Chapter 1 Buddhism As Philosophy

Purpose of Book = Examine Buddhism As Philosophy

Before that clarify 'philosophy' and 'Buddhism'

1.1

What is Philosophy about? What is its subject matter?

At first glance, philosophy is about 'philosophical questions'

e.g:
"How did all this come about?" But this could be explored via astrophysics
"How should I live my life?" can be addressed by literature (?!!)
"How do we know anything?" can be addressed by cognitive science

So better answer is -- Philosophy is about method, not content. It is about how to

answer questions, not about the answers themselves. (then why not study logic +
rhetoric?)

Learn philosophy == learn to think carefully and critically about serious issues.
The answers are not very relevant, and there is not a real 'body of knowledge' the
learner ingests, which sets Philosophy apart from say, Chemistry, and frustrates
some people who ask "In all these centuries, what are the facts established /
answers discovered by Philosophy?" . One answer is that Philosophy has established
that none of the simple answers to the questions Philosophy asks are correct, and
the truth is very complicated. e.g: consider anwering the question 'How does the
body and the mind interact?"
Another answer is that Philosophy is not about answers, but about acquiring a set
of skills, e.g 'critical argumentation', which is useful in other fields, say Law.

What sort of questions does Philosophy ask?

Questions on Ethics - What is Right and Wrong wrt treating others?

Questions on Morality - What is Good (and Bad) Life?
Questions on Metaphysics - the disciplined investigation of the basic
components of Reality- e.g - What is the relation between Cause and Effect? Are
only sensory inputs 'real'? What is the nature of time? Does a 'self' exist? If so
what does it consist of ? Offshoot = Philosophy of Language. How do sentences have
meaning? What does it mean for a statement to be true?
Questions about Epistomology - the theory of knowledge. E.g: What does it mean
for someone to know something? What are the means and methods of knowledge?
(possible answers: Sensory Input, Reasoning). If there are multiple means of
knowledge, how are they related to each other?

Philosophers have developed different answers to each question in each branch of

Philosophy, and there is no consensus on any of them. For every answer, there are
serious objections. The 'process' of Philosophy is in addressing these answers, and
trying to answer them.

Not every culture developed its own philosophical tradition. But Ancient Greece and
India did, spurred by question on ethics and what a good/bad life is. To figure
this out, we need to figure out the nature of reality and where we fit in it. This
in turn requires clarity on the nature of knowledge and the processes that lead to
it.

1.2
Philosophy is (then) the systematic examination of questions in ethics,
metaphysics, epistemology, and other related fields. It's practice involves using
analysis and argumentation in systematic and reflective ways.

Now the second question: What is Buddhism?

Key Question: Is Buddhism a 'religion' (as the term is understood in the West)? In
one sense, yes. In another, no.
Clarifying this issue is helpful

In the West
the familiar religions are Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. All 3 involve
belief (see below) in a personal(?) eternal being who created the Universe, and is
perfect. Not all religions believe all of this.
Religion is thought of as a 'faith' - a set of beliefs that one accepts out of
conviction not based on evidence or rational argument, something that falls on the
'heart side' of the 'head/heart divide'
A divide is seen between matters of 'the head'- questions whose answers are
sought via reason, and matters of 'the heart' - questions whose answers are sought
via faith and/or feeling.
A similar dichotomy is seen between facts - what science discovers and value-
and religious beliefes - which are private subjective convictions not open to
(much) rational scrutiny

Note however these are culture (and probably individual) specific. It is not
obvious these dichotomies actually exist. Neither is it universally accepted that
matters of 'religion' and/or 'spirituality' belong to the 'faith side' of such a
divide, even when some such is assumed to exist

Soteriology:
All theisms (mono/poly/whatever) postulate a vision for the ideal state of humans.
This is contrasted with the 'way things are normally' aka 'the way humans would
live if left to their own devices'. The latter state is considered 'unsatisfactory'
in some manner, and achieving the former state is represented as 'salvation' from
the unsatisfactory 'mundane' state.

This idea of 'attaining salvation' of somehow 'escaping' an unsatisfactory

situation and achieving a 'good' situation (the theory and practical methods
therof) in other words the 'doctrine of salvation' offered by a religion, is called
soteriology.

When we believe a religion, (which delivers a soteriology) is a matter of 'faith'

we assert that salvation is about non rational/emotional/belief based commitment
to a set of principles, and that rational/experimental approaches are of no (or
lesser) use in achieving salvation.

The Ancient Greeks and Indians (including the Buddha) did not hold to this view,
and viewed rational faculties as valid approaches to Salvation.
Note: They did not insist it was the *only* way.

The Bhagavad Gita claims there are four (major) paths to salvation, of which a
(primarily) rational path is one.
Buddhism claims that the (only one true) path to liberation consists of a combined
practice of philosophical reasoning(1) *and* meditation.

(my comment: This seems to be true only if 'philosophical reasoning' is meant to

imply a 'coming to perceive' ontological factor x (say sankharas or the five
elements or 'clinging') at work, and gaining control of them (by meditation? by
effort? by habit changes? I don't see philosophical reasoning as path to salvation
in Theravada or Mahayana. Vajrayana/PureLand etc specifically seems to believe that
faith/faith based practices are enough., or at least in any case, in combination
with meditation. No philosophical reasoning in sight anywhere, as *a practice*! )

but note: this doesn't mean we can't say Buddhism is a philosophy and not a
religion. Firstly this assumes a dichotomy between the two. And a dichotomy between
reason and faith. Buddhists have an attitude to the soteriological doctrine that
can be compared to a modern educated person's attitude to advanced scientific
theories. We don't have direct 'perception' or experience of this, but we know that
if we put in the effort to get the required training, we can 'see' them.

So Buddhism *is* a religion in that it addresses soteriological concerns.

But it does not involve 'faith' - a commitment to beliefs for which no reasons are
given.
The practising Buddhist is given reasons supporting various claims and are expected
to *investigate for themselves* if these claims are true or not, and this process
of investigation is the 'path to nirvana' or the 'soteriological process'.

The Buddha is revered as a teacher who found out objective facts about the world
and our place in it through his own intellectual power. The Buddha is *not*
worshipped as a god or God. He is also not considered a prophet whose enhanced
spiritual status derives from special access to god (or God). Buddhism explicitly
denies an eternal creator God and people used the Western Religious modes can see
this as 'atheism'. Buddhism does beliewe in myriad 'small g' gods, but is not
polytheistic either, since they are not immortal, just longer lived and more
powerful than (the average) human being. When they die, they undergo rebirth, just
as humans do.

Also, no enlightened being, even the Buddha can bestow nirvana on others. This is
something one can only achieve by oneself. Enlightened beings can only point the
way.

Karma

Buddhism believes that after death one is reborn in some form - human, animal, god,
hungry ghost etc.

Now (here we start applying the philosophical approach to Buddhism) does Buddhism
ask us to believe things for which there is no objective evidence?

Good (philosophical) question.

But first clear up some points:

1. Karma is not divine retribution. karma => receive good experiences for
acting out with morally good motives, and receive painful results for acting with
evil intentions.
So who determines what is good and what is evil?
Buddhist answer: No one does. Karma is not a set of rules created by and
enforced by a divine ruler. Karma is an (a set of) impersonal causal law(s) that
happens to describe how the Universe works. As with the law of Gravity, no one
'passed' this rule or enforces it. So Karma is not a 'rule' that can be obeyed or
broken, but an impersonal description of what follows what.

2. Karma and so rebirth after death is *not* a substitute for the 'afterlife'
of some religions. It is not a consolation or relief. The point of Buddhism is not
to do those things which result in a pleasant rebirth. Per the Buddha, rebirth (and
so redeath) is part of the problem, and what we need to be liberated from. We could
try to manipulate the laws of causation to ensure better rebirths, but since
Buddhism treats this kind of action as a manifestation of ignorance, and since
ignorant action results in bad effects, it will inevitably create suffering.

3. Karma is not a view peculiar to Buddhism.

It *is* reasonable to ask what evidence is there for Karma *when we are
investigating Buddhism as a philosophy*. not if we are investigating Buddhism as,
say, a historical artifact, as (say) a part of the study of religions. In that
context we can just note that Indian Buddhists believed in Karma, and set aside the
question of whether there is evidence to buttress this claim.

Alternatively (in a non philosophical approach) we could examine how the doctrine
of karma affected other parts of the Buddhist 'system' and figure out how the
system 'hangs together'. But when investigating *philosophically* we can check what
happens to other parts of the system, when teachings without rational support are
thrown out. So (once we get to philosophical investigation) we'll do exactly this.

1.3
Some focii. We will examine Buddhist literature that lays out philosophical
arguments. We will not look at, for example, the rules of monastic life for monks
and nuns, popular writing for lay followers, artistic expressions in architecture,
poetry etc, institutions, organizations, history.

Even within philosophy, we don't pay much attention to historical development and
often take things out of sequence.

We do look at (philosophical) conclusions, but also supporting arguments,

objections, answers to objections.
We try to come up with our own objections, and also try to figure out any answers
that Buddhist philosophers can give to our objections.
We examine how much (or if) Buddhist doctrines stand up to rational scrutiny.

Some doctrines we can say are trivially false. E.g: The Buddhist idea that matter
is made up of four types of atoms - Earth, Fire, Water and Air. In this view,
alcohol differs from water in how much of the fire element it contains. All liquids
have the same 'type of element'.

We now know that this is not true. There are more than four 'elements' (in the
sense of fundamental constituents of matter). Two liquids may have no lement in
common. (my comment: So this leads to the classical five elements as being 'modes
of being' rather than 'constituting matter'). So when Buddhist philosophers argue
about whether color is a constituent of all four 'elements' we dismiss the whole
discussion as it can't produce useful answers.

Note that these errors don't mean that we need to dismiss all of Buddhism.
Aristotle believed that the Earth is the centre of the Universe, and though we now
know this is wrong, Aristotle is still considered an important philosopher. We
simply set aside those parts that contradict scientific knowledge and focus on the
reminder.

In ancient cultures (Greece, India) it was felt that philosophers had to develop a
truly comprehensive world view, which included a comprehensive understanding of how
the material world worked. The same methods of rational argumentation and analysis
the philosophers developed to answer questions in ethics, metaphysics, and
epistemology seemed to be useful to study the natural world. Thus Aristotle wrote
books on metereology, and the Sankhyaists developed a theory of chemistry.
The sciences have their origins in philosophy but are now distinct disciplines,
with their own methods of investigation. Philosophy now focus on ethics,
metaphysics, and epistemology. So when we deal with ancient philosophies we set
aside their notions of how the material world works.

We also ignore arguments which are essentially Appeals to the Authority of the
Buddha, by pointing, for example, at a specific Sutra where the Buddha is supposed
to have said something that supports a given position.

A final point - the book does not say what 'the Buddhist philosophy' is. There is
no such thing, no more than there is 'the Christian Philosophy' or 'the Judaic
philosophy'. There are certain fundamentals on which all the philophers of a
particular school agree, but they also differ radically in their understandings of
matters beyond this 'core'. Aquinas vs Kirkegaard on Christian teachings,
Maimonedes vs Spinoza on Judaic teachings. Likewis with Buddism, there are
fundamentals on which all Buddhists agree, but there are important issues (which
can get quite complicated) on which they disagree.

To help keep track of things it is useful to have a basic taxonomy of Buddhist

philosophical systems.

There are three distinct phases in the development of Buddhist philosophy.

1. Early Buddhism - The teachings of Buddha and his immediate disciples
2. Abhidharma - The development of rigorous metaphysical and epistemological
theories growing out of the attempt to give consistent, systematic interpretations
to the teachings of early Buddhism
3. Mahayana: Criticisms of the Abhidharma doctrines, along with an alternative
account of what Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology should look like.

Phases 2 and 3 saw the development of different schools, reflecting different

responses to philosophical challenges faced.

For our purposes the important schools are

Abhidharma
1. Vaibhaasika (Sarvaastivaada)
2. Sautantrika (Darshtaantika)
3. Theravaada

Mahayana
1. Madhyamaka (the philosophical basis of much of Tibetan Buddhism)
2. Yogachara (Buddist idealism)
3. Yogachara Sautrantika (Buddhist logic)

We look at each of these schools in turn, seeing how their work developed out of
the work of early philosophers, trying to understand the merits of their arguments.
But first, in the next 3 chapters, we examine the fundamentals (the 'core') of
Buddhism that all schools agree upon

Chapter 2 Basic Teaching

a core, taught by the Buddha and his disciples that all Buddhist schools accept.

Sramanas rejected key elements of the prevailing Brahminical orthodoxy as

inadequate to their spiritual goals.
This orthodoxy was centred on a set of texts, the Vedas, considered to be divinely
inspired. They enjoined the performance of various rituals to uphold the cosmic
order and provide the 'sponsor' many material benefits. This made sense as long as
the prevailing notion was that humans had one life and then a tenuous afterlife.
The Vedas did not teach Karma, and were vague wrt an afterlife. The prevailing
culture promoted 3 goals in life - dharma (virtue + social standing), artha (money
and wealth) and kama (sensual pleasure) and a literature developed around each
(e.g: The Kama Shastra). In this context vedic rituals etc made sense, as providing
for benefits here and in the herafter.

With the arrival of karma and reincarnation, this lost some of its cachet. If I'm
going to be reborn what is the point of (only) working to improve this life?
Shouldn't I worry about what happens in the next? Also what is the point of the
eternal birth-death cycle? (and how does one break out).

The shramanas acknowledged Karma and claimed that true happiness comes only by
realizing our 'true nature' and our truly ideal state involved being liberated from
the cycle of birth, death and rebirth. (note: Soteriology!!). The shramanas
explored a variety of techniques to achieve this ideal stage - ascetic practises
like fasting, remaining motionless for long periods, abstaining from sleep etc, and
also various meditational/yogic practices, like focusing the mind on a single
point, exploring a variety of altered states of consciousness etc.

-- ordinary vs enhanced 'biographies' of Siddhartha --

2.2 Post Enlightenment Teaching

The Buddha immediately after enlightenment taught

- there is a middle path between a life of asceticism and a life of sensual
dissolution.
- it has eight components - (right) view, intention, speech, action,
livelihood, exertion, self possession (?), and concentration.
- The Four Noble Truths. In summary form, these are
1. There is Suffering
2. Suffering has an origin. It comes into existence in dependence on causes
(?)
3. Suffering (can) ceases. All future suffering can be prevented
4. There is a path to the cessation of suffering.

The second truth is elaborated in a 12 linked chain of causes and effects, the
first of which is ignorance.
Ignorance is explained in terms of failure to know (perceive?) three
characteristics of reality - impermanence, suffering and non-self. Non self is
argued for on the grounds that all constituents of any 'self' are impermanent.

To summarize, in the early (first?) episode of Buddha's teaching we find the

following doctrines and ideas
1. The Dharma as a 'Middle' Path
2. The Eight Fold Path.
3. The Four Noble Truths.
4. The 12 linked chain of dependent origination.
5. The three characteristics of existence - impermanence, suffering, non-self

At first glance the first NT "There is Suffering" seems redundant. Of course there
is a lot of suffering in the world.
The key is that this is used in non conventional sense and the Buddha thinks this
is something about which most people are in denial.
Here the 'four sights' (old age, sickness, death, shramana) become significant.
The Buddha is not refering to ordinary suffering as when we are injured or sick,
but to existential suffering that results from the realization of our mortality.
Here Siderits says that 'dukkha' comes from (paraphrase) "once we face our
mortality, frustration, despair, and alienation result because once we realize that
we'll die someday life events lose their significance" (huh?). net, net in the face
of mortality, existential dread arises.

so question: Suppose I believe in karma. So I live another life after I die. Also
what I do in this life impacts my next life. Then why existential despair when
faced with death?

Answer: Buddhism delineates 3 layers of suffering

Layer 1: experience of what is conventionally called suffering - being cut or

burnt, having a toothache or headache, not getting the coveted job etc. Even here
there are two levels to the negative nature of the experience. The first is the
pain itself. The second is our worry about what the pain says about us and where we
are going (?). This sense of dis-ease can permeate the rest of our life,
undermining enjoyment of our ordinary pleasures.

Layer 2: Negative Experiences deriving from impermanence. This is much wider

than we think. (as we see later) Buddhists claim that everything that originates in
dependence on causes (?) must cease to exist. Since *all* things we ordinarily care
about originates in dependence on causes (?) they are all impermanent.

Now we can classify tootaches among the pain from impermanence, because healthy
teeth are impermanent.

But it is not just getting things we don't want (like toothaches) that exemplify
pain from impermanence. Getting things we *do* want - a car, a job, a child, a job,
esteem from people you respect, happiness for a friend, bring happiness but also
anxiety about losing it. So Buddhists call such experiences more subtle (bringers
of pain) than obviously negative experiences. There is thus suffering in getting
what we want, because it is tinged with impermanence.

The feeling of happiness we get from getting what we want is itself impermanent,
and often wears off when novelty fades. Then we pursue something new and old
patterns of behaviour repeat.

Layer 3: Suffering due to conditions

conditions = factors said to be responsible for rebirth -
intentions/volitions(?)/actions that lead to rebirth.

Argument against rebirth causing existential suffering - If we knew the causal laws
of karma, we could do things that insured a better rebirth.

Answer: This still puts us in a situation where impermanence exists. Especially

impermanence of the body, mortality. Which by logic above causes life events to
lose meaning. Perpetual treadmillish recycling causes ennui - what is the point?
(my comment: Buddhism does not see a series of rebirths as having a point, or
moving closer to a goal such as 'merging with the Brahman'. Other philosophies do.
Rebirth by itself ensures (eventual) liberation by the 'school of hard knocks'.
Slow, but sure. One can of course accelerate this progress by striving hard
spiritually). Given an *endless* sequence of lives being the default, and with each
life having impermanence of various kinds, the law of karma becomes a reinforcer of
suffering.

Buddhists do not deny that *some* lives can be filled with pleasure and success.
But they say that overall (given the 'treadmill' concept above) suffering
predominate across endless lives.
2.3

The First Noble Truth points out the existence of suffering. The second points at
how it originates.
Underlying idea == by learning the cause (mechanism?) of a phenomenon, we might get
to exercise some control over it.

The Buddha gives a "12 linked chain" of factors that cause the origination of
suffering. The links in the chain are

1. Ignorance
of the fact that all existence is characterized by impermanence, suffering
and non-self, which causes
2. "Volitions"
active forces of karma that causes rebirth. Dependence on these volitions
in one life causes
3. Consciousness in the next life.
rebirth (the first moment of consciousness in a new life) occurs because of
the desires that led to actions in a past life. This in turn causes
4. a sentient body
due to the first moment of consciousness in a life, fetal matter becomes a
sentient being. This causes the arising of
5. the six senses - the five conventional ones + an 'inner knowing' sense which
causes
6. contact (with sensory phenomena) which causes
7. feeling - the hedonic states of pain, pleasure, indifference (NOT our
emotional states like 'feeling angry' etc) which causes
8. desire (?) which leads to
9. 'appropriation' - the attitude by which we take certain things to be 'me'
and 'mine' (and certain other things to be 'not me' and 'not mine')
10. 'becoming' - volitions that cause the next birth
11. 'birth' - into the third life
12. old age ad death, here standing for all existential suffering

From Wikipedia

1. Ignorance (Pali: Avijjā)

2. Mental formations/volitions (Pali: Saṅkhāra Sanskrit: Saṃskāra)
3. Status consciousness (Pali: Viññāṇa)
4. "Name" and "Form" (Pali: Nāmarūpa)
5. The six senses (Pali: Saḷāyatana)
6. Contact (Pali: Phassa)
7. Feelings (Pali: Vedanā)
8. Cravings/longings/desires (Pali: Taṇhā)
9. Clinging to (Pali: Upādāna)
10. Generation of factors for rebirth (Pali: Bhava)
11. Birth (Pali: Jāti)
12. All the sufferings (Pali: Jarāmaraṇa)

There are problems with this list. The tenth item being similar to/same as the
second. Birth into the third life treated as a separate condition, birth into the
second is not. Multiple versions of this list, some with different items.

Setting that aside, the basic logic is this. (note we are picking a random point in
an infinite cycle to start the list from)

One is born into this life as the result of acting (in the last life) on volitions
born of ignorance of the facts of our existence. Having been born with a body, mind
and senses, we come into contact with sense objects, which give rise to feelings of
pleasure, pain and indifference. These feelings trigger desires, and (such) desires
that are conditioned by desires lead to the stance known as appropriation - taking
certain things (including things that do not exist any longer, and things that do
not exist yet) as 'me' and other things as 'my' possessions. This stance
(appropriation) fuels rebirth, and rebirth causes existential suffering.

Ignorance comes first, or is choosen to be first in an infinite chain of links,

because of its key role in bringing about suffering. Ignorance at any point in
one's life then causes one to act in certain ways that set the stage for later
suffering and continued ignorance (thus ignorance perpetuates itself).

The third truth directly follows from the above. Ignorance is a remediable
condition. When 'cured', the infinitely linked chain (or feedack loop from
ignorance to ignorance in 12 steps) snaps, and since it is the chain that
originates suffering, we can eliminate suffering by snapping it.

The fourth truth then provides a set of eight practices designed to bring about
this cure (for ignorance)

These fall into three buckets.

Right View and Intention represent wisdom.
Right speech, action and livelihood represent morality.
Right exertion, self possession (?) , concentration are the practices that make up
meditation.

(note the last three are (samyag) vyayaama, smrti, and samadhi. smrti is
interpreted as 'mindfulness'(and so connected to vipassana etc) and not 'self
possession' as here.)

These can be engaged in sequentially, but the practice of any one (or subset) will
reinforce the others.

Siderits considers the mutual relationship between wisdom and meditation to be

particularly significant and interprets 'wisdom' as the practice of philosophy:
analyzing concepts, investigating arguments, considering objections and the like
(my view: it may just mean that you need the right 'initial framework' sufficient
to start practice - the basic framework of whatever theory your practice manifests
in this case the basic framework of Buddhism - the four noble thoughts, the 3 core
factors, the eightfold path etc)

Note that 'doing philosophy' is necessary, but not sufficient. This is because even
if you 'philosophically' (aka 'logically') know something you may not be able to
live those values. e.g: smokers who know smoking is bad for them, but do so anyway.
Similarly we can 'logically' know that 'ignorance' == impermanance + suffering +
non self but also *live* as if we (and the things we want) will exist indefinitely,
we can attain happiness by pursuing conventional goals, and that there is a true
'me' for which this life can have meaning and value.

Per Buddhism, only meditation can help you break this 'know logically but can't
make work in practice' problem. Meditation increases control of the mind, which is
then used to *examine* (so really see/percieve vs logically know) and counteract
those processes that lead to suffering.

At the same time 'doing philosophy' is said to be needed to meditate (NB: Siderits
equates the first 'bucket' - Right View + Right Intention - the 'wisdom bucket' to
equate to 'doing philosophy', wheras the conventional intepretation says this means
having knowledge of basic buddhist doctrine and intending to achieve Nirvana)
Reason: Meditation leads to altered states of consciousness in which our awareness
is different from normal awareness. We need a conceptual framework to make sense
of such perceptions and experiences. 'Doing Philosophy' helps us to acquire these
conceptual tools.

E.g: If we are aware of the arguments for a non-self, helps us be aware of causal
connections (?) between mental processes (?) which in turns shows us there is no
self standing behind the scenes directing our mental life

Just as there are interesting relationships between the 8 components of the 8 fold
paths, so there connections between impermanence, suffering and non-self, the 3
'characteristics of existence'

(some stuff skipped here but the crux seems to be that 'no self' is the central
concept and not impermanence, and that it is hard to say what the experience of
Nirvana - and post Nirvanic life - 'is like')

Chapter 3 Non Self: Empty Persons.

Of the 'three characteristics' 'non-self' is central. According to Early Buddhism,
there is no self and persons are (ultimately) not real. (!!). In this chapter we
explore this claim. We look at the arguments in Early Buddhist texts for the claim
that there is no self. We then try to determine the meaning of the statement that
persons are not real.

Before we can do either of these things, we need to determine what it means to say
there *is* a self. In general discourse the word 'self' is used in many different
ways, only one of which is relevant to this doctrine. We can avoid much confusion
about what Buddhists mean by 'non self' if we first understand what they mean by
'self'.

By the 'self' the Buddhists mean that part of a person that is required to
continue to exist for the person to continue to exist.

We can shift perspective and ask what exactly does "I" refer to. "I" am a person,
who exists continuously for a life time, and who is made up of many components -
physical components that make up the body, mental components (thoughts, feelings
etc) that make up the mind etc. But all parts of a person does not need to continue
to exist for the person to exist. If I lose a hand, or have a heart transplant, or
lose my desire for coffee, I'm still the same person.

so "I" refers only to those parts of the person whose continued existence is
necessary for the person to exist. The other parts can be called 'mine' as opposed
to 'me'.

An alternate view is to use 'I' or 'me' to refer to the collective of parts.

Thus to say that there is a self is to say that there is a component (or a group of
components) of a person that would continue to exist over time, so one can identify
a person at a point (in time) X to be the same person at a different time point Y.
The 'continuing' parts of a person are the basis of his identity over time.

There is a subtlety in the use of 'the same'. In English 'the same' can be used for
numerical identity or qualitative identity.

x and y are numerically identical == x and y are just two names for the same
entity.
x and y are qualitatively identical == x and y share the same qualities (that make
them interchangeable within a context)

So there can be qualitative identity but numerical distinctness - two identical

Tshirts that come out of a factory - or numerical identity but qualitative
distinctness - a green leaf in the spring that is reddish brown in autumn.

So in terms of continuity of the self we use 'the same' (self) in the sense of
numerical identity.

Likewise, when people talk of 'discovering their self' or 'finding oneself' they
are using the word in terms of a shift in what is important to a person('s life).
They are not using it in the Buddhist sense - the part of the person that has to
continue for the person to continue. Let's say a person puts a lot of importance on
his skill at sculpting. If he loses his hands, he loses this skill, and so his life
becomes less meaningful but it is still the same (in the Buddhist sense of 'that
which continues') self/person leading that now less meaningful life.

Again, there is the notion of a person's 'identity' being what sets him apart from
everyone else. This is not the same as the Buddhist usage. If you consider that a
person's exact duplicate is formed (say by 'instant cloning'). Then even at the
moment just after cloning, their body and 'brain state' are identical, but they are
still two distinct people. They are qualitatively identical with respect to all
properties, but not numerically identical.

Net net, Buddhist notions of self have to do with numerical identity.

Non Buddhist philosophers have a slightly different idea. They propose a

'component' that is identical for everyone, and then other (non permanent)
components that have experiences, think thoughts, etc. This 'core self' is
indivisible and unchanging. So eating food changes my body, smelling coffee creates
a desire for a cup of coffee (and so changes my mind) but this core self is not
changed by any of these and is just aware of these changes happening to 'other
components' of 'me'. The interesting bit is that someone who believes in no self,
i.e, there is no core unchanging self, can also explain qualitative differences
between persons with the same argument.

So for we have the (Buddhist) notion of the self being that *part* of a person that
has to continue to exist for the person to be (numerically) same across time. (e.g:
"I live in New York, I'll move to Arizona" . The part of the person that 'is the
same (numerically)' when in New York and Arizona is 'the self').

If self is a(n enduring) part of a person, we can find it by making a list of parts
(assuming the list does not leave anything out!) and systematically going through
them to identify the 'self part'.

The Buddha provides us a list of 'person parts' with the doctrine of the five
skandhas (the word 'skandha' is used with the meaning 'bundle')

These are
1. rupas: anything corporeal or physical (A)
2. vedana: feeling, sensations of pleasure, pain, indifference (B)
3. samjna: perceptions, those mental events (sense 'events') whereby one grasps
the sensible characterstics of a perceptible object. the 'seeing event' of a patch
of blue color, the 'hearing event' or 'hearing perception' of roll of thunder
4. sankharas: volition, the mental forces or events that are responsible for
bodily or mental activity, so hunger, emotions, thoughts - 'mental activities and
formations'
5. vijnana: consciousness, the *awareness* of mental and physical states (C)
(A) rupa is often translated as 'form' but what it really means is 'that which has
form or shape' in other words anything physical.
(B) vedana is *only* these three feelings. something like 'anger' is
sankhara/volition, not vedana
(C) just the awareness itself, not what it is aware of

The five skandhas are typically called 'nama-rupa' where 'nama' is the collective
name for skandhas 2-5. Here the meaning of the word is 'that which can *only* be
named' (i.e there is no physical characteristic for these skandha-elements,rupa can
be percieved by the sense, namas can't, we can only communicate about them through
the names we have created for them)

The Buddha uses the 5 skandhas as a list of 'self-parts' and tries to show that
nothing that can be included in any skandha can be part of a self. This claim
depends on the exhaustiveness claim. That is the five aggregates cover all the
'locations' that the 'self' can exist in.

The Buddha makes two arguments for why each skandha cannot be 'the self' - the are
transitory/impermanent/subject to destruction. They are not under control.

Considering the impermanence argument first, this is the structure of the argument

1. Rupa is impermanent
2. Vedana is impermanent.
3. Samjna is impermanent
4. Samskaras are impermanent
5. Vijnana is impermanent
6. If there were a self it would be permanent (continues across time)
7. [Implicit Premise] The 5 skandhas are exhaustive wrt 'self factors'
so
8. (conclusion) There is no permanent self

This is a valid argument *if* the premises are all valid. Before examining if the
premises are valid, what is meant by 'permanant'?

If we accept Karma and rebirth 'permanent' == 'eternal', even in the absence of

corporeal existence
If we confine to one life 'permanent' == 'existing at least a whole lifetime'

But the latter brings a problem. The body does last an entire lifetime.

answer: the self is supposed to be a 'part' that endures. Which 'part' of the body,
if it doesn't endure / is replaced, 'switches off' the self

first cut, anything other than the brain can be replaced.

but the cells of the brain are constantly dying and being renewed. So the brain
isn't 'permanent' either.

(My comment.there is some trickery here. Whether an infinitesimal subpart of the

brain is renewed by an identical part in a given time interval does not affect the
basic idea that the brain, even if replacable with a new one, does extinguish the
individual. Consider two people. If their hearts are interchanged (assume no
pain,infection etc) they are still the same individual. If brains are replaced,
they just switched individuals between bodies. So when the brain is extinguished,
the 'person' does get extinguished.
Also note that the Buddha did not know about cell replacement! this is an argument
that only 20th century+ Buddhists can make. In the Buddha's time, limbs would be
part of 'can be destroyed and the individual remains the same' but the 'vital
organs' - brain, heart, lungs, kidneys, liver etc, if destroyed cause death, which
from the rupa perspective at least, extinguishes the individual.

So in essence this is the same argument as 'what part of a sword, when it is

replaced makes it not the same sword? Apply to computer. car. government. In all
these cases there is the concept of a 'core' or 'directing' part - the blade, the
CPU+MEMORY+'board' vs the non-core part, handle, scabbard, computer casing etc- the
replacement of which changes identity. For a government, "Prime Minister or
President". For a historical nation, change of dynasty or constitution or state
religion.If these change it is a new government even if nothing else does. shades
of 'can you step into the same river twice' yes or no answers depend on perspective

but by the same token since the Buddha did speak of multiple lifetimes, then rupa
is *of course* impermanent. Given enough time, all physical forms get destroyed.
)

With respect to the mind, the Buddha claims that there is no permanent mind only a
succession of mental events that give the illusion of a continuous mind. In
addition to the problem above (is a movie an entity by itself or 'just' a sequence
of frames? Of course distinct movies exist. The only principle that can be drawn
from this is that 'parts which endure across time' == 'the self' is a dubious
argument. Collectives of things can have identities beyond the collected parts. A
wooden handle + blade + rivets != sword. But a sword, once built has an identity
beyond those of its components. Actually this is a good argument for hierarchies of
identities or 'selves'. A sword's identity 'overpowers' or 'subsumes' the
identities of the constituent parts, but they exist at their own 'lower' levels.

At *best* what can be said about the above argument is that things which look to be
continuous maybe an actual aggregation of smaller parts which 'flow' faster than
the granularity of perception. Which might be practically useful, and may even
apply to the mind *if* someone can actually see this aggregations come and go -
analogous to slowing down the frames of a movie or looking at film reel against the
light. But 'identity' can occur for aggregats too)

In the last chapter we used dependent origination to explain suffering.

Here we say dependent origination is the relation between causes and an effect and
conditions. The effect arises when the causes and conditions hold. And the effect
does not arise when causes and conditions don't hold.

The Buddha asserts that all naama skandhas are dependently originated.

Consider the feeling of pleasure derived from eating one's favorite ice cream.
First there is contact between sense of taste (located in taste bud) and the
icecream. The feeling of delight arises. In other words, the sense of delight
arises in dependence on the contact between the taste sense and the ice cream.
Before the bite, there was no pleasure. After the bite the pleasure fades till the
next bite. Then the pleasure arises again. Iow, one pleasure sensation arose and
faded away, then another arises. The two feelings of pleasure are numerically
distinct.

The Buddha says the senses are always restless, seeking contact with new objects.
This means there will be an unbroken stream of mental events (feelings and other
sense events). It is easy to mistake this stream for a single enduring thing, but
the Buddha says that if we attend to the individual constituents of this stream and
see how they are dependently originated, we can see through the illusion of 'one
continuous thing'.

Here, dependent origination is supposed to show two things -

(1) There is no such thing as 'mind' over and above the 'mental event' making
up the stream.
(2) These 'mental events' are short lived. (here 'mental event' seems to be
short hand for all the nama rupas - vedana, samjnas, samskara , vijnana)

Focusing on (2) , and going through the nama rupas

- vedana is transitory (since these are 'feelings' of pleasure, pain and
indifference, which are activated only for periods of time, as with the ice cream
example above)
- samjnas are also transitory since the senses eventually move on from whatever
they are focusing on

- how about samksaras - mental/emotional activity and constructs?

e.g : "liking coffee" seems to be permanent for years, if not a lifetime. The
(weak imo) counter argument is that this is something that is acquired and
potentially could be got rid of (weak argument imo, the only reasonable argument is
if we bring karma in, and say that 'love of cofee' is not something that endures
*across* lifetimes)

what about 'built in' instincts (which are samskaras) like fleeing from danger?
This would seem to endure for a lifetime. (and possibly more, since every living
entity has this instinct) . The Buddha's (likely) response is that it is not an
'enduring' samskaras, but multiple samskaras that arise and fade away in response
to sense contacts that show the appearance and disappearance of a threat

The opponent claims that this is an enduring pattern that 're emerges' when it is
illuminated, but is always present.

The Buddha was never presented with this argument, but later Buddhist philosophers
had to deal with it.

There is one observed phenomenon - recurring patterns of behaviour separated by

time- and two explanations - the 'opponent' claim that this is an enduring pattern
(and so part of 'self') that gets activated and deactivated, and the Buddhist claim
that these are not enduring, but multiple 'instances' that dependently arise and
fade away with no 'enduring' part.

The Buddhist claim invokes the Ockaham's Razor / "Principle of Lightness" argument
which is essentially- given two theories equally good at explaining phenomena,
choose the one that has the minimum of unobservable entities.

(my comment: This is not a good defense. You can't observe karma or reincarnation.
But these are still a part of Buddhist theory. If this theory held, then the idea
that there is only one life, the circumstances of which are essentially random is a
much better theory by this principle. Such a principle can be used only where
theories are actually *used* to create effects - as by experimentation in the
sciences. Here when someone makes a claim of ' a fairy lives in my garage' the
immediate next question is what are the *effects* (including sensory effects of
actually perceiving the fairy) that can be explained by this fact, and by no other.
The problem here is that philosophy cares only about *reasoning*, not
experimentation or effects

From Wikipedia
"In science, Occam's razor is used as a heuristic guide in the development of
theoretical models, rather than as a rigorous arbiter between candidate models.[1]
[2] In the scientific method, Occam's razor is not considered an irrefutable
principle of logic or a scientific result; the preference for simplicity in the
scientific method is based on the falsifiability criterion. For each accepted
explanation of a phenomenon, there may be an extremely large, perhaps even
incomprehensible, number of possible and more complex alternatives. Since one can
always burden failing explanations with ad hoc hypotheses to prevent them from
being falsified, simpler theories are preferable to more complex ones because they
are more testable"

Without the testability, selecting one theory over another 'because it has less
unobservable entities' is very dubious. It can be a *heuristic* as Wikipedia
correctly points out. The primary criterion is falsifiability. Any assertion that
cannot be falsified is as good or bad as any other non-falsifiable assertion. This
is why Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Taoism etc are all equally valid *as
philosphical structures*. The idea that one philosophy 'wins' over another with
*reasoning only* is why the old 'debates' (between Shankara and Kumarila Bhatta,
say) are essentially tests of memory (to quote scriptures taken as 'authority') and
'reasoning' as above).

The 'lightness principle' argument is also used to justify the premise that vijnana
is impermanent.

The basic argument is that consciousness also rises based on sensory contact (hmm
is this true? if all senses are negated, one is still 'conscious' as in deep
meditation for e.g, but perhaps it is using the term technically, also note that
the mind itself is a 'sense organ' here) (the sutta quoted is the wood fire/rag
fire /chip fire one).

Opponent: One and the same consciousness is aware of the color of the ice cream and
(later) the taste of the ice cream. (so consciousness endures)

Buddhist: Then what happens to this consciousness when an individual is asleep,

insensate (say under anaesthetic?)

Opponent: the consciousness is still there, but 'in the closet'

Buddhist: Aha! Principle of Lightness QED

Thus we have run through premises 1 through 5 that the skandhas (rupa + namas) are
impermanent.

There remains one implicit premise : The exhaustiveness claim. If we accept this
then we have to concede that the argument from impermanence establishes no-self.

Opponent: We don't agree with the exhaustiveness principle. Most people are aware
of a "I self" / a 'sense of I-ness' that has various physical components and
experiences mental states. If the E.P were true, there would be a body, mental
states etc and they would belong to nobody and be 'ownerless' and without a
'subject' (who has a body? who feels sad?). This is absurd.

Buddhist: We defer this for now.

Now we argue from 'lack of control'.

Consider the statement : "I feel ok about my hair today, but my nails look bad. I
have to do something about them".
This shows we think of the "I" as a 'part' that evaluates the state of the person
and seeks to change those it finds unsatisfactory. (my comment: a combination of
the 'observer' and the 'doer').

we call this (the combination of 'observer' + 'changer/correcter') the 'executive'.

Then if there is a self, the self would be a part of the person that performs the
'executive function'.

So far the argument is not very promising because there is no reason why the 'self
part' has to have perfect control over the 'non self' parts and the Buddha
dismisses the skandhas as the self because we have less than perfect control over
it.

But there is a different way of looking at the self. The Anti-Reflexivity

Principle, which is adopted by many Indian philosophical systems says that an
entity cannot operate on itself. Examples - a knife can cut other things but not
itself. A finger can point at the moon but not itself.

(my comment: This is not true for say self modifying programs. So this is another
big assumption - like the 'lightness principle' modulo experimentation)

Objection: What about the doctor who treats herself?

Buddhist reply: The body part on which the doctor operates is not 'the Doctor' (my
comment: This is more sophistry)

People who accept this principle state that all counter examples involve one part
operating on another, and so no counterexamples are valid.

***IF*** this principle is accepted, then the part that is dissatisfied and tries
to change another part could be the self, but the part that is changed / attempted
to *be* changed is not.

So if I ever wanted to change something about my nose, my nose is not the self.

So generalizing, the argument would look like this.

1. I sometimes dislike and seek to change the rupa.

2. I sometimes dislike and seek to change vedana
3. I sometimes dislike and seek to change sajnas
4. I sometimes dislike and seek to change samskaaras.
5. I sometimes dislike and seek to change vijnana
6. If the self exists, it would be the part that performs the executive function
(be aware of other parts, and try to change them)
7. {Implict premise} The five skandhas are all there is to a person (the
exhaustiveness argument)
8. Therefore there is no self

At first glance this seems to be a valid argument.

But 1--5 start with "I sometimes..." who is this I if there is no self? If none of
the 5 skandhas contain 'the self' where is this "I" coming from? If we say that the
skandhas are all there is to the person, there is no self in any of the 5
skandhas, then who is performing the executive function? and where is this
'executive entity' located?

This becomes a very powerful counter argument to Buddhist theory. The 'part'
performing the executive function may not be in the skandhas, but it certainly
exists. We could call this the self, and simultaneously say that the self is not
observable by itself by the Anti Reflexivity principle. (note: here the AR
principle is taken as valid, wheras before, it was accepted provisionally). It
cannot observe itself, but can observe and potentially change all the 5 skandhas.
The exhaustiveness claim is false, and there is more to a person than the 5
skandhas.

The Buddhists counter argue that at different points, different parts of the person
(located in the various skandhas) become the performer of the executive function
and observe and attempt to change other parts of the person

(my objection: this is pretty strained. Which part plays the executive function
when? some concrete examples?)

Even the Buddhists recognize this "shifting coalition of executive function

implementors" is weak and turn to conventional and ultimate truth argument (which
seems to be some kind of catchall). The Buddha says the self is 'ultimately' not
real. Buddhists say the "I" in the formal argument statements above is what they
call a 'convenient designator'. What does *this* mean?

The Buddhist uses the conventional/ultimate truth duality and the 'convenient
designator' concept to answer challenges to the exhaustiveness claim.

But before examining this, we look at the state of play.

The Buddha gave two arguments to support the 'non self' concept - the argument from
impermanence, and the argument from control.
Both arguments depend on the 'exhaustiveness claim' which essentially says there is
no more to the person than the five skandhas.
This is crucial to both arguments since they proceed by showing that there is some
property of a self (permanence, executive function) that all the skandhas
lack.Showing this would not show there is no self, if there are 'parts of the
person' beyond the five skandhas.

Opponent's powerful argument: If there is something not in the skandhas, but

observing and changing (or attempting to change) the skandhas (as the "I" in the
Buddhist argument shows) then (a) the skandhas are not exhaustive (b) the entity
doing the 'executive function' - the referent of the "I" is part of the self.

Buddhist response: there are 'switching coalitions of skandhas' who perform the
executive function (roll eyes)

Opponent: that means there are many controllers, not one (?? The argument seems to
be that the Buddhists are using a singular "I" to refer to a plurality of acting
entities, which is a no no)

Buddhist response: There is a single controller, the person, but the person is only
'conventionally real' (???)

3.5 Conventionally vs Ultimately Real

Conversation between King Milinda and the monk Nagasena.

the basic idea is that Nagasena runs through a list of parts of his body and mind,
and asks "Is X Nagasena?" and the king replies "no" each time.

Then he runs through a list of parts of a chariot and asks if any of these are the
chariot, and the king says no.
Then the king says the word 'chariot' refers to a specific arrangement of its parts
- the axle, wheels, etc .

Mereology: That part of metaphysics focusing on the relation between the whole and
the parts.
Mereological Reductionism = the idea that the whole and parts are related by the
whole being reducible to the parts.

So the idea is that the chariot is not real but its parts are.

The same parts lying in disarray on a battle field don't have a name (like
'chariot')

Per Nagasena, the word "chariot" is a 'convenient designator' - a way to designate

an arrangement of parts that is convenient to us.
(some weird logic skipped). This is what is known as a 'conceptual fiction' -
something that is not ultimately true, but is accepted as real by common sense via
a 'convenient designator'. Thus our 'common sense ontology' is full of wholes with
names, but which are reducible to parts. The Buddhist view is that strictly none of
these things are real. (my comment: yeah right. no wonder no one with any sense
learns philosophy)

3.6 Conventional And Ultimate Truth

A statement is conventionally true == it is acceptable to common sense and useful

practically in the 'day to day world'.
A statement is ultimately true == it uses no convenient designators

So assuming there is a soft-drink machine in the lobby of our building.

"There is a sdm in the lobby" is conventionally true because it is true in terms of

practical day to day life. But it is not 'ultimately true' because 'soft drink
machine' is a 'conceptual fiction' just as 'the chariot' is, and ultimately the
'soft drink machine' does not exist

(my comment: this is total bullshit and ultimate sophistry. No wonder no one gives
a shit about religious philosophy. also note: there is no example given of an
'ultimately true' statement)

Standing behind any 'conventionally true' statement is an 'ultimately true'

statement that explains how accepting the conventionally true statement leads to
successful practical effects (?? what is the ultimately true statement that lies
behind "There is a soft drink machine in the lobby?" what crap!

The best possible interpretation of this is that there are various levels of
'truths' and one level may work better than the other. E.g: For most engineering we
can use Newtonian Physics, though Quantum Physics is 'more accurate'. The
difference is that Buddhists claim a superiority for the 'ultimate truth' and look
down on the 'conventional truth'. No scientist has contempt for Newtonian Physics
or plays word games with people who reach for Newtonian Physics to make them look
like idiots.

If Nagasena had said something like "yes from this pov there is a monk named
Nagasen (or a chariot or whatever) but from another, there isn't" that would be
much better.

And of course, what is missing from the Physics analogy is that Physics can be
*used* for practical effects - both Newtonian and Quantum physics - wheras these
'conventional' and 'ultimate' *philosophical* 'truths' are just word play, and
ultimately depend, for acceptance, on appeals to authority of the Buddha. Take that
away, this is all sheer nonsense)

3.7

the conventional vs ultimate truth idea was developed by *commentators on the early
Buddhist texts* to deal with a problem in exegesis - The Buddha seemed to
contradict himself.

On some occasions he asserts 'no self' and says that what we consider a person is
just a causal series of impersonal impermanent states.

On other occasions he says nothing of this and teaches a morality based on karma
and rebirth. The inconsistency stems from the fact that the latter teaching appears
to involve the idea that it is the same person who acts and then reaps the reward
of that action, possibly in a future birth.

We *could* say the Buddha contradicted himself and leave it at that. But the
commentators didn't want to attribute contradiction to the founder of their
religion, and put forward the idea that the first ('no self') kind of teaching
refers to the full and final truth, and the latter (morality based) teachings are
what ordinary people need to know in order to make progress towards realizing the
full and final truth.

Presumably the 'conventional' teachings address an audience that does not fully
grasp the consequences of rebirth. They engage in immoral conduct which binds them
more firmly to the rebirth cycle. By teaching a karmically based morality the
Buddha hopes to make them less prone to conduct that renforces their ignorance.
Then they will be able to (eventually) appreciate the full and final 'ultimate'
truth about persons

If we posit an 'ultimate ontology' (ontology = what exists in a given metaphysics)

that reflects the 'objective nature' of reality, in Buddhist terms, this would not
have any 'conceptual fictions' (like chariots or named persons) and would involve
only 'ultimate truths'

Milinda essentially asks if a child and the adult it develops into are the same
person.
Nagasena says "he is neither the same person, nor someone else" (!!)

Nagasena asks the king whether the king as an infant and the king as he is now is
the same person.
The king says no (!)

Common sense would seem to indicate that the baby and the adult are the same
person. The explanation is that the king is trying to anticipate the Buddhist
argument by saying that there is no self and the skandhas are impermanent, so these
are two persons.
"Milinda's Principle" - Numerically distinct skandhas make two distinct persons

Nagasena's example of 'mother of the zygote' vs 'mother of the fetus' vs 'mother

of the newborn' vs 'mother of the adult'.
A mother is a woman who conceives a child, deliver it, brings it up. So for there
to be ' a mother' there has to be a person who continues to exist from the time of
conception to the time the child is grown.

But the skandhas that make up a person are constantly coming into and going out of
existence.

so if Milinda's principle holds the mother with a 2 month fetus is not the same as
the one with a six month fetus.
Similarly the criminal sitting in prison is not the person who committed the crime.
Similarly the student who passed the exam, not the one who studied.

This is obviously absurd. If these people followed Milinda's principle, the mother
wouldn't take care of her health, and the student won't study.

Our concept is that a 'person' is something that endures for a lifetime. If we

followed Milinda's principle a 'person' would be something that endures that lasts
as long as skandhas last, and how many need replacement before we identify a new
whole. Let this 'momentary' concept of persons be called p-persons, and the
resulting 'view' - Punctualism. But this would lead to disastrous consequences.

so the (common man's) notion of person, is a 'convenient notion' that is useful in

practical life and allows us to avoid the disaster brought by "Punctualism".

"Conventional statements" are those that help in practical life. And as explained
above, behind every conventional statement is an ultimate statement that explains
how it works. Nagasena explains that past and present skandhas are united through
their bodily causal connections

Nagasena's examples:

A flame that burns all night. The flames at different temporal points in the night
are different flames (!?) but are united by dependence on the first flame.

Milk changes over time into sour cream, butter, then ghee. These are not the same
as the original milk, but come into being by dependence on that milk.

Likewise, the various dharmas ('psychophyiscal elements' (?) == skandhas) that

arise and fade away are different at different points in time, but are connected by
the earlier (original?) conciousness. Hence persons are neither the same nor
different.

Milinda's statements about persons are

1. Infant and adult are neither the same nor distinct person.
2. Infant and adult are the same person.
3. There is a causal series running from 'infant' skandhas and 'adult' skandhas.

1 and 2 seem to contradict.

But if we understand 2 to be the 'conventional level' truth and (1) and (3) to be
the 'ultimate' truth, then it makes sense

(1) means that at the level of ultimate truth, no statement about persons is true.
All such statements are meaningless. To ask whether someone is the same person or
distinct person assumes there are things called 'persons'.
(2) represents the conventional truth. This works practically.
(3) the ultimate truth is that when the infant skandhas went out of existence, they
caused the adult skandhas to come into existence, and so on until we arrive at the
present 'adult' skandhas.
There are many causal connections between earlier and later skandhas.
This means that what happens to earlier skandhas can influence what happens to
later skandhas. Thus if an expecting mother takes care of her health, that affects
her ease of delivery and possibly the health of her child.
Drinking beer today causes pain skandhas tomorrow.
So when present skandhas identify with past and future skandhas, i.e when they
think of these skandhas as 'me' they are likely to behave in ways that make it
better for later skandhas. To think of oneself as a person is to have the *habit*
of identifying with past and future skandhas. This is why it is useful to think of
ourselves as persons (note: This is the 'ultimate truth' explanation of a
conventional truth)

Nagasena gives two examples of causal series of skandhas

With the night lamp examples, a continuing series of causally connected skandhas
leads to the 'conceptual fiction' of the 'one light' that shines all night.

On closer examination, a flame lasts only a second, it is composed of incandescent

gas molecules produced by the burning of oil. But when these molecules are done,
they cause new molecules to take their place, producing a replacement flame. The
result is an illusion of a single thing that seems to endure through the night. So
it is conventionally true that there is a single flame that burns all night. The
ultimate truth is there are many distinct flames, each causing the next.

The second example is more complex.

Here too, there is a series of skandhas, but unlike with the case of flames, they
don't resemble each other. Milk is white, cream is off white, butter is yellow etc.
Likewise we use them in different ways - we drink milk, we put butter on toast, we
use ghee for frying. (unlike with the flame skandhas which have the same effect).
In the diary series of skandhas, we are *not* tempted to think of it as one
enduring thing (unlike with the flame skandha series). Instead we think about it as
a series of distinct products.

'Dharmas' are specific entities that get classified under the various skandhas. We
deal with these in chapter 6, but for now, we call them 'psychophysical elements'.

as applied to 'persons'
the conventional truth is that I am a person who has existed for some time, and
experience this existence as there being a 'me' who is aware of the different
experiences this "I" has. What "I" am varies over time, but it is always the same
"I" that is aware of them. There is one thing (the "I") holding together a
plurality (the experiences). This is how it seems to us when we use the 'convenient
designator' - a 'person'.

the ultimate truth is that there is a causal series of 'dharmas' (aka the
psychophysical elements). Each arises, holds for sometime, and fades, causing a
replacement element to come into existence. In some cases the replacement element
is qualitatively similar (or identical) to the one that went before. Consciousness
(vijnana) is like this, as with the 'flame that burns through the night'. In other
cases, successive dharmas are not alike. A desire arises, then fades away, is
replaced by other things, and so on, as with the 'diary skandha' sequence . This is
the 'ultimate truth' behind the appearance of a preson living a life. At this level
of truth, there is no enduring I that has different experiences throughout a life.
But it is also not true that there is a distinct I at each moment, there are
*causally connected* skandhas in series

We are now in a position to return to (a) the exhaustiveness claim (b) The Buddha's
two arguments - from impermanence and control - for 'no self'.

Both arguments (for non self) depends on there being no more to a person than the
skandhas.

Review:
Opponent: an "I" exerts some degree of control over the 5 skandhas, so there exists
a 'controller' self beyond the skandhas
Buddhist: A shifting coalition of skandhas can play the role of controller, with
different skandhas playing the role at different points in time
opponent: in which case, there are multiple "I"s which is more pernicious position
than one "I"

New Buddhist response:

conventionally there is indeed one "I" (the same "I") that exerts control over
all the skandhas. This is a conceptual fiction, but it is useful to think for a
bunch of skandhas to think of themselves as an "I". Because it is useful, it is
conventionally true.

from the 'ultimate truth' pov, it is not true that there is one thing
exercising control over the skandhas, and neither is it true that there are many
things exercising control. There is just a causally connected series of skandhas
and that is it.

3.8
Does this answer the exhaustiveness objection? Siderits leaves this unresolved
(!!!)

A different objection: How is rebirth possible if there is no self being reborn?

This is a different sort of objection than the one against the exhaustive claims,
which tried to show that a key premise (exhaustiveness) was false. Here, the
objection is that the conclusion of the Buddhist's argument - that there is no self
- is incompatible with something else that the Buddha said (that there is rebirth).

Milinda asks Nagasena exactly this - how can rebirth exist without transmigration.
Nagasena provides the following examples
- One (flame) light is lit from another. The new flame is not a result of the
first 'transmigrating'.
- A student learns a verse from his teacher. The verse did not transmigrate to
the student.

In both cases you have one thing bringing about the arising of a distinct but
similar being. One flame *becomes the cause* of a second flame, and the teacher
knowing a verse, and communicating it *becomes the cause* of a student knowing the
verse. Simlarly, one set of skandhas - those making up a person - *become the
cause of* the rising of skandhas making up a different person, in another life. The
process of rebirth is governed by causal laws- specifically the law of karma. It is
because "I" did such and such things in one life that I am born into specific
circumstances in another life.

Objection: If the bearer of the consequences of actions by 'person 1' is 'person 2'
living the next life after rebirth, does this not violate justice? Person 1 did the
deed, but a different person suffers the consequences.

Nagasena gives the example of a man who lights a fire to warm himself, then fails
to put it out, and the fire spreads to another man's fields and burns his crops.
The first man cannot get away by saying that the fire he didn't put out is
different from the fire that burnt the crops.

Likewise the skandhas that do an evil deed are numerically distinct from the
skandhas that suffer the consequences. So human skandhas at one point of time
create a set of preta skandhas to arise at a different point in time. So
'conventionally' it is the same entity that suffers a preta birth for an evil deed
(at this point of the argument, might as well go with the 'self that
transmigrates'. all this dual level of truth just adds complexity for not much
good)

There are still questions for the Buddhist to answer. Some of the Buddhist
arguments for 'non self' makes critical use of the claim that wholes are unreal,
but the parts are. This is their basis of the claim that 'persons' are conventional
designations of wholes made up of parts (skandhas manifesting in an eternal
sequence) . The only real thing is what cannot be broken into parts . But suppose
that there is nothing that cannot be broken down further. E.g: the chariot (an
'unreal' thing as per Buddhists) is made up of spokes, wheels etc. But these can
also be broken down, to the atomic level and beyond. If nothing exists that cannot
be broken down into parts (or at least can be broken down to the level of subatomic
objects) then that presents a major problem for the Buddhist approach.

The Abhidarma movement represents an approach to conquer this difficulty. Later,

we'll look at what Abhidharma considers 'genuinely impartile'. Before that we look
at the nature of being (Buddhistically) enlightened, and how this affects morality.

Chapter 4: Buddhist Ethics

The Buddhist view of persons is a form of reductionism - a position that certain

'whole' don't exist, or only exist in terms of components they can be reduced to.
The Buddhists says being aware of the truth of reductionism relieves existential
suffering and that it makes us more concerned about the welfare of others. We
explore the ethical implications of the claim that there is no self and persons are
only conventionally real.

4.1 What can be said about Nirvana?

The Buddha claims nirvana is the supreme goal for humans. In Chapter 2, we see that
underlying this claim is the idea that only by becoming enlightened can we
permanently escape existential suffering.

But what is Nirvana like? The Buddhist texts are silent on this. We saw (we did?)
that this might be a strategy to get around the paradox of liberation (?).

Now we understand the doctrine of 'non self', we might be able to resolve some of
these issues.

There is a claim that nirvana is ineffable, that it cannot be described or

understood.

There follows a conversation between Gotama and Vaccha where G denies that all 4
permutations of the 'arhat exists ,arhat does not exist' (build a truth table
without connecting the two prepositons by saying the negation of one equals the
other, and you get TT, TF,FT, and FF) are true.

Similarly to the question of Vaccha where a monk who is enlightened is reborn, the
Buddha denies all four combinations of 'the monk is reborn, the monk is not
reborn'. Buddha counter questions Vaccha by asking that when a fire burning in
front of him goes out, where does it go? G says that the fire is dependent or
whatever it fuel is (grass, say) and when the fuel is exhausted, the fire goes out,
but to ask in which 'direction' it went is nonsensical.

G goes through the skandhas (that could cause future arisings) and says they have
all gone out and have been 'uprooted' by enlightenment. (so why can't it be said
that rebirth has stopped and the enlightened person is not reborn, since the
skandhas have stopped future 'arisings' and so will eventually 'run out'?)
Siderits then says that the reason the Buddha is able to deny all the four
possibilities is that an 'arhat' is just a conceptual fiction and not an ultimate
truth level entity. So any statement (at the ultimate level) about this fictitious
entity is not true *or false*. There is no such thing. Just as there is no such
thing as a 'fire' at the ultimate level - only a sequence of flame skandhas- there
is no 'arhat'. We can only make statements at the ultimate level about sequnces of
skandhas. We can say (at ult lev) that at a given point - the death of the arhat,
the nama skandhas that exist at that point do not give rise to future nama skandhas
(why nama? why not rupa?)

So the whole argument about why any statement of what happens after nirvana can be
denied is that there is no such thing as the arhat who 'attains nirvana.

(the problem with this argument is that there is no 'arhat' before nirvana either.
So no statement about what happens *before* nirvana can be true either, and such
statements make up a lot of Buddhist doctrine!

At best what can be said is that 'ultimately' one can only talk about sequences of
skandhas, and that 'enlightenment' aborts the creation of post death skandhas. <--
A lot of 'air gap' there --->)

4.2 The "Puncutalist" position . Nirvana == living wholly in the present

Punctualism is a kind of Annihilationism, something thatt the Buddha explicitlly

rejects as extreme.

the basic argument - if there is no enduring self, and a 'person' is only those
skandhas active at a given point in time, then the set of future skandhas is
another 'person' and there is no point in the 'present person' doing things that
have no immediate benefit, (and even brings present pain, like exercise or
flossing) to benefit the 'future person'. The punctualist view is to enjoy the
present and not give thought to the future.

To identify something as part of "I" is to be concerned about its welfare, both

present and future.

Is the Punctualist view ultimately true?

No, because they still have an "I", though confined to present skandhas. This is a
'whole'. And since 'no self' is a reductionist view, wholes are not true.

Is P~ conventionally true?
No, because it does not lead to successful practice in 'conventional' reality. If
successful (conventional) practice is defined as bringing more pleasure and less
pain, then treating the self (or "I") as something that endures throughout a life
time vs something that exists only in the present is more successful (since it
enables practices like exercise and flossing)

The Fallacy of Begging the Question == the argument smuggles its conclusion into
the premises.

Example: Needed conclusion = "God exists"

Argument:
God exists because it says so in the Sacred Texts.

Opponent: Why are the sacred texts true?

Because they are the Word of God !

so argument structure

Sacred Texts say God exists.

Sacred Texts are True because they are the word of God. (<-- here is where 'begging
the question' comes in by bringing conclusion into premises)

Conclusion: So God exists

4.3

Part of thinking of oneself as a person (a 'conventional fiction' as per Buddhist

doctrine) is to think our life has (or should have) meaning. The fact (as per
Buddhist doctrine) undermines this conventional fiction, which leads to existential
suffering. When we feel despair over the meaninglessness of our lives (in the face
of extinction and eternity) this arises (so the Buddhist says) from a fundamental
error in who we are (or, how we see ourselves as being)

(Siderits claims) Adults think of themselves as persons, but much of child rearing
involves teaching a child to think of themselves as persons. (really?)

Siderits uses two examples:

a child does not want to eat healthy (but bland) food because it does not
identify with the healthy adult 'self' it will become in the future.
a child being punished in the present for something it did in the past is being
taught to identify with its 'past self' and to see the 'present self' as a
continuation of that self.

(there is something wobbly about these examples. Children no doubt 'live in the
present' more than adults, but I doubt they don't identify with past/future selves
and they are explicitly taught to do so by society (wtf!). Is there any society
anywhere in the world where people don't identify with their past and future selves
and think of such selves as different people? If anything it is the Buddhist 'no
self' that is out of whack and practised by no society in the world, especially wrt
children. Besides both the behaviours above are exhibited by adults also. Plenty of
adults don't exercise and eat junk food knowing their future selves will pay the
price. If social conditioning enables identifying with non present tense 'selves',
it does a bad job!)

Siderits says a child comes to see itself as a (conventional) person and to

identify with past and future selves by seeing life as a narrative, a story with
itself at the center, and this causes an expectation that life should have
meaning. (Siderits is making huge assertions here with notihng to back any of this
up).

The Buddhist says that is all conventionally true, since it leads to less suffering
and more happiness. To the extent that someone sees himself as a free agent, a
'hero' who can shape his life, he'll indulge in behaviour that leads to more
happiness and less suffering. But, as per the Buddhist this also sets the stage for
existential suffering,

So the Buddhist suggests that we unlearn the myth (of life being a story or drama
with ourselves at the centre, of the notion of an enduring 'self') but continue the
practice (of taking actions that reduce suffering and increases happiness). So
ideally we continue to floss, exercise, practice charity etc, without leaning on
the notion of a 'self' that provides meaning to life. We do these things directly
to reduce suffering and bring about more pleasure. This way we avoid existential
suffering.
Opponent: The Buddhist view of life is depressing and robs it of all meaning. You
(buddhists) say that the idea that our individual lives have a purpose is an
illusion. Then what is the point?

Buddhist: this reaction (depression) is a mistake. We are not saying lives are
inherently meaningless (or meaningful). We are saying there does not exist anything
(a self) for whom events in a life have meaning. Lives don't have or lack meaning.
They just are.

So there is *some* sense to the enlightened person 'living in the now'. Being
enlightened does not mean not having any concern about how actions at one point in
time can create effects in another point in time.

An EP can consider how having a beer today will cause a hangover tomorrow. But he
does not see this action as identifying who he is. (??) It is burdensome (creates
existential suffering?) to see each event as having meaning for my (enduring)
'self'. This detracts from our appreciation of the present and makes bad
experiences worse.

So for an EP, being sick or injured *is* painful, and she will seek appropriate
medical treatment. But she does not feel the *additional* existential anxiety about
how the pain impacts who she is or affects the story of her life. She is liberated
from the burdens that come with a sense of self.

(My best reading of this: Buddhism takes away the 'existential problems' of
disease, old age, suffering etc by 'removing' the self who suffers. In other words,
post enlightenment, all these things happen, but they 'just' happen. The EP is not
worried by this since he has no 'self' to which these events can attach and 'create
a storyline'. If you are being cut to pieces by a gang of bandits, it is 'just an
event' that brings pain etc. There is no despair, or sense of failure or unfairness
etc. To me it seems to be like cutting the nerves that carry feeling to the brain
as a response to a painful disease. The disease is still 'untreated' and in full
flow, it is just that you are anesthetized. Well that is one way of dealing with
life ;-) )

4.4

In the last section we looked at the impact of the 'no self' doctrine on how we
should live our own lives. We now examine how this doctrine impacts conducts
towards others.

Religions are a source of moral training for their adherents, with stories
illustrating virtues, moral exemplars, vices, and people who indulged in them and
paid for such conduct etc.

4.4

In the last section we looked at the impact of the 'no self' doctrine on how we
should live our own lives. We now examine how this doctrine impacts conducts
towards others.

Religions are a source of moral training for their adherents, with stories
illustrating virtues, moral exemplars, vices, and people who indulged in them and
paid for such conduct etc.

Buddhism is no difference, but a major difference is that most relgions are about
belief in a higher power, and codes of morality are laid down by this Supreme Power
in some fashion. Buddhism does not believe in a creator God, so any moral rules are
not divine commandments. If it is wrong to take another's property it is not
because Buddha said so.

Why according to the Buddhist must we be moral?

The Buddhist answer has 3 layers. Each layer answers the question of moral
motivation in a way that responds to people at a certain stage on the path to
nirvana
1. The first answer is that we should obey the moral rules because they
reflect the karmic causal laws. Stealing for instance is motivated by a desire that
causes bad karmic fruit, such as rebirth as a preta (and should be avoided).
Benevolence to strangers, for example, is motivated by desires that cause good
karmic fruit, such as birth as a god or high caste human. But how does this work
on the path to nirvana? This question leads to
2. The Buddha refers to three poisons (kleshas) - factors that account for us
staying bound to samsara. These are greed, hatred and delusion. Thes factors have
the interesting property of being self perpetuating. Greed for instance motivates
actions that tend to reinforce the three poisons.

Here delusion is ignorance of the three characteristics (Impermanance, suffering,

and non self) . Greed and hatred presupposes such ignorance. Greed and hatred lead
us to act in ways that reinforce ignorance, setting the stage for further bouts of
greed and hatred. The result is a kind of feedback loop that perpetuates rebirth.

Buddha's 8 fold path breaks this loop. Of the 8 factors of the path, three (right
speech, conduct, livelihood) represent basic virtues layfollowers of Buddhism are
supposed to undertake. Right speech for instance, includes the virtue of honesty,
and right conduct, the absence of stealing. They are included in the path to
nirvana not because they generate the right karmic fruits, but because they counter
the kleshas. A specific kind of moral training is a prerequisite to gain the
insight that leads to nirvana.

The first layer answer said we should be moral because it results in pleasant
rebirths. The second layer answer said we should be moral because doing so (a) is
part of the training necessary to achieve nirvana, (b) results in habits that
counteract the three kleshas.

The virtue of honesty will, for example, make it easy for us to accept the truth
about ourselves. The virtue of refraining from stealing will diminish our desire
for possessions.

However, even with the practice of these virtues, the three poisons still have
ample scope in the lives of the conventionally virtuous person. He might not steal,
but might still *covet* the possessions of others. He might get 'righteously' angry
at less moral people. But such klesha counteracting morality is an early stage
practice, which counters the kleshas just enough so someone can get to a point
where they can ordain, and take on even more rigorous morality - say celibacy (for
monks and nuns) and confining of possessions to a robe and a bowl. Also advanced
meditations become available at this stage. By following this regime of retraining
our emotional habits, we eventually grasp no-self and so nirvana.

What about the morality of an enlightened arhat?

this brings us to the third layer.

Here the argument is in two steps.

A rationale is provided for why the enlightened person must be benevolent.
And another for why benevolence is the soul of morality.

The basic idea is, if there is no self, there is no distinction between one's own
suffering and anothers.
So once we accept the need for removing (conventionally) one's own suffering, at
the ultimate level, we remove suffering no matter that the 'skandhas' who do the
removing and the skandhas whose suffering is removed are distinct.

The argument is as follows

1. Suppose that we are each obligated to ease only our own suffering
2. In the case of easing one's own future suffering, one set of skandhas does
the easing, another set of skandhas experiences the benefit.
3. In the case of one's own present suffering, one part does the easing, and
another 'gets eased'. (A)
4. The sense of "I" that calls future skandhas and distinct present parts "me"
is a conceptual illusion.
5. Hence it cannot ultimately be said that some suffering is one's own, and
some suffering is of others
6. Hence the claim that we are obligated to ease only one's own suffering lacks
ultimate grounding.
7. Hence either there is an obligation to prevent suffering wherever it occurs,
or there is no obligation to prevent any suffering.
8. But everyone agrees (?? this is an argument ??) that some suffering should
be prevented, at least one's own.
9. Conclusion: So there is an obligation to prevent suffering wherever it
occurs

(A) This is the 'hand pulls splinter from the foot, but hand != foot (crazy)
analogy'

(this is crazy argument, taking a conventionally true statement - one must attempt
to reduce suffering, to justify an ultimate truth - we should prevent all
suffering. At best what can be concluded is 7.)

Buddhist claim there is no self.

They also claim an enlightened person (who has realized 'no self') is
compassionate.

It is WRONG to connect the two this way

"(If no one has a self then) you and I aren't distinct persons, we are really (==
at some level) one, so I should be just as concerned with your welfare as mine" .
There *are* Indian philosophers who say something like this because they hold there
is only One Self, but they aren't Buddhists. Buddhists can't accept "we ore really
one"

Siderits points out a possible way the above argument doesn't work. Ultimately
there are different causal series sequences of skandhas, which present
conventionally as different persons. The refusal by one 'causal series of skandhas'
to exercise does not manifest as disease in *another* series of skandhas. So maybe
each 'csofsk's are responsible only for the future skandhas in *that* series. This
'interpretation' of the ultimate truth (of csosks) justifies not being benevolent
or moral to others.

Siderits posits the above as a concrete example of how to analyze an argument

philosophically. Essentially look for logical structure, rhetorical 'tricks' etc
and propose solid counter arguments. Then mentally 'switch sides' and see what the
opponent (Here Buddhists) would say to counter this counter argument. And so on.

Chapter 5 : A Nyaya Interlude

Nyaya is an orthodox school of Indian Philosophy which agrees with Buddhism that
life as ordinarily lived is suffering. But unlike Buddhism Nyaya
 1. accepts the existence of a self.
2. asserts there are things that exist eternally.

Thus it disputes 2 of 3 Buddhist claims about the nature of existence

(impermanence, and no self)
The foundational books of this school was written about 5 centuries after Buddha.
Even if this literature reflects an earlier oral tradition, the Buddha probably
knew nothing about Nyaya. Then why study Nyaya?

Reason 1: The debates about self between Nyaya and Buddhism had a profound effect
on the development of Buddhism from 2nd century CE. And the better we undrestand
this debate, the better we can evaluate claims about the self and the nature of the
world.

What we examine are Nyaya metaphysics and epistemology. Strictly speaking, the
metaphysics come from another school, Vaisheshika. This school developed the 7
categories of Reals, which Nyaya adopted. But we use "Nyaya" to refer to the
combination of both schools.

Reason 2: Some of the key tools and techniques of Indian philosophy originated with
Nyaya.

First we examine the metaphysical theory of 7 categories. Nyaya epistemology takes

the form of a theory of the means of knowledge, which we examine. Then we look at a
Nyaya argument for the existence of self. Here the hard work of grappling with
Nyaya epistemology and metaphysics pays off, because it becomes clear how answers
to abstract question of metaphysics and epistemology affect our view of what we
are.

5.1

A doctrine of categories lays out the basic constituents of reality. (is this the
same as ontology?).

The Buddha's list of the five skandhas is one such doctrine of categories, his view
of what fundamental things make up the world we experience.

Nyaya claims there are seven, not five factors that make up reality, but also takes
a different approach (from the skandhas).

The Nyayas are

1. substance
2. quality
3. motion
4. universal
5. inherence
6. individuator and
7. absence.

Suppose you see a cow standing alone in a field swishing its tail.

1. The cow is a substance.

2. Its white color is a quality.
3. The swishing of its tail is a motion.
4. What makes this particular cow a cow? What gives it the same name as all
cows in all times and places? What is common to all cows in all times and places is
a 'universal' which we call 'cowness'.
5. We say of this cow that (1) it *is* a cow. (2) it *is* white. (3) it *is*
swishing its tail. What is the connection expressed by "is"? "Is" is the relation
called 'inherence'. Inherence is the relation of 'being in' that we are talking
about when we say that the white color, 'cowness' and (the movement) swishing
'occur in' the cow.
6. This is one particular cow. Another cow in the barn is a different cow. For
certain kinds of substances (which for technical reasons for does not include an
individual cow) what makes two qualitatively identical entities qualitatively
different is is the inherence in each entity of an 'individuator'. (though the cow
is not distinguished by an individuator from another, for some technical reasons,
the individiuator still has an indirect influence)
7. We might note that a goat that was standing in the field is not there now.
In this case what we are aware of is the absence of the goat.

We perceive (in this case a white cow standing in a field swishing its tail). We
judge (?) what we perceive. Nyaya categories represent the component elements of
our judgements about our perceptions. (should this be 'verbalizations' of our
perceptions?)

Nyaya claims there must be 7 aspects of reality to explain what we said (our
perception is,) is true.

There are (percetible in the conventional sense) aspects like substance (we need
something to perceive) and qualities and motion are the 'saying something about the
perceived object) part. The words 'cow' 'white' 'swishing' etc must also hook up to
aspects of reality. These must all be bought together by the inherence relation
(else we have a list of disconnected words).

The Nyaya list of categories is thus generated by reflecting on what has to be true
for our cognitions to adequately capture facts in the world. Nyaya ontology is thus
more sophisticated (how exactly?) than the Buddhist one of the skandhas. Buddhist
philosophers respond by creating new ontologies, culminating in 'svalakshana'
(chapter 10). The 5 skandhas are never abandoned, but become something unimportant,
a mere classificatory device by late Buddhism.

Let us look more closely at the first category "substance". Substances are concrete
particulars, - a cow, a horse, a tree. In colloquial English, things like mud,
iron, etc - which are spread out in multiple locations, are 'substances'. In
philosophy, however, 'substance' is a technical term that indicates a particular
thing that occurs at a point in space (there are 3 exceptions in nyaya - space,
time, and self. Space is a substance without spatial location, and time and self
are considered omnipresent and all pervading).
Thus 'mud' can be present at many points in space, and so is not a substance, but
*a* cow (say Bessie the cow) will be in a given point in space, and so is a
substance.

(summary comment: A *lot* of philosophy is people arguing about (a) whether

category scheme X is 'the true' categorization of reality. or (b) whether category
scheme X 'actually implies' A or B, or which of A or B it implies more strongly. It
is important to keep in mind that these were created by people without scientific
knowledge, and so are not necessarily more true than any other, at best being
useful in actual practice of a certain person than other schemes.

A better way to process these is to treat category scheme X, Y etc as *models* and
focus on what these models *enable*. Again Newntonian and Quantum Mechanics are
both 'true' in that they enable predictions, but one may be more appropriate than
another in a given context. So in essence, instead of *arguing*, use
*experimentation* and prediction of real world effects to cull the categorization
schemes to a set of 'powerful' ones, and then *use* them appropriately (vs arguing
about it), but then Philosophers would go out of business. It is important to
remember that the *motivation* for all these Buddhism vs Nyaya etc debates were
about retaining or attaining control over how other people lived and thought, aka
politics, and economics. These arguments have nothing or very little to do with
'the truth'. So understand the basic ontologies sufficient to inform *practice* and
then rely on direct perception and experimentation)

How are substances related to the other categories? Qualities, motions,universals,

and individuators inhere to substances. Iow, elements of these categories 'occur
in' substances. e.g: whitess, swishing motion, and 'cowness' inhere in our
particular cow. There would be no qualities, motions, universals (? not in text) or
individuators if there were no substances to inhere in. Likewise, every substance
has some qualities, and at least one universal inhering to it.

(in the Nyaya ontology) there are two types of substance - eternal and non eternal,
with the non-eternal substances being compounded out of eternal ones, which are
themselves impartile, and cannot be broken down further.

A pot for instance is non-eternal. It has a beginning, when the potter makes it,
and an end, when it breaks. A pot is made from bits of clay which can be broken
down into smaller things, which can itself be broken down into even smaller things,
till we hit impartile 'atoms' and since these are impartile, they are considered
eternal. (note: that what we today call atoms can be broken down into protons,
electrons etc, but the philosophical atom is an impartile particle). These are
supposed to come in four varieties - fire, water, air and earth.

Nyaya thus concludes that in addition to the non eternal physical particles we can
perceive, such as cows, pots and trees, there must be there must be eternal
physial atoms out of which the former are made. But there are non physical
substances as well - space, time, ether (akasha), the inner sense and (of?) self.

Factor 5: Individuator
Two substances may be qualitatively identical, but numerically distinct. Flossie
and Bossie maybe identical cows, but they are distinct cows. One level of
explanation is that they are distinguished by the atoms that make them up. One set
makes up Flossie, another set Bossie. But what if atoms are identical? Nyaya
answers - each atom has an 'individuator' which makes that atom unique, and the
same is true of selves.

Substances have qualities and motions. The cow is white, the stone falls, etc.
Nyaya would express these facts as - the cow is inhered in by the color white, the
stone in inhered in by downward motion etc. Inherence is defined as a relation
between what inheres and what it inheres in. This means the white color and
downward motion cannot exist independently of the cow and the stone. The reverse is
not true. The cow can change its color (to brown say) and still be the same cow.
substances are the substrata of qualities and motions. They are what stand below
and support items in these categories (qualities and motions). Substances can thus
endure changes in the qualites and motions that inhere in them.

this is not true of universals that inhere in substances. A cow cannot remain a cow
when 'cowness' stops inhering to it. Universals can continue to exist even when
substances perish. Bossie the cow may die, but cowness endures in other cows

Simple substances don't inhere in anything else (note this is talking about
inherence of *substances* in other substances, not qualities or motion in
substances). But non-eternal substances do inhere in other substances, their parts.
Thus a tree is equally present in its leaves, roots, etc.

At first this looks like an odd claim, how can big tree be present in its small
leaf? A leaf is only a part of tree that is located at a point in space.
But if you think about the existence of a substance (say Flossie the cow, or a pot)
through time, all of Flossie exists at all points in time. Nyaya extends this
concept across space. Just as people think Flossie exists completely yesterday,
today or tomorrow, Nyaya says Flossie exists fully in her head, left foreleg and
tail.

Qualities seems simple but have one surprising quality. Qualities are individual
just as are the substances they inhere to. The white color of Bossie is a different
entity from the white color of Flossie. The two shades of white may be
indistinguishable but they are still two. We do say that the two cows are the same
color. But as per Nyaya we are saying that both colors (distinct entities) are
inhered in by the same universal - whiteness.
So the color that inheres in Flossie is inhered in by the universal of whiteness.
But this is a different quality from the exact shade of white color that is inhered
in Bossie, but which is inhered in by the same color. If Bossie died and were
cremated, her inhered quality of white color would go out of existence (though the
universal of whiteness remains in Flossie, milk, etc)

Philosophers define the "One Over Many" problem thus

"M etaphysics, ancient G reek philosophy We can apply one predicate to many
different things. How can they be related in this way? According to Plato , a
common description suggests that there is a common intrinsic feature or nature
shared by these different things that determines their real existence. This common
nature is one and the same and stands over many particular things. This is Plato's
“one over many principle.” He called the one common nature Form or Idea and
declared that Ideas are objects independent of our minds and that each of the many
particulars imitates or participates in their Idea"

e.g: How can Frances, Joel and Hari (many things) all be left handed? Classical
philosophy calls this the 'one over many' problem and postulates universal entities
called universals, here 'left handedness' that somehow adhere to many (here
Frances, Joel and Hari) things.

Nyaya answers the one over many problem with the idea of universals. The universal
'cowness' inheres to Flossie and Bossie (and all other cows in the world).

Now *where* do Universals (like 'cowness') exist? The usual answer is 'everywhere'
with it needing inherence to a substance to physically manifest. A better way to
say this is that universals have no spatial location of their own.

*When* do Universal exist? They are timeless/eternal.

These stances commit Nyaya to assert that Universals can exist in the absence of
substances to adhere to.

The last category we deal with is absence, which will play an important rule in the
debates between nyaya and Buddhism. Absence might seem an odd thing to include in
the list of categories. Isn't an absence, like the absence of a drill in this room,
just the kind of thing we say is unreal? Nyaya says absences are non-existent, but
not unreal. By this they mean that while absences are different from all other
categories (all of which we can say exist) they must still be acknowledged as part
of reality. How else would we acknowledge the reality that there is no drill in the
room?

Opponent: We don't need absence as a category to make this judgment true. All we
need to do is point at the bare floor. That makes it true.

Nyaya: What does it mean to say that the floor is bare? Is it positive or negative?
(what does this mean? This makes no sense. what is 'positive' and 'negative')

5.2
We have enough Nyaya metaphysical theory. Let us look at some Nyaya Epistemology.

Philosophers use "know" in two senses.

Consider the fact that "Wellington is the capital of New Zealand".
When I 'know' this in the dispositional sense, I know this when I'm asleep, not
actively thinking about or processing this fact etc. But if someone were to ask me
what the capital of New Zealand is, I'd answer Wellington.

When I 'know' this in the episodic sense, there must be an *ongoing* cognition in
my mind that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand. When 'know' is used in the
episodic sense, I don't 'know' that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand when
I'm sleeping. (unless I'm dreaming that I'm in Wellington ? ;-))

If an epistemological theory gives us an analysis of knowledge in one of these two

senses, we can work out what to say about knowledge in the other sense. So it
doesn't make a difference what sense we start with, as long as we are clear about
it.

For the most part western epistemologists have been concerned with knowledge in the
dispositional sense. Indian theories of knowledge start with the episodic sense.

When Indian epistemologists seek a definition of knowledge, they are looking for
the best way to characterize those cognitive occurrences that correctly represent
the facts.

Nyaya approaches this task (of finding the best way to characterize fact
representing cognitive occurrences) by looking for the means of knowledge. A means
of knowledge is a set of conditions that causes true cognitions.

To call something a means of knowledge is to say that any cognition it produces

correctly represents reality. A means of knowledge is a source of truthful
cognition. Other Indian schools (including Buddhists) follow Nyaya in this approach
to epistemology. Their arguments are about how many distinct means of knowledge
there are, and how each should be defined.

Western epistemology not only defines knowledge to be dispositionally, but they

also think knowledge == *justified* true belief.
That is, I know something == I believe it, It is true, *and I have good reasons to
believe it to be true*.

In other words suppose I see a red flower in a room. My vision is perfect, there is
adequate lighting. In Nyaya, this is enough for me to 'Know' that there is a red
flower in the room. In Western epistemology, I have to *check* my vision, there is
enough light, and there are no holographic projectors in the room etc

Nyaya claims there are four means of knowledge : perception, inference, testimony,
comparison.
Buddhists disagree and accept only two: perception and inference

but note: this disagreement is not about whether testimony from a qualified expert
is a valid source of true beliefs. What is controversial is if this is a *distinct*
means of knowledge. To Buddhists, testimony is a variant of inference.

Perception is defined as sense object contact that is non-wandering and definite.

Like Buddhist, nyayiks (my term) recognize 6 senses - the usual 5 + the 'inner
sense'. When one of these faculties comes in contact with an object of the
appropriate sort, there is a cognition.

Nyaya recognizes two main ways in which the resulting cognition can be erroneous
1. 'Wandering' : The senses create a cognition of an object that attributes to
the object a characteristic that is not in the object, but somewhere else. e.g: a
jaundice sufferer seeing a white cow as yellow. A twig in the water being seen as
bent instead of as straight. Generalizing the senses report a connection between
two things that don't exist in reality.
2. Lack of definiteness: Perceptual congnitions can fail to be truthful when
they are not definite. e.g: When the object is too far away from me to see whether
it is a person or a post.

Perceptual Cognition comes in two varieties

1. Conceptual - what we would ordinarily consider a perceptual cognition. It is
something that may be expressed as a judgment, something of the form 'x is _'. To
see or feel (?) something is to experience it *as* something. We don't 'just' see
or feel the object, we see it as being some particular way. To see a cow is to see
an object *as* a cow. To feel a warm wall is to feel it *as* warm. We need not feel
it or say it in as many words but cognitions can be expressed this way. They are
attributive in character, they always attribute a characteristic to the object we
are perceiving.
2. Non conceptual. - Nyaya says that for conceptual cognition to occur, we
first have a *non* conceptual cognition where we perceive the individual
constituents of the conceptual cognition separately.
So before we conceptually conceive of Flossie as a white cow, we non
conceptually perceive the cowness as such, the whiteness as such, the movement as
such etc. We are not aware of this process - we couldn't be since they cannot be
expressed, and expressing something requires making a judgment on it

(my comment: this seems to be a (poor) description of perception being at first

'wordless' and then being expressed in 'words' or known concepts.)

Nyaya argues that there must first be this non conceptual perception before every
conceptual perception, since we would be unable to connect two objects without
first perceiving them separately. Likewise we cannot connect two objects without
perceiving the *connection* separately.

Note: The *object* does not exist separately from a characteristic. Thus Flossie
never exists separately from cowness. But to *percieve* Flossie as a cow, we must
first non conceptually see Flossie, see cowness, and see the latter inhering in the
former. *then* we have a conceptual perception of Flossie the cow

Note that Nyaya says we can directly see universals like cowness. This causes some
difficulty for people who think universals are abstract, like numbers, and we don't
see numbers directly, we see objects with specific numericity. i.e we don't really
see the number one separately when we see one cow.

But Nyaya insists that universals are things that are perceived. The argument is
that if we are not perceiving 'cowness' how do we learn to associate the word 'cow'
with cows? To learn to use the word 'cow' there must be some feature common to
Bossie and Flossie. (WTF? this confuses the word with what it denotes.)

Claiming that universals can be perceived helps Nyaya overcome some other
epistemological problems. It explains how we can perceive causation, and
'pervasion'

Causation: How do we know fire causes smoke?

Nyaya holds that causation is a relation between universals. So fire causing smoke
is explained by saying there is a causation between the universals fireness and
smokeness.

Suppose we thought that universals were not real, (and so not perceivable). Then we
would have to claim that every instance of smoke everywhere and at any point of
time is preceeded by an instance of fire. But we can't perceive all instances over
time. So how can we claim this?

But if we can perceive universals, and causation is a relation between universals,

we don't need to see all instances. We can just perceive the relation of the two
universals, and cognize the relation. And we can do this by observing the
relationship of the two universals.

Pervasion:
This is the relation at the heart of inference. If we understand how this relation
holds between universals, and not just between particular instances, then we can
explain how we can come to know

To understand this, we first need to know the nature of inference as a means of

knowledge.
We'll contrast inference with perception. By perception we directly can directly
cognize the states of affairs in the world. By inference we indirectly cognize
them. Thus we can cognize that someone walked down the beach by direct cognition-
perception by actually seeing them do this - or indirectly, via inference from
seeing footprints in the sand.

It is the same state of affairs we cognize in two different ways. It is the walking
of one and the same person that we cognize directly or indirectly. This is called
'intermingling' of 'means of knowledge' by Nyaya. One can simultaneously infer
fire from smoke seen from far away (but not the fire itself) but if nearer, we
could also uses senses of vision and touch to see the fire/feel the heat (in
addition to the smoke).

The basic cognition of there being a fire on the mountain, inferred from smoke has
the following structure.
- There is fire on the mountain.
- Because there is smoke on the mountain
- Whatever has smoke has fire,
- like the kitchen,
- and unlike the lake.

**If** we think of this as an argument in the western philosophical sense, the

first line is the conclusion and the second and third are premises or evidences put
forward to derive the conclusion from.

Indian logicians analyze this inference differently. They see it as made up of five
terms
1. The subject (the mountain)
2. The property to be proved *by inference* (the fire) ;; sanskrit name for
'property to be proved'- saadhya
3. The reason - the observed thing from which the sadhya is inferred(the smoke)
4. A positive example (the kitchen)
5. A negative example (the lake)

So the inference structure is

- the subject is characterized by the sadhya - the property to be proved
inheres in the subject - fireness (note: universal) inheres in the mountain
- the subject is characterized by the reason - the 'reason universal' inheres
in the subject - smokeness (universal) inheres in the mountain
- the reason universal is pervaded by the (universal corresponding to the)
property to be proved. Here smokeness is pervaded by fireness ('whatever has smoke
has fire)
- the claim of pervasion is supported by a positive and negative example.

Note: The reason universal is pervaded by the cause universal. Smokeness is

pervaded by the fireness universal. There can be smokeless fire, but not fireless
smoke.

Very Important: Pervasion is a relation between universals. The claim that is being
made (by pervasion between universals) is that wherever there is smoke there is
fire.

Pervasion helps Nyaya avoid some epistemological problems. e.g: the problem that we
cannot cognize every instance of fire and smoke. Nyaya says we can percieve the
universals smokeness and fireness and the relation (pervasion) that holds between
them.

What then is the epistemic role of the examples?

The examples help us steer clear of situations where it is only a coincidence that
two things happen together.
To do this we look for counter examples - situations where the reason (here smoke)
occurs without the saadhya (here fire). If we find such a counter example we then
know that the two universals are not connected by pervasion.

e.g: we see 'smoke' on a lake in the morning, and we know that there is no fire on
the lake. So a reason universal seems to occur without a saadhya universal. But it
is mist, not smoke. So there is no pervasion (there is no saadhya (== inferred ==
here, fireness) universal or cause( from which inference is made, here, smokeness)
universal). The negative counterexample shows that our search for counterexamples
has come up empty.

The positive example (kitchen fire + smoke) is supporting evidence, and the
negative counterexample shows that we've put alleged pervasion to the test and
come up empty.

the Nyaya view of how we apprehend pervasion may seem complex but it really
reflects common sense practice.

Pervasion claims assert general principles. They claim all instances of the reason
(Here, smoke) are instances of the saadhya (here fire).

Consider another claim: The anti reflexivity principle. No entity ever operates on
itself.
The people making the claim give supporting examples - the finger that can't point
at itself. The knife that can't cut itself etc.
If we are critical, we scrutinize this claim and come up with counter examples- the
light that illuminates itself, someone clipping his toenails.
The latter can be explained away by positing a self that does the clipping but does
not include the toe nail. If this stands up to scrutiny, and the light example can
be explained, then we'll have good reason to accept the anti-reflexivity principle.
It is always possible that there is a killer counter example we miss. Which is
fine, we'll incorporate it when it turns up. The game of knowledge is fallible and
we are imperfect.

One final point. What we take to be valid inferences may not be. Nyaya develops a
catalog of some of the more common ones, and this then becomes a checklist for any
inferences we make. If they survive the checklist, it is probably that our
inference is valid.
The name for such errors in inference is 'pseudo inference' (in Nyaya).

5.3 The Nyaya side of the Nyaya Buddhist controverly of the existence of self.

The arguments for the self from Vaatsayana's comments in the foundational text The
Nyaaya Sutra

Vaatsayana begins by saying that while the self is not perceived it is known by
testimony, and the Vedas speak about it (an argument that Buddhists won't accept)

V goes on to say that the self can be *inferred*.

"Desire and aversion, pleasure, pain and aversion are marks of the self"

paraphrase:
The senses come in contact with a particular object. The self experiences
pleasure. When the self percieves that object again next, desire to possess it
arises. The self connects the distinct acts of seeing. Likewise aversion to a
previously perceived cause of suffering.

Saying that the two different sense contacts are united without a self doesn't make
sense. Sense contacts occurring to different persons are not united. The non-self
advocates can't explain how the remembrance of a past contact creates desire or
aversion if there is no 'self' that spans the time interval. What one has perceived
cannot be remembered by another. Thus the non self theory is broken. and it is
established - the self exists.

The (here Buddhist) opponent says that this is not because of an 'interlinking
self' but because of a 'cause effect relation' between distinct groups of skandhas.
one grain of rice acts as a seed for the rice plant, which produces more rice
grains. The produced rice grains and seed rice grains are linked by cause and
effect, not because there is an interlinking self,which in any case is not
perceived. The rice grains are distinct, with there only being a cause effect
relationship. There is no common 'self'. Thus one experience being similar to a
remembered one is not enough to establish self.

Udyotakara (Nyayika): Two things being distinct but linked via cause effect
relationship is not the argument for self. The argument is a (feeling of /memory
of,) *unification* between two distinct things (that a 'something' or 'self' has),
whether the distinct occurrences are related by cause and effect or not. You
(Buddhist opponent) are saying that two distinct things may be seen as the same
'because'. We are saying that there is a 'something that remembers' linking both
(distinct) occurrences thus unifying them. If the experiencers are distinct, the
memory of one cannot trigger desire in the second who experiences the later
occurrence. You cannot remember what another has experienced.

The Buddhist view is that an experience happens. Then it goes out of existence
(unlike the seed rice grain which is put into the ground). Then later the second
experience occurs. One causing the other is fine, but in this case (memory) there
is no physical or temporal contact (unlike the rice grains which are temporally
linked via the rice plant). If there is no physical or temporal contact, then how
is there a 'cause -effect' relationship?

etc etc long chains of argument elided.

But net net, the Buddhists need an answer to the question of unification by memory
and learned pleasure and pain.
Chapter 6 Abhidharma: The Metaphysics of Empty Persons

AD = a movement in Buddhist philosophy that grew out of an attempt to

systematically interpret the discourses of the Buddha, which emerged from the
difficulties encountered in attempts to sort out all the entities that the Buddha
discussed. Over time subtle differences emerged in the solutions proposed which led
to different schools of Buddhism. But all schools shared a common philosophical
outlook, the focus of this chapter.

Our interest is in the metaphysics of the AD which evolved in response to the Nyaya
challenge. We explore the theory of dharmas and variations in what 'the dharmas'
are considered to exist. We also look an important epistemological dispute about
the nature of perception. we begin with 'proving that wholes are unreal and only
unpartite entities are real'.

For AD, the most important part of the argument that shows that a real whole is not
identical to or distinct from real parts.

But first we stand apart and look at the overall framework of the argument. The
basic question is ontological. The question is what is real? But narrowed down to
wholes and parts. This means there are four possible answers to "what is real"?

(a) wholes and parts are both real

(b) wholes are real, parts are unreal
(c) Neither wholes nor parts are real
(d) Wholes are unreal and parts are real

The strategy is to show that (a) (b) and (c) are false, so (4) is true by proof of
elimination.

We start with (2). The thesis is that wholes are real, but parts are not. Chariots
are real, but its parts are not, the tree is real, but its roots branches and
leaves are not. If we were to ask someone (who holds this belief) why leaves and
branches are not real, they'll say that this is a mental process of abstraction
that divides up a whole into useful chunks, and then we forget that something can
be a branch only by belonging to a tree.

the one major problem that this argument faces, is that its logic extended (what we
think of wholes are parts of bigger wholes) implies that there is only One Big
Thing. The thing that is Ultimately Real is One and Indivisible. This is absolute
Monism, - Shankara the Advaitist, the pre-socratic philosopher Parminedes.

Problem: If everything is ultimately one, one can't account for differences in

effect of different things - "it doesn't matter if we drink beer or bleach". So we
need to suppose the the One Big Thing can be divided into smaller things (which are
real in that they have different properties and effects' . so 2 seems to be false
(what is false is the 'parts are unreal' bit).

(3) means nothing at all exists. This is called Nihilism, which is 'obviously
false'.

(1) says that the bicycle is real and so are the parts - seats, handlebars etc.
The counterargument is 'if both are real, then they (whole/part) are either
identical or distinct. Assume that the parts are assembled in the right way so as
to form a bicycle. We'll call this 'parts arranged as a bicycle' an instance of
"parts in relation"
So we split (1) into two hypotheses
(1a) whole and parts are both real and the whole is identical with the parts in
relation.
(1b) whole and parts are both real and the whole is distinct from the parts in
relation.

the arguments for dismissing 1 are completely weird and off the charts and comes
down to hairsplitting on the meaning of words. Apparently the bicycle is *not*
identical to the 'parts in relation' because the former has the property of 'being
one thing' wheras the latter has the property of 'many things arranged as one'
(this misses the notion of heirarchical arrangement - many things on one level a
can be put together to create a 'single entity' on another level. We can even
dismiss talks of 'levels' and consider both to be two *viewpoints* of *the same
thing*.)

ok I'm skipping the rest. This kind of wordplay is useless and of interest only to
people trying to 'win' arid arguments. I'll focus on the scientific approach and
focus on experimentation, and theory to enable prediction and action in the world.