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Judge Carol Hooten

Weapon possession a no-no for ex-delinquent

 By: Dan Heilman  August 17, 2019

Should an adult have the right to own a firearm if he was judged delinquent as a juvenile?

That question was before the Minnesota Court of Appeals in a case published last week. As a
teenager, appellant Dennis Roberts was adjudicated delinquent of a fifth-degree drug
offense. Three years later, after he had reached the age of majority, he was arrested,
charged with, and pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by an ineligible person.

The Hennepin County District Court sentenced Roberts to 60 months stayed prison time with
five years of probation. Then, last year, Roberts violated his probation and the District Court
executed his sentence.

Roberts then filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that as a matter of law, his
prior juvenile adjudication did not qualify as a crime of violence, meaning the gun statute
didn’t apply to him. The postconviction court denied that petition, saying Roberts’ reading of
the relevant statutes would contravene clear legislative intent and make the relevant
statutory language meaningless.

Roberts appealed, citing abuse of discretion by the court. Riley vs. State, a 2012 decision,
held that “a postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”

Unconvincing argument
Was Roberts wrongly forbidden from owning a firearm? The appellate court didn’t think so. A
subdivision of Minnesota statute 624.713 says that “a person who has been convicted of, or
adjudicated delinquent or convicted as an extended jurisdiction juvenile for committing, in
this state or elsewhere, a crime of violence” cannot own firearms or ammunition.

As for what constitutes a crime of violence, possession of drugs or controlled substances falls
under that heading, according to Minnesota statute.
 “These statutes unambiguously criminalize possession of a firearm by a person who has
been adjudicated delinquent under one of the statutes listed in the definition of ‘crime of
violence,’” wrote Court of Appeals Judge Carol Hooten in her opinion.

Roberts’ appeal was based around the argument that a delinquency adjudication cannot
constitute a “crime of violence” because the relevant statute requires convictions, and
juvenile adjudications are not convictions. The state argued, though, that statute 260B.245,
explicitly provides for a lifetime ban on possession of a firearm for a juvenile adjudication of
a crime of violence, which “clearly demonstrates the intent of the legislature for section
624.712, subdivision 5, to refer to more than just adult convictions under the listed statutes,”
wrote Hooten.

The court also endeavored to determine whether there was ambiguity in the statutes
affecting Roberts. The state’s interpretation was that that persons who have been
adjudicated delinquent of a crime of violence can be convicted of possession of a firearm by
an ineligible person — which the court acknowledged was a reasonable interpretation in line
with existing application of the law.

Roberts, on the other hand, interpreted the statute to mean that the term “convictions”
excludes prior juvenile adjudications. The court found that interpretation not reasonable, and
directly contradicted by other statutory language.

Statute 624.713 “would make no sense within the statutory context if we were to adopt
appellant’s argument,” wrote Hooten. “That section renders ineligible to possess firearms
under criminal penalty ‘a person under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, who has been
charged with committing a crime of violence.’”

To underscore the point, the court pointed toward a previous case, State v. Moon. That case
revolved around a stay of imposition for felony theft that was subsequently reduced to
misdemeanor theft when Moon was discharged from probation.

In that case, Moon focused his argument on the definitional statute’s inclusion of felonious
theft as a crime of violence that resulted in a 10-year loss of firearms rights, while
misdemeanor theft carried no such consequence under the firearms statute in effect at the
time.

The Minnesota Supreme Court went on to state that regardless of the fact that Moon no
longer had a conviction under one of the relevant statutes, “We hold that the definitions of
the offenses listed as crimes of violence in section 624.712, subdivision 5, relate to the
elements of the offense for which the defendant was originally convicted rather than the
disposition subsequently imposed by the trial judge.”

“This holding is relevant to the instant case, where there is no debate that appellant
committed all of the elements of one of the offenses that would constitute a crime of
violence,” wrote Hooten.

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