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In Singapore, the proliferation of Islamic classes drawing from self-help rhetoric, popular culture, the
Qur’an, and Hadith allude to the increased appeal of affective pedagogies to Muslim youth. Taught by
Singaporean Al-Azhar University graduates, the classes predominantly attracted university-educated,
minoritized Malay Muslim women. Through the use of affective pedagogies, the teachers reframed
Islamic piety to foreground three forms of love: self, divine, and romantic. Extending scholarship on
racialized affect, this article interrogates the ways in which the teachers’ affective pedagogies mediated
young women’s anxieties within a neoliberalizing context, and the latter’s negotiations of their newly
acquired religious knowledge as they contended with quotidian precarities. While anthropology’s
foregrounding of lived materialities complicates some of the theoretical presuppositions of affect
theory, the latter expands our understanding of piety projects as not merely concerned with ethical
self-discipline, but entangled with broader racialization processes – especially for minoritized subjects
whose capacity to transform becomes constitutive of a will to improve. By placing anthropological
theory on Islamic piety in a dialogical tension with affect theory, I highlight the forms of affective
religious sentiments that circulate through difference and negation, and are integral to particular sites
of minoritized Muslim subject formation.
After leading the students in a recitation of Surah Al-Fateha (1:1-7) from the Qur’an,
Ustaz Ali welcomed us to the class.1 Fiddling with his laptop, he proceeded to screen a
short clip that he had extracted from the Hollywood blockbuster Eat, pray, love (2010),
prefacing that we were about to ‘witness someone preparing for the endless waves of
transformation’.2 On the projector screen, Julia Roberts’s character was penning a letter
to her former lover, her voiceover articulating quotes such as ‘ruin is a gift; ruin is the
road to transformation’. Ustaz asked the students whether they recognized the film,
and many nodded in response. Perhaps to allay the students’ concerns that a religious
class with a teacher in a songkok and a baju kurung (Malay cultural attire) had begun
with a Hollywood popular cultural reference, Ustaz clarified that the short clip was
‘useful’ in ‘sending a message’.3 The video should compel us to think about the ‘forms
of romantic attachment’ embodied by the protagonist, who ‘desired to break free from
her partner in order to find herself’. Ustaz further reminded us that the concept of
attachment in Islam had to be framed in terms of a ‘deep spiritual relationship with
the 2015 and 2017 census reports suggest that the Malays, comprising approximately
13.4 percent of Singapore’s population of 5.61 million, compared to the dominant 74.3 per
cent Chinese majority, account for 99.2 per cent of Singaporean Muslims (Department
of Statistics 2015; 2017). With the exception of a brief merger with Malaysia (1962-
5) as part of the process of decolonization from the British, the post-independence
government led by the People’s Action Party (PAP) has sought to secure political
dominance by ensuring economic growth through foreign and state-owned capital,
while managing religious expression, political dissent, and press freedoms (Chua &
Kwok 2001). Scarred by the neighbouring Malaysian elites’ rhetoric of Malay bumiputera
(sons of the soil) rights during the merger, the PAP set about legitimizing the logic
of multiculturalism by categorizing Singaporeans into four ethnic groups – radically
simplifying cultural differences into a monolithic CMIO (Chinese, Malay, Indian,
Others) model (Chua 2005). Within this frame, Singaporean Malays heralding from
different parts of the Archipelago with hybridized ethnic identities such as Javanese and
Baweanese were automatically indexed Malay and Muslim at birth. Thus, while I utilize
descriptive terms such as ‘Malay’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘the Malay community’ to represent
my interlocutors’ articulations of their subject positions, I remain cautious that the
categories they index allude to the state’s normative disciplining of race and religion for
the purposes of governance – an illusion of homogeneity that elides the complex ways
that identities configure in the praxis.
As Ahmed (2004b) elucidates, discourses of multicultural harmony require the
negation of unwilful aspects that challenge the perceived progress of the nation.
The pursuit of multiculturalism mirrors the ethos of conditional love, whereby
ideas of tolerance and respectful difference function so long as they fulfil certain
criteria endorsed by authoritative structures. In the process, the state disciplines
into erasure other subjectivities that might threaten the semblance of upper-middle-
class respectability. For instance, although the British colonial governance initially
consolidated racial governmentality in Singapore, race and class continue to reverberate
as haunting spectres – with the post-independence PAP government evoking the racial
riots of the 1960s to emphasize the need for socially engineered multiculturalism,
national harmony, and political stability. To avoid the stigma of a welfare state,
the government promoted the creation of race-specific civic associations supposedly
best positioned to understand the ‘problems’ plaguing each ethnic community.
Labelled ‘self-help groups’, they facilitate the state’s framing of perceived behavioural
dysfunctionalities such as addiction, low educational achievement, and poverty,
as distinctly Malay problems that the community should resolve through self-
transformation (see Chua 1995). Such rhetoric further points to the neoliberal-
developmental state’s strategic appeal to particular political-economic modalities in
sustaining economic growth at the expense of state welfarism.8
Although Singapore’s secular identity is contentious, the state’s obsession with
defining religious signs and the spaces they inhabit is part of its attempt at securing the
nation’s boundaries (also see Agrama 2010). Concerned with the spread of racial and
religion tensions from Malaysia and Indonesia within a ‘double minority setting’ (Mauzy
& Milne 2002),9 the state intricately manages Islam in Singapore through particular
provisions, while preventing religious claims from assuming political overtones within
various public spheres (Fischer 2016: 49; Nasir, Pereira & Turner 2010: 3). These
affordances belie a sense of anxiety in acknowledging the Malays’ indigenous ontology
within the region that must be disciplined into limited recognition. For example,
through the Administration of Muslims Act (1966), the PAP government has constructed
a specific power structure to lead the Malay Muslim community comprising a state-
appointed Minister of Muslim Affairs endorsed by the Islamic Religious Council of
Singapore (MUIS), a state-linked statutory board. The government also continues
to provide the Muslim community with incentives such as mosque-building funds,
subsidized tertiary education fees, as well as an institutionalized syariah (shari‘a) court
system to mitigate matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Despite
these allowances, Islam assumes limited electoral visibility in Singapore compared to
Malaysia and Indonesia. With the implementation of the Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Act in 1990, religious leaders who engage in political discourse – vaguely
defined – could face detention without trial and be charged with sedition (Tan 2010).
Wary of dissenting voices that would disrupt the meticulously crafted religious and
racial harmony, the government mandated the registration of all Muslim preachers,
and standardized the Friday khutbah (sermons) across local mosques (Nasir et al. 2010).
Despite the state’s precise management of national harmony, however, the Muslim
community has tussled with numerous incidents from the late 1990s onward involving
the wearing of hijab in public schools, an attempted terrorist attack by Singaporean
members of the regional Jemaah Islamiyah organization, and conservative preachers’
crusades against homosexuality.10 Within this climate of intensified Islamophobia and
state surveillance, religious preachers like my Singaporean interlocutors were conscious
of the need to refrain from political commentary in the classroom, explicitly framing
their lessons as mere ‘gathering[s] of lovers’ that focus on seemingly apolitical topics,
while fostering empowerment through affective personal transformation.11
to acknowledge the centrality of sensorial intensities while accounting for the power
structures that interpellate these affective registers. Within the context of this article,
it becomes pertinent to critically consider the senses of empowerment that upwardly
mobile Muslim subjects acquired from appropriating the state’s discourses on racialized
Malay affects. Always already framed as embodying alterity, the class participants’
positioning of educational and financial mobility as metrics of individual and collective
successes reproduced a problematic ‘model minority’ rhetoric that elided the structural
inequities faced by their predominantly working-class ethnic community.16 In this
manner, racialized affects exist as both an index of vulnerability and an extension of
power. Seriously contending with the aspirations of pious interlocutors thus requires us
to transcend Marxist teleological notions of false consciousness in theorizing neoliberal
self-transformation, examining not only minoritized affects, but also the political-
economic structures that undergird the reproduction of dominant registers.
appropriate the state’s liable affective discourses as part of their project of neoliberal
self-transformation (see Svendsen 2011; Yang 2013).
It is critical to note at this juncture that although neoliberalism conventionally
references the retreat of the state in favour of a free market, its practical instantiation
involves extensive state involvement in the interests of corporations and economic
elites (Brown 2003; Harvey 2005). Beyond economic shifts, neoliberal transformation
entails the restructuring of labour, reproductive life, welfare, and the ‘habits of the
heart’ (Harvey 2005: 3). Reducing neoliberalism to a mere collection of economic
policies therefore ignores the political rationality that transcends market spaces (Brown
2003: 38). In Neoliberalism as exception, anthropologist Aihwa Ong thus proposes a
conception of neoliberalism as a ‘technology of government’ (2006: 1), whereby state
apparatuses rely on calculative techniques to rationalize social issues as non-political
ones that require technical solutions and self-governance. Neoliberalism, in Ong’s (2006:
4-6) framing, serves as a ‘biopolitical mode of governing’ (vis-à-vis Foucault [1983])
comprising assemblages of market-driven techniques that manage conduct according
to principles of efficiency, flexibility, and competitiveness. The idea of neoliberalism as a
form of governmentality aptly captures the ‘baroque ecology’ (Ong 2006: 180) of nation-
states like Singapore where state-sanctioned technocrats assert political authority and
craft material and social values while leveraging on liberal market ideology to attract
investments from global entities. At the same time, neoliberal rationality does not
merely extend from the state apparatuses, it also emanates from individuals such as
the teachers who practise self-discipline and offer Islamic classes inciting Muslims to
manage themselves. As Rose (1999: xxiii) argues, governmentality must be apprehended
in relation to the process of assembling subjects: the ways that particular techniques,
gazes, and devices within spaces such as classrooms create subjects who embody
neoliberal rationality through ethical self-practices. When self-help ideologues such
as Muslim preachers frame labour productivity in terms of personal satisfaction at the
expense of justified remuneration, and conceptualize poverty as a form of behavioural
deficit, they ‘enter the soul of the citizen directly into political discourse and the practices
of government’ (Rose 1999: 2).17
seriously’. With the exception of these few students, my interlocutors constantly referred
to this particular pedagogical moment as crucial to their sense of self-awareness and
transformation. Many informed me that they could not stop themselves from tearing
up as it was the first time that they had considered the importance of practising
compassion towards themselves in evaluating their ‘romantic and professional failures’.
Ustaz’s attempts at creating a conducive environment to elicit the desired response from
the students point to the connection between sonic landscapes and the production of
spatialized affects. Ethnomusicologist Steven Feld (2012) has written extensively on
the ways that acoustic soundscapes generate shared experiential knowledge by inciting
emotions. Sound not only evokes individualized responses, it also constructs a collective
public sentiment with others embedded within the similar experience, prompting social
practice. Despite my initial scepticism, I was interpellated into the classroom collective
when I became highly conscious of the affective intensities circulating within the room
as I completed my own list. Although not immediately moved to tears myself, the
intimacy of the exercise compelled me to engage in intense self-reflection, inspired by
the women around me who were deeply invested in the exercise.
At other instances, the teachers encouraged students to be cognizant of their emotions
while performing the daily ritualized prayers or when making dua (supplication) in
order to experience the requisite affective intensities. Here, the cathartic ability to
manifest tears during the performances of religious rituals signals one’s ability to
transcend routinized banality and attain a form of pietized emotional authenticity
necessary for God-consciousness. As demonstrated by Asad’s discussion of medieval
monastic Christians’ deliberate cultivation of weeping, affect could be deliberately
organized to index the ‘apt performance of conventional behavior’ (1993: 64). Others,
such as Mahmood (2005), have drawn from Asad’s frame to discuss Egyptian Muslim
women’s participation in piety movements that emphasize the capacity to weep as
signifying a pious self with the ability to emote. However, a tension exists between the
cultivation of the desire to weep and the ability to do so spontaneously – what Mahmood
(2005: 129) refers to as rehearsed spontaneity. Yet we cannot divorce the emphasis on
rehearsed spontaneity – as an embodiment of authenticated piety – from the broader
social context that necessitates such affective transformations in the first place. Instead
of a form of materiality without historicity, the cultivation of pious affective intensities
drawing from Islamic discursive traditions is implicated by particular structures of
governmentality. For instance, the ‘forgiveness list’ that Ustaz Ali encouraged us to create
re-interpellated the self as the locus of neoliberal transformation, whereby professional
failures were reconstituted as negative individualized attributes, thereby occluding the
broader political-economic structures contributing to precarity.
and affective sentiments against potential sins. Women could transgress pious norms,
yet they also possessed the willpower to transform themselves and their community
towards ideal subjectivity. In his analysis of Egyptian Muslims’ negotiations of discursive
traditions, Schielke (2009) similarly suggests that male youth possessed greater ability
to navigate moral registers related to gender, sexuality, and religion than their female
counterparts, who constantly felt the pressure to safeguard their chastity for marriage.
Young Egyptian men experimented with non-marital romance despite the Salafi
preachers’ insistence on its incommensurability with Islam; nevertheless these young
males upheld conventions such as prohibitions against adultery, and the importance of
finding the right marital partner corresponding to their family’s social status. Within
both contexts, the preachers’ authority was incumbent upon their ability to mitigate
Muslim youth’s anxieties as they navigated religious and cultural norms tied to romance
and marriage.
As he concluded the Valentine’s Day class, Ustaz Ali emphasized the significance of
romantic love as a way to attain a greater, more totalizing affect, one that enslaves a
subject to their creator in a state of submission:
If you go to other religious classes, they will tell you that everything is haram [forbidden]. In this
class, I will not tell you that. The great thing about being in love is that it makes you think about
others than yourself. It makes you a better person. Most importantly, it makes you understand what
it means to be a slave.
Ustaz’s proclamation positioned love as central to the Islamic faith, although Islam itself
was ‘more than just romance’. Being in love is important as it makes us conscious of the
needs of others, thus enabling us to submit fully to God. Like other Muslim religious
authorities globally, Ustaz’s demonstration of moral flexibility, and his ability to extend
the symbolic connection between romantic and spiritual love, enhanced his appeal to
Muslim youth wary of the older preachers’ hardline stances towards romance (see Deeb
& Harb 2013). The students I attended classes with appreciated his willingness to discuss
romance and regularly shared their relationship troubles with him, inviting him to their
engagement and wedding ceremonies. In turn, he often alluded to his insider status by
referencing his students’ romantic partnerships in class: for instance, telling jokes about
one of the male students’ attempts at impressing his girlfriend.
Ustaz’s rhetoric was not particular to the male teachers. Ustazah Fatimah, a fellow
Al-Azhar graduate, often articulated the following statement in her classes: ‘We must
want the Creator, who wants love’. Ustazah encouraged the single female students in
her classes to get married as a way to ‘get access to jannah [heaven]’. Thus, all the
classes that she offered – on work, marriage, consumption of organic food, child-
rearing – advocated the cultivation of ideal gendered affects as epistemological and
ontological frames (see Jamil 2016). It is crucial to note that unlike the subjects of
feminist emancipatory analyses, my interlocutors consistently framed themselves (and
other Muslims) as being in a state of wilful submission to God – in spite of the
agentive choices that they might enact in other spheres of their lives. In this regard, I
concur with Mahmood’s (2005) call to dismantle the presumed universal relevance of
Western secular liberal models of emancipation. Yet, as I pursued social activities such
as yoga, dining, and shopping with my interlocutors, I realized that even as the students
presented romantic affects as religious requisites, they did not always conceive of their
desires as means of becoming wilful subjects to God. Instead, their commitment to
fulfilling the Islamic sunnah (prophetic tradition) to marry were also deeply entangled
with quotidian concerns that affected their habituation of Islamic discursive traditions.
graduate, she had travelled independently across Asia and Australia, and was one
of the women with whom I ended up forging a close bond over endless cups of
espresso at cafés around the city. Although she considered the ‘obsession with marriage’
an ‘older way of thinking’, she confided her apprehensions about finding a suitable
partner. Her ideal spouse had to display the requisite emotive sentiments such as
spiritual commitment to Islam, and express support of her career goals while holding
a promising job of his own. Like Alia, many young women did not hesitate to end
their romantic relationships when their male partners failed to display the appropriate
affects suited to a middle-class Muslim morality such as labouring towards upward
mobility, and enhancing their ethical commitment to Islam. Often these break-ups
devastated young women, and part of their recuperative efforts included spending time
with other female friends, and delving further into their spiritual growth. Hana, a 26-
year-old mid-rank civil servant, ended her five-year relationship with her boyfriend
midway through my research because he was ‘directionless’ and ‘consistently failed his
university exams’. Hana dealt with the demise of her relationship by attending Islamic
classes, and providing her ex-boyfriend with lists of ‘things to work on’, such as ‘excelling
in school’ and ‘getting a good job’. He eventually regained her affections by ‘proving’ that
he had ‘mended his ways’ and was ‘serious about improving himself’. He subsequently
proposed to her and they recently tied the knot. Even though pious women like Hana
desired the barakah (blessings) of marriage, they also insisted that romance had to be
accompanied with the possession of desirable affects necessary to excel in Singapore’s
neoliberalized economy.19
In casual conversations, young women who felt the need to settle down early despite
nagging uncertainties about their partners cited social pressures from relatives, the fear
of waiting too long and being too old, and the knowledge they had gained from the
religious classes espousing the ‘beautiful benefits of marriage’. In these classes, women
teachers like Ustazah Fatimah constantly reminded women that ‘Allah has promised
rezeki [sustenance] for those who choose marriage and avoid zina [unlawful sexual
relations]’. Amira, a 22-year-old teacher-in-training, casually shared the following with
me over afternoon tea:
Well, I hope to get married soon . . . I still pray daily for that. Hopefully in two years’ time because
I have a partner. But he said that I had to finish my studies first. For me, that is not important, you
know . . . He is working, but he is not where he wants to be. He is still trying to find his career. He
doesn’t attend these classes with me. I think he should, then maybe he will change his mind [about
marriage]. [I then asked why she did not encourage him to attend the classes with her] . . . He works
different shifts. It is hard for him to be free for classes. But he goes with his friends to the mosque
sometimes, but never to paid classes. He’s a practising Muslim; he’s just not ready to get married.
prefer expensive wedding banquets at hotels with a limited guest list. The teachers,
however, favoured small, ‘tasteful’ receptions at mosques that foreground the proper
affects by excluding audiovisual entertainment and restricting gendered interactions.
The teachers often relied on humour to extend their meta-commentary on the liable
affects of certain cultural practices: for example, associating the luxurious array of
foods at Malay weddings with the lack of self-discipline contributing to rising obesity
and chronic diseases in the community. The teachers’ rhetoric aligned with the
normative discourses on ethnic minorities’ poverty as a by-product of diminished
self-will instead of structural impediments to equity. The teachers’ commentary also
suggested that the affective sensibilities associated with being a particular type of Malay
were incommensurable with Islam. Islam thus became a marker of distinction and the
negation of a problematic Malay identity. At the same time, the teachers’ appropriation
of authoritative discourses on Malayness and alterity reinscribed conceptions of ideal
Muslim subjectivities.
Although the students deeply respected the teachers and took their advice seriously,
many of my interlocutors desired, or were in the process of planning for, day-long
wedding receptions at void decks or community centres to facilitate attendance by
friends, family, and extended kin networks ranging from 500 to 1,500 guests. Many
women desired to retain the hantaran (brideprice) practice, beautiful wedding décor
and Halal patisseries, and resplendent modest outfits at their ceremonies. To keep
themselves updated with the latest wedding trends, they utilized social media platforms
like Instagram, Pinterest, and Facebook.20 Young women rationalized their choices by
evoking their parents’ authority in shaping the contours of their wedding ceremonies,
and as a means of directly obtaining the community’s barakah. They negotiated their
dissension with the teachers by citing the importance of foregrounding the proper
affects such as the sincerity of niyyah (intention), while verbally distancing themselves
from ideas of riak (arrogance/self-importance). Through these negotiations, women
re-signified the potentially de-authenticating effects of their materialism on their pious
self-presentation – constructing religious virtue through, rather than separate from,
their consumption practices (see Jones 2010; Meneley 2007). In so doing, they disciplined
their liable affects in ways that affirmed their commitment to pious cultivation while
fulfilling their material desires.
NOTES
The author would like express gratitude to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their thorough and
insightful comments that expanded the critical stakes of the essay. Her research was funded by the Wenner-
Gren Foundation and the Spencer Foundation/National Academy of Education.
1 I relied on pseudonyms throughout the article to ensure confidentiality as requested by my interlocutors.
2 Unless otherwise referenced, all quotations in the article are derived from the ethnographic research I
conducted in Singapore
3 The songkok is a brimless cap in the shape of a truncated cone, and is typically made of black embroidered
felt or velvet. The men’s baju kurung comprises a long-sleeved shirt and trousers. Both are types of cultural
attire often worn within the Malay Archipelago to commemorate occasions such as Eid and during prayer
ceremonies and communal gatherings.
4 ‘But those ye call upon besides Him, are unable to help you, and indeed to help themselves’ (7:197).
‘When they advanced to meet Goliath and his forces, they prayed: “Our Lord! Pour out constancy on us and
make our steps firm: Help us against those that reject faith”’ (2:250). ‘And verily thy Lord is He, the Exalted
in Might, Most Merciful’ (26:104).
5 The teachers conducted the classes in English – using Malay to cite colloquial examples, and Arabic when
referencing the Qur’an or Hadith. For purposes of clarity, I present my interlocutors’ speech as articulated.
I translated the Malay and Arabic terminologies according to my interlocutors’ interpretation of these
lexicons.
6 For a review of this debate, see Deeb (2015); Fadil & Fernando (2015a; 2015b); Schielke (2015).
7 For ethnographic case studies depicting rising inequalities in Singapore, see Teo (2018).
8 Scholars have examined Singapore’s embrace of neoliberal political-economic modalities as evidenced by
its endorsement of the Washington Consensus, the privatization of healthcare and transportation industries,
the rise of government-linked companies, and the transfer of S$62 billion from the compulsory national
superannuation scheme (the Central Provident Fund or CPF) to private sector fund managers (see Liow 2011;
Robison, Rodan & Hewison 2005; Tan 2012).
9 Mauzy and Milne (2002: 109) utilized the term ‘double minority’ to describe Singapore’s geospatial
particularity, whereby the Chinese comprise a dominant majority in the nation-state while constituting a
minority in Southeast Asia, and the Malays exist as minorities within Singapore, while comprising a majority
in the region.
10 The tudung (hijab) issue involved a Muslim parent who insisted on sending his 9-year-old daughters to
their public school in a hijab instead of their school uniforms, sparking debates on the compatibility of Islam
with secularism (see Nasir et al. 2010). The attempted terrorist attack stunned the nation as the government
revealed that a regional Muslim terrorist group had planned attacks on state infrastructures (see Tan 2003).
In 2014, a few preachers began a campaign against a major queer event that also took place on the first night
of Ramadan (Reuters 2014).
11 The phrase ‘This is a gathering of lovers’ is by Jalal ad-Din Rumi, a thirteenth-century Persian poet,
jurist, and Sufi mystic. One of the teachers regularly referenced this quote in their classes.
12 Culture-and-personality scholars relied on culturalist frames in analysing emotional and psychological
states, instead of examining their intersections with the broader political economy. Within this frame, the
interior states of minoritized subjects and the cultural group psyche provided an explanation for structural
processes such as poverty and inequality. Thus, for example, culture-of-poverty explanations located
structural inequalities as corresponding to cultural and individual deficit. In so doing, such frameworks
have focused on the ‘medicalization, psychiatricization, criminalization, and pathologization of structural
conditions’ (Berg & Ramos-Zayas 2015: 658). By the mid-1980s, the anthropology of emotion (Lutz & White
1986) emerged as a more nuanced response to the culture-and-personality paradigm. For an extensive critique,
see di Leonardo (1998).
13 For an extensive review of anthropological analyses of emotion in Southeast Asia, see Boelstorff &
Lindquist (2004).
14 Berg and Ramos-Zayas (2015) argue that by rendering emotion and affect as synonymous and eliding
1960s Basic Emotions paradigm such as Tomkins, Ekman, and Damasio, who propose that affective bodily
sensations occur prior to, and independent of, intentionality. There is thus a gap – 0.5 seconds, according
to Massumi (1995: 90) – between a subject’s affective response and their cognitive appraisal of the situation,
such that affect exists before the mind or reason intervenes.
16 The term ‘model minority’ was initially used to describe Asian American achievements, yet scholars
such as Suzuki (2002) have pointed out the ways in which the concept has pitted immigrant groups against
one another, focusing on individual acquisition of mobility without attending to structural inequities,
and presenting Asian Americans as homogeneous and thus rendering poverty invisible within such
communities.
17 For example, Yang (2013: 293) has written extensively on the Chinese government’s engagements in
‘psycho-politics’ – marked by its attempts at disciplining citizens affectively so as to extract productive labour
amidst its failure to provide public goods.
18 To reduce the citizen strain on welfare and maintain ‘Asian values’ like filial piety, the government
prohibits single adults from purchasing their own public housing unit before the age of 35, and provides
subsidies for married couples buying apartments close to their parents’ residence.
19 See Suriani Suratman’s (2011) research on dual-income Malay households.
20 There is a thriving on-line Instagram community featuring Malay bridal companies, caterers, décor
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Nurhaizatul Jamil is an Assistant Professor in Global South Studies, and the co-ordinator of the Social Media
Lab at Pratt Institute. Her scholarship foregrounds minoritized Muslims’ engagements in transnational
circuits of Islamic education and consumption.