DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

Lasallian Commission on Bar Operations

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

AND PRACTICAL EXERCISES
Justice Perlas-Bernabe Digests

 Atty. Suerte-Felipe is a notary public for the City of
Pasig.
 He notarized an “Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate” of a person, representing that he was a “notary
public for and in the City of Marikina”
Whether or not Atty. Suerte-Felipe violated the
lawyer’s oath.
Yes, for misrepresenting in the said
acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the
City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact,
uncontroverted that he was not, he committed a form of
falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's
oath.
The said transgression also runs afoul of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proves that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” He was
suspended for 6 months; disqualified from being
commissioned as a notary public for 1 year and his notarial
commission was revoked.
 Atty. De Vera handled the election protest case of Sps.
Umaguing. He rushed the preparation of the
documents, did not appear for a certain hearing with
no explanation, and let the Affidavits of material
witnesses Lachica and Almera be signed by different
persons in their stead then had it duly notarized
before one Atty. Manguiat.
 When Lachica discovered the falsification, she
immediately disowned the signature affixed in the
affidavit.
 Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in
handling case because of the alleged favoritism of the
judge who allegedly received P60K from the defense
counsel. He said that he would only appear for the
case if the Sps. would give him P80K which he would
in turn, give to the Judge.
 Sps. Umaguing filed an Administrative Complaint
against Atty. De Vera for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct in his handling
of the election protest case.
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held liable
for violating the Lawyer’s Oath.
Yes, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the
Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 by submitting a
falsified affidavit before a court in his desire to beat the
deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing.
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only
to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the
doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.
Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to
observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means
a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty,
integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated
by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
  On behalf of the same client, he then filed rescission
of contract cases over the same property as in the
ejectment cases against the same opposing party.
These were denied.
 Later, he filed a petition for review of those cases. In
the certifications against forum shopping attached to
said petitions, he said he has not commenced, nor
does he have knowledge of any similar proceeding
involving the same issues pending before any court.
 As a notary public, he also notarized the said
certifications against forum shopping.
 Crisostomo filed an administrative complaint against
him, claiming that Atty. Nazareno made false
declarations in the certifications against forum
shopping.

 Abella filed an illegal dismissal case and secured a Whether or not Atty. Nazareno made false
ruling in his favor against a corporation. declarations, thus, violating the CPR.
 When Abella moved for execution with Labor Arbiter
Barrios,the latter: Yes, the submission of false entries in a
o Did not act for thirteen months certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect
o When complainant went to his office to follow or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring
up, he asked complainant for a bribe so that the counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal
matter could be “easily fixed.” actions.
Said infraction may be considered as violation of
Whether or not Labor Arbiter Barrios is guilty of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. In
gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct. this case, Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the
certifications attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he
Yes, he is guilty of both gross immoral conduct should be administratively liable.
and gross misconduct. He was merely tasked to recompute
the monetary awards due to Abella who sought to execute
the CA Decision which had already been final and
executory. When Abella moved for execution ― twice at
that ― he slept on the same for more than a year. It was
only when Abella paid him a personal visit latter speedily
issued a writ of execution three (3) days after.
Based on these incidents, the Court observes
that the sudden dispatch in his action soon after the
aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his
denial, i.e., that he did not extort money from the
complainant. He was only ordered to pay a fine.

 Agot alleged that she sought the services of Atty.

Rivera who represented himself as an immigration
lawyer. They entered into a contract wherein Agot
will pay respondent P350K to facilitate the released of
a US immigrant visa.
 Atty. Rivera failed to perform his undertaking within
the agreed period. When Agot asked for a refund,
payment was not heeded. Hence, Agot filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rivera.

Whether or not Atty. Rivera engaged himself in a

 Atty. Nazareno filed an ejectment case against some deceitful conduct.
of the complainants.
 Yes, he is guilty for engaging in deceitful becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed
conduct by misrepresenting himself as an immigration himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property
lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's
assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and reputation. He violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR.
paying him the amount of P350,000.00 as down payment
for his legal services.
In truth, however, he has no specialization in
immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with
Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly processes
US visa applications for him.
As officers, lawyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. As such, the Court held
that he violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1.

 Sps. Lopez, while living abroad, secured the services

of Atty. Limos as counsel to adopt Ethan, a minor
child, and gave P75K as consideration.
 She then asked Sps. Lopez to come home to the PH to
testify in the adoption case she purportedly filed but
there was actually nothing filed after almost 1 yr.
 So Sps. Lopez hired another lawyer to handle the
adoption case and demanded the return of the P75k,
but Atty. Limos refused. Thus, they filed an
administrative case against Atty. Limos.

Whether or not Atty. Limos’ misrepresentation

violated Canon 1 of the CPR.

Yes. Atty. Limos violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1

 Atty. Uy’s aunt died, leaving several properties which because she misrepresented to her clients that she already
were covered by a Trust Agreement between him and commenced an adoption proceeding and burdened her
his cousin, the daughter of the decedent aunt. clients to go to the PH, when nothing was actually filed.
She is meted the penalty of suspension from the practice
 The Trust Agreement as well as the properties
of law for 3 years.
covered therein became the subject of several legal
disputes. This notwithstanding, he mortgaged one
commercial property within the scope of the
agreement, without the consent of such cousin, for a
significant sum of money.
 Atty. Uy’s cousin filed cases against him. Eventually,
the two cousins were able to settle the dispute
through a compromise agreement.
 Nevertheless, an administrative case was filed against
him by his cousin for his act of mortgaging property
subject of a legal dispute.

: Whether or not Uy was guilty of “some form of

misconduct.”

Yes, the Court found that respondent committed
some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the
subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute
over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim,
respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint
● Facturan filed a complaint for qualified theft against
Mendoza. The records were forwarded, together with
the recommendation of the prosecution to
Prosecutor Barcelona for his approval and signature.
● However, Prosec. Barcelona neither approved nor
signed the resolution. Instead, he removed the case
 records from the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor and brought them to his residence, where
they were kept in his custody. It appears that he is a
cousin of one of the respondents in the IS No. 04-211,
and the rest of the respondents therein were his close
friends.
● Aggrieved, Facturan sought the intervention of then
DOJ Secretary. Unfortunately, State Prosec. Pinote
could not take appropriate action on IS No.04-211 as
the case records were still in the possession of Prosec.
Barcelona who failed to turn them over despite the
directive to do so.
● IBP held that he violated Canons 18 and 18.03 of the
CPR, contending that he neglected to perform his
 Dongga-as engaged the services of the law firm of
duty. IBP recommends his suspension from the
the respondents to handle the annulment of his
practice of law for 1 year.
marriage.
 From then on, he constantly followed up his case
Whether or not Prosecutor Barcelona violated with Atty. Cruz-Angeles and Paler. However, the
Canon 18 of the CPR. lawyers could not present any petition and instead
offered excuses for the delay.
No, he violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the CPR  Due to the delay in the filing of his petition, he
which states that “a lawyer in the government service shall terminated their engagement and demanded for a
not use his public position to promote or advance his refund of P350k. However, the lawyers refused to
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his return the said amount. Thus, the filing of the
public duties”. complaint against the lawyers for several violations
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a Whether or not respondent lawyers’
governmental official. He may be disciplined by this Court misrepresentation amounts to a violation of the CPR
as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. In this
Yes, they violated Rule 1,01, Canon 1 when they
regard, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in the
misrepresented to Dongga-as that the delay in the filing of
government service, enjoining them from using one’s
the petition was due to the fact that they were still looking
public position to: (1) promote private interest; (2) advance
for a “friendly” court, judge and public prosecutor. Thus,
private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere
the two lawyers were given suspension for a period of 3
with public duties.
years.
In this case, absent of any intelligent explanation
as regards his lapses in the handling of IS No.04-211 and his
failure to timely return the case records thereof for further
action, it can only be inferred that he not merely failed, but
obstinately and deliberately refused to perform his duties
as a prosecutor. His acts were due for the benefit of and to
safeguard private interests. He was suspended from the
practice of law for 1 year.

 Reyes filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.

Nieva for sexually harassing her.
 Sometime in January, she was re-assigned at the
CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under the
supervision of Atty. Nieva. During her stint under him,
she would notice that during office hours, Atty. Nieva
would often watch "pampagana" videos saved in his
office laptop, all of which turned out to be
 pornographic films.
 Reyes also averred that whenever Atty. Nieva got
close to her, he would hold her hand and would
sometimes give it a kiss. When she was asked to
encode a memorandum, Atty. Nieva placed his hand
on her waist area near her breast and started
caressing the latter's torso. Complainant immediately
moved away from respondent and told him
"sumosobra na ho kayo sir."
 Instead of asking for an apology, Atty. Nieva told her
that he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month
from his own pocket and even gave her a note stating
"just between you and me, . . . kahit na si mommy,"
referring to her mother who was also working at
CAAP.
 At around past 11 o'clock in the morning of the same
day, while they were left alone in the office, Atty.
Nieva suddenly closed the door, grabbed her arm, and
uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then attempted to
kiss complainant.
Whether or not Atty Nieva violated Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Yes, the Court notes that respondent never
refuted complainant's allegation that he would regularly
watch "pampagana" movies in his office-issued laptop. As
confirmed in the Transcript of the investigation, these
"pampagana" movies and "Interesting shows" turned out to
be pornographic materials, which respondent even asks
his male staff to regularly play for him as he is not well
versed in using computers.
As a lawyer in the government service,
respondent is expected to perform and discharge his
duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with utmost
devotion and dedication to duty. However, his aforesaid
habit miserably fails to showcase these standards, and
instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of
respect to the government position he was entrusted to
hold. He was suspended for 2 years.
 Atty. Dela Rosa handled the legal matters of Sps.
Concepcion; among others, is the prospect of opening
a pawnshop business which failed to materialize.
 Aware that Sps. Concepcion had money intact from
their failed business venture, Atty. Dela Rosa
borrowed P2.5M, which he promised to return w/in 5
days.
 Atty. Dela Rosa failed to return the money despite
demands. He even denied borrowing money from Sps.
Concepcion and claimed that Nault, one of his clients,
was the real debtor.
Whether or not Atty. Dela Rosa violated Canon 7 of
the CPR.
Yes, in unduly borrowing money from Sps.
Concepcion and by blatantly refusing to pay the same,
Atty. Dela Rosa abused the trust and confidence reposed
in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he
should be equally held administratively liable under Canon
7. He was suspended for 3 years.
 Noble was the lawyer of Marcelo Ailes, the brother of
Atty. Orlando Ailes. He filed a verified complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Orlando.
 He learned that Marcelo had filed grave threats and
estafa against Orlando. When he was furnished a
copy of the complaint, he discovered that through
text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and
dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that
he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others:
o “x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who
will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in
court records, never appeared even once,
that’s why you lost in the pretrial stage. x x x
get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to
squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig
mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol.”
Whether Atty. Orlando Ailes violated Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as entire Canon 8 of the CPR.
Yes, the text messages were clearly intended to
malign and annoy Noble, as evident from the use of the
word “polpol” (stupid). Likewise, his insistence
that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Noble
indicates Orlando’s offensive conduct against his
colleague. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have
been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that
they pertain to another lawyer. He was admonished.
 In a verified complaint for disbarment, Nuezca et. al.
averred that Atty. Villagarcia sent them a demand
letter containing not just threats but also libelous
utterances.
 Nuezca et. al. posited that new clippings were
attached to instill fear and claim that the circulation
of the letter caused them mental and emotional
torment and that the purpose of the letter was to
besmirch their reputation. Hence, they claim that
the Atty. Villagarcia is administratively liable.
 Atty. Villagarcia failed to comply with the Court’s
directive which led to the IBP’s investigation report.
He still failed to appear during the hearings and that
the notices were returned unserved.
Whether or not Atty. Villagarcia violated Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the CPR.
Yes, the demand letter sent to the complainants
contained not just demands to settle monetary obligations
but also maligned their character. It imputed crimes
against them i.e, estafa and issuing worthless or bum
checks.
Rule 8.01 provides that “a lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.”
Atty. Villagarcia could have just stated the
ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of
complainants to his client and refused to impugn criminal
offenses given that there is a proper forum for such
complaint. He used demeaning and immoderate language
in order to shame and disgrace the complainants. It should
also be considered that several other persons were
furnished a copy of the demand letter. He was suspended
for 1 month from the practice of law.
 Belo-Henares is a medical doctor and a principal
stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI).
 Atty. Gueverra is lawyer of Ms. Norcio who filed
criminal cases against Belo for a botched surgery on
her buttocks which caused her to be ill in 2009 due to
infection.
 In 2009, Atty. Guevarra posted content on Facebook
which contained insults and verbal abuse directed
towards the complainant.
 It was further alleged by Belo that Atty. Guevarra
intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical
personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of
around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause.
 Finally, Belo averred that the attacks against her were
made with the object to extort money from her, as
apparent from the following reply made by Atty.
Guevarra on a comment on his Facebook post.
 Belo filed a case for disbarment before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Whether or not Atty. Guevarra violated CPR when
he posted vulgar and obscene remarks against
complainant and BGMI on his Facebook account.
Yes, by posting the subject remarks on Facebook
directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent
disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to
observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or
private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in
a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is,
respectful, firm, and decent.
Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely. He
used words unbecoming of an officer of the law and
conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults
and maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation. That
complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and
therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism
does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is
the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety.
The Supreme Court found Atty. Guevarra guilty
of the violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He was suspended for 1 year.

 Atty. De Vera handled the election protest case of Sps.
Umaguing. He rushed the preparation of the
documents, did not appear for a certain hearing with
no explanation, and let the Affidavits of material
witnesses Lachica and Almera be signed by different
persons in their stead then had it duly notarized
before one Atty. Manguiat.
 When Lachica discovered the falsification, she
immediately disowned the signature affixed in the
affidavit.
 Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in
handling case because of the alleged favoritism of the
judge who allegedly received P60K from the defense
counsel. He said that he would only appear for the
case if the Sps. would give him P80K which he would
in turn, give to the Judge.
 Sps. Umaguing filed an Administrative Complaint
against Atty. De Vera for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct in his handling
of the election protest case.
Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held liable
for violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR.
Yes, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating Rule
Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 by submitting a
falsified affidavit before a court in his desire to beat the
deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. He is
suspended for 6 months.
 Sps. Lopez, while living abroad, secured the services
of Atty. Limos as counsel to adopt Ethan, a minor
child, and gave P75K as consideration.
 She then asked Sps. Lopez to come home to the PH to
testify in the adoption case she purportedly filed but
there was actually nothing filed after almost 1 yr.
 So Sps. Lopez hired another lawyer to handle the
adoption case and demanded the return of the P75k,
but Atty. Limos refused. Thus, they filed an
administrative case against Atty. Limos.
Whether or not Atty. Limos should be held liable
for ignoring court orders.
Yes, Atty. Limos violated Canon 11 and Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the CPR. The Court had repeatedly required
her to comment on the complainants’ petition, but she
ignored such command.
Similarly, when the case was referred to the IBP
for investigation, she again disregarded the directives of
the Investigating Commissioner to attend the mandatory
conference and to submit a position paper, which cause
undue delay in the resolution of the admin case.
She is meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for 3 years.
 Datu Dumanlag, leader of the Indigenous People of
Bangcud, Malaybalay filed a case against Atty. Intong
for negligence and gross misconduct.
 The Court issued three resolution requiring the
presence of the Atty. Intong, all of which he failed to
comply with. Thus, the Court in the final resolution
dispensed with the filing of his comment and instead
referred the case to the IBP.
 However, even if the court referred the case to the
IBP, the he again was unable to express his side even
though he was given several opportunities.
 Neither did he file a position paper as required by the
Commission on Bar Discipline. Again, he merely
ignored the Commission's orders. Another resolution
was made on April 19, 2015, it suspended Atty. Intong
from practicing for six months.
Whether or not Atty. Intong should be held liable
for his repetitive disregard to comply with court directives.
Yes. Respondent ought to know that orders of
the court are "not mere requests but directives which
should have been complied with promptly and
completely." He cannot escape accountability for his
repetitive disregard of the resolutions of the Court
requiring him to file his comment to the complaint. His
conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to
obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand
foremost in complying with court directives as an officer
of the court, pursuant to Canon 11 of the CPR, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers . . ."
 Complainant alleged that we has elected as the Mayor
of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. The opponent
Villarosa filed an election protest against him.
 After deciding in favor of Villarosa, RTC issued an
order granting his motion for execution pending
appeal.
 Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari
with the COMELEC, seeking a TRO against the
issuance of the writ of execution.
 Despite issuance of a TRO, Atty. Zubiri as counsel of
Villarosa filed manifestations addressed to the OIC-
Branch Clerk of Court (COC) insisting on the writ’s
issuance. He did not serve copies of these
manifestations to the other party.
 Thus, this disbarment complaint against Atty. Zubiri
for violating his ethical duties when he misled and
induced the COC to defy lawful orders.
 IBP held that by filing manifestations instead of
motions, he was able to disregard the rule that
motions shall be served on the other party and shall
contain a notice of hearing. Also, that he acted in bad
faith when he convinced the COC to disregard the
COMELEC’s TRO.
Whether or not Atty. Zubiri should be held
administratively liable for violating Canon 8 and Canon 10
of the CPR.
Yes, he improperly filed the five (5) motions as
“manifestations” to sidestep the requirement of notice of
hearing for motions. Moreover, the fact that he submitted
these manifestations directly to COC, instead of properly
filing them before the RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit
fairness towards the other party by keeping the latter
completely unaware of his manifestations. Undoubtedly,
he violated his professional obligations to respect and
observe procedural rules, not to misuse the rules to cause
injustice, and to exhibit fairness towards his professional
colleagues.
Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR
require lawyers to conduct themselves with fairness
towards their professional colleagues, to observe
procedural rules, and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
A lawyer’s primary duty is to assist the courts in
the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to
delay, impede, or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes this obligation.
Indeed, a lawyer must champion his client’s
cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot
invoke this as an excuse for his failure to exhibit courtesy
and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal
processes designed to afford due process to all
stakeholders.
 In the course of the proceedings, Atty. Jumamil
admittedly prepared and notarized the affidavit of
client Samonte’s intended witness despite his belief
that such was a perjured one.
Whether or not Atty. Jumamil violated Canon 10 of
the CPR when he notarized a perjured affidavit.
Yes, respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the CPR. The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only
to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the
doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.
Here, Atty. indulged in deliberate falsehood
when he admittedly prepared and notarized the affidavit
of complainant’s intended witness, despite his belief that
he was a perjured witness. Thus, he is liable.

 Atty. Capistrano was asked by two clients to handle
their judicial declaration of nullity of marriage cases.
 He received substantial sums for the same, inclusive
of retainer fees, filing fees, appearance fees, etc.
 He only filed a petition for one of his clients (Client 1)
but was unable to file a petition for the other (Client
2).
 Despite Client 2’s demands for the return of the sums
paid, respondent returned less than a tenth of the
same and thereafter refused to communicate with her
Whether or not Atty. Capistrano violated Canon 16
and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Yes, Atty. Capistrano admitted his liability for his
failure to act on Suzette’s case as well as to account and
return the funds she entrusted to him.
Moreover, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause,
he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father
of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed
on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to
his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.
His workload does not justify neglect in handling
one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer must only
accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.
 In 2000, Atty. Dumaguing was given P342,000.00 for
the purchase of land with Fil-Estate. He then
purchased two manager’s checks and consigned them
with HLURB.
 On behalf of Dhaliwal, he filed with the HLURB a
complaint for delivery of title and damages against
Fil-Estate. A week after, he withdrew the two
manager’s checks.
 In 2003, Dhaliwal informed HLURB that Atty.
Dumaguing was no longer representing her.
 HLURB promulgated a decision, finding the case for
delivery of title and damages premature as there was
no evidence of full payment of the purchase price.
 Dhaliwal demands to return and account to her the
amounts previously consigned with the HLURB,
however, Atty. Dumaguing did not comply. Hence,
this administrative complaint.
 The Commission on Bar Discipline found that Atty.
Dumaguing violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that he
be given one (1) year suspension.
Whether or not Atty. Dumaguing violated Canon 16
of the Code.
Yes, money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as payment for the balance of the purchase
price of a parcel of land as in the present case, but not used
for the purpose, should be immediately returned.
“A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence
in the legal profession and deserves punishment.” He is
suspended for six (6) months.
 Gloria Jinon engaged in the services of Atty. Jiz in
order to recover a title. She immediately paid P17,000
worth of acceptance fee with a promise to have the
title transferred in Gloria’s name.
 After another meeting, Atty. Jiz asked Gloria to remit
P45,000 to answer for the expenses of the transfer.
 When Gloria inquired about the case, she
found out that a certain Atty. Caras was handling the
case and that the subject property was being rented
out and such rents were being collected by Atty. Jiz.
Whether or not Atty. Jiz remiss in his duties as a
lawyer with respect to the legal services he had
undertaken to perform for his client, Gloria.
Yes, he was remiss in his duties as a lawyer in
neglecting his client’s case, misappropriating her funds
and assigning complainant’s case to another lawyer
without her consent. He violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Furthermore, he disobeyed the Commission on
Bar Discipline’s lawful orders requiring the submission of
his pleadings and his attendance at hearings. He was
suspended for 2 years.
● Cabanes was the counsel of Caranza in an unlawful
detainer case. The former failed to submit pre-trial
brief as well as attend the scheduled preliminary
conference.
● Consequently, the opposing counsel moved that the
case be submitted for decision which was granted.
● MTC ruled in against Caranza and ordered her to
vacate and turn-over the possession of the subject
property. RTC reversed while the CA reinstated the
decision of MTC.
● Cabanes received a copy of the CA’s ruling, yet he
failed to inform his client Caranza. Neither did he
pursue any further action.
● Hence, Caranza filed an administrative complaint
alleging that Cabanes’ acts amounted to gross
negligence.
Whether or not respondent Cabanes failed to
exercise ordinary diligence in handling complainant’s
cause.
Yes, he was negligent in failing to attend the
preliminary conference which resulted in the immediate
submission of the said case for decision and eventual loss
of complainant’s cause.
Cabanes could have exercised ordinary diligence
by inquiring from the court as to whether the said
preliminary conference would push through.
Jurisprudence provides that a lawyer who have been held
liable for gross negligence, for infractions similar to this
case, is suspended for a period of 6 months.
 Believing that a major stockholder in his client’s
company is hiding something, Atty. Gagate advised
his client to
o First, put a paper on the door of the premises of
the company and, then,
o Later, change the lock of the main door used by
employees for ingress and egress.
 He assured his client that this was legal. When his
client was then charged with grave coercion, he
advised his client to go into hiding. Then, later, he
abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped
communicating with his client.
Whether or not Atty. Gagate was guilty of unethical
practice of law and gross neglect, thus violating the CPR.
Yes. First, he failed to represent his client
competently and diligently by acting and proffering
professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and,
second, he abandoned his client’s cause while the grave
coercion case against them was pending.
Were it not for his imprudent counseling, not to
mention his act of abandoning his client during the
proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered
the harbors of a criminal prosecution. He was given
suspension of 3 years.

 In a settlement of estate case, Atty. Ramos appeared
for as counsel for both parties.
 He appeared for the first party free of charge and only
to accommodate a request to temporarily appear
since the counsel of record could not attend two
scheduled hearings. No confidential information was
relayed to him.
 He then appeared for the second party representing
interests adverse to that of the first party.
Whether Atty. Ramos violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15
of the CPR for representing conflicting interests.
Yes. The rule on conflict of interests, as
enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition
from representation with respect to opposing parties in
the same case. That Atty. Ramos’ previous appearances for
and in behalf of the [first party] was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any credence
since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is
remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted
in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests. He was suspended for 3 months.
● Segovia-Ribaya entered into a retainership
agreement with Atty. Lawsin to process the
registration and eventually deliver within 6 months
the certificate of title of a certain parcel of land.
● Atty. Lawsin received the amount of P15k and P39k to
cover the litigation and land registration expenses.
● Notwithstanding the lapse of more than 3 years, Atty.
Lawsin failed to fulfill his undertaking to register the
land and deliver the certificate of title over the same.
● The IBP Investigating Commissioner found that Atty.
Lawsin violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the
CPR, for his failure to properly account for the money
entrusted to him without any adequate explanation
why he could not return the same. It was likewise held
that his acts constitute “gross dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and even misappropriation of money, in
violation of the CPR.
Whether or not the Atty. Lawsin violated Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code.
Yes, he admitted the receipt of the subject
amount from complainant to cover the pertinent
registration expenses but posited his failure to return the
same due to his client’s act of confronting him at his office
wherein she shouted and called him names.
With the fact of receipt established, it was then
his obligation to return the money entrusted to him.
Suffice it to state that complainant’s purported act of
maligning him does not justify the latter’s failure to
properly account for and return his client’s money upon
due demand. His suspension was extended from 6 months
to 1 year for his failure to exercise due diligence in handling
his client’s cause under Canon 18.
 Dagala assisted by Atty. Quesada, filed a case with the
NLRC which was dismissed due to Atty. Quesada’s
failure to appear during the two scheduled mandatory
conference hearings despite due notice.
 Dagala then engaged the services of Atty. Adquilen,
who re-filed his labor case which was again dismissed
due to the parties’ failure to submit their respective
position papers.
 Dagala and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case for a third
time. He failed to submit the position resulting in the
dismissal of the complaint "for lack of interest and
failure to prosecute" as stated in an Order.
 Dagala, this time thru by Atty. Picar filed an MR to the
 NLRC-NCR which the latter dismissed for
having been filed out of time, adding that the
negligence of counsel binds the client.
 Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate letters
to respondents, informing them that complainant is
in the process of pursuing administrative cases
against them before the Court.
 Only Atty. Quesada responded to the said letter and
subsequently, through a MOA undertook to
compensate the damages sustained by complainant in
consideration of the non-filing of an administrative
complaint against him. Atty. Quesada, however,
reneged on his promise, thus prompting complainant
to proceed with the present complaint.
Whether or not Atty. Quesada should be held liable
for mishandling his client’s case.
Yes, Atty. Quesada failed to exercise the required
diligence in handling complainant's case by his failure to
justify his absence on the two mandatory conference
hearings in NLRC despite due notice, which thus resulted
in its dismissal.
It bears stressing that a retained counsel is
expected to serve the client with competence and
diligence and not to sit idly by and leave the rights of his
client in a state of uncertainty. To this end, he is obliged
to attend scheduled hearings or conferences, prepare and
file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urge their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or
her to do so.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued
with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients
are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of
their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree
of diligence in handling their affairs. He was suspended for
1 year.
 Agot alleged that she sought the services of Atty.
Rivera who represented himself as an immigration
lawyer. They entered into a contract wherein Agot
will pay Atty. Rivera P350K to facilitate the released of
a US immigrant visa.
 Atty. Rivera failed to perform his undertaking within
the agreed period. When Agot asked for a refund,
payment was not heeded. Hence, Agot filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rivera.
Whether or not Atty. Rivera violated the CPR when
he failed to account for and return the money of his client.
Yes, respondent violated Rule 16.01 and 16.03 of
Canon 16, when he failed to refund the amount of P350k
that complainant paid to him.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client
is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer great fidelity
and good faith. This high fiduciary relationship imposes a
duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Lawyer's failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client, gives rise to a
presumption that he has appropriated the same. Such act
is a gross violation of general morality as well as
professional ethics.
 Agot alleged that she sought the services of Atty.
Rivera who represented himself as an immigration
lawyer. They entered into a contract wherein Agot
will pay Atty. Rivera P350K to facilitate the released of
a US immigrant visa.
 Atty. Rivera failed to perform his undertaking within
the agreed period. When Agot asked for a refund,
payment was not heeded. Hence, Agot filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rivera.
Whether or not Atty. Rivera neglected his client’s
case.
Yes, Atty. Rivera failed to perform his obligations
under the contract, which is to facilitate and secure the
issuance of a US visa in favor of the complainant. This
constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03 of Canon 18.
Under such rule, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for fee
or for free.
Lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to
him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence which
merits administrative liability.
 In the Sumbong, it was alleged that Atty. Villanueva is
Layos’ counsel of record in Criminal Case pending
before the RTC, wherein the former's constant failure
to appear during court hearings resulted in the RTC's
issuance of an Order waiving the defense's right to
cross-examine a prosecution witness.
 Despite the issuance of such order, Atty. Villanueva
remained absent and thus, Layos was only able to
move for reconsideration, thru Atty. Villanueva, only
4 years later, which was denied in an Order.
 The CA dismissed the petition on the merits. It
likewise chastised Atty. Villanueva for his "lack of
candidness and fervor on [his part] to champion the
cause” of his client’s case.
 Thus, Layos filed the instant administrative case
against Atty. Villanueva.
Whether or not Atty. Villanueva violated the CPR
for neglecting the interests of his client.
Yes, records reveal that since missing the 2002
hearing due to car trouble, Atty. Villanueva no longer kept
track of complainant's criminal case and merely assumed
that the same was already amicably settled and
terminated. When he knew that the case was still ongoing
and discovered that there was on Order issued by RTC
which is prejudicial to his client, he did not immediately
seek any remedy to further the interests of his client.
Clearly, he failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence
as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an
attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client's
case. Keeping the client informed of the developments of
the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust
and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not
leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending
the client's interests. In this connection, the lawyer must
constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or
nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.
As such, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted
with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client
who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also
a whole-hearted fealty to the client's cause. He was
suspended for 3 months.
 Atty. Dela Rosa handled the legal matters of Sps.
Concepcion; among others, is the prospect of opening
a pawnshop business which failed to materialize.
 Aware that Sps. Concepcion had money intact from
their failed business venture, Atty. Dela Rosa
borrowed P2.5M, which he promised to return w/in 5
days.
 Atty. Dela Rosa failed to return the money despite
demands. He even denied borrowing money from Sps.
Concepcion and claimed that Nault, one of his clients,
was the real debtor.
Whether or not Atty. Dela Rosa is guilty of violating
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR.
Yes, Atty. Dela Rosa violated Rule 16.04 for
borrowing money from his clients without ensuring that
the latter’s interests are fully protected.
The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer
prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence
over his client, and his ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.
In this case, Atty. Dela Rosa borrowed money
from Sps. Concepcion who were his clients and whose
interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not
fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in him,
they relied solely on Atty. Dela Rosa’s word that he will
return the money plus interest 5 days. However, Atty. Dela
Rosa abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving
his previous clients the runaround up to this day. He shall
be suspended for 3 years.

 Anglo sought the services of respondent’s law firm
regarding a labor case filed against Anglo.
 A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against
Anglo and his wife by FEVE Farms, acting through a
certain Villacorta.
 Villacorta was also represented by respondents’ law
firm. Hence, Anglo filed a disbarment case against
respondents for violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR.
 Respondents argued that the attorney-client
relationship with Anglo was already terminated.
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of
representing conflicting interests in violation of the
pertinent provisions of the CPR.
Yes, respondents’ law firm was engaged and
represented Anglo in the labor case against him. After
which, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE
Farms against Anglo. Court held that a lawyer is prohibited
from representing new clients whose interests oppose
those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they
are parties in the same case or not.
Court held that there is conflict of interest when
a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client”.
Also, there is conflict of interest when the
acceptance of a new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.
Another test is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing.
Termination of attorney-client relationship
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client.
 Maglente alleged that he engaged the services of Atty.
Agcaoili for the purpose of filing a land dispute case.
 He gave P48k to Atty. Agcaoili for the filing fees,
evidenced by a written acknowledgement.
 Despite payment, Atty. Agcaoili failed to file an action
in court. When confronted, he explained that the
money was not enough for the filing fees.
 Maglente asked for the return of the money but Atty.
Agcaoili claimed that he spent the same.
Whether or not Atty. Agcaoili should be held
administratively liable for neglecting his client’s affairs.
: Yes, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and attend to such client's cause with
diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for fee
or for free.
Lawyers must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon them. Therefore, a lawyer's
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be
administratively liable, violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
CPR.
In the instant case, respondent failed to comply
with his undertaking without justifiable reason.
 Maglente alleged that he engaged the services of Atty.
Agcaoili for the purpose of filing a land dispute case.
 He gave P48k to Atty. Agcaoili for the filing fees,
evidenced by a written acknowledgement.
 Despite payment, Atty. Agcaoili failed to file an action
in court. When confronted, he explained that the
money was not enough for the filing fees.
 Maglente asked for the return of the money
but Atty. Agcaoili claimed that he spent the same.
Whether or not Atty. Agcaoili violated the CPR
when he failed to account for and return the money of his
client.
Yes, Atty. Agcaoili violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03
of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount given to
him despite demand.
Court rules that when a lawyer receives money
from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for the intended purpose. If money
is not used accordingly, the same must be immediately
returned to the client. Failure to do so is a violation of trust
reposed upon him and indicative of his lack of integrity.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases
where lawyers neglect their clients' affairs and, at the same
time, fails to return the latter's money and/or property
despite demand, the Court meted out the penalty of
suspension. In the case at bar, the Court found it
appropriate to suspend respondent for 1 year.
 Olayta-Camba alleged that she engaged the services
of Atty. Bongon for the purpose of titling/
reconstituting tiles. She claimed to have given him the
amount of P112k for legal services, and expenses for
the titling.
 Atty. Bongon failed to update Olayta-Camba
regarding the status of the matter.
 She thus terminated her engagement with Atty.
Bongon and demanded return of the amount but to
no avail.
Whether or not Atty. Bongon violated the CPR
when he failed to account for and return the money of his
client.
Yes, he violated Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03, Canon
16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of
P55,000.00 that he personally received from complainant
despite repeated demands.
A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his
client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust
reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as
in this case.
 Olayta-Camba alleged that she engaged the services
of Atty. Bongon for the purpose of titling/
reconstituting tiles. She claimed to have given him the
amount of P112k for legal services, and expenses for
the titling.
 Atty. Bongon failed to update Olayta-Camba
regarding the status of the matter.
 She thus terminated her engagement with Atty.
Bongon and demanded return of the amount but to
no avail.
Whether or not Atty. Bongon violated the CPR for
neglecting the interests of his client.
Yes, he must be held administratively liable for
violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR. As correctly
pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
complainant engaged the services of respondent for the
purpose of titling and/or reconstituting the titles to the
real estate properties of the late Bernabe Olayta, as well as
preparing the Deed, and in connection therewith, allegedly
gave various amounts to respondent, of which the latter
admitted the receipt of only P55,000.00.
Despite such, he failed to comply with his
undertaking and offered the excuse that the reconstitution
of titles and the preparation of the Deed were delayed due
to the Deed’s several revisions; and that Bernabe Olayta’s
surviving heirs were living in different places, making it
difficult to secure their presence, much less obtain their
signatures to the said Deed.

 Sps. Lopez, while living abroad, secured the services
of Atty. Limos as counsel to adopt Ethan, a minor
child, and gave P75K as consideration.
 She then asked Sps. Lopez to come home to the PH to
testify in the adoption case she purportedly filed but
there was actually nothing filed after almost 1 yr.
 So Sps. Lopez hired another lawyer to handle the
adoption case and demanded the return of the P75k,
but Atty. Limos refused. Thus, they filed an
administrative case against Atty. Limos.
Whether or not Atty. Limos violated the CPR for
neglecting the interests of her client.
Yes, Atty. Limos violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the CPR because she neglected a legal matter, i.e. the filing
of the adopting case, entrusted to her by her client which
neglect constitutes inexcusable negligence. She is meted
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 3
years.
 Dongga-as engaged the services of the law firm of
the respondents to handle the annulment of his
marriage.
 From then on, he constantly followed up his case
with Atty. Cruz-Angeles and Paler. However, the
lawyers could not present any petition and instead
offered excuses for the delay.
 Due to the delay in the filing of his petition, he
terminated their engagement and demanded for a
refund of P350k. However, the lawyers refused to
return the said amount. Thus, the filing of the
complaint against the lawyers for several violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Whether or not respondent lawyers violated the
CPR for refusing to return the money given by
complainant.
Yes, they violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon
16 of the CPR when they failed to return to complainant
the amount of P350k, representing their legal fees. Thus,
the two lawyers were given suspension for a period of 3
years.
Whether or not respondent lawyers violated the
CPR for neglecting the legal matter entrusted to them by
their client.
Yes, despite the passage of more than 5 months
from engagement, the lawyers failed to file the appropriate
pleading to initiate the case before the proper court; and
worse, could not even show a finished draft of such
pleading.
Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to
them by their client constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR. Thus, the two lawyers were
given suspension for a period of 3 years.
 Egger engaged Atty. Duran’s services to file on his
behalf a petition for the annulment of his marriage.
 As consideration therefor, he deposited the total
amount of P100,000.00, Despite such payment, Atty.
Duran never prepared, much less filed, said petition.
 This prompted Egger to terminate Atty.
Duran’s services due to loss of trust and confidence.
Further, Egger, through his wife, wrote a letter
demanding for the return of the P100,000.00 he gave
as lawyer's fees.
 In reply, Atty. Duran wrote Egger a letter promising
the return of the aforesaid amount before the end of
May 2014. However, he did not fulfill his promise,
prompting Egger to hire a new counsel, who in turn,
wrote another letter demanding for the return of the
said lawyer's fees.
 As the second demand letter went unheeded, Egger
filed the instant case against Atty. Duran.
Whether or not Atty. Duran violated Canon 18 of
the CPR for his failure to perform undertaking as counsel.
Yes, he admittedly breached this duty when he
failed to prepare, much less file, the appropriate pleading
to initiate complainant and Reposo's case before the
proper court. His act of agreeing to handle complainant's
case, coupled with his acceptance of the partial payment
of P100,000.00, already established an attorney-client
relationship that gave rise to his duty of fidelity to the
client's cause.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he
is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed upon him. This is
commanded by Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Whether or not Atty. Duran violated Canon 16 of
the CPR for refusing to return the money given by
complainant.
Yes, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to return the amount
of P100,000.00 representing the legal fees that
complainant paid him. The highly fiduciary nature of this
relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client. He was suspended for 6 months.
 Respondent-counsel for petitioner not only failed to
attend the scheduled preliminary conference, but
also failed to take any steps to have it cancelled or
reset to another date, resulting to an order that the
ejectment case was submitted for decision due to
complainants' failure to appear during the
preliminary conference.
 The trial court issued a decision adverse to the
complainants. Respondent-lawyer received it but
failed to inform complainants about the status of the
case as to enable them to prepare the next course of
action.
Whether or not Atty. Gatchalian should be held
administratively liable for neglecting his clients’ affairs.
Yes, he breached Rule 18.03 of the CPR. Every
lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost
diligence and competence, and never neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him.
Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's duties
of competence and diligence include not merely reviewing
cases or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of
properly representing a client before any court or tribunal,
attending scheduled hearings and conferences, preparing
and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to
prod him to do so. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer's negligence in
fulfilling these duties subjects him to disciplinary action.
In this case, Atty. Gatchalian failed to notify
complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court.
Had the complainants not inquired with the trial court,
they would have lost their opportunity to appeal.

 A disbarment complaint was filed by complainant
Sison against respondent Atty. Valdez for violating his
professional duties under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 Complainant engaged respondent-atty’s services to
file a money claim, and pursuant to such engagement,
complainant paid Atty a total of P215,000.00.
 After 3 months, complainant terminated Atty’s legal
services due to failure to render legal services with a
demand to return the amount given, which was not
heeded notwithstanding several demands.
 Hence, this instant disbarment complaint alleging
that Atty. commingled her money with that of Atty's
wife; misappropriated her money by failing to issue a
receipt for the last installment of the payment
received; and fabricated documents to justify
retention of her money.
Whether or not Atty. Valdez CPR should be held
administratively liable when he failed to account for and
return the money of his client.
Yes, Atty. violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16
of the CPR.
The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client
relationship imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for
the money or property collected or received for or from
his client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as for the filing and processing of a case, if
not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand.
His failure to return gives rise to a presumption
that he has appropriated it for his own use, and the
conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes a gross
violation of his professional obligation under Canon 16 of
the CPR.
Whether or not Atty. Valdez should be held
administratively liable for his failure to duly update his
client on the developments of the case.
Yes, Atty’s lapses constituted a violation of Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of CPR.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, a
lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence
and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care,
and devotion. In this relation, a lawyer has the duty to
apprise his client of the status and developments of the
case and all other relevant information.
Respondent cannot justify his noncompliance by
shifting the blame to complainant for failing to meet with
him, especially so that he failed to inform his client of the
pleadings she needed to sign.
 The government of Quezon City filed a complaint for
expropriation against the land owned by Sy for the
property to be used as a multi-purpose barangay hall.
 Pursuant to Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code of
1991, the City deposited with the Clerk of Court 15%
of the fair market value of the property.
 The RTC awarded legal interests amounting to 6% for
equity considerations which was affirmed by the CA
with modifications on exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
Whether or not the CA correctly awarded
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Yes, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
should be awarded to the landowner if the government
takes possession of the property for a prolonged period of
time without properly initiating expropriation
proceedings.
In this case, the City already commenced with
the taking of the subject property as early as 1986 and only
filed its expropriation complaint in 1994. This wanton and
irresponsible act should be suppressed and correct. Thus,
the Court found that the grant of exemplary damages of
P200k as well as attorney’s fees equivalent to 1% of the
total amount due amply justified.
 Jurisprudence dictates that in the absence of a
governing stipulation, attorney’s fees may be awarded only
in case the plaintiff’s action or defendant’s stand is so
untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. This
is also embodied in Art. 2208 of the Civil Code.
Absent any other just or equitable reason to rule
otherwise, these incidents are clearly off-tangent with a
finding of gross and evident bad faith which altogether
negates Sumitomo’s entitlement to attorney’s fees.

● Asian Construction entered into a Civil Work

Agreement with Sumitomo for the construction of the
LRT System. The Agreement provides that the
“validity, interpretation, enforceability, and
performance of the same shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the law of the State of
New York, USA, and that any dispute, controversy or
claim arising therefrom “shall be solely and finally
settled by the arbitration.”
● Later on, Sumitomo informed Asian Construction that
it was terminating the Agreement due to the latter’s
failure to complete the project and among other  Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints
things. As such, Asian Construction filed a complaint (COJCOLDS) entered into a contract with BTL
before the Construction Industry Arbitration Construction for the construction of a meeting house
Commission’s (CIAC) Arbitral Tribunal. facility.
● The Arbitral Tribunal further directed the parties to  BTL suffered financial losses from another project. It
itemize their respective claims for costs and asked petitioner to make payments based on the 95-
attorney’s fees and to submit factual proof and legal 100% completion which COJCOLDS agreed to.
bases for their entitlement thereto. Pursuant to this  BTL then ceased its project due to lack of funds
directive, Sumitomo submitted evidence to prove the thereby leaving an incomplete project which caused
costs it had incurred and paid as a result of the COJCOLDS to terminate their services and hire
arbitration proceedings. another contractor. This caused BTL to file a claim
● The Arbitral Award rendered the Final Award which against COJCOLDS, which includes attorney’s fees.
granted Sumitomo’s claim for attorney’s fees in the
amount of US$200,000.00. On the other hand, a Whether or not attorney’s fees should be awarded.
similar claim for attorney’s fees made by Asian
Construction was denied by reason of the latter’s
No, neither of the parties have acted in bad faith
failure to submit, as directed, proof of its entitlement
in pursuing their respective claims. Thus, the Court deems
thereto.
it inappropriate to award attorney’s fees in favor of either
party.
Whether or not the award of attorney’s fees in
As a general rule, attorney’s fees cannot be
favor of Sumitomo is proper.
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The
No. In this case, there was no gross and evident power of the court to award under Article 2208 of the Civil
bad faith on the part of Asian Construction in filing its Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
complaint against Sumitomo since it was merely seeking Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
payment of its unpaid works done pursuant to the persons to protect his rights, no attorney’s fees may be
Agreement. Neither may it be classified as a badge of bad awarded when no sufficient showing of bad faith could be
faith since it was within its right to either accept or reject reflected in a party’s persistence in a case.
the same owing to its contractual nature.

 The case involves the recovery of a parcel of land by
Dy from Yu.
 When the case reached the CA, an award of attorney's
fees in the amount of P75k in favor of Yu was given,
for the reason that they were compelled to litigate to
protect their interests.
 Dy appealed before the Court to delete the award of
attorney's fees as the trial court failed to explain its
findings of facts and law to justify the award.
Whether or not the award of attorney's fees was
proper.
No, the power of the court to award attorney's
fees demands factual, legal and equitable justification,
without which, the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture. Such failure or oversight of the trial court
cannot even be supplanted by the CA.
As settled by the Court in another case, it is
necessary for the trial court to make findings of facts and
law that would justify the awarding of attorney's fees. The
award cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive portion
of the decision. It must be clearly explained and justified
by the trial court. On appeal, the CA is precluded from
supplementing the bases for the award when the trial
court failed to discuss in its decision the reason for
awarding the same.
● Rafael Martinez, respondent’s father, obtained a loan
from Marilag. RTC ordered Rafael to pay petitioner
the amount of P229,200.
● However, before Rafael had notice of the RTC’s
Decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael’s obligation
to petitioner which was pegged at P689,000. After
making a total payment of P400,000 he executed a
promissory note.
● After the respondent learned of the RTC’s Decision
that the obligation was merely for P229,000,
respondent refused to pay the amount in the
promissory note. This prompted Marilag to file a
complaint for sum of money.
● The court a quo denied recovery on the subject
promissory note. It further held that there was an
excess in the payment of Martinez. As such, it ordered
Marilag to return the excess and pay attorney’s fees
and the cost of the suit.
Whether or not Marilag is liable for attorney’s fees.
No, the case is already barred by prior judgment
or res judicata. As such, petitioner must return to
respondent the excess payments with legal interest.
However, inasmuch as the court a quo failed to state in the
body of its decision the factual or legal basis for the award
of attorney’s fees to the respondent, as required under Art.
2208 of the NCC, the Court resolves to delete the same.
The rule is well-settled that the trial court must
clearly state the reasons for awarding attorney’s fees in the
body of its decision, not merely in its dispositive portion,
as the appellate courts are precluded from supplementing
the bases for such award.
 Gargallo, employee of Dohle, met an accident in work.
After some time, the company-designated physician
declared him fit to work. But, on second-opinion, an
independent doctor declared that he was unfit to
work
 He then filed, a
complaint to recover permanent total disability
benefits. NLRC: In favor of Gargallo. CA: Against
Gargallo. Thus, it deleted the award of attorney’s fees.

Whether or not Gargallo is entitled to attorney’s
fees.
Yes, while respondents have not been shown to
have acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy Gargallo’s demands, it is settled that where an
employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to
protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total award at the
time of actual payment.
 Gargallo, certified by his chosen physician to have a
permanent total disability, filed for benefits against
respondents.
 Respondents averred that the filing of the disability
claim was premature since Gargallo was still
undergoing medical treatment within the allowable
240-day period at the time the complaint was filed.
 Gargallo’s claim for permanent total disability
benefits was dismissed, but the court ordered Dohle
Seafront and Dohle Manning, jointly and severally, to
pay him the income benefit arising from his
temporary total disability which lasted for 194 days
plus 10% of the total amount of the income benefit as
attorney's fees.
Whether or not the award of attorney’s fees is
proper.
No, the award of attorney's fees must be deleted.
As a rule, the mere fact of having been forced to litigate to
protect one’s interest does not amount to a compelling
legal reason to justify an award of attorney’s fees in the
claimant’s favor. Verily, jurisprudence is replete with cases
holding that attorney’s fees may be awarded to a claimant
who is compelled to litigate with third persons or incur
expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified
act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is
sought only when there is sufficient showing of bad faith
on the part of the latter in refusing to pay.
The Court had pronounced in Montierro v.
Rickmers that in labor cases, the withholding of wages and
benefits need not be coupled with malice or bad faith to
warrant the grant of attorney's fees since all that is
required is that the refusal to pay was without justification,
thus, compelling the employee to litigate. Nonetheless,
since the complaint in Montierro was filed: (a) when the
petitioner therein was still under treatment; (b) prior to the
assessment of the company-designated physician within
the allowable 240-day period; and (c) without complying
with the prescribed conflict-resolution procedure, the
Court declared that there was no unlawful withholding of
benefits, rendering the award of attorney’s fees to be
improper. Thus, considering that similar circumstances
obtain in the present case, the Court finds it proper to rule
in the same way.
 Abejon filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title with
collection of sum of money against Delos Santos
before the RTC.
 RTC ruled in favor of Abejon and declared the Deed of
Sale null and void; and ordered petitioners to pay
respondents, among others, P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. CA affirmed.
Whether or not petitioners should be held liable for
attorney’s fees.
No. The general rule is that attorney’s cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are
not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The
power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article
2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and
equitable justification. In this case, the Court finds no
justification for the award of attorney’s fees to either party.
Accordingly, any award for attorney’s fees made by the
courts a quo must be deleted.
 Martin engaged the legal services of Atty. Dela Cruz.
During the pendency of that case, she repeatedly
went to Atty. Dela Cruz’s office to inquire on the
status of the same, but he was not there.
 Thus, Martin wrote several letters to him requesting
the return of the money she paid as acceptance fee
due to his failure to take any action on her cases.
 Atty. Dela Cruz even failed to appear in the hearing
for preliminary investigation, and also refused to
answer any of her calls.

Whether or not Atty. Dela Cruz erred in not

returning the acceptance fee paid by the complainant.

Yes, in absence of legal service, the lawyer has no

basis for retaining client’s payment. The Court has, in
several cases, allowed the return of acceptance fees when
a lawyer completely fails to render legal service. As applied
to this case, the order for Atty. to return the acceptance
fee is, therefore, proper.
Indeed, an acceptance fee is generally non-
refundable, but such rule presupposes that the lawyer has
rendered legal service to his client. In the absence of such
service, the lawyer has no basis for retaining complainant's
payment, as in this case.

 Atty. Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of
spouses Tiong, while having an affair with said client’s
wife.
 Atty. Florendo and the wife then executed and
signed an affidavit stating that they admit of
their illicit relationship; that they are seeking the
forgiveness of their respective spouse. The husband
forgave them.
 Nevertheless, the husband filed a disbarment case
against Atty. Florendo who argued that he can no
longer be sanctioned because he was already
pardoned.
Whether or not the pardon extended to Atty.
Florendo is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the
disbarment case against him.
No, a petition for suspension or disbarment of
a lawyer is a sui generis case. This class of cases is meant
to protect the public and the courts of undesirable
members of the legal profession. As such, pardon by the
offended party of the act complained of does not operate
to offset the ground for disbarment or suspension.
Atty. violated the trust and confidence reposed
on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under
Canon 17 of CPR. Respondent’s act of having an affair with
his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on
the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.
It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for
the ethics of his profession. therefore, his illicit
relationship amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral
conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court.
 Atty. Pefianco promised to give Tumbokon a 10%
commission from the attorney’s fees for his referral to
Sps. Yap.
 Despite receiving P40M, Atty. Pefianco refused to pay
and stated that Sps. Yap will be the one to shoulder
the commission.
 Thus, an administrative complaint for disbarment was
filed against Atty. Pefianco. It was further alleged that
Pefianco abandoned his legal wife Hilado and two
children and cohabited with Galido, with whom he
has four children.
 The IBP Board of Governors adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating IBP
Commissioner to suspend Atty. Pefianco for one (1)
year from the active practice of law.
Whether or not Atty. Pefianco should be disbarred
for grave dishonesty and gross immoral conduct.
No, although he should be sanctioned for his
actions, he should not be disbarred absent any
circumstances of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and as member of the bar, or the misconduct borders
on the criminal, or committed under scandalous
circumstance.
He clearly violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating
to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed
to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain
in the case at bar. Furthermore, he did not deny the
accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit
with his mistress. Settled is the rule that betrayal of marital
vow or fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral.
As such, Atty. Pefianco violated the Lawyer’s
Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes
a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.” He was suspended for one year.

 Abella filed an illegal dismissal case and secured a
ruling in his favor against a corporation.
 When Abella moved for execution with Labor Arbiter
Barrios, the latter:
o Did not act for thirteen months
o When complainant went to his office to follow
up, he asked complainant for a bribe so that the
matter could be “easily fixed.”
Whether or not Atty. Barrios should be disbarred
for his gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct.
No, although respondent’s violations clearly
constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct,
his disbarment should come as a matter of course.
However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he
had already been disbarred in a previous administrative
case, which therefore precludes the Court from
duplicitously decreeing the same. He was imposed a fine
of P40k.
● Atty. Paulma issued a check to Nulada. The check was
in the amount of P650,000, representing payment for
Paulma’s debt. Nulada accepted the check without
question.
● However, the check was dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. Thus, a criminal complaint for violation of BP
Blg. 22 was filed against Atty. Paulma.
● Prior to the promulgation of the RTC, Nulada filed an
administrative complaint before the SC, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
● The Commission on Bar Discipline found that the
offense which Atty. Paulma was found guilty involved
moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer’s oath
and the CPR. As such, the recommendation is to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.
Whether or not Atty. Paulma should be
administratively disciplined for having been found guilty of
a crime involving moral turpitude.
Yes, he was suspended from the practice of law
for 2 years. The issuance of worthless checks indicates a
lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence,
and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
In this case, Atty. Paulma’s conviction for
violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had
been established. Such conviction has, in fact, already
became final. Consequently, he violated the lawyer’s oath
and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, and as such should
subject him to disciplinary action.
As held by the court in similar cases, the Court
suspended lawyers from the practice of law for issuing a
check which later dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Atty. Paulma was suspended for 2 years.
● In June 2007, Senate investigated the anomalies that
plagued the PHILCOMSAT group of companies.
● Among the records examined by the Senate was an
entry in complainant’s checkbook stub which reads
“Cash for Sandiganbayan”. It was then discovered that
the check was issued in connection with
complainant’s injunction case before the
Sandiganbayan, which was filed by Atty. Lokin’s
group, with Atty. Labastilla as its external counsel.
● As the investigation was publicized by the media, the
Sandiganbayan learned about the subject checkbook
entry and, accordingly, motu proprio initiated
indirect contempt proceedings against the
respondents. It held both Atty. Lokin and Atty.
Labastilla guilty.
● Following the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayan’s Resolution, the complainant
instituted the instant administrative complaint.
● IBP found Atty. Lokin administratively liable but
absolved Atty. Labastilla. The IBP Board of Governors
increased the period of suspension of Atty. Lokin from
the practice of law to three (3) years.
Whether or not respondent lawyers may only be
held administratively liable after their conviction in the
indirect contempt case.
No, a disbarment proceeding is separate and
distinct from a criminal action. The indirect contempt case
originally filed before the Sandiganbayan is in the nature
of a criminal contempt. Since the indirect contempt case
is criminal in nature, respondents cannot insist that the
filing of an administrative case against them on the basis
of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling in the aforesaid case is
premature on the premise that their conviction has not
attained finality.
Case law instructs that a finding of guilt in the
criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of
liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the lawyer’s
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate them
administratively.
Court finds that it was Atty. Lokin who caused
the making of the subject checkbook entry in the
complainant’s financial records. Atty. Labastilla should also
be held administratively liable for his complicity in the
making of the subject checkbook entry. As members of the
Bar, respondents should not perform acts that would tend
to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts,
such as the subject checkbook entry which
contumaciously imputed corruption against the
Sandiganbayan. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and
officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts. They violated Canon 7 and 11 of the CPR. Atty.
Lokin is suspended from the practice of law for 3 years,
while Atty. Labastilla is suspended from the practice of law
for 1 year.
● Sps. Eustaquio are the owners of an apartment in
Quezon City which they leased to Atty. Navales. The
latter violated the terms of the contract Thus, an
ejectment case was filed against him.
● Sps. Eustaquio also filed an administrative case before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
contending that Atty. Navales miserably failed to
exemplify honesty, integrity, and respect for the laws
when he failed and refused to fulfil his obligations to
complainants.
● During the pendency of the case, he was appointed as
an Assistant City Public Prosecutor of Quezon City.
● IBP later on recommended for his suspension from
the practice of law for six (6) months. The same
became final through Court’s Resolution.
● However, despite such finality of his suspension
order, he was still appearing in courts as Assistant
City Prosecutor. Hence, the OBC increased his total
suspension period to one (1) year.
Whether or not Atty. Navales should be held
administratively liable for disobeying the Court’s order of
suspension.
Yes, the OBC correctly pointed out that Court’s
Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for a
period of 6 months became final and executory 15 days
after receipt of the same. Thus, he should have already
commenced serving his 6-month suspension. However, he
never heeded the suspension order. The continuous
discharge of his functions constitutes practice of law, and
thus, a clear defiance of the Court’s order of suspension.
He violated Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
which provides: “A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court x x x for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do.” He was suspended from the practice of law, totaling
one (1) year from service of the Decision.
 The administrative case stemmed from a disbarment
complaint filed by Mrs. Paras against her husband.
 In October 2000, the court suspended Atty. Paras
from the practice of law for six months for falsifying
his wife’s signature in bank documents, and
 suspension for one year for immorality and
abandonment of his family.
 On March 2, 2001, Complainant filed a motion to
declare in contempt and disbar the respondent for
continued practice of law, in violation of the
suspension order. Also, it was manifested that
respondent appeared before a court in an election
case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his
motion to lift suspension.

Whether or not Atty. Paras should be held liable for

practicing law while he was suspended.

Yes, after this filing and without waiting for a

Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to
accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an
amicable settlement for his client with the Department of
Agrarian Reform.
It must be stressed that a lawyer's suspension is
not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension
period. The lawyer must submit the required documents
and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension
before he or she resumes the practice of law.
Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice
of law without waiting for the Court order lifting the
suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held
administratively liable. Since he had been previously
disbarred, he cannot anymore be suspended for 6 months.
 Atty. Macarubbo was disbarred in 2004 for having
contracted a bigamous marriage that constituted as
gross and immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 He now seeks for reconsideration and re-admittance
to the bar which prompted the court to look at certain
merits of the previous case. Particularly to his proof
of remorse and reformation.

Whether or not Atty. Macarubbo should be

reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Yes, respondent sufficiently showed his remorse

and acknowledged his indiscretion. He has asked
forgiveness from his children and maintained cordial
relationship with them. There were also affidavits of
various people attesting to his reformation and the
reinstatement plea was duly supported by the IBP-
Cagayan Chapter.
The court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency: (1) There must be
proof of remorse and reformation; (2) sufficient time must
have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reform; (3) the age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put into good use; (4) there must
be a promise as well as potential for public service; (5)
there must be other relevant factors and circumstances to
justify clemency.
It had been 8 years since he was disbarred, and
at the age of 58 he has still productive years ahead of him
to contribute to the legal profession.
  In the course of the proceedings, Atty. Jumamil
admittedly prepared and notarized the affidavit of
client Samonte’s intended witness despite his belief
that such was a perjured one.

 Salita obtained a loan from Rodriguez and signed

Whether or not Atty. Jumamil violated the Rules on
several blank documents, including a preformed Deed
Notarial Practice when he notarized a perjured affidavit.
of Absolute Sale (DAS) over his property as collateral.
He later paid his loan in full.
Yes, respondent violated Section 4(a), Rule IV of
 Thereafter, Rodriguez instituted an ejectment case
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The rule provides that
against Salita. Salita discovered that the DAS had
“a notary public shall not perform any notarial act
already been notarized by Atty. Salve, and his
described in these Rules for any person requesting such an
Community Tax Certificate Nos. were falsified.
act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by
 It appeared that Salita had sold the subject property
these Rules if: (a) the notary knows or has good reason to
to Rodriguez and executed the DAS before Atty. Salve.
believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
Hence the administrative case against Atty. Salve.
immoral.”
Here, Atty. indulged in deliberate falsehood
Whether or not Atty. Salve is guilty of gross when he admittedly prepared and notarized the affidavit
negligence in his conduct as a notary public. of complainant’s intended witness, despite his belief that
he was a perjured witness. Thus, he is liable.
Yes, Atty. Salve’s act of certifying under oath an
irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the
personal appearance of the persons executing the same
constitutes gross negligence in the performance of duty as
a notary public.
A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be
delegated because what are stated therein are facts they
have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to.
Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in
the said documents as the ones who executed the same.

 Atty. Nazareno filed an ejectment case against some

of the complainants.
 On behalf of the same client, he then filed rescission
of contract cases over the same property as in the
ejectment cases against the same opposing party.
These were denied.
 Later, he filed a petition for review of those
cases. In the certifications against forum shopping
attached to said petitions, he said he has not
commenced, nor does he have knowledge of any
similar proceeding involving the same issues pending
before any court.
 As a notary public, he also notarized the said
certifications against forum shopping.
 Complainants filed an administrative complaint
against him, claiming that Atty. Nazareno made false
declarations in the certifications against forum
shopping.
Whether or not Atty. Nazareno was guilty of
malpractice as a notary public.
Yes, considering that he assigned only one
document number to the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the six complaints for rescission and
ejectment despite the fact that each of them should have
been treated as a separate notarial act. Worse, he
notarized the certifications attached to all the complaints,
fully aware that they identically asserted a material
falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions
or proceeding or was not aware of any pending actions or
proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum.
The administrative liability of an erring notary
public in this respect was clearly delineated as a violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code. He was permanently
disqualified from being commissioned as notary public and
his notarial commission was revoked.
 Manansala claimed to be Magbuhos’ attorney-in-fact
in the ejectment case filed against the latter, and
presented an SPA.
 It turns out that the SPA is for another transaction
(cash loan). So, Manansala’s counsel, Atty. Miranda,
submitted another SPA that just altered the first one.
o It now included, in handwritten phrase, the
property in the ejectment case. But, it did not
have any counter-signatures; hence it was not
appreciated by the MTCC.
 When an administrative case was filed against Atty.
Miranda for submitting a falsified document which he
notarized himself, he said that it was a mere “honest
mistake or oversight”.
 He claims that he asked his secretary to print a copy
of similar document in his files for him to insert the
correction and ordered his secretary to retype the
document and reprint it. Thinking that it already
contained his corrections. He no longer proofread the
SPA and then proceeded to notarize it. After realizing
the mishap, he informed his client, who instructed
him to insert the necessary corrections.
Whether or not Atty. Miranda should be held
administratively liable for notarizing a document which
did not reflect the true intent of his clients.
Yes, Atty. Miranda’s attempt to escape
administrative sanctions by pinning the blame on his
secretary cannot be condoned as case law instructs that in
these instances, the lawyer himself, not merely his
secretary, should be held accountable for these kinds of
misdeeds. Worse, he himself caused the intercalation of
the notarized SPA by inserting handwritten alterations
therein which changed its meaning; thus, violating Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
A notary public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial
duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity
of a notarized document would be undermined.
Absent any competent proof, Atty. Miranda’s
assertion that he was verbally authorized by Magbuhos in
altering the SPA is self-serving and cannot be given any
credence.
 Atty. Basilio, a notary public, notarized a Joint
Affidavit document purportedly subscribed and
sworn to before him by Tañedo and Lim.
 He said that he verified their identities prior to the
notarization through their SSS IDs and driver’s
 license. He denied any knowledge that the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of
one who appeared before him misrepresented Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s
himself as Tañedo and that the latter was already jurisdiction is crystal clear from Sec. 11, Rule III of the 2004
dead. Rules on Notarial Practice.
 But Atty. Basilio admitted his failure to record the
subject document, submit the copy of the same to the
court and have the notarization revoked.

Whether or not Atty. Basilio is liable of violation of

Notarial Rules.

Yes, Atty. Basilio affixed his official signature and

seal on the notarial certificate of the Joint Affidavit without
properly identifying the persons who signed the same. His
claim that he verified the identities of the affiants through
their respective SSS IDs and driver’s licenses cannot be
given any credence because the details of such IDs are not
indicated in the certificate. On the other hand, one of the
named signatories to the Joint Affidavit was already dead
when he notarized the aforesaid document. Hence, it is
sufficiently clear that Basilio had indeed affixed his official
signature and seal on an incomplete, if not false, notarial
certificate.
By failing in this regard, the notary public
permits a falsehood which does not only transgress the
Notarial Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which
provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

 Atty. Suerte-Felipe is a notary public for the City of

Pasig.
 He notarized an “Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate” of a person, representing that he was a “notary
public for and in the City of Marikina”

Whether or not Atty. Suerte-Felipe violated the

Notarial Law.

Yes, he admitted that he was commissioned as

notary public only in the City of Pasig and the
Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and
Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, and could not
notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the
City of Marikina, as said notarial act is beyond the
 Evelina Banaag filed a complaint before the Office of
the Court Administrator charging Olivia Espeleta, a
court interpreter, with Gross Immorality and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for
engaging in an illicit and immoral relationship with
her husband Avelino Banaag.
 Olivia was asked by OCA to comment on the letter-
complaint which she failed to comply. Instead it was
found that she filed a letter of resignation and had
gone to the United States.
Whether or not Olivia Espeleta is guilty of immoral
conduct.
Yes, she is found guilty of Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct under the Administrative Code of 1987.
It is “an act which violates the basic norm of decency,
morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the
society” and “conduct which is willful, flagrant, shameless
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinions of
the good and respectable members of the community.”
Olivia’s act of maintaining an illicit relationship
with a married man comes within the purview of
disgraceful and immoral conduct. The resignation was
taken as a strong indication of guilt on her part. In view of
such resignation, instead of mere suspension, she was
imposed a fine of P50,000.
 Sandiganbayan convicted accused Pacifico Velasco in
a criminal case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
 Accused sought its reconsideration, which the
Sandiganbayan denied. He elevated the case before
the Court via a petition for review on certiorari, which
was denied.
 Accused then filed numerous actions questioning his
conviction and subsequently his warrant of arrest.
 Hence, the instant administrative complaint for grave
misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct filed by Velasco against the Sandiganbayan
Justices.
 Velasco asserts that his conviction of accused having
attained finality, the Sandiganbayan Justices should
have merely performed the ministerial duty of
executing his final sentence and not entertained
motions or pleadings.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan Justices are
guilty of grave misconduct or violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
No, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices
respecting the execution of the final judgment against
accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference
to the Court’s action on the various petitions filed by the
former, who apparently exhausted what he perceived were
valid available remedies under the law. However, the
becoming modesty that the Sandiganbayan Justices have
exhibited in this case cannot detract from the fact that the
judgment of conviction of accused Velasco should have
been immediately executed, absent any restraining order
from the Court. This lapse in judgment deserves
admonition.
● Hermosisima (security guard II) inquired from
Abulencia (Clerk III) and Burgonio (HRM Assistant)
about the status of the computation of the loyalty
differential of Sandiganbayan employees. The
Complainants replied that they were still finalizing.
● Hermosisima then said, “bakit nyo pinapatagal?” to
which Burgonio replied, “Matalino ka naman, ikaw na
gumawa nyan!”. Hermosisima then in a loud angry
voice uttered, “Mga putang-ina nyo, ang bobobo nyo!
Ang ta-tanga nyo, ayusin nyo yang trabaho nyo!”
● In this regard, complainants filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for grave misconduct.
Respondent admitted his rude behavior which he
explained was, but an outburst of emotion brought by
the delayed release of his loyalty benefits.
● Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) held
Hermosisima guilty of simple misconduct.
Whether or not Hermosisima is guilty of simple
misconduct.
Yes, respondent’s act of hurling invectives on the
complainants during office hours and within the court
premises was correctly held to be a case of simple
misconduct.
Simple misconduct has been defined as an
unacceptable behavior which transgresses the established
rules of conduct for public officers, work-related or not.
Verily, respondent’s foul and vulgar utterances,
albeit not work related, constitute clear deviations from
the established norms of conduct which out to be followed
by public officers.
 Mah-Arevalo alleged in her complaint that Judge
Mantua has committed Disgraceful/ Immoral
Conduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct,
Dishonesty, Violation of Republic Act. No. 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), Gross Violation of
the Judicial Code of Conduct, Abuse of Authority, and
Gross Ignorance of the Law.
 Mah-Arevalo alleged that Judge Mantua used the Hall
of Justice as his residence; openly brought his
mistress in court; used the court process server as his
personal driver, delegated his work load to his legal
researcher, committed gross ignorance of the law,
asked for additional benefits from the local
government, and failed to decide cases within the
prescribed 90-day period.
Whether or not Judge Mantua should be held
administratively liable for Immorality.
Yes, Judge Mantua is guilty of Immorality, which
is defined "to include not only sexual matters but also,
‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare.'"
Judge Mantua can no longer be dismissed or
suspended on account of his compulsory retirement, he
was imposed a fine of P40k.

 Atty. Miano filed motions for inhibition in several
cases which Judge Aguilar granted.
 However, Judge Aguilar later issued an Order in one
of the cases, directing the proceedings be held in
abeyance until such time that a new Judge will be
appointed.
 Atty. Miano asserted that this constitutes ignorance
of the rules on inhibition on the part of the Judge
Aguilar, invoking AM No. 03-8-02-SC.
Whether or not Judge Aguilar should be held guilty
of Gross Ignorance of the Law/Procedure, and thus be
dismissed from service.
 Pilot is the judgment obligee in a civil case.
 To implement the writ of execution and for payment
of publication expenses, respondent sheriff Baron
asked and received P15,000 from Pilot and thereafter,
levied the house and lot of Sps. Bambalan.
 The scheduled auction sale did not push through for
four (4) times as Pilot failed to give another P18,000
demanded by Baron for publication expenses.
 When Sps. Bambalan paid P500,000, Baron offered to
deliver the said amount for a sheriff’s fee of 2.5% of
the amount in the notice of auction sale.
 On several occasions, he solicited money from Pilot
for his cellphone load and transportation expenses in
the service of the notice of sale.
 Pilot filed a letter complaint before the Office of Court
Administrator against Baron.

No, Judge Aguilar was remiss in her duty of Whether or not Baron is guilty of grave
familiarizing herself with the rules on inhibition, but it misconduct.
cannot be categorized as gross ignorance of the law.
To be able to render substantial justice and
Yes, he is found guilty of dishonesty and grave
maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges
misconduct when he unlawfully collected and pocketed
should be embodiments of competence, integrity, and
the amount of P15,000.00 intended to defray the expenses
independence.
for the publication of the notice and enforcement of the
Gross ignorance of the law is more than an
writ of execution but which was not accordingly spent.
erroneous application of legal provisions. Not every error
He is likewise guilty of dereliction of duty in
or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his
failing to observe the proper procedure in collecting
duties renders him liable, unless there is a showing of bad
execution expenses and conducting an execution sale.
faith or with deliberate intent to do an Injustice. To
He violated Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
constitute as gross ignorance of the law and for
which prohibits court employees from receiving tips or
administrative liability to attach, it must be proven that (1)
any remuneration from parties to the actions or
the decision, order, or actuation is contrary to law, and
proceedings with the courts. Since he has been an AWOL,
that, (2) it must be proven that the judge was moved by bad
the only appropriate imposable penalty is a fine.
faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, or had committed
an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

 Ong received favorable judgment in a case which
entitled him to damages and attorney’s fees. To
implement the same, RTC issued an order granting
the issuance of the writ of execution.
 However, after the lapse of two years, after two later
issuances of Alias Writs of Execution, still, Basiya-
Saratan was yet to issue the same.
 Thus, Ong filed an administrative case against Basiya-
Saratan.
Whether or not Basiya-Saratan should be held
liable for her repeated failure to issue corresponding alias
writs of execution.
Yes, Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform
their official duties properly and with diligence at all times.
Clerks of Court like respondent are primarily responsible
for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes
and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on
their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping
the records and the seal of the court, issuing processes,
entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies
of records upon request.
 Ampong, a court interpreter, was dismissed from the
Civil Service Commission for dishonesty, however,
remained employed in the RTC.
 SC has already held that Ampong was administratively
liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the
November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination
for Teachers on behalf of another.
 OCA recommended for Ampong’s dismissal for her
acts constituted dishonesty.
Whether or not the Ampong as the court
interpreter should be dismissed.
Yes, Ampong must be dismissed. Every employee
of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency
in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of
justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent
standards set for a judicial employee and does not,
therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
 Andres is the Human Resource Management Officer
III, RTC-Personnel Division, Office of Administrative
Services-Office of the Court Administrator.
 Andres was in charge of processing applicants for a
Sheriff position. He negligently overwrote the rating
 of one of the applicants, turning the rating
from 'Satisfactory' to 'Very Satisfactory'. This resulted
in such applicant to be erroneously promoted.
Whether or not Andres should be held
administratively liable for simple neglect of duty and the
alleged tampering of the record.
Yes, Andres was remiss and negligent in
performing his assigned tasks, in violation of Sec. 1, Canon
IV of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, otherwise known as the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel. It provides that "court
personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly
and with diligence."
Andres as processor-in-charge of appointment,
occupies a sensitive position which is vital to the human
resource management operations and activities of the
RTC-Personnel Division of the OAS-OCA. His primary task
is to check and verify the information given by applicants
for any vacant position in the RTC and, thereafter, prepare
the necessary reports for his supervisors.
Court found that Andres failed to meticulously
check Puerto's qualifications and indicate in the list of
lacking requirements the absence of Puerto's PR form, and
also erroneously reported Puerto's performance as 'very
satisfactory' instead of 'satisfactory'. He is guilty of simple
neglect, which is defined as "the failure of an employee to
give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a
duty due to carelessness or indifference."
 April 14, 2011 Office Memorandum and SC Admin
Circular No. 1-99 prohibits gambling within the court
premises.
 Atty. Enjambre caught Labar, driver at the mailing and
delivery section of the Court of Appeals, playing cards
and gambling under the staircase at the back of the
office building during office hours. So, she filed a
complaint against Labar.
 Labar said that he simply forgot about the April 14,
2011 Memorandum. Labar was charged with
insubordination, and not merely a violation of the
office rules and regulations, which meted the penalty
of suspension for 1 month and 1 day.
 The OCA said that the April 14 2011 Memorandum was
in the form of a directive or order of a superior officer
to a subordinate, and said Memorandum directed
compliance with a SC Circular which cannot be taken
lightly.
Whether or not Labar should be held
administratively liable for insubordination, or for violation
of office rules and regulations and for the offense of
gambling.
Yes, Labar should be held liable for violation of
office rules and regulations and for the offense of gambling
prohibited by law, and not for insubordination.
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order,
which a superior officer is entitled to give and have
obeyed. It, therefore, imports a willful or intentional
disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the
employer.
Labar’s acts of loitering in the maintenance
section of the premises of CA-Cebu without any official
business therein and without a valid pass slip from the
office of the Asst. Clerk of Court and at the same time
gambling thereat during office hours were not done
deliberately and intentionally for the purpose of defying
the April 14, 2011 Memorandum. Hence, Labar cannot be
held guilty of insubordination. His penalty is only of
reprimand.
 Alerta is a court stenographer of RTC-Dumangas.
Fernandez engaged the services of Alerta to cause the
transfer to Fernandez’s name the Original Certificate
of Title, which covers the parcel of land he bought
from Arones.
 After over 19 years, however, Alerta still had not
caused the transfer.
 Alerta admitted the she agreed to cause the transfer
of the property, which is not among her duties as
court stenographer. OCA remarked that she was
engaged in “moonlighting”, which is the pursuit of a
private business or vocation.
 Whether or not Alerta should be held
administratively liable for moonlighting.
Yes, Alerta’s processing of the transfer of title in
Fernandez’s name, which task is not part of her duties as
court stenographer, is clearly in pursuit of a private
business venture.
Officers and employees of the judiciary engaging
in any private business, vocation or profession without
prior approval of the Court were guilty of moonlighting.
In dealing and transacting with external
government agencies, more particularly, the Registry of
Deeds, she had not only expended time and effort which
should have been devoted to the performance of her
official functions, but she had also tainted the integrity of
her office by giving, at the very least, the impression that
she could have wielded her authority or influence in
exchange for unofficial favors.
Absent any showing that it was permitted, she
violated the rule against moonlighting, and was meted with
the penalty of reprimand being her first infraction.
 Judge Masamayor, Executive and Presiding Judge of
RTC at Talibon, Bohol filed an application for lateral
transfer to RTCs of Tagbilaran City.
 However, she received a letter from the Judicial and
Bar Council informing that she was not included in
the list of nominees for RTC, Branch 2 or 4, Tagbilaran
City.
 She attributes her disqualification to her previous
administrative record of gross inefficiency for
belatedly filing her motions for extension of time to
resolve cases then pending before her sala. She was
ordered to pay a fine of P5k each in two cases and
P10k in another case.
 To reverse such disqualification, she filed a petition
for judicial clemency.
Whether or not Judge Masamayor is qualified for
judicial clemency.
Yes. The Court laid down the guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation;
2. Sufficient time have lapsed from imposition of the
penalty to ensure a period of reform;
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself;
4. There must be a showing of promise, as well as
potential for public service;
5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency.
In this case, Judge Masamayor has exhibited remorse
for her past misdeeds, which occurred more than 10 years
ago. She has subsequently shown diligence in the
performance of her duties and has not committed any
similar act or omission. She was also acknowledged on her
prompt compliance with the judicial audit requirements of
pending cases and was even commended for her good
performance in the effective management of her court and
in handling of court records. Moreover, the IBP Bohol
Chapter has shown its high regard for Judge Masamayor
per the letter of support signed by a number of its
members during the pendency of her administrative cases
and the endorsement of her application for lateral transfer
to the RTC of Tagbilaran City.
 In 1996, Judge Hermin Arceo was dismissed from
service for committing lewd and lustful acts against
Atty. Talens-Dabon which constituted gross
misconduct and immorality.
 In 2012, he filed a petition for judicial clemency
seeking to lift the ban against his employment in any
branch of the government and to be allowed to
receive his accrued leave credits and other monetary
benefits.
Whether or not Judge Arceo is qualified for judicial
clemency.
 Yes. The Court laid down the guidelines
in resolving requests for judicial clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation;
2. Sufficient time have lapsed from imposition of the
penalty to ensure a period of reform;
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself;
4. There must be a showing of promise, as well as
potential for public service;
5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency.
Judge Arceo has sufficiently shown his remorse
and reformation after his dismissal. He engaged in private
practice and most of his cases involve poor litigants,
neighbors and close friends. He also submitted documents
from the IBP Bulacan Chapter attesting to his reformation.
Court also noted the many years that had elapsed from the
time of his dismissal which was 16 years.
While he may be at 71 years old and can no longer
be eligible for regular employment in the public service,
yet, considering his achievements and mental aptitude, he
could still be of service to the government in some other
capacity. The judicial clemency lifted the ban against his
disqualification from from re-employment in any branch
of the government, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations.
 In the report of the judicial audit team of the Office of
Court Administrator (OCA) in 2006, it noted that
Judge Buenavista had several cases submitted for
decision beyond the 90-day reglementary period;
cases where no action had been taken since their
filing and other did not progress for unreasonable
periods of time.
 OCA recommended that he be fined P10,000 for
failing to decide and resolve cases within the
reglementary period and for failure to effectively
manage the court dockets in RTC Branches 72 and 22.
o OCA took into consideration the demise of his
wife the year preceding the audit; his failing
eyesight; his diligence in disposing 25 cases
before he retired and that the periods of delay
in deciding cases were minimal.
Whether or not Judge Buenavista should be
imposed the penalty recommended by OCA.
Yes, a fine of P10k was imposed upon him for his
failure to effectively manage the court dockets in RTC
Branches 72 and 22, Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, resulting in the
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases.
Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied.
Under the Constitution, trial judges are mandated to
decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission.
Corollary to this, Sec. 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness. An inexcusable failure to
decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period
constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition
of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office
without pay or fine.
 Sps. Marcelo were plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer
case decided by Judge Pichay in their favor. Along
with the judgment came a writ of execution against
Sps. Magopoy to vacate the said property on April
2006.
 Sps. Magopoy however re-entered the said property
causing petitioners to move to cite the former for
disobedience of lawful court process, which is a form
of indirect contempt.
 Judge Pichay in response did not cite said spouses in
contempt but merely ordered them to vacate the said
property. This prompted Sps. Magopoy to file a
motion for consideration followed by series of filing
of replies and comments, most of which Judge Pichay
failed to act upon.
 o The hearing was rescheduled and Judge
Pichay even went on a sick leave for 3 weeks.
Note that the series of filing happened from
2007-2010.
 Such prompted Spouses Marcelo to file for an
administrative complaint.
Whether or not Judge Pichay may be held
administratively liable for undue delay in the resolution of
the pending incidents relative to the execution of the said
decision.
Yes, notwithstanding the matter has already
been submitted for decision, Judge Pichay continued the
proceedings by setting motions for hearing.
The Constitution provides the time period for
the courts to decide cases and resolve matters brought to
their adjudication. The lower court has three months from
the date the matter is submitted for decision or resolution.
Further, he was not able to explain why he failed
to resolve the same, therefore there is undue delay in the
resolution of pending issues relative to the Civil Case.
 Atty. Miano filed motions for inhibition in several
cases which Judge Aguilar granted. However,
respondent later issued an Order in one of the cases,
directing the proceedings be held in abeyance until
such time that a new Judge will be appointed.
 Atty. Miano alleged that Judge Aguilar’s order
constitutes ignorance of the rules on inhibition. Atty.
Miano also averred that Judge Aguilar is also guilty of
gross inefficiency when she failed to resolve the
motion for inhibition within 90-days.
Whether or not Judge Aguilar should be held guilty
of Undue Delay in Issuing Orders, and Undue Delay in
Transmitting Records of a Case.
Yes, respondent was careless and did not
exercise diligence in ensuring that the records of the case
were immediately transmitted to the pairing judge.
However, there is no showing that the delay it was
deliberately and maliciously caused as to amount to bad
faith. Bad faith cannot be presumed, and the Court ruled
that it cannot conclude that bad faith exists when nothing
has been shown to prove it. Court found no need to
sanction respondent as to this violation. Thus, the penalty
should be suspension only.
With regard to the delay in resolving the case,
the Court ruled that respondent failed to file any request
for an extension of time within which to resolve them.
Court held that failure to decide cases and other matters
within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants an imposition of administrative
sanction against respondent.
 In 2009, Dulang moved for the resolution of the
ejectment case filed before Judge Regencia, given that
the same had been filed as early as the year 2000.
 Notwithstanding the summary nature of the
ejectment proceeding, Judge Regencia rendered a
judgment dismissing the ejectment case only in 2011,
more than 11 years after its filing.
 Thus, the Dulang filed this administrative case against
Judge Regencia.
Whether or not Judge Regencia should be held
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision.
Yes, the undue delay in rendering a decision is
classified as a less serious charge, punishable either by: (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a
fine of not more than P10k but not exceeding P20k.
Judges should be imbued with a high sense of
duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation
to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states
that “a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods and echoed
in Sec. 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary which provides that “judges shall
perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness.”
 Undue delay in rendering a decision is since it was the first instance that the Court En Banc was
classified as a less serious charge punishable by either being asked to pass upon the request concerning the
suspension or fine. Here, the penalty of fine was imposed. computation for purposes of adjusting the retirement
benefits.

 Wack Wack Residents Assoc. Inc. (WWRAI) fenced off

its street that AMA Land uses as access road to their
 Chief Justice Panganiban reached the compulsory
construction site, so AMA filed a petition to enforce
retirement age on December 7, 2006. He was credited
an easement of right of way.
11 years of public service not including his 4-year
 Apart from praying for the dismissal of the complaint,
service to DepEd thus failing to meet the 20 years
WWRAI interposed a counterclaim for TRO and writ
length of service required under R.A. 910. He was only
of prelim injunction (WPI).
eligible to the 5-year lumpsum payment under the
 On the counterclaim: RTC denied. But the CA granted
said law.
WWRAI’s application for TRO and WPI.
 Subsequently, then President Arroyo approved R.A.
 AMA filed an administrative complaint against the CA
9946 which reduced the length of service required
justices for issuing the unjust Decision (granting
from 20 to 15 years. It also entitles those who are
WWRAI’s application for TRO and WPI) pending
qualified to retirement benefits with lifetime annuity.
resolution of the petition for easement of right of way
 Justice Brion denied such request as allowing for re-
filed by AMA.
computation when the former Chief Justice has been
denied eligibility to his retirement benefits would be
another case of flip-flopping. Whether or not an administrative complaint could
be filed against the justices for its alleged erroneous
decision prior to the final resolution of judicial issues.
Whether or not the re-computation of years of
creditable services should be allowed.
No, Errors, if any, committed by a judge in the
exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected
Yes, The Court has followed the liberal treatment
through administrative proceedings, but should instead be
in passing upon retirement claims of judges and justices in
assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary
some cases: (1) waiving the lack of required length of
proceedings against judges do not complement,
service in cases of death or disability while in actual or
supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus,
distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave credits to
cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial
the actual length of government services in order to qualify
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous
for retirement; (3) tacking post retirement service in order
orders or judgments.
to complete the years of government service required; (4)
In this case, AMA had already filed a petition for
extending full benefits; (5) considering legal counselling
review on certiorari challenging the questioned decision of
work for a government body as creditable government
the CA Justices, which is still pending final action by the
service. In this case, no liberal construction is even
Court. Consequently, a decision on the validity of the
necessary to resolve the merits of CJ Panganiban’s request.
proceedings and propriety of the orders/decision of the
The Court need only observe consistency in its rulings.
CA Justices in this administrative proceeding would be
Moreover, there is no flip-flopping situation to speak of
premature. Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies
and a final ruling on the matter, are prerequisites
for the taking of appropriate measures against the judges
concerned. If the assailed act is subsequently found and
declared to be correct, there would be no occasion to
proceed against him at all.

 Judge Soluren has been instructing party-litigants to

deposit with her court settlement money for various
cases. Such was indorsed to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) who then sent a letter asking
said Judge and her researcher to comment on the said
incident.
 Tuzon, the legal researcher admitted to the receipt of
various amounts for different cases and explained
that he merely accepted such upon order of Judge
Soluren.
 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) observed  Judge Soluren was no longer investigated due to her
that the “bundy” cards of several employees including compulsory retirement on January 26, 2012.
respondent Capistrano’s had irregular entries.
o Bundy cards herein are similar to time sheets
Whether or not Judge Soluren who had been
indicating the employees time of arrival.
terminated due to her compulsory retirement be held
 Their respective time of arrivals bore overbars, thus,
administratively liable.
indicating that the bundy cards were punched in the
evening.
No, Supreme Court upheld the recommendation
 OCA sent a letter to the employees involved including
of the OCA that the complaint against her is considered
respondent (who is a Court Stenographer) requiring
terminated or closed as her compulsory retirement had
them to submit a written explanation regarding the
divested the court of jurisdiction to hear the complaint
matter.
against her.
 In such letter, Capistrano admitted to falsifying her
bundy card and appealed for judicial clemency as well
as pleaded for another opportunity to serve the
judiciary considering her length of service and
dedication to her work.

Whether or not Capistrano should be held

administratively liable for dishonesty and therefore be
dismissed as a penalty.

No, although the falsification of Daily Time

Records is tantamount to dishonesty and is treated as a
grave offense with the penalty of dismissal from service,
Sec. 53 Rule IV of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service grants the disciplining authority
the discretion to mitigate the final penalty depending on
the circumstances. Among the factors are, admission of
guilt, remorse, length of service, or high-performance
rating.
In Capistrano’s case, she admitted, expressed
remorse, and that this was her first administrative case.
Therefore, suspension as recommended by the OCA is
deemed proper in her case.
 Judge Amor has been accused of Grave Abuse of
Authority, Grave Misconduct, and Acts Inimical to
Judicial Service. These were due to him impounding a
tricycle of a certain Ojeda, and tolerating the abusive
practices of a certain Atty. Verida, as the latter has
been giving him gold.
 Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) sought for
respondent’s explanation but failed to obtain such.
 Meanwhile, the latter had already filed his Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) for the 2002 barangay elections,
resulting in his automatic resignation.
 Whether or not Judge Amor may still be held
administratively liable despite his resignation.

Yes, although the Office of the Court

Administrator has noted his automatic resignation by the
filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, it is well-settled that
resignation should not be used as a means to escape any
sanctions. The resignation did not divest the Court of its
jurisdiction in determining his administrative liability.
In this case, administrative disabilities such as:
(a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of
retirement benefits; (c) perpetual disqualification from any
government agency; and (d) bar from taking civil service
examinations, shall stand.