MARTIRES, J.

:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution, dated 22 November 2011, of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118333, which dismissed the petition seeking the
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment of fine in eight (8) cases of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).

THE FACTS

In an Information, dated 26 May 2006, respondent Salvador Alapan (respondent) and his wife
Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Upon
arraignment on 1 September 2006, they pleaded not guilty to the charges.

In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed P400,000.00 from petitioner Brian Victor
Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the said amount within three (3)
months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks.

When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, PNB informed petitioner that the checks were
dishonored for the reason that the account against which the hecks were drawn was closed.
Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of the checks.

On their part, the Spouses Alapan averred that their account was closed only on the last week
of October 2005 because they suffered business reverses. They nonetheless stated that they
were willing to settle their monetary obligation.

The MTC Ruling

In a decision,[1] dated 4 February 2009, the Municipal Trial Court, San Felipe, Zambales (MTC),
convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine
instead of imprisonment considering that respondent's act of issuing the bounced checks was
not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time offender. On the other hand, the MTC
acquitted Myrna because she did not participate in the issuance of the dishonored checks.
The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have established the guilt of
Accused Salvador Alapan of the eight (8) counts of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and imposes upon
the aforenamed accused to pay a fine of P30,000.00 for each case or total of P240,000.00 and
to indemnify the offended party, Mr. Brian Victor Britchford the sum of FOUR HUNDRED
ELEVEN THOUSAND (P411,000.00) Philippine Currency, representing the face value of the
dishonored checks, with legal interest per annum commencing from March 8, 2006, when
demand was made, until fully paid, and to pay attorney's fees of P15,000.00 and to pay the
costs.[2]
After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued. The writ,
however, was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary
Penalty[3] for respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.

In its Order,[4] dated 24 September 2010, the MTC denied the motion on the ground that
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was not imposed in the judgment of conviction.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales
(RTC).

The RTC Ruling

In a decision,[5] dated 25 January 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It
held that respondent could not be made to undergo subsidiary imprisonment because the
judgment of conviction did not provide for such penalty in case of non-payment of fine. The
RTC further opined that the MTC decision which already attained finality could no longer be
altered or modified. It disposed the case in this wise:

IN VIEW THEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.[6]

Undeterred, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution, dated 22 November 2011, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the
petition was filed without the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
was contrary to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code. The
dispositive portion reads:

In view of the foregoing and finding the Manifestation (in lieu of Comment) filed by the OSG to
be well-founded, the petition is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 3, Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Court.[7]
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

I. WHETHER PETITIONER MAY ASSAIL THE PENALTY IMPOSED IN THE JUDGMENT OF

CONVICTION;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT MAY UNDERGO SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT FOR FAILURE TO

PAY THE FINE.

Petitioner argues that Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code is
applicable only in cases wherein the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities is
directly involved; that the said law does not cover matters wherein it is the interest of the
private complainant that is directly affected; and that Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
expressly states that there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine be imposed and the accused be
unable to pay the fine.[8]

In his comment, respondent counters, citing Gonzales v. Chavez,[9] that it is mandatory upon the
OSG to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of a lawyer; that it is only the State, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, which has the sole
right and authority to institute criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court;[10] that the imposition or the non-imposition of subsidiary penalty is a matter
that involves the interest of the State, thus, the private offended party is without legal
personality to bring an appeal on the criminal aspect of the case; and that the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment must be clearly stated in the judgment.[11]

In his reply, petitioner avers that Administrative Circular No. 13-200I categorically implies that
subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to even if the penalty provided by the trial court is
limited only to tine; and that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment would emphasize the
gravity of the offense committed by respondent and would serve as a deterrent to others not
to emulate this malicious act.[12]

OUR RULING

Petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court's order.

In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the authority
to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. This power is expressly
provided in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised Administrative
Code.[13]Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all
criminal cases.[14]

Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private complainant is limited only to
the civil liability arising from the crime. Thus, in Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan,[15] the Court
ruled:

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the
State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only
by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent
the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
undertake such appeal.[16]
In this case, respondent was convicted of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for which
he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment pursuant to Administrative
Circulars No. 12-2000 and 13-2001. Thus, the penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal aspect of the case. On the
other hand, the indemnification for the face value of the dishonored checks refers to the civil
aspect of the case. Consequently, petitioner could not appeal the imposition of fine as penalty
which was not even questioned by the People through the OSG. "While a private prosecutor
may be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot
be permitted to adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be
tantamount to giving the private prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal
proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law."[17] Hence, the CA properly dismissed the petition
for review.

Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the judgment of

conviction.

Another reason which militates against petitioner's position is the lack of provision pertaining
to subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of conviction. People v. Fajardo,[18] in relation to
Republic Act. No. 5465 which amended Article 39 of the RPC, discusses the rationale behind the
necessity for expressly imposing subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of conviction, viz:

The first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine
mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary
personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules: ...

Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part, which deals with the execution
and service of penalties, provides:

ART. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty shall executed except by virtue
of a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any
other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.

It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
the United States of America approved on August 29, 1916, which was still in force when the
order appealed from was made, that no person may be deprived of liberty without due
process of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense incorporated in article 78 of the
Revised Penal Code prescribing that no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final
judgment. As the fact show that there is no judgment sentencing the accused to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay the fine imposed upon him, because the
said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that
the court could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. A contrary
holding would be a violation of the laws aforementioned. That subsidiary imprisonment is a
penalty, there can be no doubt, for, according to article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
imposed upon the accused and served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay on account
of insolvency. There is not a single provision in the Code from which it may be logically inferred
that an accused may automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case where
he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been found to be insolvent. Such would be
contrary to the legal provisions above-cited and to the doctrine laid down in United States vs.
Miranda (2 Phil., 606, 610), in which it was said: "That judgment of the lower court fails to
impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for indemnification to the owner of the
banca, but only imposes subsidiary punishment as to the costs. In this respect the judgment is
erroneous and should be modified."

We, therefore, conclude that an accused who has been sentenced by final judgment to pay a
fine only and is found to be insolvent and could not pay the fine for this reason, cannot be
compelled to serve the subsidiary imprisonment provided for in article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code. [emphasis supplied][19]
Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should only a fine be imposed and
the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the Circular does not
sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for the same must still comply
with the law.

Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to
pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating
the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

The final and executory decision of the MTC can no longer be modified.

Finally, the time-honored doctrine of immutability of judgment precludes modification of a final

and executory judgment:

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The
orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble
purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice
system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to
this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any
act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of
conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what
are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been
conferred.

The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of
clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and (3) void judgments.[20]
There is no doubt that the MTC decision has long attained finality and that none of the
aforementioned exceptions finds application in this case. Hence, the MTC decision stands and
any other question involving the said decision must now be put to rest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 November 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 118333 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

97 Phil. 724

CONCEPCION, J.:
On November 24, 1950, plaintiff, Hilario S. Nagrampa, filed a complaint against defendant,
Mulvaney, McMillan & Co., Inc., stating that on January 26, 1950, a truck of said defendant,
bearing plate No. T-3931, then without brake and with a defective machine, and being driven
by defendant's driver, Florentino Blarama, on the wrong lane of the road, bumped and struck
plaintiff's truck No. T-7173, in the municipality of Makati, Rizal, as a consequence of which said
truck No. T-7173 suffered damages in the sum of P1,037.30; that, accordingly, said Florentine)
Blarama was accused of damage to property, thru reckless imprudence, in Criminal Case No.
2462 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that, having pleaded guilty to the charge, said
Blarama was sentenced to pay a fine of P1,037.30, plus damages in the same amount, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency, and costs; that said Blarama is
insolvent and is serving the aforementioned subsidiary imprisonment; that, owing to Blarama's
failure to pay said indemnity of P1,037.30, his employer, namely, defendant, Mulvaney,
McMillan & Co., Inc., is pursuant to articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as
construed in the case of Martinez vs. Barredo (G. R. No. 4930) ipso facto subsidiarily liable for
the payment of said sum, for which reason judgment therefor is prayed, with costs. Copy of the
information and of the decision rendered against Blarama, as well as of the sheriff's return
certifying (1) that Blarama had not paid the amounts stated in the aforementioned decision,
upon the ground that he is insolvent, and (2) that no properties, real or personal, registered in
his name, had been found were attached to the aforesaid complaint, as Appendices A, B and C,
respectively.
The defendant filed an answer admitting the allegations of the complaint, relative to the
capacity of the parties, the conviction of Blarama, and the sentence rendered against him, and
denying the allegations of the complaint regarding the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff and the defendant's alleged subsidiary liability to pay said amount, "the truth of the
matter being that the damage sustained by plaintiff's truck amounted to only about P300."
Defendant denied, also, in its answer, the applicability of the rule laid down in the case of
Martinez vs. Barredo.
Soon later, plaintiff filed a motion praying that, with the presentation of the documents
attached thereto, as Exhibits A, B and C which are copies of the aforementioned appendices to
the complaint judgment be rendered on the pleadings, the defendant having admitted in its
answer the material allegations of the complaint. Defendant replied thereto with a pleading,
dated January 16, 1951, expressing its "conformity to plaintiff's 'motion for judgment on the
pleadings'", but objecting to the presentation of Exhibits A, B and C and the admission thereof,
upon the ground that it is improper in a petition for judgment on the pleadings; that defendant
had alleged in its answer that it is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations, in the complaint, relative to Blarama's alleged insolvency and
service of subsidiary imprisonment; and that, apart from denying that the damages sustained
by the plaintiff reached the sum of P1,037.30, the defendant has alleged; in its answer, that
said damages amounted to P300 only.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision sentencing the defendant to
pay the plaintiff said sum of P1,037.30, with interest thereon, at the legal rate, as well as the
costs. The defendant has appealed from this decision, and its counsel now allege that:
1. "The lower court erred in basing its judgment not on the pleadings exclusively but likewise on
evidence presented by plaintiff-appellee alone.
2. "The lower court erred in finding defendant-appellant liable to plaintiff-appellee in the
amount of P1,037.30.
3. "The lower court erred in not finding that the damage caused to plaintiff-appellee's, truck
was P300." (Defendant-Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-5.)
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that the lower court should not have considered
Exhibits A, B and C as evidence in rendering the decision appealed from, the admission of said
evidence being allegedly inconsistent with the nature of a judgment on the pleadings. This
pretense is clearly untenable. To begin with, the decision, Exhibit B, against Blarama, was
attached to the complaint (As Appendix B) by virtue of paragraph (3) thereof, in which the
contents of said decision and the circumstances under which it was rendered, were set forth,
and the allegations of said paragraph (3) were expressly admitted in defendant's answer.
Secondly, Exhibit A is the information filed against Blarama. Copy thereof was attached, also, to
the complaint, as appendix A, and the allegations of said complaint, relative thereto, were not
denied by the defendant, except as to the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff. Thus,
defendant is deemed to have admitted said allegations, as regards the filing of the information
and the contents thereof (Section 8, Rule 9, Rules of Court). Thirdly, although, referring to
paragraph (4) of the complaint, which states
"That the accused, Florentino Blarama, in the said Criminal Case No. 2462, is insolvent and is
serving the subsidiary imprisonment in the Provincial Jail, Pasig, Rizal, the fine of P1,037.30, as
proved in the hereto attached Sheriff's Return, Appendix 'C' ". (Record on Appeal, p. 3.)
the defendant alleged in its answer that
"Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the complaint" (Record on Appeal, p. 10.)
it appears that in its pleading dated January 16, 1951, it expressed conformity to plaintiff's
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and prayed as follows:
"Premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that a judgment on the pleadings be issued by
this Honorable Court ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P300 in full settlement
for the damages sustained by plaintiff's truck and caused by defendant's truck driven by
Florentino Blarama." (Record on Appeal, p. 22.)
This prayer implies an acknowledgment of defendant's subsidiary liability for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff, on account of the acts and omissions of former's driver, which, in
turn, connotes an admission of Blarama's insolvency, upon which the aforementioned
subsidiary liability depends (Articles 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code). Hence, the first
assignment of error is devoid of merit.
Defendant maintains, under its second and third assignments of error, that, having specifically
denied that plaintiff had suffered damages in the sum of P1,037.30, and expressly alleged that
said damages amount to P300 only, it should not have been sentenced by the lower court to
pay the first sum. The case of Maria Luisa Martinez vs. Manuel H. Barredo (45 Off. Gaz., 4922-
4923) is squarely in point. The facts therein were:
"On April 11, 1940, a taxicab Owned by Fausto Barredo and driven by Rosendo Digman collided
in a Manila thoroughfare with Chevrolet car driven by Maria Luisa Martinez. The collision gave
rise to mutual charges for damage to property through reckless imprudence, one by Maria Luisa
Martinez against Digman, and the other by Fausto Barredo against Maria Luisa Martinez. After
investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Digman and quashed Barredo's complaint.
Digman entered a plea of guilty in his criminal case and was therefore sentenced to pay a fine
of P605.97 and to indemnify Maria Luisa Martinez in the same amount, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. Digman failed to pay any of these amounts
and had to undergo corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. Due to the inability of Digman to
pay the indemnity, Maria Luisa Martinez, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against Fausto Barredo, as Digman's employer, for the purpose of holding him subsidiary liable
for said indemnity under articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. At the trial Maria Luisa
Martinez relied solely on the judgment of conviction against Rosendo Digman, the writ of
execution issued against him, a certificate of the Director of Prisons regarding Digman's service
of subsidiary imprisonment, and the information filed against Digman. Maria Luisa Martinez
obtained a favorable judgment from which Barredo appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
latter court, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance, held that the judgment of
conviction was not conclusive against Barredo and its weight as prima facie evidence was
overcome by the evidence presented by Barredo. Hence the present appeal of Maria Luisa
Martinez by way of certiorari.
"The important question is whether a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant to pay
an indemnity is conclusive in an action against his employer for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary liability under articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code."
Passing upon the issues thus raised, we held:
"After very careful reflection, we have arrived at the opinion that the judgment of conviction, in
the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, should bind the
person subsidiary liable. The stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and implications
mere civil liability. Common sense dictates that a finding of guilt in a criminal case in which
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary, should not be nullified in a subsequent civil action
requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment, unless those who support the
contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to automatically set
aside the verdict against the defendant in the criminal case. It is anomalous, to say the least, to
suppose that the driver, excelling 'Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde', could be guilty of reckless
negligence in so far as his obligation to pay indemnity ia concerned, and at the same time could
be free from any blame when said indemnity is sought to be collected from his employer,
although the right to the indemnity arose from and was based on one and the same act of the
driver.
"The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day In court, because the situation
before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of
the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to
and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and
decide only in a criminal action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily
liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the later's insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's
subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence."
Considering that, as thus held, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiary liable upon
conviction of his employee and upon proof of the latter's insolvency; that the only proof of the
employee's insolvency in the Martinez case was a certificate, of the Director of Prisons,
regarding service of subsidiary imprisonment by the accused involved therein; that a similar
certificate, issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (Appendix C and Exhibit C), appears in the
record hereof; that, as above stated, defendant herein has impliedly admitted the insolvency of
its driver Blarama; that there is no allegation, or even insinuation, that the decision Exhibit B,
rendered against Blarama, is tainted with fraud, collusion or clear mistake of law or fact, or lack
of jurisdiction; and that, although defendant maintains that the damages sustained by the
plaintiff amount to P300 only, this pretense is untenable in view of the conclusive nature of the
decision against Blarama (Exhibit B) /fixing the amount of said damages at Fl.037.30, it follows
necessarily that the second and third* assignments of error cannot be sustained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-
appellant. So ordered.

PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30,
2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber .22
firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace
Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -

Point of Entry - lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the
umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 V% years of age, who suffered the following:

"Gunshot wound -
Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter

Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"

which directly caused their instant death.

That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation
for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
offense.

Contrary to law.[2]

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel,
was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court,the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent
to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said
firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the
spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel
Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are
minors, were not hit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said
proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002,
he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only
appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no participation in the shooting
incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime scene.
Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case
against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.[4] Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case
for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial
proceeded only as to appellant.[5]

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr.
Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children
of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted
that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than
the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were used.[6]

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of
June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the
"sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences)
remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came
into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp
hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and
Roger San Miguel.

The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men
then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon" Norberto pleaded with them,
saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa
inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his
body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he
heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled together in
their hut.[7]

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2)
young daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from
neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the
street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the
hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her.[8]

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto
replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he
(Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.[9]

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense.
Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel
and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San
Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred.
However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk
away from the crime scene.[10]

Finding appellant's defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of
Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together
with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was
then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder
in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary
Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to
suffer Reclusion Perpetuafor the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to
pay for the costs,

SO ORDERED.[11]

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No.
7702-G, reads:

WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article
248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correctional as minimum to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties;
Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is
ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012,
the CA rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.[13]

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012,
the Court issued a Resolution[14] notifying the parties that they may submit their respective
Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental
briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA.[15]

The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's
testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and
to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto's children.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions
based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court
will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial
court and affirmed by the CA.[16]

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA,
that appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms
and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto
clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a
lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:

Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do
you have light in your house?
A: Yes., sir.

Q: What kind of light was there?

A: A gas lamp.

Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?

A: In the middle of our house.

xxxx

Q: when did they fire a shot?

A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.

Q: How many gunshots did you hear?

A: Only one.

Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm? A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)

xxxx

Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?

A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.

xxxx

Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?

A: All of them.

Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were having one firearm
each?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And they fired shots at the same time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were.

Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position
then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.

Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering
them to line (sic) down face down)

Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Less than five minutes, sir.

Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened
to them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.

x x x[17]

Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's
daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission
of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to
discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a
common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all.[18] Here, the
three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each
with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the
bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children.

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a
person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or
evident premeditation.[19] The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article
248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.[20] The trial court correctly ruled that
appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto's two children,
thus:

xxx Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side
about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall
made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilbcrto
Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused
despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The
family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace
Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 lA years old respectively.
In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants
when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly
and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves. Norberto
and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night, xxx[21]

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held
in People v. Fallorina,[22] the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an
unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by
reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person
illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In Esqueda v. People,[23] the Court held:

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated
or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill
the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted
on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the
offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as
shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered[24] during, as well as the manner of, the
commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court's finding that
appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first
by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended
victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there
were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely
all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of
Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina,
Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the
only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.[25]

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state
from the very beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the
shots from appellant's firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put
a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show that
there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,[26] "[m]inor
inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of
witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."[27] Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward
testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the
principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People[28] that:

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would
justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's
determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court
in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness,
honesty and candor x x x.[29]

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or
exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no
cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the
testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief.
Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one
of the perpetrators of the crime.

However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to
identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the
trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting
appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to
penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted
Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial,
show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the
killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his
cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder
and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the
Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the
same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court
of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,[30] thus:

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the
accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently
prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges
which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing
the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise,
the defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for
the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same.
Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not
file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of Section 3 of this Rule."

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as
many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.[31] Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations
in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted
murder, respectively, and proven during trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,[32] the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as
defined in Article 48[33] of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law
and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is
imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known
as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more
persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes.[34]

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two
others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their
respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several
gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows
their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What
appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held
in People v. Nelmida,[35] "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual
acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."[36]

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account
dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:

That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.[37]

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

xxx the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by
treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house
occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of
Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the
accused x x x[38]

In People v. Agcanas,[39] the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that
dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human
abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who
offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the
dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation
therefor.[40] The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated
the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without
provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as
an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the
penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus,
with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each
of two (2) counts of murder.[41] However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion
perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to
the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision
mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be
from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its
periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt
to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.

Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as
regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in
these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely:
civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or
temperate damages in some instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended
party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven
actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. [42]

This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable."

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be
increased by the Court when appropriate.[43]Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount
for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus,
although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount
awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it.[44]

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also
compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals[45] expounded on the nature and
purpose of moral damages, viz.:

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold
injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the
concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant
for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to
the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been
suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed
in Article 2219[46] and Article 2220[47] of the Civil Code, x x x.

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages

awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." [48] They may
also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity,
and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the
factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating
circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress."[49]

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs ofRey
Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted."[50]

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220[51] of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount
of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil
indemnity.[52]

Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:

ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are

intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person
as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,[53] the theory being
that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of
the defendant — associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud[54] - that intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of
damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In
either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.[55]

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has
a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary
or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern,
the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is
a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability
of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[56]

The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[57] requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or
information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A criminal
complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its
qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the
proper penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In
the civil aspect, the presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the
information but proven during trial would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as
Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229,
the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v, Matrimonio,[58] the
Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,[59] the
Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v.
Cañada,[60] People v. Neverio[61] and People v. Layco, Sr. ,[62] the Court awarded exemplary
damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.

Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at P30,000.00,[63] despite the lack
of any aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to
P50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.

If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of
the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence[64] sets the amount of P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider
the penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the
death penalty under certain circumstances.[65] Under the same law, the following crimes are
punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general,[66] mutiny on the high seas,[67] and simple
rape.[68] For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death: qualified piracy;[69] qualified bribery under certain
circumstances;[70] parricide;[71] murder;[72] infanticide, except when committed by the mother of
the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for
the same purpose;[73]kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain
circumstances;[74] robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain
circumstances;[75] destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penalized under the article;[76] attempted or frustrated rape,
when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion thereof; plunder; and carnapping,
when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[78] Finally, RA 7659 imposes the
death penalty on the following crimes:

(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.

b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped,
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.

(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under Article 320, death results.

(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or
homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
(1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the
police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the husband,
parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when
the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is
afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by
any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible
penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the
RPC, which provides:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.

2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and
importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules,
according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)

Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the
court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court
can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present.

But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the
death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.[79]

As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion
perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the
ruling in People v. Salome[80] and People v. Quiachon[81] is "the penalty provided by law or
imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed
on the offender."[82]
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death
penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v.
Victor[83] that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape -when punishable by death
should be P75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of
the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."[84]Such
reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased
to P100,000.00.[85]

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa[86] P50,000.00
was awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it
is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious
crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[87] Subsequently, the amount was
increased to P75,000.00 in People v. Soriano[88] and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao[89]

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the
imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must
be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.

Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary
aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetna, the latest jurisprudence[90] pegs the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying
aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount
of P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral
damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary
damages shall be fixed at P100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of
the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x."[91]

When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the
proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating
circumstances present.

When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender
caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each
of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any
ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the
penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be
imposed,[92] then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of
the RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:

In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,[93] this Court ruled that special complex crime, or
more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v.
Barros,[94] explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to
the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist
of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do
they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper].
However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal
possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes
although composed of two or more offenses."[95]

In People v. De Leon,[96] we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
as follows:

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has
to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed
by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.[97]

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in
its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape.[98] Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales:[99]

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons
and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly
characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel
was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of
the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other
companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery)
obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded
as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its
own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime
of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the
circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could
not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine
the penalty to be imposed.[100]

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot
be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be P100,000.00 each, and another
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an
example. If there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the
penalty imposed is death, an additional P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 moral
damages and P100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime
committed.

For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide[101] wherein three (3) people died as a
consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as
discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who were killed were the victims of the
robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the perpetrators or robbers
themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed even if one of
the robbers dies.[102] This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more than one
victim of rape.

In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in
which the crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. -Consummated felonies, as well as

those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death
but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages
that should be awarded will each be P100,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for exemplary
damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be P75,000.00 each, as well as
exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in its
frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be
P50,000.00, and an award of P25,000.00 civil indemnity and P25,000.00 moral damages when
the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the
stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way
that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil
indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or attempted
stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48
of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P100,000.00 each, while in the
attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P25,000.00
each.

In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims
(except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be
remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes
have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to commit
the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another
crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, other victims
sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide
as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element
of robbery,[103] which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature
and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of
awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died
if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage,
and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an
attempted stage.

In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be P50,000.00 and
P50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award of
P50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an aggravating
circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.

Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases.
The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no
evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[104]Under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of
the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[105] In this case,
the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to P50,000.00.

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were
further made atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors — one is a
mere 3 1/2-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of
awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over
such crimes and wastage of lives.

In summary:

I. For those crimes[106] like, Murder,[107] Parricide,[108] Serious Intentional

Mutilation,[109] Infanticide,[110] and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages -P100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

ii. Moral damages - P75,000.00
 iii. Exemplary damages — P75,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity-P50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity -P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00

ii. Moral damages - P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity-P25,000.00
ii. Moral damages - P25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages - P25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
 a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages"[111] -P100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:" [112]

a. Civil indemnity-P50.000.00
b. Moral damages - P50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:

a. Civil indemnity-P25,000.00
b. Moral damages-P25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or
sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend
on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity-P75,000.00
b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other
complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty
imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,[113] Robbery with Rape,[114] Robbery
with Intentional Mutilation,[115]Robbery with Arson,[116] Rape with Flomicide,[117] Kidnapping
with Murder,[118] Carnapping with Homicide[119] or Carnapping with Rape,[120] Highway Robbery
with Homicide.[121] Qualified Piracy,[122] Arson with Homicide,[123] Hazing with Death, Rape,
Sodomy or Mutilation[124] and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the
composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is Death but reduced toreclusion perpetua although death did not occur.

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds[125] and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

 a. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00
b. Moral damages - P50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.

2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity -P50,000.00

b. Moral damages - P50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages -P50,000.00

2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity -P25,000.00

b. Moral damages - P25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages — P25,000.00

In Robbery with Physical Injuries,[126] the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on
the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

The: above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or
perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every
additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall
be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate
crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.

V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour
of the offender,[127] Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:

1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

a. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00

b. Moral damages - P50,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are
no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity -P30,000.00

ii. Moral damages-P30,000.00
b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity-P20,000.00
ii. Moral damages - P20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information,[128] in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
damages, the amount of P50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; P30,000.00 for
frustrated; and P20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death
occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the
following:[129]

a. Civil indemnity-P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00[l30]

B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could
have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:

a. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00

b. Moral damages - P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity - P50,000.00

b. Moral damages - P50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P50,000.00

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses
is presented in court, the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.

To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum
amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly
modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.[131]

Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the
victims the following damages: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children
who died; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3) another
PI00,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate damages in
the amount of P50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of Attempted
Murder, appellant should pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity,
moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are
subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision
until fully paid.[132]

Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges
against Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as
the companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very
straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other
people who fired the gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the
testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime scene, tended
to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial
Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn
statement said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert
Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two
other people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster
the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may have been
involved in the killing of his two young daughters.

After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy
because the same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has
attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a
valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[133] In this case, the case against Estores
and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double
jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any,
of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and
Claudine Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d)
P50,000.00 as temperate damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the
four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to each of the
four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judv Ann Divina.

(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the
civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.

(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice,
be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately
conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of
Justice for his information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Leonen, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.
Jardeleza, J., no part.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 5, 2016 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received
by this Office on May 3, 2016 at 1:44 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA
Clerk of Court

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora T. Lantion, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican
and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-21.

[2] Record, Vol. 1, pp. 2-3.

[3] Record, Vol. II., p. 2.

[4] Order of the Provincial Prosecutor, Record, Vol. I, pp. 12-14.

[5] RTC Order, Record, Vol. II, pp. 66-67.

[6] TSN, February 5, 2004, Folder of TSN's.

[7] TSN, March 3, 2004, Folder of TSN's

[8] Id.

[9] TSN, June 28, 2004, Folder of TSN's.

[10]
TSN's, February 10, 2005, April 7, 2005, February 15, 2006, August 3, 2006, September 6
2006 and June 7, 2006.

[11] Record, Vol, I, pp. 293-294.

[12] Record, Vol. II, p. 131.

[13] Supra note 1.

[14] Rollo, p. 27.

[15] Rollo, pp. 33-34.

[16] People of the Philippines v. Renandang Mamaruncas, 680 Phil. 192, 211 (2012).

[17] TSN, July 14, 2004, pp. 6-8.

[18] People v. Nazareno, 698 Phil. 187, 193 (2012).

[19] People v. Advienlo, et al., 684 Phil. 507, 519 (2012)

[20]
Art. 248. 2 — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing moans to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment

or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with
the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

[21] Supra note 11, at 287.

[22]
468 Phil. 816, 840 (2004), citing People v. Bustamante; 445 Phil. 345, 363-364 (2003); People
v. Magno, 379 Phil, 531, 554 (2000).

[23] 607 Phil. 480, 505 (2009).

[24] "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon."

[25] Supra note 12, at 128-129.

[26] 682 Phil. 164 (2012).

[27] People v. Cabtalan, supra, at 168.

[28] G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 311.

[29] Medina, Jr. v. People, supra, at 320.

[30] G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015.

[31]
People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al,
supra.

[32] 694 Phil. 529, 581 (2012).

Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes - When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

[34] People v. Nelmida, supra note 32, at 569-570. (Emphasis omitted)

[35] Supra note 32.

[36] People v. Nelmida, supra, at 570.

[37] Supra note 2.

[38] Supra note 3.

[39] 674 Phil. 626, 635 (2011).1

[40] People v. Evangelic, 672 Phil. 229, 248-249 (2011).

[41]Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. (1), provides, in part, that when the penalty consists of two
(2) indivisible penalties and is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances, the greater
penalty shall be applied, and in this case, the death penalty shall be imposed.

[42]
People v. Combate, 653 Phil. 487, 504 (2010), citing People v. Victor, 354 Phil. 195, 209
(1998)

[43] Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 724 SCRA 1, 57.

[44] Id. at 58-59.

[45] G.R. No. 104576, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.

[46] Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1)A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26,27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this
article, may also recover moral damages.

The s,pouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action mentioned
in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

[47]
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

[48] Bagumbayan Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-66274, September 30 1984 132
SCRA 441,446.

[49] 6A C.J.S. Assault §68.

[50] G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 296.

[51]
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same
rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

[52] Lilo Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, supra note 43, at 59.

[53]
People v. Dalisay, 620 Phil. 831, 844 (2009), citing People v. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102, 119
(2001), citing American Cent. Corp. v. Stevens Van Lines, Inc., 103 Mich App 507, 303 NW2d
234; Morris v. Duncan, 126 Ga 467, 54 SE 1045; Faircloth v. Greiner, 174 Ga app 845, 332 SE 2d
905; §731, 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 784; American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F 2d 523, 20 ALR 3d
335; Erwin v. Michigan, 188 Ark 658, 67SW2d592.

[54] §762, 22 Am Jur 2d pp. 817-818.

[55] §733. 22 Am Jur 2d, p. 785; Symposium: Punitive Damages, 56 So Cal LR 1, November 1982.

[56] People v. Catubig, supra note 53, at 119-120.

[57] Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 8 Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
(Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 9, Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well
as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)

[58] G.R. Nos. 82223-24, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA613, 634.

[59] 322 Phil. 551 (1996).

[60] 617 Phil. 587(2009).

[61] 613 Phil. 507(2009).

[62] 605 Phil. 877 (2009).

[63] People v. Abdlera, 553 Phil. 307 (2007).

[64]
People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533-534. People v.
Combats, supra note 41, at 509.

Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger,
shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or passengers. The same
penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.

[67] Id.

[68]Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be
punished by reclusion temporal, x x x.

[69]Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the
following circumstances:

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;

2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves or;

3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.

[70]
Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he
refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted, x x x

[71]Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty
of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
[72]
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment
or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

[73]
Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in
Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of
age.

[74]Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.

xxxx

[76]
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

x x x x.

[76] Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result
of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people
usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings
and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the
offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on
fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or

conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of
another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or
to collect from insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or
committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their
purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act
in the commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance,

storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

xxxx

[77]Republic Act No. 7080 (1991), Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in
Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense.
In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

[78]Republic Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found
guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the
value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by x x x the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

G.R. No. 184500

PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision[1] dated 18 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision[2] dated 30 September 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding
herein appellants Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao" (Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @ "Pordoy"
(Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder
and double attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellants were likewise ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
each of the deceased victims, i.e., Police Officer 3 Hernando P. Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and
Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of P50,000.00 each as moral
damages and P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of the said victims.
Similarly, appellants were directed to pay, jointly and severally, Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan the
amount of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of the suit.

Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel), Brigido Abais @ "Bidok"
(Brigido), Pedro Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro), Eduardo Bacong, Sr. (Eduardo, Sr.), Eduardo
Bacong, Jr. @ "Junjun" (Eduardo, Jr.), Alejandro Abarquez (Alejandro), Ruben Bartolo @ "Yoyoy
Bulhog" (Ruben), Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo" (Arnel), Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok"
(Alfredo), Opao Casinillo (Opao) and other John Does, were charged in an Amended
Information[3] dated 3 October 2001 with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellants and their co-
accused], conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with assorted
high-powered firearms and hand-grenade, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with treachery, evident premidation (sic), taking advantage of their superiority in
strength and in numbers, and with intent to kill, ambush, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the persons of the following, namely[:]

1. [PO3 Dela Cruz], [Philippine National Police (PNP)];

2. [T/Sgt. Dacoco], [Philippine Army (PA)];
3. [Private First Class (PFC)] Haron Angni, PA;
4. [PFC] Gador[4] Tomanto, PA;
5. Juanito Ibunalo;
6. Mosanif[5] Ameril;
7. Macasubar[6] Tandayao;
8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan;[7] and
9. Jun Palanas

by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered firearms thereby inflicting
upon the persons of [PO3 De la Cruz], [T/Sgt. Dacoco], [PFC] Haron Angni, [PFC] Ga[p]or
Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, M[o]sani[p] Ameril and [Macasuba] Tandayao gunshot wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of the death of [PO3 De la Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco]
and the serious wounding of said [PFC] Haron Angni, [PFC] Ga[p]or Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo,
Mosani[p] Ameril and [Macasuba] Tandayao that without the medical assistance would have
caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny Tawan[-]tawan and Jun Palanas were not hit.[8]

When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their counsel de parte[9] and
counsel de oficio,[10] respectively; and their co-accused Samuel, likewise assisted by counsel de
oficio,[11] all entered separate pleas of NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The rest of the
accused in this case, however, remained at large. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge

Accused [Samuel] To Be Utilized As State Witness,[12] which the court a quo granted in an Order
dated 12 February 2003.[13] Also, upon motion of the prosecution, the court a quoissued
another Order dated 17 March 2003,[14] directing the release of Samuel from detention
following his discharge as state witness.

As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba Tandayao (Macasuba),
Mosanip Ameril (Mosanip), PFC Gapor Tomanto (PFC Tomanto), Merlina Dela Cruz (Merlina),
Senior Police Inspector Renato Salazar (Senior P/Insp. Salazar), PFC Haron Angni (PFC Angni),
Senior Police Officer 4 Raul Torres Medrano (SPO4 Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand
Suaring (SPO1 Suaring), Senior Police Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco (SPO2 Evasco), Senior Police
Officer 4 Emmie Subingsubing (SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo (Juanito), Senior Police
Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny Tawantawan (Mayor Tawan-tawan),
testified for the prosecution.

The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid prosecution
witnesses is as follows:

On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his security
escorts composed of some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP)
and civilian aides, to wit: (1) T/Sgt. Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3) PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz;
(5) Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a certain Jun, respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao
del Norte. In the afternoon, the group went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the
yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito.
Sitting at the passenger seat of the aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at
the back seat were Mosanip, Jun, and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito.
Those seated on a wooden bench installed at the rear (open) portion of the said yellow pick-up
service vehicle were PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco. PFC Tomanto
and PFC Angni were sitting beside each other facing the right side of the road while PO3 Dela
Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco were both seated behind PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni facing the left
side of the road.[15]

At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed co-accused,
brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one
located on the left side of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed
by appellants and their co-accused to stay in the said waiting shed while they assembled
themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road, which is more or less five (5)
meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and their coaccused surreptitiously waited for the
vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan.[16]
A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan
approaching towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment the yellow pick-
up service vehicle of Mayor Tawantawan passed by the aforesaid waiting shed, appellants and
their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered firearms.
Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto, who was
then sitting on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pickup service vehicle, saw appellant
Wenceslao on the right side of the road firing at them in a squatting position using an M-16
armalite rifle. Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr.,
Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawantawan ordered Juanito
to keep on driving to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the army and
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in Curva, Miagao, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. Mayor Tawan-tawan then asked assistance therefrom.[17]

Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of
Samuel's aunt located, more or less, 10 meters away from the site of the ambush to get their
bags and other stuff. The house of Samuel's aunt was the place where appellants and their co-
accused stayed prior to the incident. Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused to the
house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants and their co-accused hurriedly ran
towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte.[18]

On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawantawan, namely, PO3 Dela
Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered injuries. In particular, Macasuba was slightly
hit on the head by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained injury on his shoulder that almost severed his
left arm; PFC Tomanto was hit on the right and left sides of his body, on his left leg and knee;
PFC Angni was hit on his left shoulder; and Juanito was hit on his right point finger, right head
and left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun were not injured.[19]

All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to Bontilao Country Clinic in
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and were later transferred to Mindanao Sanitarium and
Hospital in Tibanga, Iligan City. PO3 Dela Cruz, however, died before reaching the hospital while
T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the hospital. PFC Tomanto stayed at Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital
for 13 days before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de Oro
City, and then in a hospital in Manila and Quezon City. PFC Angni stayed for seven (7) days in
Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital,
where he was confined for one (1) month. PFC Angni was transferred to V. Luna Hospital in
Quezon City and was confined therein for two (2) months.[20]

On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the CAFGU went back
to the site of the ambush but appellants and their co-accused were no longer there. Not long
after, SPO4 Medrano, Chief of Police of Salvador Municipal Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, and his troops arrived. It was while inside the Salvador Municipal Police Station that
SPO4 Medrano heard gunfire and he came to know that the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan was
ambushed prompting him and his troops to go to the scene of the crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan
informed SPO4 Medrano that appellant Wenceslao was one of those responsible for the
ambush. SPO4 Medrano and his troops, then, conducted an investigation during which he
noticed Samuel at the scene of the crime. Upon interrogation Samuel denied any involvement
in the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious, hence, he and his fellow
police officers arrested him and turned him over to a certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police of
Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to Lala Municipal Jail in Lanao del Norte.
Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the CAFGU, PNP and the rest of
the troops who were at the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints believed to be from
the culprits. They conducted a hot pursuit operation towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality
of Baroy, Lanao del Norte, where appellants and their co-accused were believed to have fled.
They were able to recover an M-16 armalite rifle caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4
Medrano then sent a Spot Report and a follow-up report about the ambush. He did not,
however, reveal the identity of appellant Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant
Wenceslao could be arrested at the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also informed the
provincial headquarters about the incident through a radio message.[21]

The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring, member of PNP Lala
Municipal Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that there were electrical supplies and radio antenna in
San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, left by the malefactors. SPO1 Suaring, together with Samuel,
Senior P/Insp. Salazar, SPO4 Subingsubing and a certain SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where they found the materials near the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) canal, which is 30 meters away from the house of Samuel's aunt. These
were photographed.[22]

Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a call from Barangay
Kagawad Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a black backpack was found in Mount
Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala, Lanao del Norte, which is two (2) kilometers away from the highway.
Immediately, SPO2 Evasco and Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon went to the location. Upon inspection,
they recovered from the backpack an army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch
and one fragmentation grenade cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these to the police
station in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to Senior P/Insp. Salazar. [23]

On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying appellants and their co-
accused as the persons responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
companions. Samuel was, thereafter, incarcerated at the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) in Tubod, Lanao del Norte.[24]

On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant Wenceslao was
arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. Appellant Ricardo, on the
other hand, was arrested on 20 December 2001 while working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao
del Norte. It was Senior P/Insp. Salazar who effected the arrest of the appellants.[25]

Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao presented as
witnesses Armida Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey Paninsuro (Jeffrey), Luzviminda Apolinares
(Luzviminda), Rudy Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant Teofanis Garsuta (Sgt. Garsuta) and Master
Sergeant Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt. Cudilla). Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, did not present any
witness other than himself.

Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house with his family. At
around 1:00 p.m., he went outside their house to clean the pigsty and feed the pigs. Then, at
around 2:30 p.m., Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a certain Romy, who is a military personnel, arrived
to get a copy of the election returns of the 15 May 2001 elections upon the orders of Tanny
Pepito, a gubernatorial candidate. He told them that he has no copy of the returns. He then
advised them to get it to Atty. Aldoni Umpa (Atty. Umpa) who has a copy. At that time, he,
Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside the house while his wife and nieces were just eight (8) to
10 meters away from them. After 10 minutes, his visitors left.[26] Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao
heard gunfire coming from the direction of the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His nephew,
Jeffrey, approached and informed him that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the latter's group were
ambushed. After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again heard gunfire. This time the bullets
were already hitting the roof and walls of their house. He then instructed Jeffrey, who is also a
CAFGU member, to report the said incident and to ask help from the members of the Philippine
Army stationed at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.[27] When Jeffrey left, appellant
Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not know where his wife and the rest of the women,
who were in their house, went after the gunburst. After more or less 15 minutes, he walked
barefooted and unarmed towards Camp Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed
the former regarding the incident happened in their house. Not long after, a certain Captain
Esmeralda (Capt. Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo Company of the Philippine Army,
arrived. He also approached and informed Capt. Esmeralda about the incident in their house.
Capt. Esmeralda then ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch
appellant Wenceslao's wife and relatives in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A six-by-six
truck returned to Camp Allere carrying appellant Wenceslao's wife and relatives.[28]

On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his wife and daughter, slept
in his father's house located, more or less, 100 meters away from Camp Allere and stayed there
for five (5) days. Appellant Wenceslao's wife then requested for transfer to their son's house in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she could no longer sleep because of what happened at their
house. Thus, they went to their son's house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and stayed there
for eight (8) days. During that period of time, he did not hear of any case filed against him. No
policemen even bothered to arrest him. His wife, however, was still afraid, so they left the
house of their son and moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. They stayed there
until he was arrested on 29 August 2001.[29]

Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a 15 minute-
vehicle ride from his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to the site of the
ambush in San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also, from his house to Camp Allere it would only
take, more or less, 5 minute-vehicle ride. Appellant Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the
vice-mayoralty position in Salvador, Lanao del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001
elections. Way back in the 1998 elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same locality
against Mayor Tawan-tawan but he lost. On both occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were
no longer in the same political party. Similarly, during the term of Mayor Tawantawan in 1998,
appellant Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were charged with illegal possession of
firearm.[30]

Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant
Wenceslao's wife, nephew and niece, respectively, corroborated appellant Wenceslao's
testimony on all material points. They all denied that appellant Wenceslao has something to do
with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. Nonetheless, Armida admitted that
there is a road connecting San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
There are also vehicles for hire plying the route of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice versa.[31]

Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslao's testimony with respect to
the fact that on 5 June 2001, he, together with Jacob Pepito and a certain member of the army
intelligence group, went to the house of appellant Wenceslao to get the election returns.
However, he could not recall anything unusual that happened while he was in the house of
appellant Wenceslao. They left the house of appellant Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m. Still, no
unusual incident happened thereafter. Rudy similarly revealed that he did not go inside the
house of appellant Wenceslao but merely waited for Jacob Pepito and a member of the army
intelligence group inside their vehicle parked at a distance of, more or less, three (3) meters
from the house of appellant Wenceslao. As such, he did not hear the subject of the
conversation between appellant Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a member of the army
intelligence group.[32]

Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the afternoon of 5 June 2001,
while he was at the legislative hall in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, to secure the
canvass of the elections, they received a radio call from M/Sgt. Cudilla informing them that
Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed and the house of appellant Wenceslao was strafed.
Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. As they passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, they stopped to get
some information from the police officers therein. They proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. They arrived at Camp Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he saw
appellant Wenceslao waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla. Appellant Wenceslao then
requested that his family and some personal effects be taken from his house. Thus, Capt.
Esmeralda ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant Wenceslao's
house. Upon reaching the house of appellant Wenceslao, nobody was there. Suddenly,
appellant Wenceslao's wife came out from the nearby house. Then they ordered her to board a
six-by-six truck after taking some personal belongings of appellant Wenceslao in the latter's
house.[33]

M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June 2001, while he was at
their command post at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, his detachment commander, a
certain T/Sgt. Quijano, called and informed him through radio that an ambush incident
happened in his area of responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He advised
T/Sgt. Quijano to verify the incident. M/Sgt. Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the
latter about the said ambush incident. He, thereafter, prepared a perimeter defense in the
camp. In the second call of T/Sgt. Quijano, the latter told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was
ambushed. After about 15 minutes, M/Sgt. Cudilla heard gunbursts from Poblacion, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte. Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at Camp Allere.

M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2001, also at around 3:00 p.m., he saw
appellant Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside Camp Allere near Km. Post one. Appellant
Wenceslao then informed him of the strafing incident in his house. When their commanding
officer arrived, appellant Wenceslao approached the former. Thereafter, a platoon was
organized heading towards Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.[34]

Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was also in his house
in Purok 5, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and children because his
wife had just given birth in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof, he heard a gunburst
somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed by some commotion in the street.
Later, his brother, Joji Ajok, arrived and informed him that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his
house.[35]

Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June 2001, he and his family
transferred to the house of his parents-in-law at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He so
decided when he heard rumors that the supporters of Atty. Umpa, the political rival of Mayor
Tawan-tawan in the 2001 local elections, were being persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpa's
supporters, he got scared, prompting him to bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed there
until the following morning and then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and
stayed there for three (3) months. Thereafter, he moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del
Norte, where he worked in the farm of his friend. He stayed there until he was arrested on 20
December 2001.[36]

Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an instance that Atty. Umpa was
harassed or intimidated by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He claimed that only Atty.
Umpa's supporters were harassed. He also revealed that prior to the ambush incident, there
was never an instance that he was threatened by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just
presumed that Atty. Umpa's supporters were being harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-
tawan because others were already harassed.[37]

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were victims of the
ambush, to be credible, categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent, coupled with
their positive identification of the appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime and their
lack of ill-motive to falsely testify against them, vis-à-vis the defense of denial
and alibi proffered by the latter, the trial court rendered its Decision on 30 September 2005
finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial court's Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding
[herein appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, and the Court
hereby sentences them to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the late [PO3 Dela Cruz] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; to pay,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the late [T/Sgt. Dacoco] the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages plus P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; and to pay, jointly and
severally, Ex-Mayor Johnny Tawantawan the amount of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees,
and the costs of suit.

The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade and the [G]arand pouch are
hereby ordered turned-over to the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the PNP Headquarters,
Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for proper disposition as authorized by law.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the [appellants] shall be credited to them and
deducted from their prison term provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code. [Appellant Wenceslao] was arrested on 29 August 2001 and detained
since then up to the present. While [appellant Ricardo] was arrested on 20 December 2001 and
detained since then up to the present.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the part of the
prosecution to prosecute the case against the other accused who remain at-large, as soon as
said accused are apprehended.[38] [Emphasis supplied].

Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial court's Decision to the Court of
Appeals via Notice of Appeal,[39] and, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal briefs.

In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE AND NOT ORCHESTRATED LIES INTENDED TO FALSELY IMPUTE THE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO [APPELLANT WENCESLAO][;]

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES OF PROSECUTION

WITNESSES ARE HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR AND TRIVIAL POINTS[;]

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO AND RICARDO] FAILED TO
CAST ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THAT THESE WITNESSES
HAD NO IMPROPER AND NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE [APPELLANTS][;]

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE MILITARY MEN WHO ARE
NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE WITNESSES[;]

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] ABSCONDED AND IN
IMPUTING MALICE ON THE ACT OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] IN TEMPORARILY LEAVING HIS
RESIDENCE[;]

VI.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] OF THE CRIME CHARGED
BASED ON TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL VERACITY[;]

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO]
BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE WHICH ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR[.][40]

While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT RICARDO] DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[41]

On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision affirming appellants'
conviction of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record
disclosed that the alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant Wenceslao refer only to
minor matters. The same did not damage the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly that of PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan. Honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial points serve to strengthen rather than destroy the
credibility of a witness to a crime. Moreover, since the prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellants in open court as among the perpetrators of the ambush, the same must
prevail over the alleged inconsistencies, as well as the defense of denial and alibi interposed by
the appellants. Denial is a negative and self-serving assertion that cannot overcome the victim's
affirmative, categorical and convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi to prosper, it must
be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was impossible for the accused to
be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and not merely assert that he was
somewhere else. As in the present case, the trial court took judicial notice of the distance of
seven (7) kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where appellants reside, and San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush incident took place. Appellants, therefore,
could not successfully invoke alibi as a defense because it was not physically impossible for
them to have been at the scene of the crime.[42] The Court of Appeals then decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate APPEALS are DENIED, and the
appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.[43]

Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of Appeals to this
Court via Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the parties to simultaneously
submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In lieu thereof, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation[45] stating that it will no longer file a supplement to its
Consolidated Appellee's Brief[46] dated 14 December 2006 there being no transactions,
occurrences or events which have happened since the appellate court's Decision was rendered.

Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs,[47] which were a mere
rehash of the arguments already discussed in their respective Appellant's Briefs[48] submitted
before the appellate court. In his Supplemental Brief, appellant Wenceslao reiterates that: the
trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible errors when they decided a question of
substance which is not in accord with established facts and the applicable laws.[49] He, once
again, enumerated the following errors committed by the appellate court, thus:

I.

The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they ruled that the
inconsistencies committed by the prosecution witnesses are on minor and trivial points when
these inconsistencies are indicative of the innocence of [appellant Wenceslao][;]
 II.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative of innocence of
[appellant Wenceslao] the fact that the authorities did not include in the police report the
name of [appellant Wenceslao] and did not arrest him immediately after the ambush, or within
a couple of months from the date of the ambush[;]

III.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they deliberately
refused or failed to consider and appreciate the testimonies of the military officers who are
neutral, impartial, and objective witnesses[;]

IV.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to consider the evidence for the
defense despite the clear and unmistakable proof of their honesty and integrity[;]

V.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately [misinterpreted] the facts and
[misapplied] the laws regarding "flight" as an alleged indication of guilt[;]

VI.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted [appellant Wenceslao] based on
jurisprudence on "alibi" which are not applicable in the case at bar[50] [Emphasis and italicized
omitted].

Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses would show these are tainted with glaring inconsistencies, which are badges of lies
and dishonesty, thus, casting doubts on their credibility.

The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as follows: (1) whether PFC
Tomanto and PFC Angni were already with Mayor Tawantawan from Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
to Tubod, Lanao del Norte, and vice- versa, or they merely hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-
tawan's vehicle on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (2) if so, the place where PFC
Tomanto and PFC Angni hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan's vehicle; (3) the officer from
whom PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni got permission in order to go home to Salvador, Lanao del
Norte; (4) PFC Angni allegedly knew appellant Wenceslao prior to the ambush incident on 5
June 2001 and he even saw appellant Wenceslao as among the perpetrators of the ambush,
yet, he did not mention the name of the former in his affidavit; (5) Mayor Tawan-tawan should
have mentioned the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush
incident when he reported the same to SPO4 Medrano; (6) SPO4 Medrano should have
included the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the Provincial
Police Office of the PNP and should have immediately caused his arrest if he truly participated
in the ambush incident; (7) it would no longer be necessary to discharge Samuel and to make
him as state witness if the victims of the ambush incident, indeed, saw the perpetrators of the
crime; and (8) if appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers, Samuel would not have failed
to mention the former in his sworn statement.

Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated inconsistencies only proved that he
has no participation in the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. The declaration
of his innocence is thus called for.

Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in testifying against him. The motive was to remove him, being the only
non-Muslim leader, in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, who has the courage to
challenge the reign of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his clan. It was also an act of revenge against
him for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections. As to Samuel's motive,
appellant Wenceslao claims that it was for self- preservation, freedom, leniency and some
other consideration. Evidently, after Samuel's testimony, the latter was released from jail.

Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5 June 2001 as can be
gleaned from the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt. Garsuta.

Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of guilt. He justified his
temporary absence from his residence by stating that it was because of the traumatic
experience of his wife, who had no peace of mind since their house was riddled with bullets by
lawless elements without any cause.

With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the determination of
credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because
the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the
best position to discern whether they are telling the truth.[51] Moreover, credibility, to state
what is axiomatic, is the sole province of the trial court. In the absence of any clear showing
that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on the
matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. [52] A careful perusal of the
records of this case revealed that none of these circumstances is attendant herein.

The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial court places this case
under the rule that factual findings are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal
to this Court. No reason has been given by appellants to deviate from the factual findings
arrived at by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto,
PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June 2001 ambush incident.
As such, they actually witnessed what exactly happened on that fateful day, especially
Macasuba and PFC Angni, who vividly saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road
and in a squatting position firing at them with his M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC Angni,
having seated behind the driver and on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service
vehicle, respectively, both facing the right side of the road, were in such a position to see
without any obstruction how appellant Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle with his M-16
armalite rifle while they were traversing the road of San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, on their
way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Macasuba was also able to identify appellant Ricardo,
Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the perpetrators of the ambush.

It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in broad daylight, such that it
would not be impossible for Macasuba and PFC Angni to have seen and identified their
assailants, particularly appellant Wenceslao, who was once chief of Civilian Home Defense
Force (CHDF), then municipal councilor and twice elected vice-mayor of Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte.[53]

The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally confirmed by Samuel, an
accused-turned-state-witness, who, in his testimony before the open court, narrated how
appellants and their coaccused, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro,
Ruben, Arnel, and Opao, brought him in the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao
del Norte; assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road;
surreptitiously waited for the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group; and
executed the ambush from the moment the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group passed by the aforesaid waiting shed.

Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities of the appellants and
their co-accused as the perpetrators of the ambush because he was near the scene of the
crime, i.e., merely five (5) meters away therefrom. This is aside from the fact that appellants
and their co-accused were the very same people who brought him to the site of the ambush.
Appellants and their co-accused likewise stayed for a long period of time in the house of
Samuel's aunt prior to the ambush incident and Samuel is very well-acquainted with these
people for he himself resided therein.[54]
Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba, PFC
Angni and Samuel, have firmly established the identities of appellants as the perpetrators of the
ambush. In addition, their testimonies on who and how the crime was committed were
characterized by the trial court as simple and candid. Even their answers to questions were
simple, straightforward and categorical. Such simplicity and candidness in their testimonies only
prove that they were telling the truth, thus, strengthening their credibility as witnesses.

Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao that allegedly cast
doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, this Court finds them frivolous, trivial,
minor, irrelevant and have nothing to do with the essential elements of the crime charged, i.e.,
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder. In the same
manner, they do not detract from the fact that Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group, which
includes PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni, were ambushed by appellants and their co-accused on 5
June 2001 while on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle as it passed by the waiting shed
in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. And, said ambush resulted in the death of PO3
Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and injuries to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and
Juanito.

It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor details or collateral
matters do not affect his or her credibility as these variations are in fact indicative of truth and
show that the witness was not coached to fabricate or dissemble. An inconsistency, which has
nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction.[55]

Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel's failure to name appellant Wenceslao in their affidavits/sworn
statements as one of the ambushers does not necessarily render their testimonies implausible
and unworthy of belief.

Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not
necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete
and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial
notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and
elaborate than those stated in sworn statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate
for a variety of reasons. More so, because of the partial and innocent suggestions, or for want
of specific inquiries. In addition, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared
by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's
statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed,
the prosecution witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior
to their extrajudicial statements.[56] Similarly, the failure of a witness to immediately disclose
the name of the culprit does not necessarily impair his or her credibility.[57]

A meticulous perusal of Samuel's sworn statement reveals that he categorically mentioned

therein the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. In his sworn statement,
Samuel specifically stated that during the ambush, he saw appellant Wenceslao at the other
side of the road, just a few meters away from the bridge, who, at that time armed with an M16
rifle, was likewise firing towards the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan.58 Above all, both PFC Angni
and Samuel positively identified appellant Wenceslao in open court as one of those responsible
for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.[59] Such open court declaration is much
stronger than their affidavits/sworn statements.

Mayor Tawan-tawan's failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name of appellant Wenceslao as
one of those responsible in the ambush and SPO4 Medrano's failure to include the name of
appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the
PNP would not inure to appellant Wenceslao's benefit.

As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when Mayor Tawan-tawan and
SPO4 Medrano met at the scene of the crime, the former immediately told the latter that
appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers.[60] This belied the claim of appellant
Wenceslao that Mayor Tawan-tawan did not tell SPO4 Medrano that he (appellant Wenceslao)
was among the ambushers. Also, SPO4 Medrano provided an explanation [61] for his failure to
state in his Spot Reports the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. And, even
granting that his explanation would not have been satisfactory, still, SPO4 Medrano's failure to
mention appellant Wenceslao's name in his Spot Reports was not fatal to the cause of the
prosecution. More especially because appellant Wenceslao was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate the fact that
prosecution witnesses, Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw appellants as among the
perpetrators of the crime. To note, appellants were not the only persons accused of the crime;
they were many including Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben,
Arnel, and Opao. In order to give justice to the victims of the ambush, especially those who
have died by reason thereof, all persons responsible therefor must be penalized. Since Samuel
knew all those who have participated in the ambush incident, his testimony as to the other
accused in this case is material to strengthen the case of the prosecution against them.
Unfortunately, the other accused in this case remained at large until now.

As aptly observed by the trial court, thus:

x x x The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity of the testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses who are all in one pointing to [herein appellant Wenceslao] as one of
those who participated in the ambush, and on the veracity of the testimonies of the two
prosecution eyewitnesses [Macasuba and Samuel] to the effect that [appellant Ricardo] was
among the people who perpetrated the said ambush.

The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The simplicity and candidness of
their testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth. Their answers to questions were
simple, straightforward and categorical; spontaneous, frank and consistent. Thus, a witness
who testifies categorically, spontaneously, frankly and consistently is a credible witness.[62]
Appellant Wenceslao's allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of prosecution witnesses,
including Samuel, have no leg to stand on.

The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of appellant Wenceslao that
the motive of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him was to remove him as the only
non-Muslim leader in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and that it was an act of
revenge for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections. Appellant Wenceslao
failed to present an iota of evidence to support his aforesaid allegations. As properly stated by
the Court of Appeals, "[m]ere allegation or claim is not proof. Each party must prove his own
affirmative allegation." Also, it must be emphasized that during the 1998 elections, it was
Mayor Tawan-tawan who won the mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly implausible for
Mayor Tawan-tawan, who emerged as the victor, to take revenge against the losing candidate,
appellant Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses. It is settled that where the defense fails to prove that witnesses are
moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their
testimonies are therefore entitled to full weight and credit.[63]

To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being the aggrieved
parties, they all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is unnatural for them to
falsely accuse someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise stated, it is very unlikely for
these prosecution witnesses to implicate an innocent person to the crime. It has been correctly
observed that the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so, the
victims themselves, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating
persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity.[64]

Contrary to appellant Wenceslao's assertion, this Court is convince that his and appellant
Ricardo's flight from the scene of the crime immediately after the ambush is an evidence of
their guilt. It is noteworthy that after the ambush incident, appellant Wenceslao immediately
left his residence and moved to his father's house, then to his son's house in Kolambugan,
Lanao del Norte, and lastly to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested.
Appellant Ricardo did the same thing. From his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, he transferred to his parents-in-law's house, then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis
Occidental, and thereafter, moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until he was
arrested on 20 December 2001. If appellants were truly innocent of the crime charged, they
would not go into hiding rather they would face their accusers to clear their names. Courts go
by the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold
as a lion."[65]

Appellants' respective explanations regarding their flight fail to persuade this Court. It bears
emphasis that after the alleged strafing of appellant Wenceslao's house, all he did is to move
from one place to another instead of having it investigated by the authorities. Until now, the
alleged strafing of his house remains a mystery. If that strafing incident truly happened, he
would be much eager to know who caused it in order to penalize the author thereof. Appellant
Ricardo, on the other hand, was allegedly afraid of being persecuted for being one of the
supporters of Mayor Tawan-tawan's political rival. His fear, however, was more imaginary than
real. The aforesaid claim of appellant Ricardo was uncorroborated, hence, cannot be given any
considerable weight.

In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of prosecution witnesses, coupled
with their positive identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of the ambush,
appellants' defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper.

As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that
appellants committed the crime.[66] For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place
must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that appellants were somewhere else when the
crime happened. They must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time
of its commission.[67] Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.[68] A mere denial, like alibi, is
inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[69]

In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their respective houses in Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the ambush incident happened and they have no involvement
whatsoever in the commission thereof.

To corroborate appellant Wenceslao's testimony, the defense presented Armida, Jeffrey and
Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslao's wife, nephew and niece, respectively. This Court,
however, cannot give credence to the testimonies of these defense witnesses. Being appellant
Wenceslao's relatives, their testimonies are rendered suspect because the former's relationship
to them makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The defense
of alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by the appellant himself and his relatives, and
not by credible persons.[70] This Court further quote with conformity the observation made by
the trial court, viz:

FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for [herein appellant Wenceslao]
were shattered by the testimony of [Rudy], another witness for [appellant Wenceslao], who
categorically told the Court that during the time he and his companions Jacob Pepito and a
certain Romy were in the house of [appellant Wenceslao] in the afternoon of 5 June
2001, there was no unusual incident that took place, as well as no unusual incident that
happened when they left the house of [appellant Wenceslao] at about 2:45 in the afternoon.

The foregoing testimony of [Rudy] clearly imparts that the visit of [Rudy] and his companions to
the house of [appellant Wenceslao], if any, happened on another date. This will be so because if
[appellant Wenceslao] and his closely related witnesses are telling the truth that Jacob Pepito,
[Rudy] and Romy were in the house of [appellant Wenceslao] talking about the said election
returns during that fateful afternoon, then definitely, [Rudy] should have had known of the
ambush incident, said incident being spreaded throughout or shall we say, "the talk of the
town" that afternoon of 5 June 2001.

If the ambush incident occurred on the day [Rudy] and his companions visited [appellant
Wenceslao], then, no doubt that [Rudy] will tell the Court about it. But his testimony was
otherwise.[71] [Emphasis supplied].

In the same breath, appellant Ricardo's defense of denial and alibi cannot be given any
evidentiary value as it was unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo never presented any witness to
support his claim that he was simply inside their house attending to his wife and children during
the time that the ambush incident happened. This Court reiterates that mere denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no
weight in law. Between the categorical and positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and
the negative averments of the accused which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent
evidence, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater
evidentiary weight.[72]

Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of the crime in the
afternoon of 5 June 2001. As observed by the trial court and the appellate court, Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both appellants' reside, is only about seven (7) kilometers
away from San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush took place.[73]

All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that, indeed,
appellants were among the perpetrators of the ambush against Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group. Prosecution witnesses' categorical, positive and straightforward testimonies, coupled
with their positive identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime, prevail
over appellants' defense of bare denial and alibi.

As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, convicted appellants
of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder. This Court
believes, however, that appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the
killing and wounding of the victims in this case were not the result of a single act but of several
acts of the appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.

Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group with bullets discharged from their firearms when the said vehicle
passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of two security escorts of
Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murderand shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxxx

5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].

Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the commission of the crime. Time
and again, this Court, in a plethora of cases, has consistently held that there is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. There are two (2)
conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the employment of means of
execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b)
the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or escape."[74]

The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow the hapless
victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The
attack was executed by appellants and their-co-accused in such a vicious manner as to make
the defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances, it is very apparent that appellants
had murder in their hearts when they waylaid their unwary victims. [75] Thus, as to the death
of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, appellants should be held liable for murder.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, cannot be appreciated as

it is deemed absorbed in treachery.[76]

Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident premeditation, the
circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the
prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3)
a lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof,
sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [77] None of these
elements could be gathered from the evidence on record.
As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, although they
were injured during the ambush and were all hospitalized, except for Macasuba, it was not
mentioned that their injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal such that without the timely
medical assistance accorded to them, they would have died.[78] However, it does not necessarily
follow that the crimes committed against the aforenamed victims were simply less serious
physical injuries. Also, even though Mayor Tawantawan and Jun did not sustain any injury
during the ambush, it does not mean that no crime has been committed against them. The
latter were just fortunate enough not to have sustained any injury on the occasion
thereof. Since appellants were motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun, appellants should
be held guilty of attempted murder.

What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of appellants must be for
the separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder or
of the complex crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder.

The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which
explicitly states that:[79]

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
[Emphasis supplied].

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law
and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is
imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known
as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more
persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number
killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.[80]

Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances present in this
case do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the victims
were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-accused. To
note, appellants and their coaccused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security escorts died while five (5) of them
were wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their
bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims.
Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v.
Valdez,[81] each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give
rise to a complex crime.[82]

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several
individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."

There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code despite
the fact that several acts were performed by several accused in the commission of the crime
resulting to the death and/or injuries to their victims.

In People v. Lawas,[83] the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader, Lawas,
simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50 persons died. It was
there held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as there was no intent on the part
of the accused to fire at each and every victim separately and distinctly from each other. If
the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single
offense. However, "single criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code in the said case because there was therein no evidence at all
showing the identity or number of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy
to perpetuate the killing,thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the
accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by each of them,
this Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide
instead of holding each of them responsible for 50 deaths. [84]

Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this Court held in People
v. Remollino,[85] the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general rule.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters
agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once
established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime
actually committed by any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to
commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense
or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community
of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors
incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.[86]

The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy, among others.
Although the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed, such may be inferred
from the concerted actions of the appellants and their co-accused, to wit: (1) appellants and
their co-accused brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on the left side of the road where
the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass;
(2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter, assembled themselves on both sides of the road
and surreptitiously waited for the aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the
yellow pick-up service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused
opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of the victims; (4)
immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel's aunt to get
their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused; and (6)
appellants and their coaccused fled.

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the appellants and
their co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were synchronized in their
approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. They
were motivated by a single criminal impulse - to kill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is
implied when the accused persons had a common purpose and were united in its execution.
Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the
commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.[87]

With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused had
assumed joint criminal responsibility - the act of one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who
among them actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial.
Collective responsibility replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the
impossibility of determining who killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.

Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos,[88] People v. Abella,[89] People v. Garcia[90] and People v.
Pincalin,[91] this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code even though several acts
were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.

In People v. De los Santos,[92] a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days inside the national
penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and Oxo. As a result,
nine (9) inmates were killed. Fourteen (14) inmates were then convicted for the crime of
multiple murder. The existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime was duly proven.
There was, however, no discussion why the accused were convicted of a complex crime instead
of separate crimes.

In a similar case of People v. Abella,[93] involving the massacre of certain prisoners in the Davao
Penal Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that occurred in the national penitentiary on 16
February 1958 (subject of De los Santos), all the accused were also convicted for the complex
crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Conspiracy likewise attended the
commission of the crime. This Court applied the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the
ruling in the said case is predicated on the theory that "when for the attainment of a single
purpose which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered
only as one offense," a complex one. The Lawas doctrine was equally applied although
conspiracy had been duly proven. This Court then stated that where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose "their individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act the act of execution giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious
agreement produces a sole and solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single
being."[94]

People v. Garcia[95] and People v. Pincalin[96] have the same factual background as De los Santos
and Abella. They were the third and fourth cases, respectively, of prison riots resulting to the
killing of convicts by fellow convicts while inside the national penitentiary. In Garcia, the
accused were convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and double attempted
murder, while in Pincalin the accused were convicted for the complex crime of double murder
and frustrated murder. In both cases, this Court found conspiracy to have attended the
commission of the crime.

In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this Court, gave the
same justification as in Abella: that both cases were covered by the rule that "when for the
attainment of a single purpose, which constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such
acts must be considered as only one offense, a complex one." Correspondingly, "where a
conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to
a complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single
complex offense.[97]

We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to Lawas, that
Article 48 is applicable even in cases where several acts were performed by the
accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. In Pincalin, this Court has
already clarified that: [n]onetheless, this Court further held that "in other cases where several
killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule
may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses, as opined by
Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided cases."[98]

De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the general rule stated
in Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the peculiar circumstance of the cases.

It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad,[99] this Court, once again, applied Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of the case were not the same as in Lawas,
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court departed from the general rule.

In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a volley of shots at the
jeepney boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando),
survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Conspiracy attended the commission of
the crime. Accused were convicted for the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder. We there held that the case comes within the purview of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. Citing Lawas and Abella, it was pronounced that although several independent acts
were performed by the accused, it was not possible to determine who among them actually
killed Rolando; and that there was no evidence that the accused intended to fire at each and
every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the premise that the
evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a whole, we
repeated that where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their
individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of
execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.[100]

The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.

The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where several
killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule
may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses. Since
in Sanidad, the killings did not involve prisoners or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow
prisoners. As such, Abella would not apply.

To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since
conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the
accused. Each accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear
evidence showing the number of persons actually killed by each of them.

Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.

Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one
performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each
one of the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the
application of Article 48. The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act,
thus the definitional phrase "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies."
This is not an original reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda,[101]the Court already
recognized the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when various victims expire from separate
shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." As we observed in People v.
Tabaco,[102] clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the [Revised Penal Code], [this Court]
further stated in [Hon.] Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." [103]

With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2)
counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.

As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime
of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63[104] of the Revised Penal Code.[105]
Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty prescribed by
law for murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced by two degrees,
conformably to Article 51[106] of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2, Article 61,[107] in
relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. There being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the same should be imposed in its medium
period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64[108] of the Revised Penal Code.[109]Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken
from the medium period of prision mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any
of its periods, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore,
imposed upon the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of
attempted murder.

As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3)
moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[110]

Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs
of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim without need of any
evidence or proof thereof. Moral damages like civil indemnity, is also mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of murder.[111] Therefore, the trial court and the appellate court properly
awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of
P50,000.00 to the heirs of each deceased victims.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, treachery may no
longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was already taken as a qualifying
circumstance in the murder, and abuse of superior strength which would otherwise warrant the
award of exemplary damages was already absorbed in the treachery.[112] However, in People v.
Combate,[113] this Court still awards exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating
circumstance to deter similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good. Thus, to
deter future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages in favor of the heirs of each deceased victims is proper.[114] The said amount is in
conformity with this Court's ruling in People v. Gutierrez.[115]

Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering the
expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other expenses for the death of the victims. In lieu
thereof, temperate damages may be recovered where it has been shown that the victim's
family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty as
provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil Code.[116] In this case, it cannot be denied that the
heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not
proved with certainty. Thus, this Court similarly awards P25,000.00 as temperate damages to
the heirs of each deceased victims.[117]

The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, are also
entitled to moral, temperate and exemplary damages.

Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted upon the
aforesaid victims would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock,
and similar injuries.[118] It is only justifiable to grant them moral damages in the amount of
P40,000.00 each in conformity with this Court's ruling in People v. Mokammad.[119]

The award of P25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto,
PFC Angni and Juanito is also in order. It is beyond doubt that these victims were hospitalized
and spent money for their medication. As to Macasuba, although he was not confined in a
hospital, it cannot be gainsaid that he also spent for the treatment of the minor injuries he
sustained by reason of the ambush. However, they all failed to present any receipt therefor.
Nevertheless, it could not be denied that they suffered pecuniary loss; thus, it is only prudent to
award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to each of them.

The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC
Angni and Juanito are awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 to conform to
current jurisprudence.[120]

This Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as costs
of the suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-tawan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No.
00246 dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing upon them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count; (2) appellants are also found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of seven (7) counts of attempted murder thereby imposing upon them the indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum, for each count; (3) other than the civil indemnity and moral damages
already awarded by the trial court and the appellate court, appellants are further ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, exemplary and temperate damages in the amount of P30,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each deceased victims; and (4) appellants are also
directed to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito
the amount of P40,000.00 each as moral damages, P25,000.00 each as temperate damages and
P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, Jr., concur.

PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision[1] dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated July 30, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of
the Revised Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry
for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence,
he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall
remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60
days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the
pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised
the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from
one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht
men's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth
P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine
currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the
sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the
said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far
from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the
accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety-
Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said
Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which
can be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged
in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made,
they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private
complainant. However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for
which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated
May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject
pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the
penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty
consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND
TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to
indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages,
and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the
RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the
imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the
decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present
petition stating the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND

APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS,
WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE
SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF]
JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05

JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE
PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL,

CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;

3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the
following counter-arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the
offense and the acts complained of.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight
when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion.[4] Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the
factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and
substantive issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the
same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records
show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly
pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established
doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they
were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.[5]

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information
filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the
pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was
different from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA
did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that
objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the
first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner[6] and that the time of occurrence is not a
material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally
defective. The CA ruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of

the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at
bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the
time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July,
1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same
Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of
the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission
thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution
to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the
said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the
proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there
was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed
to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him. [7]

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b)
that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.[8]

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party
on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant
narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he
gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising
to pay them. Thus:

PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been
finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?

a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items
are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir. [9]

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.[10] Demand need not even
be formal; it may be verbal.[11] The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that
it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. [12] As
expounded in Asejo v. People:[13]

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of
estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary,
the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its
general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted
to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the
crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or
property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however,
be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.[14]

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold,
or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed
period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the
same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this
Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity
denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.[15] The assessment
by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by
the CA.[16] Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their
testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
weighed not numbered.[17]

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money
and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the
division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they
decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus,
several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on
the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en
banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the
following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot
be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without
any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall
render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of penal legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the offense.[18]
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render
the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise
here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the
court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law
through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein
the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of
the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said
penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform
the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,[19] Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in
Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to
be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is,
that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by
penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on
the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive
or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the
Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh.[20]

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal
Code,[21] echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must
be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or
justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon
conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are
questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts
to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty
falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A
petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.[22]

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the
current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it would be
dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition
of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change,
thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so,
it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It
is also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the
subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature
intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those
punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves
of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal
laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered,
the legislature lowered it to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the
threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00
to P500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem
to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft,
the provisions state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total
of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value
of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the
thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of
the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the
thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states that the
penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the
penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum
period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present
law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is
still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period
to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for
pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for
probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its
minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period under the
existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all
excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.[23]

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the
crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum
and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be
imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to
the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision
mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision

correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).[24]

3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).

4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto

mayor medium to prision correccionalminimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month
and 1 day to 6 months).

6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto

mayor medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the
penalties are not changed, as follows:

1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable

by prision correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).[25]

2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision

correccionalminimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).[26]

3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto

mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months).

4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1
day to 6 months)

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that
the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness,[27] which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.[28]

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial
distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which
violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafainvolving
higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a
person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals
hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3,
considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental
penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is
the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which
leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to
Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the
remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-
Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00)
Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you
right?

DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix
the amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.

x x x x[29]

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,[30] Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal
Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court
therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a
specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and
(3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because
in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of
South Dakota after it took into account the latter's recidivist statute and not the original penalty
for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would
have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist
statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are
different from the present controversy.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for
the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a
domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially
gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and
allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the
protection and safekeeping of the employer's loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal
of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
commission of such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the
subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the
amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total
value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.

The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the
unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed
is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty
is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6
years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement
of P20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special
law,i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section
3,[31] wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary
amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)[32] under the Anti-Graft Law will now
become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public
official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the
government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are
the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.

In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the
thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be
the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering
the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to
Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a
fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the
premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the
penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty
of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty
of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but
likewise the unlawful taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be
imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6
months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the
value of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage
caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot
be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00, which simply means
that the fine of P200.00 under the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of
Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that
the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.[33] Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the
penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly,
may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by
the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the
value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library
and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of
swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special
cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public
monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such
as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited
Transactions), Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article
218(Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible
public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes
which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.[34] The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.[35] Under the law, the offender shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310[36] of the Revised Penal Code, which
means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or
forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of
Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is
concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is
in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special
Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is
needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law
that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the
intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the
applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence
of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the
matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to
amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will
adopt to the times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal
Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present,
fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal
Code,[37]each one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were
promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far
different from today's conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction
which is repugnant to its terms.[38] The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give
effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and
purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary
function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable
breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it
can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as
restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be
contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the
imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value
of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain
the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only
imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when
the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220[39] of the
Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary
upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended
party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as
it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in
nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that
should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially
when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly
written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio's opinions is that the
incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should
only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is
properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the
appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when
every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the
proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no
legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal
justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659[40] in December 1993.
The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more
cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its
lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,[41] the Court did not impede the imposition of the
death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19
(1),[42] Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending
the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention
of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present
action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned
parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues
must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,[43] more so in the present controversy wherein
the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of
duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel
or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the
stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not
thus be within the prohibition.[44]

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to
be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is
severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to
come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community."[45]

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to
our modern time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned
monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There
are other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and
deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects
on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be
painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us
believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no
resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and
surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you
have to take into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all
of those economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don't think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to
One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.[46]

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that
the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent
injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not
impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of
1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into
consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the
substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court's adjustment of indemnity in
crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in
the case of People v. Pantoja.[47] Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being
repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to
legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from
crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to
civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly
based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated,
penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since
the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the
minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can
be adjusted in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.

In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People[48] is
highly instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which
case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into
three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of
the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods
of the penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months,
20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months,
10 days[49]

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum
to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which
portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65[50] of the RPC.[51] In
the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the
maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added
to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case
shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set
by law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7
years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7
years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa
charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making
and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is
a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.