Opinion, Tinga, J. in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources prescriptive... period.
Corporation, et al., supra note 39.
54
the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
Id.
55
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
People v. Olarte, 19 Phil. 494 , 500 (1967).
the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the... peace for preliminary
investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the
CASE DIGEST accused.
LUIS PANAGUITON v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GR No. 167571, 2008-11-25
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
Facts: investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the... complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8
the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner
initial step of the proceedings against the... offender,[48] and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
three (3) checks in payment of the said... loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili
and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the... amounts of the under his control.
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson[4] for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang
22
A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995,... well within
the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the
dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner
filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the
assailed resolution, an aggregate period... of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to
suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its... misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying...
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the
Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution
of the accused and thus effectively... interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged
under B.P. Blg. 22.
Principles:
G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private
Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against
petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.3
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine
Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private
complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability
and effectivity of contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of
Prejudicial Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil
action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal
proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of
Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with
her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the
amount of ₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of ₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were,
however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent
Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch
218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000
Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although
received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest
amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when
the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having
been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo
is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153. 4
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review5 on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to
comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City,
thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had
already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was
notified by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period
granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four
years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the
proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly
prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No.
3326, as amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper
court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act
3326, as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds
that the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22.9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1âwphi1 According to the OSG, while it admits
that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930,
governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed
with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged.10 It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16
September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the
case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.11 that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial
proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, 12 the CA allegedly failed to
consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal’s
Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the
filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of
four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as
amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed
outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the
decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the
petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims
that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are
therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which
is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction
should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and
offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg.
22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the
period of prescription of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or
certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record.
A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA
decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket
Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense
committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is
the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than
one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et.
al.17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive
period of a criminal offense.
Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.18 is not controlling in special laws. In
Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases
involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription Footnotes
1
period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases. Rollo, pp. 33-66.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court 2
Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 162-170.
3
City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. Id. at 169.
4
22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not Rollo, p. 133.
be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s 5
Id. at 134-167.
6
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. Id. at 169.
7
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the G.R. No. 102342, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 277.
8
commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent Id.
9
was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law CA rollo, pp. 167-168.
10
elapsed. Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure
11
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached Supra note 7 at 284-285.
12
the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for Supra.
13
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of Calderon-Bargas v. RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 162, G.R. Nos. 103259-61, 1 October 1993, 227
"prejudicial question". The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the SCRA 56; Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, 30 May 1983, 122 SCRA 538; Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,
petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the G.R. No. 112584, 23 May 1997, 272 SCRA 563.
violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City. 14
Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000. shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped
that are not under his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file for any reason not imputable to him.
the requisite complaint. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Archipelago.
15
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations Section 1. Institution of criminal actions.—Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:
for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent. xxx
SO ORDERED. xxx
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the
Associate Justice offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.
16
WE CONCUR: G.R. No. L-22465, 28 February 1967, 19 SCRA 494, 500.
17
ANTONIO T. CARPIO 207 Phil 471, 477 (1983).
18
Senior Associate Justice Supra note 7.
19
Chairperson 328 Phil. 1272 (1996).
20
ARTURO D. BRION MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Supra note 13.
21
Associate Justice Associate Justice 483 Phil. 568 (2004)
22
G.R. No. 168662, 19 February 2008, 546 SCRA 303.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES 23
G.R. No. 135808, 6 October 2008, 567 SCRA 354, 415-416.
Associate Justice 24
G.R. No. 167571, 25 November 2008, 571 SCRA 549, 562.
CERTIFICATION 25
Supra note 16.
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
 CASE DIGEST
People of the Philippines vs Alfredo Pangilinan y Trinidad
G.R. No. 171020, March 14, 2007
FACTS:
Pangilinan is the husband of BBB and the father of AAA. On September 9, 1995, AAA felt that appellant approach
their bed where she and her two siblings are sleeping. Appellant removed her shorts and lay on top of her. Her
hands were pinned down above her head by the appellant. Appellant tried to insert her penis on the vagina of AAA
but was not successful. On the following night, again appellant did the same but this time he had forcibly inserted his
penis unto the vagina of AAA. During the month of September 1995, appellant repeatedly raped AAA. On the month
of January 1995, appellant did the same act towards AAA. On March 1997, BBB the mother of AAA went home from
Singapore. AAA kept her silence until the time when BBB is about to leave for Singapore. BBB was confronted by
the grandmother of AAA saying that appellant is molesting AAA. BBB confronted AAA and she tearfully confessed.
BBB filed the complaint. Prosecution finally offered the evidences in which the trial court finds that those evidences
against the accused are strong. Trial court having discovered that the accused has not be arraigned, scheduled his
arraignment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the case would be dismissed for the ground that the appellant was not properly arraigned.
HELD:
No. Because appellant’s elated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his
counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. His
counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a
clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have
objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was
subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now,
after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has
been violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. SC did not allow it.
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 174764-65
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding
that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17,
2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of
the denial of his motion to quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with
corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
(Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of
the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give
gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five
hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of
stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of stock,
and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project")
of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and
obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos,
taking undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the
aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the
contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts
constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the
Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal relation,
intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the Philippine
Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan,
request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount
of Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business,
transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of
accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and
Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said
PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused
DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand
E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or
pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct
intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for
Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by
prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion
to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable
action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution denying
the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second assailed resolution. 10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT SECTION 4,
PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE
THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED JURISDICTION
WITHOUT HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT
THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE APPLICABLE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT OF
INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES
CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE ‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001
AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT
CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED
FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini
v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government(PCGG) against Disini and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that
Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through
them is appropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of
corruption,14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the
first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained
staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the
Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful concert, active collaboration
and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of
their association and influence with the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-
gotten assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through which
defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions from
foreign corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits
from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse
Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously exorbitant amount that
included defendant’s staggering commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the contract for the
aforesaid nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos.
92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the records of
the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i)
some parts or elements are also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan;
(ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party
defendants in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for
proper action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial
investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and
intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the
Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it was on the
basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of
coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of
said criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x18
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in
the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot
possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from
conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer
has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate
action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary investigation
on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject of Disini’s
motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed
pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not
of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither
pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office
of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the
Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses
charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4
(c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant
to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to
recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their relatives,
subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The
law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the
Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the
directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG
would not be an impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain
the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention
of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and
Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness
in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges
involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal
prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989(Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
 (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director
and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’ and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in
Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public
officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene
the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his
being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive
period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and given gifts and presents to
Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and architectural design of
and to construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption of public officials. 24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the
Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted." 25 Under the second paragraph of
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the
execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift.
Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of
public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express
provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under
R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It
became settled in People v. Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to
crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982,
because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the
information alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the
applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses
punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved
person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does
not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine,
incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of
the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to
apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the
existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the
prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases,
that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only
from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced
from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint
was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was
succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986EDSA
Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries
of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
question the legality of these transactions. (Citations omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when
the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases
were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials
involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State,
as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in
1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or
transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the
establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the
discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution
having been regularly done in the course of official functions. 32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to
1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation. 33 In accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the criminal
complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According
to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws,
the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive
period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before" investigation
and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should
now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal
Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for
purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not
yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April
1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense
charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no
offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be
sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential
elements of the offense as defined in the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there
would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of
Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth that Disini, in
the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President
Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who,
by taking undue advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in
consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be
awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design
of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under
circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to
President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in
causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in
committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct
bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed under
circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without
alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in
direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly
upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in
the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
 9
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, Rollo, pp. 74-103.
10
would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin- Supra note 2.
11
Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Rollo, pp. 10-11.
12
Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) G.R. No. 175730, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 354.
13
Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Id. at 358.
14
Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application Id. at 359.
15
with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had Id. at 359-360.
16
family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural Sandiganbayan, rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 164-165.
17
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP. G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1991, 190 SCRA 226.
18
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on January Id. at 254-255.
19
17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case Id. at 256-257.
20
No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit. G.R. No. 132120, February 10, 2003, 397 SCRA 171.
21
SO ORDERED. See the Section 1(A), Rules and Regulations of the PCGG, to wit:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Section 1.Definition. – (A) "Ill-gotten wealth" is hereby defined as any asset, property, business
Associate Justice enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of Executive Orders 1 and 2,
WE CONCUR: acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
Chief Justice (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, or misuse or malversation of public funds or
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ* raids on the public treasury;
Associate Justice Associate Justice (2) Through the receipt, directly or indirectly, of any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by the reason of the
Associate Justice
office or position of the official concerned;
CERTIFICATION
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
owned or controlled corporations;
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity
Chief Justice
or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of
Footnotes
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and
* In lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, who took part in the Sandiganbayan, per the
(6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence
raffle of October 3, 2011.
1 for personal gain or benefit. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Rollo, pp. 51-55; penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (now a Member of the Court), and 22
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or
concurred in by Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (now a Member of the Court) and
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above,
Associate Justice Efren N. De la Cruz.
2 exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
Id. at 57-73; penned by Associate Justice Peralta, and still joined by Associate Justice Leonardo-De
court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
Castro and Associate Justice De la Cruz.
3 jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."
Id. at 104-105. 23
4 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, G.R. No. 130817, August22,
Id. at 108-109.
5 2001, 363 SCRA 489, 493.
Id. at 111-116. 24
6 Supra, Note 3.
Id. at 117-128.
7
25
Article 212. Corruption of public officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted,
Id. at 129-130.
8 except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have made
Supra note 1.
the offers or promises or given gifts or presents described in the preceding articles."
26
Article 210. Direct bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in 37
Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754, February 18, 1991, 194 SCRA 145, 150.
38
connection with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present People v. Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 565, 573.
39
received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision The elements of direct bribery are:
mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not less 1. The offender is a public officer;
than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if 2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through
the same shall have been committed. another;
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not 3. That such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice official duty to do; and 4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is
the value of such gift. connected with the performance of his official duties (Magno v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain No. 147904, October 4, 2002,390 SCRA 495, 499).
from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not less
than three times the value of such gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the
penalty of special temporary disqualification. The provisions contained in the preceding CASE DIGEST
paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim
commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties. DISINI VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. NOS. 169823-24; 174764-65, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013]
27
Article 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusionte
mporal shall prescribe in twenty years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan
fifteen years. with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as
those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002). In this 2 actions it alleged his confederations with
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. the late President Marcos and His family. Gaining wealth in conspiracy with the Marcoses. ‘
The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses
prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the
of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash. Disini voluntarily
28
G.R. No. 139405, March 13, 2001, 354 SCRA 310, 318. submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to travel
29
An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal abroad. He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations. Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motions.
Ordinances And to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run.
30
G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 586. Hence, the petitioner filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court for the lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for
31
Id. at 596-597. this case.
32
Section 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court .
33
Records, Vol. 1, p. 164. Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction?
34
Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
Ruling: Yes.
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent (PRELIMINARY INVERSTIGATION): Whether or not PCGG can conduct PI?
from the Philippine Archipelago.
35
G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 549. RULING: No.
36
Id. at 560-561.
Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) filed this cases.
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991, the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for
proper action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial
investigation.
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and
intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the
Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s properties, it was on the
basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of
coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said
criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in
the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot
possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from
conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
that the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer
has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary investigation
on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the
informations that became the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002.
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the
Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases
to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of
a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative
Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City,
BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be
reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and
manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section
13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is
illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading
to the filing of the Informations are the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel
Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents
in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly,
the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp
belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The fines of
₱500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan
alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan
Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure
to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel.
After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use and
value which is ₱26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were
not paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed
two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was
eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent
Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's
employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent
Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the
wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He
alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his
family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a
piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell. 4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor
Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner.
Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of
Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the
existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the
cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance.
Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or
Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered
owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file
the corresponding informations against them in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25,
2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with unity of action and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front
wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered
immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the
damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such
clamp worth ₱26,250.00 and other consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a
January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or
Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action
or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of
charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription
of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As
can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on
October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence,
criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the
Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order11 to
argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these
cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on
May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents'
Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion
to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on
the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3,
1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT
TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case
was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously
saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing
of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office
of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution
of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise
provided in special laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal
information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in
these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of
a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and
procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as
required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by
information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply in
this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should
have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other
hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be
commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the
running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion. They
held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. 20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the
alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the
Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F.
Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only
be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in
court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the
respondent judge’s Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an
August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang,
"John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does
not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In
any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of
the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor
unless otherwise provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on
prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash,
namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one
offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no legal
personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case but the assailed Order
and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago23 which held that the private complainant
may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription,
since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated
but did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings
contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National
Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x
x may file a verified petition"26 before the court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing
the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute
that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special
law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not
argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under
City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day.
These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall
be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that the
criteria established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent
component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An
independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual
Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known
as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the
rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues
with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on
May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This
Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of
municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall
be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section
2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a
matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the
Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v.
Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned.
Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to
violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in
the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the
Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of
Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the
Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and
commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by
the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the
same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the crime
charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a
prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a
"polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of
domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the
Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only
by the filing of the complaint or information in court.
 xxxx Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson s Attestation, I certify that the
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial the opinion of the Court s Division.
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not Chief Justice
constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1âwphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and established Regional
State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions Footnotes
1
where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located Baguio City Ordinance Numbered 003, Series of 2000, Sec. 13.
2
in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, Rollo, p. 34.
3
and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos. Id. at 21-24.
4
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the Information Id. at 34.
5
within the two-month period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1âwphi1 Id. at 32-35.
6
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the Id. at 34-35.
7
case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their Id. at 37.
8
prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia Id. at 38.
9
also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling: Id. at 39.
10
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed Id. at 43.
11
seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial Id. at 44.
12
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond Id. at 46.
13
their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. Id. at 48-49.
14
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought Id. at 50-52.
to be corrected.33 15
Id. at 53-54.
16
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED. Id. at 55-63. The Petition was dated June 18, 2004.
17
SO ORDERED. Id. at 59.
18
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN Id. at 59 and 60.
19
Associate Justice Id. at 64.
20
WE CONCUR: Id. at 65 citing Act No. 3326.
21
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277.
22
Associate Justice Rollo, p. 92.
23
Chairperson 255 Phil. 851 (1989).
24
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD Rollo, p. 100.
25
Associate Justice Associate Justice A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective December 1, 2000.
26
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 65, Sec. 1.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA 27
507 Phil. 727 (2005).
Associate Justice 28
Id. at 741.
ATTESTATION 29
31 Phil. 524 (1915).
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to 30
Zaldivia v. Reyes, supra note 21, at 282-284.
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. 31
G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 105.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 32
Presidential Decree No. 1275, "Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the
Associate Justice
Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, And Creating the National
Chairperson, Third Division
Prosecution Service" (1978), Sec. 6.
CERTIFICATION 33
Id., per note 18, 284.
CASE DIGEST
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION v. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., GR No. 169588, 2013-10-07
Facts:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and
manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section
13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle... immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is
illegally parked.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel
Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents
in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang,... Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly,
the car was then illegally parked and [left] unattended at a Loading and Unloading
Zone.
Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-
complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia,
Jeffrey Walan and two (2)
John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to
Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was
earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell... personnel.
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997.
Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia,... Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John
Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.
A preliminary investigation took place on May
28, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president... with Usurpation of
Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp
restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing... of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an
illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so
that he and his family could continue using the car.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25,
2003, stating:
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and
dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order[11] to
argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these
cases have been... filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint
on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion
to quash, which is that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on
the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3,
1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT
TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR
VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN
PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN"
Petitioner contended further that:
[the] filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal
information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in
these cases had... prescribed.
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the
running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F.
Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the... filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only
be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in
court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the... respondents and upheld the
respondent judge's Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an
August 15, 2005 Order.
Issues:
The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds:
extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts... that charged
an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May
23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang,
"John Does," and "Peter Does."
Ruling:
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing
the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute
that provides for any prescriptive period for... the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special
law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not
argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,[27] this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
[I]n resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was... interrupted.[28] (Citation omitted)
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or... information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the
rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting... a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall
be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the... date the case is actually
filed in court and not on any date before that.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents.
Principles: