State Immunity
Lasco vs UN ● The petitioners were dismissed from their employment with
Revolving private respondent the United Nations Revolving Fund for
Natural Resources Exploration which is a special fund and
subsidiary organ of the United Nations.
● The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine
Government and the United Nations for exploration work in
Dinagat Island. Petitioners complained for illegal dismissal
and damages.
● In its Motion to Dismiss, private respondent alleged that
respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its
personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity pursuant to
the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations.
● In support private respondent attached a letter from the
Department of Foreign Affairs dated August 26, 1991, which
acknowledged its immunity from suit.
● The letter confirmed that private respondent, being a special
fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the
1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an
original signatory.
● On November 25, 1991 respondent Labor Arbiter issued
order dismissing the complaints on the ground that private
respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity. The
dismissal was based on the letter of the Foreign Office dated
September 10, 1991.
● Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, an
appeal was filed with the NLRC, which affirmed the dismissal
of the complaints.
Hence, Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General is of the view that
private respondent is covered by the mantle of
diplomatic immunity.
Private respondent is a specialized agency of the United
Nations. Under Article 105 of the Charter of the United
Nations:
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of its
Members such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United
Nations and officials of the Organization shall
similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions in connection with the organization.
The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was
sufficiently established by the letter of the Department
of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the
immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations where the Philippine Government was a
party. The issue whether an international organization is
entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question"
and such determination by the executive branch is
conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies.
Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over private
respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which
is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4).

Arigo v Swift ● Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of
Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on 11 August 1988.
● In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as
one of the Philippines’ oldest ecosystems.
● On 6 April 2010, Congress passed R.A. No. 10067 (RA
10067), otherwise known as the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural
Park (TRNP) Act of 2009”, to ensure protection and
conservation of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the
enjoyment of present and future generations.
● Under the “no take” policy, entry into the waters of the
TRNP is strictly regulated and many human activities are
prohibited, penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering,
destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP.
● In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines
requested diplomatic clearance for the USS Guardian (the
ship) “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty.”
● On 6 January 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on 13 January 2013. Two days later, it
departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia.
● On 17 January 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the
Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial
venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by
virtue of a joint project entered into by the
Philippine Government and the United Nations for
mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is
not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily
thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the
people, including that of petitioners.
RULING
1. None. The US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate
grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP
was committed while they were performing
official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials
will require remedial actions and appropriation
of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the
persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
It is worthy to note that during the deliberations, Justice
Antonio Carpio took the position that the conduct of the
US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted
area in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS).
While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity
from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of
 Tubbataha Reefs. No one was injured in the incident and
there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
● On 20 January 2013, US 7th Fleet Commander, Vice
Admiral Scott Swift expressed regret for the incident in a
press statement.
● On 4 February 2013, US Ambassador to the Philippine
Harry Thomas, Jr. met with Department of Foreign Affairs
Secretary Albert del Rosario regarding the compensation for
damage to the reef caused by the ship.
● By 30 March 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had
finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from
the coral reef.
● On 17 April 2013, petitioners Arigo, et.al. on their behalf
and in representation of their respective sector/organization
and others, including minors or generations yet unborn filed
a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. Their contentions are:
- The grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the ship cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antiques, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboaga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu and
Taw-Tawi which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
- There should be a directive from the Supreme Court
for the institution of civil, administrative and
criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident
- US respondents committed the following violations
under RA 10067: unauthorized entry; non-payment
of conservation fees; obstruction of law enforcement
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases
where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations
of the coastal State regarding passage through the
latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS,
as a matter of long-standing policy, the US considers
itself bound by customary international rules on the
“traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.
The Court concurs with Justice Carpio’s view that non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US
will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal
State over its internal waters and territorial sea. The
Court thus expects the US to bear “international
responsibility under Art. 31 of UNCLOS in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely
affected the Tubbataha reefs.
2. No. The waiver of State immunity under the
VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and
not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation
of an environmental law is to be filed separately:
“SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions. – The filing of
a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall
not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or
administrative actions.”
A ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US
 officer; damages to the reef; and destroying and
disturbing resources
- The VFA provides for a waiver of immunity from
suit
● The respondents consist of the following: Scott Swift in his
capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet; Mark Rice as
the Commanding Officer of the ship; President Benigno
Aquino III as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines; Hon. Albert del Rosario as the DFA
Secretary; Hon. Paquito Ochoa as the Executive Secretary;
Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR Secretary; Vice Admiral
Jose Luis Alano as the Philippine Navy Flag Officer in
Command; Admiral Rodolfo Isorena as Commandant of the
Philippine Coast Guard, Commodore Enrico Efren
Evangelista as the Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, Major
Gen. Virgilio Domingo as Commandant of the AFP and Lt.
Gen. Terry Robling as Co-Director of the US Marine Corps.
Forces. The Philippine respondents contend that:
- The grounds relied upon by petitioners for the
issuance of TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become
fait accompli as the salvage operations on the ship
were already completed
- The petition is defective in form and in substance
- The petition improperly raises issues involving VFA
between Philippines and USA
- The determination of the extent of responsibility of
the US Government regarding the damage to the
Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the
executive branch
ISSUES
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents
2. WON the waiver of immunity provisions of the VFA applies
3. WON the petition has become moot
personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature
and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan. The Court found it unnecessary to determine
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed
absolute.
In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages which
have resulted from the violation of environmental laws.
Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases enumerates the reliefs which may
be granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan, to wit:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision, the court
shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege
of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the
following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist
from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a
duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government
agency, private person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
4. WON the Court can determine the extent of responsibility of (d) Directing the respondent public official, government
the US Government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final judgment; and

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the

people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of
the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied)

3. Yes, in the sense that the salvage operation

sought to be enjoined or restrained had already
been accomplished. However, insofar as the
directives to Philippine respondents to protect
and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and
marine habitat adversely affected by the
grounding incident are concerned, petitioners
are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the
completion of the removal of the USS Guardian
from the coral reef.

The Court is mindful of the fact that the US and

Philippine governments both expressed readiness to
negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the
damage caused by the USS Guardian. After all,
exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases
is not proscribed by the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.

4. No. The Court deferred to the Executive Branch

the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels.
Resolution of these issues impinges on our
relations with another State in the context of
common security interests under the VFA.

HUDCC vs ● Gonzalo Roque et. al. owned several parcels of land located in
Roque Quezon city.
● In 1978, the Republic (DPWH) asked the respondent to sell a
portion of the land at a lower price than the market value. The
Republic was for the President Marcos' National
Government Center (NGC) Project to bring the various
national government offices in one venue for greater efficiency.
● The respondents alleged that several public hearings place and
during the meetings, the Republic made the following
representations:
First, the Republic guaranteed construction of the NGC Project
that will enhance the surrounding portions of the land.
Second, the Republic assured the respondents that, if it abandons
the project, they will have the right to buy back the land.
● The respondents alleged that they were reluctant to sell the land
but felt compelled to do so because martial law was in force.
Thus, the respondents signed the deeds of absolute sale.
● The Register of Deeds cancelled the three certificates of title
(TCT) and issued six new titles.
● The Republic did not immediately take possession of the land
it. Thus, the respondents continued to occupy portions of the
sold properties.
● After several years, informal settlers began to occupy parts of
the land. Hence, Gonzalo sent letters twice to then DPWH
Secretary Vicente R. Jayme (Jayme) offering to buy back the
properties. However, no response.
● The respondents' suspicion was confirmed in December 2003.
De Castro (De Castro), undersecretary of the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), requested
It is settled that the conduct of the foreign relations of
our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative – “the political” departments
of the government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject
to judicial inquiry or decision.
We rule that the Republic is not immune from suit in the
present case.
The Constitution provides that "the State may not be
sued without its consent." One instance when a suit is
against the State is when the Republic is sued by name,
as in this case.
A suit against the State is allowed when the State
gives its consent, either expressly or impliedly.
Express consent is given through a statute while
implied consent is given when the State enters into a
contract or commences litigation. Athough not all
contracts entered into by the government operates as a
waiver of its non-suability.
In the present case, the Republic entered into deeds of
sale with the respondents to construct the NGC
Project on the lots sold. To facilitate the sale, the
Republic created a negotiating team to discuss the terms
of the sale with the respondents. The latter agreed to the
negotiated sale on these alleged conditions: (a) that
they will have the right to repurchase the properties
if the NGC Project does not push through; and (b)
that the NGC Project will increase the market value
of their remaining properties.
Following Santiago and Republic, the State's failure to
 the Roque etc. to vacate all portions of sold land that they were abide by these conditions constitutes the State's
still occupying, because the government would use the implied waiver of its immunity. We reiterate that the
properties for socialized housing pursuant to Republic Act No. doctrine of state immunity from suit cannot serve to
9207. perpetrate an injustice on a citizen. If we rule otherwise,
● Gonzalo wrote another letter to then HUDCC offering to buy we will be tolerating unfair dealing in contract
back the properties. Secretary Defensor allegedly found the negotiation.
respondents' position requested feedback on the possibility of a
repurchase. However, the secretary was transferred to another
department and was unable to further address the situation.
● Realizing that the Republic had completely abandoned its initial
plan to use the land for the NGC Project the respondents filed
a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the properties on the
grounds of fraud, force, intimidation, or undue influence.
● They also asserted their right to buy back the properties at the
same price at which they sold them since the Republic failed to
develop the land according to the original purpose for which was
expropriated. In their answer, the Republic and the HUDCC
(defendants) argue that: (1) they are immune from suit as
government instrumentalities; (2) they agreed to neither the
respondents' right to repurchase the properties in case the
government abandons the NGC Project nor a right to additional
compensation in case the respondents' remaining properties
suffer a decrease in market value; (3) the respondents were not
forced, intimidated, or unduly influenced to sell their properties
to the government; and (4) even assuming that any vice of
consent attended the sale, the respondents' action for the
annulment of sale is barred by prescription and laches.
● During trial, Dante Viloria (Viloria) testified on the negotiations
that took place. Viloria was part of the government's negotiating
team for the NGC Project. He testified that: (a) the negotiated
price was lower than the base amounts in Presidential Decree
No. 1517, (b) the government did not file any court action to
expropriate the properties; (c) it did not take possession of the
properties; and (d) it undertook to resell the properties to the
respondents at the same price if the project would not push
through. Gonzalo's testimony corroborated Viloria's testimony.
 ● The RTC decided in the respondents' favor. It held that: (1) the
Republic is not immune from suit; (2) the respondents' action is
not barred by either prescription or laches; and (3) the sale
should be annulled. On the other hand, the CA affirmed its
decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the Republic is immune from suit.
City of ● Phuture was incorporated in 2004. In May 2005, its Articles of
Bacolod vs Incorporation (AOI) was amended includes the operation of
Phuture lotto betting stations and/or other gaming outlets as one of its
visions co. secondary purposes. Thereafter, it applied with the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (P AGCOR) for an
authority to operate bingo games at SM Bacolod and SM Prime.
PAGCOR then issued Grant of Authority (GOA) to Phuture but
they must comply with certain requirements, and received an
Award Notice from SM Prime.
● Thereafter, Phuture was able to process the requirements and
paid fees needed for its Application for Permit to Engage in
Business, Trade or Occupation to operate bingo games at SM
Bacolod.
● Phuture was then issued a claim slip for its permit on February
19, 2007, which was to be claimed on March 16, 2007. Phuture
amended its AOI on February 27, 2007 to reflect its engagement
in bingo operations as its primary purpose.
● Phuture started bingo operations at SM Bacolod on March 2,
2007, after issuance of the actual hard copy of the mayor's
permit. The respondent learned that its bingo outlet was
padlocked by agents of the Office of the City Legal Officer and
that a copy of a Closure Order was posted at the bingo outlet.
● Phuture claimed that the closure of its bingo outlet at SM
Bacolod is tainted with malice and bad faith and that petitioners
did not have the legal authority to shut down said bingo
operations, especially since PAGCOR itself had already issued a
provisional GOA in its favor.
The principle of immunity from suit is embodied in
Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which states that "the State cannot be
sued without its consent."
The State and its political subdivisions are open to suit
only when they consent to it.
Consent may be express or implied, such as when the
government exercises its proprietary functions, or where
such is embodied in a general or special law.
In the present case, respondent sued petitioners for the
latter's refusal to issue a mayor's permit for bingo
operations and for closing its business on account of the
lack of such permit. However, while the authority of
city mayors issue or grant licenses and business permits
is granted by the Local Government Code which also
vests local government units with corporate powers, one
of which is the power to sue and be sued, this Court has
held that the power to issue or grant licenses and
business permits is not an exercise of the government's
proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the
police power of the State, ergo a governmental act.
No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can
thus be implied from the mere conferment and exercise
of the power to issue business permits and licenses.
Accordingly, there is merit in petitioners' argument that
they cannot be sued by respondent since the City's
On March 19, 2007, petitioners filed their Answer with
Counterclaim, denying the allegations.
● As according to them, Phuture applied for the renewal of its
mayor's permit with " entertainment services" as its declared line
of business.
● Upon submission of the requirements, Phuture was issued a
"claim slip" for it to claim the actual mayor's permit if the
requirements were found to be in order. However, petitioners
found discrepancies in the submitted requirements, wherein it
reflect the company's primary purpose for bingo operations. In
addition, the respondent failed to pay the necessary permit
fee/assessment fee.Also, without the release of the mayor's
permit, respondent started the operation of its bingo outlet at SM
Bacolod.
● This prompted the former City Legal Officer (Atty.Zamora) to
issue a Closure Order. The Closure Order was also presented to
respondent's lawyers to negotiate a possible peaceful solution
before its implementation. However, respondent simply ignored
the information.
● Thus, the closing of said business. Petitioners contended that the
claim slip relied upon by respondent was a mere oversight or
human error of the City Government's employee.
Ruling of RTC and CA
● The RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary
mandatory order and dismissed the case for lack of merit. On the
other hand, The CA partially granted the appeal by affirming the
trial court's denial of the application for a temporary mandatory
order but reversing the dismissal of the suit for damages and
ordering the case to be reinstated and remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
● Aggrieved, petitioners brought the matter before this Court
through the present recourse.
consent had not been secured for this purpose. This is
notwithstanding petitioners' failure to raise this
exculpatory defense at the first instance before the trial
court or even before the appellate court.
As this Court has repeatedly held, waiver of immunity
from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be
lightly inferred.33 Moreover, it deserves mentioning
that the City of Bacolod as a government agency or
instrumentality cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents.34 Estoppel
does not also lie against the government or any of its
agencies arising from unauthorized or illegal acts of
public officers.35 Hence, we cannot hold petitioners
estopped from invoking their immunity from suit on
account of having raised it only for the first time on
appeal. On this score, Justice Barredo's Opinion in
Insurance Co. of North America v. Osaka Shosen
Kaisha36 is particularly illuminating:
x x x [T]he real reason why, from the procedural point
of view, a suit against the state filed without its consent
must be dismissed is because, necessarily, any such
complaint cannot state a cause of action, since, as the
above decision confirms, "there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends." x x x
The question that arises now is, may failure to state a
cause of action be alleged as a ground of dismissal for
the first-time on appeal?
xxx
x x x The requirement that this defense should be raised
at the trial is only to give the plaintiff a chance to cure
 W/N: The hearing of the action for damages effectively violates the
City's immunity from suit?
Veterans FACTS:
Manpower ● Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI)
and alleges that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 5487 violate
Protective the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution against
Services Inc. monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of
vs CA trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc.
(PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in
more than one security agency.
● Furthermore, VMPSI questions the provision on requiring all
private security agencies or company security forces to register
as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the
Region where their main offices are located.
● On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed
by PADPAO and the PC Chief wherein it fixed the minimum
monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security
service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00
outside of Metro Manila.
● PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition in
undercutting its contract rate for services rendered to the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS),
charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates
provided in the 1986 Memorandum of Agreement.
● As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of
membership to VMPSI when it requested one. VMPSI filed a
civil against the PC Chief and Philippine Constabulary
Supervisory Unit for the Security and Immigration Agencies
the defect of his complaint, but if, as in this case, the
lack of consent of the state cannot be cured because it is
a matter of judicial notice that there is no law allowing
the present suit, (only Congress that can give such
consent) the reason for the rule cannot obtain, hence it is
clear that such non-suability may be raised even on
appeal. After all, the record on appeal can be examined
to find out if the consent of the state is alleged in the
complaint.
HELD:
Yes, the filed complaint by VMPSI against PC Chief
and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the state without its
consent.
The State may not be sued without its consent (Article
XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this
rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being
instrumentalities of the national government exercising
a primarily governmental function of regulating the
organization and operation of private detective,
watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the
PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued
without the Government’s consent, especially in this
case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to
compel the public respondents to act in a certain way,
but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and
compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages in the same amount, and
P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public
respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of
its monetary claims may not be enforced because the
State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds
for that purpose.
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his
personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Shauf
v. Court of Appeals, supra), however, since the acts for
 (PC-SUSIA). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that the case is against the State which had not
given consent thereto.
ISSUE:
Is VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA a
suit against the State without its consent?
Garcia vs ● This is an appeal from an order of dismissal.
chief of staff On December 1, 1961 - Mariano E. Garcia, filed with the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of
money against the Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chairman of the Philippine
Veterans Board and/or the Auditor General.
● The complaint alleged: that sometime in July, 1948, the plaintiff
suffered injuries while undergoing the 10-month military
training at Camp Florida blanca, Pampanga.
● Thereafter, he filed his claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and
in April, 1957, he submitted some papers in support of his claim
to the Adjutant General’s Office upon the latter’s request;
● On May 2, 1957 - he received a letter from the said Adjutant
General’s office disallowing his claim for disability benefits.
● On November 24,1958 - the Adjutant General’s Office denied
the said claim, alleging that Commonwealth Act 400 had already
been repealed by Republic Act 610 which took effect on January
1, 1950; that by reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff he
was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently
disabled; and that by reason of the unjustified refusal by
defendants of plaintiff’s claim, the latter was deprived of his
which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to
account in this case, were performed by them as part of
their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or
bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their
private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
agreed with the observation of the Court of Appeals that
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does
not constitute an implied consent by the State to be
sued.
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not
from a mere memorandum.
Petition for review is DENIED and the judgment
appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal.
On December 1, 1961 - Mariano E. Garcia, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to
collect a sum of money against the Chief of Staff and
the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans
Board and/or the Auditor General.
The complaint alleged: that sometime in July, 1948, the
plaintiff suffered injuries while undergoing the 10-
month military training at Camp Florida blanca,
Pampanga.
Thereafter, he filed his claim under Commonwealth Act
400 and in April, 1957, he submitted some papers in
support of his claim to the Adjutant General’s Office
upon the latter’s request;
On May 2, 1957 - he received a letter from the said
Adjutant General’s office disallowing his claim for
disability benefits.
On November 24,1958 - the Adjutant General’s Office
denied the said claim, alleging that Commonwealth Act
 disability pension from July, 1948 totaling no less than P4,000 at
the rate of P20 a month and suffered thereby moral damages and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000.00.
● The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces filed separate motions to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming
to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that
the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
● On March 2, 1962, the court rendered an order dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the action has prescribed. Hence,
plaintiff has interposed this appeal.
Callado vs ● Ernesto Callado, was employed as a driver at the IRRI from
IRRI April 11, 1983 to December 14, 1990. On February 11, 1990,
while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner
figured in an accident.
● He was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation
conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development
Department Manager in a Memorandum dated March 5, 1990.
He was charged with driving while under the influence of liquor;
Serious misconduct due to failure to report to your supervisors
the failure of your vehicle to start because of a problem with the
car battery which, you alleged, required you to overstay in
400 had already been repealed by Republic Act 610
which took effect on January 1, 1950;
that by reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff he was
deprived of his sight or vision rendering him
permanently disabled; and that by reason of the
unjustified refusal by defendants of plaintiff’s claim, the
latter was deprived of his disability pension from July,
1948 totaling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20 a
month and suffered thereby moral damages and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000.00.
The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces filed separate motions to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies before coming to court; that
the complaint states no cause of action; and that the
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
On March 2, 1962, the court rendered an order
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action
has prescribed. Hence, plaintiff has interposed this
appeal.
RULING:
The Supreme Court rule in the negative and vote to
dismiss the petition. We find no merit in petitioner's
arguments. Time and again the Institute has reiterated
that it will not use its immunity under P.D. 1620 for the
purpose of terminating the services of any of its
employees. Despite continuing efforts on the part of
IRRI to live up to this undertaking, there appears to be
apprehension in the minds of some IRRI employees. To
help allay these fears the following guidelines will be
followed hereafter by the Personnel/Legal Office while
handling cases of dismissed employees.
 Manila for more than six (6) hours, whereas, had you reported
the matter to IRRI, Los Baños by telephone, your problem could
have been solved within one or two hours; Gross and habitual
neglect of your duties. On March 9, 1990, petitioner submitted
his answer and defenses to the charges against him. Then IRRI
issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7,
1990.
● Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint on December 19, 1990
before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
● After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other
evidence On January 2, 1991, private respondent IRRI, through
counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute
enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having
waived the same.
● While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter,
nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute on August 13,
1991 to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent
IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the
case.
● IRRI likewise wrote in the same tenor to the Regional Director
of the Department of Labor and Employment.
● The Labor arbiter's decision dated October 31, 1991. ordering
respondent to reinstate complainant to his former position
without loss or (sic) seniority rights and privileges within five
(5) days from receipt hereof and to pay his full back wages from
March 7, 1990 to October 31, 1991, in the total amount of
P83,048.75 computed on the basis of his last monthly salary.
● The NLRC found merit in private respondent’s appeal and,
finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides: Art. 3.
Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy
immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the
Institute or his authorized representatives.
Petitioner's allegation that he was denied due process is
unfounded and has no basis. It is not denied that he was
informed of the findings and charges resulting from an
investigation conducted of his case in accordance with
IRRI policies and procedures. He had a chance to
comment thereon in a Memorandum he submitted to the
Manager of the Human Resource and Development
Department. Therefore, he was given proper notice and
adequate opportunity to refute the charges and findings,
hereby fulfilling the basic requirements of due process.
The non-referral to the Council of IRRI Employees and
Management. Private respondent correctly pointed out
that petitioner, having opted not to seek the help of the
CIEM Grievance Committee, prepared his answer by his
own self. He cannot now fault the Institute for not
referring his case to the CIEM.
 complaint dismissed. Hence, this petition where it is contended
that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization
granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be
invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by
virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of
dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
● It is also petitioner's position that a dismissal of his complaint
before the Labor Arbiter leaves him no other remedy through
which he can seek redress. He further states that since the
investigation of his case was not referred to the Council of IRRI
Employees and Management (CIEM), he was denied his
constitutional right to due process.

ISSUE:
● Did the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waive its
immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship?

Merrit vs ● Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street
Gov’t when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General
Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him
unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act
2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the
Government in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower
court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the
driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction
of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is
a special official. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility
 2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance?
Minsterio vs ● Ministerio filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
city of cebu Cebu, sought the payment of just compensation for a registered
lot alleging that in 1927 the National Government, through its
authorized representatives, took physical and material
possessions of it, and used it for the widening of a national road
in Cebu City without paying just compensation and any
agreement, either written or verbal.
● Despite the repeated demands for the payment, Public Highway
Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its
possession. Ministerio further alleged that the appraisal
committee of Cebu appraised the lot at P50.00 per square meter
or a total of P52,250.00.
● The respondents, through the Solicitor General, answered that
the suit was against the government and should be dismissed
because no consent was shown. Ministerio then provided a
stipulation of facts wherein it showed that they are the registered
owners of the lot, that the National Government in 1927 took the
possession of Lot and used it for the road widening, that the
Appraisal Committee of Cebu approved in fixing the price of the
lot at P50.00 per square meter, that the National Government
still possesses and utilizes the lot, and that the National
Government has not yet paid the value of the land being utilized
for public use.
ISSUE:
Can Ministerio sue the National Government because of the
possession and utilization of their lot and not be justly compensated?
performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by
law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of
the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.
RULING:
Yes. Despite the fact that the government is
immune from suit without its consent nor is it
indispensable that it be the party proceeded against.
Under such circumstances, the liability of the official
sued is not personal, hence, the party that could be
adversely affected is government, and the defense of
non-suability may be interposed.
When a public official is made to account in his
capacity as such as for acts contrary to law and injurious
to the plaintiff, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose
rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of Immunity of the State from suit.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the acts of the
Public Highway invaded and violated the personal and
property rights of Ministerio, under an unconstitutional
act or under an assumption of authority which he does
not have, can then be considered not to be a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may be not be sued without its consent.
The fact that the lot is already being used as a
public road means that it cannot be convenient or
feasible to restore it, and the only relief that the
Government could do is to make due compensation. The
doctrine of State Immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen had
the government followed the procedure indicated by the

Republic vs ● A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by
Purisima defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit
in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money
claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff
being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
● At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,
Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon
stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits
of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the
machinery of the national government unless consent be shown,
had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge
Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila
denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
WON the respondent’s decision is valid
governing law at judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed.
Rationale:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the
explicit affirmation found in this provision of the
present Constitution: "The State may not be sued
without its consent."
"The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this
jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935]
Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist
concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates
the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in
itself the source of the law on which such a right may be
predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does
give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded
role of government enabling it to engage in business
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not
obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that
calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice
thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to
seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the
statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass
upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for
final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as
we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance
decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent, as it has operated in
practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be
the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and
ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants
may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all
factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so
unavoidable in the determination of what principles
must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal,

PNR vs IAC ● That plaintiff (passenger bus) was passing thru the town of
Calumpit Bulacan temporarily while the bridge at Hagonoy,
Bulacan was under construction.
● That defendant Philippine National Railways is a purely
government owned and regularly passes along the intersection of
Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan, in going to San Fernando,
La Union from Manila and return.
● That on August 10, 1974, at about 1:20 o'clock in the afternoon,
Passenger train No. 73 hit and bumped the right mid portion of
the plaintiff's passenger bus No. 1066, while the rear portion of
said bus was at the railroad track and its direction was towards
Hagonoy, Bulacan at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
● That at the time of the collision there was a slight rainfall in the
vicinity of the scene of the accident and that there was at said
intersection no bar, semaphores, and signal lights that would
warn the public of the approaching train.
● That on account of said collision, the Baliwag Transit Bus with
Body No. 1066 driven by Romeo Hughes was damaged and
eighteen (18) of its passengers died and the rest who were more
than fifty three (53) passengers suffered physical injuries.
● Plaintiff filed an action for damages against PNR alleging
therein that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its engineer,
Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado in operating its
passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars,
the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years,
for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate
of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance
Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the
State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed
out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever
counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration
agreed to had no binding force on the government.
RULING:
The PNR is not immune from suit, in line with the
pronouncement in Malong vs. PNR
“In the instant case the State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit.
It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles
1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.”
The correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character
of the objects for which the entity was organized."
When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of
reasonable diligence commensurate with the
surroundings it should be apparent, to the company that
a person on its track or to get on its track is unaware of
his danger or cannot get out of the way, it becomes the
duty of the company to use such precautions, by
warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be
reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him.
What exacerbates against petitioners' contention is the
authority in this jurisdiction to the effect that the failure
of a railroad company to install a semaphore or at the
very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the
public of the passing train amounts to negligence.
 semaphores, signal light, flagman or switchman to warn the
public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing.
● In its Answer thereto defendant PNR alleged as affirmative
defense that the collision was caused by negligence, imprudence
and lack of foresight of plaintiff’s bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
● The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and ordered
the defendant to pay the latter: P179, 511.52 as actual damages;
P436, 642.00 as reimbursement for the damages paid by plaintiff
to death, injury and damage claimants; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and interest at the legal
rate on the above amounts due to the plaintiff from Aug. 10,
1974 until fully paid.
● The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PNR can be sued or be held liable for damages.

Ato v Ramos ● Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that
a portion of their land in Baguio City with an area of 985 square
meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and
running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by
petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO).
● On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations
to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in
consideration of the amount of ₱778,150.00. However, the ATO
failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus,
on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection
against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC.
● In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an
affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358,
whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land
that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of the
Loakan Airport.
● They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the
action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of
sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental
functions.
RULING:
The petition for review has no merit. The immunity of
the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of
sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is
expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, viz: Section 3. The State may not be sued
without its consent.
An unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary
functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in
favor of the former because its function is governmental
or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in
favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a
 ● The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay
the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of P778,150.00 being the
value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO
as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12%
from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully
paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages
and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00
representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs
counsel; (4) The costs of this suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTCs decision withmodification deleting the awarded cost,
and reducing the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00
each, and attorneys fees is lowered to P10,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ATO can be sued without the State's consent?
Palafox vs Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and
Province of detailed to the Office of the District Engineer. While driving his
ilocos norte truck, Sabas ran over Proceto Palafox resulting to the latter’s death.
Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to
which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case
necessary function of government but was essentially a
business.
The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the
category of a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business,
even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the
travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which,
far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may,
more than the construction of public roads, be
undertaken by private concerns.
In Supreme Courts’ view, the CA thereby correctly
appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an
agency of the Government not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was instead
involved in the management and maintenance of the
Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive
prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence,
the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.
SC uphold the CA’s aforequoted holding.SC further
observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’
property. The Court denies the petition for review on
certiorari, and affirms the decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals. No pronouncement on costs of suit.
NO. The general rule is that local government units are
not liable for negligent acts of its employees while they
are performing governmental functions or duties. In this
case, the driver was involved in the construction or
maintenance of roads which was a governmental duty.
 against him, the Province, the District Engineer and the Provincial
Treasurer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Province of Ilocos Norte can be held liable.
UP vs Dizon The UP entered into General Construction Agreement with Stern
Builders Construction represented by General Manager Secretary
villano dela cruz for the construction building and renovation of the
CAS building. Stern Builder submitted 3 progress billings of the
work accomplished but UP did not paid the third billing worth 273,
739 due to COA’s disapproval. Stern Builders and Dela Cruz filed
with RTC(2 c) to collect the unpaid billing and recover various
damages. The RTC in favored to Stern Builders and ordered UP to
pay 503, 462 (3rd billing to accomplished work and retention money;
actual and moral damages, atty’s fees and cost of suit. UP filed a
notice of appeal but RTC denied for it had been filed out of time and
granted the motion of execution of the decision. UP assailed the
denial of due course to its appeal in the CA but CA dismissed due to
the ground that it was 17 days late of the reglementary period and
the RTC’s decision had already become final and executory.
The UP was exhausting the available remedies to overturn the
denial of due course to the appeal and the issuance of the writ of
execution. RTC granted another motion for execution although the
RTC had already issued the writ of execution. The sheriff served
notices of garnishment on the UP’s depository banks namely; Land
Bank of the Philippines and the DBP and assailed it and filed motion
to quash the writ of execution and was denied.
Stern Builders’ motion of ex parte and the release of the garnished
funds were granted despite of UP’s opposition. Stern Builders and
dela cruz moved to cite DBP in direct contempt of court for its non
compliance with the order of release. The UP petition in the CA to
challenge the jurisdiction of the RTC in issuing the order argued that
government funds and properties could not be seized by virtue of
writs of execution or garnishment as cited in PD 1445, Sec. 84. The
CA issued a TRO and Stern Builders and dela cruz filed in RTC
Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his
negligent act. However tragic and deplorable it may be,
the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to
pay monetary consideration.
UP’s funds, being government funds, are not subject to
garnishment.
UP is a government instrumentality which it has Special
Trust Fund audited to COA as defined under P.D. 1445.
Its funds is a government funds could be validly made
the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or
garnishment. The adverse judgement rendered against
the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly rendered
against UP in a suit to which, it had impliedly consented
was not immediately enforceable by execution against
UP, because suability at the state did not necessarily
mean its liability.
Disbursements of public funds must be required by law
and judgement of awards of actual and moral
damages was not validly made I there was no
special appropriation by Congress.
The COA must adjudicate private respondent’s claim
before execution should proceed.
P.D. 1445 Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines
- all money claims against the Government must be filed
with the Commission on Audit which act upon it within
60 days.
3. Period of appeal did not start without effective service
of decision upon counsel of
record.
 from sheriffs assistance to implement the release order stating that
the TRO 60 days period lapsed. This was granted and directed the
sheriff to proceed tot eh DBP to receive the check; UP presented a
motion to withhold the release of the payment of the judgement
award. RTC noted that the DBP had already delivered to the sheriff
manager’s check representing the garnished funds payable to the
order of Stern builders should not encash the check due to pending
of the UP’s petition for certiorari. CA denied the petitions of UP
given that UP had been given ample time to contest the motion to
direct DBP to deposit the check and that garnished funds could be
the proper subject because they had already marked the project.

Matters Arriving from Pendency of the Petition

UP’s files within 15 days reglementary period and the withdrawal
deposit not allowed which is final and executory
UP cannot escape liability that they already exhaust administrative
remedies
Up alleging that judge Yadao gravely erred in ordering the
immediate release of the garnished funds despite the pendency
Garnished amount was already by stern builders
TRO was released on Feb. 2, 2007 but the release order was on Jan
17, 2007 which makes the the TRO ineffectual.
UP contends that the CA contravened Sec. 5, Art 14 the constitution
by allowing that the garnishment of UP funds because it
substantially reduce UP’s limited budget allocated and the awards of
damages should be reduce.

w/n: UP’s fund is subject to garnishment.

GSIS vs ● Lapu-Lapu Development & Housing Corporation (LLDHC) was
Group the registered owner of seventy-eight (78) lots (subject lots),
Management situated in Barrio Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City.
● LLDHC and the GSIS entered into a Project and Loan
Agreement for the development of the subject lots.
● GSIS agreed to extend a Twenty-Five Million Peso-loan
(P25,000,000.00) to LLDHC, and in return, LLDHC will
develop, subdivide, and sell its lots to GSIS members.
GMC came to this Court on a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, seeking to set aside the
Order of the Lapu-Lapu RTC
For lack of sufficient basis the charge of contempt of
court against respondent Lapu-Lapu Development and
Housing Corporation and the public respondents is
hereby DISMISSED.
● To secure the payment of the loan, LLDHC executed a real
estate mortgage over the subject lots in favor of GSIS.
● For LLDHC’s failure to fulfill its obligations, GSIS foreclosed
the mortgage.
● As the lone bidder in the public auction sale, GSIS acquired the
subject lots, and eventually was able to consolidate its
ownership over the subject lots with the corresponding transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) issued in its name.
● GMC offered to purchase on installments the subject lots from
GSIS for a total price of One Million One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,100,000.00), with the aggregate area specified as
423,177 square meters.
● GSIS accepted the offer and on February 26, 1980, executed a
Deed of Conditional Sale over the subject lots.
● However, when GMC discovered that the total area of the
subject lots was only 298,504 square meters, it wrote GSIS and
proposed to proportionately reduce the purchase price to
conform to the actual total area of the subject lots.
● GSIS approved this proposal and an Amendment to the Deed of
Conditional Sale was executed to reflect the final sales
agreement between GSIS and GMC.
● FIRST CIVIL CASE – LLDHC v GSIS) - LLDHC filed a
complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure with Writ of
Mandatory Injunction against GSIS before the RTC of Manila
(Manila RTC).
● (Second civil case – GMC v. GSIS) GMC filed its own
complaint against GSIS for Specific Performance with Damages
before the Lapu-Lapu RTC. The complaint was to compel GSIS
to execute a Final Deed of Sale over the subject lots since the
purchase price had already been fully paid by GMC.
● GSIS, submitted to the court a Commission on Audit (COA)
Memorandum, purportedly disallowing in audit the sale of the
subject lots for "apparent inherent irregularities," the sale price
to GMC being lower than GSIS’s purchase price at the public
auction.
However, on September 23, 2005, the Special
Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals came
out with its own decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382.
It granted LLDHC’s petition, contrary to the Court
of Appeals’ decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85096, and
annulled and set aside the March 11, 2004 Order of
the Lapu-Lapu RTC
Meanwhile, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier
issued is hereby declared PERMANENT
GSIS and GMC are now before this Court, with their
separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari, assailing
the decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 85096 and CA-G.R. SP No. 84382, respectively.
G.R. No. 167000
- GSIS is assailing the Orders issued by the Lapu-
Lapu RTC on March 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004
for being legally unenforceable on GSIS
because the titles of the 78 lots in Marigondon,
Lapu-Lapu City were already in LLDHC’s
name, due to the final and executory judgment
rendered by the Manila RTC in Civil Case No.
R-82-3429
- LLDHC alleges that because of this
"supervening event," GSIS cannot be compelled
to execute a final deed of sale in GMC’s favor,
and "LLDHC cannot be divested of its titles,
ownership and possession" of the subject
properties.
- GMC in its comment argues that GSIS has no
legal standing to institute this petition because it
has no more interest in the subject lots, since it
● The Lapu-Lapu RTC rendered its decision in favor of GMC (2nd
case)
● In deciding in favor of GMC, the Lapu-Lapu RTC held that
there existed a valid and binding sales contract between GSIS
and GMC, which GSIS could not continue to ignore without any
justifiable reason especially since GMC had already fully
complied with its obligations.
● It also dismissed LLDHC’s complaint-in-intervention, APPEAL
ALSO DISMISSED.
● (FIRST CASE) On May 10, 1994, the Manila RTC rendered a
Decision and held that GSIS was unable to prove the alleged
violations committed by LLDHC to warrant the foreclosure of
the mortgage over the subject lots.
● Thus, the Manila RTC annulled the foreclosure made by GSIS
and ordered LLDHC to pay GSIS the balance of its loan with
interest.
LLDHC, filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision (GSIS
& GMC sale). LLDHC alleged that the Manila RTC decision
nullified the sale of the subject lots to GMC and consequently,
the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision was also nullified.
IT WAS DENIED
LLDHC filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari in seeking to
annul the February 24, 1992 Decision of the Lapu-Lapu RTC, again
alleged that the Manila RTC Decision nullified the Lapu-Lapu RTC
Decision. But Dismissal of this petition is inevitable. (DISMISSED,
mere repetition of the previous case already dismissed)
The Lapu-Lapu RTC issued an Order directing the execution of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 2203-L (GMC and GSIS)
The Motions to Stay Execution filed by LLDHC and GSIS were
denied
is no longer in possession and the titles thereto
have already been registered in LLDHC’s name.
- GMC claims that the decision of the Special
Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is
barred by res judicata, and that LLDHC is guilty
of forum shopping for filing several petitions
before the Court of Appeals and this Court with
the same issues and arguments.
G.R. No. 169971
- GMC is praying that the decision of the Special
Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 be reversed and set
aside.
- GMC is claiming that the Court of Appeals, in
rendering the said decision, committed a
palpable legal error by overruling several final
decisions rendered by the Lapu-Lapu RTC.
- GMC claims that the Lapu-Lapu RTC’s duty to
continue with the implementation of its orders is
purely ministerial as the judgment has not only
become final and executory, but has been
affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in several equally final and
executory decisions. GMC, repeating its
arguments in G.R. No. 167000, maintains that
the petition is barred by res judicata, that there
is forum shopping, and that the Manila RTC
decision is not binding on GMC.
- LLDHC in its comment insists that there is a
supervening event which rendered it necessary
to stay the execution of the judgment of the
Lapu-Lapu RTC.
LLDHC filed a Petition for Certiorari with preliminary injunction
before the Court of Appeals, praying that GMC and the Lapu-Lapu
RTC be ordered to cease and desist from proceeding with the
execution of its Decision in Civil Case No. 2203-L, on the theory
that the Manila RTC decision was a supervening event which made
it mandatory for the Lapu-Lapu RTC to stop the execution of its
decision.
On July 21, 1997, because of GSIS’s continued refusal to implement
the December 17, 1996 Writ of Execution, the Lapu-Lapu RTC,
upon GMC’s motion, issued an Order redirecting its instructions to
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City
The Lapu-Lapu RTC thus directed the Register of Deeds of Lapu-
Lapu City to effect the transfer of the titles to the subject lots in
favor of GMC and declared "any and all acts done by the Register of
Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City null and void starting with the
surreptitious issuance of the new certificates of title in the name of
[LLDHC], contrary" to its decision and orders.
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether or not the decision of the Manila RTC in
Civil Case No. R-82-3429 constitutes a supervening
event, which should be admitted as an exception to
the doctrine of finality of judgments.
2. Whether or not the September 23, 2005 Decision of
the Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382 and GSIS’s
Petition in G.R. No. 167000 are barred by res
judicata.
3. Whether or not there is a legal and physical
impossibility for GSIS to comply with the March
11, 2004 and May 7, 2004 Orders of the Lapu-Lapu
RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L.
4. Whether or not LLDHC and GSIS are guilty of
forum shopping.
DISCUSSION
First Issue:
Supervening Event
- It is well-settled that once a judgment attains
finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
It may not be changed, altered or modified in
any way even if the modification were for the
purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law. This is referred to as the
"doctrine of finality of judgments," and this
doctrine applies even to the highest court of the
land.
- The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded
on fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice, and that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgments or orders of
courts must become final at some definite time
 fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end
to litigations, thus setting to naught the main
role of courts of justice which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality.
- Both GSIS and LLDHC claim that the
execution of the decision and orders in Civil
Case No. 2203-L should be stayed because of
the occurrence of "supervening events" which
render the execution of the judgment
"impossible, unfair, unjust and inequitable."
- However, in order for an event to be considered
a supervening event to justify the alteration or
modification of a final judgment, the event must
have transpired after the judgment has become
final and executory,
- Therefore, the ruling by the Manila RTC (GSIS
& LLDHC) is evidently not a supervening
event. It was already in existence even before
the decision in (GSIS & GM) Civil Case No.
2203-L attained finality.
- Since the Manila RTC decision does not
constitute a supervening event, there is therefore
neither reason nor justification to alter, modify
or annul the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision and
Orders, which have long become final and
executory.
- Thus, in the present case, GMC must not be
deprived of its right to enjoy the fruits of a
final verdict.
- Petitioner likewise claims that Private
Respondent GMC cannot escape the adverse
effects of the final and executory judgment of
the Manila RTC.
- Again, we do not agree.
 - A trial court has no power to stop an act that has
been authorized by another trial court of equal
rank.
- As correctly stated by the CA, the Decision
rendered by the Manila RTC -- while final and
executory -- cannot bind herein private
respondent [GMC], which was not a party to the
case before the said RTC. A personal judgment
is binding only upon the parties, their agents,
representatives and successors in interest.

- Third, petitioner grievously errs in insisting that

the judgment of the Manila RTC nullified that
of the Lapu-lapu RTC.
- As already adverted to earlier, courts of coequal
and coordinate jurisdiction may not interfere
with or pass upon each other’s orders or
processes, since they have the same power and
jurisdiction.
- Except in extreme situations authorized by law,
they are proscribed from doing so.

- It bears repeating that the issue of whether or

not the Manila RTC Decision could nullify or
render unenforceable the Lapu Lapu RTC
Decision has been litigated many times over in
different fora.
- It would be the height of inequity if the Court
were to now reverse the Court of Appeals’ and
its own final and executory rulings and allow
GSIS to prevent the execution of the Lapu Lapu
RTC Decision on the same legal grounds
previously discredited by the courts.

Second Issue:
Res Judicata
- GMC asserts that the petition herein by GSIS in
G.R. No. 167000 are barred by res judicata as
the issues involved had been fully resolved not
only by the lower courts but by this Court as
well.
- GSIS and LLDHC both insist that res judicata
does not apply as this Court "has not yet
rendered a decision involving the same or any
similar petition."
- All three parties herein are in agreement with
the facts that led to the petitions in this case.
However, not all of them agree that the matters
involved in this case have already been
judicially settled.
- While GMC contends that GSIS’s petition is
barred by res judicata, both GSIS and LLDHC
assert that this Court has not yet decided any
similar petition, thus disputing the claim of res
judicata.
- Notwithstanding the difference in the forms of
actions GSIS and LLDHC filed, the doctrine of
res judicata still applies considering that the
parties were litigating the same thing, i.e., the
78 lots in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, and
more importantly, the same contentions and
evidence were used in all causes of action
- Evidently, this Court could dispose of this case
simply upon the application of the principle of
res judicata.
- It is clear that GSIS’s petition in G.R. No.
167000 and LLDHC’s petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84382 should have never reached those
stages for having been barred by a final and
executory judgment on their claims.
- Third Issue:
GSIS’s Compliance with the
Lapu-Lapu RTC Judgment and Orders

- GSIS asserts that the assailed Orders cannot be

enforced upon it given the physical and legal
impossibility for it to comply as the titles over
the subject properties were transferred to
LLDHC under the Manila RTC writ of
execution.
- A closer perusal of the March 11, 2004 and May
7, 2004 Orders shows that GSIS’s argument
holds no water.
- GSIS’s argument of legal and physical
impossibility of compliance with the assailed
Orders is baseless.
- GSIS also argues that it cannot be the
"subject [of any] execution including [the]
payment of any damage and other monetary
judgments because all GSIS funds and
properties are absolutely and expressly
exempt from execution and other legal
processes under Section 39 of Republic Act
No. 8291."

Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291 provides:

SECTION 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and
Lien. —It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State
that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall
be preserved and maintained at all times and that
contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits
under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order
not to burden the members of the GSIS and their
employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair
the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the
contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this
Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the
contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all
accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt
from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly
and specifically revoked and any assessment against the
GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby
considered paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances,
regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence
contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby
deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective
and without legal force and effect.
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as
well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to
the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other
processes issued by the courts, quasi judicial agencies
or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit
(COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations
of the members, including his pecuniary accountability
arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or
performance of his official functions or duties, or
incurred relative to or in connection with his position or
work except when his monetary liability, contractual or
otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.

- This Court, in Rubia v. Government Service

Insurance System, held that the exemption of
GSIS is not absolute and does not encompass all
of its funds, to wit: In so far as Section 39 of the
GSIS charter exempts the GSIS from execution,
suffice it to say that such exemption is not
absolute and does not encompass all the GSIS
funds.
- By way of illustration and as may be gleaned
from the Implementing Rules and Regulation of
 the GSIS Act of 1997, one exemption refers to
social security benefits and other benefits of
GSIS members under Republic Act No. 8291 in
connection with financial obligations of the
members to other parties. The pertinent GSIS
Rule provides:
Rule XV. Funds of the GSIS
Section 15.7 Exemption of Benefits of Members from
Tax, Attachment, Execution, Levy or other Legal
Processes. – The social security benefits and other
benefits of GSIS members under R.A. 8291 shall be
exempt from tax, attachment, garnishment, execution,
levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-
judicial agencies or administrative bodies in connection
with all financial obligations of the member, including
his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or
occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official
functions or duties or incurred in connection with his
position or work, as well as COA disallowances.
Monetary liability in favor of the GSIS, however, may be
deducted from the benefits of the member. [Emphasis
supplied]

- The processual exemption of the GSIS funds

and properties under Section 39 of the GSIS
Charter, in our view, should be read consistently
with its avowed principal purpose: to maintain
actuarial solvency of the GSIS in the protection
of assets which are to be used to finance the
retirement, disability and life insurance benefits
of its members.
- Clearly, the exemption should be limited to the
purposes and objects covered. Any
interpretation that would give it an expansive
construction to exempt all GSIS assets from
 legal processes absolutely would be
unwarranted.
- Furthermore, the declared policy of the State in
Section 39 of the GSIS Charter granting GSIS
an exemption from tax, lien, attachment, levy,
execution, and other legal processes should be
read together with the grant of power to the
GSIS to invest its "excess funds" under Section
36 of the same Act.
- Under Section 36, the GSIS is granted the
ancillary power to invest in business and other
ventures for the benefit of the employees, by
using its excess funds for investment purposes.
In the exercise of such function and power, the
GSIS is allowed to assume a character similar to
a private corporation.
- Thus, it may sue and be sued, as also, explicitly
granted by its charter. to say, where proper,
under Section 36, the GSIS may be held liable
for the contracts it has entered into in the course
of its business investments.
- For GSIS cannot claim a special immunity from
liability in regard to its business ventures under
said Section. Nor can it deny contracting
parties, in our view, the right of redress and the
enforcement of a claim, particularly as it arises
from a purely contractual relationship, of a
private character between an individual and the
GSIS.
- In this case, the monetary judgments against
GSIS arose from its failure to comply with its
private and contractual obligation to GMC. As
such, GSIS cannot claim immunity from the
enforcement of the final and executory
judgment against it.
Fourth Issue:
Forum Shopping
- this Court already found LLDHC guilty of
forum shopping and was adjudged to pay treble
costs way back in 2002
- There is forum shopping whenever, as a result
of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) from another.
- There is forum shopping when two or more
actions or proceedings, other than appeal or
certiorari, involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, are instituted either
simultaneously or successively to obtain a more
favorable decision.
- It is undeniable that both LLDHC and GSIS are
guilty of forum shopping, for having gone
through several actions and proceedings from
the lowest court to this Court in the hopes that
they will obtain a decision favorable to them.
- In all those actions, only one issue was in
contention: the ownership of the subject lots. In
the process, the parties degraded the
administration of justice, congested our court
dockets, and abused our judicial system.
Moreover, the simultaneous and successive
actions filed below have resulted in conflicting
decisions rendered by not only the trial courts
but also by different divisions of the Court of
Appeals.
 - As this Court held in the earlier case of LLDHC
against GMC: "[The] insidious practice of
repeatedly bringing essentially the same action
– albeit disguised in various nomenclatures –
before different courts at different times is
forum shopping no less."

Conclusion
- Although it is settled that the Lapu-Lapu RTC
Decision was not in any way nullified by the
Manila RTC Decision, it is this Court’s duty to
resolve the legal implications of having two
conflicting, final, and executory decisions in
existence.
- In summary, this Court finds the execution of
the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision in Civil Case No.
2203-L to be in order. We affirm the assailed
Orders of March 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004,
which reiterate, among others, the October 23,
1997 Order issued by the Lapu-Lapu RTC,
directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu
City to cancel the certificates of title of LLDHC
and to issue new ones in GMC’s name.
Whatever rights are due LLDHC from GSIS as
a result of the final judgment of the Manila RTC
in Civil Case No. R-82-3429, which we have
previously held to be binding between GSIS and
LLDHC, may be threshed out in an appropriate
proceeding. Such proceeding shall not further
delay the execution of the Lapu-Lapu RTC
Decision.

Ruling to the two consolidated Petitions for Review

on Certiorari concerning 78 parcels of land located
in Barrio Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City:

Makati vs Facts:
CA
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land
owned by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors
Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of
the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this
amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was
earlier released to private respondent. It then issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of
garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its
funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The
RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a
petition for review before the SC.
Issue:
1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from
garnishment and levy upon execution?
2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?
- The petition in G.R. No. 167000 is DENIED
and the Decision dated November 25, 2004 and
Resolution dated January 20, 2005 of the
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
- The petition in G.R. No. 169971 is GRANTED
and the Decision dated September 23, 2005 of
the Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
Held:
1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule
that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute. More
particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether
real or personal, which are necessary for public use
cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a
money judgment against the municipality. Municipal
revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees,
and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental activities and
functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council
of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from
its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance
due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution
may be validly effected on the public funds of
petitioner.
2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent
and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason,
to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered

Itagonoy vs ● Chao was engaged in buying and selling trucks, heavy
dumdum equipment, et.al. was contacted by Ople for the delivery of
motor vehicles which were needed to carry out certain
developmental undertakings in the municipality.
● Chao agreed to deliver from Cebu 21 motor vehicles with a total
value of P5,820,000.00. But despite several deliveries, Ople
allegedly did not pay Chao, and the total obligation already
totaled to P10,026,060.13.
● Chao prayed for full payment of the said amount with interest at
not less than 2% per month, plust P500,000 as damages for
business losses, P500,000 as exemplary damages, P100,000 for
attorney’s fees and the cost for the suit to which the trial court
granted, and issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing
the sheriff “to attach the estate, real and personal properties” of
Ople.
● Ople filed a Motion to Dismiss because there was no written
contract that would evince the supposed agreement entered with
Chao. And in order to obtain the contract, Chao is subject to
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy
of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and
the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
therefor.
For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession
and use of the subject property notwithstanding its
inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to
pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its
possession of the property since the same has been the
site of Makati West High School since the school year
1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's
blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from
expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. The
State's power of eminent domain should be exercised
within the bounds of fair play and justice.
RULING:
Yes, because the general rule in Art. 16, Sec. 3
of the Constitution is that the State and its political
subdivisions may not be sued without their consent.
This means that they are open to suit but only when they
consent to it. Consent is implied when the government
enters into a bsuiness contract, as it then descends to the
level of the other contracting party, or it may be
embodied in a general or special law.
In this case, it was stated and proven that Chao
did not go through the proper procedure to obtain the
contract. Hence, there is non-existence of an implied
consent on the part of the Municipality of Hagonoy
 public bidding and prior approval of the municipal council
wherein she did not obtain.
● Ople also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Write
of Preliminary Attachment, invoking the immunity of the state
from suit, unenforceability of the contract, and failure to
substantiate the allegation of fraud. The trial court denied the
two motions. Ople appealed to the CA but also denied for lack
of merit and affirmed the trial court’s order.
ISSUE:
Can Ople invoke State Immunity to withhold the right of
Municipality of Hagonoy to be sued?